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Civil Law Review Doctrines II
Civil Law Review Doctrines II
Alano,
640 SCRA 517, G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place.—It is also
established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept
that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place
because the affliction—already then existing—was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves.—We have stressed time and again
that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage.
Aquino vs. Delizo, 109 Phil. 21, No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY AT TIME
OF MARRIAGE CONSTITUTES FRAUD AS GROUND FOR
ANNULMENT.—Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation
to Art. 86, par. (3), New Civil Code).
2.NEW TRIAL; MERE FAILURE TO ANSWER MOTION IS NEITHER
EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION NOR GROUND FOR DENIAL.—When the
evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what
has already been adduced would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged
by plaintiff, the motion praying for new trial should not be denied simply
because defendant f ailed to file her answer thereto. Such f ailure cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially where a provincial fiscal has been
ordered to represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion.
Barrido vs Nonato
Civil Law; Property Regimes of Void Marriages; Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.—The
records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void
for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. x x x This
particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. The
term “capacitated” in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not
been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry.
Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio,
652 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011
Yu vs. Yu,
484 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006
Annulment; Custody of Children; By petitioner’s filing of the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically
submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.—By
petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as
an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the
habeas corpus case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer
for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the
custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. That that is
so gains light from Section 21 of the “Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity
Of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” which provides:
Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes.—Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry
of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking
jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the
custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only
mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider
the issue of custody of a minor.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 685 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012
Abandonment of Conjugal Home; Infidelity; Abandonment was not one of the
grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code; Sexual infidelity
was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.—The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted
in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with
another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological
incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10)
of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Espinosa vs. Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011
Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void.—This case is not novel. This Court has ruled
that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.
Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil., 404, No. 996 October 13, 1902
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; ALIMONY; PROHIBITION.—Where the
answer to a complaint alleging marriage and praying for a divorce denies the
fact of marriage, the court exceeds its jurisdiction in granting alimony, and
the enforcement of an order granting it will be restrained by the writ of
prohibition.
The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where
the existence of the status is put in issue by the pleading it can not be
presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.