NATRES CASE DIGEST
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOOD VS. CA
(181 SCRA 443)
FACTS:
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is
the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the
Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in
Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The
Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion
on the ground that the lots were forest lands
and therefore inalienable.
CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-
General's contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not land is alienable and
disposable land of the State.
HELD:
No.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine
subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands to the dominion of the State. Thus,
before any land may be declassified from the
forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural purposes, there
must be a positive act from the Government.
Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by
the Director of Lands does not confer any
validity on such title if the property covered by
the title or patent is part of the public forest.
REPUBLIC VS SAYO
(191 SCRA 71)
FACTS:
The case at bar started at 1961 whe
the spouses Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed
an application for a parcel of land, Lot 7454
originally party of Santiago but had since then
been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
The registration was opposed by Bayaua,
Reyes, and the Philippine Cacao and Farm
Products.
The case went on until on 1981, 20 years after,
the Heirs of Sandoval, Heirs of Bayaua, and
the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development entered a compromise
agreement, which effectively distributed parts
of lot 7454 among the aforesaid parties and the
counsel of the Heirs of Sandoval as attorney's
fees. The compromise agreement was
approved by the court and confirmed the title
and ownership of the parties in accordance
with its terms.
Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor
General filed a complaint before the court to
annul the decision rendered by the court a quo
for being void and made in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The Solicitor General contended that the the
Heirs of Sandoval et. al. did not present any
evidence to support their claims of ownership
or registration, nor did the government
agencies involve have a y authority to enter
into the compromise agreement, and finally,
that he was not notified of the proceedings and
so had not opportunity to take part therein.
As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention,
they asseverate that the land is not a public
land as the possessory information title in their
name and of their predecessors-in-interest, the
pre-war certification appearing in the Bureau of
Archives, and the fact that the proceeding of
the registration was brought under the Torrens
act which presupposes an existing title to be
confirmed, are all evidences that the land is a
private land.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent's evidences can
be considered as proof that the lot 7454 is a
private land.
HELD:
No.
Under the Regalian Doctrine 2 all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
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private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land
registration proceedings have the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land thus
sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in
showing by clear and convincing evidence that
the property involved was acquired by him or
his ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the
proper acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain . 4
The applicant must present competent and
persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he
may not rely on general statements, or mere
conclusions of law other than factual evidence
of possession and title. 5
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that
the principal document relied upon and
presented by the applicants for registration, to
prove the private character of the large tract of
land subject of their application, was a
photocopy of a certification of the National
Library. But, as this Court has already had
occasion to rule, that Spanish document
cannot be considered a title to property, it not
being one of the grants made during the
Spanish regime, and obviously not constituting
primary evidence of ownership. 6 It is an
inefficacious document on which to base any
finding of the private character of the land in
question.
It thus appears that the decision of the
Registration Court a quo is based solely on the
compromise agreement of the parties. But that
compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any competent
evidence of their ownership over the land
subject of the registration proceeding. Portions
of the land in controversy were assigned to
persons or entities who had presented nothing
whatever to prove their ownership of any part
of the land. The assent of the Directors of
Lands and Forest Development to the
compromise agreement did not and could not
supply the absence of evidence of title required
of the private respondents.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the
private respondents, it should be pointed out
that under the Spanish Mortgage Law, it was
considered a mode of acquiring title to public
lands, subject to two (2) conditions: first, the
inscription thereof in the Registry of Property,
and second, actual, public, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of the land for twenty
(20) years (later reduced to ten [10] years); but
where, as here, proof of fulfillment of these
conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria
cannot be considered as anything more than
prima facie evidence of possession. 7
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor
General in the execution of the compromise
agreement and its submission to the Court for
approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor General,
who is the principal counsel of the
Government; this is the reason for our holding
that "Court orders and decisions sent to the
fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor General
in land registration cases, are not binding until
they are actually received by the Solicitor
General."
SEVILLE VS. NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
GR NO. 129401
FEBRUARY 2, 2001
FACTS:
LSBDA (Leyte Sub-A Basin
Development Authority) was created by virtue
of PD no. 625. In connection with this, a letter
of instruction was executed authorizing LSBDA
to purchase or acquire privately owned land.
In June 14, 1980, certain Calixto Yap
sold to LSBDA a 464,920 square meter parcel
of land. The LSBDA was able to register it
under its name through the approved
miscellaneous sales application with the
Bureau of Lands.
However in May 11, 1990, petitioner
Seville filed a complaint for recovery or real
property, rentals and damages against LSBDA,
contending that he acquired the property and
its predecessor-in-interest for more than 30
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
years and therefore they are the rightful owner
of it.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of
the petitioner, when the case reached in the
CA, the latter reversed the RTC decision on
the ground that petitioner’s possession of the
said property was never ripen into ownership
since it still remains under the inalienable land
of public domain.
ISSUE:
1. WON LSBDA ‘s title to property valid?
2. WON petitioner’s claim of ownership
over the property was correct?
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of LSBDA.
According to the SC, Seville or the Ortega
estate did not become the owner of the subject
property even though they possessed the land
for more than 30 years, because at the time
they occupied the said land, it is still part of
inalienable land of public domain. Until the
State declares it to be alienable and
disposable, no matter how long they
possessed it, it may not ripen into ownership.
Here the petitioner failed to discharge
the burden of proving in court that the subject
property is already outside the component of
inalienable land of public domain when they
occupied the same.
LDBDA is a rightful owner of the said
land because, it acquired ownership and title
over it through Sales patent application which
was approved by the Bureau of Land, this
shows that the said property is no longer under
the ambit of inalienable public land.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS IAC
219 SCRA 108
FACTS:
The land involved is an island known as
Tambac Island in Lingayen Gulf situated in the
Municipality of Bani, Pangasinan. Pacific
Farms, Inc. initially applied for registration the
subject property under the Land Registration
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Act (Act No. 496). The Republic of the
Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed
the application alleging that Pacific Farms, Inc.
does not possess a fee simple title to the land
nor did its predecessors possess the land for at
least thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of application. The opposition likewise
specifically alleged that the applicant is a
private corporation disqualified under the
(1973) new Philippine Constitution from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain
citing Section 11, Article 14.
The Director of Forest Development
also entered its opposition alleging that the
land is within the unclassified public land and,
hence, inalienable. Other private parties also
filed their oppositions, but were subsequently
withdrawn. Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a
manifestation-motion to change the applicant
from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta.
ISSUE: WON the land known as the "Tambac
Island" can be subject of registration.
HELD:
No.
The Court held that lands of the public
domain are classified under three main
categories, namely: Mineral, Forest and
Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the
Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural
lands were allowed to be alienated. Their
disposition was provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which
states that it is only the President, upon the
recommendation of the proper department
head, who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral
and Timber or forest lands are not subject to
private ownership unless they are first
reclassified as agricultural lands and so
released for alienation. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified
land until released therefrom and rendered
open to disposition. Courts have no authority to
do so.
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This is in consonance with the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of
the government is needed to declassify a forest
land into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of state ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for
registration that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
Since the subject property is still
unclassified, whatever possession the
applicant may have had and however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. The
conversion of subject property does not
automatically render the property as alienable
and disposable.
5 United Paracale vs Dela Rosa (221
SCRA 108) PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao
6 Republic vs Register of Deeds of
Quezon (224 SCRA 537) PAMISARAN,
Excel Joy G.
FACTS:
Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of
land, by virtue of which he was issued an OCT.
Through an investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, it was found that the free
patent acquired by Petitioner was fraudulent. A
case for falsification of public documents was
filed by Petitioner was acquitted of the crime.
Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a
complaint against Petitioner, praying for the
declaration of nullity of the Free Patent and the
OCT.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Petitioner's main contention was that the land
in question was no longer within the
unclassified public forest land because by the
approval of his application for Free Patent by
the Bureau of Lands, the land was already
alienable and disposable public agricultural
land. He also claimed that the land was a small
portion of Lot 5139, an area which had been
declared disposable public land by the
cadastral court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land is alienable and
disposable public land
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise clearly appearing to be privately-
owned are presumed to belong to the State.
Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which
are public lands, are not subject to private
ownership unless they under the Constitution
become private properties. In the absence of
such classification, the land remains
unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
The task of administering and disposing lands
of the public domain belongs to the Director of
Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Classification of public lands is, thus, an
exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department, through the Office of the
President. Courts have no authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition
of public agricultural lands, the burden of
overcoming the presumption of state
ownership of lands of the public domain lies
upon the private claimant.
In the present case, Petitioner failed to present
clear, positive and absolute evidence to
overcome said presumption and to support his
claim.
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Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a
title to the land is of no moment,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title
issued under the Torrens System. The
indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be
invoked by one who procured the same by
means of fraud.
7 Ituralde vs Falcasantos (GR No.
128017, January 20, 1999) NALLA, Glene
Alacayde
Facts:
On October 17, 1986, Ramon Ituralde, herein
petitioner, acquired by purchase from the heirs
of Pedro Mana-ay a parcel of land, with an
area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less.
However, on November 3, 1986, respondent
Alfredo Falcasantos applied with the Bureau of
Lands for the award to him of the same parcel
of land under free patent, which application
was protested by Ramon Ituralde.
On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of
Lands rendered a decision giving respondent a
period of one hundred twenty (120) days to
exercise the right to repurchase the land by
reimbursing petitioner of all expenses he
incurred in the purchase of the property in
question, and held in abeyance respondent's
application for free patent. Alfredo failed to
exercise the right of repurchase, which
amounted to a waiver. The Director of Land
then rejected Alfredo’s application and allowed
Ramon Ituralde to file a public land application
for the subject land. Meanwhile, in a case for
the recovery of ownership and possession filed
by Ituralde against Alfredo, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring petitioner the
owner and the possessor of the subject parcel
of land with all the improvements existing
thereon, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and
ordering respondent to vacate the land in
question. Ramon appealed to the decision.
However the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed
Roman’s appeal. Hence this case.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals committed
an error in reversing the decision of the trial
court and dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
Ruling: NO.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals
erred in setting aside the trial court's decision
in his favor and dismissing the complaint
because when the Director of Lands allowed
petitioner to file a public land application for
said property, it was equivalent to a declaration
that said land was no longer part
of the public domain.
We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals
correctly held that "the evidence is unrebutted
that the subject land is within the Forest
Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557
certified on August 13, 1951'." and, hence, not
capable of private appropriation and
occupation.
In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon,
we held that "Forest land, like mineral timber
lands which are public lands, are not subject to
private ownership unless they under the
Constitution, become private properties. In the
absence of such classification, the land
remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition."
In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, we said: "Thus, before any land
may be
declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules
on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain."
Hence, a positive act of the government is
needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes. "
And the rule is "Possession of forest lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership."
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What is more, there is yet no award or grant to
petitioner of the land in question by free patent
or other ways of acquisition of public land.
Consequently, he cannot lawfully claim to be
the owner of the land in question.
8 Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela
Rosa (GR No. L-43938, 04/15/1988)
MISTERIO, John Kessler Sumauang
FACTS:
The case is about a parcel of land whose
ownership is being disputed by four parties: the
Dela Rosas, Benguet Consolidated Inc. (BCI),
Atok Corp. (Atok) and the Bureau of Forestry
Development (BFD).
Sometime in 1965, Jose dela Rosa, on his own
behalf and on behalf of this three children, filed
an application for the registration of a parcel of
land divided into 9 lots in Benguet. According
to the children, they had acquired the land by
virtue of prescription. As evidenced, they
produced tax declarations and realty tax
receipts.
BCI and Atok opposed their application
claiming that the lots were covered by mineral
claim sold to it in 1934. BCI, on lots 1-5,
contented that it had been in actual, continuous
and exclusive possession of the land in the
concept of an owner. As evidence, BCI
presented geological maps, payments of taxes
and construction on the land.
Atok claims of ownership on a portion of lots 1-
5 and all of lots 6-9 is similar to that of BCI, that
a mineral claim covering that the lots had been
sold to them in 1931 and produced evidence
such as the construction and tax payments.
BFD objected that the land in dispute was
covered by the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve under Proc. No. 217. And since it
was a forest land, it cannot be subject to
alienation, pursuant to the 1935 and 1973
Constitution.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
The Lower Court denied the application, while
the CA reversed the decision, affirming the
surface rights of the Dela Rosas, while also the
sub-surface rights of the BCI and Atok. In other
words, the CA ruled that the surface was to be
agricultural and mineral underneath.
ISSUE:
1. Who has better claim on the land in
dispute
2. WON land can be classified as both
agricultural and mineral at the same time.
HELD:
1ST ISSUE:
The Court held that BCI and Atok have vested
rights over the land. The Court found that the
mineral claims of both BCI and Atok have been
perfected prior to the approval of the 1935
Constitution. As a legal effect of a valid mineral
claim, it segregates the area from the public
domain and confers to the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim. As of 1935,
they were removed from the public domain and
had become private properties of BCI and
Atok. Even if the land was included in the
Central Cordillera forest reserve, it did not
impair the rights vested in both mining
companies. The claim of the Dela Rosas was
disregarded for weak evidence, and even so,
they could not have acquired the land through
prescription since the lad had already been
converted to mineral land.
2ND ISSUE:
No. Land cannot be classified as half
agricultural and half mineral. The Court held
that the classification of land must be
categorical: the land must either completely be
mineral or agricultural. In this case, while the
land was initially classified as forest land, it
ceases to be so and completely became
mineral when the mining claims were
perfected. Even if the surface was being tilled
by the Dela Rosas, it is still to be considered as
mineral land.
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As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon or underneath, it is still
mineral, and not agricultural.
Hence, the Court ruled that BCI and Atok have
exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the 1935
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
the lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands. It could not have been
transferred to private respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription not could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA was set
aside, and reinstated the decision of the lower
court.
9 Heirs of Gozo v. Philippine Union
Mission Corp. of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, G.R. No. 195990, [August 5, 2015])
LOZADA, Leah Amaya
FACTS:
Petitioners are heirs of Spouses Rafael and
Concepcion Gozo who possessed a property in
Brgy. Lala, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte of
236,638 sq.m.
Respondent (PUMC-SDA) claimed that a
portion of that property was donated to it by
spouses Gozo based on the deed of donation
dated 28 Feb. 1937.
When spouses Gozo donated the property in
1937, they were not yet the registered owners
of the property although they are the lawful
possessors thereof.
In 1953, the land was registered under the
name of spouses Gozo and an OCT was
issued in their favor pursuant to Homestead
Patent granted by the President of the Phil.
After Rafael Gozo’s dealth, his wife
Concepcion and their 6 children, herein
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
petitioners, caused the extrajudicial partition of
the property. Thus, the Register of Deeds
issued a TCT under the names of the
heirs/petitioners in 1954.
When Concepcion caused the survey and the
subdivision, it was at this point that respondent
brought to the attention of Concepcion that
5,000 sq.m. portion of the property is already
owned by it
based on the deed of donation. Upon learning
from the ROD that the donation was not
annotated in the title, petitioners refused to
recognize the donation. After Concepcion’s
death, the heirs/petitioners continued to pursue
their claims to recover the subject property
from respondent.
In 2000 or after 6 decades after the alleged
deed of donation was executed, petitioners
filed an action for declaration of nullity of deed
of donation and recovery of possession and
ownership against respondent. Petitioners
argued that the signatures of their parents in
the deed is not genuine and the donation lack
the formality of acceptance, hence invalid.
Respondent argued that since 1937 they are in
open, continuous, exclusive and adverse
possession of the property in the concept of an
owner, that they have built therein a church
and an elementary school and that the
petitioners’ claim of lack of acceptance 63
years after the deed was executed is already
barred by laches.
In 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of petitioners declaring that since the deed is
void for lack of acceptance, they are the rightful
owners thereof. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision on the ground of
laches stating that petitioners failed to assert
their rights over the land for
more than 60 years, thus laches had set in.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the donor is necessarily the
owner of the real estate donated?
RULING:
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No. The donors may be the possessor at the
time of the donation in 1937, but they are not
the owners thereof as the subject property was
part of the public domain. It was only in 1953
that ownership of the property was vested by
the State to the spouses Gozo by virtue of its
issuance of the OCT pursuant to the
Homestead Patent granted by the President of
the Phil. Hence the donor is not necessarily
the owner of the real property they donated
when the said property was still part of the
public domain (inalienable). The donors cannot
give what they do not have, nemo dat quod
non habet.
SANGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF
BATAAN VS. GARCIA
G.R. NO. 174964
OCTOBER 5, 2016
FACTS:
Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan
Cadastre, containing 1,222 square meters and
10,598 sq m, respectively, were registered in
the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots
were embraced in Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. N-182, and occupied by the Bataan
Community Colleges (BCC) and the Medina
Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades
(MLLSAT), both State-run schools. On
February 26, 1998, the Congress of the
Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8562, authored by Congressman Enrique T.
Garcia, Jr. (Cong. Garcia), converting the
MLLSAT into a polytechnic college, to be
known as the Bataan Polytechnic State
College (BPSC), and integrating thereto the
BCC.
All parcels of land belonging to the
government occupied by the Medina Lacson
de Leon School of Arts and Trades and the
Bataan Community Colleges are hereby
declared to be the property of the Bataan
Polytechnic State College and shall be titled
under that name: Provided, That should the
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
State College cease to exist or be abolished or
should such parcels of land aforementioned be
no longer needed by the State College, the
same shall revert to the Province of Bataan.
On the basis of the above provision, Cong.
Garcia wrote to then Governor of Bataan
Leonardo Roman, and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan (petitioner), requesting
them to cause the transfer of the title of the
aforesaid lots to BPSC. No transfer was
effected. Thus, Cong. Garcia, along with the
faculty members and some concerned
students of BPSC (collectively, the
respondents) filed a Special Civil Action for
Mandamus with the RTC of Balanga, Bataan
against the Governor and the petitioner.
Initially, the Board of Trustees of the BPSC
was impleaded as an unwilling plaintiff but was
eventually included as co-petitioner in the civil
suit pursuant to Resolution No
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of
land are patrimonial properties of the Province
of Bataan which cannot be taken without due
process of law and without just compensation?
HELD:
NO. Under the well-entrenched and
time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of
the public domain are under the absolute
control and ownership of the State. The State's
ownership of and control over all lands and
resources of the public domain are beyond
dispute. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution provides that “All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State
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REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA
G.R. NO. 186603
APRIL 5, 2017
FACTS:
A cadastral decree was issued in favor
of Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title
was issued in the name of Espinosa who later
sold to Caliston which a Transfer Certificate of
Title was issued. The State through Regional
Executive Director of the DENR filed a
Complaint for annulment of title and reversion
of land with the RTC claiming the property is
inalienable public land because it fell within the
timberland area.
RTC ruled in favor of the State and
ordered reversion of the property.
CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found
that the State failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation when she was issued the
Original Certificate of Title. It further ruled that
the State failed to prove that the property is
forest land. The lone piece of evidence
consisting of LC Map No, 2978 was not
authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.
It noted that the parties stipulated only
as to the existence of the map, but not as to
genuineness of truthfulness of its content.
Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence,
Espinosa’s rights over the property, which
accrued in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a
subsequent classification by the State done in
1986, or after 24 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State has
sufficiently proved that the property is part of
inalienable forest land at the time Espinosa
was granted the cadastral decree and issued a
title.
HELD:
No.
The State failed to prove that the
property was classified as forest land at the
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
time of the grant of the cadastral decree and
issuance of title to Espinosa. In land
registration proceedings, the applicant has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership. It must establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought
to be registered is alienable or disposable
based on a positive act of the government.
Since cadastral proceedings are governed by
the usual rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate
of title are issued only after the applicant
proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that
they are entitled to the claimed lot, that all
parties are heard, and that evidence is
considered. As such, the cadastral decree is a
judgment which adjudicates ownership after
proving these jurisdictional facts. Here, it is
undisputed that Espinosa was granted a
cadastral decree and was subsequently issued
OCT No. 191- N, the predecessor title of
Caliston’s TCT No. 91117. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding,
Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain. 33
This means that Espinosa, as the applicant,
was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence
that the property is alienable and disposable
property in the cadastral proceedings. This is
not to say, however, that the State has no
remedy to recover the property if indeed it is
part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain. The State may still do so through an
action for reversion, as in the present case.
IMPERIUM AND DOMINIUM
LEE HONG KOK VS. DAVID
GR NO.G.R. NO. L-3038
DECEMBER 27, 1972
Nature:
Lee Hong Kok, et al filed an appeal on
certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the lower court in dismissing the complaint to
have the Torrens Title of Aniano David be
declared null and void.
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Aniano David acquired lawful title to a
parcel of land pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application. An order of award and for
issuance of a sales patent was made by the
Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering
Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square
meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the
Naga Cadastre.
On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209
pursuant to which an OCT was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Naga City to Aniano
David.
Since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in
connection with said application, up to the
actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor,
Lee Hong Kok did not put up any
opposition or adverse claim to Lot 2892.
The opposition was fatal because after the
registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public
land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of RA
496 subject to all the safeguards provided
therein. Under Section 38 of RA 496, any
question concerning the validity of the
certificate of title based on fraud should be
raised within 1 year from the date of the
issuance of the patent otherwise the certificate
of title becomes indefeasible after the lapse of
1 year.
The contention of Lee Hong Kok was that
David’s lot is a private property for it was
formed thru the process of accretion.
ISSUE 1: Can the patent certificate of Aniano
David to the property be nullified?
HELD:
No.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
There is no legal justification for
nullifying the right to the disputed lot arising
from the grant made in his favor.
1. The lot in question is NOT a private
property as the Director of Lands and
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained its
public character for having been formed
by reclamation and not accretion.
a. RECLAMATION is the act of
filling submerged land by
deliberate acts and reclaiming
title thereto.
b. ACCRETION - is the process
whereby the soil is deposited;
accretion resulting from the
gradual deposit by or
sedimentation from the waters
belongs to the owners of the
land bordering on streams,
torrents, lakes, or rivers
i. Therefore the only
remedy available to the
appellants is an action
for reconveyance on the
ground of fraud.
QUESTION:
But did he commit any fraud?
NO. Aniano David has not
committed any fraud in applying for the
purchase of the Lot because everything
was done in the open. The notices
regarding the auction sale of the land
were published, the actual sale and
award thereof to Aniano David were not
clandestine but open and public official
acts of an officer of the Government.
The application was merely a renewal of
his deceased wife's application who had
occupied the land since 1938.
QUESTION: If the grant was presumed to be
invalid, who has the right to question it?
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
c. Only the Government,
represented by the Director of
Lands or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural
Resources can bring an action
to cancel a void certificate of
title pursuant to a void patent.
d. The private parties cannot
claim that the patent and title
issued for the land involved are
void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor
had they been declared as
owners in the cadastral
proceedings of the Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their
private property.
e. Citing Maninang vs Consolacion:
‘The fact that the grant was made
by the government is undisputed.
Whether the grant was in
conformity with the law or not is a
question which the government
may raise, but until it is raised by
the government and set aside,
the defendant cannot question it.
The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee
and the government.’
By what authority does the government
have in disposing of the land in question?
f. IMPERIUM refers to the
government authority possessed
by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty.
DOMINIUM, on the other hand, is
appropriate with reference to
lands held by the state in its
proprietary character. In such
capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and
other natural resources, including
their disposition, except as limited
by the Constitution.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
g. The manifestation of the concept
of jura regalia, which was
adopted by the present
Constitution, was embodied in
the universal feudal theory that
all lands were held from the
Crown, the ownership however
is vested in the state rather
than the head thereof.
h. As to the unappropriated public
lands constituting the public
domain, the sole power of
legislation is vested in Congress.
i. There being no evidence
whatever that the property in
question was ever acquired by
the applicants or their ancestors
either by composition title from
the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by
any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be
public domain (Heirs of Datu
Pendatun v. Director of Lands).
j. “No public land can be
acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or
implied, from the government.”
Therefore it is indispensable that
there be a showing of a title from
the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law
otherwise the property is and
remains part of the public
domain.
2. Was David’s title to the property already
indefeasible?
a. As far back as 1919, in Aquino
v. Director of Lands, Justice
Malcolm, speaking for the Court,
stated: "The proceedings under
the Land Registration Law and
under the provisions of
Chapter VI of the Public Land
Law are the same in that both
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST

are against the whole world, IPRA LAW (R.A. 8731)

both take the nature of judicial CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF DENR
proceedings, and for both the GR NO. 135385
decree of registration issued is DEC. 6, 2000
conclusive and final." FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar
b. Meanwhile in Cabacug v. Lao. Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
There is this revealing excerpt mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
appearing in that decision: "It is the constitutionality of certain provisions of
said, and with reason, that a Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
holder of a land acquired under Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
a free patent is more favorably and its implementing rules and regulations
situated than that of an owner (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions
of registered property. Not only of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
does a free patent have a force these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
and effect of a Torrens Title, but State’s ownership over lands of the public
in addition the person to whom it domain as well as minerals and other natural
is granted has likewise in his resources therein, in violation of the regalian
favor the right to repurchase doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of
within a period of five years." It is the Constitution.
quite apparent, therefore, that
petitioners' stand is legally ISSUE:
indefensible. Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the
Constitution?
RULING:
The decision of the CA of January 31, HELD:
1969 and its resolution of March 14, No, the provisions of IPRA do not
1969 are affirmed. contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
IMPORTANT CONCEPTS the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain.
IMPERIUM DOMINIUM Ownership over the natural resources in the
The State’s authority to govern is 1. The capacity of the State ancestral domains remains with the State and
embraced in the concept of to own and acquire the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
sovereignty that includes passing property. It covers such
laws concerning a territory, rights as title to land, over the natural resources in their ancestral
maintaining peace and order over it, exploitation and use of it, domains merely gives them, as owners and
and defending it against foreign and disposition or sale of
invasion. the same. occupants of the land on which the resources
2. It refers to lands held by are found, the right to the small scale utilization
the government in a
proprietary character: can of these resources, and at the same time, a
provide for the exploitation priority in their large scale development and
and use of lands and
other natural resources. exploitation.
When the State acts in this capacity, The Regalian Doctrine whereby all
jure imperii, it generally enjoys lands of the public domain belong to
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral
state immunity. the State, and anyone claiming title domains are not part of the lands of the public
has the burden to show ownership,
comes within this concept. In this
domain. They are private lands and belong to
capacity, jure gestium, the State the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
descends to the status of ordinary
persons and thus becomes liable as
of private land title that existed irrespective of
such. any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited

MARIA ANNY G. YANONG JMC COLLEGE OF LAW- LLB 5YR PROGRAM Page 12
 NATRES CASE DIGEST
form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
CARIÑO VS. INSULAR
GOVERNMENT
41 PHIL. 935 (1906)
FACTS:
Mateo Carino (appellant) filed his
petition in the Court of Land Registration to be
granted a parcel of land consisting of 146
hectares in Baguio, Province of Benguet
together with a house erected thereon.
It was granted, but the Government of
the Philippines and also on behalf of the United
States averred having taken possession of the
property for public and military purposes,
Respondents also asserted that they
had title to all the land in the Philippines except
to permit private lands to be acquired and no
prescription runs against the Spanish crown.
The US succeeded the title of Spain
through Treaty of Paris and Mateo’s land was
not registered and that he had lost all his
rights and now is deemed to be a mere
trespasser.
Then the Court of First Instance
dismissed the application for Mateo since he
did not possessed the land since time
immemorial and the land was property of the
Government.
The decision was affirmed by the
Philippine Supreme Court.
Thus the case was brought to the US
Supreme Court by virtue of Writ of
Error(general method of bringing cases to this
court, an appeal the exception, confined to
equity in the main.
Mateo Carino in his appeal stated that he is an
Igorot of the Province of Benguet, they have
owned the land for more than 50 years before
the Treaty of Paris ,they all had been
recognized as owners by the Igorots and had
inherited or received his land from his father in
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
accordance with Igorot custom. However, no
document of title had been issued from the
Spanish Crown
ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful
owner of the land by virtue of his possession of
it for some time.
HELD:
No.
The statute of limitations did not run
against the government. The government is
still the absolute owner of the land (regalian
doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the
land has not been of such a character as to
require the presumption of a grant. No one has
lived upon it for many years. It was never used
for anything but pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not
been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized
the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves
a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet
it has always insisted that he must make that
proof before the proper administrative officers,
and obtain from them his deed, and until he did
the State remained the absolute owner.
“In view of these provisions of the law, it
seems to us impossible to say that as to the
public agricultural lands in the Philippines there
existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse
of thirty or any other number of years that the
Government of Spain had granted to the
possessor thereof a legal title thereto.
The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the
Public Land Act, for the reason that the act is
not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The
judgment of the court below is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the
appellant.”
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ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES
AND DEEDS OF PASAY CITY VS. RTC
BRANCH 57 MAKATI
GR NO. 81564
APRIL 26, 1990
FACTS:
On November 5, 1985, Domingo
Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of
Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati,
Metro Manila for declaratory relief, quieting of
title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 192, and cancellation of entries upon
Original Certificate of Title No. 291.
Palomares had earlier come to this
Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar petition,
and in addition, to direct the Register of Deeds
to issue a duplicate owner's copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 291, embracing
allegedly Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the
(alleged) lost one. On September 9, 1985, the
Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
During the pendency of the case also,
Proclamation No. 192 (“RESERVING FOR
THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES
CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON”)
and Proclamation No. 423 (“RESERVING FOR
MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND
PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND
PASAY CITY”) were issued by the
government.
On August 29, 1986, the respondent
judge issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the petitioners to cease and desist
from performing the acts complained of.
In a subsequent memorandum, the
petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal had
conveyed the property to the Government of
the United States in 1906 and the Manila
Railroad Company on which Judge Ostrand,
the Presiding Judge of the Court of Land
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Registration, later Justice of this Court, had
stamped his imprimatur.
On October 12, 1987, the respondent
court issued an order which grants the
plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS MOTION in
order to safeguard the integrity of the land
embraced in OCT 291 and authorizes Plaintiff
Domingo C. Palomares:
1. To order such subdivision and/or
individual survey or surveys within
Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under
Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed
geodetic engineer or engineers at
plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate
and simplify the efficient administration
of the property described in OCT 291;
and
2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise
dispose (of) any area or areas or portion
or portions thereof, subject to the
approval of the Intestate Estate Court, to
cover expenses for the payment of
taxes to which the property is subject,
as well as expenses of administration
and for the protection of the integrity of
the said lands.
Eleven days later, or on October 23,
1987, it issued another order acting on the
plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987
praying for the issuance of a Writ of Execution
implementing the Order of the Court dated
October 12, 1987, to execute and perform the
acts authorized in the said Order of October
12, 1987 without the need of a Writ of
Execution, he may take whatever steps he
considers appropriate for the implementation of
the said Order without need of further Orders
or additional authority from the Court.
The petitioners filed a notice of appeal;
the respondent court, however, denied it" 3 "it
being directed against . . . an interlocutory
order.
Hence, this recourse.
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ISSUE: Whether or not, Proclamation 192 and
423 were valid in the absence of proof of
ownership of the property by the government?
HELD:
Yes.
While there is no presumption that
property is Government property until
otherwise shown, because the law recognizes
private ownership, thus:
Art. 425. Property of private ownership,
besides the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of all property
belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
we find hard evidence on record that:
(1) the property covered by OCT No.
291 had been conveyed to the United
States of America;
(2) it had been later ceded to the
Republic of the Philippines, and
(3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291
was cancelled upon final order of Judge
Ostrand.
Be that as it may, the private respondent
in G.R. No. 81564 is pressed hard to establish
the fact that portions of the property, especially
the open spaces referred to in the lower court's
writ of injunction and the private respondent's
manifestation of December 14, 1989, and
which open spaces it claims to be
outside Maricaban, are indeed outside
Maricaban (or OCT 291).
With respect, however, to parts thereof
on which Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga
Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport,
Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission
National Science and Development Board, and
National Housing Authority sit, the hands of the
private respondent are tied.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was
a counterfeit is not only self-serving, it finds no
support from the records.
The presumptions is "that official duty
has been regularly performed," and the burden
is on the private respondent to prove irregular
performance. The barren insistence that Judge
Ostrands order was a forgery is not sufficient to
overthrow the presumption. To begin with, the
act of forgery has been seasonably disputed by
the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting Registrar
of Deeds of Pasig, who supposedly certified to
the fake character of Judge Ostrand's order,
has himself joined the other petitioners in
opposing the reconveyance sought.
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
A. CONSTITUTION
PALOMO V. CA
266 SCRA 392
G.R. NO. 130906
FACTS:
In 1913, some 440,530 square meters
of land in Albay were reserved for provincial
park purposes by virtue of EO No. 40. Of said
area, 15 parcels of land were registered in the
name of Diego Palomo by the Court of First
Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these
lands to his heirs Ignacio and Carmen Palomo.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates
of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 30, 1950. The Register of
Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park. The Palomos contended that
they have been in possession of the subject
lands and have introduced improvements
thereon.
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ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles
issued to the petitioners valid?
HELD:
NO.
Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the
lands, whether agricultural, mineral, or forest
were under the exclusive patrimony and
dominion of the Spanish crown. Private
ownership of land could only be acquired
through royal concessions which were
documented in various forms, such as (1)
Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de
Compra or Title by Purchase and (4)
Informacion Posesoria or Possessory
Information title obtained under the Spanish
Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of
January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by
petitioners were not signed by the judge but
were merely certified copies of notification to
Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the
Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question were
not classified as alienable lands. Since the
lands were made part of a reservation for
provincial park purposes, they form part of the
forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid
subject of alienation.
REPUBLIC VS CANDY MAKER INC
GR. NO. 163766
JUNE 22, 2006
FACTS:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia Cruz
and Felisa Cruz executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel
of land located below the reglementary lake
elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away
the Laguna de Bay.
Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an
application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for
registration of its alleged title over the lot. The
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to
fall within the alienable and disposable zone.
On the other hand, the Land
Registration Authority recommended the
exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it
is a legal easement and intended for public
use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.
On July 2001, the Republic of the
Philippines, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) filed its opposition which
alleged that the lot subject of the application for
registration may not be alienated and disposed
since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake
Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the property subject of the
amended application is alienable and
disposable property of the State.
HELD:
Yes. The property subject of this
application was alienable and disposable
public agricultural land.
However, respondent failed to prove
that it possesses registrable title over the
property. The statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural lands does not operate
against the statute unless the occupant proves
possession and occupation of the same after a
claim of ownership for the required number of
years to constitute a grant from the State. A
mere casual cultivation of portions of the land
by the claimant does not constitute sufficient
basis for a claim of ownership, such
possession is not exclusive and notorious as to
give rise to presumptive grant from the state.
In light of the foregoing, the petition of
the Republic of the Philippines is granted.
CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
G.R. NO. 133250
JULY 9, 2002
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, the
government, through the Commissioner of
Public Highways, signed a contract with the
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines (“CDCP” for brevity) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty
percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA “to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas,” and “to
develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands.”
On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay”2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road
and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President
Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA
to amend its contract with CDCP, so that “[A]ll
future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded
and owned by PEA.” Accordingly, PEA and
CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement
dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
“(i) CDCP shall undertake all
reclamation, construction, and such
other works in the MCCRRP as may be
agreed upon by the parties, to be paid
according to progress of works on a unit
price/lump sum basis for items of work
to be agreed upon, subject to price
escalation, retention and other terms
and conditions provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the
financing required for such works shall
be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its
development rights and hereby agrees
to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all
of the rights, title, interest and
participation of CDCP in and to all the
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981
which have not yet been sold,
transferred or otherwise disposed of by
CDCP as of said date, which areas
consist of approximately Ninety-Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three
(99,473) square meters in the Financial
Center Area covered by land pledge No.
5 and approximately Three Million Three
Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888)
square meters of reclaimed areas at
varying elevations above Mean Low
Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First
Neighborhood Unit.”
On January 19, 1988, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA “the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP) containing a total area of one
million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square
meters.” Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of
PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the “Freedom Islands” located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands
have a total land area of One Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four
Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square
meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (“JVA” for brevity)
with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop
the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required
the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares
of submerged areas surrounding these islands
to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28,
1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5On
June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
through then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate
President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA
as the “grandmother of all scams.” As a result,
the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported
the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September
16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their
report are:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are
lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands;
(2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President
Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal
Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of
the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
No. 560. The members of the Legal Task
Force were the Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the
10
Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal
Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA,
contrary to the conclusions reached by the
Senate Committees.
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that
there were on-going renegotiations between
PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these
reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA
Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating
panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta
filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition
with Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994
seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed
the petition “for unwarranted disregard of
judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the
refiling of the case before the proper court.”12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez
(“Petitioner” for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose
billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of
the public domain as a blatant violation of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the
public domain to private corporations. Finally,
petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the
loss of billions of pesos in properties of the
State that are of public dominion.
On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed
an Omnibus Motion:
(a) to require PEA to submit the terms of
the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract;
(b) for issuance of a temporary
restraining order; and
(c) to set the case for hearing on oral
argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative
Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated
May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in
a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.]
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999,
the Court gave due course to the petition and
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
required the parties to file their respective
memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI
signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(“Amended JVA,” for brevity). On May 28,
1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E.
Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by
the Office of the President, petitioner now
prays that on “constitutional and statutory
grounds the renegotiated contract be declared
null and void.”
ISSUE: WON the transfer to AMARI lands
reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between
AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD:
On the issue of Amended JVA as
violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed
lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may
only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain
until classified as alienable
disposable lands open to disposition
and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas
are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to
transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void
for being contrary to Section 3, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks
to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable,
and further declare them no longer needed for
public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain
to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
or
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17 Alba vs Court of Appeals (GR No.
120066, 9/9/1999) ENERO, Jomari Ivan
Tagud
GR 120066, September 9, 1999
FACTS:
In 1958, Lachica filed an application for title to
a 4,485 sq.m. parcel of land which he had
acquired through purchase dating back to
1945. However, some parties filed their
opposition thereto invoking that they are
owners of some parts of land within the total
area applied for. The lower court ruled in
favor of Lachica and held, among others, that
Lachica had been in actual, open and
continuous possession of the subject land in
the concept of owner since 1945 and thus had
acquired it through prescription.
ISSUE:
Did Lachica acquire the subject property by
prescription?
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.
Based from the facts and evidences presented,
it was proven that Lachicha only had a title to a
620sq.m. portion of the total area. Prescription
cannot be had on the remaining area as the
Court held that the law applicable in this case
is Sec. 48 of CA 141 (wc deals with registration
of lands of public domain) and not Sec. 19 of
Act 496 (wc deals with registration of private
lands) and with which the lower courts had
relied on.
The law in force at the time an action accrues
is what governs the proceeding consistent with
the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
proved. In this case, the lower courts relied on
the provisions on prescription with the
assumption that the subject property is a
private land. However, the application for
registration should be that of a judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title considering
that the land is presumed under the Regalian
Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Public lands are classified into (1) alienable or
disposable lands which includes agricultural
lands and (2) inalienable or non-disposable
lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation which includes Timber lands and
Mineral lands. For purposes of administration
and disposition, the lands of the public domain
classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are
further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.]
Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar
productive purposes; c.] Educational,
charitable or other similar purposes, and d.]
Reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public purposes.
Possession of public agricultural land, however
long the period may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor and it
is because the statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.
Under (b), Sec. 48, CA 141, confirmation of an
imperfect title to a public domain requires that:
1. There be an open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain;
2. It should be under a bona fide claim of
ownership; and
3. possession should be for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure
In this case, Lachica had not yet satisfied the
requirement of the 30 years possession,
hence, prescription cannot be granted in favor
of him. JOM
18 Republic vs Imperial (GR No. 130906,
2/11/1990) DALISAY, Armando, Jr. D
Case Digest: Republic vs. Imperial
FACTS:
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias
Imperial was issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No.
55173 of then Court of First Instance of
Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and
further subdivided resulting in the issuance
of several titles, which are now the subjects
of herein petition in the name of private
respondents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a case with the trial court
to judicially declare the Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein
private respondents null and void on the
ground that the subject land, on which the
OCT was based, has the features of a
foreshore land based on an investigation
conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi
City. Respondents, on the other hand
contend that Director of Lands found Jose
Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655,
which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be
"definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private
respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita
Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their
answer with cross-claim, while the rest,
namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial,
Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed
a motion to dismiss. They contended that
the adjudication by the cadastral court is
binding against the whole world including
the Republic since the cadastral
proceedings are in rem and the government
itself through the Director of Lands
instituted the proceedings and was a direct
and active participant therein. Petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed an objection to the motion to dismiss.
After hearing the motion to dismiss, the
trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the judgment rendered by the
cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and
the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet
title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the
parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500)
was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and for
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
failure to file the appellants brief within the
extended period granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should
be granted.
HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether
the parcels of land in question are
foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of
the alienable land of the public domain and
may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of
the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides." It is also known as "a strip of
land that lies between the high and low
water marks and, is alternatively wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a
function of the executive branch of
government, specifically the director of
lands (now the director of the Lands
Management Bureau). The decision of the
director of lands when approved by the
Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive
upon the court.
There is allegedly a conflict between the
findings of the Director of Lands and the
DENR, Region V, in the present case.
Respondents contend that the Director of
Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by
TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT
408(500), to be "definitely outside of the
foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other
hand, claims that subsequent investigation
of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City,
disclosed that the land covered by OCT No.
408 (500) from whence the titles were
derived "has the features of a foreshore
land." The contradictory views of the
Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V,
Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land,
which contradiction was neither discussed
nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
premise of any conclusive classification of
the land involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and
for all whether the lands subject of
petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore
lands constitutes good and sufficient cause
for relaxing procedural rules and granting
the third and fourth motions for extension
to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal
presents an exceptional circumstance
impressed with public interest and must
then be given due course.
In the case at bar, the need to determine
once and for all whether the lands subject
of petitioners reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and
sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth
motions for extensions to file appellants
brief. Petitioner Republics appeal presented
an exceptional circumstance impressed
with public interest which in the Courts
discretion must be given due course.
19 Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals
and Bisnar (GR No. 83609, 10/26/1989)
CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (178
SCRA 708)
Facts:
On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed
their joint application for the registration of two
parcels of land, located in the province of
Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They claimed that
they inherited those parcels of land. The
Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development opposed the application
on the ground that said parcels of land were
part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it
cannot be the subject of the registration
proceedings. After the hearing, the CFI ordered
the registration of the title of the lots in the
names of the applicants, herein private
respondents after finding that the applicants
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
and their predecessors- in-interest have been
in open, public, continuous, peaceful and
adverse possession of the subject parcels of
land under bona fide claims of ownership for
more than 80 years. The CA affirmed the CFI’s
decision, holding that the classification of the
lotsas timberland by the Director of Forestry
cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the
said lots are indeed more valuable as forest
land than as agricultural land, citing as
authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands (40 Phil.10).
Issue/s:
Whether or not the possession of forestlands
or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private
ownership.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that possession of
forestlands, however long, cannot ripe ninto
private ownership. It emphasized that a
positive act of the government, particularly the
Executive Department is needed to declassify
land, which is classified as forest, and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes before
registration of which may proceed. The Court,
citing various cases, stated that a parcel of
forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry, an office under the
Executive Department, and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System.
20 Montano vs Insular Government (GR
No. 3714, 1//26/1909) CEBALLOS, Jesus
Cadavez
Facts:
Montano applied for land registration of
a parcel of land used for fishery in Libis,
Caloocan. This was opposed to by the
Solicitor-General (Sol. Gen.) contending that
the land is owned by the US Government as
well as Obras Pias de la Sagrda Mitra as it was
the absolute owner of the lot.
The Court of Land Registration granted
the application of Montano. Only the Sol. Gen.
appealed the decision.
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Issue:
Whether the lands used as a fishery , for
the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland
some distance from the sea, and asserted,
though not clearly proved to be overflowed at
high tide could be registered as private
property.
Held:
Yes, it can.
The Supreme Court held that since fish
ponds are not classified as forest or mineral
lands, it must necessarily be agricultural land.
The Court noted that before Montano owned
the lot, bacawan had been sown and
propagated in the mud by the owner.
The Court also noted that government
land is NOT similar to public domain or public
land. Government land includes not only public
domain, but also other lands of the
Government already reserved or developed to
public use or subject to private right.
Government owns real estate which is
part of public lands and other real estate which
is not part thereof. There is much real property
belonging to the Government which is not
affected by statutes for the settlement,
prescription or sale of public lands. Examples
in point are properties occupied by public
buildings or devoted to municipal or other
governmental uses.
21 Lee Hong Kokvs David (GR No.G.R.
No. L-30389, 12/27/1972) CAMASURA,
Jayson Ug-ay
FACTS:
§ Aniano David acquired lawful title
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application in accordance with which an
order of award and for issuance of a sales
patent (*similar to public auction) was made
by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958,
covering Lot 2892.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
§ On the basis of the order of award of the
Director of Lands the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued
on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT
No. 510 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.
§ Land in question is not a private property
as the Director of Lands and the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
always sustained the public character for
having been formed by reclamation (as
opposed to peittioners contention that it is
accretion)
§ The only remedy: action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But
there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES:
1. W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the
grant. - NO
2. W/N David has original acquisition of
title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal
justification for nullifying the right of David to
the disputed lot arising from the grant made in
his favor by respondent officials)
§ Only the Government, represented by
the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate
of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The
legality of the grant is a question between
the grantee and the government. Private
parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim that
the patent and title issued for the land
involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they
been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property.
§ Well-settled Rule : no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
grant, express or implied, from the
government
§ Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land
acquired under a free patent is more
favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free
patent have a force and effect of a Torrens
Title, but in addition the person to whom it
is granted has likewise in his favor the right
to repurchase within a period of 5 years.
§ Imperium v. Dominium
1. Imperium - government authority
possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty
2. Dominium - capacity to own or
acquire property. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held
by the state in its proprietary character. In
such capacity, it may provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.
22 Director of Lands vs CA and Valeriano
(GR No. 58867, 6/22/1984)
CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan
23 Menguito vs Republic (GR No. 134308,
12/14/2000) BENITEZ, Winnie L
Menguito v. Republic
[G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000]
FACTS:
A petition for review assailing the Court of
Appeals Sept 30, 1997 decision against the
Menguito’s –the petitioners, with promulgated
resolution 10-Mos. later reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The
RTC decision confirmed the application for the
titling of the parcel of land with aggregate area
of 2112 sqm located at Brgy Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, in favor of the Menguito’s.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
The application of TCT was brought by the
operation of the Land Registration of Authority
as amended by the Property Registration
Decree No. 1529 proceeding to declare:
1. That its applicants –the Menguito’s, are
owners, in fee simple, these 11 parcels of land.
2. Listing the applicants lot title numbers,
attendant documents given with their
respective Technical Descriptions.
For the said application, the RTC of Pasig
issued a notice of its initial hearing against the
whole world publishing the same at Abante
Tabloid on April 5, 1989.
Seven days earlier, however, March 30,
1989, the Office of Solicitor General, filed its
contention as:
1. Applicants nor its predecessor’s
in interest were neither in open,
continuous, exclusive, adverse and
notorious possession or
occupation of the land they applied
for since 1945.
2. Applicants don’t have
competent and sufficient evidence
of bonafide acquisition –without
open, uninterrupted-continuous,
exclusive, adverse or notorious
occupation of the lot in the concept
of the owner and so appearing not
genuine or indicative of pretended
possession.
3. Titling from fee simple with
Spanish grant title were not
anymore available after Feb 16,
1976 as required by PD 892.
4. That the said parcel of
land applied for is part of the public
domain and belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines –and
not subject to private appropriation.
The OSG thus stated its valid opposition on the
presented documents by the applicants leaving
its prayers that said application be denied and
land in question be reverted to the ownership
of the Republic of the Philippines.
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At the appellate court, the RTC’s decision
favoring the registrations of the land applied
were reversed and thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA’s did not err in its
decision to reverse the trial court findings.
HELD: No. The petition is without merit.
The Court cited Sec. 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended,
provide the registration the registration of the
title of lands in this wise;
“(b) Who by themselves, or their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land
in the concept of the owner.”
The Court thus observed that the petitioners
have insufficient evidence on this.”
The Court likewise pointed that;
• Applicants to avail the OCT they must
overcome the presumption that the land
they applied for forms part of the public
domain and if so, it has to be shown as re-
classified or alienated to a private person
by the state.
• Otherwise, the land remain inalienable
public domain.
• To overcome this, an incontrovertible or
clear and convincing evidence must be
presented.
• The court observed that applicants
possession were tacked only as far back
as 1948 to its predecessors of interest –the
same must have shown that their
predecessors in interest were in
possession of the property by some 30-
years back or 1938 before WW-2.
The court find the petitioners
failed to show it even as they claimed that
Cirilo Menguito once declared the land for tax
purposes in 1943 –yet failed to show
documentary evidence to support the claim.
The court therefore find no
reason to modify the appellate court’s decision
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
-thus denied the petition and declared cost
against petitioner.
Note:
Menguito v. Republic:
“Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered
as a title.
24 MesinavsSonza (GR No. L-14722,
5/25/1960) BANTUGAN
25 Susi vsRazon (G.R. No. L-
24066December 9, 1925) BALUCANAG,
April Gem Balansag
FACTS:
On September 5, 1899, Valentin Susi bought a
parcel of land from Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza. Prior to such purchase, the said
sellers have been in an open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of the land for
19 years.
After the purchase, Valentin Susi took
possession of the land in an open, continuous,
adverse and public manner and without
interruption. However on September 13, 1913,
the possession was interrupted when Angela
Razon filed an action to recover possession of
the land. The Court of First Instance dismissed
Angela Razon’s complaint.
Despite the dismissal of the case, Angela
Razon filed for the purchase of the disputed
land with the Director of Lands. Valentin Susi
filed his opposition and asserted his right over
the land. However, the Director of Land
overruled the opposition and sold the land the
Angela Razon on the ground that the land was
still and public land and Valentin Susi does not
have a title over it.
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
ISSUE:
WON Valentin Susi already acquired title to the
land.
HELD:
YES. Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously,
adversely and publicly personally and through
his predecessors for 45 years. This being the
case, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of United States in Cariño vs
Government of the Philippine Islands is
applicable. Here, it held that To acquire a right
to a certificate of title over a land of the public
domain, under the provisions of Chapter VI of
Act No. 926, as amended by Chapter VIII of
Act No. 2874, an open, adverse, public and
continuous possession from July 26,1894, is
sufficient, provided the possessor makes
application therefor under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. The possessor
under such circumstances acquires by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the government, and the actual
issuance of a title is not necessary in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.
In the present case all the requirements for a
grant were complied with since Valentin Susi
has been in possession of the land in question
openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly,
personally and through his predecessors, since
the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years.
By a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it
had already ceased to be the public domain
and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,
in selling the land in question to Angela Razon,
the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and
the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right.
26 Alba vs Court of Appeals (GR No.
120066, 9/9/1999) APURADA, Kathryne
Vencio
Facts:
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for
title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that
the land applied for was purchased by him and
his wife, Adela Raz from one Eulalio Raz. The
documents attached to the application are:
technical description, surveyor's certificate,
certification by the chief deputy assessor of
Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277. The
land applied for is residential.
The initial hearing was held on and an order of
general default was issued but those who
presented their opposition, namely, Octabela
Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana
Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia
Rebeco.
Petitioners contended that they were the real
owners of the subject land, which they have
been possession continuously, openly and
peacefully under claim of ownership for not
less than 70 years together with their
predecessor-in-interest, and the applicant is
only entitled to have the portion of 620 square
meters which is contrary to his application of
4,845 square meters.
The trial court finds that Dr. Jose Lachica as
the absolute owner in fee simple of the land
described in his application for its original
registration in his name.
Issue:
WON the private respondent/applicant is
entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in
fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel
of land he applied for.
Held: NO
In Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141,
(which is the law enforced during the filing of
application) as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and
6236, which states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their
claim and issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
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(a) Those who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the United States
have applied for the purchase, composition or
other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then
in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for
any other cause, not received title therefor, if
such applicants or grantees and their heirs
have occupied and cultivated said lands
continuously since the filing of their
applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities
who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled
to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision
readily shows that in the affirming the ruling of
the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on
the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in
relation to the Civil Code's provision's on
prescription on the assumption that the subject
land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the
appellate court's postulate. The application for
registration of private respondent is for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title considering
that the land is presumed under the Regalian
Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
The private respondent failed to satisfy the
Supreme Court that he complied the condition
set forth for the judicial confirmation of his title
for the following reasons, to wit;
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
a. as to the (a) of Section 48 of CA 141-
respondent did present any imperfect title with
Spanish decree.
b. as to the (b) of Section 48 of CA 141-
prescription cannot be applied as there were
no express grant from the government that the
subject land was amongst the agricultural land
certified as alienable and disposable.
Ultimately, No public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or
implied from the government; it is
indispensable that there be a showing of title
from the state.
c. nor he is members as specified on the (c)
condition of CA 141.
27 Republic vs Court of Appeals and
Naguit (GR No. 1/17/2005) ANTOPINA,
Babielen Poliquit
Facts:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land. The
application sought a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Angeles opposed the petition.
The court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except as to Angeles
and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel
of land was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945.
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor
of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced
all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent
Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-
in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees in
addition to existing coconut trees which were
then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had
occupied the land openly and in the concept of
owner without any objection from any private
person or even the government until she filed
her application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in
open, continuous and exclusive possession
must first be alienable. Since the subject land
was declared alienable only on October 15,
1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
as required by Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the
land was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all
lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June
12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that
the subject land be first classified as alienable
and disposable before the applicant’s
possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
Held:
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings,
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing
of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) – that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation, and; that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands
as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12,
1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
The more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of
registration of title under Section 14(1) had
been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
been declared alienable; Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land
evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the
time she purchased the property; as well as the
tax declarations executed by the original owner
Urbano in 1954, which strengthened one's
bona fide claim of ownership.
28 Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic,
G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL
244-326) JESURA
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed
an application for land registration before the
RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of
land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of
71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that
he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and
peaceful possession of the land for more than
thirty
(30) years. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–
the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon
Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But
by
1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become
the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them
in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that
was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan
during trial was a Certification dated 11 June
2001, issued by the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office, Department of
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject
property was “verified to be within the Alienable
or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December
2002, the RTC approved the application for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court
of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the application of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of
June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing
of the
applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land under a bona fide claim
of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land
classified as alienable and disposable be
deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?
HELD:
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
The Petition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms
that “those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on
the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable,
subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized
as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development
of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of
the government. The person acquires
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by
which patrimonial property may be acquired,
oneordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good
faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is
insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they
presented in particular—is to the year 1948.
Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section
14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
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29 Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic,
G.R. No. 179987, [September 3, 2013
COSTAN
30 Palomo vs CA (GR No. 95608,
1/21/1997) TAN, Cesnee Joyce V.
Palomo v. CA (266 SCRA 392, G.R. No.
130906)
FACTS:
In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land
in Albay were reserved for provincial park
purposes by virtue of EO No. 40. Of said area,
15 parcels of land were registered in the name
of Diego Palomo by the Court of First Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to
his heirs Ignacio and Carmen Palomo.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates
of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 30, 1950. The Register of
Deeds of Albay issued Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914
sometime in October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued
Proclamation No. 47 converting the area
covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park. The Palomos contended that
they have been in possession of the subject
lands and have introduced improvements
thereon.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles
issued to the petitioners valid? –NO
HELD
Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands,
whether agricultural, mineral, or forest were
under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of
the Spanish crown.Private ownership of land
could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in
various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal
Grant," (2) Concession Especial or Special
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or
Possessory Information title obtained under the
Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal
Decree of January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by
petitioners were not signed by the judge but
were merely certified copies of notification to
Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the
Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question were
not classified as alienable lands. Since the
lands were made part of a reservation for
provincial park purposes, they form part of the
forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid
subject of alienation.
31 Republic vs Bracewell[G.R. No.
107427. January 25, 2000] TACDER,
Lovella Fe Madelo
Facts:
The controversy involves a total of nine
thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657)
square meters of land located in Las Piñas,
Metro Manila.
In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James
Bracewell, Sr., who acquired the said parcels
of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez
families of Las Piñas; after which
corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in
the name of Maria Cailles.
On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the
said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner,
by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly
annotated and registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were
thereafter issued in the name of petitioner,
canceling the previous Tax Declarations issued
to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before
the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal
an action for confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
141.
The Director of Lands, represented by the
Solicitor General, opposed petitioner's
application on the grounds that neither he nor
his predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the subject land nor have they
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the
application, and that the subject land is part of
the public domain.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an
Order granting the application of petitioner. The
Solicitor General promptly appealed to
respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992,
reversed and set aside the lower court's Order.
It also denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution of September
30, 1992.
Issues:
a) Whether the failure of the petitioner to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time?
b) Whether the tax declarations attached to the
complaint do not constitute acquisition of the
lands applied for?
Held:
The controversy is simple. On one hand,
petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject
land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, having by himself and through his
predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject
parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the
other hand, it is the respondents' position that
since the subject parcels of land were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March
27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to
confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years
possession met.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court
of Appeals, where a homestead patent issued
to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was
cancelled on the ground that at the time it was
issued, the subject land was still part of the
public domain.
In the said case, this Court ruled as follows —
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State
(Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for
registration. The applicant must show that the
land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. These petitioners failed to do.
The homestead patent was issued to
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject
land belong to the inalienable and
undisposable portion of the public domain.
Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake
or oversight is void ab initio because at the
time the homestead patent was issued to
petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the
original patent applicant, the Director of Lands
was not then authorized to dispose of the same
because the area was not yet classified as
disposable public land. Consequently, the title
issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of
Lands is void ab initio.
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the
subject Forestry Administrative Order
recognizes private or vested rights under which
his case may fall. We only find on record the
Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest
Development from which no indication of such
exemption may be gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
action for his application for confirmation of
imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the
other errors raised in this petition.
32 Republic vs Court of Appeals and
Bernabe (GR No. L-40402, 3/16/1987)
RAÑON, Rexie Monicimpo
FACTS:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was
declared public land in a decision rendered
before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19,
LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6,
1965 such lot was segregated from the forest
zone and released and certified by the Bureau
of Forestry (BOF) as an agricultural Land for
disposition under the Public Land Act. On April
26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of
Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their
titles to said lots. They alleged that they
acquired ownership and possession of said
parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same
including that of the herein respondents, has
always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of
owners for more than 30 years. The Director
of Forestry filed an opposition to the above
petition but later withdrew the same upon
verification of findings that this portion of the
timberland had already been released from the
mass of the public forests. Subsequently, the
Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf
of the Director of Lands filed his opposition
alleging that the land is still a Public Land and
as such cannot be the subject of a land
registration proceeding under Act 496. The
lower court adjudicated in favor or respondent
Bernabes, finding that the latter have complied
with all the terms and conditions entitling them
to a grant. This decision having become final,
the Commissioner of Land Registration issued
the corresponding decrees of registration. On
the other hand, petitioner DL through the
Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the
decrees. Afterwards, he filed an Amended
Petition for Review, adding: that respondents
executed simulated deeds of sale conveying
portions of the subject parcels to third parties
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
for fictitious considerations in order to remove
the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act
496, but in truth, buyers are mere dummies of
petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value.
The Court of First Instance denied this petition
and on appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned
decision. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied for lack of
merit; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the lots claimed by respondents could be
legally be the subject of a juridical confirmation
of Title under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act 141 as amended by Republic Act 1942.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b)
of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to
public lands. Forest lands or areas covered
with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of
forest lands, however long cannot ripen into
private ownership. A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the Torrens System. Thus, even if the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at
all possible, private respondents have not
qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA
141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9
mos. and 20 days of possession and
occupation of the lots involved, counted from
July 6, 1965 when the lots involved had been
segregated from the forest zone and released
by the BOF as an agricultural land for
disposition under the Public Land Act. As
such, respondents and their predecessors in
interest could not have possessed the lots for
the required period of 30 years as disposable
agricultural land.
33 Republic v. Bautista, Jr., G.R. No.
166890, [June 28, 2016]) PLAZA,
Mariafe Manatad
FACTS:
Apolonio Bautista Jr. acquired lot 17078
through succession, when his father Apolonio
Sr. died in 1987. He applied judicial
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
confirmation of imperfect title before MTC with
testimonial evidence that his father was in
possession of the said lot since 1969 and
acquired it from Jardin and Villanueva, through
notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 15, 1971 and May 25, 1973
respectively. The MTC granted the application
and declared him as the owner in fee simple of
the said land.
The Government of the Philippines appealed
before CA, contending that the testimony of
Apolonio Jr. is an hearsay which should not be
given probative value. The application of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title must
comply with Sec. 48(b) of CA 141. The CA
affirmed the ruling of MTC, it pointed out that
the Government of the Phil. did not timely
object to the evidence presented.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of judicial confirmation
of imperfect title to Apolonio Jr proper?
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of MTC
and CA. It held that the requisite period of
possession must conform with Sec 48(b) of
Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942
which provides that any person who applies for
judicial confirmation, he or his predecessor in
interest must have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable land of
public domain under the bonafide claim of
ownership at least 30 years since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
In the present case, the lower court relied only
on the testimony of Bautista Jr. that his father
acquired the land and in possession since
1969. He failed to prove that the transferor had
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of said land for at least 30 years
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Bautista Jr. has
no personal knowledge of these facts. Lack of
this evidence does not give the court the right
to grant a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
in favor of Bautista Jr.
34 MIAA vs Court of Appeals (GR
No. 155650, 7/20/2006) PELAEZ, Chester
Bryan Pepito
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Facts:
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City. The Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
issued Opinion No. 061 which states that the
Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the
exemption from real estate tax granted to
MIAA. Thus, MIAA negotiated with City of
Parañaque to pay the real estate tax imposed
by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real
estate tax already due.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate
Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque
for the taxable years 1992 to 2001 amounting
to 624M. The City of Parañaque, through its
City Treasurer, also issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and
Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque
threatened to sell at public auction the Airport
Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay
the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA thus
sought a clarification of OGCC Opinion No.
061. The OGCC issued Opinion No. 147
clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061 and pointed
out that Local Government Code requires
persons exempt from real estate tax to show
proof of exemption. The OGCC opined that
Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof
that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA
then filed with the Court of Appeals an original
petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on,
levying against, and auctioning for public sale
the Airport Lands and Buildings. However, this
was dismissed due to because MIAA filed it
beyond the 60-day reglementary period. The
Court of Appeals also denied MIAA's motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Hence, MIAA filed a petition
for review before the SC.
Issue:
WON the Land and Buildings of MIAA are part
of the public dominion and thus cannot be the
subject of levy and auction sale.
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Held:
Yes. The Court held that the land and buildings
of MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since
the airport is devoted for public use, for the
domestic and international travel and
transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this
is for support of its operation and for regulation
and does not change the character of the land
and buildings of MIAA as part of the public
dominion.
As part of the public dominion the land and
buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce of
man. To subject them to levy and public
auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the
President issues a proclamation withdrawing
the airport land and buildings from public use,
these properties remain to be of public
dominion and are inalienable. As long as the
land and buildings are for public use the
ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines.
35 Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kalibovs Municipality of Buruanga (GR No.
149145, 3/31/2006) PASAOL, Ric
Jason Patlingrao
36 Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry (GR No. L-27873, 11/29/1983)
PAMISARAN, Excel Joy Gemota
37 Ankronvs Government of the
Philippines (GR No. 14213, 8/23/1919)
NALLA, Glene Alacayde
Facts: This case involves an application for
registration under the Torrens system of a
certain parcel of land. The only opposition
of the said application which was
presented by the Director of Landswas that
the land in question was the property of the
Government of the United States under the
control and administration of the
Government of the Philippine Islands. The
lower court ordered and decreed that said
parcel of land be registered in the name of
the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject,
however, to the right of the Government of
the Philippine Islands to open a road
thereon in the manner and conditions
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
mentioned in said decision. On appeal,
appellant, contented, among others that,
that portions of said land cannot be
registered in accordance with the existing
Land Registration Law for the reason that
they are manglares.
Issue: WON the land in question cannot
registered?
Ruling:
The mere fact that a tract of land has trees
upon it or has mineral within it is not of
itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land.
There must be some proof of the extent and
present or future value of the forestry and
of the minerals. While, as we have just said,
many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral"
lands, and that in each case it is a question
of fact, we think it is safe to say that in
order to be forestry or mineral land the
proof must show that it is more valuable for
the forestry or the mineral which it contains
than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7,
Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show
that there exists some trees upon the land
or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and,
by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or
mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the
rapid growth of timber or the discovery of
valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently
classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular
case, having regard for its present or future
value for one or the other purposes. We
believe, however, considering the fact that
it is a matter of public knowledge that a
majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands, that the
courts have a right to presume, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown. Whatever the
land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land
must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
superior value for one purpose or the other
is a question of fact to be settled by the
proof in each particular case. The fact that
the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is
not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral land. It may perchance belong to
one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government, in the first instance, under the
provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions
of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made.
In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue
of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may
decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land.
38 Sta. Rosa Development
Corporation vs CA (GR No. 112526,
10/12/2001) MISTERIO, John Kessler
Sumauang
FACTS:
The case is a petition regarding Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board’s
(DARAB) order of compulsory acquisition of
petitioner’s property under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Development Corporation
(SRRDC), was the registered owner of two
parcel of land situated at Brgy. Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna. According to them, these
lands are watersheds which provide clean and
potable (drinkable) water to the Canlubang
community and that 90 light industries are
located in that area.
They were alleging respondents usurped its
rights over their property thereby destroying
the ecosystem. Since the said land provides
water to the residents, respondents sought an
easement of a right of a way to and from
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Barangay Castile, to which, by counterclaim,
Sta. Rosa sought ejectment against
respondents.
Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case
for compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa
Property under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
Compulsory acquisition is the power of the
government to acquire private rights in land
without the willing consent of its owner or
occupant in order to benefit the society.
The said land was inspected by the Municipal
and Agrarian Reform Officer, and upon
consensus of the authorities concerned, they
decided that the said land must be placed
under compulsory acquisition.
Petitioners filed an objection on the ground
that:
· The area is not appropriate for
agricultural purposes.
· The area was rugged in terrain with
slopes 18% and above. (which falls under
the exception in compulsory acquisition of
CARP)
· The occupants of the land were illegal
settlers or (squatters) who by no means are
entitled to the land as beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
· Whether or not the property in question
is covered by CARP despite the fact that
the entire property formed part of a
watershed area prior to the enactment of
R.A No. 6657
· Whether the petition of land
conversion of the parcels of land may be
granted?
HELD:
Watershed is one of those enumerated by
CARP to be exempt from its coverage.
· Art. 67 of PD 1067 provides that Any
watershed or any area of land adjacent to
any surface water or overlying any ground
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
water may be declared by the Department
of Natural resources as a protected area.
· Watersheds may be defined as an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which
separates it from adjacent watersheds.
We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed
parcels of land form a vital part of an area that
need to be protected for watershed purposes.
The protection of watersheds ensures an
adequate supply of water for future generations
and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an
intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the
Supreme Court opines that the area must be
maintained for watershed purposes for
ecological and environmental considerations
despite the 88 families who are beneficiaries of
the CARP. It is important that a larger view of
the situation be taken because of the
thousands of residents downstream if the
watershed will not be protected and maintained
for its natural purpose.
Despite Supreme Court’s strong opinion of
protection of watersheds as an
intergenerational responsibility, they, however
ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation
of the case since the said land falls under
exception.
39 Collado vs Court of Appeals (GR
No. 107764, 10/4/2002) LOZADA, Leah
Amaya
FACTS:
Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the
land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”), situated
in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the application
was a technical description, stating “this survey
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.” The
Solicitor General filed oppositions to the
application. Petitioners (Edna Collado and her
co-applicants) allege that they have occupied
the Lot since time immemorial. Their
possession has been open, public, notorious
and in the concept of owners. They paid all real
estate taxes and submitted evidence to prove
that there have been 9 transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-
interest. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners
for having presented sufficient evidence to
establish registrable title over the property.
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioners have registrable title over
the Lot. NO.
(2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over
the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO
33? NO.
HELD:
(1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside
the literal description of Marikina Watershed
Reservation (MWR). Their main claim over the
Lot is that “all Presidential proclamations like
the proclamation setting aside the MWR are
subject to private rights.” EO 33 (which
established the MWR) has a saving clause that
the reservations are “subject to existing private
rights, if any there be.”
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. The Spaniards first introduced the
doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically,
Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid
the foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain." Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories
and possessions" in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown.
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the
Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893.
The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree
of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the
Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies.
The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the
"adjustment" or registration of all agricultural
lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the
state.
Four years later, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights,
interests and claims over the national territory
of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the
United States colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926,
the first Public Land Act, which was described
as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was
passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions
of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public
lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers
upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish
concessions and grants in the Islands." In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the
Name: I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural
Resources First Set_ Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the
government’s title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States.
The term "public land" referred to all lands of
the public domain whose title still remained in
the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
patrimonial property of the government and the
friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue
that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution
readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the
public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution
belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource:
The term "natural resource" includes "not only
timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and
submerged lands, but also, features which
supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community,
and are essential to the well-being thereof and
proper enjoyment of property devoted to park
and recreational purposes."
(2) An applicant must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain and that he has an
interest to warrant registration in his name
arising from an imperfect title (may have been
derived from old Spanish grants or titles). In
the case at bar, petitioners were unable to
acquire a valid and enforceable right or title
because of the failure to complete the required
period of possession (at least 30 years).
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and
disposable land prior to the issuance of EO 33
in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a
watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
disposable and inalienable public land. At the
time petitioners filed their application on April
25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a
watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to
the filing of petitioners’ application.
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40 Director of Forestry vs. Villareal
(GR No. L-32266, 2/27/1989) LARANAS,
Rascille Mae Dagoon
FACTS: The said land consists of 178,113
square meters of mangrove swamps located in
the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto
Villareal applied for its registration on January
25, 1949, alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than forty
years. He was opposed by several persons,
including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the
application was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition
for review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject
to private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed. It is undisputed by the
parties that the land in dispute is a mangrove
land HOWEVER the legal nature of mangrove
swamps or manglares are still in contention.
Director of Forestry claims that it is forestall
and is not disposable. On the other hand,
Private respondents insists that it is alienable
as agricultural land.
ISSUES: Are mangrove swamps classified as
public forest lands?
RULING: YES. Part of our public forest lands,
they are not alienable under the Constitution or
are they considered public agricultural lands;
they may be acquired under private ownership.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public
forests of the Philippines as defined in the
aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so
determined, we have no authority to ignore or
modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the
exercise of our own discretion. The statutory
definition remains unchanged to date and, no
less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly,
the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. L-32266 | February 27, 1989 | Cruz,
J.
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is
thus presumed valid and so must be
respected. We repeat our statement in
the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. That determination
having been made and no cogent argument
having been raised to annul it, we have no duty
as judges but to apply it.
It follows from all this that the land under
contention being admittedly a part of the
mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for which a
minor forest license had in fact been issued by
the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it
must be considered forest land. It could
therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed
by the private respondent in support of his
application for registration. To be so, it had first
to be released as forest land and reclassified
as agricultural land pursuant to the certification
the Director of Forestry may issue under
Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The Respondent even showed, a survey of the
land and its tax declaration to support its claim,
however the court held that the same is
insufficient especially now that the land is a
forest land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is
DISMISSED, with cost against him. This
decision is immediately executory.
41 Atok-Big Wedge Mining
Corporation vs Court of Appeals, GR No.
88883, 1/18/1991) INOK, Erick Jay
Noro
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991
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FACTS:
Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was
located sometime between December 25, 1930
and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6)
days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, better known as the Philippine Bill of
1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of mineral
claim was duly recorded in the Office of the
Mining Recorder sometime on January 2,
1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other
mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to
Big Wedge Mining Company, the earlier
corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein
petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on
November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok
has been in continuous and exclusive
ownership and possession of said claim up to
the present .
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation
fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia
mineral claim together with other mineral
claims owned by Atok has been declared
under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in
view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an
application for lease was filed by Atok covering
the Fredia mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan
Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr.
Acay at Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He
constructed a house thereon sometime in
1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration
No. 9462. When he first constructed his house
below the lot of Mr. Acay he was told that it
was not necessary for him to obtain a building
permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he
was constructing a house thereon. It was only
in January 1984 when private respondent
Consi repaired the said house that people
came to take pictures and told him that the lot
belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has
been paying taxes on said land which his
father before him had occupied .
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok
informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of
Atok, that a construction was being undertaken
at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by
private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano
Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take
pictures of the construction. Feliciano Reyes
himself and other security guards went to the
place of the construction to verify and then to
the police to report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for
forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi
, which was dismissed after due hearing by the
MTC of Itogon in favor of Liwan Consi.
Petitioner ATOK appealed to the RTC of
Baguio, which reversed the decision of the
MTC, ordering defendant Liwan Consi to
vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral
claim, restoring possession thereof to the
plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
Defendant Liwan Cosi was further ordered to
remove and demolish the house he
constructed in the premises of the land of
Fredia Mineral claim.
In a petition for review filed by Liwan Consi
with the CA, the CA rendered its decision
dismissing the subject forcible entry action, and
further rule in part that: Liwan Consi had a
possessory right over the property which may
mature into ownership on the basis of long-
term possession under the Public Land Law.
Thus, it held that both Consi and ATOK are of
equal footing with regards to the subject lot,
holding possessory titles to the land. The
petitioner through its long term occupancy
while respondent mining firm being the claim
locator and applicant for lease on the mineral
claim.
ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an individual's long term
occupation of land of the public domain vests
him with such rights over the same as to defeat
the rights of the owner of that claim.
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HELD:
It is of no importance whether Benguet and
Atok had secured a patent for as held in the
Gold Creek Mining Corporation case, for all
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is
not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining
laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though
secured by patent (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record
pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully
complied with all the requirements of the law
regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia
Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted
the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or obtaining
of a patent over it. As the land had become the
private property of the locators, they had the
right to transfer the same, as they did, to
Benguet and Atok .
As in the instant petition, the record shows that
the lot in question was acquired through a
Deed of Sale executed between Atok and
Fredia Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok
have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes (Ibid).
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
On the matter of possession, private
respondent contends that his predecessor-in-
interest has been in possession of said lot
even before the war and has in fact cultivated
the same. Since the subject lot is mineral land,
private respondent's possession of the subject
lot no matter how long did not confer upon him
possessory rights over the same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-
possession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors,
the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if all these conditions are
equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper
proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK
has been in continuous and exclusive
possession of the Fredia mineral claim while
private respondent's possession started only
sometime in 1964 when he constructed a
house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior
possessory rights than private respondent,
Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer
in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal
viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in
actual physical possession of the property.
Having been deprived of this possession by the
private respondent, petitioner has every right to
sue for ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can
further be declared and held that petitioner
Atok has the exclusive right to the property in
question.
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42 Palomovs Court of Appeals [G.R.
No. 95608. January 21, 1997] IMPIG,
Sychar M
43 Republic vs Southside
Homeowners (GR No. 156951, 9/22/2006)
HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda Nee
Corong
44 Republic vsAlagad (G.R. No. L-
66807 January 26, 1989) GURO, Farhana
FACTS: On or about October 11, 1951,
defendants filed an application for registration
of their title over a parcel of land situated at
Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263
hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971,
which was amended after the land was divided
into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of
5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of
2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-
226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the
stereo-typed ground that applicants and their
predecessors have not been in possession of
the land openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894 and the land has not
ceased to be a part of the public domain. It
appears that barrio folk also opposed the
application.
Issue: WON that applicants and their
predecessors have not been in possession of
the land openly, continuously, publicly and
adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership
since July 26, 1894
HELD:
The case, then, has to be decided alongside
these principles and regretfully, the Court
cannot make a ruling, in the first place,
because it is not a trier of facts, and in the
second, it is in possession of no evidence to
assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition 31
We therefore remand the case to the court a
quo to determine whether or not the property
subject of controversy is foreshore. We,
consequently, reverse both the Court of
Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the
Republic's complaint.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
45 SIAN Enterprise vs. FF Cruz (GR
no. 146616, 8/31/2006) FERNANDEZ,
Pauline August Momongan
SIAIN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. F.F. CRUZ &
CO., INC.
500 SCRA 406 (2006)
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed
does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right
to lease of the littoral owner.
Facts:
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation
(WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease application
over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots
registered in its name. It eventually withdrew
the application and filed a petition for
registration over the same foreshore land with
the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The
case was, however, archived as WESVICO‘s
representative could no longer be contacted,
and later on, WESVICO has ceased
operations.
F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the
Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City a foreshore lease
application over a foreshore land, a portion of
which is adjacent to the lot previously occupied
by WESVICO. Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN)
purchased the properties previously owned by
WESVICO from the Development Bank of the
Philippines. It subsequently filed a foreshore
lease application over the foreshore land
adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP.
Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the
foreshore land subject of F.F. Cruz’s foreshore
lease application overlapped that covered by
its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a
protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of the
property adjoining the overlapping area, it
should be given preference in its lease.
F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given
preferential right since the area in dispute is
classified as ―reclaimed‖ and that the
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ownership was not by means of accretion. This
argument has been sustained by the Land
Management Bureau.
Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN
was upheld, declaring that there was no basis
to declare the area as ―reclaimed‖. F.F. Cruz
however appealed to the Office of the
President which overturned the decision of the
DENR Secretary and found that the area is
reclaimed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. Hence, the present
petition. SIAIN contends that the evidence
overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area
is foreshore land and not reclaimed land which
thus entitles it preferential rights over the
ISSUES:
Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or
―reclaimed‖ area
HELD:
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed
does not remove it from its classification of
foreshore area subject to the preferential right
to lease of the littoral owner.
It bears noting that it was not the reclamation
that brought the disputed foreshore area into
existence. Such foreshore area existed even
before F.F. Cruz undertook its reclamation. It
was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits
due to the action of the sea.‖ Following
Santulan, the littoral owner has preferential
right to lease the same.
Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the
President, as affirmed by the appellate court,
littoral owner WESVICO cannot be considered
to have waived or abandoned its preferential
right to lease the disputed area when it
subsequently filed an application for
registration thereover. For being a part of the
public domain, ownership of the area could not
be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential right
remained, however. Its move to have the
contested land titled in its name, albeit a faux
pas, in fact more than proves its interest to
utilize it.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were
WESVICO‘s petition for registration which, as
stated earlier, was archived by the trial court,
pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO
would not have been barred from filing anew a
foreshore lease application. Parenthetically,
the petition for registration of WESVICO was
archived not on account of lack of interest but
because it ceased operations due to financial
reasons.
46 Director of Lands vs. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila (GR No. 14869)
ENERO, Jomari Ivan Tagud
FACTS:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were
conducted to settle the title to a considerable
tract of land in the Province of Rizal. The
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (church)
and other private parties were claimants of 13
cadastral lots that comprised the contested
property. The lower court ruled in favor of the
private claimants. Upon appeal, the church
invoked that the composition title of the church
with the Spanish Government included the
subject property. The church then presented
one witness and rested. The private oppositors
then called their respective witnesses to prove
title by possession, and rested. The church
thereafter made an offer to present additional
testimony intended to show that the
possession of the private claimants had been
interrupted and that it was merely possession
through the tolerance of the church. However,
the counsel for the oppositors objected to the
entry of additional testimonies which was
sustained.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in refusing the entry the
church’s additional testimonies?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The object of a cadastral petition is that the title
to the various lots embraced in the survey may
be settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
a proceeding in rem, promoted by the Director
of Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry
and investigation leading to a judicial decree.
In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is
no defendant. In another sense, the
Government is the plaintiff and all the-
claimants are defendants.
As a general rule, courts should adhere to the
usual rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence that governs registration
proceedings. However, in registration
proceedings where so many parties are
involved and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, opportunity should be given to parties
to submit additional corroborative evidence in
support of their claims of title, if the ends of
justice so require. This case was remanded
back to the lower court with the church being
allowed to admit additional testimonies in the
interest of justice and ascertainment of truth.
JOM
47 AbelleravsFarol (GR No. 48480,
7/30/1943) DALISAY, Armando, Jr.
D Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner,
vs.
MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL., respondents
Facts:
Abellera, in a previous case concerning the
same real estate involved herein, sued
Hermegildo Balanag and others who are either
the same parties in this case or the latter's
predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of
the land. But his complaint was dismissed by
the Court of First Instance on two grounds:
(1) prescription in favor of defendants; and
(2) the deed of donation of these lands to him
had not been formally accepted according to
Article 633 of the Civil Code.
Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment of the
trial court was affirmed on the second ground
aforementioned. It appears in that decision of
this Court that after the perfection of the
appeal, Abellera executed a public document
formally accepting the donation of the land,
and presented and deed of acceptance
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
together with proofs of notification of
acceptance to the donor, as ground for new
trial.
In July of 1918, or four months after the above-
mentioned decision of this Court, petitioner
herein brought another action for recovery of
the land against the same defendants in the
previous case.
The second suit was later dismissed by the
Court of First Instance and transferred to
cadastral case No. 5 which included the
hacienda in question that had in the meantime
been subdivided into lots.
The latter through counsel moved that
Abellera's claim over the lots concerned be
dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and
prescription.
Issue:
Did the cadastral court, on the ground of
res judicata, have any power to entertain the
motion to dismiss Abellera's claim and bar him
from presenting evidence to prove his
ownership of these lots?
Ruling:
These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases
not herein provided for, except by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral
cases when two conditions are present: (1)
analogy or need to supplement the cadastral
law, and (2) practicability and convenience.
The principal aim is to settle as much as
possible all disputes over land and to remove
all clouds over land titles, as far a practicable,
in a community.
To attain this purpose, the cadastral court
should allow all claimants ample freedom to
ventilate whatever right they may assert over
real estate, permitting them, in keeping with the
law of evidence, to offer proofs in support of
their allegations.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a
cadastral case res judicata is available to a
claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment
can not set up in a motion to dismiss.
48 Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No.
68109, 7/17/1991) CLARK, Immaculate
Gonzales
Gayapanao vs. IAC (GR No. 68109,
7/17/1991)
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Severino Gayapanao and his siblings
questioning the decision of the IAC in
upholding the validity of the sale of the land
between their father Constantino and their
sister. The 2 hectare land, subject of this case
is part of 10 hectare homestead land registered
in the name of Constantino Gayapanao under
OCT. The final order of the Director of Lands
for the issuance of patent was issued on
December 10, 1937. On November 15, 1938,
Constantino Gayapanao executed a private
deed entitled kasulatan ng bilihan in favor of
Simeona Gayapanao and his husband.
RTC’s decision: The contract of sale between
Simeona Gayapanao and her father is null and
void for having been executed with the 5 year
prohibitory period provided under Section 118
of the Public Land Law
CA’s decision: It reversed the decision of the
RTC and uphold the validity of the sale.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding the
validity of the sale?
RULING:
No, the provision of law which prohibits the
sale or encumbrance of the homestead within
5 years after the grant is mandatory.
From the date of the approval of the application
and for a term of five (5) years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions cannot be subject to encumbrance
or alienation, nor shall they become liable to
the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period. The only
exception mentioned by the law is the sale or
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
encumbrance in favor of the government or
any of its branches, units or institutions.
In a number of cases, we have consistently
ruled that a sale of homestead within the five
(5) year prohibitive period is void ab initio and
the same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire
validity through the passage of time.
49 Republic vs Garcia (GR No. L-
11597, 5/27/1959) CEBALLOS, Jesus
Cadavez
Facts:
Garcia was granted a homestead patent
for his 23.21 hectares of land. After 3 years
and 3 months later (April 14, 1950), he sold 19
hectares to the lot to several persons. For this
reason, the CFI of Cotabato decreed the
reversion of the property in favor of the
Government for violating the selling the
property within the prohibitive period of 5 years
from date of issuance under Sec. 118 of CA
141.
Garcia contends that he did not violate
the said provision since the sale was not
registered and that it was not the entire land
was sold.
Issue:
Whether or not Garcia violated the Sec.
118 of CA 141.
Held.
Yes, he did.
The Supreme Court held that it is
enough that the property, in whole or in part,
was alienated or encumbered within the
prohibitive period except in favor of the
Government, Sec. 118 of CA 141 partly
provides: Except in favor of the Government or
any its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead
provision shall not be subject to encumbrance
of alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, association, or
corporations.
Such alienation is a sufficient cause for
reversion to the State of the whole grant. In
granting a homestead to an applicant, the law
imposes as a condition that the land should not
be encumbered, sold or alienated within five
years from the issuance of the patent. Sec. 124
of CA 141 provides: Any acquisition,
conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other
contract made or executed in violation of any of
the provisions of section118, 120, 121, 122,
and 123 of this Act shall be unlawful and null
and void from its execution and shall produce
the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant,
title, patent, or permit originally issued,
recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State.
50 Lee Chuy Realty Corp vs Court of
Appeals (GR No. 104114, 12/4/1995)
CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay
Facts:
A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan,
Bulacan, with an area of 24,576 sq. m. and
covered by OCT No. 0-5290 is disputed by Lee
Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc Realty and
Development Corp. Such land was originally
co-owned by Ruben Jacinto(one-sixth),
Dominador, Arsenio, Liwayway all surnamed
Bascara and Ernesto jacinto(collectively owned
the remaining five-sixths).
On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his one-
sixth pro-indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY
which was registered 30 April 1981. On 5 May
1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto also
sold their share to MARC REALTY which was
registered on 16 October 1989.
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never
informed of the existence of the sale between
Marc Realty and the Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally notified of
the sale and was given a copy of the deed of
sale.
On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY
filed a complaint for legal redemption against
MARC REALTY and consigned in court a
manager's check for 614,400. MARC REALTY
insisted that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action there being no
allegation of prior valid tender of payment or a
prior valid notice of consignation.
On Dec 26, 1990, the trial court ruled in favour
of Lee Chuy Realty which stated that there was
a valid tender of payment and consignation. It
also stated that neither a separate offer to
redeem nor a formal notice of consignation is
necessary for the reason that the filing of the
action itself, within the period of redemption, is
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition with
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which was referred to
the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the
decision of the lower court and ruled that "a
prior tender or offer of redemption is a
prerequisite or precondition to the filing of an
action for legal redemption” and that "there
must be tender of the redemption price within
the required period because the policy of the
law is not to leave the purchaser's title in
uncertainty beyond the established 30-day
period.
MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of
payment is a condition precedent to the filing of
an action in court in order to validly exercise
the right of legal redemption. LEE CHUY
REALTY however argues that the filing of the
action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem, which is a condition precedent to the
valid exercise of the right of legal redemption.
Lee Chuy filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied
Issue:
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied
with tender of payment a condition precedent
to the filing of an action for the valid exercise of
the right of legal redemption; is the filing of the
action with consignation equivalent to a formal
offer to redeem
Held:
No.
In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the Court,
citing previous decisions, declared that the
formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a
bona fide tender of the redemption price, within
the prescribed period is only essential to
preserve the right of redemption for future
enforcement beyond such period of redemption
and within the period prescribed for the action
by the statute of limitations. Where, as in the
instant case, the right to redeem is exercised
through judicial action within the reglementary
period the formal offer to redeem,
accompanied by a bona fide tender of the
redemption price, while proper, may be
unessential. The filing of the action itself is
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a
distinct step or condition sine qua non to the
filing of the action in Court for the valid
exercise of the right of legal redemption. What
constitutes a condition precedent is either a
formal offer to redeem or the filing of an action
in court together with the consignation of the
redemption price within the reglementary
period.
The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and
Belisario cases was jettisoned by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that they do not involve
legal redemption by a co-owner but by a
mortgagor. It concluded that the application of
the rules on legal redemption by a co-owner
differs from the legal redemption by a
mortgagor. But the law does not distinguish;
neither should we. For sure, the principle in the
aforecited cases is applicable regardless of
whether the redemptioner is a co-owner or a
mortgagor. Public policy favors redemption
regardless of whether the redemptioner is a co-
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
owner or mortgagor, although perhaps with
unequal force and effect since each is given a
fixed but different period. A co-owner desirous
of exercising his right of legal redemption is
given a period of thirty (30) days from notice of
the sale within which to avail of the right to
redeem.15 Under the free patent or homestead
provisions of the Public Land Act a period of
five (5) years from the date of conveyance is
provided,16 the five-year period to be reckoned
from the date of the sale and not from the date
of registration in the office of the Register of
Deeds.17 The redemption of extrajudicially
foreclosed properties, on the other hand, is
exercisable within one (1) year from the date of
the auction sale as provided for in Act No.
3135.
51 Ong Ching Po vs. Court of
Appeals (239 SCRA 341)
CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan
52 Frenzel vs Catito (GR No.
143958, July 11, 2003) BENITEZ, Winnie L
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner,
v.
EDERLINA P. CATITO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner – Alfred Fritz Frenzel, is an
Australian Electrical Engineer who once
worked with New Guinea Airlines, started doing
business in the Philippines since 1974, and two
years later got married to a Filipina Teresita
Santos. They were separated bread and board
in 1981 and two years later met Ederlina Catito
as a masseuse in one of night clubs in Sydney
Australia
Frenzel got enamored with Ederlina and
convinced her to setup wholesome business in
Manila for her own as he was willing to help
her. Ederlina returned and later Alfred followed
and helped her setup a Edorial Beauty saloon
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
with his personal funds –let alone Ederlina as
sole registered owner. Alfred went back to
work in Papue New Guinea as airline pilot
while Ederlina too went to Germany to file her
divorce with her husband –Muller.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines to live
with Ederlina–he bought house and lot or real
properties in QC for her with his own funds and
agreeing to name it under Ederlina alone
accepting that as a foreigner he is not allowed
to own a real estate property under the
Philippine Laws. Alfred decided to stay for
good in the Philippines and sold his personal
properties in Australia with proceeds later used
to buy other 2-more properties in Davao City –
again, in Ederlina’s name only. There was also
an occasion when Ederlina deposited some
USD 250,000 in their joint-accounts.
Meanwhile, Ederlina’s divorce case with her
German husband was denied and with the
prospect that she could be charged with
bigamy along with Alfed who himself is still
married. This started their common law
marriage deterioration and soon enough Alfred
got penniless and filed his claim on the
properties listed in Ederlina’s name alone as
well as charges the return of all other asset
bought with his own funds.
ISSUE:
Will the good faith doctrine and applicable
Articles in Civil code 1416, In combination
with RA Nos. 133, 4381 and Rep. Act No.
4882, the proceeds of the sale would be
remitted to him, by way of refund for the money
he used to purchase the said properties. To
bar the petitioner from recovering the subject
properties, or at the very least, the money used
for the purchase and to bar the petitioner to the
proceeds thereof is to enrich the respondent at
his expense, and can this withstand the
Constitutional proscription on the property
ownership for the aliens in the Philippines?
Hence, this petition, after successive defeat
from lower and appellate court.
HELD.
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
No. The petition is Denied.
The Court ruled on evidence on record: to
wit;
“The three parcels of land subject of the
complaint were not mortgaged to the petitioner
by the owners thereof but were sold to the
respondent as the vendee, albeit with the use
of the petitioners personal funds.” The sales of
three parcels of land in favor of the petitioner
who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The
transactions are void ab initio because they
were entered into in violation of the
Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to
recover the properties or the money used in
the purchase of the parcels of land would be
subversive of public policy.
This finds support under Section 7, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
states: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”
The court stated: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been
designated as an accion in rem verso.
This provision does not apply if, as in this case,
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or
by the application of the pari delicto doctrine.
It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner
from filing an accion in rem verso over the
subject properties, or from recovering the
money he paid for the said properties, but, as
Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman vs. Johnson. ”The objection that a
contract is immoral or illegal as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not
for his sake, however, that the objection is ever
allowed; but it is founded in general principles
of policy, which the defendant has the
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as
between him and the plaintiff, therefore, the
petition is bereft of merits.
53 Muller vs. Muller (GR no. 149615,
August 29, 2006) BALUCANAG,
April Gem Balansag
FACTS:
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut
Muller are husband and wife in this case.
They wed and resided in Germany until they
decided to permanently reside in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, they
bought a house in Antipolo, Rizal using the
proceeds that they got from selling the
house the Helmut Muller inherited from his
parents in Germany.
The marriage, however, did not last. They
were eventually separated and Helmut
Muller filed for separation of their
properties. The trial court then dissolved
the absolute community of property and
ordered the equal partition of their personal
properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during marriage. As to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired
using the paraphernal funds of Helmut,
however, he cannot recover said property,
nor have a right to recover the funds used
to buy it since it was purchased in violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals granted
Helmut Muller’s prayer for reimbursement
for the Antipolo property.
ISSUE:
WON Helmut Muller is entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used to acquire
the Antipolo property.
HELD:
NO. Respondent was aware of the
constitutional prohibition and expressly
admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of petitioner
because of the said prohibition. His attempt
at subsequently asserting or claiming a
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
right on the said property cannot be
sustained. Thus, in the instant case,
respondent cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it is clear that
he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional
prohibition. To allow reimbursement would
in effect permit respondent to enjoy the
fruits of a property which he is not allowed
to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law.
54 Lee vs. Director of Lands (GR
No. 128195, October 3, 2001)
APURADA, Kathryne Vencio
Facts:
Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco,
Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion,
Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal, and
Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee
Liong, A Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with
an approximate area of 1,631 square meters,
designed as lot 398 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3389.
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with
the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action
against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of
sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs
assailed the validity of the sale because of the
constitutional prohibition against aliens
acquiring ownership of private agriculture land,
including residential, commercial or industrial
land.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and
ruled thus: pari delicto (in sales of real estate to
aliens incapable of holding title thereto by
virtue of provision of the Constitution, both the
vendor and vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and thus
the courts will not afford protection to either
party).
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners
(Dinglasans) filed with the Court of First
Instance and action for recovery of the same
parcel of land. On Sept. 23, 1968, the heirs of
Lee Liong file with the trial. Both cases were
elevated to the Supreme Court but were
dismissed holding the suit barred by res
judicata. On Sept. 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-
Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC,
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Roxas City a petition for reconstitution of title of
Lot No. 398 of Capiz.
They were the widows of the heirs of Lee
Liong, the owner of the lot. Both widows
received a parcel of land through succession
from their deceased husbands. RTC ordered
the reconstitution of the lost and destroyed
certificate of said title of lot. On Jan. 25, 1995,
OSG filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for annulment of judgment of reconstitution
alleging that petitioners were not the proper
parties in the reconstitution of title, since Lee
Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he
was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally
not qualified to own the subject land. CA
decided, declaring the judgment of
reconstitution to be void. Hence this petition.
Issue/s:
1. WON OSG has the capacity to object the
reconstitution.
2. WON constitutional prohibition still exists
considering the land is now under the
ownership of Lee’s heirs thru succession.
Held:
1. Yes.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of
the land t an alien did not validate the
transaction. For it was still contrary to the
constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain.
However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction as was not the
parties to the transaction. The proper party to
assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This
was what was done in this case when the
Solicitor General initiated an action for
annulment of judgement of reconstitution of
title. While it took the Republic more than sixty
years to assert it, it is not barred from initiating
such action. Prescription never lies against the
State.
2. No.
The constitutional proscription on alien
ownership of lands of the public or private
domain was intended to protect lands from
falling in the hands of non- Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public
policy violated since the land is in the hands of
Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
land. “If the land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of
the transferee is rendered valid.”
55 Ramirez vs. Vda de Ramirez
(111 SCRA 704) ANTOPINA,
Babielen Poliquit
Republic vs. Hachero ( G.R. No. 200973,
May 30, 2016)
Facts:
In 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his
Free Patent Application No. 045307-969
covering Lot No. 1514, CAD-1150-D (subject
land) before the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
Palawan. The said application for free
patent was later approved by the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(PENRO) of Palawan based on the following
findings, among others that the land
applied for had been classified as alienable
and disposable and, therefore, subject to
disposition under the Public Land Law;
On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No.
045307-98-9384 was issued to Hachero and
the subject land was registered under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. E-
18011 on May 7, 1999.
After an inspection and verification were
conducted by the CENRO in 2000, it was
discovered that the subject land, covered
by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as
timberland and so not susceptible of
private ownership under the Free Patent
provision of the Public Land Act. Hence, the
Republic filed the Complaint for the
Cancellation of Free Patent No. 045307-98-
9384 and OCT No. E-18011 and for
Reversion, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3726.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of
Hachero on the ground that the free patent
and title had already been issued after
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Hachero was found to have complied with
all the requirements; that it was the
Republic itself thru the DENR-CENRO,
Coron, which brought the subject land
under the operation of the Torrens System.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
1. Won the petition for cancellation of
the title and reversion of the subject lot is
meritorious.
2. WON the Government is estopped by
its previous acts.
Ruling:
1. Cancellation of title and reversion
proper
where there exists a mistake or oversight in
granting free patent over inalienable land
Reversion is an action where the ultimate
relief sought is to revert the land back to
the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject
of the action originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation therefore is a
matter between the grantor and the grantee.
xxx. In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico
v. Republic (Yujuico case), reversion was
defined as an action which seeks to restore
public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain.
It bears to point out, though, that the Court
also allowed the resort by the Government
to actions for reversion to cancel titles that
were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e.,
violation by the grantee of a patent of the
conditions imposed by law; and lack of
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant
a patent covering inalienable forest land or
portion of a river, even when such grant
was made through mere oversight.d
In the case at bench, although the
Republic's action for cancellation of patent
and title and for reversion was not based on
fraud or misrepresentation on the part of
Hachero, his title could still be cancelled
and the subject land reverted back to the
State because the grant was made through
mistake or oversight. This could probably
be the reason why, shortly after one (1) year
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
from the issuance of OCT No. E-18011 to
Hachero, the DENR personnel conducted
another investigation and verification on
the subject land. It would appear that they
suspected that a mistake was made in their
issuance of the patent as the subject land
had not been reclassified or released as
alienable or disposable land. It remained
plotted within the timberland classification
zone.
2. Prescription and estoppel cannot
lie against the State
At any rate, it is a time-honored principle
that the statute of limitations or the lapse of
time does not run against the State.
Jurisprudence also recognizes the State's
immunity from estoppel as a result of the
mistakes or errors of its officials and
agents.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of
title issued under an administrative
proceeding pursuant to a homestead
patent, as in the instant case, is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under a judicial registration proceeding,
provided the land covered by said
certificate is a disposable public land within
the contemplation of the Public Land Law.
Yet, we emphasize that our statement in the
aforequoted case that a certificate of title
issued pursuant to a homestead patent
becomes indefeasible after one year, is
subject to the proviso that "the land
covered by said certificate is a disposable
public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law."
But then again, the Court had several times
in the past recognized the right of the State
to avail itself of the remedy of reversion in
other instances when the title to the land is
void for reasons other than having been
secured by fraud or misrepresentation.
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the
officials or agents of the BOL in this regard
cannot be invoked against the government
with regard to property of the public
domain. It has been said that the State
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
cannot be estopped by the omission,
mistake or error of its officials or agents.
58 Republic vs Umali (GR No.
80687, April 10, 1989) RAÑON, Rexie
Monicimpo
FACTS:
The land in question is situated in Tanza,
Cavite, and consists of 78,865 square meters.
It was originally purchased on installment from
the government on July 1, 1910 by Florentina
Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her rights
thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio
and Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922.
Tomasa and Julio assigned their shares to
Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In 1971, these
three assignees purportedly signed a joint
affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of
Lands to support their claim that they were
entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title
over the said land on which they said they had
already made full payment. On the basis of
this affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources executed Deed No. V-
10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on
September 10, 1971, in favor of the said
affiants. Subsequently, on October 13, 1971,
TCT No. 55044 (replacing Bobadilla's OCT No.
180) was issued by the register of deeds of
Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal, Gregorio
Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal)
Rosalina Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval.
When the complaint for reversion was filed on
October 10, 1985, the registered owners of the
land, following several transfers, were
Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan
C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina,
Luz and Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394.
They were named as defendants and asked to
return the property to the State on the
aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The
plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having
died on February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal
on January 8, 1959, they could not have
signed the joint affidavit dated August 9, 1971,
on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate
No. 1280) was based. The present holders of
the property claiming to be innocent
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
purchasers for value and not privy to the
alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot
lie against them.
ISSUE:
WON the sale itself be considered null and
void from the start, as the petitioner insists, so
as to make all titles derived therefrom also
ineffectual, void ab initio.
HELD:
No. Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of
the Land Reg. Act), states that, every
registered owner receiving a certificate of title
in pursuance of a decree of registration, and
every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking a certificate of title for value and in good
faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on the
certificate and any of the encumbrances which
may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law.
Under said provision, claims and liens of
whatever character, except those mentioned
by law as existing against the land prior to the
issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by
such certificate if not noted thereon, and the
certificate so issued binds the whole world,
including the government. The Torrens system
was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the
assurance that the seller’s title thereto is valid,
he should not run the risk of being told later
that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
We find that the private respondents are
transferees in good faith and for value of the
subject property and that the original
acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not
affect their own titles. These are valid against
the whole world, including the government.
59 Piñero vs Director of Lands (GR
No. L-36507, 12/14/1974) PLAZA,
Mariafe Manatad
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
60 Kionisala vs. Dacut (GR No.
147379, 2/27/2002) PELAEZ, Chester Bryan
Pepito
61 Evangelista vs. Santiago (GR No.
157447, 4/29/2005) PASAOL, Ric
Jason Patlingrao
62 Roco vs. Gimeda (GR No. L-
11651, 12/27/1958) PAMISARAN, Excel Joy
Gemota
63 Republic v. Hachero, G.R. No.
200973, [May 30, 2016]) NALLA, Glene
Alacayde
64 Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No.
186603, [April 5, 2017]) MISTERIO, John
Kessler Sumauang
Facts
A cadastral decree was issued in favor of
Espinosa. The Original Certificate of Title
was issued in the name of Espinosa who
later sold to Caliston which a Transfer
Certificate of Title was issued.
The State through Regional Executive
Director of the DENR filed a Complaint for
annulment of title and reversion of land
with the RTC claiming the property is
inalienable public land because it fell within
the timberland area.
RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered
reversion of the property.
CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found
that the State failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation when she was issued the
Original Certificate of Title. It further ruled
that the State failed to prove that the
property is forest land. The lone piece of
evidence consisting of LC Map No, 2978
was not authenticated pursuant to Section
24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
that the parties stipulated only as to the
existence of the map, but not as to
genuineness of truthfulness of its content.
Assuming that the map is admitted in
evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the
property, which accrued in 1962, should not
be prejudiced by a subsequent
classification by the State done in 1986, or
after 24 years.
Issue
1st Issue: Whether or not the State has
sufficiently proved that the property is part
of inalienable forest land at the time
Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree
and issued a title.
2nd Issue: WON the State may initiate an
action for Reversion over the subject land.
Held
No. The State failed to prove that the
property was classified as forest land at the
time of the grant of the cadastral decree
and issuance of title to Espinosa.
Since cadastral proceedings are governed
by the usual rules of practice, procedure,
and evidence, a cadastral decree and a
certificate of title are issued only after the
applicant proves all the requisite
jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to
the claimed lot, that all parties are heard,
and that evidence is considered.31 As such,
the cadastral decree is a judgment which
adjudicates ownership after proving these
jurisdictional facts.
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was
granted a cadastral decree and was
subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the
predecessor title of Caliston’s TCT No.
91117.
Having been granted a decree in a cadastral
proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to
have overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain.33 This means that
Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to
prove by incontrovertible evidence that the
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST

property is alienable and disposable 67 Mustang Lumber vs Court of

property in the cadastral proceedings. Appeals (June 18, 1996) JESURA

This is not to say, however, that the State

has no remedy to recover the property if 68 Paatvs Court of Appeals (January
indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of 10, 1997) INOK, Erick Jay Noro
the public domain. The State may still do so
through an action for reversion, as in the
present case. 69 Crescencio v. People, G.R. No.
205015, [November 19, 2014]) IMPIG,
2nd Issue: WON the State may initiate an Sychar M
action for Reversion over the subject land.

No. 70 Ruzon vs Sandiganbayan GR

186739, April 17, 2013 HONTANOSAS,
Reversion is the remedy where the State, Luzviminda Nee Corong
pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to
revert land back to the mass of the public
domain. It is proper when public land is 71 Aquino vs Municipality of Malay
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to Aklan (GR NO. 211356, Sept 29, 2014)
private individuals or corporations. GURO, Farhana

There are also instances when we granted FACTS:

reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as Boracay Island West Cove Management
when a “person obtains a title under the Public Philippines, Inc. applied for a building
Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands permit covering the construction of a three-
which cannot be registered under the Torrens storey hotel in Malay, Aklan, which is
system, or when the Director of Lands did not covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement
have jurisdiction over the same because it is of for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by
the public domain.”36 the DENR. The Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor application on the ground that the proposed
General, alleges neither fraud nor construction site was within the “no build
misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance.
and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa’s Petitioner appealed the denial action to the
favor. No mistake or oversight was also found Office of the Mayor but despite follow up,
in the issuance of title. Hence, the remedy of no action was ever taken by the respondent
reversion could not be applied in this case. mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by
the municipal government, ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West
65 Ysmaelvs Deputy Executive Cove’s hotel.
Secretary (October 18, 1990) Contentions of West Cove:
LOZADA, Leah Amaya 1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated
because it is not a nuisance per se, given
the hundred million peso-worth of capital
66 Oposa vs. Factoran (July 30, infused in the venture.
1993) LARANAS, Rascille Mae 2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have
Dagoon first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.

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 NATRES CASE DIGEST
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition
needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings
The CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should
first be conducted before the LGU can
order the closure and demolition of the
property in question.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the property involved
cannot be classified as a nuisance per se
which can therefore be summarily abated.
Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident, its location and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Otherwise stated, had it not been
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay
West Cove could have secured the
necessary permits without issue. As such,
even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it
is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a
particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the
hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise
of police power and the general welfare
clause, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Moreover, the Local
Government Code authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. The office of the mayor
has quasi-judicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments.
72 Republic vs CA and Carantes GR
No. L-56984, September 30, 1987)
FERNANDEZ, Pauline August
Momongan
Republic vs CA and Carantes
MARIA ANNY G. YANONG
GR. No. 56948, Set. 30, 1987
Facts:
In 1968, respondent Martina Carantes for and
in behalf of the Heirs of Saying Piraso filed an
application for land registration over a parcel of
land situated in Tuba, Mountain Province,
containing a land area of 219.7879 hectares.
In 1970, the director of lands, through the
solicitor general, filed an opposition to the
application for registration stating, among
others: That neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title
to said parcel of land; neither it have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the present application.
Few months after, the director of forestry also
filed an opposition to the application on the
ground, that the whole area applied for
registration is within the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve established under
proclamation no. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
After trial, a decision was rendered by the land
registration court, adjudicating the parcel of
land to the applicants. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the government in the
Court of appeals however affirmed in toto the
decision of the LRA.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the land in question is
part of the public forest within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve.
2. Whether or not Carantes have
established registrable title over the land in
question.
Held:
1. Yes. Proclamation no. 217 merely
declared a special forest reserve out of already
existing forest lands. The land was already
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 NATRES CASE DIGEST

forest or timber land even before the 78 La Bugal-B’laan Tribal

proclamation. A person cannot enter into forest Association vs Ramos (12/1/2004) CAIGAS,
land and by the simple act of cultivating a Lloyd
portion of that land. The government must first
declare the forest land to be alienable and
disposable agricultural land before the year of 79 Loneyvs People (February 10,
entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse 2006) CABANOG, Princess
possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.
80 DidipioEarthsavers Multipurpose
2. No. It is a well settled rule that forest Association vs. Gozun (GR No. 157882,
lands or forest reserves are not capable of 3/30/2006) CABALLERO, Jeremiah
private appropriation and possession thereof, Napalan
however long, will not convert them into private
property. The Court of Appeals finding is based
on a wrong concept of what is forest land. 81 (Southeast Mindanao Gold
There is a big difference between “forest” as Mining Corp. v. Balite Portal Mining
defined in a dictionary and “forest or timber Cooperative, G.R. No. 135190, [April 3,
land” as a classification of lands of the public 2002], 429 PHIL 668-685) BENITEZ,
domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive Winnie L
of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status a classification for legal purposes.
82 YINLU BICOL MINING
CORPORATION vs. Trans-asia Oil and energy
73 Yngson vs Secretary of Development Corporation, GR NO. 207942,
Agriculture GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983) January 12, 2015) BALUCANAG, April Gem
ENERO, Jomari Ivan Tagud Balansag

74 Director of Forestry vs VIllareal 83 Atok Big-Wedge Mining Co. vs

GR No. L-46048 November 29, 1988 IAC (GR No. 63528, September 9, 1996)
DALISAY, Armando, Jr. D APURADA, Kathryne Vencio

75 International Hardwood vs UP Gr 84 Apex Mining Corporation vs

No. 521518 Aug 13, 1991 CLARK, Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation
Immaculate Gonzales (GR NO 152613, June 13, 2006) ANTOPINA,
Babielen Poliquit

76 People vs Que GR No. 120365,

December 17, 1996 CEBALLOS, Jesus 85 PNOC Energy Development vs
Cadavez Veneracion (GR NO. 129820, November 30,
2006) TAN, Cesnee Joyce V.

77 Miners Association of the

Philippines vsFactoran (240 SCRA 100) 86 Benguet Corporation vs Leviste
CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay (GR NO. 65021, November 21, 1991)
TACDER, Lovella Fe Madelo

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 NATRES CASE DIGEST

87 Industrial Enterprises Inc vs 96 Henares, Jr. v. Land

Court of Appeals, GR NO. 88550, April 18, Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
1990) RAÑON, Rexie M. Board, G.R. No. 158290, [October 23, 2006],
535 PHIL 835-849) JESURA

88 Sta. Rosa Realty Development

Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112526, 97 People vs Que GR No. 120365,
[October 12, 2001], 419 PHIL 457-480) December 17, 1996 INOK, Erick Jay
PLAZA, Mariafe Manatad Noro

89 (National Water Resources Board 98 Cudia vs. Court of Appeals 284

v. A. L. Ang Network, Inc., G.R. No. 186450, SCRA 173 (1998) IMPIG, Sychar M
[April 8, 2010], 632 PHIL 22-32) PELAEZ,
Chester Bryan Pepito
99 Pp. vs. RosalindoCutamora, Et.
Al G.R. Nos. 133448-53. October 6, 2000
90 (Metropolitan Manila HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda Nee
Development Authority v. Concerned Corong
Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-
48, [December 18, 2008], 595 PHIL 305-352)
PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao 100 People vs. Robert P. Balao, Et Al G.R.
No. 176819, Jan 26, 2011 GURO, Farhana

91 MMDA vsJancom ([G.R. No.

147465. January 30, 2002] PAMISARAN, 101 Casupanan vs. Laroya, August 26, 2002
Excel Joy Gemota FERNANDEZ, Pauline August Momongan

92 Mead vsArgel (G.R. No. L-41958, 102 Pp. vs. Sucro March 18, 1991, 195
[July 20, 1982], 115 SCRA 256) NALLA, SCRA 388 DALISAY, Armando, Jr. D
Glene Alacayde

103 People vs. Evaristo 216 S 431

93 PAB vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. CLARK, Immaculate Gonzales
No. 93891March 11, 1991195 SCRA 112)
MISTERIO, John Kessler Sumauang
104 Pp. vs. Joselito del Rosario April 14,
1999 CEBALLOS, Jesus Cadavez
94 Technology Developers, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94759, [January
21, 1991], 271 PHIL 148-154) 105 People vs Del Rosario GR 182601
LOZADA, Leah Amaya CAMASURA, Jayson Ug-ay

95 Rodriguez, Jr. v. Intermediate 106 People vs Gerente G.R. No. 95847-48.

Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74816, [March 17, CABANOG, Princess
1987], 232 PHIL 562-575) LARANAS,
Rascille Mae Dagoon
107 People vs Tonog G.R. No. 94533
CABALLERO, Jeremiah Napalan

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 NATRES CASE DIGEST

119 Myla Paredes Et. Al. vs. Judge Jacinto

Manalo May 10, 1995 NALLA, Glene
108 People vs. Manlulu April 22, 1994 Alacayde
BENITEZ, Winnie L

120 Abraham Ramirez vs. Antonia Corpuz-

109 Paderanga v. Court of Appeals 247 Macandong Sept. 26, 1986 MISTERIO,
SCRA 741 (1995) BALUCANAG, John Kessler Sumauang
April Gem Balansag

121 Pp. vs. Omar Mapalao May 14, 1991

110 Enrile vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. LOZADA, Leah Amaya
213847 August 18, 2015 APURADA,
Kathryne Vencio
122 People vs. Joven De Grano G.R. No.
167710, June 5, 2009 LARANAS,
111 Borinaga v. Tamin 26 SCRA 206 (1993); Rascille Mae Dagoon
ANTOPINA, Babielen Poliquit

123 PilarCañeda Braga v. Hon. Joseph

112 Cardines v. Rozete, 242 SCRA 557 Emilio A. Abaya (GR No. 223076, september
(1995). TAN, Cesnee Joyce V. 13, 2016 JESURA

113 Pp. vs. Martin Villarama June 23, 1992 124 Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, v. Hon.
TACDER, Lovella Fe Madelo Teodoro a. Casiño (G.r. No. 207257, February
03, 2015) INOK, Erick Jay Noro

114 Abubakar vs. Abubakar Oct 22, 1999

RAÑON, Rexie M.

125 Lnl Archipelago Minerals, Inc. vs.

115 Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia 162 SCRA 665; Agham party list (G.r. No. 209165)
Marcelino Rivera, Jr. vs. Pp August 30, 1990 IMPIG, Sychar M
PLAZA, Mariafe Manatad

126 Segovia v. Climate Change

116 Pp vs. Marcelino A. Bugarin (June 13, Commission, G.R. No. 211010, [March 7,
1997) PELAEZ, Chester Bryan Pepito 2017]) HONTANOSAS, Luzviminda
Nee Corong

117 Pp. vs. ElegioNadera (Feb. 2, 2000)

PASAOL, Ric Jason Patlingrao 127 Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510,
[September 16, 2014]) GURO, Farhana

118 Eligio Madrid vs. CA (May 31, 2000)

PAMISARAN, Excel Joy Gemota 128 (Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes,
G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527, [April 21, 2015])
FERNANDEZ, Pauline August
Momongan

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