G.R. No.
200465, April 20, 2015 the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner failed
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND MONICA NEALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 31,
2011 and its Resolution2 dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32363. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14
October 2008 and 12 February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records
of this case be REMANDED to Branch 40 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.3
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of
Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic
Act No. [RA] 6938).4 The accusatory portion of the Information
filed against her reads:
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then the Chairperson and Managing
Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, and as such, have a complete control and exclusively
manage the entire business of A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as
such and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or
equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering into a contract
with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in
truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the sale of
Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the
damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then
Chairperson of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, had entered into an exclusive dealership
agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola)
for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. By virtue of
a Memorandum of Agreement between the school and the
Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school principal, directed
petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as
Chairperson. Instead, petitioner claimed that the principal had no
business and authority to require her to produce financial
statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the
school bulletin board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into
the financial reports of the Cooperative. The committee was
composed of Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica Nealiga
(member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia
Apostol (auditor), who later executed their respective affidavits
in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on the
documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of
actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared
by petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner
defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years in
the following amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 -
P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000 - P40,503.00; and S.Y. 2000-2001 -
P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative
1
and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board
Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to
Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other
matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40,
does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged
(Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a
sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, thus:
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offense or
predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of
R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than
six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of
the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and
determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first
level courts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds
that it has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Accordingly,
the instant case is hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no
jurisdiction, further discussions over the defense' allegation that
there was a violation of the principle of primary jurisdiction and
that the private complainants used a falsified resolution to
purposely empower them to file the instant case become moot
and academic.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the
private prosecutor's motion for a reconsideration of the order of
dismissal.7 The RTC held:
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal
sanctions/liability for violation of acts or omission prescribed
therein. If ever, the liability is only for damages and for double
the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in law that an act or
omission is not a crime unless there is a law making it so and
providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the facts charged in
the information do not charge an offense. And even
assuming arguendo that they do constitute an offense, the penalty
therefor is that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of
R.A. [6938] which is "imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court," which
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second
level court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the
prosecution is the undisputed fact that before this case was filed
in Court, conciliation/mediation process for the amicable
settlement of the dispute was not availed of by the private
complainants who are all members (directors) of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in
accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the
Cooperative Code itself and the Guidelines for the
Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative dispute
(Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute
involving the parties is certainly a dispute and issue between and
among directors, officers or members of the A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is
governed by the Guidelines.
Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until
the Office of the President as outlined in the Cooperative Code
and in its implementing rules not having been resorted to by the
complainants, the rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and
this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
present case.8
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the order of
dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and
setting aside the RTC Orders dated October 14, 2008 and
February 12, 2009 and remanded the case records to the RTC for
further proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN,
UNAMBIGUOUS AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH
4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE TO THE PENAL
SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE
[CODE], RA-6938 AND ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE
DERIVED FROM ITS INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN
SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO
10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT
HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A GROUND TO
REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE
OTHER GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF
[SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938, (COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE
WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION -
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE
COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING TO COURT.
3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER
REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE DISMISSAL IS NOT
APPEALABLE.
4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE
PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER
PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW
AND AMENDED COOPERATIVE CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE
APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE
OF EXPOSE (SIC) FACTO LAW.]10
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which
the OSG points out as the proper remedy to assail the CA
decision.
Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65,
because the assailed CA decision is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. She posits that the Court ordered the exclusion of the
CA as one of the party respondents, and considered the petition
as one filed under Rule 45, since the focal issue raised in the
petition is a question of law calling for an interpretation of
Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by RA 7691. She adds that had she chosen to file an
appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with the same
question of law.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is
appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.11 In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court had again
stressed the distinction between the remedies provided for
under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to wit:
2
xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the
Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is
not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule
45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals
in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition
for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate
process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the
specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be
availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary
appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. xxx.13
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's
Association, Inc.,14 the Court explained that one of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor
is grave abuse of discretion. It is also well settled that a party
cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of
Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies
and have distinct applications. The remedy of appeal under Rule
45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when
petitioner adopts an improper remedy, petition may be
dismissed outright.
However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable
reasons as when the petition before it is clearly meritorious and
filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65.15 In accordance with
the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as having been
filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered
by petitioner for a more liberal interpretation of procedural
rules. Although it was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65,
the petition at bench lacks substantive merit and raises only
questions of law which should have been duly made in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.16
On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over
petitioner's criminal case for violation of Section 46 (Liability of
Directors, Officers and Committee Members) of RA 6938, the
Court affirms the CA ruling that it is the RTC, not the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her
case.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the
law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or
Information, and the penalty provided by law for the crime
charged at the time of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. -
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective
of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
(Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years,
irrespective of the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC, in accordance with Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. � Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers
and Committee Members) of RA 6938 provides only for a civil
liability but not a criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has
jurisdiction over her criminal case which is punishable under
paragraph 4 of Section 124:
Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions
affecting cooperatives are hereby prohibited:
(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no
penalty is imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine
of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of
Directors, Officers and Committee Members), Section 47
(Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938,
are plain, unambiguous, and categorical. She submits that
statutory construction of such clear provisions, especially if
prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would subject her to
higher penalty, should not be allowed.
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has
jurisdiction over petitioner's case pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Section 124 of RA 6938:
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated
the provisions of Section 47 (liability of directors, officers
and committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director)
and Section 51 (illegal use of confidential information) shall upon
conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years
but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's
discretion; (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted
provision is a clerical error because the "liability of directors,
officers and committee members" is undisputedly governed by
Section 46 of RA 6938, while Section 47 thereof deals with the
compensation of directors, officers and employees, to wit:
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members. - Directors, officers and committee members, who
willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing
the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors,
officers or committee member shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative,
members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to
acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest or equity
adverse to the cooperative in respect to any matter which has
been reposed in him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the
cooperative, be liable for damages and for double the profits
which otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision
in the by-laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not
receive any compensation except for reasonable per
diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per diems may
be granted to directors by a majority vote of the members with
voting rights at a regular or special general assembly meeting
specifically called for the purpose: Provided further, that no
additional compensation other than per diems shall be paid
during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to
present any compelling reason to warrant a departure from the
exhaustive CA ruling on why the RTC, not the MeTC, has
jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation of Section 46 of
RA 6938, thus:
3
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the
legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints
which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless,
empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended
operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the
face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is
abrogated. To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the
nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. For
it is the duty of the court to give a statute a sensible construction,
one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or
absurdity. It is its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and in
doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule under which it
must be held without variance or shadow of turning the
legislature intended to make a typographical error, the result of
which would be to make nonsense of the act, and not to carry out
the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.
xxxx
Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec]
124, paragraph 4, as the trial court did, is necessary and
therefore, warranted the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of
jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec] 46 of the Code, entitled "Liability
of Directors, Officers, and Committee Members," provides for
violations under which the said officers could be held liable for,
and the corresponding liability for damages and profits from the
said violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for penal
sanction, an application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow
as the said provision evidently refers to the penal sanction on
erring directors, officers and committee members. It would
make no sense if we were to follow what clearly appears to be a
clerical error, that is, applying [Sec] 124, paragraph 4 instead,
just because paragraph 3 of the same [section] refers to [Sec] 47,
which upon examination of the Code provides for the
"Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees of
the cooperative.
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section]
124 (3) should refer to "[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors,
Officers and Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a
Director) and [Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential
information)." Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46,
therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years
but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion,
which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.18
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by
the OSG in Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on the liability of directors,
officers and committee members, has been recognized and duly
corrected when the legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act
Amending the Cooperative Code of the Philippines to be known
as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008." Pertinent portions
of the corrected provision read
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. -
Directors, officers and committee members, who are willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of
the cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee
members shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or
profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members, and
other persons.
xxxx
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions
affecting cooperatives are hereby prohibited:
xxxx
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the
provisions of Article 45 on the Liability of Directors, Officers
and Committee Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a
Director, and Article 49 on the Illegal Use of Confidential
Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not
less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both
at the court's discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
was violated when the Cooperative filed a criminal case against
petitioner without undergoing conciliation/mediation
proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the By-laws of
the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or
mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for
violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case is not
an intra-cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-
cooperative dispute and should have been resolved at the
cooperative level. As aptly argued by the People, this is not an
intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a dispute
arising between or among members of the same cooperative. The
instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former
chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of
Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is
not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of
the regular court.19
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the
offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is limited
to that of a witness for the prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal
case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real
offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere
private complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited
to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can hardly
be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one
arising between or among members of the same cooperative.
On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on
demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and
unappealable, the Court rules in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to
the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court,
in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule
that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal
and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case" and when
the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal,
the case ends there.23
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence
and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did
not decide the case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of
petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence proffered
by the prosecution. This being the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC
Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may
still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.24 As aptly noted by the CA:
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal
of the case against her is an acquittal. It should be emphasized'
that "acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the
defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
4
the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but dismissal
does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is
not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because
the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance,
etc."25
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated
her right against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative
and upholds the CA in ruling that the dismissal having been
granted upon petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not
attach, thus:
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed
in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed that the
dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of
a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the
trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach
are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the
dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by
moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to
evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal
was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is
deemed to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy.
In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of
petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.26
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that
the prosecution of her case before the RTC for violation of Section
46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res
judicatabecause the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a
Resolution27 dated August 13, 2012, granted her demurrer to
evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of
private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.28 In
support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the
private complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative]
and the subject matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola
products] of both cases are the same, and that the case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually and necessarily
included in the case for falsification of private documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no
bearing on criminal proceedings.29 At any rate, petitioner's
argument is incidentally related to double jeopardy which
embrace's a prohibition against being tried for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the
defense of double jeopardy may prosper. There is double
jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.32
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second
requisites of double jeopardy are present in view of the MeTC
Resolution33 dated August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's
demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-
CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite
of double jeopardy � a second jeopardy is for the same offense
as in the first � is present. Such question of identity or lack of
identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements
are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense
involved.34
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the
offense charged in the information for Section 46 of RA 6938
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime for
falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to determine whether an
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
other is provided under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against
petitioner for falsification of private document in Criminal Case
No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in
Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the first
offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily
include and is not necessarily included in the second offense.
The Information for falsification of private document, on the one
hand, alleged that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and
Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare
financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-
2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in
violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the RPC. The elements of
falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2
of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171;36(2) that
the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on
the other hand, that being then such officer and director of the
Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or
equity adverse to it, in violation of her duty and of the confidence
reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with Coca-Cola in
her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales
profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative.
The essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are
(1) that the offender is a director, officer or committee member;
and (2) that the offender willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for or
assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence
or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c)
acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their
duty as such directors, officers or committee member.
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential
elements of the crimes of falsification of private document under
Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA
6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As
neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is
necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double
jeopardy to attach�a second jeopardy is for the same offense as
in the first�is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements
different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former
is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the
part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what
makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A
simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof
of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines
5
two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the
same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not
an essential element of the other.
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate,
and distinct offenses as discussed above�the first against'
Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against
Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)�one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be
charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if
these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is
directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of
two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or
by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the
prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of
the other.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and
the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its
Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.182157 August 17, 2015
ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION, as represented by
ALFREDO A. DY, Petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN ANG, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review 1 filed by petitioner Anlud
Metal Recycling Corporation, which assails the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
97124. 2 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12691-2004-
C 3 dismissing the charge of estate against respondent Joaquin
Ang; 4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
San Miguel Packaging Products-Metal Closures Lithography Plant
(SMC-MCLP) allegedly awarded petitioner an exclusive contract
to purchase its aluminum-and tin-based scrap materials from 20
March 2003 to 31 January 2004. However, on 23 January 2004,
the President of Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation Found that
SMC-MCLP’s employee Conrado Alday had allowed Nenita B. Dela
Cruz to load
scrap materials in two trucks! owned by respondent Ang, which
were then operated by his truck drivers Edjanel Jose Paniergo
and Renato Bagauana.
Based on the narration of petitioner, Dela Cruz pretended to be
an agent of Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation when she
arranged for the transport of the scrap materials. She had
allegedly coordinated the hauling with Alday, who was then
working for SMC-MCLP. Alday purportedly allowed the trucks
driven by Paniergo and Bagaua to enter the plant and load the
scrap materials in the cargoes based on a false representation
that the transaction was authorized by petitioner. Fortunately,
the two trucks was not able to leave the premises of SMC-MCLP.
Petitioner lodged a Complaint for attempted estafa through
falsification of commercial/private document against Alday, Dela
Cruz, Paniergo, Bagaua, and respondent Ang. Subsequently, the
Investigating Prosecutor caused the filing with the RTC of an
Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2( a) of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads as follows: 5
That on or about January 23, 2004 at Brgy. Canlubang, in the City
of Calamba and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to defraud by means of
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, did then there unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously pretend to possess business or imaginary
transactions by claiming that he has the authority from
complainant Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation to withdraw
from San Miguel Corp - Metal Closure Lithography Plant (SMC
MCLP), when in truth and in fact they were not and as a
consequence, they were able to withdraw thirty (30) metric tons
of Aluminum Scraps from the said SMC-MCLP estimated at more
than ₱500,000 using the name of Anlud Metal Recycling
Corporation (ANLUD), which was charged to the latter's account,
to its damage and prejudice in the amount of PS00,000.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest 6 on 26 October 2004 against
Ang and his co-accused. Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition
for Reinvestigation and a Motion for Preliminary Investigation
before the City Prosecutor's Office. He also filed with the RTC an
Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending Reinvestigation
and to Recall Order of Arrest Against Accused Movant Joaquin
Ang. 7
In its Order dated 20 January 2005, 8 the RTC denied the motion
filed by Ang. It ruled that his allegations were not supported by
evidence; and that based on the facts of the case, there was a
reasonable ground to engender a well-founded belief that he had
committed estafa.
In contrast, on 3 February 2005, the City Prosecutor's Office
issued its Resolution on Reconsideration 9 absolving respondent
from the offense charged. It discussed that although he owned
the trucks that carried the scrap materials, the theory of
conspiracy had no foundation absent any proof that he had
performed any overt act of estafa. It also highlighted the fact that
he was not present at the time of the incident. As a result, the City
Prosecutor's Office filed an Amended Information, 10 which no
longer included him as an accused.
Petitioner bewailed the dropping of respondent from the charge.
Thus, it filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Petition for
Review, which the latter granted. 11 According to the DOJ,
respondent could not be considered innocent of estafa, since (1)
his denial was self-serving; (2) he owned the trucks used in
loading the scrap materials; (3) he failed to adduce exculpatory
evidence showing that it was Dela Cruz who had commanded the
use of his trucks; ( 4) the drivers of the trucks were respondent's
own; and (5) it can be inferred from the action of the truck
drivers that they received instructions from him. Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but to no avail. 12 Thus, a
Second Amended Information 13 was filed with the RTC, which
already named Ang as one of the accused. On 16 June 2006,
respondent sought judicial relief by filing an Omnibus Motion to
Determine Probable Cause and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest Until Determination of Probable Cause Is Completed
(Omnibus Motion). 14 Petitioner filed its
Comment/Opposition 15 thereto on 7 July 2006. ·
This time around, the court took a different stance. In its Decision
dated 18 September 2006, the RTC dismissed the case against
respondent for want of probable cause. It explained that mere
ownership of the trucks did not make respondent a co-
conspirator for estafa. For conspiracy to be appreciated against
Ang, the trial court required proof showing that he knew of the
crime, consented to its commission, or performed any of its
elements.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 and a Motion for
Inhibition, 17 but both were denied through the RTC Order dated
3 October 2006. 18 The court reiterated in its ruling that "in the
resolution of the judicial determination of probable cause, the
court is not bound and cannot be bound by the findings of the
6
Secretary of Justice in the existence of probable cause and hold
the accused for trial." 19
Unrelenting, petitioner questioned the dismissal of Ang's criminal
case before the CA. In its Decision dated 4 December 2007, and
subsequent Resolution dated 13 March 2008, the CA gave due
course to the Petition for Certiorari 20 notwithstanding that Anlud
Metal Recycling Corporation had appealed without the
participation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which
was supposed to act on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
However, the petition failed on the merits. Petitioner had argued
before the CA that the RTC should not have entertained
respondent's Omnibus Motion, because its Notice of Hearing was
addressed only to the public prosecutor and not to petitioner.
The CA rejected this argument and ruled that the "absence of a
notice to a private prosecutor although the public prosecutor has
been notified is a matter that is for a trial judge to consider in his
sound discretion." 21
Petitioner also failed to dispute the RTC's ruling to exclude Ang as
an accused in the crime of estafa. According to the CA, since the
trial court had conducted an independent evaluation, the fact
alone that the latter reversed its earlier finding of probable cause
did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; and any error of the
RTC was an error of judgment not correctible by certiorari.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition before this Court
and raised the following contentions: (1) the RTC had no
jurisdiction to determine probable cause; (2) it abused its
discretion when it entertained respondent's Omnibus Motion for
determination of probable cause despite a defective Notice of
Hearing; and (3) it erred in dismissing the charge of estafa
against Ang. In turn, respondent filed a Comment, 22 which
included the issue of petitioner's standing to file this appeal
without the participation of the OSG. Petitioner submitted its
Reply 23 to refute the allegations of respondent.
RULING OF THE COURT
Petitioner has no personality to appeal the dismissal of the
criminal case for estafa before this Court. Before the Court
proceeds with the substantive issues in this case, the procedural
issue of petitioner's personality to appeal the dismissal of the
criminal case merits preliminary attention.
Petitioner argues that since the CA has already ruled upon this
issue, without respondent filing a partial appeal, then the latter
has already lost its right to question the standing of Anlud ·Metal
Recycling Corporation. This argument is unmeritorious. In the
past, the Court has motu propre ascertained the standing of a
private offended party to appeal the dismissal of a criminal
case.24
In any event, respondent cannot be considered to have waived its
argument regarding the personality of petitioner to file the
instant appeal. In his Comment, respondent cites Republic v.
Partisala 25 and asserts that petitioner has no right to appeal the
dismissal of the criminal case absent the participation of the OSG.
In its Reply, petitioner responds by quoting the ruling of the CA,
viz: 26
As argued by petitioner, citing the case of Perez v. Hagonoy Rural
Bank, Inc., the petitioner, as private complainant, has legal
personality to impugn the dismissal of the criminal case against
the private respondent under Rule 65. As private offended party,
the petitioner has an interest in the civil aspect of the case; thus,
it may file a special civil action for certiorari and prosecute the
same in its own name without making the People of the
Philippines a party. While it is only the Solicitor General who may
bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal
proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a
special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal
proceedings before the courts of law.
Notably, both positions taken by the parties are supported by
jurisprudence. It is then proper for this Court to clarify the
standing of a private offended party - in this case, petitioner - to
appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused, who
in this case is respondent.
The real party in interest in a criminal case is the People of the
Philippines. Hence, if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court, the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the
Solicitor General on behalf of the State. 27
As a qualification, however, this Court recognizes that the private
offended party has an interest in the civil aspect of the
case. 28 Logically, the capability of the private complainant to
question the dismissal of the criminal proceedings is limited only
to questions relating to the civil aspect of the case. 29 It should
ideally be along this thin framework that we may entertain
questions regarding the dismissals of criminal cases instituted by
private offended parties. Enlarging this scope may result in
wanton disregard of the OSG's personality, as well as the clogging
of our dockets, which this Court is keen to avoid. Therefore, the
litmus test in ascertaining the personality of herein petitioner lies
in whether or not the substance of the certiorari action it
instituted in the CA referred to the civil aspect of the case. 30
Here in this Rule 45 petition, petitioner argues that the RTC erred
when it concluded that "there is no evidence of conspiracy
against private respondent Ang." Petitioner goes on to enumerate
circumstances that collectively amount to a finding that based on
probable cause, respondent conspired with the accused in
defrauding Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation.: 31
Clearly, petitioner mainly disputes the RTC's finding of want of
probable cause to indict Ang as an accused for estafa. This
dispute refers, though, to the criminal, and not the civil, aspect of
the case. In Jimenez v. Sorongon 32we similarly ruled:
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the
petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to
protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the
crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute
which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the
OSG. (Emphasis supplied)
Given that nowhere in the pleadings did petitioner even briefly
discuss the civil liability of respondent, this Court holds that
Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation lacks the requisite legal
standing to appeal the discharge of respondent Ang from the
Information for estafa. On this ground alone, the petition already
fails. 33
Nonetheless, this Court has already acknowledged the interest of
substantial justice, grave error committed by the judge, and lack
of due process as veritable grounds to allow appeals to prosper
despite the non participation of the OSG. 34 But as will be
discussed below, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the
petition falls under any of these exceptions.
The RTC may conduct a judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner explains that there are two determinations of probable
cause: the first is for the purpose of filing a criminal information
in the court, and the second is for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Petitioner submits that since the first kind is executive in
nature, then the RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine
the existence of probable cause to hold respondent as an accused
in the crime of estafa.
Hence, for petitioner, the RTC grievously erred when it gave due
course to the Omnibus Motion of respondent, which questioned
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor.
Respondent counters this argument by alleging that the RTC may
7
resolve issues brought before it pursuant to the power of the
court to administer justice.
Petitioner's interpretation of the rules on the determination of
probable cause is inaccurate. Although courts must respect the
executive determination of probable cause, 35 the trial courts may
still independently determine probable cause. They are not
irrevocably bound to the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor and the DOJ. 36
The trial court actually has the following options upon the filing
of a criminal information: ( 1) immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days
from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause. 37 These options are provided in Rule 112, Section 6 (a) of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-" (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. -" Within ten ( 10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section
7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the RTC is allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa against
Ang notwithstanding the executive determination of probable
cause by the prosecutor. If we were to construe otherwise, we
would be contradicting the basic principle that "once an
information is filed in RTC, any disposition of the case rests
already in the sound discretion of the court." 38
Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court was substantially
complied with.
Citing Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, petitioner regards
the Notice of Hearing appended to respondent's Omnibus Motion
as defective. This is because the notice was addressed only to the
public prosecutor and the clerk of court, and not to the private
offended party - petitioner herein. 39
By having a defective Notice of Hearing, petitioner concludes that
the Omnibus Motion was a mere scrap of paper, which the RTC
should have instantly disregarded. Thus, when the RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, gave due course to the motion, petitioner
believes that its right to due process was oppressed.
Petitioner correctly argues that a notice of hearing must be
addressed to all the parties concerned; 40 and that failure to
comply with this directive results in a motion that should be
treated as a mere scrap of paper. 41 However, this general
requirement of a valid notice of hearing is one of those
procedural rules that admit of various exceptions. 42
In Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, 43 the
Court considered the defect in the notice of hearing as cured,
since the adverse party had the opportunity to be heard and had
filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. In particular, the
adverse party was able to argue the procedural defects and even
ventilate substantial arguments.
This same application has already been echoed in our past
decisions. 44 In those cases, the Court observes that the real
purpose behind the requirement of notice of hearing is to afford
the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is
resolved by the court. 45 The test is the presence of the
opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon
which it is based. 46 Considering the circumstances of the present
case, . we believe that procedural due process has substantially
been complied with.
Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition on 7 July 2006
specifically to oppose the supposedly defective Omnibus Motion
filed by respondent on 16 June 2006. In that pleading, petitioner
raised the incompleteness of the Notice of Hearing and likewise
argued about the substantive merits - that probable cause existed
to indict Ang as an accused. Thereafter, the RTC scheduled the
hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause on 16
August 2006, but the hearing was later rescheduled on 30 August
2006. 47 Only after these proceedings had transpired did the trial
court issue its assailed Decision on 18 September 2006 finding a
want of probable cause to hold Ang for trial for the crime of
estafa. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on 2 October 2006, which the RTC denied in its Order dated 3
October 2006.
Based on the sequence of events mentioned above, it is clear that
petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard. It advanced its
opposition to the Omnibus Motion when it filed its
Comment/Opposition on 7 July 2006 and later on in its Motion
for Reconsideration dated 2 October 2006. From these facts, we
conclude that Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on notice of
hearing was substantially complied with. Consequently, this
Court cannot agree with petitioner that the latter's right to due
process has been denied. In any event, petitioner cannot anchor
the reversal of the finding of want of probable cause on the mere
pretext that the Omnibus Motion filed by respondent was just a
scrap of paper as it contained a defective Notice of Hearing. The
judicial determination of probable cause may proceed even if the
accused does not file a pertinent motion. As adverted to earlier,
the RTC may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. 48
The RTC did not exceed its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
charge of estafa against respondent for want of probable cause.
In the main, petitioner questions the ruling of the CA, which
dismissed its Petition for Certiorari. The CA held that the RTC did
not commit an error of jurisdiction when the latter ruled that the
prosecution failed to establish probable cause against
respondent.
Ordinarily, the detennination of probable cause is not lodged
with this Court. 49 We emphasize that the viewpoint we follow
must conform to the nature of reviewing a CA decision, which
was rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Hao v. People, [[50] ] we explained that in this situation, the
Court is confronted with the question of whether the CA correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, and not on the basis of whether the
latter's assessment of the incidents before it was strictly legally
correct. To recall, grave abuse of discretion exists when there is
an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion of or a
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law. 51
In this case, the CA no longer dealt with the particular exhibits
relied upon by the RTC to conclude the absence of probable cause
to indict Ang as an accused in the case for estafa. In its rulings, the
RTC reasoned as follows: 52
The fact that the accused is the owner of the truck that carried
the objects of the crime cannot make him a co-conspirator in the
execution of the crime of estafa. An affirmation of this
supposition (sic) open a floodgate for charges against people,
whose only fault was being owners of vehicle used in the
commission of the crime.
8
xxxx
Upon review and examination of the prosecution evidence in the
judicial determination of probable cause, there is total absence of
any prosecution evidence in their documents (Annexes "A-1" to
"A-9") and witnesses' affidavits (Exhibits "A" & "B") where this
Court can logically surmised nor inferred (sic) from any of the
proven acts of any of the other accused that Accused Joaquin Ang
was in conspiracy with the other accused in their common
criminal unity and intent to defraud Anlud.
There was nothing from these documents and affidavits that
Accused Joaquin Ang committed, executed or implied any act
leading to a conclusion that he knew the commission of the crime
or performed any of the elements of the offense to establish that
he acted in unison with the other accused. There was no proof
that he benefited from the effects of the crime. There was no
proof that he gave his consent to the commission of the alleged
crime.
In view of this (sic) findings, this Court agrees with the
observation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba City in
their Resolution on Reconsideration dated 22 September 2004
that absolved Accused Joaquin Ang. To quote their logic and ratio:
The bone of movant's contention dwells on the theory of
conspiracy which was the basis of his inclusion as one of the
accused. Indubitably, accused Renato Bagaua and Edjanel Jose
were the assigned drivers of his trucks with plate number UUG
787 and TJL 632 that were chanced upon by the complainant
loading scrap materials inside the premises of San Miguel
Corporation-Metal Closure Lithography Plant (SMC-MCLP)
sometime in January 23, 2004. A careful perusal of the evidence
adduced by the parties will clearly show that moving was not
around at the premises of SMC MCLP during the time that the
other respondents were loading scrap materials on his truck
Neither that he executed any act leading to a conclusion that he
has knowledge thereof or performed any of the elements of the
offense charged to show that he acted in unison with the accused.
There is also no proof that he benefited, in any manner, from the
effects of the crime or gave his consent to the commission
thereof.
Based on the explanation of the RTC, this Court holds that the CA
was correct in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court.1âwphi1 In referring to the extant facts, the
arguments of the parties, as well as logic and law, the RTC did not
whimsically, arbitrarily, or capriciously ascertain the absence of
probable cause.
Probable cause, albeit requiring less evidence than that which
would justify a conviction, nevertheless implies the probability of
guilt and requires more than bare suspicion. 53 Given that Ang
was implicated in the conspiracy, the trial court correctly looked
into whether respondent performed any overt act as direct or
indirect contribution to the execution of the crime planned to be
committed. 54
As held by the RTC, apart from owning the trucks, no other link
has been established by the prosecution to hold respondent as a
conspirator in the hauling of the scrap materials. Even in the
instant petition,55 petitioner harps only on Ang being engaged in
scrap trading, owning the trucks, and employing the accused as
his truck drivers. Without more, none of these depicts any overt
act of respondent connected to the accomplishment of estafa.
Petitioner relies on the Memorandum submitted by Ang before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, on 25
September 2004 to argue that respondent admitted his
complicity in the transaction. He purportedly admitted to the
crime when he pleaded: 56
Worse, Alfredo (petitioner's representative) went beyond the
bounds of fairness and good faith by maliciously and recklessly
accusing the poor truck drivers Edjanel and Renato of the crime
when all they did was to drive the truck for their employer who
had negotiated with San Miguel for the purchase of the scrap
material.
This issue was already raised by petitioner in the proceedings
below. Unfortunately, neither the RTC nor the CA discussed this
matter.
Based on our own appreciation then, we find that nowhere in the
above-quoted passage is it indicated that respondent specifically
made a factual admission that he had instructed his drivers to go
to the plant, misrepresent that they were from Anlud Metal
Recycling Corporation, and coordinate the hauling of the scrap
materials with Alday and Dela Cruz. An admission must be clear;
and in this instance, it must take into account the unwavering
position of Ang that he did not conspire with any of the accused
in their alleged scheme to haul scrap materials with the use of his
trucks. 57
All told, we are not inclined to disturb the conclusions of the RTC,
as these are based on the evidence on record. Neither are we in
disagreement with the CA, which remarked that the dismissal of
the criminal action against Ang is "not fatal to the cause of the
public prosecution because such quashal appears to have been
issued at the initial stage of the criminal trial
process." 58 Considering the foregoing, we rule to sustain the
judgments of the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review filed by Anlud Metal
Recycling Corporation is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 4 December 2007 and subsequent Resolution dated 13
March 2008 in CA G.R. SP. No. 97124, affirming the Regional Trial
Court Decision dated 18 September 2006 and Order dated 3
October 2006 in Criminal Case No. 12691-04-C are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200942 June 16, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with
the crime of murder for the death of Jose Buensuceso
(Buensuceso). During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not
guilty.1 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10
o'clock in the evening, Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole,
Phils. in Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company
staff house on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a
despedida for one of his employees.
While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was
gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle.
The guard on duty, David Azucena (Azucena), who was then
opening the gate, identified one of the assailants as herein
appellant.
During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the
extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the preliminary
investigation of the case, admitting to the killing of Buensuceso.
However, when it was appellant’s turn to testify, he narrated that
at the time of the killing, he was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay
City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
On February 16, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision2 finding
appellant guilty as charged, viz.:
9
WHEREFORE, Judgment is issued finding the accused Jorie
Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and directing him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of
₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 [as] civil indemnity
and actual damages as follows:
₱59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased;
[P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for
₱220,000[;]
₱1,500.00 Appearance fee; and
₱50,000.00 Attorney’s fee.
He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary of Davao
Penal [C]olony.
SO ORDERED.3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In his appeal, appellant argued that when his supposed
extrajudicial confession was being taken, Atty. Michael Florentino
Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao), the lawyer who supposedly assisted him,
was not around. He arrived only when appellant was about to
sign the extrajudicial confession.
Appellant also insisted that Azucena, the prosecution’s alleged
eyewitness, did not actually see him shooting the victim.
Appellant’s contentions were, however, disregarded by the CA.
In its Decision4 dated October 13, 2011, the CA found no reason
to depart from the trial court’s findings. It held that appellant’s
contention that he lacked legal intervention and assistance
during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was totally belied
by the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered assistance to
the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and carefully
explained to the latter the consequences of his admission.
Besides, the voluntariness of the execution of the extrajudicial
confession was apparent considering that it is replete with
details that only appellant would know. The appellate court
brushed aside appellant’s assertion of torture, the same being
unsupported by medical certificate or marks of physical abuse. In
any case, he never bothered to narrate how he was tortured or to
identify his alleged tormentors. Moreover, the ballistic
examination proved that the slugs used in killing Buensuceso
were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from appellant.
The CA also found no merit in appellant’s claim that Azucena did
not actually see him shoot the victim. The CA opined that
although Azucena did not see appellant actually shoot the victim,
he nonetheless saw appellant within seconds from hearing the
gunshots fleeing from the immediate vicinity of the crime scene
aboard a motorcycle with a gun in hand. Based on the foregoing,
the appellate court found appellant’s denial and alibi undeserving
of credence.
The dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 16, [2009]
decision rendered by Branch [8], Regional Trial Court, 9th
Judicial Region, Malaybalay City, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We totally agree with the RTC and the CA in finding that the guilt
of appellant for the crime of murder was proved beyond
reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that on April 2, 2003, at
around 10 o’clock in the evening, appellant shot Buensuceso
while the latter was about to enter the gate of the staff house of
Stanfilco-Dole in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Moreover, we agree
with the findings of the RTC and the CA that appellant’s
extrajudicial confession6 was voluntarily and duly executed and
replete with details that only appellant could supply, viz.:
x x x But before proceeding in questioning you, I am informing
you that under our new constitution, you have the right to the
following:
A. You have the right to remain silent and not answer x x x my
questions; it might be that I might use your answers as evidence
against you or favorable to you.
01. QUESTION: Do you understand your right?
ANSWER: Yes[,] Sir.
02. QUESTION: Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER: I would rather not[,] sir[,] because I would
tell the truth as to what had happened.
B. You have the right to avail [of] the services of a
counsel of your choice to help you in this investigation,
and if you can’t afford to hire the services of a lawyer,
the government will provide you with free legal services
of a lawyer from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
03. QUESTION: Do you understand your right?
ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.
04: QUESTION: Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER: I have my own lawyer, he is Atty. Michael
Florentino Dumlao III, we already had a talk and he
made me understand x x x my rights, and he also made
me understand about this investigation where I will
voluntarily narrate what I x x x [know].
05. QUESTION: Did anybody give you money or
promised to give you a reward, or did anybody
intimidate you in giving this affidavit?
ANSWER: Nobody[,] sir.
06. QUESTION: Did you understand your rights that I
told you?
ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.7
Appellant then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Alex
Laranjo (Laranjo) and Kid Canadilla (Canadilla), for and in behalf
of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to
kill the victim for a fee. According to appellant, Alonzo wanted
the victim killed because the latter withheld the release of his
collectibles from Stanfilco-Dole. Appellant then narrated how he
met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received
payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how
he executed the plan. Appellant signed his extrajudicial
confession, with the assistance of Atty. Dumlao, and subscribed
the same before Atty. Dennis B. Caayupan at the Office of the
Clerk of Court.8
Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal
assistance to appellant all throughout the proceedings and
carefully explained to him the ramifications of his admission. He
informed appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be
10
used in evidence against him. Notwithstanding, appellant insisted
on giving his extrajudicial confession.9
In any event, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was
not based solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution
likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who
testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he saw
appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the
victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle
and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that
the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm
earlier confiscated from the appellant. Moreover, appellant was
not able to establish that it was physically impossible for him to
be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
The RTC and the CA thus properly found appellant guilty of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. However, it must be stated that appellant is not eligible
for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines.
Anent the damages awarded, we find that modification is in
order.1âwphi1
Regarding the award for lost earnings, the general rule is that
there must be documentary proof to support indemnity for loss
of earning capacity. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule,
viz.:
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1)
the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.10 Notably, this case does not fall under any of the
exceptions. The deceased victim could not be considered as a
self-employed earning less than the minimum wage; neither
could he be considered employed as a daily wage worker.
However, we are inclined to award lost earnings considering that
the deceased, as testified by his widow, was the manager of
Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City and was receiving a
monthly salary of ₱95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when
gunned down by appellant. This testimony was not objected to by
appellant or questioned during cross-examination or on appeal.
Clearly, the existence of factual basis of the award has been
satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the award for
lost earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 –
age] x [gross annual income - necessary expenses equivalent to
50% of the gross annual income]. Thus: [2/3 x (80-54)]
[(₱95,000 x 12) – 50% (₱95,000 x 12)] = ₱9,878,100.00.
In addition, the awards of actual damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 must be deleted for lack of proof; in lieu thereof,
temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is awarded. The
awards of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, and moral
damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00, are in line with prevailing
jurisprudence. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. Finally, all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this resolution until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant
Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that
appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost earnings is
reduced to ₱9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is
deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. VICTORIA R.
ARAMBULO AND MIGUEL ARAMBULO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the
Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 5 February 2008 and 27
February 2009, respectively of the Court of Appeals, Seventeenth
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 86353 which effectively suspended the
criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-62784, an estafacase
against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 121, Caloocan City.
Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria),
Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo
Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the
heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped
Estate Inc. (Anaped) was incorporated as part of the estate
planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of
Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of
Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa against
Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that
Victoria failed to remit the rentals collected from the time the
ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to
Anaped.
On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A. Almora
recommended the filing of an Information against respondents.
On 1 June 2001, respondents were charged
with estafa committed as follow:
That on [or] about the period from December, 1994 to June,
1997, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, and with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, after having received
rentals from IMF International Corporation, in the total amount
of THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTY-EIGHT (P319,888.00) PESOS, under the express
obligation of turning over or remitting the same to ANAPED
ESTATE INCORPORATED, once in possession of the said amount
and far from complying with their obligation aforesaid and
despite notice [to] that effect, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply,
and convert the said amount to their own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of ANAPED ESTATE, INC., in
the sum above-aforementioned.3
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the
pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of
Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a
petition filed by Victoria�s brother Oscar for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale,
injunction, receivership and damages.4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259
is a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and
Domingo questioning the authority of their elder sibling Rodrigo
Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, as well as the Anaped Board
of Directors and officers, including private complainant Buban to
act for and in behalf of the corporation.5chanrobleslaw
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted
that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the
issues of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the
lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are
duly authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.
On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the
proceedings. The trial court reasoned that the issue in the SEC
cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in
11
behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the issue of the
culpability of the accused for estafa, thus:
For indeed, if the aforesaid issues are resolved in the
[respondent�s] favor, they cannot be held liable for
misappropriation for they possess the authority to collect rentals
and hold the same on behalf of the firm. They would then be
justified in not remitting the collections to the group of Jose
Buban who would be then deemed as mere usurpers of
authority.6
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the
trial court issued an Order dated 19 February 2004 setting aside
its 28 August 2003 Order and setting the case for pre-trial. The
trial court noted that respondents failed to file an opposition to
the motion for reconsideration.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that they be
allowed to file their Comment/Opposition to the motion for
reconsideration and that the pre-trial be held in abeyance.
Respondents claimed that the Order of the trial court to file
comment/opposition was served on respondents themselves and
not on their counsel.
On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents� Omnibus
Motion. The trial court stressed that even if the order was served
upon respondents and not upon their counsel, records show that
a copy of the motion for reconsideration was served by
registered mail upon counsel. Thus, the trial court stated that
respondents� counsel was well aware of the existence of the
motion for reconsideration, thus he could have taken the
initiative to file his comment thereto without waiting for any
directive from the court.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals asserting that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied them the opportunity to file
their comment; when it ruled that respondents� counsel should
have filed the comment as he was furnished a copy of the motion
for reconsideration; and when it granted petitioner�s motion for
reconsideration.
On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge dated
February 19, 2004 and July 23, 2004 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and she is hereby enjoined from hearing the Criminal Case
No. C-62784 until the termination of the SEC Case No. 03-99-
6259. The August 28, 2003 Order of the respondent Judge is
hereby REINSTATED.7
Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that respondents were given the opportunity to
present their side in their motion to suspend proceedings. The
appellate court treated respondents� arguments in said motion
as their Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner. That is correct.
The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259:
[T]he issue is the legality of the election of Anaped Board of
Directors, as well as the authority of its officers, which include
private complainant Jose Buban, to act for and in behalf of the
corporation. Clearly, it involves facts that are intimately related
to those upon which the criminal case is based. The resolution of
the issues raised in this intra-corporate dispute will ultimately
determine the guilt or innocence of [respondents] in the crime
of estafa initiated by Jose Buban. It must be remembered that one
of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence
under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is
a demand made by the offended party to the offender. A valid
demand must therefore be made by an offended party to the
offender.8
The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging
the authority of Buban, then the validity of Buban�s demand to
turn over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate
court concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found
to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the
prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in
a Resolution dated 27 February 2009.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the lone
ground of whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that
there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension
of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.
Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court in the SEC
cases with respect to the question of who are the lawful officers
or directors of Anaped is not determinative of the liability of
respondents to remit the rental collections in favor of Anaped.
Petitioner proffers that a corporation has a personality distinct
and separate from its individual stockholders. Petitioner
emphasizes that at the time the demand for remittance of the
rental collections was made against respondents, Buban was an
officer of Anaped and until such time that his authority is validly
revoked, all his previous acts are valid and binding. Moreover,
petitioner avers that the duty of respondents to remit the
collection still subsists even during the pendency of the SEC cases
as the money remitted goes directly to the corporation and not to
the person who demanded the remittance. Finally, petitioner
opines that question pertaining to the authority of Buban to
demand remittance may only be considered as a defense in
the estafa case and not as a ground to suspend the proceedings.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.9chanrobleslaw
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
prescribes the elements that must concur in order for a civil case
to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. � The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil
action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause
the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal.10chanrobleslaw
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-
5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case
for estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and
assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and
damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents,
they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does
not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds
and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate
assets would result in the conviction of respondents in
the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the
Court of Appeals� finding that a prejudicial question exists. The
Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification
of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban.
Essentially, the issue is the authority of the aforesaid officers to
act for and behalf of the corporation.
On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case pertains to
whether respondents committed estafa. Under Article 315,
12
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with abuse of
confidence are as follows: (1) that the money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3)
that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) that there is demand by the
offended party to the offender.11chanrobleslaw
The elements of demand and misappropriation bear relevance to
the validity or invalidity of the authority of Anaped directors and
officers. In Omictin v. Court of Appeals,12 we held that since the
alleged offended party is the corporation, the validity of the
demand for the delivery rests upon the authority of the person
making such a demand on the company�s behalf. If the
supposed authority of the person making the demand is found to
be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence the
prosecution for estafa cannot prosper. The Court added that mere
failure to return the thing received for administration or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the
same or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give
rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime
of estafa.13chanrobleslaw
It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the
prosecution proves misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is
evidence of misappropriation or conversion.14 The phrase, �to
misappropriate to one�s own use� has been said to include
�not only conversion to one�s personal advantage, but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right.�15 In this case, the resolution of the issue of
misappropriation by respondents depends upon the result of SEC
Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC case that the present
Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then
respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of
rental to Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation
in estafa may be absent in this case.
In this connection, we find important the fact, noted by the CA,
that:
It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo for
the last twenty (20) years had been tasked with the management
and collection of rentals of the real properties the Reyes siblings
inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro Reyes.16
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed
by Victoria and her brothers Domingo and Reynaldo questioning
the very authority of their elder siblings Rodrigo and
Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and
Officers, including Buban to act for and in behalf of the
corporation. We find this issue consonant with the provisions of
the Corporation Code which provides in Section 23 that:
Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. - Unless otherwise
provided in this Code, the corporate powers of all corporations
formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted
and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the
board of directors or trustees to be elected from among the
holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the
members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1)
year and until their successors are elected and qualified.
In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,17 we said that:
The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that the
business and� affairs of the corporation must be governed by a
board of directors whose� members have stood for election, and
who have actually been elected by the stockholders, on an annual
basis. Only in that way can the directors� continued�
accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of their
decisions that bind the� corporation�s stockholders, be
assured. The shareholder vote is critical to the theory that
legitimizes the exercise of power by the directors or officers over
properties that they do not own.
From the foregoing, it is clear that, should respondents herein
prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not
own either by himself or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner,
the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand
remittance of the rentals on the property and Victoria does not
have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.
Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the
innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 5 February 2008 and 27
February 2009 enjoining the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 121 from hearing Criminal Case No. C-62784 until
the termination of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172505 October 1, 2014
ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated August 11, 2005 and
its· resolution3 dated April 27, 2006, denying petitioner Antonio
Garcia's motion for reconsideration.
Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through
Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute· sale and
purchase of shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The deed was for
the sale and purchase of shares of stock from various
corporations, including one class "A" share in Alabang Country
Club, Inc. and one proprietary membership in the Manila Polo
Club, Inc.4 These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio
Garcia.5 The contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these
shares of stock from being sold at public auction to pay the
outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia.6
On March 3, 1989, a deed of right of repurchase over the same
shares of stock subject of the deed of absolute sale and purchase
of shares of stock was entered into between Antonio Garcia and
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. Under the deed of right of repurchase,
Antonio Garcia can redeem the properties sold within 180 days
from the signing of the agreement.7
Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised
his right to repurchase the properties.8 However, Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase ofthe shares of
stock.9 Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific
performance and annulment of transfer of shares.10
On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in Alabang Country
Club, Inc. and proprietary membership in the Manila Polo Club,
Inc., which were included in the contracts entered intobetween
Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public
auction to Philippine Investment System Organization.11
On September 3, 1990, the information based on the complaint of
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was filed against Antonio Garcia before the
Regional Trial Court.12 He was charged with estafaunder Article
318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly
13
misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject
of the contracts entered into were free from all liens and
encumbrances. The information reads:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor accuses Antonio M. Garcia
of the felony of Estafa as defined and penalized under Art. 318 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended, committed as follows:
THAT on or about 15 July 1988, in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with evident bad faith and
deceit, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
misrepresent to FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. (FCI) represented by
Ramon M. Garcia, that his share of stock/proprietary share with
Ayala Alabang Country Club, Inc. and Manila Polo Club, Inc.
collectively valued at about ₱10.00 Million Pesos, being part of
other shares of stock subject matter of a Deed of Absolute Sale
and Purchase of Shares of Stock between the accused and FCI,
were free from all liens, encumbrances and claims by third
persons, when in truth and in fact, accused well knew that
aforesaid share of stock/proprietary share had already been
garnished in July 1985 and subsequently sold at public auction in
September 1989, and which misrepresentation and assurance
FCI relied upon and paid the consideration in accordance with
the stipulated condition/manner of payment, all to the damage
and prejudice of FCI in the aforestated amount of ₱10.00 Million
Pesos.
Contrary to law.13
In the decision dated December 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court, Antonio Garcia was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.14 The Regional Trial Court held:
From the foregoing, it is very clear that private complainant was
aware of the status of the subject CLUB SHARES. Thus, the
element of false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
which constitute the very cause or the only motive which induced
the private complainant to enter into the questioned deed of sale
(Exh. "A") is wanting in the case at bar.15 (Underscoring in the
original)
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the Regional Trial Court in the order dated July 29,
1997.16
On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court
of Appeals the July 29, 1997 order of the Regional Trial Court as
to the civil aspect of the case.17 The notice of appeal18 filed was
entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of
The Civil Aspect of the Case)." It alleged:
4. Herein private complainant hereby gives notice, out of extreme
caution, that it is appealing the Decision dated 12 December 1996
and the Order dated 29 July 1997 on the civil aspect of the case to
the Court of Appeals on the ground that it is notin accordance
with the law and the facts of the case.
5. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due course
thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the
consolidation of this appeal with the said petition.19
On October 15, 1997, the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office and
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also filed a petition for certiorari20 with this
court, assailing the Regional Trial Court’s December 12, 1996
decision and July 29, 1997 order acquitting Antonio Garcia.21
The petition for certiorari22 filed before this court sought to annul
the decision of the trial court acquitting Antonio Garcia. People of
the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. argued that the trial
court "acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment of acquittal
based on affidavits not at all introduced in evidence by either of
the parties thereby depriving the people of their substantive
right to due process of law."23 The verification/certification
against forum shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of
Ferro Chemicals, Inc., disclosed that the notice of appeal was filed
"with respect to the civil aspect of the case."24
In the resolution25 dated November 16, 1998, this court
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed, and entry of judgment
was made on December 24, 1998.26
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals,27 in its decision28 dated
August 11, 2005, granted the appeal and awarded Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as actual loss with
legal interest and attorney’s fees in the amount of
₱20,000.00.29 The appellate court found that Antonio Garcia
failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings
Organization’s lien over the club shares.30 Thus:
The issue in this case is whether or not Antonio Garcia disclosed
to Ferro-Chemicals, during the negotiation stage of the
impending sale of the imputed club shares, the third attachment
lien in favor of Philippine Investment and Savings Organization
(PISO) which, ultimately, became the basis of the auction sale of
said club shares. We have scrutinized the records of the case but
found no evidence that Antonio Garcia intimated to his brother
the third attachment lien of PISO over the said club shares. While
it is true that Antonio Garcia divulged the two liens of Security
Bank and Insular Bank of Asia and America, the lien of PISO was
clearly not discussed. The affidavits executed by the two lawyers
to the effect that the lien of PISO was considered but deliberately
left out in the deed cannot be given much weight as they were
never placed on the witness stand and cross-examined by Ferro-
Chemicals. If their affidavits, although not offered, were
considered inthe criminal aspect and placed a cloud on the
prosecution’s thrust, theycannot be given the same probative
value in this civil aspect as only a preponderance of evidence is
necessary to carry the day for the plaintiff, Ferro Chemicals.
While Antonio Garcia insists that no consideration was ever
made over the club shares as the same were merely given for
safekeeping, the document denominated as Deed of Absolute Sale
states otherwise. It is a basic rule of evidence that between
documentary evidence and oral evidence, the former carries
more weight.
Also, We have observed that in Antonio Garcia’s letter of
redemption addressed to Ferro Chemicals, he mentioned his
interest in redeeming the company shares only. That he did not
include the club shares only meant that said club shares no
longer had any much redeemable value as there was a lienover
them. To redeem them would be pointless.
If they had no redeemable value to Antonio Garcia, to Ferro
Chemical they were certainly marketable assets. The non-
disclosure of the third lien in favor of PISO materially affected
Ferro Chemicals since it was not able to act on time to protect its
interest when the auction sale over the club shares actually took
place. As a result, Ferro Chemicals suffered losses due to the
unfortunate public auction sale. It is but just and fair that Antonio
Garcia be made to compensate the loss pursuant to Articles 21
and 2199 of the Civil Code.
The actual loss suffered by Ferro Chemicals amounted to
₱1,000,000.00 which correspondents to the bid value of the club
shares at the time of the auction as evidenced by the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale.31 (Citations omitted)
Antonio Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration and Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. filed a partial motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.32 These motions were denied in
the resolution33 dated April 27, 2006. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed
this petition for review on certiorari,34 assailing the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Antonio Garcia argues that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals were erroneous35 and insists that "[Ferro Chemicals,
14
Inc.] was fully aware that the shares covered by the Deed of
Absolute Sale, including the Subject Club Shares, were not free
from liens and encumbrances and that the Deed [of] Sale was
executed [to] warehouse [Antonio Garcia’s] assets based on,
among other evidence, the affidavits executed by Jaime Gonzales .
. . and Rolando Navarro. . . ."36
Antonio Garcia faults the Court of Appeals in disregarding the
affidavits executed by Jaime Gonzales and Rolando Navarro.
Antonio Garcia argues that even thiscourt in G.R. No. 130880
entitled People of the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. v.
Hon. Dennis Villa Ignacio and Antonio Garcia where the
admissibility of the affidavits was put in issue held that the trial
court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in the
challenged decision.37 He then reasoned that "pursuant to the law
of the case, [the affidavits of Gonzalez and Navarro] are
admissible and should be given weight."38
Finally, Antonio Garcia claims thatboth he and and Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. acted in bad faith when they entered into the deed
of absolute sale as a scheme to defraud Antonio Garcia’s
creditors. Thus, they are in pari delicto and Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
should not be allowed to recover from Antonio Garcia.39
In its comment,40 Ferro Chemicals, Inc. points out that Antonio
Garcia raised factual issues not proper ina Rule 45 petition and
reiterates the findings of the Court of Appeals.41
There are pertinent and important issues that the parties failed
to raise before the trial court, Court of Appeals, and this court.
Nonetheless, we resolve to rule on these issues.
As a general rule, this court through its appellate jurisdiction can
only decide on matters or issues raised by the parties.42 However,
the rule admits of exceptions.43 When the unassigned error
affects jurisdiction over the subject matter44 or when the
consideration of the error is necessary for a complete resolution
of the case,45 this court can still decide on these issues.
We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the law
or patently erroneous decisions or resolutions simply because
the parties failed to raise these errors before the court.
Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the mistakes
of the parties’ counsel and condoning reckless and negligent acts
of lawyers to the prejudice of the litigants. Failure to rule on
these issues amounts to an abdication of our duty to dispense
justice to all parties.
The issues are:
I. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the case
II. Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the
notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals and the
petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court
decision amounted to forum shopping
III. Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the
awards given as civil liability ex delicto
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by
law.46 In criminal cases, the imposable penalty of the crime
charged in the information determines the court that has
jurisdiction over the case.47
The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto
mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months. Article 318 states:
ART. 318: Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a
fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not
more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person
who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not
mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make
forecasts, tell fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the
public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in
force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by
Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases.–
....
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a
fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. This lack of jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of
the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment
rendered.48 Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was
never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even
until it reached this court, we proceed with resolving the matter.
In Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals,49 this court held:
Thus, we apply the general rule thatjurisdiction is vested by law
and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal
and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of
jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded fromruling that
the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case[.]
....
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did
not have jurisdiction to try the case against the appellant, it is no
longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.50
The trial court’s lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the
parties’ silence on the matter.51 The failure of the parties to raise
the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of
the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived
by the parties.
The assailed decision is void, considering that it originates from a
void decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping
Forum shopping is defined as "theact of a litigant who
‘repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court . . .
to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another’."52 Once clearly established that forum
15
shopping was committed willfully and deliberately by a party or
his or her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with
prejudice, and the act shall constitute direct contempt and a
cause for administrative sanctions.53
Forum shopping is prohibited, and sanctions are imposed on
those who commit forum shopping as "it trifles with the courts,
abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice
and adds to the already congested court dockets."54 This court
has said:
What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same
or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the suits
was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.55 (Citation
omitted)
The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a
litigant commits forum shopping are the following:
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentiaare present, or whether a
final judgment in one case amounts to res judicatain another.
Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are
present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties
asrepresent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicatain the action under consideration; said requisites are also
constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens.56 (Citation omitted)
There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum
shopping when it filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and
a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial
court decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice
of appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of Appeal
Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the
Case)."57 The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto.
However, it failed to make a reservation before the trial court to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delictoor institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case.
There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and
respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc., are both parties in the appeal
filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari
before this court.
There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in
both actions. At a glance, it may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court of Appeals
is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the
petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only onthe
criminal aspect of the case. However, the civil liability asserted by
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the
criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute a
separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal
case.58 Thus, it is an adjunct of the criminalaspect of the
case.1âwphi1 As held in Lim v. Kou Co Ping:59
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delictois based on
the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence,
its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action.For this
reason, the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delictois
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal
action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of
the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is
extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares
that ‘the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist’."60 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal
aspect in the petition for certiorari before thiscourt, the civil
aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus, the relief
prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil
liability ex delicto, is asserted in both actions before this court
and the Court of Appeals.
Even the allegations in the notice of appeal readily show that
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committedforum shopping, to wit:
5. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an
appropriate petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due course
thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the
consolidation of this appeal with the said petition.61
As to the third requisite, on the assumption that the trial court
had jurisdiction over the case, this court’s decision in G.R. No.
130880 affirming the trial court’s decision acquitting the accused
for lack of an essential element of the crime charged amounts to
res judicatato assert the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense. This court’s resolution dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. states:
In any event, petitioners failed to sufficiently show that any grave
abuse of discretion was committed by the Regional Trial Court in
rendering the challenged decision and order which, on the
contrary, appear to be in accord with the facts and the applicable
law and jurisprudence.62
Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate remedies for
the same relief in the hope that in one forum, the relief prayed for
will be granted. This is the evil sought tobe averted by the
doctrine of non-forum shopping, and this is the problem that has
happened in this case. This court denied the petition for
certiorari filed byFerro Chemicals, Inc. resulting in finality of the
trial court’s decision.1awp++i1 The decision found Antonio
Garcia not guilty of the offense charged, and no civil liability was
awarded to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at present,there is a
conflicting decision from the Court of Appeals awarding Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.
When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
instituted with the criminal action, whether by choice of private
complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior filing of a
separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case
will be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.63 The civil action cannot proceed independently of
the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the
criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals,
Inc. joined the public prosecutor in filing the petition for
certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro
Chemicals, Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping of the petition for certiorari.64
We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal
cases are not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration
and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision
acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the
Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings before
the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the private offended
party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower
court."65 As discussed in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Hajime
Umezawa:66
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the offended party is
limited to the civil liability arising there from. Hence, if a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal
16
aspect there of is concerned and may be made only by the public
prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through
the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not
undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case.However, the offended party or
private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the
civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private
complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of
the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may
appeal or file a petition for certiorarior mandamus,if grave abuse
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the
aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.67 (Citations omitted)
This is in consonance with the doctrine that:
[T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry
with it the extinction ofthe civil action, whether the latter is
instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delictoif there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence
has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the
accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil
liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the
court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;and (c)
if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.68
However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of
a decision of the trial court acquitting the accused and private
complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate
civil action,the civil liability ex delictothat is inherently attached
to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability
ex delictois impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari
assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot
anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without
violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.
On the other hand, the conclusion isdifferent if private
complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial
Court orinstitute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the
criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
In these situations, the filing of an appealas to the civil aspect of
the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.1âwphi1 This is
not the situation here.
We see no more reason to discuss the issues presented by the
parties in light of the foregoing discussion.
Entry of judgment having been made on the resolution of the
court in G.R. No. 130880 involving the same parties and issues
and by virtue of the doctrine of finality of judgment, we reiterate
the resolution of this court.
WHEREFORE, the resolution in G.R. No. 130880 is reiterated. We
grant the petition insofar as it prays for the setting aside of the
Court of Appeals' decision d~ted August 11, 2005 and resolution
dated April 27, 2006 as a final decision over the assailed Regional
Trial Court decision that was rendered on November 16, 1998 in
G.R. No. 130880.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and
found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act No.
7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee
while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the
classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as
duly certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is
the question that this appeal must determine, in light of the
Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable
doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human
being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up
the factual antecedents in its comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales,
then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School located in
the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep,
petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael
did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14,
1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his
thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to
the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he
lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up
by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November
13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During
lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his
classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home
crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14,
1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales
reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza
(TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael
Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s aunt and Barangay
Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y.
Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita
Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police
Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in
part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2
cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the
area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the
Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case was
assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as
follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and
Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses
17
FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE
LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan
Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the
DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child,
by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter
slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan
Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on
different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the
petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the
Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been
proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner
through its assailed decision promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with
a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on
June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with
the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum
of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits
that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by
holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse
penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and
notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by
holding that petitioner’s constitutional right to due process and
her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her was not violated when the essential elements of the
crime charged were not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the
petitioner is raising are mainly factual and, therefore, not
reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance
of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law
and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence
of the trial; and that the information charging her with child
abuse was sufficient in form and substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could
raise only questions of law in her present recourse. Under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questionsof law.
The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the
findings of fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by
the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier
of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence
all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits
of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in
which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts,
to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d)
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts
went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the
findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to
those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i)
the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the
findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on
the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting
a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further exception
is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions
applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately
inflict the physical injuries suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat
or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or
degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact
of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do
towards the development of the child. She insists that her act
further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries
on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not
justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining
him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited
by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the
infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority
shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the
parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict
corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical
maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita
Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three
hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her
Medical Report stated as follows:
18
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2
cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the
area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the
testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the trial judge
observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a
discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation of blood
beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the
ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the
lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the
vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her
examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put
pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by
pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on
the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have
been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is
located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified
that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades
or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by wordsthat
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held
him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy
fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness
[but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant
further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the
floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional
trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of
fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established
circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe
petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a
human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical maltreatment by
the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of a
child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross
examination that she had also experienced the petitioner’s
cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo
City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of
another childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents
manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as
the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her
with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance, in that
the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly
alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to
due process of law was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child
abusecharged against the petitioner in the context of the
statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner’s
challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and
substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the
time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash
on the ground that the information did not conform substantially
to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not
do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex
delictobecause no evidence had been adduced thereon.20 The CA
saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The
explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was
misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual
expenses, or testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower courts
still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising
from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child
abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional
trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his
parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both
lower courts committed a plain error that demands correction by
the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v.
People,21 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper
penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following
manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded
their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed
upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by
his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the
Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That
the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and
justice.1âwphi1
19
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid
omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or
in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be
worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the
rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for
only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would
they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their
rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They
should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual
for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in
order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always
entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions
has been reserved or waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and
emotional sufferings of the victim, and in that respect the Court
believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was
likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article
2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.
The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her
being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its
maximum period pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No.
7610. The amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is
imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as
a deterrent to other public school teachers who violate the ban
imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against the
infliction of corporal punishment on children under their
substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the actual
expenses for the victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the
granting of a measure of compensation in the formof temperate
damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may
be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered butits
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no question
aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment,
temperate damages ofat least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it
would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment.
Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items
of civil liability, to be reckoned from the finality of this decision
until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is
that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation
and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of
prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense
was aggravated by the petitioner being a public
schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610,
which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer
or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the
information and established by evidence as well as admitted by
her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime
committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six years
and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight
months and one day to seven years and four months, for the
medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to
eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period,
therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and
one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate
sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum
period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day
to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days,
and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of
prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the
petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to
Michael Ryan Gonzales ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00
as exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate damages,
plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil
liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196508 September 24, 2014
LEONARDO A. VILLALON and ERLINDA TALDE-
VILLALON, Petitioners,
vs.
AMELIA CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the July 30,
2010 decision2 and April 8, 2011 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 93807. The CA annulled and set
aside the March 3, 2006 resolution4 and September 5, 2006
order5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Antipolo
City, which disallowed the private offended party's counsel from
participating in the prosecution of the petitioners for bigamy and
dismissed the bigamy case filed against the petitioners,
respectively.
Factual Antecedents
On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon
Basilio Chua in a civil ceremony solemnized by then Judge Cancio
C. Garcia of the City Court of Caloocan. The respondent claimed
that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present petitioner,
Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio
Chua, this time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly
contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place
on June 2, 1993. This marriage was solemnized by Judge Ruth C.
Santos of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not
personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested
Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners. On September 13, 2003, a
verified complaint-affidavit6 alleging the commission of the crime
of bigamy was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Antipolo. Consequently, an Information7 was filed with the RTC,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-30485. On arraignment, the
petitioners pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial (or on February 6, 2006), Atty. Apollo V.
Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia, the private offended party.
20
On February 20, 2006, Atty. Atencia formally filed his entry of
appearance8 as private prosecutor, with the conformity and
under the control and supervision of Assistant City Prosecutor
Gerardo P. Barot.
Leonardo filed an omnibus motion9 with the RTC seeking to
disqualify Atty. Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be
represented in the bigamy case because she was not a party to
the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit. He also
argued that Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and
criminal case against him and his co-defendant Erlinda. Amelia
opposed the omnibus motion,10 while the public prosecutor
joined the petitioners in disqualifyingAtty. Atencia from
appearing in the case.11
In a resolution12 dated March 3, 2006, the RTC granted
Leonardo’s omnibus motion. Trial of the case ensued thereafter.
On March 27, 2006, Amelia filed a petition13 for certiorari and
prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
with the CA. In a resolution14 dated April 19, 2006, the CA issued
a TRO enjoining further proceedings on the case.
Despite the TRO issued by the CA, trial of the bigamy case
proceeded with the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, to
which Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence. In an order15 dated
September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case for failure
of the prosecution to prove the petitioners’ guilt.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA,
Amelia alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
when it issued its March 3, 2006 resolution and proceeded with
the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty.
Atencia as private prosecutor.
In a decision16 dated July 30, 2010, the CA granted Amelia’s
petition and annulled the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution
disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participation in the case, and its
September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case against
the petitioners. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being
public in nature, can be denounced by anyone, not only by the
offended party, before the prosecuting authorities without the
offended party losing her right to recover damages. Thus, the CA
concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it did not allow Atty. Atencia to intervene and
represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial court
denied Amelia her right to due process.
Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of
the right to intervene in the criminal case only when he or she
expressly waives the civil action or reserves the right toinstitute
one. The CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held that
Atty. Atencia’s appearance as private prosecutor was proof
enough of Amelia’s determination to enforce her claim for
damages in the bigamy case.
The CA disposed of the certiorari petition under these terms:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 3
March 2006 disqualifying Petitioner’s counsel to intervene and
the Order dated 5 September 2006 dismissing Criminal Case No.
05-30485 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Public respondent is
hereby inhibited from
further hearing the case. This case is therefore REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for RE-RAFFLE to another
branch and for further proceedings. The trial court and public
prosecutor are ORDERED to allow the private prosecutor subject
to the latter’s control and supervision to intervene in the
proceedings in order to protect the interests of Petitioner as a
complaining witness.
SO ORDERED.17
Petition for review on certiorari with this Court
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration18 before the
CA, the petitioners filed the present petition for review on
certiorari before this Court and raised the following arguments:
A. The Decision of the Court of Appeals gravely
transgresses the petitioners’ constitutional right to due
process of law, apart from being violative of the legal
proscription against double jeopardy.
B. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in granting the
petition for certiorari insofar as the Resolution, dated 3
March 2006, of therein respondent Judge was
concerned.
C. The petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93907 is fatally
defective in that, among other things, it failed toimplead
the People of the Philippines as a party-respondent in
that case, hence, the same should have been dismissed
outright.19
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petitioners’ arguments.
First, the petitioners argue that the RTC’s September 5, 2006
order dismissing the bigamy case against themhad already
become final because it was not assailed by the respondent in her
petition for certiorari before the CA. The petitioners point out
that the respondent only particularly assailed the RTC’s March 3,
2006 resolution and failed to file a separate or amended petition
for certiorari to include the September 5, 2006 order as one of
the assailed orders of the RTC. Based on this assertion, the
petitioners contend that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-
raffle of the bigamy case to another RTC branch, violates their
right against double jeopardy.
The petitioners are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion encompassed, not
only the issuance of the March 3, 2006 resolution,but all
proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. This is apparent from
the words used by the respondent in her certiorari petition
before the CA where she raised the following supporting
grounds:
1. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED 03 MARCH 2006 IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-30485 WHICH HELD THAT NO
CLAIM FOR CIVIL LIABILITY WAS DEEMED
INSTITUTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, AND
CONSEQUENTLY DISQUALIFYING THE OFFENDED
PARTY’S COUNSEL FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE
TRIAL OF THE CASE;
2. THE HEARINGS OF THE BIGAMY CASE WHEREIN
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IS
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED ARE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.20 (Emphasis ours) Evidently, the CA’s
review is not limited to the RTC’s March 3, 2006
resolution but also included the September 5, 2006
order that was issued by the RTC in the course of the
proceedings on the bigamy case. Thus, the RTC’s
September 5, 2006 order, which isstill the subject of
review by this Court, has not attained finality and the
CA’s assailed order of remanding and re-raffling the
bigamy case to another trial court would not violate the
petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.
21
Also, we emphasize that the RTC issued its September 5, 2006
order in defiance of the TRO issued by the CA. The records show
that the CA had issued a TRO on April 19, 2006, which should
have prohibited the RTC from further proceeding on the case. But
the RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the
prosecution’s evidence and issued the assailed September 5,
2006 order.
Under this circumstance, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order was
actually without force and effect and would not serve as basis for
the petitioners to claim that their right against double jeopardy
had been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its September 5, 2006 order in view ofthe
earlier TRO issued by the CA.
Second, the petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it
ruled that: the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as
private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification
violatedthe respondent’s rights to intervene and be heard in the
bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s
disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to
participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a
witness but the respondent never appeared before the court
because she was out of the country during the whole proceedings
on the bigamy case.
Section 1621 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure22 expressly allows an offended party to intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil
liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal
action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separatelyor institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.23
In this case, the CA found no suchwaiver from or reservation
made by the respondent.1âwphi1 The fact that the respondent,
who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an
attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to
participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover
civil liability from the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have
allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from
intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the
offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through
counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil
aspect of the case.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent’s certiorari
petition before the CA should have been dismissed outright
because it failed to implead the "People of the Philippines" as a
party-respondent.
The respondent’s failure to implead the "People of the
Philippines" as a party-respondent is not a fatal defect
warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for certiorari
and prohibition before the CA because: (1) a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions alleged to have acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction;24 and (2) the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by the respondent is a special civil action
separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the
petitioners. For these reasons, the "People of the Philippines"
need not be impleaded as a party in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
WHEREFOR£, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the present
petition for review on certiorari due to lack of merit, and hereby
AFFIRM the decision dated July 30, 2010 and resolution dated
April 8, 2011 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93807.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192912 June 4, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The Court resolves the appeal of the accused-appellant
Democrito Paras from the Decision1 dated February 2, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The
appellate court affirmed the Decision2 dated October 18, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Branch 29, in
Criminal Case No. TCS-2729, which found the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of rape.
The prosecution charged the accused-appellant of committing
rape against AAA,3 a 17-year old girl, allegedly committed as
follows:
That at noon in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto,
in [XXX] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with the use of a gun of unknown caliber,
by force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [AAA] against the
latter's will and as a result of which the latter became pregnant,
to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.4
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 In the
trial that ensued, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
AAA,6 Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
Field Officer Ma. Pamela Jusay,7 and Dr. Marcelo Pilapil,8 the
physician who physically examined AAA. The defense thereafter
presented the testimonies of the accused-appellant9 and his
mother, Luisa Paras.10
In their brief before the Court of Appeals, the prosecution
summarized their version of the facts in this wise:
Around noon of March 19, 1996, or subsequent thereto, while the
victim [AAA], a house-helper of spouses Sergio and Heny Agua,
was weeding grass using a bolo at her employer’s farm in [XXX],
appellant Democrito Paras approached her from behind (TSN,
July 15, 1999, pp. 6-7). He pulled [AAA] towards the lower
portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth.
While pointing the gun at [AAA], appellant pulled down her long
pants and panties. Appellant also pulled down his pants and
underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted her.
He spread [AAA’s] legs with his two hands after putting down his
firearm. He then inserted his penis into [AAA’s] vagina. [AAA] felt
pain (Ibid., p. 8). [AAA] struggled and tried to kick appellant but
all proved futile as appellant was physically stronger (TSN, Nov.
19, 1999, p. 10)[.]
Since [AAA] was afraid of appellant and that she was also afraid
to kill a person, she did not strike appellant with the bolo she was
holding (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 3). Appellant told[AAA] not to
shout. He made a push and pull movement. [AAA] felt appellant’s
organ inside her while she continued to struggle. While
struggling, [AAA] even threw stones at appellant (Ibid. p. 4).
After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and
fled, while [AAA] went back to the house of her employers (Ibid.).
Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to the incident. She gave
birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA]
testified on January 11, 2000. (TSN, Jan. 11, 2000, p. 5)[.]11
The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of
denial and alibi:
22
Accused-appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private
complainant because she was the helper at the house of his elder
sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA. On March 19,
1996, he was at the Lusaran market to buy dried fish and other
household items to be consumed for the whole week because he
lived in a mountain barangay. He could not estimate the distance
between Lusaran Market and his house but it would take two (2)
hours of travel time by walking only. It was about 8:00 o’clock in
the morning when he went to Lusaran Market on March 19, 1996
and arrived home at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon already.
AAA accused him of rape because of the misunderstanding he had
with the husband of his elder sister regarding the mango trees
owned by his mother. AAA is an employee of his brother-in-law,
Sergio Agua, whose house is about seventy (70) meters away
from his house. Aside from their houses, there are also other
houses, about five (5) of them, located in their locality. The
mango trees were already allocated by his mother to each and
every child. One of his brothers transferred residence to
Compostela abandoning the mango trees allocated to him.
Accused-appellant took over the said mango trees and sprayed
them with chemicals. However, Sergio Agua also sprayed them
and accused-appellant chided him. This made his brother-in-law
angry who pulled out his bolo. Thereafter, he told accused-
appellant to "beware". After that incident, accused-appellant and
Sergio no longer talked about the mango trees. Aside from this,
accused-appellant and Sergio also had a disagreement regarding
the five (5) hectares of land owned by the latter’s mother. Sergio
wanted it divided but accused-appellant objected since he has
other siblings who are still single. Sergio got mad and again
threatened accused-appellant to "beware"[.]12
The Decision of the RTC
In a Decision dated October 18, 2005, the RTC convicted the
accused-appellant of the crime charged. The trial court gave
credence to the testimony of AAA, finding the same frank, candid,
and straightforward. In contrast, the trial court rejected the
accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi since the same
were not corroborated even by the testimony of his mother, Luisa
Paras. The latter merely testified on an alleged feud between the
accused-appellant and Sergio Agua, who happened to be the
employer of AAA. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellant as
follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, this Court finds the
guilt of the accused DEMOCRITO PARAS to have been proved
beyond peradventure of a reasonable doubt and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of ₱50,000.00 by
way of compensatory damages plus the amount of ₱100,000.00
as and for moral damages.13
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the RTC
in a Decision dated February 2, 2010. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s appreciation of AAA’s testimony, which
was held to be steadfast and unyielding throughout the direct
and cross-examinations. The testimony of Luisa Paras on the
alleged misunderstanding between the accused-appellant and
Sergio Agua was found to be insufficient to overturn the candid
testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-
appellant as the malefactor. The Court of Appeals also brushed
aside the accused-appellant’s arguments of alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in AAA’s testimony, i.e., that
AAA could recall the details of the rape but not the birth date of
her child and the name of her neighbor, that AAA did not seize
the opportunities given her to save herself, and that the supposed
date of the rape was not clearly established by the prosecution
evidence. The appellate court ruled that said inconsistencies
were on inconsequential matters that did not bear upon the
essential elements of the crime of rape. The Court of Appeals
decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated October
18, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Toledo City, in
Criminal Case No. TCS-2729 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
As modified, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified rape as defined and penalized in
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the private complainant the amount of ₱50,000.00 only as
moral damages plus exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of
₱50,000.00 stands.14
The Ruling of the Court
The accused-appellant again appealed his case to this Court,
arguing that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime
charged even if his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.15
The appeal lacks merit.
As the accused-appellant was charged to have committed the
rape "in March 1996 or for sometime subsequent thereto," the
applicable provision of the law in this case is Article 335 16 of the
Revised Penal Code.17 The relevant portions of said statutory
provision read:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
xxxx
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the
accused-appellant guilty of rape by having carnal knowledge of
AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The courts
a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive
identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case,
the Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in
her testimony that the accused-appellant was the one who
pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse
with her. We, thus, see no reason to disturb the lower courts’
appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony. People v. De
Guzman18 teaches that:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on
the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand,
the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The
record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a
serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will
not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in
remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
23
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations
arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.
The Court likewise upholds the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the
testimony of AAA, namely, her inability to remember the birth
date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy
her credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to do with
the essential elements of rape, that is, carnal knowledge of a
person through force or intimidation. As held in People v.
Maglente19:
Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant
to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As long
as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not
affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not
always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the
lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may
even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not
been rehearsed. (Citations omitted.)
Before the Court of Appeals and this Court, the accused-appellant
also capitalized on the findings of Dr. Pilapil that AAA was
already three months pregnant when she was examined on
October 7, 1996. If that were the case, the accused-appellant
argued that AAA could have had sexual intercourse sometime in
June or July 1996 and not in March 1996 when the rape was
supposed to have been committed. We find that the Court of
Appeals correctly rejected this contention. We had occasion to
state in People v. Adora20 that "authorities in forensic medicine
agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is
problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the
difficulty in determining the actual normal duration of
pregnancy." At any rate, we ruled in People v. Bejic21 that:
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.
Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the
accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What
is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her
consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful
manner. (Citation omitted.)
Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having
many opportunities to do so, we are not persuaded. Were
iterated in Sison v. People22 that:
[P]eople react differently under emotional stress. There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking
incident, especially if the assailant is physically near. The
workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable. In a given situation, some may shout, others
may faint, and still others may be frozen into silence.
Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for
help at the very first opportunity cannot be construed consent to
the sexual intercourse. (Citations omitted.)
Finally, the accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi also
fail to convince the Court.1âwphi1 Given that the accused-
appellant failed to support the same with strong evidence of his
lack of guilt, said defenses cannot prevail over the positive
identification of AAA.
All told, the accused-appellant failed to show that the RTC and the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sexually abusing AAA. Under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever the
crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, the
accused-appellant’s use of a gun in the commission of the rape
against AAA was both specifically alleged in the information and
proven during the trial of the case. Considering that there was
neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed.23
As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals properly
imposed the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. On the award of exemplary
damages, the same is increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 in
line with recent jurisprudence.24
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS the
Decision dated February 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB CR.-H.C. No. 00465. The accused-appellant is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one count of rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163879 July 30, 2014
DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M.
PALMA and ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 165805
DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M.
PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the
Decision1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 27293, affirming the Decision2 dated February 28,2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellant Dr. Antonio
P. Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the
crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
The Information3 alleged –
That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, DR. ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and DR.
CLENIO YNZON, being then the attending physicians of one
RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old, confederating and
acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness
and imprudence to perform immediate operation upon their
patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis, when they,
the said physicians, should have been done so considering that
examinations conducted upon their patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr.
seriously manifest todo so, causing by such negligence,
carelessness, and imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR.,
to die due to:
24
"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC
ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS),
CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)"
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P.
Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said
deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR. and other consequential damages
relative thereto.
CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001.
Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to consolidate
these cases.4 The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-
year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal pain
to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5 o’clock that sameafternoon,
Palma's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought JR to
the clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general
practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave medicines for
the pain and told Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach
pains continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the
early morning of June 15, 2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao,
who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in
Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said
hospital at 5:30 in the morning.5
Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. The
complete blood count conveyed the following result: wbc – 27.80
x 10 9/L; lymphocytes – 0.10 and neutrophils – 0.90. Diagnostic
ultrasound was likewise conducted on the patient's lower
abdomen by radiologist, Dr. Ricky V. Querubin, with the following
findings:
Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen, kidneys
and urinary bladder.
There is no free peritoneal fluid.
There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region, more
so in the supra and right paraumbilical areas.
There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right
periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18 mm surrounded by
undistended gas-filled bowels. This is suggestive of an
inflammatory process wherein appendiceal or periappendiceal
pathology cannot be excluded. Clinical correlation is essential." 6
Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the following:
"rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness, negative mass." The
initial impression was Acute Appendicitis,7 and hence, he
referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.8 In the
later part of the morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the
hospital and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The
administration of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JRwere
ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on observation for twenty-
four (24) hours.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of
abdominal pain and his parents noticeda swelling in his scrotum.
In the afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted out greenish stuff
three (3) times and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The
nurses on-duty relayed JR's condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely
gaveorders via telephone.9Accused continued medications to
alleviate JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR
again vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements and was
unable to sleep. The following morning, June 17,2000, JR's
condition worsened, he had a running fever of 38°C. JR's fever
remained uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given
Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's condition
continued to deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's
temperature soared to 42°C, had convulsions and finally died.
The Death Certificate10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr.
Cabugao indicated the following causes of death:
Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY
Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS)
Other significant conditionscontributing to death:
CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)
No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February
1, 2001, an Information was filed against accused for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both
accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial
court found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to
conclude that accused were indeed negligent in the performance
of their duties:
It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the
accused from the time of his admission for confinement at the
Nazareth General Hospital until his death. Upon his admission,
the initial working diagnosis was to consider acute appendicitis.
To assist the accused in the consideration of acute appendicitis,
Dr. Cabugao requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a
diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and
ultrasound showed that an inflammatory process or infection
was going on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process
was happening in the periumbilical region where the appendix
could be located. The initial diagnosis of acute appendicitis
appears to be a distinct possibility. x x x.
Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being
manifested by JR. Thereafter, he ordered that JR be observed for
24 hours. However, the accused, as the attending physicians, did
not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes
that may occur. Rather, they left the monitoring and actual
observation to resident physicians who are just on residency
training and in doing so, they substituted their own expertise,
skill and competence with those of physicians who are merely
new doctors still on training. Not having personally observed JR
during this 24-hour critical period of observation, the accused
relinquished their duty and thereby were unable to give the
proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In
situations where massive infection is going on as shown by the
aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the patient
is serious which necessitated personal, not delegated, attention of
attending physicians, namely JR and the accused in this case.
xxxx
Throughout the course of the hospitalization and treatment of JR,
the accused failed to address the acute appendicitis which was
the initial diagnosis. They did not take steps to find out if indeed
acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection
that was ongoing inside the body of JR even when the
inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region
where the appendix can be located. x x x
There may have been other diseases but the records do not show
that the accused took steps to find outwhat disease exactly was
plaguing JR. It was their duty to find out the disease causing the
health problem of JR, but they did not perform any process of
elimination. Appendicitis, according to expert testimonies, could
be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery was done by the
accused. But the accused could not have found out the real
disease of JR because they were treating merely and exclusively
the symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest the
manifested symptoms. In fact, by treating the symptoms alone,
the accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as
25
signs of the graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence on
the part of the accused allowed the infection to spread inside the
body of JR unabated. The infection obviously spread so fastand
was so massive that within a period of only two and a half (2 ½)
days from the day of admission to the hospital on June 15, 2000,
JR who was otherwise healthy died [of] Septicemia (Acute
Appendicitis) on June 17, 2000.11
On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction, the Court of
Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of
reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's attending physicians,
appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon in neglecting to monitor
effectively and sufficiently the developments/changes during the
observation period and act upon the situation after said 24-hour
period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his condition even
worsened with the appearance of more serious symptoms of
nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Considering the brief visit only
made on regular rounds, the records clearly show such gross
negligence in failing to take appropriate steps to determine the
real cause of JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to
perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out
precisely because of the inexcusable neglect to undertake
suchefficient diagnosis by process of elimination, as correctly
pointed out by the trial court. As has been succinctly emphasized
by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and
with the emergence of symptoms after the 24-hour observation
(high fever, vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery,
not even considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also
expressed the opinion that the decision to operate could have
been made after the result of the ultrasound test, considering that
acute appendicitis was the initial diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after
he had conducted a rectal examination.
Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in treating
JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference and neglect of the
patient's condition as a serious case. Indeed, appendicitis
remains a clinical emergencyand a surgical disease, as correctly
underscored by Dr. Mateo, a practicing surgeon who has already
performed over a thousand appendectomy. In fact,
appendectomy is the only rational therapy for acute appendicitis;
it avoids clinical deterioration and may avoid chronic or
recurrent appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition
and immediate treatment of the disease prevent complications.
Under the factual circumstances, the inaction, neglect and
indifference of appellants who, after the day of admission and
after being apprised of the ongoing infection from the CBC and
initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from rectal examination
and ultrasound testand only briefly visited JR once during regular
rounds and gave medication orders by telephone – constitutes
gross negligenceleading to the continued deterioration of the
patient, his infection having spread in sofast a pace that he died
within just two and a half (2 ½) days’ stay inthe hospital.
Authorities state that if the clinical picture is unclear a short
period of 4 to 6 hours of watchful waiting and a CT scan may
improve diagnostic accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even
assuming that JR's case had an atypical presentation in view of
the location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have helped to
confirm diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe possibility of JR
having a retrocecal appendicitis should have been a strong
consideration. Lamentably, however, as found by the trial court,
appellants had not taken steps towards correct diagnosis and
demonstrated laxity even when JR was already running a high
fever in the morning of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting
with diarrhea, his abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is
the reason why private complainants were not even apprised of
the progress of appellants' diagnosis – appellants have nothing to
report because they did nothing towards the end and merely
gave medications to address the symptoms.12
Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the
following arguments:
I
WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS CONTAINED IN THE
INFORMATION IS "FAILURE TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE
OPERATION UPON THE PATIENT ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF
ACUTE APPENDICITIS;
II
WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION APPEARS TO HAVE
ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS OF CONSPIRACY AND THE
APPEALED DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED BOTH
ACCUSED DOCTORS TO BE IN CONSPIRACY;
III
WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A GENERAL
PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON) AND HAVE EXCLUDED
SURGERY FROM THE LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE, AND IT WAS NOT
AND NEVER HIS DUTY TO OPERATE THE PATIENT RODOLFO
PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY HE REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT
TO A SURGEON, DR. CLENIO YNZON;
IV
WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT THERE IS
GUARANTEE THAT DOING SURGERY WOULD HAVE SAVED THE
PATIENT;
V doctors.
WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION
INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S EXPERT WITNESSES EVER
DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO HAD
THE DUTY TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION ON RODOLFO
PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/SHOW THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE
APPENDICITIS;
VI
WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION EVER QUESTIONED THE MANAGEMENT AND
CARE APPLIED BY PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;
VII
WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE
DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN APPROVING THE METHOD OF
TREATMENT APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS ON
SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT
THEY WOULD FIRST PLACE SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER
OBSERVATION, AND WOULD NOT PERFORM IMMEDIATE
OPERATION;
VIII
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR. YNZON WAS
ESTABLISHED WITH THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT WAS
SPECIFICALLY SUFFERING FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE
APPENDICITIS; and
IX
WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE SPECIFIC SURGICAL
OPERATION KNOWN AS APPENDECTOMY CONSTITUTED
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.
In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises the
issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from
analleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on
record.
26
Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in
nature, which as a general rule, findings of factof the trial court
and the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusiveupon this
Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings
unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to
make certain exception.
AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to
do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precautionon the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act.13 The elements
of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to
do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is
voluntary; (3) that it bewithout malice; (4) that material damage
results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.14
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have
been clearly established by the evidence on record. The court a
quoand the appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon
failed to observe the required standard of care expected from
In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent
certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery on JR
immediately. Even the prosecution’s own expert witness, Dr.
Antonio Mateo,15 testified during cross-examination that he
would perform surgery on JR:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen, ambulatory,
watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the ultrasound result, with
that laboratory would you operate the patient?
A Yes, I would do surgery.
Q And you should have done surgery with this particular case?"
A Yes, sir.16
xxxx
COURT:
Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do] surgery
to the patient, why doctor, if you are notgoing to do surgery, what
will happen?
A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would be that
it would be ruptured and generalized peritonitis and eventually
septicemia, sir.
Q What do you mean by that doctor?
A That means that infection would spread throughout the body,
sir.
Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
A It will result to death.17
xxxx
Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other
considerations from the time the patient was admitted?
A From the time the patient was admitted until the report of the
sonologist, I would have made a decision by then.
Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a particular exact
time, would it be the same for all surgeons?
A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about 24 hours
because acute appendicitis is a 24-hour disease, sir.
Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the changes
on the condition of the patient?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are
changes?
A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards
appendicitis then you have to decide right there and then, sir.
Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to appendicitis?
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in the
observation period, sir.
Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring you in
doubt that there is something else other than appendicitis, would
you extend over a period of 24 hours?
A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.
Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician and there is
a change not pointing to appendicitis, would you extend over a
period of 24 hours?
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
xxxx
Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending
physician?
A. Yes, sir.18
Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is concerned,
because if you will agree with me, you did not even touch the
patient?
A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir. The
records show that after the observation period, the abdominal
pain is still there plus there are already other signs and
symptoms which are not seen or noted.
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the abdomen of
the patient, would you give a comment on that?
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of observation, the
pain apparently was still there and there was more vomiting and
there was diarrhea. In my personal opinion, I think the condition
of the patient was deteriorating.
Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?
A. I based on what was on the record, sir.19
From the foregoing, it is clear that if JR’s condition remained
unchecked it would ultimately result in his death, as what
27
actually happened in the present case. Another expert witness for
the defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct
examination that he would perform a personal and thorough
physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6
hours, to wit:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history of
abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting, fever, anurecia (sic),
elevated white blood cell count, physical examination of a
positive psoas sign, observation of the sonologist of abdominal
tenderness and the ultrasound findings of the probability of
appendiceal (sic) pathology, what will you do if you have faced
these problems, Doctor?
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will depend on my
physical examination and that isprobably every 4 to 6 hours,
sir.20
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions made at
that time, your Honor, do I understand thatT/C does not mean
ruled out but rather to consider the matter?
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it says
here, impression and T/C means to consider the appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial working
diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr., otherwise known as JR, to whom
I shall now refer to as JR, the primary consideration then is acute
appendicitis, is that correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the impression.
Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary consideration
in the initial working diagnosis, isn't it a fact that it has tobe ruled
out in order to consider it as not the disease of JR?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not the
disease of JR, surgery or operation must be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute
appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is an acute
appendicitis, you have to operate.21
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there
was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise
was feverish and that he was vomiting, does that not show a
disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then
Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule
out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you
have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.22
Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is,
in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The
deference of courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians
stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating.23 From the testimonies of the expert
witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon
failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the
treatment of his patient.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed
want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the needs of JR
by neglecting to monitor effectively the developmentsand
changes on JR's condition during the observation period, and to
act upon the situation after the 24-hour period when his
abdominal pain persisted and his condition worsened.
Lamentable, Dr. Ynzon appeared to have visited JRbriefly only
during regular rounds in the mornings. He was not there during
the crucial times on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to
deteriorate until JR's death. As the attending surgeon, he should
be primarily responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he
is in the best position considering his skills and experience to
know if the patient's condition had deteriorated. While the
resident-doctors-onduty could likewise monitor the
patient’scondition, he is the one directly responsible for the
patient as the attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross
negligence of duty to relegate his personal responsibility to
observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute appendicitis
was the working diagnosis, and with the emergence of graver
symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out
surgery for no apparent reason. We, likewise, note that the
records are devoid of showing of any reasonable cause which
would lead Dr. Ynzon tooverrule appendectomy despite the
initial diagnosis of appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing
that he was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took
appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what
perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary
act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that
which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as tobring an
act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of
the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the
standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused.24 Quasioffenses
penalize the mental attitudeor condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the
"imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act.25 This is precisely where this Court
found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his seemingly indifference to the
deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to
exercise lack of precaution which eventually led to JR's death.
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an
"inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is
to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science. In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents
that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians
and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He,
therefore, has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances.26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did
not display that degree of care and precaution demanded by the
circumstances.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove
two things — the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the
28
elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and
the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Based on
the above disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove
these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral certainty
that Dr. Cabugao isguilty of reckless imprudence as the elements
thereof were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to
perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to determine the
source of infection which caused the deterioration of JR's
condition. However, a review of the records fail to show that Dr.
Cabugao is in any position to perform the required
appendectomy.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is
the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but a general
practitioner specializing in family medicine;27 thus, even if he
wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an
appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he
referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis. Dr.
Mateo, the prosecution’s expert witness, emphasized the role of
the surgeon during direct examination, to wit:
ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and
condition, you have mentioned that surgery is the solution, would
you have allowed then a 24 hour observation?
A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of observation of
18-24 hours can be allowed provided that there would be close
monitoring of the patient, sir.
Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the monitoring
doctor?
A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best surgeon,
sir.
Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the surgeon
attending to the case to have been the one to observe within the
period of observation?
A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe the
sudden changes in the condition of the patient, sir.
Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how often
would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the condition of the patient
during the period of observation?
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four (4) hours,
some centers will recommend hourly or every two hours but
here in the Philippines, would recommend for 4 to 6 hours, sir.28
Dr. Cabugao’s supervision does not cease upon his endorsement
of his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to
have exerted all efforts to monitor his patient and under these
circumstances he did not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzon’s
competence and diligence. Expert testimonies have been offered
to prove the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the
need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr. Villaflor, on
cross examination testified, to wit:
Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as notthe
disease of JR, surgery or operation mustbe done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute
appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute
appendicitis, you have to operate.29
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there
was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise
was feverish and that he was vomitting, does that not show a
disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. It’s possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then
Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule
out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you
have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.30
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent
or lacked the necessary precaution in his performance of his duty
as a family doctor. On the contrary, a perusal ofthe medical
records would show that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it
was Dr. Cabugao who frequently made orders on the
administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There was also
repetitive instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon
as it appeared that he is suspecting appendicitis. The referral of
JR to Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as
he knew that appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise.
This clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge
and skill in attending to JR's condition, even after the referral of
JR to Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the calculated assessment of Dr.
Cabugao to refer JRto a surgeon who has sufficient training and
experience to handle JR’s case belies the finding that he displayed
inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient.31
We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's
condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before he left, he made
endorsement and notified the resident-doctor and nurses-on-
duty that he will be on leave.
Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of
JR during his hospital confinement, it cannot be said that the
finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon necessitates the same finding on the
co-accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the idea
of a felony committed by means of culpa.32 Thus, the accused-
doctors to be found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, it must be shown that both accused-doctors
demonstratedan act executed without malice or criminal intent –
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence.
Noteworthy, the evidence on record clearly points to the reckless
imprudence of Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in
Dr. Cabugao's case.
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr.
Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on December 23,
2011 due to "multiorgan failure" as evidenced by a copy of death
certificate.33 Thus, the effect of death, pending appeal of his
conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and
pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v.
Bayotas,34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the
accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based
29
solely on the offense committed, i.e.,civil liability ex
delictoin senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation fromwhich the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either againstthe
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitationson the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation
of right by prescription.35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists
as the same is not based on delictbut by contract and the reckless
imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.1âwphi1For this reason, a separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate
of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based,36 and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. – The death of the accused
after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However,
the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising
from other sources of obligation may be continued against the
estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs
of the accused may besubstituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party
may file against the estate of the deceased. (Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the
offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action
based on the other sources of obligation in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 111.37 If the same act or omission complained of
arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate
of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court:38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for
the recovery of money or debtor interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover
real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate,
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him. (Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of arising from
contract, the filing of a separate civil action must be filed against
the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not
filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the
decent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the
time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commencesan
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the
claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims
may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the
estate, as though the claim had been presented directly beforethe
court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double
recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the
same act or omission whether the action is brought against the
executor or administrator, or the estate.39 The heirs of JR must
choose which of the available causes of action for damages they
will bring.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P.
CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the
disposition of this case, his criminal liability is extinguished;
however, his civil liability subsists. A separate civil action may be
filed either against the executor/administrator, or the estateof
Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same are based.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013
LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, Petitioner, v. CHUA PUE CHIN
LEE, Respondent.
30
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the
reversal of the May 31, 2007 Decision2 and the January 31, 2008
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510.
The CA affirmed the Orders4 dated August 15, 2003 and
November 5, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila denying (a) the Omnibus Motion5for the exclusion of a
private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury pending
before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration6 of the
said order denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of
Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC
Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer
company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is
the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and
his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a
majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner�s siblings including respondent and
some unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves
inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and
other factory employees were unable to enter the factory
premises. This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-
V-99, 55503 to 55505 against Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against
Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in
Valenzuela City.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the
Secretary�s Certificate8 issued by Virginia Lee on even date)
caused the filing of a verified Petition9 for the Issuance of an
Owner�s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 23223810 which covers a property owned by CHI. The case
was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said
court an Affidavit of Loss11 stating that: (1) by virtue of his
position as President of CHI, he had in his custody and possession
the owner�s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238 issued by the
Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner�s copy of TCT
No. 232238 was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and
he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted diligent
efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is
already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the
subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any
obligation with any person, credit or banking institution.
Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing
averments during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order12 dated
September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and directed
the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner�s
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus
Motion praying, among others, that the September 17, 1999
Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that
respondent was in possession of the said Owner�s Duplicate
Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of
vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely
needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to
mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank.
Respondent even produced the Owner�s Duplicate Copy of TCT
No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC
recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.
In a Complaint-Affidavit14 dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City
Prosecutor of Manila, respondent alleged the following:
1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer
of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), which corporation is duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws.
2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody
and safekeeping of all vital financial documents including bank
accounts, securities, and land titles.
3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owner�s
Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 232238
registered in the name of CHI.
4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a
VERIFIED PETITION for the issuance of a new owner�s
duplicate copy of the aforementioned certificate claiming under
oath that said duplicate copy was in his custody but was lost.
xxxx
5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same
fact of loss, which affidavit he used and presented as exhibit
�D�.
xxxx
6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No.
232238 was inadvertently lost and misplaced from his files.
xxxx
7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in
his verified petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew
that I was in possession of the owner�s duplicate copy of TCT No.
232238.
8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee
and even produced in open court the owner�s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 232238.
Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila,
dated November 12, 1999, x x x.
9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute,
which dispute is now pending with the SEC.
10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owner�s duplicate of the
aforementioned TCT so that he could mortgage the property
covered thereby with the Planters Development Bank, even
without my knowledge and consent as well as the consent and
knowledge of my brother Nixon Lee who is likewise a
shareholder, board member and officer of CHI.
11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with
his perjurious misrepresentation, a new owner�s duplicate
could have been issued.
x x x x15 (Italics supplied.)
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental
Affidavit16 to clarify that she was accusing petitioner of perjury
allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring
in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition
filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No.
232238 was in his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring
under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3)
by testifying under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost
from his files.
The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
case. However, in the Review Resolution17 dated December 1,
2000 issued by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla,
the recommendation to dismiss the case was set aside.
Thereafter, said City Prosecutor filed the Informations18 docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 352270-71 CR for perjury, punishable
under Article 18319of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
against petitioner before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for
respondent and as private prosecutor with the consent and
under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. After
the prosecution�s presentation of its first witness in the person
of Atty. Ronaldo Viesca, Jr.,20 a lawyer from the Land Registration
Authority, petitioner�s counsel moved in open court that
31
respondent and her lawyer in this case should be excluded from
participating in the case since perjury is a public offense. Said
motion was vehemently opposed by Atty. Macam.21 In its
Order22 dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC gave both the defense and
the prosecution the opportunity to submit their motion and
comment respectively as regards the issue raised by
petitioner�s counsel.
Complying with the MeTC�s directive, petitioner filed the
aforementioned Omnibus Motion23 asserting that in the crime of
perjury punishable under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As
such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution
in this case. Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime against
public interest as provided under Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV,
Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the
offended party is the State alone. Petitioner posited that there
being no allegation of damage to private interests, a private
prosecutor is not needed. On the other hand, the Prosecution
filed its Opposition24 to petitioner�s Omnibus Motion.
The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order25 dated
August 15, 2003, as follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor, however, an
offended party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by
attorney, especially in cases of offenses which cannot be
prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. The only
exception to this rule is when the offended party waives his right
to [file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute
it after the termination of the case, in which case he loses his
right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost
his interest in its prosecution. And, in any event, whenever an
offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action,
his intervention must always be subject to the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil.
197).
Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are
public in nature and those that can only be prosecuted at the
instance of the offended party. In either case, the law gives to the
offended party the right to intervene, personally or by counsel,
and he is deprived of such right only when he waives the civil
action or reserves his right to institute one. Such is not the
situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public crime and
the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.
The MeTC also denied petitioner�s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a
petition28 for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Petitioner prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin the MeTC
and respondent from enforcing the MeTC Orders dated August
15, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin the MeTC
and respondent from further allowing the private prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings below while the instant case is
pending.
By Decision29 dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, holding that the presence of the private prosecutor
who was under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury
cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that
respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the
private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved
party.30 Reiterating the MeTC�s invocation of our ruling in Lim
Tek Goan v. Yatco31 as cited by former Supreme Court Associate
Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his Remedial Law
Compendium,32 the CA ruled that �the offended party, who has
neither reserved, waived, nor instituted the civil action may
intervene, and such right to intervene exists even when no civil
liability is involved.
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA
declared that respondent�s property rights and interests as the
treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed and/or
threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner. Further, the CA
opined that petitioner�s right to a fair trial is not violated
because the presence of the private prosecutor in these cases
does not exclude the presence of the public prosecutor who
remains to have the prosecuting authority, subjecting the private
prosecutor to his control and supervision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 but the CA denied
it under Resolution35 dated January 31, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT
THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF
PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER
COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF RESPONDENT,
AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON
BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public
interest, does not offend any private party but is a crime which
only offends the public interest in the fair and orderly
administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a felony where
no civil liability arises on the part of the offender because there
are no damages to be compensated and that there is no private
person injured by the crime.
Petitioner argues that the CA�s invocation of our
pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited by Justice Regalado in his
book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have a
civil interest in the criminal case in order to intervene through a
private prosecutor. Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out
that said case involved the crime of grave threats where Lim Tek
Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the
crime of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be
satisfied, petitioner claims that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of
right, may still intervene because he was one of the offended
parties.
Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private
prosecutor to represent respondent in this case despite the fact
that the latter was not the offended party and did not suffer any
damage as she herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any
damage that may be satisfied through restitution,37 reparation for
the damage caused38and indemnification for consequential
damages.39 Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the
proper offended party that may intervene in this case as she was
not authorized by CHI. Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty.
Macam or any private prosecutor for that matter be excluded
from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all
proceedings undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened be set
aside and that the same be taken anew by the public prosecutor
alone.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and
intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are
not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an
aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer
of CHI and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that
pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek Goan she has the right to
intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case.
The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that �[e]very person criminally
liable x x x is also civilly liable.�42 Underlying this legal principle
is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he
32
offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or
the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated;
and (2) the individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured
or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.�(a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the
appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16
of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action.�Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of
the offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, defines an offended party as �the person against
whom or against whose property the offense was committed.�
In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,44 this Court rejected petitioner�s
theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in
public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language
of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to
assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime,
public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly
liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender
is civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,45 we also held that
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private
individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act
or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is
damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such
party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse
under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient
or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will
be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such
interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and
not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of
some third and unrelated party.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of
TCT No. 232238 covering CHI�s property and its loss through
inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious
to respondent�s personal credibility and reputation insofar as
her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a
Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered
issuance of a new owner�s duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was
only averted by respondent�s timely discovery of the case filed
by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the
perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the
early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,47 cited by both MeTC and CA,
that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is
erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the
offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene
in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening
for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction
and control of the public prosecutor.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,49 as a result of the complaint-affidavit
filed by private respondent who is also the corporation�s
Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents
(Minutes of Annual Stockholder�s Meeting) was instituted by
the City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private
respondent�s testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner
moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the
ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the
case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of
said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court
reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private
prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which
dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in
allowing the private prosecutors to actively participate in the
trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where
from the nature of the offense or where the law defining and
punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity,
the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the
offense.
Petitioner�s contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that
every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law
he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another.Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really
the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral
part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the
crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the
offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111,
the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, �[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.�
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she
reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the
civil action for damages arising from the offense
charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can
intervene in the trial of the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondent�s testimony in the
inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages personally
sustained by her as a result of petitioner�s alleged acts of
falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages
were proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as
private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue the civil
aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without
basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action,
evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court
should determine who are the persons entitled to such
indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil
33
liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent
of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a
reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the
criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising
from the offense committed, and the private offended party
has the right to intervene through the private
prosecutors.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in
holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioner�s motion to exclude Atty. Macam as
private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Decision dated May 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated
January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81510
are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202920 October 2, 2013
RICHARD CHUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
MANILA, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 assailing the
Orders2 dated 26 June 2012 and 26 July 2012 of the Executive
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Manila, in UDK
Nos. 12001457 to 96.
The facts:
On 13 January 2012, herein petitioner Richard Chua tiled before
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, a complaint
charging one Letty Sy Gan of forty (40) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 or the Bouncing Checks
Law.3 After conducting preliminary investigation, the OCP found
probable cause and, on 22 March 2012, filed forty (40) counts of
violation of BP Blg. 22 before the MeTC.4
Consequently, the MeTC informed petitioner that he has to pay a
totalof ₱540,668.00 as filing fees for all the forty (40) counts of
violation of BP Blg. 22.5 Finding the said amount to be beyond his
means, petitioner consulted with the MeTC clerk of court to ask
whether he could pay filing fees on a per case basis instead of
being required to pay the total filing fees for all the BP Blg. 22
cases all at once.6 The MeTC clerk of court opined that petitioner
could not.7 Petitioner was thus unable to pay any filing fees.
Due to non-payment of the required filing fees, the MeTC
designated the forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 as
undocketed cases under UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96.
Subsequently, the OCP moved for consolidation of the said cases.8
On 18 April 2012, petitioner filed before the Executive Judge of
the MeTC a motion entitled "
Urgent Motion to Allow Private Complainant to Pay Filing Fee on
a Per Case Basis" (Urgent Motion).9 In it, petitioner reiterated his
request that he be allowed to pay filing fees on a per case basis
instead of being required to pay the total amount of filing fees in
its entirety.
On 26 June 2012, the Executive Judge issued an Order denying
petitioner’s Urgent Motion. In rebuffing petitioner’s Urgent
Motion, the Executive Judge of the MeTC ratiocinated that
granting petitioner’s plea would constitute a deferment in the
payment of filing fees that, in turn, contravenes Section 1(b) of
the Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Hence, this appeal.
OUR RULING
Prefatorily, it must be pointed out that petitioner availed of the
wrong remedy in assailing the Orders dated 26 June 2012 and 26
July 2012 of the Executive Judge of the MeTC via the present
petition for review on certiorari. The assailed orders are not,
technically, final orders that are appealable,11 let alone the
proper subjects of an appeal by certiorari.12 The assailed orders
do not, at least for the moment, completely dispose of the B.P. 22
cases filed before the MeTC.
The correct remedy for the petitioner, in view of the
unavailability of an appeal or any other remedy in the ordinary
course of law, is a certiorari petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.13 But then again, the petitioner should have filed such a
petition, not directly with this Court, but before the appropriate
Regional Trial Court pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of
courts.14
In the weightier interest of substantial justice, however, this
Court forgives such procedural lapses and treats the instant
appeal as a certiorari petition filed properly before this Court. To
this Court, the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive Judge was patent on the undisputed facts of this case
and is serious enough to warrant a momentary deviation from
the procedural norm.
Thus, We come to the focal issue of whether the Executive Judge
of the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion, in light of the
facts and circumstances herein obtaining, in refusing petitioner’s
request of paying filing fees on a per case basis.
We answer in the affirmative. We grant the petition.
In proposing to pay filing fees on a per case basis, petitioner was
not trying to evade or deny his obligation to pay for the filing fees
for all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 filed before the
MeTC. He, in fact, acknowledges such obligation. He, in fact,
admits that he is incapable of fulfilling such obligation in its
entirety.
Rather, what petitioner is asking is that he at least be allowed to
pursue some of the cases, the filing fees of which he is capable of
financing. Petitioner manifests that, given his current financial
status, he simply cannot afford the filing fees for all the forty (40)
BP Blg. 22 cases.
We see nothing wrong or illegal in granting petitioner’s request.
First. The Executive Judge erred when she treated the
entire₱540,668.00 as one indivisible obligation, when that figure
was nothing but the sum of individual filing fees due for each
count of violation of BP Blg.22 filed before the MeTC. Granting
petitioner’s request would not constitute a deferment in the
payment of filing fees, for the latter clearly intends to pay in full
the filing fees of some, albeit not all, of the cases filed.
Filing fees, when required, are assessed and become due for each
initiatory pleading filed.15 In criminal actions, these pleadings
refer to the information filed in court.
In the instant case, there are a total of forty (40) counts of
violation of BP Blg. 22 that was filed before the
MeTC.1âwphi1And each of the forty (40) was, in fact, assessed its
filing fees, individually, based on the amount of check one
34
covers.16 Under the rules of criminal procedure, the filing of the
forty(40) counts is equivalent to the filing of forty (40) different
informations, as each count represents an independent violation
of BP Blg. 22.17 Filing fees are, therefore, due for each count and
may be paid for each count separately.
Second. In an effort to justify her refusal of petitioner’s request,
the Executive Judge further argues that since all forty (40) counts
of violation of BP Blg. 22 were brought about by a single
complaint filed before the OCP and are now consolidated before
the court, the payment of their tiling fees should be made for all
or none at all.18
That all forty (40) counts of violation of BP Blg. 22 all emanated
from a single complaint filed in the OCP is irrelevant. The fact
remains that there are still forty (40) counts of violation of BP
Blg. 22 that were filed before the MeTC and, as a consequence,
forty (40) individual filing fees to be paid.
Neither would the consolidation of all forty (40) counts make any
difference. Consolidation unifies criminal cases involving related
offenses only for purposes of trial.19 Consolidation does not
transform the tiling fees due for each case consolidated into one
indivisible fee.
Third. Allowing petitioner to pay for the tiling fees of some of the
forty ( 40) counts of violation of BP Big. 22 tiled before the MeTC,
will concededly result into the absolute non-payment of the filing
fees of the rest. The fate of the cases which filing fees were not
paid, however, is already the concern of the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated 26 June 2012 and 26 July
2012 of the Executive Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Manila, in UDK Nos.12001457 to 96 are ANNULED and SET
ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, is hereby directed to
accept payments of tiling fees in UDK Nos. 12001457 to 96 on a
per information basis.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to stop the
proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the writ of
certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252
entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge,
Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing,
Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City
deferring the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-
120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases
pending between him and the complainant in the trial courts in
Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans totaling
₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land
(property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite
registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its
option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of
₱21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts
due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing
in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional
amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was
purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture
partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property,
they learned that the title to the property was really TCT No.
114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the
parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by
de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be
spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of
₱41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and
received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive
relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding
against him for the collection of the ₱41,377,851.48 on the
ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for
estafa through falsification of public document against Consing
and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati
City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a sum of money
and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an information for estafa
through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City
(Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to Branch 60
(Makati criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in
the Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a
prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati
civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion
for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional ground of
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19,
2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the
RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in
the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding
the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
35
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite
and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e.
whether or not private respondent may be held liable in the
questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of
private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati
criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati
criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case show
that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in
controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles
(TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of
Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are
identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for
the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig
civil case identical to or intimately related to the criminal cases in
Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in
the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the
questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in view of
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto,
did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice of
an official act of another judicial authority. It was also a better
legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our legal
system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private respondent’s
arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the
fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the
Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced
its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-
95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against Consing and De
la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No.
7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case).
Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the
Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the
RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion.
Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his arraignment and
trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on
March 19, 2001, and later promulgated its decision on May 31,
2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside
the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and
trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally
decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this
Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the May 31,
2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted
the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set
aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the
Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the
Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila
civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother
in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the
purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of
the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if
PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus
damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be
held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document.
Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI
should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not
necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case
where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as
determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal
case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for
executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor
of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee.
Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of
management contract, one of the causes of action of which
consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while
the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal
case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary
before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court
denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no
prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court
and ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case
on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20,
1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565
was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine
the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No.
56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that
both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case
and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon
fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil
Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in
issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not
made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
36
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the
reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA, citing the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and
Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that
justified the suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal
case, and claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the
Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question
that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration,
Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not
binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which
was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati
criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did
not yet become final and executory, and could still be reversed at
any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied
upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for
his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a
contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as
his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself.
It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The
transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the issue of
the respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions are
all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same
parties with the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R.
No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-
95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed
lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of
the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March 18,
2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with
the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied
the motion through the second assailed resolution of December
11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No.
148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252,
which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in
Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its
amended decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the
Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a
prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil
action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a
certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the
resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or
innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as an
independent civil action intended to exact civil liability
separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully
authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took cognizance
of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged
amended decision that the Makati civil case, just like the Manila
civil case, was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of
Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise
a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal
Case No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193,
the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial question,
because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere
agent of his mother, had any obligation or liability toward
Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he
filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not intended to delay
the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such
resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered
determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to
warrant the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a
prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of the
proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm
holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended
because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action,
while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was
wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to
him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and
his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals
that the action was predicated on fraud. This was apparent from
the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that
Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as security and
later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and
foisting to the public a spurious title."22 As such, the action was
one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-
120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as
follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and
physical injuries may be independently instituted pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.23 This
was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
xxxx
37
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and
Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As
such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to
apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with Unicapital,
for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different
complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions
Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately instituted against
him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based
on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending
the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s
being a mere agent of his mother who should not be criminally
liable for having so acted due to the property involved having
belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R.
No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case (the
Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the
Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila
civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother
in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.25 (Words in
parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated
February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an
Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and
without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.

Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City
filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage
is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge
of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the
RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband
during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and
Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been
declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted
petitioner�s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be
dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already
been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: �Karla Medina-
Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo,� a case
for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo
and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it
was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case
are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-
captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil
case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and
arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that
there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili
and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has declared �the
voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity� of the said second
marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more
bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC�s decision. The falloreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in
Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said
decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution7 dated July 24,
2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari alleging that:
38
1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF
THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG
CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS
THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE
FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE
PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES
THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO,
IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN
NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE
SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS
FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO
THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE,
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G.
TISMO OF THE SURNAME �CAPILI� IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY
RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent
declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. � The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of
bigamy were present when the Information was filed on June 28,
2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during
the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and
Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably,
the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of
the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may
still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so
long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused�s conviction
for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on
the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner�s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal
case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner�s
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner�s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the
aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that
39
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with
private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of
nullity of petitioner�s second marriage does not impede the
filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191411 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 191871
EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA.
G. AMUGOD, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated Petitions for Certiorari1 are the
October 6, 20092 and February 10, 20103Resolutions of public
respondent First Division of Sandiganbayan (SB), denying the
Motion to Quash4 dated July 8, 2009 filed by petitioner Rafael L.
Coscolluela (Coscolluela). The said motion was adopted by
petitioners Edwin N. Nacionales (Nacionales), Dr. Ernesto P.
Malvas (Malvas), and Jose Ma. G. Amugod (Amugod), praying for
the dismissal of Crim. Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of
their right to speedy disposition of cases.
The Facts
Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros
Occidental (Province) for three (3) full terms which ended on
June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served as his Special
Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and
Malvas as Provincial Health Officer.5
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas (Office of the Ombudsman) received a letter-
complaint6 dated November 7, 2001 from People’s Graftwatch,
requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase
of medical and agricultural equipment for the Province in the
amount of ₱20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a
month before Coscolluela stepped down from office.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the
Office of the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in
the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report7 dated April 16, 2002
which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against
petitioners.8 Consequently, petitioners filed their respective
counter-affidavits.9
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch
E. Cañares (Cañares) prepared a Resolution (March 27, 2003
Resolution), finding probable cause against petitioners for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On
even date, the Information10 was prepared and signed by Cañares
and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C.
Miro (Miro) for recommendation. Miro recommended the
approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final
approval of Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro),
came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the
Information was filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information only when they received a copy of
the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.11
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing,
among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were
resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint
was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted
Coscolluela’s motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to
Quash13 dated August 7, 2009, explaining that although the
Information was originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go
through careful review and revision before its final approval. It
also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections
regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the
interim.14
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In a Resolution15 dated October 6, 2009, the SB denied
petitioners’ Motion to Quash for lack of merit. It held that the
preliminary investigation against petitioners was actually
resolved by Cañares on March 27, 2003, one (1) year and four (4)
months from the date the complaint was filed, or in November 9,
2001. Complying with internal procedure, Cañares then prepared
the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information for the
recommendation of the Miro and eventually, the final approval of
the Casimiro. As these issuances had to undergo careful review
and revision through the various levels of the said office, the
period of delay – i.e., from March 27, 2003 to May 21, 2009, or
roughly over six (6) years – cannot be deemed as
inordinate16 and as such, petitioners’ constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases was not violated.17
Aggrieved, petitioners filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration18 dated November 9, 2009 and November 6,
2009, similarly arguing that the SB erred in making a distinction
between two time periods, namely: (a) from the filing of the
complaint up to the time Cañares prepared the resolution finding
probable cause against petitioners; and (b) from the submission
of the said resolution to the Acting Ombudsman for review and
approval up to the filing of the Information with the SB. In this
regard, petitioners averred that the aforementioned periods
should not be compartmentalized and thus, treated as a single
period. Accordingly, the delay of eight (8) years of the instant
case should be deemed prejudicial to their right to speedy
disposition of cases.19
The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its
Resolution20 dated February 10, 2010 for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether the SB
gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to
speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
40
A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is
guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) which provides:
SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial
or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.21
It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of
cases should be understood to be a relative or flexible concept
such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not be sufficient.22Jurisprudence dictates that the right is
deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.23
Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following
factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert
such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the
delay.24
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that
petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case
had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation
proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete.
In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s
position that the conduct of preliminary investigation was
terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when Cañares
prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the
Information. This is belied by Section 4,
Rule II of the Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990,
otherwise known as the "Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman," which provides:
SEC. 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial
Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
provisions:
xxxx
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed
without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of
the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no
complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation
until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer’s
recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to
dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at bar, the
preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners
were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27,
2003 Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time
Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this
regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009,
or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsman’s
resolution of the case largely remains unjustified.
To this end, the Court equally denies the SB’s ratiocination that
the delay in proceedings could be excused by the fact that the
case had to undergo careful review and revision through the
different levels in the Office of the Ombudsman before it is finally
approved, in addition to the steady stream of cases which it had
to resolve.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the
mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the "protector of the
people" and as such, required to "act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, in order to promote efficient service."25 This great
responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by ineptitude.
Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not
only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to
resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful
performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the
assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its
dispensation. Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such
as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or
any event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal
work activity – any of which have not been adequately proven by
the prosecution in the case at bar – there appears to be no
justifiable basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not
have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings
against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for
their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of
cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. They were only
informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information
against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when
they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on
June 19, 2009.26 In this regard, they could have reasonably
assumed that the proceedings against them have already been
terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Instructive
on this point is the Court’s observation in Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan,27 to wit:
Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the
speedy resolution of their case because they were completely
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going.
Peculiar to this case, we reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were
merely asked to comment, and not file counter-affidavits which is
the proper procedure to follow in a preliminary investigation.
After giving their explanation and after four long years of being in
the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that the
charges against them had already been dismissed.
On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present
any plausible, special or even novel reason which could justify
the four-year delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for
the delay — the many layers of review that the case had to
undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it had to entail — has lost
its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the invocation in
the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve
complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the
fact that the subject computerization contract had been mutually
cancelled by the parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation
proceedings, it was not the petitioners’ duty to follow up on the
prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to
promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in
the case of Barker v. Wingo:28
41
A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has
that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent
with due process.
Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to the
petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases
is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch
in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression
of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its
"salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be
free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.30 This looming
unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor
of the individual. In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the
Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan31 (Corpuz) illumined:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of
the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of
the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to
minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to
limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these,
the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are
unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if
the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a
cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the
burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage
of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require
impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion
from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right
shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly
prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United States, for the
government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay,
it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious
prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification
of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned
to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For
instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily
against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to
intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the
defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the
heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be
weighted less heavily against the State. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
As the right to a speedy disposition of cases encompasses the
broader purview of the entire proceedings of which trial proper
is but a stage, the above-discussed effects in Corpuz should
equally apply to the case at bar. As held in Dansal v. Fernandez,
Sr.:32
Sec. 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies."
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one of
three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It
guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of
their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before,
during and after trial, and affords broader protection than
Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It
is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section
15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case.
The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and
administrative cases. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of
the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case as well as the
concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is
undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process
and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the
institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the
Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of
accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved
with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are
responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.
Corollarily, for the SB’s patent and utter disregard of the existing
laws and jurisprudence surrounding the matter, the Court finds
that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied the quashal of
the Information. Perforce, the assailed resolutions must be set
aside and the criminal case against petitioners be dismissed.
While the foregoing pronouncement should, as matter of course,
result in the acquittal of the petitioners, it does not necessarily
follow that petitioners are entirely exculpated from any civil
liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case
which the Province may opt to pursue.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that an
acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended
party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict,
unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.33 As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People,34 citing
Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:35
The Rules provide: "The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and
in the manner provided by law against the person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered."
xxxx
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., we declared:
"While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by
law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime
but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of
his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
whether or not the same be punishable by law."(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Based on the violation of petitioners’ right to speedy disposition
of cases as herein discussed, the present case stands to be
dismissed even before either the prosecution or the defense has
been given the chance to present any evidence. Thus, the Court is
unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether
42
petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which
any civil liability on their part might arise as prescribed under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.36 Consequently, absent
this pronouncement, the Province is not precluded from
instituting a subsequent civil case based on the delict if only to
recover the amount of ₱20,000,000.00 in public funds
attributable to petitioners’ alleged malfeasance.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the
First Division of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim.
Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of the Constitutional right
to speedy disposition of cases of petitioners Rafael L. Coscolluela,
Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas, and Jose Ma. G.
Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action which the Province
of Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199067 November 11, 2013
NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PURIFICACION F. FELIPE, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 or the Rules
or Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the June 30, 2011
Decision1 or the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
120100,2 and its October 21, 2011 Resolution,3 for being issued
in a manner not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation or
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) filed by petitioner Nissan
Gallery-Ortigas Nissan), an entity engaged in the business or car
dealership, against respondent Purificacion F. Felipe
(Purificacion) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City. The said office found probable cause to indict Purificacion
and filed an Information before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
(raffled to Branch 41), Quezon City (MeTC), for her issuance of a
postdated check in the amount of ₱1,020,000.00, which was
subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP
PAYMENT."
Purificacion issued the said check because her son, Frederick
Felipe (Frederick), attracted by a huge discount of ₱220,000.00,
purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and utility vehicle (SUV)
from Nissan. The term of the transaction was Cash-on-Delivery
and no downpayment was required. The SUV was delivered on
May 14, 1997, but Frederick failed to pay upon delivery. Despite
non-payment, Frederick took possession of the vehicle.4
Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more
than four (4) months without paying even a single centavo of the
purchase price. This constrained Nissan to send him two (2)
demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay.
Nissan, through its retained counsel, was prompted to send a
final demand letter. Reacting to the final demand, Frederick went
to Nissan’s office and asked for a grace period until October 30,
1997 within which to pay his full outstanding obligation
amounting to ₱1,026,750.00. Through further negotiation, the
amount was eventually reduced to ₱1,020,000.00.5
Frederick reneged on his promise and again failed to pay. On
November 25, 1997, he asked his mother, Purificacion, to issue
the subject check as payment for his obligation. Purificacion
acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated
check in the amount of ₱1,020,000.00. The check, however, was
dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT."6
A demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through
Frederick, who lived with her. The letter informed her of the
dishonor of the check and gave her five (5) days from receipt
within which to replace it with cash or manager’s check. Despite
receipt of the demand letter, Purificacion refused to replace the
check giving the reason that she was not the one who purchased
the vehicle. On January 6, 1998, Nissan filed a criminal case for
violation of BP 22 against her.7
During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City
Prosecutor, Purificacion gave ₱200,000.00 as partial payment to
amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter, however,
no additional payment had been made.
After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting
Purificacion of the charge, but holding her civilly liable to Nissan.
The dispositive portion of the judgment states that:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING
accused PURIFICACION FELIPE of the crime of Violation of Batas
Pambansa 22. However, accused PURIFICACION FELIPE is
ordered to pay private complainant Nissan Gallery Ortigas the
amount of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(₱675,000.00) with legal interest per annum, from the filing of
the information until the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.8
Purificacion appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch
105 thereof affirmed the MeTC decision on December 22, 2008.
The RTC ruled that Purificacion was estopped from denying that
she issued the check as a "show check" to boost the credit
standing of Frederick and that Nissan agreed not to deposit the
same.9 Further, the RTC considered Purificacion to be an
accommodation party who was "liable on the instrument to a
holder for value even though the holder at the time of taking the
instrument knew him or her to be merely an accommodation
party."10
Purificacion moved for a reconsideration, but her motion was
denied.
The CA, before whom the case was elevated via a petition for
review, granted the petition on May 20, 2009.1avvphi1 In so
deciding, the CA reasoned out that there was no privity of
contract between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability could
be adjudged against her because of her acquittal from the
criminal charge. It was Frederick who was civilly liable to
Nissan.11
It added that Purificacion could not be an accommodation party
either because she only came in after Frederick failed to pay the
purchase price, or six (6) months after the execution of the
contract between Nissan and Frederick. Her liability was limited
to her act of issuing a worthless check but by her acquittal in the
criminal charge, there was no more basis for her to be held civilly
liable to Nissan.12 Purificacion’s act of issuing the subject check
did not, by itself, assume the civil obligation of Frederick to
Nissan or automatically made her a party to the contract.13 Thus,
the decretal portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit therefrom, the instant petition is
GIVEN DUE COURSE and is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Order dated December 22, 2008 and May 20, 2009, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, in
Crim. Case No. Q-08-151734, affirming the Judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 41, Quezon City, for
Violation of B.P. 22, acquitting petitioner of the crime charged but
ordering the latter to pay respondent the amount of Six Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱675,000.00) with 12% legal
interest, is SET ASIDE and petitioner is EXONERATED from any
civil liability by reason of her issuance of the subject check.
xxx
43
SO ORDERED.14
Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was later denied.
Hence, this petition, with Nissan presenting the following
GROUNDS
A.
BOTH THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT CONCURRED THAT THE ISSUANCE BY
RESPONDENT PURIFICACION OF THE SUBJECT BOUNCED
CHECK WAS FOR AND IN PAYMENT OF HER SON’S
OUTSTANDING OBLIGATION TO NISSAN GALLERY ORIGINATING
FROM HIS PURCHASE OF THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLE, NOT
MERELY AS A "SHOW CHECK", HENCE, EVEN IF PURIFICACION
IS NOT A PARTY TO THE SALES TRANSACTION BETWEEN
NISSAN GALLERY, AS SELLER, AND FREDERICK, AS BUYER,
PURIFICACION, AS THE ONE WHO DREW THE BOUNCED CHECK
AS AND IN PAYMENT OF THE LONG-UNPAID MOTOR VEHICLE
PURCHASED BY HER SON, COULD NOT ESCAPE LIABILITY ON
THE CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CASE.
B.
WHILE IT MAY BE TRUE THAT RESPONDENT PURIFICACION
MAY BE ACQUITTED OF THE CRIME CHARGED (VIOLATION OF
B.P. 22), ONLY BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE
THAT RESPONDENT PURIFICACION WAS PROPERLY NOTIFIED
OF THE DISHONOR OF THE SUBJECT BOUNCED CHECK, IT IS
NOT CORRECT TO EXONERATE HER FROM THE CIVIL ASPECT
OF THE CASE.15
Ultimately, the question presented before the Court is whether or
not Purificacion is civilly liable for the issuance of a worthless
check despite her acquittal from the criminal charge.
Ruling of the Court
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted
upon the filing of a criminal action, subject to certain exceptions.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically provides
that:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action (unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action).
x x x x.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
x x x x.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal
actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the
corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a
reservation to file such separately is not allowed.
The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its
accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal
case is based on the principle that every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable.16 If the accused, however, is not found to be
criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not
likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.17 This rule more specifically applies when (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence
is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.18 The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if
there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.19
It can, therefore, be concluded that if the judgment is conviction
of the accused, then the necessary penalties and civil liabilities
arising from the offense or crime shall be imposed. On the
contrary, if the judgment is of acquittal, then the imposition of the
civil liability will depend on whether or not the act or omission
from which it might arise exists.
Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly
issuing a worthless check. The essential elements of the offense
of violation of BP 22 are the following:
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) The dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.20
Here, the first and third elements were duly proven in the trial.
Purificacion, however, was acquitted from criminal liability
because of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of
notice of dishonor. Of the three (3) elements, the second element
is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind.21 Thus,
Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds which, however, arises only after it is
proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor
and that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay
the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its
payment.22
Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of
dishonor was not sufficiently established.1âwphi1 Nevertheless,
the act or omission from which her civil liability arose, which was
the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly
existed. Her acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22 was
based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the
corresponding civil liability. The Court cannot agree more when
the MeTC ruled that:
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not
necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in
criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater
than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of
evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a
person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit
the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt,
the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not
mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be
that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.23
The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability
of Purificacion was limited to her act of issuing a worthless check.
The Court, however, does not agree with the CA when it went to
state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there
was no more basis for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The
acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not
change the fact that she issued the subject check which was
subsequently dishonored upon its presentment.
44
Purificacion herself admitted having issued the subject check in
the amount of ₱1,020,000.00 after Frederick asked her to do it as
payment for his obligation with Nissan. Her claim that she issued
the check as a mere "show check" to boost Frederick’s credit
standing was not convincing because there was no credit
standing to boost as her son had already defaulted in his
obligation to Nissan. Had it been issued prior to the sale of the
vehicle, the "show check" claim could be given credence. It was
not, however, the case here. It was clear that she assumed her
son’s obligation with Nissan and issued the check to pay it. The
argument that it was a mere "show check" after her son was
already in default its simply ludicrous.
The Court shall not be belabored with the issue of whether or not
Purificacion was an accommodation party because she was not.
Granting that she was, it is with more reason that she cannot
escape any civil liability because Section 2924 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law specifically bounds her to the instrument. The
crux of the controversy pertains to the civil liability of an accused
despite acquittal of a criminal charge. Such issue is no longer
novel. In cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in
issuing a check is immaterial. The law has made the mere act of
issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act prescribed by the
legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only
inquiry is whether the law has been breached.25 The lower courts
were unanimous in finding that, indeed. Purificacion issued the
bouncing check. Thus, regardless of her intent, she remains civilly
liable because the act or omission, the making and issuing of the
subject check, from which her civil liability arises, evidently
exists.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2011
Decision and the October 21, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-08-
151734, dated December 22, 2008, affirming the Judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City, for Violation of
B.P. 22 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION with respect to the
legal interest which shall be reduced to 6% per annum from
finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.26
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this
case finding accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by
sexual assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay "AAA"
the amounts of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is
entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of
6% per annum :from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.2
The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on
December 20, 2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court received
a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death
of accused-appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our
directive, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted on
November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death
certificate4 of accused-appellant.
Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012
transpired before the promulgation of this Court’s Decision on
November 14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012.
Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his appeal before this
Court was still pending resolution.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation
wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be
resolved. The Court explained the implications of the accused-
appellant’s demise as follows:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded
the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013.
When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved.1âwphi1 The Court ruled upon
Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed
of his death.
Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s
Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s
conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision
has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to
set it aside.
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision
and dismiss the criminal case against Amistoso by reason of his
death.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death
on August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside
and the case against accused-appellant must consequently be
dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is
SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692 before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED on
account of accused-appellant's demise.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 2014
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., Petitioner,
vs.
45
HANZ CALAPIZ, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO
CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA CALAPIZ,Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his
absolution from civil liability.
The Case
In this appeal, an accused desires the reversal of the decision
promulgated on February 20, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on August 6, 1999
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Oroquieta City
ordering him to pay moral damages despite his acquittal of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries charged against him.2
Antecedents
On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita
Calapiz brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the
Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an
emergency appendectomy. Hanz was attended to by the
petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo
circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of
circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following
day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited
blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the
child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed
the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as
normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the
hospital over his parents’ protestations, and was directed to
continue taking antibiotics.
On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his
penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by
Hanz’s appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go,
an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged urethra.
Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was operated
on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and
reconstructed, Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against
the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the information3 was filed in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City (MTCC), to
which the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22, 1998.4 Under the
order of April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC
pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99.5
At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses,
including Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the
physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged
urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to
have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to
trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to
strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily
explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by
trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that
had caused the injury.
In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended
that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995,
he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the
appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required
immediate surgical operation; that after performing the
appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents’
consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the
parents’ claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had
then cleared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had
subsided; that he had found no complications when Hanz
returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that
the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the penis
had been brought about by Hanz’s burst appendicitis.
Ruling of the RTC
In its decision rendered on August 6, 1999,6 the RTC acquitted
the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the
evidence. It held that the Prosecution’s evidence did not show the
required standard of care to be observed by other members of
the medical profession under similar circumstances. Nonetheless,
the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral damages
because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that
Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by
the petitioner. The decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, this court renders
judgment acquitting the accused, Dr. Encarnacion Lumantas, of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, but
ordering him to pay Hanz Calapiz ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC,7 sustaining the award of
moral damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been
acquitted of the crime charged, the acquittal did not necessarily
mean that he had not incurred civil liability considering that the
Prosecution had preponderantly established the sufferings of
Hanz as the result of the circumcision.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the
motion on April 28, 2004.8
Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s civil liability
despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.9 Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
Manantan v. Court of Appeals,10the Court elucidates on the two
kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the
different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused,
viz:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects
on the civil liability of the accused.1âwphi1 First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability
ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which
may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if
the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he
is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
46
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the
judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist."11
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an
accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered
against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case unless the
court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to
sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the
crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging
his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere
preponderance of evidence.12 In this connection, the Court
reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did
not require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability
should be through the institution of a separate civil action for
that purpose.13
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable
because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant
consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his
criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding
against him that there was preponderant evidence of his
negligence to hold him civilly liable.14With the RTC and the CA
both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from
the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the
circumcision, and that the trauma could have been avoided, the
Court must concur with their uniform findings. In that regard, the
Court need not analyze and weigh again the evidence considered
in the proceedings a quo. The Court, by virtue of its not being a
trier of facts, should now accord the highest respect to the factual
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a
clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were tainted
with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his
body.1âwphi1 Although we have long advocated the view that
any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any
part of one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not
susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should
be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The assessment
is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of one’s body. The
usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries
sustained.15 In Hanz’s case, the undesirable outcome of the
circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young child
to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to
repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his physical and moral
sufferings properly warranted the amount of ₱50,000.00
awarded as moral damages.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest
of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the award as a
sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is
not only reasonable but just and commensurate. Unless we make
the adjustment in the permissible manner by prescribing legal
interest on the award, his sufferings would be unduly
compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should
be from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997,
the making of the judicial demand for the liability of the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
February 20, 2003, with the modification that legal interest of 6%
per annum to start from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award
of:₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015
JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC., HELEN D.
DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH PACIS, AND SHIRLEY
DOMINGUEZ, Petitioners, v. CECILIA LICLICAN, NORMA D. ISIP,
AND PURITA DOMINGUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Petitioners, through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seek the reversal of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated August 30, 2012 and its
Resolution2dated July 15, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No.108617. Said
rulings nullified the Orders authorizing the issuance of the
assailed warrants of arrest against respondents for allegedly
having been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The Facts
During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM
Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. (JMD) held on December
29, 2007 at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new
set of directors was conducted. This event was presided by then
company president, and herein respondent, Cecilia Liclican
(Liclican), and attended by her co-respondents Norma Isip (Isip)
and Purita Rodriguez, and by petitioners Helen Dagdagan
(Dagdagan), Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley Dominguez
(Dominguez) as well. Conflict ensued when petitioners Patrick
and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the
ground that they are not registered stockholders of JMD. As
pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both
deceased, who are the stockholders in JMD, and that there is still
no settlement of their respective estates to effectively transfer
their shares in the company to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis.3
Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked out of the
meeting. But since the remaining stockholders with outstanding
shares constituted a quorum, the election of officers still
proceeded, which yielded the following result:
��� 1.����� Helen D. Dagdagan as President
��� 2.����� Patrick D. Pacis as Vice-President
��� 3.����� Kenneth D. Pacis as Secretary
��� 4.����� Shirley C. Dominguez as Treasurer
After staging the walk-out, respondents, on even date, executed a
Board Resolution certifying that in the stockholders meeting, the
following were elected directors and officers of JMD:
Board of Directors:
��� 1.����� Cecilia D. Liclican � Chairman and
Presiding Officer
��� 2.����� Norma D. Isip
��� 3.����� Purita C. Dominguez
��� 4.����� Tessie C. Dominguez, and
��� 5.����� Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
��� 1.����� Cecilia D. Liclican as President and Presiding
Officer
��� 2.����� Norma D. Isip as Vice-President
��� 3.����� Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate
Secretary/Treasurer and
��� 4.����� Oscar Aquino � Financial Consultant
Auditor
In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners Dagdagan,
Patrick and Kenneth Pacis, and Dominguez filed a Complaint
against respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City (RTC) for nullification of meetings, election and acts of
directors and officers, injunction and other reliefs, raffled to
Branch 59 of the court. Docketed as Civil Case No. 6623-R, the
47
case, after a failed mediation, was referred for appropriate
Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner stockholders immediately took hold of
corporate properties, represented themselves to JMD�s tenants
as the true and lawful directors of the company, and collected
and deposited rents due the company to its bank account.6
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and
Patrick Pacis, executed an Affidavit-Complaint7 dated December
15, 2008 charging respondents Liclican and Isip with qualified
theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint, docketed as I.S. No.
3011 with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City, that on
January 2, 2008, Liclican and Isip, without any authority
whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19
from the corporation�s savings account with the Equitable-PCI
Bank; and that the following day, they issued Check No.
C00024899018in the amount of P200,000, payable to cash, and to
be drawn against JMD�s account with Robinson�s Savings
Bank.9
In a separate complaint,10docketed as I.S. No. 3118, the
corporation claimed that respondents Liclican and Isip likewise
issued Equitable-PCI Bank Check No. 32095311payable to one
Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to be debited from the
corporation�s account.
After due proceedings, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City, by Joint Resolution of February 2, 2009, recommended the
filing of informations as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned
recommends for approval the attached Informations for Qualified
Theft against LICLICAN and ISIP in I.S. No. 3011 and another
against LICLICAN in I.S. No. 3118.
When filed, the informations were eventually raffled to Branch 7
of the RTC, the same court overseeing the JDR,13 presided over by
Judge Mona Lisa V. Tiongson-Tabora (JudgeTiongson-Tabora).
The criminal cases for qualified theft were then docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 29176-R (based on I.S. No. 3118) and 29175-R
(based on I.S. No. 3111).
On March 10, 2009, Judge Tiongson-Tabora issued an Order14 in
Criminal Case No. 29176-R, finding probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Liclican, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Information filed herein is hereby given due
course. Let the corresponding warrant of arrest be issued against
the accused. As recommended, the bail is hereby fixed as Php
80,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
A similar Order,15 also dated March 10, 2009,was issued in
Criminal Case No. 29175-R likewise finding probable cause
against respondents Liclican and Isip, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Information filed herein is hereby given due
course. Let the corresponding warrant of arrest be issued against
the accused. As recommended, the bail is hereby fixed at Php
80,000.00 each.
Considering that the address provided for accused Norma Isip is
Washington, U.S.A., the private complainants are hereby given
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to provide the Court with a
local address for the said accused if she may be found in the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, the corresponding warrants were issued for the
arrests of Isip and Liclican.

In due time, respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.108617, to annul and set aside the
two (2) March 10, 2009 Orders by the RTC Branch 7, anchored,
among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question.
According to respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing the
complaint-affidavit, are already assuming that they are the
legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-
corporate dispute pending in the RTC, Branch 59.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its assailed Decision, the CA granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders both dated March 10, 2009
are hereby ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court held that Judge Tiongson-Tabora should have
refrained from determining probable cause since she is well
aware of the pendency of the issue on the validity of JMD�s
elections in Civil Case No. 6623-R. As the judge overseeing the
JDR of the said intra-corporate dispute, she knew that there was
still doubt as to who the rightfully elected directors of JMD are
and, corollarily, who would have the authority to initiate the
criminal proceedings for qualified theft.
The CA further noted that even as corporate officers, as they
claim to be, petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis cannot file
the Complaint- Affidavit in the exercise of corporate powers
without authority from the board of directors under Sec. 23,18 in
relation to Sec. 2519of the Corporation Code.20 Any doubt cast on
the validity of the board elections would then necessarily extend
to the authority of the officers to act.
As further held by the CA:
x x x Since there is doubt in the instant case as to the sufficiency
of the authority of a corporate officer, Judge Tiongson-Tabora
should have exercised prudence by holding the criminal cases in
abeyance pending resolution of the intra-corporate dispute
which private respondents themselves instituted.21
Aggrieved, individual petitioners moved for reconsideration, on
the main contention that their election as officers and directors of
JMD has already been sustained by the trial court via its
Judgment in Civil Case No. 6623-R dated� May 6, 2011. They
likewise claimed that the issue on whether or not the RTC,
Branch 7 committed grave abuse of discretion is already
rendered moot and academic by the judge�s inhibition in
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R, and the termination of
the JDR proceedings in Civil Case No. 6623-R. Petitioners�
motion, however, proved futile as the appellate court denied the
same in its January 13, 2013 Resolution.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issues
Plainly, the resolution of the extant case depends on whether or
not there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the
criminal proceedings for qualified theft against respondents. In
the concrete, the issues are (i) whether or not Civil Case No.
6623-R constituted a prejudicial question warranting the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and
29176-R; and (ii) whether or not grave abuse of discretion
attended the issuance of the two assailed March 10, 2009 Orders
in Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R.
The Court�s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The challenged Orders of the trial court were issued in grave
48
abuse of discretion
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may
arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word
�capricious,� usually used in tandem with the term
�arbitrary,� conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning
action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion is imperative.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-
Tabora acted with grave abuse of discretion when she ordered
the arrests of respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence
of a prejudicial question.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally
exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be
pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.24The rationale behind the principle
is to avoid two conflicting decisions,25and its existence rests on
the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Here, the CA aptly observed that Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intra-
corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case
Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. To be sure, Civil Case No. 6623-R
involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of
JMD�s meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers,
among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who
between the two contesting group of officers should rightfully be
seated at the company�s helm. Without Civil Case No. 6623-R�s
resolution, petitioners� authority to commence and prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against respondents for
qualified theft in JMD�s behalf remained questionable,
warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Judge Tiongson-Taboracannot deny knowledge of the pendency
of Civil Case No. 6623-R as the judge presiding over its JDR. As
correctly held by the CA:
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is well-aware of the existence of said
prejudicial questionthat should have barred the filing of the
criminal complaint against petitioners Liclican and Isip, for the
simple reason that a juridical person can only act through its
officers, and the issue in the main case submitted for JDR before
Judge Tiongson-Tabora is one for nullification of meetings,
election and act of directors and officers, injunction and other
reliefs. Thus, she knows for a fact that there is a question as to
who are the legitimate directors of JMD such that there is
doubt as to whether private respondents are in a position to
act for JMD. (emphasis added)
Verily, the RTC ought to have suspended the proceedings, instead
of issuing the challenged Orders issued by the RTC.
The subsequent resolution of the prejudicial question did
not cure the defect
It may be, as the petitioners pointed out in their motion for
reconsideration filed before the CA, that Civil Case No. 6623-R
was eventually resolved in their favor through a
Judgment27 dated May 6, 2011 rendered by the RTC, Branch 59,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing disquisitions, the Court
hereby declares that the plaintiffs [petitioners herein] are the
duly elected board of directors and officers of the JM No. 108617 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. for the year 2008 and
hold-over capacity unless here had already been an election Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R are
of new officers. hereby REMANDED to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City to be re-raffled to one of its branches other
Consequently, all Corporate Acts which the than Branch 7.
defendants [herein respondents and one Gerald Cabrera and one
Oscar Aquino] have done and performed and SO ORDERED.
all documents they have executed and issued have no force
and effect.

Considering that the amount of Php850,000.00 which defendants

have withdrawn under the account of JM Dominguez Agronomic
Company, Inc. from the Equitable � PCI Bank (now Banco de
Oro) is the same subject in CC no. 29175-R entitled Pp. vs. Cecilia
Liclican and Norma D. Isip for Qualified Theft, the Court will no
longer dwell on the same.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. (emphasis and words in bracket added)

This Judgment has, on June 6, 2011,become final and executory,

as per the Notice of Entry of Judgment issued by the same trial
court.28 Evidently, whatever cloud of doubt loomed over
petitioners� actuations has already been dispelled. Petitioners
then postulate that the question on whether or not the challenged
Orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion has already been
rendered moot and academic by the June 6, 2011 ruling and by
Judge Tiongson-Tabora�s subsequent inhibition in the criminal
proceedings. Consequently, they argue that their motion for
reconsideration should have been granted by the appellate court.

We are not convinced.

The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure

the grave abuse of discretion already committed. The fact
remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged
Orders on March 10, 2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners
was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that time,
a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly,
Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not have issued the challenged
Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings
until Civil Case No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.

To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural

infirmity has subsequently been cured either by the Judgment or
by Judge Tiongson-Tabora�s inhibition would mean condoning
the continuation of the criminal proceedings despite, at that time,
the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation would
create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial
question, such that the court trying the criminal case will be
permitted to proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption
that the resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit
the private complainant in the criminal proceedings. To reiterate,
there was no certainty yet on how the RTC, Branch 59 would
rule; thus, no assumption on Civil Case No. 6623-R�s resolution
can be made when the challenged Orders were issued. Indeed,
had the RTC, Branch 59 not given credence to petitioners�
arguments,it would have led to an awkward situation wherein
much time and effort is wasted by the RTC, Branch 7 in trying
criminal cases it should not have entertained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it should be made clear that the

nullification of the March 10, 2009 Orders does not, under the
premises, entail the dismissal of the instituted criminal cases, but
would merely result in the suspension of the proceedings in view
of the prejudicial question. However, given the resolution of the
prejudicial question and Judge Tiongson-Tabora�s inhibition,
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R may already proceed,
and ought to be re-raffled to re-determine the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals� August
30, 2012 Decision and January 13, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP

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