Vital-Gozon v.

CA
G.R. No. 129132 July 8, 1998
Davide, Jr., J.
Issue:

whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of
damages in a special civil action of mandamus.
Held:

Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment in a mandamus action “commanding
the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the defendant.” The provision makes plain that the damages are an incident, or
the result of, the defendant’s wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It
is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart provision. The Solicitor General’s
theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action
of mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising
from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from
the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus,
which is certainly not the case.
Issue:
whether or not the SolGen is authorized to represent Vital-Gozon in this case
Held:
Yes. The doctrine laid down in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to, is quite clear
to the effect that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at
any stage of a criminal case. This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to
court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100,
Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of such
civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same. A fortiori, the Office of the
Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages. Here,
Dr. Vital-Gozon is not charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime,
there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985

FACTS:
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting booths.
However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering filed an
Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order
of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against
the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their
contract.

RULING:
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC relative to the conduct of
elections and enforcement of election laws.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order"

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reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt
may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal
by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions
or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Mateo v. CA
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995
Puno, J.
Issue:
whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving
dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation
Held:
No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations
are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.
Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial
remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination
of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent
could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels
aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16, 1995

(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)

TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION
SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders of the
Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.

1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders
or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission,
Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy
Commission, Board of Investments, and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided,
whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the
date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.

5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with
proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of
Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.

Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit
the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of
Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and
other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.

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6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or
agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the
specific material dates showing that it was filed within the reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.

7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding
the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal thereof.

8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within
ten (10) days from notice. The Court, however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for
delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly
legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall point out
insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A
copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals
or upon the expiration of period for the filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court
or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency
concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.

11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-
quire the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The
record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent
correction of or addition to the record.

12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of
Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties
to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.

14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals
filed and pending in the Supreme Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions for review hereunder
and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed
after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be referred to the Court of Appeals for
the same purpose.

In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions
thus transferred or referred to it shall be considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may require the
filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and
consequent to the change in the mode of appellate review.

15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and superseded by this Circular.

16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.

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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. L-49677 May 4, 1989

TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION and ATTY. VIRGILIO SY, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, respondents.
Facts:
On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of
the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was claimed
that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by med-arbiter
Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting thereon in BLR
Case No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the
holding of a certification election. This order was, however, set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of
November 21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification election be
held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
Issue:
Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form union?
Ruling:
With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and who are,
therefore, covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is provided for under
Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and
exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where there are two or more duly registered employees'
organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of
certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said
organizational unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated
November 21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a certification election among the affected
employees of respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED.

Delos Santos v. Mallare

G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950

Tuason, J.

Facts:

Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946,
by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6,
and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the
position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interimappointment by the President to
the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's
co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced
these proceedings.

Issue:

whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to
another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer
or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

4
Held:

Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches
and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except
as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made
only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination."
Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service
pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not
expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the
unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus
or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments
are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."

Three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly

technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees
appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a
method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make
it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down
for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character.
Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is
he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense
in which "highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the
classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter
of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be
discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.

Salazar vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976

The Civil Service Commission: Appointments

Facts:

On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General´confidential
agentµ in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her
appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12,
1965she was extended another appointment by way of promotion, as ´confidential agentµ in the same
office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as
´confidentialagentµ have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966. On March
31, 1966, theAuditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS
issued anappointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the
Commission of CivilService. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position.On December 27, 1966,
petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be reinstatedto her former
position as ´confidential agentµ. However, no action was taken on said letter. Petitioner filed apetition
for mandamus with the Supreme Court to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former

5
position but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action
to theCourt of First Instance.

Issue:

(1) whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.

(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as ´confidential agentµ was validly terminated on
thealleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be reinstated to
saidposition after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.

Held:

(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential.

There are two instances when a positionmay be considered primarily confidential: (1)

When the President upon recommendation of theCommissioner of Civil Service (now Civil Service
Commission) has declared the position to beprimarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of such
declaration when by the nature of the functionsof the office, there exists ´close intimacy between the
appointee and appointing power whichinsures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgiving or betrayals ofpersonal trust or confidential matters of state.µ In the case
before us, the provision of ExecutiveOrder No. 265, declaring ´...confidential agents in the several
department and offices of theGovernment, unless otherwise directed by the President, to be primarily
confidentialµ brings withinthe fold of the aforementioned executive order the position of confidential
agent in the Office ofthe Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2)

Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the termination of her
services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure, primarily confidential positionsare
excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein isallowed by
the Constitution.

This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of aprimarily confidential position
holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should benoted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from office ³ his term
merely ´expires,µ in much the the same way as officer, whoseright thereto ceases upon expiration of the
fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected,is not and cannot be deemed ´removedµ or
´dismissedµ therefrom, upon the expiration of saidterm.

The main difference between the former ³ the primarily confidential officer ³ and the latter isthat the
latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of
his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointingpower expresses
its decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent.

When this even takesplace, the latter is not ´removedµ or ´dismissedµ from office ³ his term has merely
´expired.µBut even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not primarily
confidentialand that therefore her removal from said position for loss of confidence was in violation of
her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet by her acceptance of the position of Junior
Examiner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandonedformer
position of ´confidential agentµ in the same office.

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PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA and TITO B. DATO

July 14, 1995; KAPUNAN,

J.

FACTS:

In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov. of
Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant
Provincial Warden by then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr.Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he
was appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanentappointment. He was extended a
temporary appointment, which was renewed annually. January 1, 1974 – Gov. Alfelor approved the
change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter'srepresentation that
he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however,
was notfavorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not possess
the necessary civil service eligibilityfor the office he was appointed to. His appointment remained
temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.March 16, 1976 – Dato was indefinitely
suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard forallegedly
conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from
confinement. Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the
Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil ServiceCommission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him that the status
of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary topermanent, the latter having passed
the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be maderetroactive to June
11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted privaterespondent's name
from the petitioner's plantilla.Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him.
Consequently, he requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages.His request was not heeded.
Dato filed an action before the RTC.RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent
to five years. Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decisionto the CA.CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision.
Hence the present petition.

ISSUE: W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was
suspended on March 16,1976.

Petitioner’s contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the employment status
of private respondent fromtemporary to permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary
pending validation of the results of private respondent'sexamination for supervising security guard,
private respondent's appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequentqualification for
civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.

SC Held: Agrees with Petitioner’s contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled
to his claim for backwagesfor the entire period of his suspension.

Ratio:

At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet
qualified in an appropriateexamination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service
eligibility made his appointment temporary and without afixed and definite term and is dependent
entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil
service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervisingsecurity guard
examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one.

What is required is a newappointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the

temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of theappointing authority The letter
communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of power properly
belonging to theappointing authority. CSC has the power to Approve or disapprove an appointment set
before it. It does not have the power to makethe appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority

7
to change the employment status of an employee. CSC should have endedits participation in the
appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the

temporary status of the latterwho lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing
communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toesof the appointing authority, thereby
encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association

vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
union’sdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the
courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners
for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter
since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as
the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security System contends on one hand
that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have
no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may
enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice
provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct
peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180
provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes
in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable
laws concerning strike by government employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employeesfrom staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees tostrike they are prohibited from doing so.