Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Series Editor: Paul K, Moser, Loyola University of Chicago ‘This innovative, well-structured series ie for students who have already done an introductory course in phlorophy, Each book introduces a core [general subject im contemporary philosophy and offers students an [xccesrible but substantial transition from introductory to higher-level college work in that subject. The series is accessible to nonspecalists and tach book clearly motivates and expounds the problems and postions Invroduced. An orienting chaper belly introduces ite topic and reminds readers of any crucal material they need to have retained frm atypical introductory cours, Considerable attention i+ given to explaining the central philosophical problems of a subject and the main competing folutions and arguments for those solutions. The primary aim is ‘uate students in the main problems, positions and arguments of ‘Contemporary philosophy rather than to convince students of 2s postion, The inital eight central books in the series are written by experienced authors and teachers, and treat topics essential to a wel- rounded philosophy curriculum, Epistemology Robert Aud Ethice Harry Gensler Metaphysics Michael Lous Philosophy of Art Noel Carel Philosophy of Language Willa. Lyan Philosophy of Mind John Hell Philosophy of Religion Keith EYandell Philosophy of Seence ‘Alexander Rosenberg, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE A contemporary introduction William G. Lycan London and New YorkPHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE “This exceptional text flfils two essential criteria of «good introductory textbook nthe philosophy of language: it covers a broad range of topics ‘welll of which are the bass of eareen active research and does son an ‘eufate manner accessible to undergraduate students” Mike Harnish, University of Arizona "liked the book very mach and think it will make an excellent textbook for teaching The examples throughout are delightful and student wil love them” Edwin Mares, Victoria Unioersity of Wellington The philosophy of language has been much in vogue throughout the ‘oventieth century, but only since the 1960s have the issues begun to "ppea in high resolution, This bok ean introduction to thre ire and {a variety of linguistic mechani Part I explores several theories of how proper names description and other terms bea referential elation tononlnguitc things Iti argued tha there isa puzzle, neaely a paradox, regarding the reference of proper names. Pat Il surveys seven theories of ‘meaning more generally: the Ideaional Theory the Proposition Theory ‘Witegenstinian “Use” Theory, the Verfation Theory, and two versions ‘ofthe Truth-Condition Theory and shows their advantages and disadvan tages Par IT concerns ingistic pragmatics and Part IV examines four linguistic theories of mecaphor William G. Lycan is 2 leading philosopher of language and mind. He is Wiliam Rand Kenan, Je. Professor at the University of North Carolina, His published works include over 100 artless well a ix hooks among, them Logical Form in Natural Language (2984), Consiousnes (1987), Idgement ond Justification (1988), Modality ard Meaning (1994) and Consciousness ond Experience (1938)ie published 2000 by Routilge 1 New Fee Lane Landon ECAP 4EE ‘Simultaneously pled in the USA and Canada by Roepe 9 West 35th Street New York NY 30008 Reprined 2001 Routledge is a imprint of he Telor Francie Group © 2000 Willan G. Lean “Typeset in Aldus Roman by ReineCotch Limite, Bungay, Sule Printed and Bound in Gret Ben by Clays Led Stes pe All igh escrved. No prof this book maybe repied or reproduced or tized in ny form ot by any sleronic ‘echanil or other means now known of heefer ‘eventd dung phoxcopying and recording oi any ‘nformatio storage o ev system wou! persion in rt rm he pblshers Betis inary Caalaguing in Pbleaton Data Acatalgue sco for this bok salable from the Brie Library Library of Congres Catloging Publi Data ‘jean Wilhan 6. Pilsopy of ngage aconemporary inrodction / Wiliam G. Lyon Pp eth-—(Rouledge contemporary introdacions to pias) Ince bibliographical relerenes and sdex ss Language and langoager-Pilosphy. Tiel Series words oa9se7 ar ISBN o-gs-17s45-6 (hb) ISBNo-qs-a7ise- 8) To Bob and Marge Turnbull, with gratitudeContents Preface Acknowledgements xv ‘Chapter x Introduction: meaning and reference Overview 2 ‘Meaning and understanding 5 ‘The Referential Theory 4 Summary 8 Questions 8 Notes & Further reading 8 PART I: REFERENCE AND REFERRING 9 (Chapter 2: Definite descriptions 11 Overview 12 Singular terms x3 Russell's Theory of Descriptions 16 Objections to Russell's theory 2 Donnellan’s distinction 26 Anaphora 32 ‘Summary 32 Questions 35, Notes 33 Further reading 34 (Chapter 5: Proper names: the Description Theory 35 Overview 36 Russell's Name Claim 37 Opening objections 40 Searle's “Cluster Theory” 42 Kripke's critique 43, Summary 48Questions 48 Notes 48 Further reading 49 (Chapter 4: Proper names: Direct Reference and the ‘Causal-Historical Theory 50 Overview 52 Possible worlds 52 Rigidity and proper names 53 Direct Reference 55 ‘The Causal-Historical Theory 60 Problems for the Causal-Historcal Theory 62 [Natural-kind terms and “Twin Earth” 66 ‘Summary 68 Questions 69 Notes 69 Further reading 70 PART Il: THEORIES OF MEANING 73 Chapter 5: Traditional theories of meaning. 75 Overview 76 eational theories 78 The Proposition Theory 80 Summary 86 Questions 87 Notes 87 Further reading 87 Chapter 6: “Use” theories. 88 Overview 85 "Use" ina roughly Wittgensteinian sense 90 Objections and some replies 93 ‘Summary 98 Questions 98 Notes 98 Further reading 99 Chapter Chapter 7: Psychological theories: Grice’s program 100 Overview 202 Grice’s Basic idea x02 Speaker-meaning 103 Sentence meaning 108 Summary 133, Questions 115 Notes 143 Further reading 134 Chapter 8: Verificationism 135 Overview 116 ‘The theory and its motivation 237 Some objections “119 Thebigone 124 ‘Two Quinean issues 125, Summary 127 Questions 137 Notes 138 Further reading 128 ‘Truth-Condition Theories: Davidson's program 129 Overview 130 Truth conditions 32 ‘ruth-defining natural languages 136 Initial objections 140 Summary 146 Questions 147 Notes 247 Further reading 148 ‘Chapter 10: Truth-Condition Theories: possible worlds and intensional semantics 149 Overview 150 ‘Truth conditions reconceived 253 Advantages over Davidson's view 154 Remaining objections 356Summary 158 Questions 158 Notes 159) Further reading 159 PART III: PRAGMATICS AND SPEECH ACTS. 161 Chapter 11: Semantic pragmatics 163 Overview 164. Semantic vs pragmatic pragmatics 165 “The problem of deixis 166 ‘The work of semantic pragmatics 169 Summary 372 Questions 17 Notes 375 Further reading 172 (Chapter 12: Speech acts and illocutionary force 173 Overview 374 Performatives 175 Rules and infelcties 176 Fores, content, and perlocution 178 Cohen's problem 181 Summary 384 Questions 285 Notes 185, Further reading 186 CChapter's3: Implicative relations 187 Overview 188 CConveyed meanings and invited inferences Conversational implicatare 197 “Presuppostion” and conventional implicature 395 Indirect force 399 Summary 202 Questions 202 Notes 203 a a PART IV: THEDARK SIDE 205 Chapter 4: Metaphor 207 Overview 208 A philosophical bias 209 The issues, and two simple theories 220 The Figurative Simile Theory 214 The Pragmatic Theory 217 Metaphor as analogical 222 Summary 224 Questions 224 Notes 225 Further reading 226 Glossary 227 Bibliography 229 Index 239Preface Asitsttle sly suggests this books an introduction tthe main sues in ‘contemporary philosophy of language. Philosophy of language has been tmuch in vogue throughout the twentieth centry, but only since the 960+ have the issues Begun o appear in high elution ‘One cracil development in the past thirty years is the attention of philosophers of language to formal grammar or syntax as articulated by fheoretcal Linguists. 1 personally believe that such attention is ital © success in plosophizing about language, and in my own work I pay as ‘mucho tas lam able. With regret however [have not made thata theme (ofthis book. Under severe space limitations 1 could not expend as many pages as would be necded to explain the Basis of formal synese, with ‘out having to omit presentation of some philosophical isues I consider ‘venta o competence in the fl ‘Since around 3980, ome phlosophers of language have taken a turn toward the philosophy of mind, and some have engaged in metaphysical ‘exploration ofthe relation of lack thereof between langsage and realty. ‘These adversons have captured many philosophers interest, and some fine textbooks have focused on one or both fr example Blackbur (1984) and Devitt and Sterelny (2987), But Ihave chosen otherwise Whatever the merits of those sorts of work I have not found chat either helps us sulfcently to understand specifcally hngustic mechanisms or the core fasues of philosophy of language sell. Ths book wil concentrate on those mechanism and rues. (Readers who wish to press on into metaphysics ‘or philosophy of mind should consult, respectively, Michael J Loux’s “Metaphyeics and John Hels Philosophy of Mind, both ofthe Routledge Contemporary Introductions series) ‘Many of my chapters and sections wil ake the form of presenting data pertinent to # linguistic phenomenon, expounding someane’s theory of that phenomenon, and then lsing and asesing objections to that theory. emphasize here because Iwill no always have the space odo so inthe text that im each case what will summarize forthe reaer wil be only the ‘opening moves made by the various theorist and their opponents and ‘objectors In particular, I doube that any of the objections t0 any of the ‘theories i fatal champions of theories are remarkably good at avoiding or refuting objections. The real theorizing begins where this book leaves of [have used some notation of foral logic, specifically the prediate ‘ales, for thowe who are familiar with and wil find pointe made lear by it Burin each case | have also explained the meaning in English,‘Many ofthe writings tobe discussed in tis book canbe found inthe folowing anthologies]. F Rosenberg and C. Teavs (es) Readings inthe Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliff NJ: Prentice-Hall 1972) RM Hamish (ed) Baste Topics sr the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Chis, NF Prentice-Hall, 1994); A. Martnich (ed) The Philosophy of Language, sed edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); P. Ludlow (ed) Readings inthe Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Pres, 1997). Acknowledgements 1 thank my editor Moire Taylo for her bracing encouragement and (cepecally for her psenc. Te liter wa severely te ‘Mike Hersh, Greg MeCaloch and Ed Mares each very kindly rad an eatly dre and supplied me with many thonghtal omens and ‘gestions Ibleve the book mach improved as result nd Tam most eae ‘eee Alward and Laura Morgan produced much of the cary drat by trnccribing many hour of letures om very bud audio recordings. thank them wary and hope that each of ther wil 3000 make all Scan McKeever monthe of editoril help and advie have been invaluable (fe sullered through some wransrbng at well) Thanks ‘Speci Sean for suggesting some needed cits and for ngaizng the ‘Mhicgaphy "heat ew chapters ofthis bok were completed uring my tenure a fallow of he Natal Homans Center in 398-99 thank the Center nd its wonderfl staf for ther geneoae support or addtional fand- ing I'am indebted to the National Endowrnent forthe Humanities (WRA-so160-95)1 Introduction: meaning and reference Overview Meaning and understanding The Referential Theory Summary Questions Notes Further readingOverview hat erin nds of mak and ose hae meanings nd tht we Sewn berg pt ho mv wht ing ce are very igi pep ey of mering cl explain ar fora ring of aso ie fe ng on ‘repr wr eo wi he sng has tana eng i he hey Sabet pe en gt prods ne odetand eng were ano do that so effortlessly, ae “! ward th mening ht wr nmr ange nga trons are esting by snd gi sneid Though tmmontnaal snd tea ts Rereta They of ming fay ely tow onsen rc ne puyol aly Sand or ins he sed Be ‘Sate ial ode wie pope ane cing to ie ain ila ngewe le fom prt she a Meaning and understanding the United States, inthe course of which he did some sightseeing, hada brie afar with ady named Maxine in Keokuk, lowa ied peyote (which caused him to hallucinate hordes of frogs and toads wearing Ile boots and singing the Horst Wesel Lied), inflated a murations plant near Detroit met secretly with Vice-President Curis regarding, {ealskin focures and invented she lec canopenee. “There isa good reason why not many people know all that: none of tis true: Bur the remarkable thing i that ust now ar you read through my ‘pening rentence—let ws cl sentence (2) ~ you sdertond i pee, whether or not you were ready to accept i, and you dd so without the lightest conscious effort Resmarkable, | said. Ie probably docs not strike you as remarkable or surprising, even now that you have nied it You are entirely wsed 0 Tealing words and sentence and understanding them at sight, and you {indie nearly as natural a Breathing ot eating or walking. Bu, how did ‘you understand sentence (e)? Not by having seen it before; [am certain that never in the history ofthe universe has anyone ever writen of tttered that prtcular sentence untill did. Nor did you understand (s) by having seen avery similar sentence, since I doube that anyone has ever produced a sentence even remotely similar (1). "You may say that you understood x) because you speak English and (2) {san Engl sentence. That tr 0 fart goes bu it only pushes the riytery to ar’ Tength How that you are able to “speak English” ‘given that speaking English involves being able to produce and under~ Stand, not ony elementary expressions lke "'m thirsty" *Shut up,” and "More gravy,” but novel sentences complex as (2)? That ability italy sammasng, and mach harder to explain than how you breathe or how you tt or how you walk, each of which abilities is already wel understood by Physiologie ‘One clue i fal obvious upon reflection: (2) 8 string of words English words, that you understand indvidally. So it seems that you ‘understand (2) because you understand the words that oecur in (x) and {you understand something sbout how they are strung together. AS we ‘Shall ee, that san important fac, but for now it ison suggestive ‘So far we have been talking about « human ability, to produce and understand spech, But consider linguistic expressions themselves 38 objects af study inthe own ight N: many people know that in 1931, Adolf Mitler made a visit to(2) w afd jobilel ud {G) TeS dangerous to splash gasoline around your living room. (4) Good of of primly thea the the why. (a) are all strings of marks (or of noises, if taining one of the erm and subwitue the other ofthe two forthe Bist term, without changing the meaning of atleast without changing the truth-vale ofthe sentence But eonader she sentence (4) Alber believes that the author of Nothing and Beingness isa profound thinker. and suppose (4) true. Nov Alber unaware thatthe author of Nothing fand Beingness moonlighs by writing cheap, disgusting pornography. We ‘annot substitute the ferm “te author of Stealing Vetertnarians” forthe futhor of Nothing and Beingnes” in (4) seithout changing (truth: ‘alu; the result ia false sentence since Albert believes that the author of ‘Sialing Veterinarians i a drooling moron. (Lam afraid this reveals that ‘Abert has read Sisling Veterinarians) In W. V. Quine's (196) trmin~ ‘ology, the sentental position occupied by the definite description in (4 is referenally opaque’ (“opague” for shor), a6 opposed to rferetially transparent. What causes the opacity isthe “believes that” constrction, tince the sentence "The author of Nothing and Beingness i profound thinker” sanding alone, is transparent [Not oo surprisingly, Ruse argued on che bass of these puals* that efinte deseripions do have and conttbute meaninge that go beyond their referents lone His Theory of Descriptions av thas since been caled and eptalioed, takes the form ofa contextual definition of che word the”sit occur in typical definite descriptions Thats rather than defining the word explicly, (how would you go about completing the formula, “The “ar---"8) Russel offers recipe for paraphrasing standard types of whole sentence containing "the," in sucha way as to exhibit the role of “he” indirectly, and to reveal what he called the sentences’ “logical forms: (He doesnot here treat paral uses of "the," ofthe generic use as in "The whale is « mammal,” Notice that definite descriptions can be formed without use af the,” for example by way of possessives asin “my brother” or “Doris” egg slad sandwich,” though pethape we might paraphrase those along the lines of the brother of me") Russell's Theory of Descriptions Here is Resyells contextual definition of “the” Let us tae a sentence ofthe frm "The Fis G." radigmatic (5) The author of Waverley was Scotch? (6) appears to be a simple ubject-predicat sentence, referring oan indi= ‘vidual [Sir Walter Scot) and predating something (Scotishness of him, But appearances are deceiving, Russel says. Notice thatthe ostensible singular term, “The author of Waverley,” consists of our troublesome word “the” pasted onto the front of apredicaive expression, and nice too that the meaning ofthat expresion figures erally in our ability to recognize or pick out the expressions referent; to find the referent we have to lok for someone who dd write Waverley, Russll suggests that “the” bbrevates a more complex constriction Involving what logicans and linguists all quantifiers, words dhe quanefy general terms (all ten- agers" some bananas “sx goese alaying,” “mort police officers” "m0 Tigh bulbs,” and the lke). Indeod he thinks that 5) aa whole bbrevates ‘conjunction af three quantiod general statements, none of which makes teference o Seott in particu (a) Atleast one person authored Waverley, and {by at most one person authored Waverley, and [c} whoever authored Waverley was Scotch ‘Each of (a}-(c) is intuitively necessary for the truth of (5). Ifthe author of than ane author “the” should no have been sed and if the author was ‘Scotch follows trivlly that whoever dd the authoring was. And (a}-(0) taken together certainly Seem sufcent for the uth of (5) So we seem 0 have a set of individually necessary and joindy sufcient conditions for (shrthat in self is powerful argument for Russell's analysis In standard Topical notation: Let “W" represent. the predicate +. authored Waverley” and °S® represent“. war Scotch” Then Russells three conditions are (2) GW (bfx > yey > (©) (9x5. (@}+6) are conjointly equivalent to (@) GajWx te (g)(Wy > y=8) Sx) Russell's portion i that (2) cortecy expresses the lgical form of (5) 8 distinct from (3)'s superbalgrammatial form. We have already ‘encountered an example of this distinction in Chapter illstrated bythe Sentence “Is nobody.” Superically, chat sentence has the same form as Taw Martha” ~ Subjec + Transitive Verb Object, Yet the two difer sharply in thei logical properties. "I saw March entails tha sw some ‘one while “Taw nobody” ental presiely the oppsite: tis equivalent 9 “isnot the caze that saw anyone” and "There is noone that | aw “Though someone jurt begining to lean English might take it as one, “nobody” i not really asngula term, buta quantifier logical notation, leting “A” represent "saw..." and °° represent “I, “saw nobody” fn expressed ab "-(3aJAiX™ or equivalently, “(e)~Aix" and the explicit, inference rules govering this formal notation explain the logical behavior ‘of che English sentence thus translated into it ‘So too, Ruse maintained, the apparent singular tem in (3), "The suthor of Waverley” ie not really (tht atthe level of logical form) a fingula term a¢ al but convenient (if misleading) abbreviation ofthe ‘more complicated quanefstional structure displayed in (a)6). As he put it the apparent singular term "disappears om analysis” Ove puzzles Fave arian infact from applying principles about singular elerence to cxpresions that are not really singulse tems at all but only masquerade Se roch Ler us now go through the four parle and exh ‘one by one Ruse solutionsApparent Reference to Nonexisents ‘Let us paraphrase (x according to Russells method ‘At least one person is presently King of France [more perspicuousy:*.. presently kings Franc", and at most one person is presently King of France and whoever is presently King of Franc is bald No problem. The fist ofthe foregoing three conjuncs is simply fle, Since no one kings France at present 0 (3) Hell cames out fase on Russells analysis When we fist stated the puzzle i loked as though one had 0 reject either K3 or (outrageously) KS, since Kz seemed as obvious 4s the other undeniable K-statements but now Russell ingeniously denis statement Ka, since he denies that “The present King of France” i “really” a singular term (notice again that ou three conjunets are all general statements and that nane mentions any specie individual cores ponding tothe alleed King) Alternatively and les dramatically, we could oop Ka understanding it 5 alluding to superficial grammatical form, and reject K3 on the grounds that a superfcillysubject-prediate sentence can be meaningful without picking out any particular individual because it aorevates ato of prc general statements [Negative Existentials ‘Lets apply Russell's analysis ro (2) ("The present King of France des not cexist), Now there isa Ruselan paraphrase of (2) that leaves (3) just as ‘nomalous av it seems tothe nave hearer Thats the paraphrase that takes “exit” to bean ordinary predicate like “was Scotch” or "ie bald” and sakes “noe to modify ot aply to that predicate A least one person is presently King of France and at most one person is presently King of France, and whoever i presently King of France doc no exit “The anomaly is thatthe frst conjunc asserts the existence of» present King, while the third conjunc denies it. No wonder (2) sounds pecliar 0 us To make sense of (2), we must understand "not" not as modsying the us To make sense of (2), we must understand “not nat as mo [Not (The present King of France exists). Thats, it is fale that: the present King of France exists], ‘whichis obviously what would be meant by someone stho tokened (2) ‘eriously. Then we apply Resell’ pater of analysis nse the “not.” as Fallows. [Not (Atleast one person i presently King of France, and at most fone person is presently King of France, and whoever is presently King of France exist), In symbols: Bah te (Ky 9 y=) EN), where “E” represents “exits” (Actually, “exits” is ite rete as a {quantifier in logic theory and so the conjunc "Ex" ought propery to be {eplaced by “()l2=)" which redundant) The ineitive content of (2) fj, “No one is uniguely King of France,” or “No one uniquely kings France" and Rusell's paraphrase has the virtue of being precisely equiva lent to that, Nowhere in Russels analysis do we pick out an individual and say of that individual that he does not exist, s0 the Problem of [Negative Existential vanishes atleast forthe case af definite descriptions Tn this prefered understanding of (3), the descripcion ceca in what Rusell eae “secondary” position: that, we hae construed its under~ Iying quantifier "at leat,” "at mos” and “whoever” a falling inside the not The previous, disreferred paraphrase gave the description “pri= rary” posto, placing it ist in the logical order sith the “not” inside tnd governed by it. A meaning distinction of this kind i aed a cope stncton: in more contemporary terminology, the secondary reading is that on which the quantifiers take “narrow” scope, fling inside the seape ‘of “nots onthe primary reading the quantifiers are outside the sope of noe” and "aot isin thee scope Frege’s Puzzle ‘The rght-hand term of (9) ie a definite description, so let ws paraphrase it sway in Russells manner: A est one person i presently Queen of England, and‘whoever is presently Queen of England ie one and the sme Elzabeth Windsor In symbol: a) Qx be ()IQy + =H) &x=e), [Now we see easily why our origina dentity-statement is nontrivial. Of course we ean something when we hest Ruellsparaphuas, something ‘substantive about Elizabeth and the present Queen both, And ofcourse the identry-statement i contingent, since someone else might have been ‘Queen there ight even have been no Queen tal), Elizabeth might have run away from home and formed a rock band rather than be crowned ot ‘whatever. The Theory of Deserptions seem to give a correct acount of the Wentty-tatement's intuitive content. Note that on Russell’ view the statements only superficially an identity statement, relly it isa predict tion and attributes «complex relational property to Elaabeth, That leaves us withthe problem of how a eal ideniry statement could manage to be ‘oth true and informative, more of which in Chapter 3. Substitutviey| Let us return to the troublesome (4 (“Alber believes thatthe author of [Nothing and Beingness is profound thinker". Here the definite deserip- Sion occurs as part of what Alber believes so we shal start our paraphrase With “Alber Believes” and then apply Rusel's pattern of anal¥sis giving ‘he description secondary occurence of narrow scope: Albers believes the following: (Atleast one person authored [Nothing and Beingness, and at most one person authored Nothing tnd Bemgnessand whoever authored Nothing and Beings profound thinker) This is prety good account of what Albert believen* And now is obvious why we may not substitute “the author of Sisling Veterinarians” Imo (4), for the corresponding analysis of the resulting sentence would Alber believes the following: At lent one person authored Sisling Veterinarians, and at most one person authored Sizing ‘Veterinarians, and whoever authored Sizsling Veterinarians sa profound thinker. ¥ Since this atibuts an ently differen belief to Albert, there is no wonder that cis false eventhough (is true (OF couse, at che level of logical form we have not made a substitution at all, for the singular terme have “diappeared on analysis” and reno longer thereto be subsutatd) ‘The four puzzles made it lear that definite descriptions donot hook onto the world by directly naming and nothing else But we needed a positive theory of how they do hook ont it. Russell has provided one very well motivated theory. Notice that eventhough definite descriptions ate not signed referents in the way chat names ae, and even though they ae ‘or relly” singular terms at al they sll purport to have single nd ‘iduale that answer to them; when a description does infact have the ‘corresponding individual that it purports to have ~ that ig when there docs ‘exist a unique so-and-so =I shll pea of the description’s semantic deno fatum or somentic referent. But the “hook” between a definite drciption land its semantic referent i (on Russell's view) far less tet than is the hook berwcen a simple name andits bearer. Objections to Russell’s theory Impressive as Rossel’ achievement i, a number of objections have been broughe aginst che Theory of Descriptions chilly by Strawson (3950) Before we take thee up, I note an imporeane cits that might be made at just this point, though Russel quickly moved o forestall ‘When I set out the four puzzles with which we began, I alld them puzzles “about singular terms” 1 expounded each of them by using ‘xamples featuring definite descriptions, and wielded Russell’ Theory of Descriptions against them. But they are indeed puzzles about singular terms across the board, not just desrptions We can use proper names oF even pronouns to make apparent reference to nonexistent Pegasus” you [aid by Scrooge £0 Marley's show) Frege's Puzele arses for proper names (“Samuel Longhorne Clemens = Mark Twain"); names do ‘ot subttute in belief contents (Alber: may have belief about Mark “Twain that he doesnot have about Clemens and vice versa) and Pega is either bald nor nonbald. These scem tobe exactly the same problems ae those which happened to statin terms of deseriptions. looks as though Reseell hat simply missed the bos, Because e has given a theory which by ats nature aplies only to one very special subclas of singular terms, ‘while any adequae solution ro he puzzles ought to generalize secl solution to this problem was if anything even more ingenious than the Theory af Descriptions isell In bie, was to invoke anotherdistinction berween surface appearance and underlying logical reality, and tlsim that what we ordinarily call proper ames are aot eeally proper ‘ames at all but rather they are abbreviations for deine descriptions. ‘hall postpone examination ofthis these unt he next chapter Strawson’s critique was radical and searching, Indeed, Resell and Strawson were respectively fgureheas fr two very different approaches tothe study of language and to lesser degree fortwo great rival systems of twentieth-eenury philosophy), though we shall not go into that until Chapter 6. To set the stage for Stawson’s objections I shall merely note ‘that while Russell thought inverts of sentences taken in the abstract ae objets in themselves, and their logial properties in particule, Stawson tmphaszed how the rentences are weed and reacted to by human beings in ‘concrete converntiona stations, Rossell’s most famous article (s905/ 41956) was called “On Denoting” and in i denoting was taken to be 2 relation between an expression, considered in abstraction and the thing that i the expression’ referent or denottum. Strawson’s ie was “On Refering” which he meant ironically, bocause he thought of refering nota a abstract relation berseenanexpresion and thing but as an act done by a person a aime on an occasion, This way of ooking at things fave Strawson gute anew slant onthe four problems. ‘Strawn holds that expressions do not refer at all people refer sing expressions for that purpoe. This is reminiscent of the (US) National Rifle ‘Astodation’s slogan, “Guns don’t bil people, people kill people” Cer- tainly there ts an obvious sense in which Strwaon i right. To use an ‘example of his if T write down, "This is fine red ane.” "This" does not refer to anything and no determinate statement has been made until! do something to make i refer. An expression will come to refer only if Tse it in a suitably wellengineered content, 50 that it does refer fo a pricular thing ae person. But that is a matter ofthe expresion being ted, and when I do use it it is I that am doing the work, not the expression, Objection x cording to Russel sentence (2) (“The present Kingof Franc is bal” false owing tothe lack of any such King. Staion points out tha tht verdict is implausible, Suppose someone comes out and assert (2, Would ‘hat person's hearers react hy saying “Thats alse” or dsagree? Surely not Rather Strawson maintain, the speaker has produced an ony osten- ly referring expresion that has misted: he speaker has simply filed to refer wo anything and so hs fled 10 make a complete statement. The speakers trance i ein defective, but notin the sme way that “Fie prevent Queen of England bas no chren” te defer not fncrrec ut abort des not even ge achance tbe fale. Since no statement hasbeen made the pace follows that nothing {Sher reo falc has Ben iA hearer woul ether snot ope fend or would ay “Backup and question the eran’ presupposition (Crm ot lloming you France does havea ing) Seromsn therefore tole te Problem of Apparent Reeenc to Nonessents by denying (@) steaming chat has legate we inthe ange td could Te cedtoay treo ise things the word (rte frend) were more cooperative bu not Benue it ecceds in pking ou ay inal ‘hing Resell thought of « meaningfl sentence asa sentence that has smeaniog or abe puta sete thatexrete a propaiin: A sea. tenes Doll form, on hs vient eealy that of the propotion the fenvenceexpetcs But propsgons by ter narre are ete te oF fale Stanton echews tlk of“propetons” and denies hat sentences tre the Lind of things tht canbe tre or fale tall What bers the fropeis truth and fat are rate the ststements made when seers Sete in eying something and nt every act of tering dows eed thar way, for not every meaningful sentence is always used to make a ‘Rawalanshaves andar ely Objecion x, but itdependson ome sotine that I shal nor dvelep unt Chapter 5,0 I ah ponpone ta hen Objection 2 Strawson further criticizes the aim, which he attributes to Russell tht "part of what [a speaker would be asserting in tering (x)| would be that thereat present existed one and only one king of France” (2950339), “That clan to is implausible, for although the speaker presuposes that there i one and only one king, that is certainly not part of what the speaker asserts But hat isa misunderstanding: Russell had made no such claim. He aid nothing at all about acts of asserting Perhaps Strawson is assuming on ‘Ravel's behalf that whatever is lgially implied by a sentences neces sarily aserted by a speaker who ater that sentence. But the later prin ‘ples fale f say “Fat Tommy cant run a climb tre" donot esert ‘that Tommy ie fat, eventhough my sentence logically imple that he sf Tay “Tommy i ive fee seven inches ta,” I donot asere that Tommy is Tees than eighteen miles tl,Objection 5 ‘Strawson pons out that many descriptions are context-bound, He offers the example of. (6) The ables covered with books Presumably the subjec term i a definite description, sed in a standard wn rather than in any diferent or unosual way. But if we aply Russell’ nasi we get "At leat one ching is table and t most one ting is & table and any thing shat a table is covered with books” ~ which by way oft second conjunet ental that there i at most one table, in the entire Universe. That cannot be shrugged off. However unwillingly, Rusell i joing to have ro take some notice of the context of utterance He has several options. After al Strawson has no monopaly onthe fae that when someone says “The table,” we hearers generally kaow which table ie meant, because something in Uh context has made it salient. It ‘may be the only table insight othe only one in the room, or the one we Thave just been talking about. Russell may say that there is ellipsis here, that in the content, "The tabic” is short for a more elaborate description that is uniquely satisfied. (Ae we shall e in the next chapter Rosell was ‘no enemy of elipss hypotheses) ‘The elipss view has some disturbing implications Rusell thinks of logical form as objectively real - that sentences really do have the logical forms he posits, So if “The table” ir eliptial, there hav got to be a