Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Reimagining Home in The 21st Century
Reimagining Home in The 21st Century
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Index 239
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and gender issues as well as oral sources, while more recently she has
focused on Roma issues. She has taught at many universities: La Sapienza
University of Rome, the University of Florence and the University of
Naples L’Orientale. She has conducted extensive fieldwork in Cape Verde,
Australia, Italy, Romania, Spain and Belgium. She has also coordinated a
number of cultural events and national and international projects. Since
2010 she has directed the CISU editorial series ‘Migration’.
Olivia Hamilton is a researcher and writer based in Sydney. In 2013, she
completed a Ph.D. in sociology at Macquarie University, with a study
examining the connections between embodiment and emplacement for
migrants and their descendants in Rome. She is an occasional member of a
queer theory reading group, and is currently undertaking further study in
visual arts and culture. In her current role as researcher at an independent
research organization, WESTIR Ltd, she conducts social research through
Greater Western Sydney and is often found trawling through Census data.
Her research interests include identity, belonging, race/racism, embodi-
ment, place and space, and material culture.
Evelyn Honeywill is a social researcher in the Department of Sociology at
Macquarie University. She researches the characteristics of network socie-
ties from a critical theory perspective.
Justine Humphry is a lecturer in cultural and social analysis at Western
Sydney University. She researches the discourses and practices of digital
and mobile media, with a focus on networked and urban publics, inequali-
ties, racisms/anti-racisms, and digital work and labour. She has published
her research in Sociologic: Analysing Everyday Life and Culture (Oxford
University Press, 2015), Routledge Companion to Mobile Media, Journal
of Media, Culture and Society, M/C Journal and Australian Journal of
Telecommunications and the Digital Economy. She has led research on
homelessness and digital connectivity for the Australian Communications
Consumer Action Network (ACCAN) and for the Young and Well
Cooperative Research Centre.
Lisa Kings is a senior lecturer at Södertörn University. Her research and
publications, nationally and internationally, in Swedish and English, are
focused on issues on urban theory, social movements, social justice, civil
society organization and everyday life.
Justine Lloyd is a senior lecturer in sociology at Macquarie University.
She has published in the areas of feminist cultural history and media
studies, and has a forthcoming book on intimate geographies of media
(Bloomsbury Academic, 2017). She is also the editor with Jeannine
The idea of home evokes many layers of meaning, symbolism and emotion.
In many societies, home can refer to the family home, the meaning most
commonly understood, and by extension it can symbolize a place of
warmth and security as well as a place of fear and exploitation. At the
same time, home can mean a locality in which people have close relation-
ships with neighbours and have developed attachment to a neighbourhood
square or to a local football team. Political leaders often evoke the idea of
the nation as the home for all who fulfil certain criteria of birthplace and
culture.
Increasingly, many people may have a sense of transnational or trans-
local belonging, making themselves at home in more than one place,
whether by choice or by forced displacement (Hage 2005). The situation
of refugees and migrants complicates definitions of home further when
homelands themselves change, and the displaced are able to return, yet
face further displacement as well as reconciliation (Long and Oxfeld 2004;
Markowitz and Stefansson 2004).
Images of the nation as home have been a central force in nationalism,
designed to create a strong emotional bond. But, for many, the family,
local or transnational home may have a stronger emotional pull than the
idea of the nation as home. The persistence of home within this prolifera-
tion of lifeworlds is the focus of this book. This collection investigates the
social forces that surround home in the 21st century. These forces create
the possibility both of being at home and of feeling estranged from taken-
for-granted structures (Berman 1988). Recent trends in the affordability
of housing in western economies have pushed and pulled at families and
individuals with devastating effects (Mallett et al. 2011). Home can no
longer be seen as a purely self-sufficient concept and place, as it is indeed
these external pressures that make us feel we are at home or not at home.
Increasingly, the presence of ‘others’, challenging a comfortable sense of
belonging, is highlighted by conservative forces to deflect attention from
these pressures. At the same time, many people are struggling collectively
In this book, we question the very possibility in the 21st century of any
concept of a singular and self-sufficient home. The changes to our under-
standing of home have been as profuse as they are diverse. These changes
build on, or deepen, pre-existing contradictions. Recent changes to the
labour market and work recast the domestic sphere as the site of both
consumption and production, a return to the pre-industrial formation of
home as a place of work (Holloway 2007; Pink et al. 2015). The gender-
ing of the home as feminine has been disrupted by new technologies and
new visibilities of domestic labour (Cowan 1983; Lloyd and Johnson
2004; and for a contemporary, ethnographic take on the reconfiguration
of gender roles see Meah and Jackson 2013). The intense marketing of
goods and services to home-based consumers, the commodification of the
family home in overheated real-estate markets built on debt (Tanton et al.
2008), and economic policies directed towards integrating the family and
relational aspects of social life into the market (McDowell 2007) all illus-
trate the ways in which home is increasingly a site of power opened up to
scrutiny and display.
Going beyond the notion of home as a stable, given entity has alerted
us to the exclusions and gaps in the conventional meanings of home. Far
from being a safe and secure anchor of identity, especially for marginalized
groups, the home is simultaneously the focus of neo-liberal market forces
and state interventions (see Musharbash, Chapter 5 in this book). At the
same time, the realities of what constitutes ‘home’, and how people make
their lives at ‘home’, are changing in an age of high rates of geographical
mobility and changing local contexts. Sociologists and anthropologists
have grappled with the implications of these changes, questioning whether
home can be ‘placed’ at all, or whether it is more accurate to understand
UNSETTLING HOME
considers the home as ‘the “hub” upon which the socio-structural infra-
structure of so-called network societies increasingly relies’ (this volume,
p. 150).
The question of neo-liberal social policies’ impact on home is opened
up in several chapters. Aleksandra Ålund, Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Lisa
Kings (Chapter 9) describe how youth urban justice movements have
responded to the latest riots in Stockholm. They address new ways of
home-making in the context of several youth urban justice movements that
are (re)claiming welfare in their suburban areas, heavily hit by welfare cuts.
Yasmine Musharbash (Chapter 5) provides fine-grained evidence of how
punitive policies in the name of welfare, such as the Northern Territory
Emergency Response (also known as the Northern Territory Intervention),
have disrupted indigenous patterns of home-making and relationships
to country. Adam Stebbing (Chapter 7) examines the need for a critical
approach to definitions of homelessness in the policy context. Generally
policy-makers are only able to understand a framework of ‘housed’ versus
‘houseless’. A critical approach ensures that people experiencing homeless-
ness are not represented as lacking agency in their struggles to be heard by
policy-makers.
While some might be unreflective conformists, others develop inno-
vative identities that inhabit rebellious spaces. The process of making
oneself at home in these spaces entails negotiating and manipulating our
identities to suit the context as a way of retaining agency over the process
of home-making. Deslandes and Humphry (Chapter 11), as well as
Lloyd (Chapter 8), investigate how unhomely, anonymous non-places of
transit and commerce are temporarily occupied and tactically transformed
by mediated belongings, as well as protest movements. Deslandes and
Humphry outline a set of actors who have converged on Sydney’s Central
Business District and the home-making practices, and inequalities, that
intertwine in space and time as a result. Lloyd gives an account of everyday
mobilities and how sense of home is challenged by public acts of racism.
Many of the chapters expose everyday forms of agency which are
demanded by these diverse practices of home. There is both local accom-
modation and resistance to power structures as well as to global condi-
tions (Giuffrè, Chapter 4; Redshaw, Chapter 6; Ålund, Schierup and
Kings, Chapter 9). One way of resisting the power of the state’s gaze is by
becoming invisible. On the other hand, a localized construction of home
and belonging develops right there in the localities where people live and
work (Vasta, Chapter 3; Stebbing, Chapter 7; Browitt, Chapter 14). While
this local accommodation and resistance appear to be happening off-stage
(Goffman 1959), they also occur right under the surveillance of the state
(Musharbash, Chapter 5; Lloyd, Chapter 8; Deslandes and Humphry,
THE STRANGER
The figure of ‘the stranger’ in classical social theory has acted as a marker
of difference or incommensurability for home subjects (Simmel 1950),
and this is where we start in Part I. In his chapter entitled ‘Reflections on
Home and Identity in Late Modernity’ (Chapter 2), Ebert argues that,
in late modernity, meanings of home become increasingly precarious.
Following Schütz (1944) among others, he suggests that ‘we are simul-
taneously strangers and homecomers in multiple hyper-differentiated
lifeworlds’ (this volume, p. 31). In this situation, Ebert argues, ‘it is not
the normative stability of a lifeworld that can be taken for granted, but its
plurality’ (this volume, p. 32). Ebert’s line of argument provokes us to con-
sider, how, owing to fragmentation of shared experience, ‘it is more dif-
ficult and precarious for individuals to establish identities and a sense of
home on a shared normative basis’ (this volume, p. 32). Thus, one’s sense
of home cannot be derived from a strong sense of sharing. Through his
lens on home through precarity – thereby questioning traditional socio-
logical views of modernity itself as a site of extraordinary progress and
potential as well as the harbinger of humanity’s demise – Ebert uncovers
how home has been shored up as a centre of gravity for modern individu-
als, but only through the profound displacement of shared experience.
The ambivalence that emerges from this loss of home, both a loss of rigid
norms and a gain of freedom, is a paradox that increasingly defines late
modernity.
Ellie Vasta (Chapter 3) also explores the idea of the stranger, using
Georg Simmel’s ideas on proximity and distance, individuality and com-
munity. Based on research conducted in Sydney, Vasta examines how
migrants negotiate ‘Australian values’ in their quest to construct a new
home. Her work offers a fine-grained analysis, grounded in extensive
DWELLING
PUBLICNESS
MATERIALITIES
the ‘creative tensions’ around home that engaging with material practices
can offer.
In Chapter 14, Browitt takes us on a tour of contemporary masculin-
ity through ‘man caves’. He posits the idea of the man cave as a ‘home
within home’, marked by ‘nostalgia for the largely unbounded, pre-marital
freedom from major responsibility that is perceived to disappear with
family making’ (this volume, p. 222). This study thus approaches man caves
through the objects contained therein, including things which might be
considered trivial or ‘kitsch’ by a certain cultured or intellectual gaze but
which may have deep significance for their owners and their idea of home.
Browitt explores the shifts in gendered meanings of home and complex
interplays between social categories and material culture that give rise to
the contemporary man cave phenomenon.
Concluding this part on materiality, and the book as a whole, Supski’s
study of the transformations of ‘kitchen as home’ in Chapter 15 starts
out from the kitchen as underpinning women’s pivotal role in the manage-
ment of home in the 20th century, where they asserted their efficiency and
authority in a modernist paradigm. Interweaving architectural manifestos
and her own kitchen biography, Supski tracks how ‘the design of kitchens
has moved from a greater emphasis on efficiency to one more concerned
with sociality’ (this volume, p. 225). Kitchens are posited as ‘sites of
intersection between work, gender and family relations, and objects’ (this
volume, p. 225). Her account of the history of kitchen design in the western
domestic ideal maps a nostalgia, where the now dominant open-plan
kitchen echoes aspects of the pre-modern sociable and communal kitchen.
Each of the chapters in Part IV offers an innovative way of understand-
ing how, by engaging with the presence of materiality, we deal with the
absences in our lives. In each case, the process of home-making is provoked
by loss: for Hamilton (Chapter 12) and Vanni Accarigi (Chapter 13), in
migration; for Browitt (Chapter 14) and Supski (Chapter 15), in permu-
tations of roles which change the centrality of gender within domestic
arrangements (masculinity retreating to its ‘cave’; women’s culture being
disciplined into efficiency and then a more gender-neutral conviviality).
Following Young (2005), these innovative notions of home provide a sense
of agency to the men and women portrayed in these chapters. They con-
struct and negotiate their sense of self for themselves and in their relations
with others.
Duyvendak (2011) questions why in western democracies ‘feeling at
home’ has become such a dominant theme in public and political debate.
He examines the perceived ‘crisis of home’, taking into consideration both
endogenous and exogenous changes in our construction of ‘home’. He
suggests that, because the traditional notions of home are changing and
are in a state of flux, there is a growing nostalgia for home, a nostalgia for
the social order of the past. The authors of this book show that an alterna-
tive to the drive for nostalgia also exists. So, while on the one hand there
is a desire, a nostalgia, for the safety of the past, on the other hand there
is a lived reality of multiple lifeworlds. This is the ambivalence that we all
inhabit. Hence, this collection offers a vision of the multiplicities of home,
by examining various practices, tensions and critical debates. The authors
speak to the idea of home from within and across disciplines. Their work
sets out to question home as a static entity and to provoke us to rethink
belonging as a social process in which we are all implicated but which can
never be finalized or settled.
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
and new anxieties’, Home Cultures: Journal of Architecture, Design and Domestic
Space, 4 (2), 129–146.
Meah, A. and P. Jackson (2013), ‘Crowded kitchens: The “democratisation” of
domesticity?’, Gender, Place and Culture: Journal of Feminist Geography, 20 (5),
578–596.
Noble, G. (2002), ‘Comfortable and relaxed: Furnishing the home and nation’,
Continuum, 16 (1), 53–66.
Noy, C. (2009), ‘On driving a car and being a family’, in Philip Vannini (ed.),
Material Culture and Technology in Everyday Life, New York: Peter Lang,
pp. 101–114.
Pink, S., J. Morgan and A. Dainty (2015), ‘Other people’s homes as sites of
certainty: Ways of knowing and being safe’, Environment and Planning A, 47,
450–464.
Putnam, T. (1993), ‘Beyond the modern home: Shifting the parameters of resi-
dence’, in J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson and L. Tickner (eds),
Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, London: Routledge,
pp. 150–165.
Reiger, K. (1985), The Disenchantment of the Home: Modernizing the Australian
Family, 1880–1940, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
Rutherford, J. (1990), Identity: Community, Culture and Difference, London:
Lawrence & Wishart.
Saunders, P. (1989), ‘The meaning of “home” in contemporary English culture’,
Housing Studies, 4 (3), 177–192.
Saunders, P. and P. Williams (1988), ‘The constitution of the home: Towards a
research agenda’, Housing Studies, 3 (2), 81–93.
Schillmeier, M. and M. Heinlein (2009), ‘Moving homes: From house to nursing
home and the (un)canniness of being at home’, Space and Culture, 12 (2),
218–231.
Schütz, A. (1944), ‘The stranger: An essay in social psychology’, American Journal
of Sociology, 49 (6), 499–507.
Scott, J.C. (1985), Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Scott, J.C. (1998), Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
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Simmel, G. (1950), ‘The stranger’, in Kurt H. Wolff (ed.), The Sociology of Georg
Simmel, New York: Free Press, pp. 402–408.
Spark, C. (2003), ‘Documenting Redfern: Representing home and Aboriginality on
the Block’, Continuum, 17 (1), 33–50.
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Arab-American activists in the United States’, Environment and Planning A, 38,
1599–1614.
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home: Trends in housing affordability and housing stress, 1995–96 to 2005–06’,
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politics of solidarity’, Ethnicities, 10 (4), 503–521.
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Female Body Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 123–154.
INTRODUCTION
21
In 1920 in The Second Coming William Butler Yeats wrote that ‘Things
fall apart; the centre cannot hold.’ Similarly, Walter Benjamin’s angle of
history identifies modern progress as an unfolding ‘catastrophe which
keeps piling up wreckage upon wreckage’, ultimately conceding that we
can no longer ‘make whole what has been smashed’ (1969: 257). These
lines resonate deeply with some of sociology’s core apprehensions about
modern life. All too often modernity is praised as an era of extraordinary
progress, and yet its potential and promised accomplishments remain, if
not unrealized, heavily criticized for leading as much to humanity’s demise
as to its betterment.
Arnold Gehlen’s terms Instinktreduktion (instinct reduction) and
Weltoffenheit (world openness) (1975: 21) refer to nothing less than the fact
that there is no naturally given centre that holds or that could be smashed.
What cannot but be smashed and fall apart throughout the course of
human social history, however, and in particular modernity, is our socially
established normative interpretations of the world. These worldviews help
individuals to overcome the precarity of an instinctually underdetermined
human existence. The stability of lifeworlds and with them identities and a
sense of home relies on a strong logic of sharing. It lets us at least tempo-
rarily forget the fragile space the human condition leaves us in and which
we need to fill with social definitions of reality such as home and identity.
Any social definition of reality, however, is thus precarious. The question is
how our social definitions of reality stack up against the precarity originat-
ing in the human condition.
Addressing the issue of precarious social definitions of reality in a book
chapter titled ‘Searching for a Centre That Holds’, Zygmunt Bauman
writes: ‘The underdetermination, underdefinition of the human being,
robbed of the instincts nature so lavishly bestowed on other species, makes
that being into a “bunch of possibilities” which need to be sorted out so
that some of them might solidify into the reality of existence’ (1995: 141).
The human condition provides an empty canvas on which individual and
social identities not only can, but also have to, be drawn and consistently
redrawn. Hence, as Bauman suggests, the challenge of creating meaning
today is no different to that of any other historical period. In The Homeless
Mind Berger et al. make this point about modernity when they write that
‘modernity has accomplished many far-reaching transformations, but it
has not fundamentally changed the finitude, fragility and mortality of the
human condition. What it has accomplished is to seriously weaken those
definitions of reality that previously made that human condition easier to
et al. 2007: 44), requiring redefinition from time to time, in this case under
the conditions of late modernity.
Given the human condition and the resulting normative precarity, how can
we achieve any normative stability? The simple answer is we gain stability
by defining norms collectively and socially. The lifeworld is the term with
which these definitions have been captured, in particular by phenom-
enology from Husserl to Schütz to Habermas and others. The lifeworld
functions as ‘an unquestioned scheme of reference’ (Schütz 1944: 499), a
collection of rules, norms and values with which we define where home
is and who we are. Because of the human condition, as discussed above,
‘the individual needs overarching reality definitions to give meaning to
life as a whole’ (Berger et al. 1973: 15). Home and identity are such defini-
tions. They are part of the taken-for-granted ‘stock of knowledge’ (Schütz
and Luckmann 1973: 7) which ‘supplies members with unproblematic,
common, background convictions that are assumed to be guaranteed’
(Habermas 1985: 125). This taken-for-grantedness is the remedy against
human indeterminacy, normative precarity and a world open to interpre-
tation, and it is anchored in shared lifeworlds. ‘The world of everyday life
is consequently man’s fundamental and paramount reality’ (Schütz and
Luckmann 1973: 3), and the lifeworld is where we are culturally, socially and
personally at home and gain our identities.
The important point in this discussion is the tension between norma-
tive precarity and normative stability. If the lifeworld can be regarded
as the collective bedrock of home and identity against the backdrop of
the human condition, then it is worth asking to what extent late-modern
lifeworlds are normatively stable/unstable, and how these structures affect
our late-modern understanding of home and identity. For this purpose the
next section will discuss the structures and components of the lifeworld in
more detail before we look at how they can be defined in late modernity.
Home and identity are defined and emerge from sharing norms, values
and meanings spatially and temporally within the same lifeworld. ‘Thus
from the outset, my life-world is not my private world but, rather, is
intersubjective; the fundamental structure of its reality is that it is shared
by us’ (Schütz and Luckmann 1973: 4). It is from the notion of sharing
of everyday situations that identity and home gain their weight. I define
sharing quite simplistically as experiencing life in the same space at
the same time. The goal of this section is to distinguish more precisely
what is shared on the basis of various structural components of the
lifeworld.
Jürgen Habermas gives a differentiated account of the structures of the
lifeworld when he writes:
I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which participants in
communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an
understanding about something in the world. I use the term society for the
legitimate orders through which participants regulate their memberships in
social groups and thereby secure solidarity. By personality I understand the
competences that make a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him
in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to
assert his own identity . . . The interactions woven into the fabric of everyday
communicative practice constitute the medium through which culture, society,
and person get reproduced. These reproduction processes cover the symbolic
structures of the lifeworld. (1985: 138)
CULTURE
PERSONALITY
The notion of sharing norms and values is equally central in the shaping
of personal identities. The following statement by Berger and Luckmann
makes this clear: ‘Man’s self-production is always, and of necessity a social
enterprise’ (1971: 69). Their argument rests in many ways on George
Herbert Mead, who depicted this in greater detail when he argued:
When a self does appear it always involves an experience of another; there could
not be an experience of a self simply by itself . . . when taking the attitude of the
other becomes an essential part in his behaviour – then the individual appears
in his own experience as a self; and until this happens he does not appear as a
self. (1972: 195)
SOCIETY
Neither cultures nor personalities are static. Once we are fully integrated
and recognized as full members of a lifeworld we ‘talk back’ and change
norms and values. We sign petitions, boycott products and cast protest
votes. It is here that sharing takes on a more institutionalized role of nego-
tiating the bigger normative landscape of society. We are not just socialized
into a lifeworld, but actively shape it. We are not just drawing on existing
recipes, but change the ingredients with the hope of creating the society we
want to live in and the identity of who we want to be.
Personality and culture, individual identity and feeling culturally at
home are connected through the coordinating mechanisms of society, its
institutions or what Durkheim called ‘intermediary institutions’ (1984). As
examples we can refer to the family, the workplace, education and various
memberships in clubs, social movements, parties, unions or even religions.
The important point here is that society emerges as an institutional land-
scape that provides normative stability in the shape of shared institution-
alized values that are not easily changed. Institutions here function as a
pacemaker of normative change. They are the socially constructed centre
that holds both a sense of home and identity, but they are also the place to
potentially renegotiate shared norms and values. They represent, protect
and enforce shared norms, but equally facilitate their renegotiation. This
kind of sharing is essential for both a sense of personal identity and feeling
at home in a particular lifeworld. It comes back to the paradox between
freedom and a centre that holds. As Habermas writes, ‘an autonomous ego
and an emancipated society reciprocally require one another’ (Habermas
1976: 71).
On the basis of Habermas’s three structural components of the lifeworld
we can develop a more nuanced understanding of the lifeworld as constitu-
tive of personal identities and a sense of home as normative concepts. How
What we can take from these elaborations by Habermas is that home and
identity emerge from the intersubjective flows in and between the three
structural components, that is, culture, society and personality.
The notion of communication has been extended by Axel Honneth to
include not just consensus-driven communication but any kind of inter-
subjectivity based on norms (see Petherbridge 2013). Sharing now does
not mean just agreement but also ongoing conflict over what we recognize
as shared. The topics involved here reach from food to friendship, families
and homes, countries and regions, home towns and holiday places. They
all can convey a sense of joy or pain, memories, gains and losses. Some are
mysteriously puzzling, fantastic and inspiring, grabbing the meaning of
life at its core; some appear imaginary and vague as soon as one attempts
to grasp what they are actually about, but they are based on intersubjectiv-
ity. Sharing experiences spatially and temporally includes a kind of recog-
nition that touches not just on norms but on the core of humanness, as
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, and lends strength and stability
to lifeworlds.
As members of a lifeworld we take the intersubjectively established sense
of home and identity for granted. When we know the appropriate forms of
greetings at particular times of the day, when we know the rituals around
births, weddings, funerals and anniversaries, when we know grandma’s
recipe for the family Christmas dinner, when we regularly meet friends for
coffee and when we know which bureaucracies to engage with to obtain a
new passport, that is when we have a sense of home and identity. Sharing
objects, places, spaces and time is a crucial anchor and generator of our
individual and social identities. It is this shared sense of belonging, identity
and home that makes the precarity of human existence more bearable.
Their gravity, their meaning, their importance and their sense of anchor-
age stem from a sense of sharing time, space and everyday experiences
within lifeworlds against the backdrop of the human condition.
To reiterate briefly, the human condition has left us with two basic require-
ments that underpin any discussion of the notions of home and identity.
Firstly, it leaves us in a space of normative precarity. Secondly, lifeworlds
provide normative stability in the face of the human condition. But the very
fact that lifeworlds are socially constructed also means they are subject to
social change and hence also precarious. This precarity includes a paradox
between the striving for ever more normative freedom breaking down the
very centre that could hold and the anthropological need for a stable social
order at the same time. After the discussion of normative precarity, norma-
tive stability and the essential role of sharing, the question is: what are the
underlying conditions characterizing home and identity in late modernity?
I argue that fundamental precarity originating in the human condition is
more visible and felt under what I call late-modern conditions of plurali-
zation and fragmentation. Identity and home in late-modern societies are
more precarious or ‘messy, blurred and confused’ (see for example Ahmed
et al. 2003; Nowicka 2006, 2007). What are the reasons for this?
I refer to one of the major characteristics of the late-modern condi-
tion as hyper-differentiation of the institutional landscape. Institutions
are supposed to be a stabilizing factor in any society as the hinge between
well-established norms characterizing the society we live in and norma-
tive change driven by questions about what kind of society we want to
live in. Hence, institutions are major coordinating and integrating forces
in societies. Hyper-differentiation means that their capacities to integrate
and coordinate normative changes are challenged by the pluralization and
increased complexity of existing but also envisaged normative orders.
Although talking about social systems instead of institutions, Niklas
Luhmann suggested that ‘The function of social systems is to capture and
reduce complexity. They help to mediate between the external complexity
of the world and the anthropologically very restricted ability of human
beings to consciously process experiences’ (1974: 116, trans. N. Ebert).
This suggestion leads us to a paradoxical situation that has been pointed
MULTIPLE LIFEWORLDS
The pluralistic structures of modern society have made the life of more and
more individuals migratory, ever-changing, mobile. In everyday life the modern
individual continuously alternates between highly discrepant and often con-
tradictory social contexts. In terms of his biography, the individual migrates
through a succession of widely divergent social worlds. Not only are an increas-
ing number of individuals in a modern society uprooted from their original
social milieu, but, in addition, no succeeding milieu succeeds in becoming truly
‘home’ either . . . A world in which everything is in constant motion is a world
in which certainties of any kind are hard to come by. Social mobility has its
correlate in cognitive and normative mobility. What is truth in one context of
the individual’s social life may be error in another. What was considered right
at one stage of the individual’s social career becomes wrong in the next. (Berger
et al., 1973: 184)
social context with a stock of knowledge and recipes for everyday interac-
tion from another lifeworld is what characterizes the stranger:
The approaching stranger . . . does not share certain basic assumptions which
alone guarantee the functioning of these recipes. He has to place in question
what seems unquestionable to the in-group and cannot even put his trust in a
vague knowledge about the general style of the pattern but needs explicit knowl-
edge of its elements. (Schütz 1944: 499)
What is taken for granted in one lifeworld is quickly brought into question
by entering another lifeworld. Again in Schütz’s words, ‘The discovery
that things in his new surroundings look quite different from what he
expected them to be at home is frequently the first shock to the stranger’s
confidence in the validity of his habitual “thinking as usual” ’ (Schütz
1944: 503). The situation is no different for the homecomer, the person
who returns to a lifeworld she has left for a while: ‘The homecomer . . .
expects to return to an environment of which he always had and – so
he thinks – still has intimate knowledge and which he has just to take
for granted in order to find his bearings within it’ (Schütz 1945: 369).
Under the late-modern condition we are not strangers in one place and
homecomers in another. I argue that we are simultaneously strangers and
homecomers in multiple hyper-differentiated lifeworlds. We do not necessar-
ily physically leave a lifeworld, but live in multiple lifeworlds or a plurality
of lifeworlds that are not easily reconciled collectively or individually with
notions of home and identity. In the words of Ralph and Staehli, home
‘is sedentary and mobile’ (Ralph and Staehli 2011: 520) at the same time,
and being at home in a particular lifeworld does not mean we simply
‘leave behind’ other lifeworlds or homes as, for example, Avtar Brah
(1996) explains. ‘Home’, as Katie Walsh concludes, ‘becomes an explicitly
dynamic process’ (2006: 126). What characterizes this dynamic, so my
argument goes, is that the vital experiences of sharing time, space and
emotions have become so manifold, complex and dynamic that reintegrat-
ing them into a centre that holds on the cultural, personal and social levels
has become a major task for individuals defining their sense of home and
identity. As Berger et al. write in reference to Schütz:
Plurality becomes a basic theme of life. With this pluralization, the creation
of any overarching symbolic universe becomes increasingly more difficult.
Different realities are defined and legitimated in quite discrepant ways, and
the construction of an overarching world view that will embrace all of them
becomes highly problematic. An important characteristic of the construction of
symbolic universes under modern conditions is the sheer number of items that
must be included in such a construct. (Berger et al. 1973: 112–113)
But very frequently the reproach of doubtful loyalty originates in the astonish-
ment of the members of the in-group that the stranger does not accept the total
of its cultural pattern as the natural and appropriate way of life and as the best
of all possible solutions of any problem. The stranger is called ungrateful, since
he refuses to acknowledge that the cultural pattern offered to him grants him
shelter and protection. But these people do not understand that the stranger in
the state of transition does not consider this pattern as a protecting shelter at all
but as a labyrinth in which he has lost all sense of his bearings. (Schütz 1944: 507)
It was difficult to leave Europe and her ghosts. As our ship was put to sea at
Genoa, the splash of the last rope that bound us to her shores was a searing
sight. At that moment, my departure turned into an act of disloyalty to the
person I might have become had I remained on this soil, and I felt hollowed out.
In the void that was the future into which I was about to plunge, I saw myself
acting out someone else’s life. A sense of estrangement from my old – essential,
somehow? – self began to form and traces of it persisted for years afterwards.
(Crouch 2013: 28)
The most striking point here is the question of loyalty and disloyalty to
a self, an identity, a home that is clearly tied to a lifeworld in a particular
place at a particular time. Identity and home under late-modern conditions
of hyper-differentiation are no longer anchored in taken-for-granted life-
worlds, but in permanently being strangers and homecomers who are dis/
loyal to norms from multiple and even unknown lifeworlds and ultimately
themselves.
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
Ahmed, S., C. Castaneda, A.M. Fortier and M. Sheller (2003), Uprootings/
Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration, Oxford: Berg.
Bauman, Z. (1995), ‘Searching for a centre that holds’, in M. Featherstone, S. Lash
and R. Robertson (eds), Global Modernities, London: Sage, pp. 140–153.
Benjamin, W. (1969), Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, trans. H. Zohn, ed. H.
Arendt, English language edn, New York: Schocken.
Berger, P.L. and T. Luckmann (1971), The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Penguin.
Berger, P.L., B. Berger and H. Kellner (1973), The Homeless Mind: Modernization
and Consciousness, New York: Vintage.
Brah, A. (1996), Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities, London:
Routledge.
Crouch, M. (2013), Almost Home: A Memoir of Migration, Lilyfield, NSW:
books2037.
Durkheim, E. (1984), The Division of Labor in Society, trans. W.D. Halls,
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Gehlen, A. (1975), Urmensch und Spätkultur: philosophische Ergebnisse und
Aussagen, Frankfurt am Main: Athenaion.
Giddens, A. (1991), Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late
Modern Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Habermas, J. (1976), ‘Moral development and ego identity’, Communication and
the Evolution of Society, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, pp. 69–94.
INTRODUCTION
36
third way. Simmel’s stranger can appear through various social positions
and experiences (Levine 1977: 17). Although there are numerous interpre-
tations of Simmel’s account of strangerhood (see Levine 1977; Marotta
2012), his account can be easily associated with the migrant, who is both
integrated and marginalized (Simmel 1910, 1950). The stranger is someone
who is physically close yet socially distant, where ‘distance means that he,
who is close by, is far, and strangeness means that he, who also is far, is
actually near’ (Simmel 1950: 402). In other words, the stranger ‘concerns a
particular social position within a group which involves a certain degree of
inclusion and of exclusion, of being in the group but not of it’ (McLemore
1970: 92). According to Simmel, ‘to be a stranger is naturally a very posi-
tive relation: it is a specific form of interaction’, but it is because ‘he has
not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it,
which do not and cannot stem from the group itself’; thus, ‘[h]is position
as a full-fledged member involves both being outside it and confronting it’
(Simmel 1950: 402). The stranger relationship ‘involves a distinctive blend
of closeness and remoteness: the stranger’s position within a given spatial
circle is fundamentally affected by the fact that he brings qualities into it
that are derived from the outside’ (Levine 1977: 20).
Echoing Simmel, Bauman suggests that the stranger represents in-
between, ‘ambivalent people’ who threaten and challenge the relationship
with the ‘host’ society (Bauman 1990). Being inside and outside, physically
close yet socially distant, and bringing in qualities and resources from the
outside provide us with an understanding of a social process that is clearly
relevant to the position of the migrant. Explaining the in-between position
of the insider/outsider, Marotta (2010: 109) sums up:
[T]he in-between stranger does not have complete access to the cultural and
language code of the host. While this causes anxiety and stress, it also provides
the ground for a different understanding of the host’s world . . . The position of
strangers encourages a critical and ‘objective’ stance towards the host and one’s
own culture.
‘Being in the group but not of it’ places strangers in a position where
they can develop an ‘objective stance’ both towards the culture in which
they have become immersed and towards their own culture. For Simmel,
because strangers come in from the outside, they can approach their new
milieu with a certain type of objectivity. He argues, however, that the
objectivity of the stranger is not context-free, and it is not simply about
‘passivity and detachment’; rather objectivity is characterized by ‘distance
and nearness, indifference and involvement’ (Simmel 1950: 403). But
involvement and participation suggest a subjectivist understanding by
the stranger. Scholars such as Haraway (1988) and Marotta (2012) have
reflected upon Simmel’s specific meanings of objectivity, raising concern
about standpoint epistemology as it informs identity politics, where sub-
jects analyse social relationships from their point of view. Such an episte-
mology offers new insights into power relations that have been previously
ignored, for example in the marginalization of the position of women
based on universalistic male assumptions.
Marotta provides a nuanced understanding of Simmel’s notion of
subjective objectivity by considering the relationship between objectivity,
subjectivity and the stranger. He suggests that ‘the stranger has a “bird’s
eye view” and is not immersed in particularities of the opposing parties’;
the “bird’s eye view” does not mean that the stranger is not capable of
incorporating the particular views of the parties (Marotta 2012: 684). In
contrast to a positivist conception of objectivity, Simmel shows that the
two types of understanding rely on each other, in a positive and specific
kind of participation, ‘just as the objectivity of a theoretical observation
does not refer to the mind as a passive tabula rasa on which things inscribe
their qualities’ (Simmel 1950: 403). Thus Simmel shows that objectivity
and subjectivity work together and that ‘objectivity is an illusion because
the idea of objectivism relies on the incorporation of the subjective’
(Marotta 2012: 685). Strangers can, like everyone, have a subjectivist view,
but they can also take up an objective stance of their other, simply because
they are not fully immersed in the culture of the settlement society. There
remains a degree of unfamiliarity which provides them with more objective
or ‘distant’ insights.
The objective stance of the insider/outsider allows the stranger to
develop the idea of a ‘third type of consciousness’ by allowing ‘the con-
struction of hybrid knowledge’ (Marotta 2012). In other words, detach-
ment and involvement not only allow for an objective stance but also allow
the construction of hybrid knowledge and understandings. This third type
of consciousness is significant because it indicates an ability to identify
affinities and shared interests. However, Marotta questions whether it is
possible for the stranger to have a middle or common ground position,
arguing that the in-between standpoint runs the risk of collapsing into
another standpoint, thus succumbing to the fallacy of the middle ground
(2012: 687–688).
Marotta is right to question whether the ‘in-between’ stranger can find a
middle ground or develop hybrid knowledge, because being an in-between
or ambivalent stranger (Bauman 1990) can mean being positioned between
the cracks. But not all strangers ‘fall’ in between the cracks. Nor does the
hybrid stranger necessarily adopt the middle ground. Hybridity is not in
between but a coming together of different aspects of one’s knowledge and
Simmel’s notion of the stranger, the person who is in the group but not
of the group, the person who is involved in that distinctive blend of close-
ness and remoteness, and the migrant who confronts it, provides us with
a unique insight into what I call ‘the migrant stranger at home’. Home
becomes an ambiguous space, a paradox for the national imaginary where
migrants are both insiders and outsiders, though they can also be only one
or the other. While the stranger can be in between, as neither friend nor
foe (Bauman 1990), I suggest that the migrant at home in Australia is both
friend and foe and has both insider and outsider status. Being a citizen pro-
vides legal insider status, but in a hegemonic sense insider status is defined
as, for example, having friends outside of one’s own ethnic group or going
to school in Australia, thus giving the migrant stranger at home access to
the settlement society’s values and world view.
What emerges is the construction of hybrid knowledge and identities,
while at the same time critically reflecting on and dealing with those parts
of Australian culture that are perplexing and at times inaccessible. Hence a
hybrid status does not necessarily rule out an outsider status. Hybridity is
a coming together of different aspects of one’s knowledge and experience,
which can include marginalization. As outsiders and insiders, migrants are
able to actively construct ‘home’ from various vantage points, and observe
and practise both affinities and differences with the cultural others sur-
rounding them. In different contexts, we might find that the outsider status
dominates experience and knowledge; in other contexts, the insider status
might prevail. Insider and outsider knowledge and the subjective objective
knowledge of values are not necessarily in conflict. This knowledge can
work in parallel or lead to a blending of values. In this way, the migrant
home constructed in the social space of the national Australian imaginary
is assembled from imported and local cultural qualities and characteristics
It is the difference between languages and cultures. You will never fully under-
stand their culture. Okay, it’s like, they tell a joke, you fully understood the
words, but then I simply did not find it funny . . . When everyone else finds it
funny but you do not, you will never be one of them . . . Our expressions are
very Chinese, so there will be gaps in our mutual ability to understand each
other . . . It’s not [about them not] accepting. They simply aren’t interested in
your culture. (Chinese-Australian woman 2023)
For example, I can come to visit you but I cannot easily become a part of your
family. To do so I will need to stay for a long time, and that is not considering
language difference . . . Well, I believe people here are very fair. They will accept
you. But well, okay . . . the right-wingers will dislike you based on your skin
colour; they won’t accept you because they don’t like your ethnicity. But . . .
there are many ethnic Chinese here in high positions, which I think is a form of
acceptance . . . Yes, if you think differently, you will have trouble integrating.
(Chinese-Australian man 253)
And:
Back in 2004, when I worked here, I had a lot of Aussies working with me . . .
One of the Australians asked me, ‘Who do you support?’ And I asked them one
question: ‘How do you address me? As an Australian or as an Indian?’ He said,
‘You’re an Indian.’ Then who shall I support? I will definitely support India, all
right? Look, even if I say that, I have an Australian passport and I have a decent
job, an Australian job, but even then society won’t accept me as a hundred
percent Australian, all right? They would say, ‘Oh, you’re an Indian.’ All right?
I don’t care . . . [but] that’s the whole thing; a passport is not enough to say that
you’re Australian. I mean, I would like to keep my identity as an Indian, because
even if I say to someone ‘I’m Australian’ they will say ‘Definitely you are not an
Australian.’ (Indian-Australian man 451)
So, Australian values – it’s the same values I’ve described before about myself
and my community, because I’m an Australian. So I actually get a bit annoyed
. . . [with] these commercials for lamb where he talks about how you have to eat
lamb on Australia Day, and he really annoys me because I’m an Australian and
I’m vegetarian . . . I’ll tell you how I would like to define [Australian values]. I’d
like them to be defined by being a multicultural society of people being vegetar-
ian or going to a temple or going to a mosque or going to the beach or going for
a walk . . . That’s the sort of Australian values that I hold. I think it’s about the
freedom of doing whatever you want. But for some reason I feel like in society,
if you want to be Australian, you’re supposed to go to the beach and you’re sup-
posed to drink a lot of beer! So my Australian values are very strong in the sense
that I guess I’m pro-multiculturalism, I’m pro-enjoying life, and that’s really my
Australian values . . . And if you feel like you’re an Australian then you are. That’s
it! (Indian-Australian man 450)
we learn from each other. That is how we maybe change how we think about
everything. And so what I want for my son is for him to have my values but at
the same time to have the Australian values . . . like helping others, respecting
others’ privacy, having the right to do whatever you want, but in a respectful
way. So I want him to have mixed values, of my original values like from Africa
and also this country. (Sudanese-Australian Muslim woman 600)
The quotes above illustrate a different notion of home from that which
appears in the national imaginary of Australian values. Whilst embrac-
ing ‘Australian values’, migrants construct their own Australian values by
bringing freedom and home-making to a new hybridized experience. In
this instance, bringing Sudanese and Australian values together occurs in
that ambivalent space, the hybridized meeting of affinities and differences.
I know that Australia has very good values. First thing – the Australian people
are willing to help whenever they can and they have good heart and good
intentions. Also they are very simple, and this reminds me of what the Quran
said about people living together peacefully . . . Also Australia gives people the
freedom of speech, freedom of rights and so on. Also in this country people
always encourage you to learn to go to school and to work, and those are the
values that I wish to have in my culture and to teach to my children. (Sudanese-
Australian Muslim woman 601)
and that sort of stuff, I find’ (Indian-Australian man 450). When asked
‘What can we learn from others?’, one Chinese-Australian man believes
that Australians can learn from the Chinese spirit of striving through hard
work to make something of yourself:
I think . . . first, the diligence and effort that Chinese people apply to succeed.
There are times where people supersede their natural abilities – they work
harder to overcome them. For example, you are clearly someone who cannot
get into uni, but you will push hard, to work to all ends [to get into uni]. They
are reaching for something that is over and above their natural abilities . . . And
what Australians can learn from us. Chinese people will work hard even when
there is enough to eat. (Chinese-Australian man 251)
But here the individual of liberalism is the main definition, and compari-
son suggests that the Chinese can learn from this:
In this country, there is less ethnic and racial tension. I remember that, when I
first arrived in Australia, someone said this to me, which I feel is quite true: this
place is defiantly free; they will not intrude on the individual. This aspect I think
we can learn from. In China . . . how do I put this, it is very hard to find this
balance [between] freedom and law and order. (Chinese-Australian man 250)
I did grow up in a very traditional [extended] family, and I’ve also had the
opportunity to live in the Western societies where it’s more of a nuclear family.
But, having experienced both, I think the traditional family makes more sense to
me . . . because there are more people to support you, more people to help you
with their ideas, their experiences, which you probably cannot just get from a
small family . . . Let me give an example. In Australia, we have Centrelink, which
basically is a social system that has been put in place by the government to take
care of people. Where I come from, your Centrelink is your family. Your family
takes care of you when you don’t have a job, you don’t have a place to go, you
don’t have food to eat, you don’t have money in your pocket. In Ghana, when
we say ‘community’, we mean everybody: your father’s friend, your father’s
work colleague sees you on the street and, you know, takes responsibility for
you by virtue of the fact that they just know your father . . . And friends also
help – that is your social capital, as we call it. (Ghanaian-Australian man 750)
I’m probably gonna say Asians just because I don’t know that much about them
and I see that they’re very different in the ways that they bring up their kids
. . . I think it all goes back to values. You know, actually, maybe they are similar
because they do value their boys a lot more than the girls. (Lebanese-Australian
Muslim woman 300)
One of the central hypotheses about the transition from traditional societies
to modernity is that, as societies advance economically and technologically,
patterns of systematic changes in values will occur (Inglehart 2003). The
societies’ values will increasingly shift towards an ethos of the individual’s
sense of identity and sense of self, the pursuit of self-actualization and per-
sonal happiness (Arts and Halman 2004: 27): ‘One of the consequences of
individualization is that people are increasingly developing their own pat-
terns of values and norms that tend increasingly to differ from institution-
alized value systems.’ More specifically, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim suggest
that on the one hand it means the disintegration of previous social forms
such as the family, class, gender roles and so on. And on the other hand the
new controls and demands of society have compelled people to look after
themselves, thus creating the ‘do-it-yourself biography’ (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim 2001). But the process of individualization has also been linked
to ‘amoral familism’ where ‘economic relationships structured by the new
welfare paradigm contribute to a society less concerned with solidarity and
more concerned with self and family’ (Rodger 2003: 416). The following
example about freedom of the individual, where the individual’s needs reign
supreme, is explained in relation to communality of the family:
Western values, it’s very individualistic. It’s about yourself and you. And, even
though I have seen a lot of my Western friends care dearly about their families,
it’s sort of secondary to what they want or what they need . . . I know that, when
we first moved to Melbourne, my sister had an Australian white friend, and we
called her mother and her grandmother over! And Donny said, ‘Oh, it’s so nice
to have a sit-down dinner!’ . . . I think, for a lot of my friends, it was also going
to family events, so like, you know, going to temples or going to community-
organized things as a family – it was very important. (Indian female 400)
Well, certainly the egalitarianism, and certainly there is something very laid-
back about Australians that they don’t particularly worry too much about other
people. Not in a bad way, but they are not overly concerned about what other
people’s opinions of them are. So I think Australians value freedom quite a lot
– individual freedom as well as social freedom, community freedom. And [they]
have a real sense of personal identity, individual identity, which I think over-
rides the family and community. But at the same time Australians are I think
just great at the whole coming together, the volunteering thing; it’s very strong
in Australia. I don’t know as a value; maybe that is community spirit. (Italian
male 550)
From this quote we note that freedom of the individual and concern for the
common good can endure together. They are not necessarily oppositional
values. Thus Simmel’s ‘third possibility’ provides a shift away from the logic
of opposites, in which a dialectic provides a more satisfactory explanation
than the binary form of opposites. The narratives presented here indicate
that the third possibility endures in many of the world views discussed in
this chapter. Finally, in reflecting upon the values of the majority members
of the settlement society, migrants are reflecting upon their own cultural
traditions and practices and the changes they are party to.
knowledge and ties provides them with a cultural framework within local
and national social contexts, they construct hybrid knowledge, a sense of
home, from which they manage their insider/outsider status and identi-
ties. By engaging with our differences, in both formal and informal ways,
at the micro and macro levels, we are likely to achieve mutual recogni-
tion of both our affinities and our differences (Vasta 2015). Different
values are put to the test through dialogue where a collective language
can emerge. The likely outcome is a change in societal structures, institu-
tions and identities based on a process of engaging with difference. As
Sennett suggests, ‘this view of the communal “we” is far deeper than the
often superficial sharing of common values . . . Strong bonding between
people means engaging over time with their differences’ (Sennett 1999:
143).
Australians of migrant background have offered critical reflections on
the values, customs and practices of the majority non-migrant Anglo-
Australian, and on other migrant cultures and values as well as on their
own. Their insider/outsider narratives remove the binary notion of being
one or the other, providing a rich tapestry of what constitutes Australian
values and how we engage with difference.
We have seen how ‘migrant strangers’ are positioned as outsiders, be
it through an inability to understand Australian humour, problems with
language communication, or various forms of racism such as being identi-
fied as non-Australian based on skin colour. But at the same time migrant
strangers negotiate home-making rituals and traditions, at both the per-
sonal and the national level, through a sense of engagement, a process of
subjectivity and objectivity applied to the society and communities around
them. They may be sufficiently detached to identify both affinities and dif-
ferences in a constructive way.
Insidership occurs through relationships with others of migrant
background, which provides a solid space for the creation of blended
Australian values. Similarly, they exercise their insider status to analyse
both Australian and their own ethnic group values and consider what each
of the cultures can learn from the other. This research also shows that
people can hold contradictory values. Based on that very insider/outsider
position, the migrant stranger can be at times in between while developing
hybrid knowledges across various contexts. In other words, there may be
some blending in some contexts, while separation or distinctness remains
in others.
To conclude, the insider/outsider constructs Australian values and a
sense of home that do not fit squarely with a homogeneous national iden-
tity that often rationalizes various forms of ethnic, religious and ideologi-
cal assimilation. Based on the drive for a unified national imaginary, the
NOTES
1. This project was funded by the Australian Research Council (ARC) for 2014–16,
conducted with Professor Lucy Taksa and Associate Professor Fei Guo, Macquarie
University. In this chapter I report only the results of the pilot study.
2. See ‘Australian Values Statement’ on the Department of Immigration and Border
Protection website, http://www.immi.gov.au/living-in-australia/values/statement/long/.
3. The interview transcripts of each respondent are given an identity number to ensure the
anonymity of the respondents.
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INTRODUCTION
Once, my grandmother showed me her passport from the 1940s, the one
she used to travel to Australia from Italy. She came by aeroplane, at a time
when most people came by boat, but her journey still took eight days.
As we flick through the faded pages of her passport, each stamp recalls
another moment to her mind: she describes the hunger she felt when they
landed in Athens and were told to travel on to Cyprus if they wanted food;
she recalls the rough ground of the landing strip in Calcutta, and the col-
ourful clothing, strange to the eyes of someone who had recently left her
small, southern Italian town for the first time. She recalls the Australian
desert, that vast expanse, and her arrival in Sydney, which was to become
her home.
In another story about arrival, this time by a woman who migrated from
El Salvador to Rome with her family in the early 2000s, I was told:
The fatigue [stanchezza] when I arrived here, it’s a fatigue not of the legs, not of
the arms, it’s a fatigue of . . . what do I have to understand, what do I have to
learn, what is this person saying, what is that person saying? You know that I feel
a great sense of peace [una grande tranquilità] when I hear someone in the street
speaking in Spanish? Oh, God, when someone speaks Spanish – immediately,
immediately! I think, ‘Ah, how lovely to hear it’, because that . . . I try at least, I
try to make myself understood, or I try to . . . to understand others, you know?
But it’s a horrible thing that I don’t know, I truly don’t know, why we do this.
(Interview, 15 November 2009)
179
the new language sits strangely in the migrant’s mouth, reminding both of
these women that they are far from their childhood homes.
Home, then, is about more than a physical structure in which a person
lives. Home is a lived space, a geographical location imbued with meaning
and materiality (Miller 2001; Pink 2004; Blunt and Dowling 2006).
Migration (both voluntary and involuntary) complicates notions of home
further, as the word comes to reference multiple places and times, carrying
with it nostalgia for what was lost as well as a grounding in the here-and-
now (Seremetakis 1996; Ang and Symonds 1997; Hage 1997; Baldassar
2001; Korac 2009). Notions of ‘home’ thus extend beyond one’s dwelling
place to include transnational as well as translocal senses of belonging and
struggles for recognition (Hedetoft and Hjort 2002; Brickell and Datta
2011). For migrants, and often for their descendants, home-making pushes
against hegemonic categorizations of belonging based on ‘pure’ ideas of
local identity, and introduces new possibilities for imagining that identity,
since ‘being at home and the work of home-building is intimately bound up
with the idea of home . . . Making home is about creating both pasts and
futures through inhabiting the grounds of the present’ (Ahmed et al. 2003:
9, emphasis in original). Of course, it is important to take into account the
impacts of power relations, which may make it difficult to establish any
sense of harmony with the outside world. This is especially relevant for
those who are targets of discrimination or harassment, or who are denied
access to legal residency. At the same time, the idea of the domestic sphere
as haven is troubled by the experiences of, for example, victims of domestic
violence. Nonetheless, in stories of migration it is clear that people seek out
ways to establish an intimacy with the place in which they live.
Another important aspect in making sense of home is the impact of
time as well as place: in order to feel at home in a new place, the migrant
needs time to learn its streets, its sights, sounds and smells, its rhythms and
its seasons. The concept of home is dependent on the particular combina-
tion of elements – buildings, streets, technologies, animals, food products,
people, rocks and stones, and trees – that have been thrown together
(Massey 2005) in a particular time and at a particular location. Home,
thus, is not static. This is most easily recognizable, perhaps, for those who
move from one location to another, though it also comes through for those
who remain in one place and observe it changing around them. Home
involves particular combinations of people, objects, ideas and sensory
experiences that combine in the place in which one lives: ‘The boundaries
of home seemingly extend beyond its walls to the neighbourhood, even
the suburb, town or city. Home is place but it is also a space inhabited by
family, people, things and belongings – a familiar, if not comfortable space
where particular activities and relationships are lived’ (Mallett 2004: 63).
It’s fairly dirty . . . It seems to me that people don’t care much about it, about
the res publica . . . That is, the street doesn’t really belong to anyone, when . . . in
other cities at least, before throwing a piece of rubbish on the street, you think
‘Wait, but this is my city.’ Whereas here if you’re inside a house it’s a completely
different thing, but you walk out through the door of your home and it seems
like you can do what you want, you know? (Interview, 10 October 2009)
I know all the streets of Rome . . . I prefer [to live] in Rome or near Rome. Like
I’m doing at the moment . . . I do it for the benefit of my son, who at least grows
up with cleaner air, because here in Rome there’s a lot of smog . . . Rome is a
chaotic city. (Interview, 24 September 2009)
people who migrated to Rome as students, while the third is from a romano
de Roma (a ‘Roman from Rome’, to use the interviewee’s own descrip-
tion). The chaos of Rome is described variously as dirtiness, confusion, a
lack of care for public spaces, and a lack of functioning public transport.
However, this chaos is not necessarily negative: the third respondent uses
this description to identify Rome as different to other cities, as special,
somewhere he wants to remain close to even if he does not live in the city.
These three descriptions of Rome point to some interesting ways of
understanding the concept of home. In the first quote, home extends
beyond the house: the city is described as something that takes time to get
used to, leaving the respondent with ‘a total confusion in [her] head’. In the
second quote, home extends beyond the individual, and beyond the house,
to incorporate the entire city: the speaker differentiates between the home-
space of the house, which people keep clean, and the home-space of the
city, which in this account is described as dirty, not belonging to anyone.
In the third quote, the ‘sense of home’ that the respondent describes
involves knowing, intimately, all the streets of Rome, in understanding
that particular chaos that characterizes the city in all three accounts. That
‘chaos’ is a part of Rome’s rhythms, its particular ‘diurnal pace’ in which
‘the activities and interactions of numerous social actors intersect . . .
collectively constitut[ing] space through their rhythmic and arrhythmic
practices’ (Edensor 2011: 191). The ‘environmental image’ (Lynch 1960: 4)
that a person develops over time, the person’s relationship with the place
in which he or she lives, has a major impact on whether or not the person
feels ‘at home’.
For other people I interviewed in Rome, ‘chaos’ is not so important. One
woman, originally from Kabul, Afghanistan, indeed sees Rome’s traffic as
relatively orderly. However, she emphasizes missing the family connections
that she remembered from her early years in Afghanistan. In response to a
question about whether she misses Afghani food, she responds:
No, the food no [I don’t miss it], because I can eat it even here. It’s what I cook.
I find almost everything. Maybe some ingredients I don’t find, but that’s fine.
It’s not that it makes me . . . it’s not that I miss it. What I do miss is my family.
For example, for us it’s . . . families are big. There are at least 10, 12 people in
a house. They live together. Then in the morning they eat breakfast together,
lunch, dinner. Then during the day they take tea. They tell stories. They chat.
That I miss. The rest no, not so much. (Interview 21 November 2009)
This woman describes missing that sense of home she had when she
was surrounded by family members, all sharing meals and stories. As she
describes this domestic scene, I imagine hearing the sound of many voices,
smelling the aromas of the food cooking, tasting the warm tea in my
In England, drinking whiskey and eating meat literally made him a new man.
He saw himself as someone who was at home in the world, wherever he might
be. But his craving for the food of South India never left him, and remained
a visceral tie to the homeland he tried so hard to discard. Chili and spice are
addictions that are not easy to leave behind. Once in control of your pallet [sic],
they remain with you for life. (Raman 2011: 168)
At first, her stomach rebelled at how little people ate for breakfast: ‘That
little cup of coffee, you can add milk, and two biscuits. That’s breakfast.
This is breakfast . . . mamma mia! But you learn’ (interview, 15 November
2009). Indeed, she learnt so well that her stomach adjusted to the small
portions of an Italian breakfast. On a return visit to El Salvador, she had
to force herself to eat the breakfast provided by her sister-in-law: ‘She
made me breakfast, a heap of breakfast, platano . . . beans, egg, tortillas,
eh . . . bread . . . I said “How much? I can’t eat!” “But no, you have to eat!”
Afterwards, because we have to eat it all, OK, I tried to eat it all to not . . .
for my sister-in-law’ (interview, 15 November 2009).
In another case, the art of cooking was acquired in the interviewee’s
adopted home, and it was not until her sister also migrated to Italy that she
learnt Brazilian recipes: ‘It’s easy [to cook Italian food] because I learnt to
cook here, with my sister-in-law . . . After 15 years of marriage my friends
were asking for something Brazilian, and I tried to make something . . . In
fact, I had to learn after my sister arrived, the one who is really Brazilian’
(interview, 12 November 2009). Here, the interviewee identifies her sister
as ‘really’ Brazilian because she knows how to cook Brazilian food. Both
women use food, and eating, to demonstrate both their sense of longing for
their homelands and their belonging in Rome.
Writing on the senses throughout western history, Mark M. Smith
observes:
The preservation and elaboration of ethnic and national identity through food,
cooking, and the use of particular ingredients might well apply to every group
that has migrated throughout history . . . and attention to the historical impor-
tance to taste in this context could help us better understand how the senses
have informed modern ideas about ethnicity and national identity. (Smith 2007:
87)
To some extent we can think of the lived experience of being at home in terms
of inhabiting a second skin, a skin which does not simply contain the homely
subject, but which allows the subject to be touched and touch the world that is
neither simply in the home or away from the home. The home as skin suggests
the boundary between self and home is permeable, but also that the boundary
between home and away is permeable as well. Here, movement away is also
movement within the constitution of home as such. That is, movement away is
always affective: it affects how ‘homely’ one might feel and fail to feel. (Ahmed
1999: 341)
The skin, here, is a boundary between self and world that does not sepa-
rate self from world, but rather invites the world in. Similarly, in writing of
the interplay between self and world, Ingold argues:
I didn’t like the way . . . because in the cold weather, of . . . very cold, which we
didn’t have . . . How can I say, I felt already the pain in my bones, some muscular
pain, for the cold . . . The main thing was the nostalgia, being alone there, to
stay alone. Maybe if my wife was there. (Interview, 20 November 2009)
years before we met. No mention of the cold seeping into his bones is made
when he speaks about Rome.
In a study of transnational relationships between Italian parents and
their emigrant children, Loretta Baldassar argues: ‘While virtual and proxy
forms of co-presence are highly valued, it is generally felt that longing,
missing and nostalgia are best resolved through physical co-presence; actu-
ally being bodily present with the longed for person or in the longed for
place so as to experience them fully, with all five senses’ (Baldassar 2008:
252).
In the interview quoted above, the pauses when recounting the part
of his life spent in northern England are an embodied expression of the
interviewee’s memory of the constant cold; the pain in his bones and the
pain of loneliness are intertwined, associated in the speaker’s memory with
northern England itself, and affecting him in the moment of recounting
that place and time. The absence of any mention of such sensory depriva-
tion in his account of life in Rome is, perhaps, evidence of the resolution
of nostalgia through the physical co-presence of his wife as much as it is
about the warmer Italian climate. This difference between experiences of
weather in Rome and in northern England speaks not only to weather’s
materiality, then, but also to the meanings attached to weather, where the
cold in northern England symbolizes absence. Indeed, as Vannini et al.
argue, ‘“weather” is produced as much as it is experienced, and the pro-
cesses of how weather is produced are inseparable from how it is experi-
enced’ (Vannini et al. 2012: 364).
CONCLUSION
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Home is something that you practise and create every day. (Yunomi 2013)
TRANSNATIONAL HOMES
192
and as something that we make rather than be at. In my study, these prac-
tices are both shaped by and shape transnational flows of bodies, sensoria,
capital, work, aesthetics, commodities and ideas. Certain everyday prac-
tices, for instance, produce particular trade routes of goods that recreate
specific aesthetic sensibilities and sensoria. These practices are made pos-
sible by and affect transnational circulation and trade via different scales
of economy from international import/export firms to retail, as well as
logistics, labour, and carbon footprints. In this process economic, social
and political networks across different societies are maintained (Al-Ali and
Koser 2002: 8) and niche markets created.
Considering the centrality of cultural practices in transnational homing
processes, I argue that the shift from conceptions of belonging to a place
to belonging through a practice is mediated and translated by objects. For
instance, using certain implements to prepare food, or certain objects to
decorate the house, or tools to cultivate the garden engenders a particular
sense of belonging by providing a continuity of practices. Continuity in
this context is not intended as repetition of the same, but rather as the
ongoing translation of a practice into different circumstances. The objects
narrated in this chapter act as translators, shifting the terms of uprooting
and regrounding, moving between different orders, locations, sensoria and
histories. Building on the idea of the processual and translational (rather
than geographically bound) nature of home, these narratives attend to
the entanglements of the material, sensory and affective in home-making,
highlighting the role played by objects. This chapter therefore asks: What
do objects do when they migrate? How do they translate cultural and
everyday practices?
MATERIALITIES
APOCALYPSES
TRANSLATIONS
The objects described in the interviews are: a doll, a teacup, a teapot (the
last two unrelated) and a library. They are all objects that, together with
their owners, have gone through the experience, more or less traumatic, of
migration. These objects have at first lost their domesticity, the background
web of everyday practices and relations between things, actions, words and
cultural memories that anchored each object to a specific lifeworld and
made its presence and usage ‘obvious’. Having been uprooted, objects
have lost, as De Martino writes, il calore segreto (the secret warmth) that
comes from being embedded in the cultural memories and the obviousness
of the everyday (1964: 130–131). Paradoxically these objects also become
the means to recreate new relations in a different lifeworld: to translate,
‘moving terms around, linking and changing them’ (Law 2009: 144),
thus contributing to a regrounding. Silvia Spitta, writing about private
collecting practices of objects that constitute an ‘identity kit’, such as
those brought back from places of origin or acquired during travels and
transculturation, makes a similar point, noticing how ‘the objects with
which we surround ourselves and which we cherish, serve to anchor the
self to the place we call home’ (2009: 164). The following objects and the
narratives they activate offer four different scenarios to answer my initial
question, and illustrate four ways to anchor the self to ‘home’.
A doll, La Negrita del Batey (the little black girl from the community
group), is described as initially enmeshed in her cultural and social
grammar, in her obviousness as a toy that crossed racial and class divides,
in Cuba:
There is something that I like very much about her. She is kind of the equalizer.
She equalizes the whole black–white–mulatto, wealthy–poor. Certainly from my
experience from talking to people about La Negrita del Batey, I feel that she
straddled it all: this means for me the absolute essence of the best of Cubanness.
She was every little girl’s doll, and the fact that she was black was irrelevant. She
is what you had when you were a little Cuban girl.
The capacity of the doll to straddle and shift the terms of a situation in
order to translate different lifeworlds, or, borrowing from Spitta (2009: 6–7),
to move between different orders of things, emerges with the continuation
of her story, which in itself extends across macro-historical events, such as
the Cuban revolution and the subsequent Cuban diaspora in Miami: ‘In a
sense I think of her as having been through all of that and holding on to
those things that were really important about my childhood’ (La Negrita
del Batey 2013). This doll is not the ‘original’ childhood toy, which was left
behind in Cuba when the family, living in a precarious situation after the
1959 revolution, finally, and with no warning, moved to Miami, where the
father and another family had already gone. This doll was bought in an art
and crafts shop for tourists during the first trip back to Cuba after 36 years.
This acquisition marks the beginning of remembering, ‘the loving and
laborious art of recollection of the past entailed by the work of memory’,
which, as Spitta argues, ‘invariably entails re-collecting, cherishing, and
remembering objects inscripted by the care and attention of the loved one
in the past’ (2009: 164). This act of remembering is also an act of defiance
of the family, who refused to have any contact with post-revolution Cuba.
Back in Cuba the landscape has altered. The grandmother’s house,
theatre of many childhood memories, is now in a neighbourhood that has
changed so much that recognizing the house is not possible. Art and crafts
shops are full of Negritas del Batey. The doll in this story operates like a
metonym, standing for all the other Negritas del Batey, but also for Cuban
childhood, as ‘she was a lot of little girls’ doll. It didn’t matter your race.
It didn’t matter your class. She was just a Cuban girl’s doll’ (La Negrita
del Batey 2013). The doll does so in traversing countries – Cuba, the USA,
Australia – and collapsing different times and historical periods together.
La Negrita del Batey also moves across three periods: the ‘before’, the
time of childhood, interrupted abruptly on 1 January 1959 by the Cuban
revolution, when the father leaves for Miami and the family in Cuba goes
into hiding; Miami, where eventually the family moves in 1960; and finally
Canberra and Sydney.
The doll’s arrival in Miami, after the first trip back to Cuba, illustrates
well how when objects move from one country to another they disturb
the affective geography of home. After a cold reception at the airport, La
Negrita del Batey goes to visit an elderly aunt for a few days:
My aunt knew I had gone. She too was very resentful. I had gone to visit her
beach house and I had brought her stories and even an avocado that one of the
custodians of the place had given to me to give to her, having remembered her
all these years. And there was this blanket rejection of my stories, this blanket
rejection of the avocado . . . One day I was sitting in the guest room in my aunt’s
house, and she [the doll] was still lying in the suitcase. My aunt saw her, and
grabbed her, and hugged her and sat her in the middle of her sofa, like guest of
honour. She said: ‘Oh my God! La Negrita del Batey. Where did you get her?’
It was almost like there was only one and I got the only one and there were not
thousands more around. And I told her the story, and I said ‘I don’t understand.
You closed me down in so many ways, for so many interesting stories I had to
tell you, and you welcomed her like that.’
And she replied: ‘Because as soon as I saw her I was a little girl again. As soon
as I saw her it was my childhood she reminded me of, not all the terrible things I
went through as an adult in Communist Cuba.’ Suddenly I realized she was my
means to hold other conversations with members of my family. (La Negrita del
Batey 2013)
I am using it for coffee. But it is for Japanese green tea. I changed its function.
My father used it for tea. We don’t drink coffee from the same cup as we use
for tea. We drink tea after every meal, and this was his cup. For coffee he had a
morning mug. (Yunomi 2013)
The description of this morning routine occurs around a red, green and
yellow teacup, a combination of colours immediately recognizable in
Japan as Kutani ware. This particular cup is:
A bit old, and there are cracks here. This was given to my dad from his cousin.
In Japan you have your dedicated teacup, rice spoon and chopsticks, so when
you have lunch or dinner you take your own cup and plate and chopsticks. So
my father had been using this as his teacup. This type of teacup comes in two
sizes, a bigger one for the husband and a smaller one for the wife, so my mum
and dad were given the cup by his cousin, 30 or 40 years ago. (Yunomi 2013)
The Japanese practice of eating using personal dishes and drinking from
personal cups is complicated by a cosmopolitan taste for coffee, for its
flavour and aroma:
But see, my father loved fresh coffee, and he used to brew coffee. So it was the
last thing he had before he died. We bought the best coffee we could buy, then,
because it had to be freshly brewed. We asked the hospital coffee shop down-
stairs to make the coffee and then we brought it up, so the last thing he had, it
was coffee, because he loved the aroma. (Yunomi 2013)
When I was doing my Ph.D. I developed this ritual: every morning I would offer
him coffee. I still do it. If I don’t offer him coffee in this cup my day doesn’t
start . . . I was doing my Ph.D. partially because of my father, because he was
an academic. He died at the age of 50 and couldn’t develop some of his ideas in
molecular biology and genetics. So when I started my Ph.D. I needed to make
my father part of it. When I went back to Japan I thought: I need to bring
something back. Then I saw this in my mum’s cupboard so I took it. I have been
using this for the past ten years . . . My ritual has changed my everyday and my
mindset, because my father came back to my everyday life, so it changed my way
of thinking. Ritual is an ordering practice, so not doing this disrupts the order.
Not doing it triggers disruption. (Yunomi 2013)
Relocating the teacup from Japan to Australia, and changing its func-
tion from a cup used every day to drink green tea to a cup used as part of
a morning ritual involving coffee, makes possible the creation of a different
sensibility of ‘being at home’. The change in function in this case signifies
first a displacement (or spaesamento) of the original ‘knot’ (Howes 2005: 9)
of interconnected senses: the smell and taste of green tea of the cup during
its life in Japan, coupled with the memory of the aroma of coffee so loved
by the interviewee’s late father. This displacement turns into a homing
practice when the cup is reinscribed in the everyday ritual of coffee offer-
ing, ‘not just in the doing, but in the feeling, smelling and talking about it
too’ (Yunomi 2013).
The intersensoriality described above in relation to the feeling of home is
captured by David Howes, who writes specifically about a form of embodi-
ment that exceeds the duopoly body–mind to bring in the senses. Howes
explains this as the emerging paradigm of emplacement, a ‘sensuous inter-
relationship of body–mind–environment’ where environment is under-
stood as ‘a bundle of sensory and social values contained in the feeling
of “home” ’ (2005: 7). The opposite of emplacement, Howes continues, is
displacement, intended as a feeling of being homeless, disconnected from
one’s physical and social environment (2005: 7).
This teacup-turned-coffee-cup moves between displacement and
emplacement, translating and collapsing together two different time-
spaces. In the process it activates the idea and narrative of home as an
everyday practice. The cup is central to the construction of a chronotope
of ‘home’, in which the here and now of Australia flows together with the
there and then of Japan. According to Bakhtin, chronotopes make certain
kinds of events possible; they are ‘the ground essential for the represent-
ability of events . . . the chronotope is the place where knots of narratives
are tied and untied’ (1981: 250). Similarly the teacup becomes the ground
for the representability of home:
This is my home now. [Places the cup on a table] It’s not the space I am in now,
but what I am doing with this cup that makes it home. Nostalgia is part of it
too. This is not just about doing this now, but it has got all this history, and
trajectories, and it is not just my trajectory. Everything is combined in this here
and now. It is linked to there and then. All these connections are remade, which
is part of home too. Home is the future, but it always contains the present and
past too. (Yunomi 2013)
Here I wasn’t really able to go and buy things. I had troubles in identifying
where to go, because when you move to another continent you have so many
emergencies – bureaucratic, work-related, economic – and you need to rebuild
the web of social relations. And the urban landscape here is so fragmented. You
can’t go to the city centre knowing that in a few streets you will find the shops
you are looking for, like in Italy. So you need to learn a new urban geography.
(Teapot 2014)
The teapot, which finally arrives as a gift from Italy, becomes the means
through which the sense of estrangement and displacement of being in
another country is finally domesticated:
While there are affective ties to objects, such as the ones given as gifts
by loved ones as in this case, objects also recreate an affective dimension
of home through the regrounding of specific sensoria. If, as Spitta argues,
‘every new cultural configuration and therefore every new subject posi-
tion depends upon transcultural processes’ (2009: 21), objects as part of
this process are transcultural also because translating a sensorium implies
translating particular cultural sensibilities. As Howes and Classen argue,
‘Perception is informed not only by a particular meaning a sensation has
for us, but also by the social values it carries’ (2013: 1). In the process of
moving countries, things, and the everyday sensorium things generate, do
not have an equivalent and need to be learnt again. A taste for tea in the
Italian context, for instance, has different implications of cultural and
social capital from the implications of a taste for tea in Australia, where tea
is a common and homely hot drink:
I started to drink tea in the afternoon when I was in high school, and at the
beginning it was something exotic, all’inglese [British style]: in Tuscany you
drink tea only when you are sick. I used to like Earl Grey and fruity teas. Now
I prefer dry ones. I liked tea because it is a pause, and because it was different
from what you would normally do in Italy . . . I travelled a lot: I drank tea in
North Africa, and it is different; I drank tea in the Middle East, and again it
is different; I drank tea in Asia, and it is different. Now I associate tea with a
cosmopolitan dimension that is not the dimension of a migrant. It is the middle
class living abroad. (Teapot 2014)
I like this teapot because it is porcelain and because it is not new. It is from the
1940s. I like its smoothness and its roundness. I find the colour combination of
greens, pinks and whites very calming, like the tea itself: tea is reassuring. It is
warm, it is light, and it is not coffee. This is not a luxury object. It was produced
for everyday usage. It was bought in an antique market: these tea sets were made
in Japan, and imported to Italy, where they were given as wedding gifts or were
part of wedding dowries of women who are now passing away. That is why this
kind of tea set is now common in antique markets.
Entangled with cultural capital, class, taste and part of a specific social
and cultural grammar, objects act like vessels to navigate and cross into a
different cultural grammar:
When I first arrived I was overstimulated. All my antennae were up for a year.
The smells, everything smelled different, and the sounds! I couldn’t tell the birds!
We literally could not cope with processing any more information . . . The first
thing I did in the first few weeks was to buy the Herald and then a women[’s]
magazine, and I did my anally retentive thing, which was to underline designer
names and shop names because I am so in my bourgeois cultural capital, and
obviously being bourgeois coming from a working-class background I have
learnt how to accumulate capital around certain names, and I know what’s
a ridiculous thing to wear. So I had to quickly figure out how this works in
Australia. (Books 2014)
I think one of the reason[s] why I brought so many books is that I wanted to
leave England. I wanted to bring the most important things with me and I
wanted to bring so many because I didn’t want to go back, so I brought that
weight and that volume and that many to say: ‘I am serious I am coming.’ For
the first three months the books were not here. I just had my suitcase. When
the stuff arrived I was very disappointed and wanted to send them back . . .
I enjoyed living with very little. My life seemed less encumbered. But I wasn’t
disappointed with the books. I was very glad to see them. One of the interesting
things is that there are so many that, you know, they change the space immedi-
ately. They invade the space. I have book avalanches. They hit people, and there
is something about their weight that is important to me that I don’t understand.
(Books 2014)
The arrival of books marks in this story the beginning of the emplace-
ment, the mind–body–environment connection described by Howes (2005:
7), in Australia:
On opening crates I would see the first book and say ‘Oh, yes, so it’s you. I
know you lot.’ Some boxes were tail ends, which I found annoying, because
books didn’t belong, so I had to theme again, at home and at work. Where I
was living there were not enough bookshelves, never enough, so I piled them up,
then piled them up in the fireplace, and I could see them, and it was fantastic.
(Books 2014)
They are one wall. There is solidity in them. They surround me – it’s like I built
a big swan nest. The way they make the space around me: they fill up the space.
They make me walk in a particular way. When one falls then a number will fall
and I have to find a new place for them to go . . . They have a life with me that
I like. I like how they invade my life. I like how they surprise me. Sometimes I
would be looking for one book, and then find another. They have this dynamic
quality that you wouldn’t imagine from a line of books. I get into them in differ-
ent ways. Sometimes I need to find a book, and I will be on my hands and knees
and I try to tunnel through, and one would go ‘I am here. You forgot about me.’
It is that serendipity thing. They have a dynamism, their visuality moves back-
ward and forward. Things get foregrounded. They might be lined out equally,
but somehow they call out and they make themselves known to me. And others
are quiet. They are this assemblage that goes back in time, and whilst they don’t
have memories like food or musical instruments they are connected, like tenta-
cles, back to the past. They are ‘a library’: it’s not just a whole lot of books. It’s
a collection. (Books 2014)
CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored what home may mean in the context of con-
temporary forms of mobility that include migration but also recurrent
and prolonged periods of travel (to the country of origin or otherwise).
It began with the definition of home as a process and a practice, starting
from the finding that what makes home is a continuity of practices and
that these practices are entangled and enacted with the help of certain
objects. This idea follows De Martino’s study (1964, 1977) on the role of
objects in moments of historical or personal change, and Spitta’s research
(2009) on how objects that travel from one culture into another create a rift
in the cultural understanding of the receiving culture. These homing prac-
tices have been analysed following four different scenarios, based on four
oral histories: home intended as objects that recreate domestic horizons
through the memories they carry; home evoked through rituals that put
into place a sensorium; home as a particular aesthetic register; and home
as an ordering or disordering of things.
It is important to stress how transcultural objects, such as those narrated
here, are not simply carriers of memories: they have a material impact that
generates particular sensory worlds. Objects in the context of mobility help
to adjust what we perceive with the senses, and to anchor us in a sensory
and aesthetic lifeworld that makes us feel at home. Feeling at home is a
matter of alignment between the aesthetic and sensory qualities around us
and the aesthetic grammar we carry in the form of sensory understand-
ings, memories and cultural capital. Feeling at home means also emplacing
small, everyday gestures and practices that are small acts of resistance to
assimilation into another culture and interruptions of its order of things.
NOTES
1. The pseudonyms used to reference the oral histories are the names of the objects chosen
and analysed in the interviews: a yunomi is a Japanese type of tea drinking vessel; La
Negrita del Batey is a stuffed doll.
2. All De Martino’s translations are by the author.
REFERENCES
Ahmed, S., C. Castañeda, A.-M. Fortier and M. Sheller (eds) (2003), ‘Introduction:
Uprootings/regroundings: Questions of home and migration’, in S. Ahmed,
C. Castañeda, A.-M. Fortier and M. Sheller (eds), Uprootings/Regroundings:
Questions of Home and Migration, Oxford: Berg, pp. 1–19.
Al-Ali, N. and Koser, K. (eds) (2002), New Approaches to Migration? Transnational
Communities and the Transformation of Home, London: Routledge.
Bakhtin, M. (1981), ‘Forms of time and of the chronotope in the novel’, in The
Dialogic Imagination, Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 84–258.
De Martino, E. (1964), ‘Apocalissi culturali e apocalissi psicopatologiche’, Nuovi
Argomenti, 69 (71), 105–141.
De Martino, E. (1977), La Fine Del Mondo: Contributo All’analisi Delle Apocalissi
Culturali, Torino: Einaudi.
De Martino, E. (2005), The Land of Remorse, trans. D.I. Zinn, London: Free
Association Books.
Interviews