LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICIALS

1. G.R. No. 202303 June 4, 2014 MENDOZA, J.:

GERARDO VILLASEÑOR AND RODEL MESA vs. OMBUDSMAN
Facts: Petitioners, both electrical inspectors of Quezon City, were administratively charged.
In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, petitioner Villaseñor was charged with grave misconduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and gross negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were charged with violation
of Section 4 of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
In its Joint Decision, the Investigating Panel of the Ombudsman ruled as follows:
1. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, Villaseñor was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and gross neglect of duty for which he was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties.
2. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, Mesa was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
which he was meted the penalty of one year suspension without pay.
Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint Decision as regards the petitioners
Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate MR of the Joint Decision.
Ombudsman denied the MR filed by Mesa and those of the other accused, and affirmed in toto the Joint
Decision. Villaseñor’s MR, however, was not enumerated as one of the pleadings resolved.
Mesa appealed to the CA, which. Villaseñor made no appeal, his MR before the Ombudsman being yet
unresolved.
Pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villaseñor’s MR, the Ombudsman directed the Mayor of Quezon City
and the Secretary of the DILG to enforce the Joint Decision immediately upon receipt of the order.
Villaseñor and Mesa filed a certiorari before the CA assailing the Order of the Ombudsman ordering the
immediate implementation of the Joint Decision despite the pendency of Villaseñor’s MR and Mesa’s appeal.
They prayed that the said order be annulled and an injunction be issued to restrain its implementation.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the Ombudsman decision was immediately executory
pending appeal and would not be stayed by the filing of the appeal or issuance of an injunctive relief. CA denied
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year can be
implemented pending resolution of Villaseñor’s MR before the Ombudsman, and Mesa’s appeal before the CA?
Ruling: The petition must fail.
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, provides that the
Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases may either be unappealable or appealable.
Unappealable decisions are final and executory, and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of the
charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month;
and (4) a fine equivalent to one month’s salary.
Appealable decisions are those which fall outside said enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule
43 of the ROC, within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for
reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of course.
Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while Villaseñor was ordered dismissed from the
service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are immediately executory pending appeal.
The petitioners cannot argue that A.O. No. 17, which makes appealable decisions of the Ombudsman
immediately executory, cannot be applied to them. It is of no moment that A.O. No. 17 took effect on
September 7, 2003, after the Joint Decision was issued against Mesa and Villaseñor on June 17, 2003. Of note
are the facts that the Joint Decision was approved by the Ombudsman on November 26, 2004; the motions for
reconsideration thereto were denied on March 2, 2006; and the Joint Decision was ordered implemented on
August 23, 2006, all after A.O. No. 17 had already become effective.
Article 4 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall have no retroactive effect. Rules regulating the
procedure of courts, however, are retroactive in nature, and are, thus, applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from
procedural laws and rules, hence, retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely
affected.
The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied
retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17.

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No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the respondent in the administrative case is
considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is
important to note that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Mesa’s appeal cannot stay the implementation of the order of suspension
against him.
Villaseñor argues that the Ombudsman erred in implementing the order of dismissal against him despite his
pending MR with the same office.
Villaseñor’s filing of a MR does not stay the immediate implementation of the Ombudsman’s order of
dismissal, considering that "a decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course" under Section 7. No vested right of Villaseñor would be violated as he would be considered under
preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in the event that he wins
his eventual appeal.
The Ombudsman did not, therefore, err in implementing the orders of suspension of one year and dismissal
from the service against the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

2. G.R. No. 204964 October 15, 2014 LEONEN, J.:

REMIGIO ESPIRITU & NOEL AGUSTIN vs. LUTGARDA DEL ROSARIO
“De facto officer”
Facts: The City Council of Angeles City, Pampanga, enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1978,
classifying areas in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles City, as agricultural land.
Pursuant to this ordinance, Lutgarda del Rosario requested the City Zoning Administrator to exempt from the
zoning classification Lot Nos. 854 and 855 located in Barangay Margot and Barangay Sapang Bato, Angeles
City. The land is covered by TCT No. T-11809 with an area of 164.7605 hectares. The request was approved by
the Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator, and the lots were allegedly reclassified as non-
agricultural or industrial lots.
On June 10, 1988, the CARL (RA 6657) was enacted.
Del Rosario, through her representative Sylvia Asperilla, filed an application for exemption with the DAR,
seeking to exempt Lot Nos. 854 and 855 from the CARP coverage.
Secretary Pagdanganan issued an order granting the application for exemption, stating that lands
classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARP are beyond its coverage.
Farmers in del Rosario’s landholdings, led by Remigio Espiritu filed a MR of the order. They argued that the
land holdings were classified as agricultural, not industrial. They argued that as per certifications by the
HLURB, the landholdings were within the agricultural zone, and there was no zoning ordinance passed that
reclassified the area into other land uses.
The motion was given due course by the DAR, this time headed by Secretary Pangandaman. Hence, Secretary
Pangandaman issued an order granting the MR and revoking the earlier order of Secretary Pagdanganan.
This order was sent through Clarita Montgomery and not at Asperilla’s address in Cubao, Quezon City, which
was her address on record. Del Rosario alleged that she only came to know of the order on January 26, 2007,
when the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga handed her a copy of the order. She then filed her
MR of the order dated June 15, 2006. The motion was dated February 9, 2007.
Secretary Pangandaman found that the certifications issued by the HLURB classified the landholdings as
agricultural before June 15, 1988, thereby denying del Rosario’s motion. Del Rosario filed a notice of appeal
before the Office of the President.
The Office of the President, Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite, rendered the decision dismissing the appeal for
lack of merit.
Del Rosario filed a motion for extension of 10 days to file her MR, however it was denied.
Aggrieved, del Rosario filed a petition for review before the CA which was granted. CA stated that del Rosario
was indeed prevented from participating in the proceedings that led to the issuance of Secretary
Pangandaman’s order when the notices were sent to her other address on record. It also found that the
decision issued by then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void since it violated Article VII, Section 13 of the
Constitution.

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Their MR having been denied, petitioners, Remigio Espiritu and Noel Agustin, filed a petition for review on
certiorari, seeking to set aside the ruling of the CA.
Issue: Whether the CA correctly set aside the order of Secretary Pangandaman and the decision of Deputy
Secretary Gaite and reinstated the order of Secretary Pagdanganan.
Held: This petition should be granted. Respondent was not deprived of due process.
While it may be true that respondent was prevented from filing a timely MR of Secretary Pangandaman’s
order, it would be erroneous to conclude that she had been completely denied her opportunity to be heard.
In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means
the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
When respondent filed her MR assailing Secretary Pangandaman’s order, she was able to completely and
exhaustively present her arguments. The denial of her motion was on the basis of the merits of her arguments
and any other evidence she was able to present. She was given a fair and reasonable opportunity to present her
side; hence, there was no deprivation of due process.
It was also erroneous to conclude that respondent was "denied her day in the administrative proceedings
below." Respondent was able to actively participate not only in the proceedings before the DAR, but also on
appeal to the Office of the President and the CA.
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite’s decision is presumed valid, effective, and binding.
It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the SEC on March 16, 2009. It is also alleged that he
has already lost his authority as Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when he rendered the decision
dated May 7, 2009 since he is constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his tenure. This,
however, is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to when he accepted the appointment, took his
oath of office, or assumed the position.
Assuming that Gaite’s appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered a de facto
officer at the time he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009.
In Funa v. Agra, a petition was filed against Alberto Agra for holding concurrent positions as the acting
Secretary of Justice and as Solicitor General. While the appointment of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of
Justice violated Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution, held that he was a de facto officer during his tenure
in the Department of Justice:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the
office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in
possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority
derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so
far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.
All official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation,
were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office.
This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose
ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agra’s official actions covered by this clarification extend to but
are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice,
and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases.
Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the SEC, any
decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective.
With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity which may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. Thus, unless the presumption in rebutted, it
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires, other than her
allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office. Unless there is clear and convincing

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evidence to the contrary, the decision dated May 7, 2009 is conclusively presumed to have been rendered in
the regular course of business.
Respondent’s landholdings were agricultural, not industrial
Prior to the enactment of RA 6657, lands were classified into agricultural, residential, or industrial by law or by
zoning ordinances enacted by local government units.
The factual findings of administrative agencies are generally given great respect and finality by the courts as it
is presumed that these agencies have the knowledge and expertise over matters under their jurisdiction. Both
the DAR and the Office of the President found respondent's lands to be agricultural. We see no reason to
disturb these findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE. The order of
the DAR and the decision of the Office of the President are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 199027 June 9, 2014 REYES, J.:

OSG vs. CA & MUN. GOV. OF SAGUIRAN, LANAO DEL SUR
Facts: The members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran sought to compel the Mun. of Saguiran to pay
them their unpaid terminal leave benefits. The Mun. of Saguiran sought the dismissal of the petition.
The RTC issued an Order dismissing the petition on the ground that the act being sought by therein petitioners
was not a ministerial duty. The RTC explained that the payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the
ordinary process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. However, it directed the Mun.
of Saguiran to include in its general or special budget for the year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave
benefits.
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s directive for the inclusion of the subject claims in the municipality’s budget, the
Mun. of Saguiran partially appealed the order of the RTC to the CA.
CA issued a notice requiring the OSG to file a memorandum for the Mun. of Saguiran.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum on the ground
of lack of legal authority to represent the Mun. of Saguiran. It reasoned that the Mun. of Saguiran had to be
represented by its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI (3)(i) of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
CA issued the assailed Resolution denying the OSG’s motion.
The OSG moved to reconsider, but this was denied by the CA.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari.
Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the Mun. of Saguiran.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran.
Such ruling disregarded the provisions of the LGC that vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be
counsels of local government units. Even the employment of a special legal officer is expressly allowed by the
law only upon a strict condition that the action or proceeding which involves the component city or
municipality is adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality.
The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file the required
memorandum could not have estopped it from later raising the issue of its lack of authority to represent the
Mun. of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing laws. No action of the OSG could have validated
an act that was beyond the scope of its authority.
It bears mentioning that the broad language of the Administrative Code on the OSG's functions, the LGC is not
the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also provides limits to its authority. For example, the Court
ruled that the OSG could not represent at any stage a public official who was accused in a criminal case. This
was necessary to prevent a clear conflict of interest in the event that the OSG would become the appellate
counsel of the People of the Philippines once a judgment of the public official's conviction was brought on
appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the CA are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Legal Officer of the Mun. Gov. of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur, or if there is none, the Prov. Attorney of the Province
of Lanao del Sur, and not the Office of the Solicitor General, has the duty to represent the local government
unit as counsel.

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4. G.R. No. 190147 March 5, 2013 VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
CSC vs. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT
Facts: Paulino Rafanan was a Gen. Manager in Pililla Water District (PWD). The BOD issued a resolution
requesting the petitioner to extend the service Paulino Rafanan, which reads:
EXTENSION OF SERVICES OF MR. PAULINO RAFANAN AS GENERAL MANAGER OF PILILLA WATER
DISTRICT
WHEREAS, the General Manager, Mr. Paulino Rafanan, is reaching his age 65 this month of this year the
Board, because of his good and honest performance in faithfully carrying out the policies of the Board resulting
in the success of the District’s expansion program, unanimously agreed to retain his services as General
Manager at least up to December 31, 2008 co-terminus with the term of the Director last appointed after which
period he may stay at the pleasure of the other Board.
THEREFORE, THE BOARD RESOLVED, AS IT HEREBY RESOLVED that the services of Mr. Paulino Rafanan
as General Manager of Pililla Water District is extended up to December 31, 2008 as a reward for his honest
and efficient services to the District.
Petitioner denied the request of BOD Chairman Valentin Paz for the extension of service of Rafanan and
considered the latter "separated from the service at the close of office hours on June 25, 2004, his 65th
birthday." Petitioner also denied the MR filed by Chairman Paz.
The BOD issued Resolution reappointing Rafanan as General Manager on coterminous status. Said
reappointment was signed by Chairman Paz and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal. A year later, the BOD
approved Resolution No. 20 declaring the appointment of General Manager Rafanan as permanent but this
resolution was not implemented.
Pililla Mayor, Leandro Masikip, Sr. questioned Rafanan’s coterminous appointment as defective and void ab
initio considering that he was appointed to a career position despite having reached the compulsory retirement
age. Said letter-complaint was treated as an appeal from the appointment made by the BOD Chairman of
respondent.
Petitioner issued Resolution invalidating the coterminous appointment issued to Rafanan as General Manager
on April 8, 2005 on the ground that it was made in violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9286. Petitioner further
observed that the appointment was issued to circumvent the denial of the several requests for extension of
service of Rafanan. Rafanan filed MR which was denied.
Respondent filed in the CA a petition for review with application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Respondent contended that petitioner cannot usurp the power of appointment and removal of the
appointing authority, and that petitioner failed to observe due process.
The CA reversed the CSC and ruled that the position of General Manager in water districts remains primarily
confidential in nature and hence respondent’s BOD may validly appoint Rafanan to the said position even
beyond the compulsory retirement age. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that the position of General Manager in water districts primarily
confidential in nature.
Held: We sustain the ruling of the CA.
A primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer and
appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship. The tenure of a
confidential employee is coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure.
However, the confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years.
Appointments in the civil service may either be of permanent or temporary status.
A permanent appointment is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed/promoted, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions
of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof, while a temporary appointment may be
extended to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position except the appropriate civil service
eligibility and for a limited period not exceeding twelve months or until a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available.
Co-terminous appointment shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on
the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with
his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability of funds.
The co-terminous status may be further classified into the following:
(1) co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

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(2) co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the
appointing authority or at his pleasure;
(3) co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the
resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed
automatically abolished; and
(4) co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the
position is deemed abolished.
For the purpose of coverage or membership with the GSIS, or their right to security of tenure, co-terminous
appointees, except those who are co-terminous with the appointing authority, shall be considered permanent.
The nature of appointment of General Managers of Water Districts falls under Sec. 14 of the "Administrative
Code of 1987", that is, the General Manager serves at the pleasure of the BOD.
Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 198 amended by R.A. No. 9286 provides that the General Manager of a water district shall
not be removed from office except for cause and after due process. Said law, however, cannot be retroactively
applied as to preclude the BOD from terminating its General Manager at the time the governing law was still
P.D. No. 198.
In this case, respondent’s BOD reappointed Rafanan as General Manager on April 8, 2005 when R.A. No.
9286 was already in force and the BOD no longer had the authority to terminate the General Manager at its
pleasure or discretion.
Policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions, involve the highest degree of
confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or
are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments
coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer that makes them.
Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of
a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of discussion,
delegation and reporting without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust
or confidential matters of state.
From the above case the "proximity rule" was derived. A position is considered to be primarily confidential
when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures
the highest degree of trust and unfettered communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters.
Moreover, in classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and
day to day in character. A position is not necessarily confidential though the one in office may sometimes hold
confidential matters or documents.
Piñero v. Hechanova laid down the doctrine that it is the nature of the position that finally determines whether
a position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical and that executive pronouncements
can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. As reiterated in
subsequent cases, such initial determination through executive declaration or legislative fiat does not foreclose
judicial review.
CSC v. Javier, declared that even petitioner’s classification of confidential positions in the government is not
binding on this Court:
At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for determining
primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that gives an enumeration of
positions classified as primarily confidential.
What is available is only petitioner's own classification of civil service positions, as well as jurisprudence which
describe or give examples of confidential positions in government.
Should the Court be bound by a classification of a position as confidential already made by an agency or
branch of government?
Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil service
made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the petitioner. The Court
is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a
primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies. The
findings of the other branches of government are merely considered initial and not conclusive to the Court.
Moreover, it is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of government, such as the
petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional role as final
arbiter of all justiciable controversies and disputes.
Applying the proximity rule and considering the nature of the duties of the office of the Corporate Secretary of
the GSIS, we held in the above-cited case that said position in the GSIS or any GOCC for that matter, is a
primarily confidential position.

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In holding that the position of General Manager of a water district is primarily confidential in nature, the CA
said:
We rule that the position of general manager remains primarily confidential in nature despite the amendment
of Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 198 by R.A. No. 9286, which gave the occupant of said position security of tenure, in that
said officer could only be removed from office for cause and after due process. The nature of the duties and
functions attached to the position points to its confidential character. First, the general manager is directly
appointed by the board of directors. Second, the general manager directly reports to the board of directors.
Third, the duties and responsibilities of a general manager are determined by the board of directors, which is a
clear indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between him and the board. Fourth, the duties and
responsibilities of a general manager are not merely clerical and routinary in nature. His work involves policy
and decision making. Fifth, the compensation of the general manager is fixed by the board of directors. And
last, the general manager is directly accountable for his actions and omissions to the board of directors. Under
this situation, the general manager is expected to possess the highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty,
which is crucial to maintaining trust and confidence between him and the board of directors. The loss of such
trust or confidence could easily result in the termination of the general manager’s services by the board of
directors. To be sure, regardless of the security of tenure a general manager may now enjoy, his term may still
be ended by the board of directors based on the ground of "loss of confidence."
Among those positions judicially determined as primarily confidential positions are the following: Chief Legal
Counsel of the PNB; Confidential Agent of the Office of the Auditor, GSIS; Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan;
Secretary to the City Mayor; Senior Security and Security Guard in the Office of the Vice Mayor; Secretary to
the Board of a government corporation; City Legal Counsel, City Legal Officer or City Attorney; Provincial
Attorney; Private Secretary; and Board Secretary II of the Philippine State College of Aeronautics. The Court in
these instances focused on the nature of the functions of the office characterized by such "close intimacy"
between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
In the case of the General Manager of a water district, Sec. 24 in relation to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as
amended, reveals the close proximity of the positions of the General Manager and BOD.
While the BOD appoints by a majority vote the General Manager and specifies from time to time the duties he
shall perform, it is the General Manager who exercises full supervision and control of the maintenance and
operation of water district facilities. The BOD is confined to policy-making and prescribing a system of
business administration and accounting for the water district patterned upon and in conformity to the
standards established by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and it is the General Manager who
implements the plans and policies approved by the BOD. And while the BOD may not engage in the detailed
management of the water district, it is empowered to delegate to such officers or agents designated by it any
executive, administrative or ministerial power,31 including entering into contracts under conditions and
restrictions it may impose. Moreover, though the General Manager is vested with the power to appoint all
personnel of the water district, the appointment of personnel in the supervisory level shall be subject to the
approval of the BOD. It is likewise evident that the General Manager is directly accountable to the BOD which
has disciplinary jurisdiction over him. The foregoing working relationship of the General Manager and BOD
under the governing law of water districts clearly demands a high degree of trust and confidence between them.
The CA therefore correctly concluded that the position of General Manager is primarily confidential in
nature.
The Civil Service Law classifies the positions in the civil service into career and non-career service positions.
Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and
other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President;
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such
as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations whether performing governmental or
proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

7
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, non-career positions shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the
usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing
agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.
A coterminous employment falls under the non-career service classification of positions in the Civil Service,
its tenure being limited or specified by law, or coterminous with that of the appointing authority, or at the
latter’s pleasure. Under R.A. No. 9286 in relation to Sec. 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the coterminous appointment of the General Manager of a water district is
based on the majority vote of the BOD and whose continuity in the service is based on the latter’s trust and
confidence or co-existent with its tenure.
The logical conclusion is that the General Manager of a water district who is appointed on coterminous status
may serve or hold office for a maximum of six years, which is the tenure of the appointing authority, subject to
reappointment for another six years unless sooner removed by the BOD for loss of trust and confidence, or for
any cause provided by law and with due process.
Since the position of General Manager of a water district remains a primarily confidential position, Rafanan
was validly reappointed to said position by respondent's BOD on April 8, 2005 under coterminous status
despite having reached the compulsory retirement age, which is allowed under Section 12 (b), Rule XIII of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as amended by Resolution No. 011624 dated October 4, 2001.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA are AFFIRMED and UPHELD. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000 November 27, 2013 ABAD, J.:
DR. ROGER POSADAS & DR. ROLANDO DAYCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the UP Diliman when he formed a Task Force on Science and
Technology Assessment Management and Policy. The Task Force was to prepare the needed curricula for
masteral and doctoral programs in "technology management, innovation studies, science and technology and
related areas." Acting on the Task Force's proposal, UP established the U Technology Management Center (UP
TMC) the members of which nominated Dr. Posadas for the post of Center Director. He declined the
nomination, however, resulting in the designation of Professor Jose Tabbada as acting UP TMC Director.
Dr. Posadas worked for the funding of the ten new graduate courses of UP TMC. With the help of the Philippine
Institute of Development Studies/Policy, Training and Technical Assistance Facility and the National
Economic Development Authority, there came into being the Institutionalization of Management and
Technology in the UP Diliman (the TMC Project), funded at Dr. Posadas’ initiative by the Canadian
International Development Agency.
Malacanang granted Dr. Posadas and fifteen other UP Diliman officials authority to attend the foundation day
of the state university in Fujian, China. Before he left, Dr. Posadas formally designated Dr. Dayco, as OIC in
his absence. On his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as "Project Director and
Consultant of the TMC Project.
COA Resident Auditor issued a Notice of Suspension of payments of Dr. Posadas for his services as TMC
Project’s Local Consultant and honorarium as Project Director.
However, the UP Diliman Legal Office issued a Memorandum to the COA Resident Auditor, pointing out that
the amounts paid the TMC Project personnel "were legal, being in the nature of consultancy fees." The legal
office also "confirmed the authority of Dr. Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as

8
project director and consultant of the TMC Project." Finding this explanation "acceptable," the COA Resident
Auditor lifted his previous notices of suspension.
Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP President Javier constituted an Administrative Disciplinary
Tribunal to hear and decide the administrative complaint that he himself filed against Dr. Posadas and Dr.
Dayco for grave misconduct and abuse of authority. The Tribunal recommended the dismissal of the two from
the service. The UP Board of Regents modified the penalty, however, to "forced resignation" with right to
reapply after one year provided they publicly apologize. Still, the UP General-Counsel filed with the
Sandiganbayan the present criminal cases.
The Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and
imposed on them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and one day as minimum and 12 years
as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office. The court also found
them guilty of violation of Sec. 7(b) of RA 6713 and imposed on them the penalty of imprisonment for 5 years
with the same disqualification. They were further ordered to indemnify the government in the sum of
₱336,000.00.
The Court affirmed the decisions of the Sandiganbayan in the two cases.
Discussion:
1. The appointments were in good faith.
Admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint
the absent Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC Project. But it cannot be said that
Dr. Dayco made those appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them, fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr.
Dayco did not have that authority as OIC Chancellor.
All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were scientists, not lawyers, hence unfamiliar with Civil
Service rules and regulations.
2. Dr. Dayco chose the most qualified for the project.
The next question is whether Dr. Dayco, believing in good faith that he had the authority to make the
questioned designations, acted with "manifest partiality" in choosing Dr. Posadas among all possible
candidates as TMC Director and Consultant. The answer is no.
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side or person rather than another. Here, the prosecution presented no evidence whatsoever that others, more
qualified than Dr. Posadas, deserve the two related appointments. The fact is that he was the best qualified for
the work:
First, Dr. Posadas originated the idea for the project and so he had every reason to want it to succeed.
Second, he worked hard to convince the relevant government offices to arrange funding for the project, proof
that he was familiar with the financial side of it as well.
Third, the members of the Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Policy—his
own peers—nominated Dr. Posadas as Director of the UP Technology Management Center.
Fourth. The work fell within his area of expertise—technical management—ensuring professionalism in the
execution of the project.
In the world of the academe, that project was the equivalent of Dr. Posadas’ thesis. Thus, since he was a natural
choice to head the same, it beats the mind that such choice could be regarded as one prompted by "manifest
partiality."
3. The misstep was essentially of the administrative kind.
The worst that could be said of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas is they showed no sensitivity to the fact that,
although Dr. Dayco may have honestly believed that he had the authority to make those appointments, he
was actually appointing his own superior, the person who made him OIC Chancellor, however qualified he
might be, to those enviable positions. But this should have been treated as a mere administrative offense for:
First. No evidence was adduced to show that UP academic officials were prohibited from receiving
compensation for work they render outside the scope of their normal duties as administrators or faculty
professors.
Second. COA disallowances of benefits given to government personnel for extra services rendered are normal
occurrences in government offices. They can hardly be regarded as cause for the filing of criminal charges of
corruption against the authorities that granted them and those who got paid.
Sec.4 of the COA Revised Rules of Procedure merely provides for an order to return what was improperly paid.
And, only if the responsible parties refuse to do so, may the auditor then (a) recommend to COA that they be
cited for contempt; (b) refer the matter to the Solicitor General for the filing of the appropriate civil action; and
(c) refer it to the Ombudsman for the appropriate administrative or criminal action.4 Here, Dr. Dayco and Dr.
Posadas were not given the chance, before they were administratively charged, to restore what amounts were

9
paid since the Resident Director withdrew his notice of disallowance after considering the view of the UP
Diliman Legal Office.
If the Court does not grant petitioners’ MR, the common disallowances of benefits paid to government
personnel will be considered equivalent to criminal giving of "unwarranted advantage to a private party," an
element of graft and corruption. This is too sweeping, unfair, and unwise, making the denial of most benefits
that government employees deserve the safer and better option.
Third. In other government offices, the case against Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas would have been treated as
purely of an administrative character. The problem in their case, however, is that other factors have muddled it.
The evidence shows that prior to the incident Dr. Posadas caused the administrative investigation of UP
Library Administrative Officer Ofelia del Mundo for grave abuse of authority, neglect of duty, and other wrong-
doings. This prompted Professor Tabbada, the Acting UP TMC Director, to resign his post in protest. In turn,
Ms. Del Mundo instigated the UP President to go after Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco. Apparently, the Office of the
Ombudsman played into the intense mutual hatred and rivalry that enlarged what was a simple administrative
misstep.
Fourth. The fault of Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas, who spent the best parts of their lives serving UP, does not
warrant their going to jail for nine to twelve years for what they did. They did not act with manifest partiality or
evident bad faith. Indeed, the UP Board of Regents, the highest governing body of that institution and the most
sensitive to any attack upon its revered portals, did not believe that Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas committed
outright corruption. Indeed, it did not dismiss them from the service; it merely ordered their forced resignation
and the accessory penalties that went with it.
The Board did not also believe that the two deserved to be permanently expelled from UP. It meted out to them
what in effect amounts to mere suspension for one year since the Board practically invited them to come back
and teach again after one year provided they render a public apology for their actions. The Board of Regents
did not regard their offense so morally detestable as to totally take away from them the privilege of teaching the
young.
4. The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue injury
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 requires the prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused "undue
injury" to the government or gave him "unwarranted benefits."
This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual damage." What is more, such "actual damage"
must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A finding of
"undue injury" cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture, or
guesswork.5 The element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed wrong has been
established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime.
The majority assumed that the payment to Dr. Posadas of ₱30 000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director caused
actual injury to the Government. The record shows, however, that the ₱247 500.00 payment to him that the
COA Resident Auditor disallowed was deducted from his terminal leave benefits.
The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas "unwarranted advantage" as a result of
the appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot be considered "unwarranted" since there is no
evidence that he did not discharge the additional responsibilities that such appointments entailed.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the MR of the petitioners and to vacate their conviction on the
ground of failure of the State to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED.

6. A.M. No. P-12-3089 Nov. 13, 2013 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES vs. AUGUSTO FELICIDARIO
Facts: Heirs of Celestino Teves accused respondent Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff IV of RTC, Manila, of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer of the Court.
Complainants alleged that they are the successors-in-interest of the late Celestino Teves to two parcels of land,
initially identified as Lots 263 and 264 of the Sampaloc Townsite in Tanay, Rizal, distributed under the DAR
Resettlement Project. These lots are adjacent and contiguous to Lot 268, which has been occupied by
respondent .
Upon the approval of a new subdivision plan, Lots 263 and 264 were clustered into one lot, designated as Lot
190; while Lot 268 was designated as Lot 189. Under the same plan, the area of Lot 189 was erroneously
increased from 838 square meters to 941 square meters. Respondent knew of this error but being dishonest,
he concealed it from the DAR.
Respondent was issued OCT pursuant to CLOA, for Lot 189, with a total area of 941 square meters. On the
basis of OCT, respondent started to unlawfully and forcibly acquire 117 square meters of complainants’ Lot
190 (disputed area).

10
Complainants filed with the DAR Region IV-A a letter-complaint against respondent. Complainants pointed
out that Regional Director Antonio Evangelista of DAR Region IV-A issued an Order ruling in their favor,
ruling that Augusto Felicidario tainted with bad faith instead proceeded to get the excess area of 117 square
meters and placed another mujon, other than the old mujon previously placed during the 1965 survey of 838
square meters;
PARO concurred with the recommendation of DARPO-Legal Division that the CLOA issued to Augusto
Felicidario be cancelled/corrected to only 838 square meters as his actual area of possession and further
recommended that individual CLOAs be generated/issued in favor of Heirs of Celestino Teves in accordance
with their actual area of possession.
The DAR Region IV-A Order became final and executory as no MR and/or appeal was filed.
Respondent, in his Comment, denied complainants’ allegations. Respondent argued that the acts imputed by
complainants against him were not related to the performance of his official duties and were not in any manner
related to a case in which complainants are parties or have legal interests.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent GUILTY and be SUSPENDED for three (3)
months without pay.
The Court re-docketed the administrative complaint against respondent as a regular administrative matter.
The Court found respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, but not of grave misconduct.
Dishonesty is an intentionally making a false statement on any material fact; and a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
It is true that respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in
the increased land area of his Lot 189. Nonetheless, respondent’s actuations displayed his lack of honesty,
fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned government
agencies/officials.
Complainants and respondent had been awarded and occupying their respective properties under the DAR
Resettlement Program since 1966, yet, respondent did not express surprise and/or bafflement that the land
area of his Lot 189 was significantly increased from 838 square meters to 941 square meters after the 2003 re-
survey.
Honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, as well as good faith and prudence, would have impelled
respondent to bring the matter to the attention of complainants and the DAR, and inquire and verify with the
DAR his entitlement to the increased land area, especially when he was well-aware that complainants had been
in possession of the disputed area, and had, in fact, introduced substantial improvements thereon, for almost
four decades. Instead, respondent, undeniably benefitting from the increased land area of Lot 189, held his
peace and already proceeded to secure a certificate of title in his name for Lot 189, with a land area of 941
square meters.
When respondent was finally issued OCT he invoked the same as justification for occupying the 117-square
meter disputed area, destroying complainants’ improvements thereon, and enclosing Lot 189 (inclusive of the
disputed area) within a concrete fence and steel gate. Whether or not an error was indeed committed by the
DAR officials during the 2003 re-survey, resulting in the increased land area of Lot 189, respondent evidently
took advantage of complainants’ ignorance of the situation in order to acquire OCT (CLOA No. 00222161) with
nary an opposition.
It bears to stress that the final and executory Order of the DAR Region IV-A declared erroneous the increase in
land area of respondent’s Lot 189 after the 2003 re-survey and the PARO had already instituted proceedings
before the DARAB for the correction of respondent’s OCT (CLOA No. 00222161).
While respondent is seeking to have the final and executory DAR Region IV-A Order set aside by the Office of
the President, as things stand at present, the basis for respondent’s legal title to the disputed area is doubtful,
at best. Considering that the increase in land area of Lot 189 was due to the (erroneous) result of the 2003 re-
survey of the Sampaloc Townsite by the DAR; that respondent’s dishonesty was committed through his silence
and/or inaction, when the circumstances demanded otherwise, rather than his active and/or express
misrepresentation to the complainants and concerned public officials; and that respondent committed the
dishonesty in his private life and not in the course of performance of his official functions, the Court holds him
guilty of only simple dishonesty.
Respondent’s deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. In addition to being dishonest, respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into the
disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes, especially those
concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the courts. It is difficult for the Court to believe that
respondent is completely unaware that even as the registered owner of the real property and with the
barangay officials’ assistance, he cannot simply enter and take possession of the disputed area and destroy
complainants’ improvements thereon. He must first initiate an ejectment case against complainants before
the appropriate court and secure a court order and writ of possession.

11
Conducts prejudicial to the best interest of the service are acts or omissions that violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the
best interest of the administration of justice. The administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official functions. As long as
the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may
be meted on the erring public officer or employee.
Respondent’s transgressions may not be related to his official duties and functions, but certainly reflect badly
upon the entire Judiciary. Respondent failed to live up to the high ethical standards demanded by the office he
occupies.
Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public
servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official
duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the Court’s good name and
standing. This is because the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel.
Thus, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and every one in the court to maintain its good name and
standing as a true temple of justice.
However, precisely because respondent was not acting in the performance of his official duties, he cannot be
administratively liable for misconduct, whether grave or simple.
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance
of his official duties.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Augusto Felicidario, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Manila, GUILTY of simple dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and is suspended for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day without pay, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. 157383 August 10, 2010 NACHURA, J.:

WINSTON GARCIA, Gen. Mgr of GSIS vs. MARIO MOLINA & ALBERT VELASCOd
Facts: Respondents Molina and Velasco, Attorneys of the GSIS, charged by the petitioner with grave
misconduct.
Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of
respondents for 90 days without pay, effective immediately. The following day, a committee was constituted to
investigate the charges against respondents.
Respondents denied the charges against them. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of
factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor
and judge.
Respondents filed with the CSC an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension Order. They contended that
petitioner could not act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed with the
CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This Commission.
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating
committee and required them to appear at the scheduled hearing.
CSC failed to resolve respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the case from the
GSIS to the CSC.
Respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for TRO.
Respondents sought the annulment and setting aside of petitioner’s order directing the former to submit to the
jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and investigate the administrative case filed against them. They
likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and
from taking any action on the aforesaid administrative case against respondents.
CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents and agreed that the investigation be made not by the GSIS but
by the CSC to ensure that the hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
*****
In the meantime, the CSC denied respondents’ Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension for being moot
and academic and denied the Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission for lack of merit.
Accordingly, GSIS President and GenMgr. Winston Garcia is directed to continue the conduct of the formal
investigation of the charges against respondents-petitioners Albert Velasco and Mario Molina.

12
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
CA granted the petition.
CA declared null and void respondents’ formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary investigation. CA
disagreed with the CSC that the question on the propriety of the preventive suspension order had become moot
and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise void having emanated from the void formal
charges. CA found that respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive
suspension. Hence, the present petition.
Ruling: The petitions are without merit.
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including GOCCs with original
charters, like the GSIS, or those created by special law. The employees are part of the civil service system and
are subject to the law and to the circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on discipline, attendance
and general terms and conditions of employment.
Petitioner, as President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority and responsibility to remove,
suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such power is not without limitations for it must be
exercised in accordance with Civil Service rules. The procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge
against an erring employee, to wit:
First, a complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, the complaint need not be under oath. Except
when otherwise provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be filed at any time with the
Commission, proper heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities.
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit Counter-
Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt.
Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation involves the ex parte examination of records and
documents submitted by the complainant and the person complained of, as well as documents readily available
from other government offices. During said investigation, the parties are given the opportunity to submit
affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure of the person complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall be
considered as a waiver thereof.
Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation, the
investigating officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete records of the case to the
disciplining authority.
Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, a formal charge shall be
issued by the disciplining authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In the absence of a prima facie case, the
complaint shall be dismissed.
It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to respondents were the formal charges against them.
These formal charges contained brief statements of material or relevant facts, a directive to answer the charges
within 72 hours from receipt thereof, an advice that they had the right to a formal investigation and a notice
that they are entitled to be assisted by a counsel of their choice.
The formal charges were issued without preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Petitioner explained that no
investigation was conducted because the CSC rules did not specifically provide that it is a pre-requisite to the
issuance of a formal charge. He likewise claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in
indictments in flagranti as in this case.
We disagree.
CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is
null and void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and
substance, the disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to submit a Counter-
Affidavit/Comment under oath within three days from receipt. The use of the word "shall" quite obviously
indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least
respondent should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his side. As can be gleaned from the
procedure set forth above, this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required
therein is different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, no
exception is provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself. To comply with such requirement, he
could have issued a memorandum requiring respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents’ comments, petitioner would
have properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie
case against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges. It is noteworthy that the
very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place the day before the formal

13
charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole determination by
the petitioner as the disciplining authority that there was a prima facie case against respondents.
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of
the act complained of as well as the gravity of the charges.
We, therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges
against them are serious and evidence of their guilt is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can
compensate for the procedural shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case.
The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without complying with the mandated
preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's
right to due process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at
any time.
Where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation
of a party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to
lose the same.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process
in investigations and hearings.
Due process in administrative proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual
or constructive notice to the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to
afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to preliminary investigation as they failed to raise it
before the GSIS.
Again, we do not agree.
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at any time directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is
invoked. Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation,
records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order) filed
with the CSC, respondents questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the formal charges
against them for lack of preliminary investigation. There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.
In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges
issued by the former without the latter knowing that there were pending administrative cases against them. It
is true that prior notice and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive suspension order.
However, considering that respondents were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that we now
declare null and void, then their preventive suspension is likewise null and void.
Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the payment of back salaries during the period of
respondents’ preventive suspension. As the administrative proceedings involved in this case are void, no
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension meted them is
baseless. Respondents should be awarded their salaries during the period of their unjustified suspension. In
granting their back salaries, we are simply repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents, and
unless we can turn back the hands of time, we can do so only by restoring to them that which is physically
feasible to do under the circumstances. The principle of "no work, no pay" does not apply where the employee
himself was unlawfully forced out of job.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 157383 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 174137 is
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

8. G.R. No. 149999 August 12, 2005 CARPIO, J.:

THE NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD (NAB) OF THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
(NAPOLCOM) vs. P/INSP. JOHN MAMAUAG, SPO2 EUGENE ALMARIO, SPO4 ERLINDA
GARCIA & SPO1 VIVIAN FELIPE
Facts: Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay were both minors and were later classified as moderate or mild
mental retardates by the DSWD. Agnes Lucero found Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the

14
Philippine Rabbit bus terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories of maltreatment and
non-payment of salary by Judge Angeles.
The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal case for child
abuse under RA 7610 against Judge Angeles. Another was an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct
filed by Judge Angeles against respondents.
The Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division ("ILAD") investigated the administrative complaint. ILAD
recommended the dismissal of the charges. The CPDC District Director approved the recommendation and
dismissed the complaint.
Not satisfied with the outcome of her complaint, Judge Angeles moved for re-investigation of the case before
PNP Chief Sarmiento.
PNP Chief Sarmiento suspended the respondents from the police service for 90 days with forfeiture of pay.
Judge Angeles filed MR. PNP Chief Sarmiento modified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from the
service of Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe ("Mamauag, et al.").
Mamauag, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PNP Chief Sarmiento, PNP Inspector
General Sales and Judge Angeles before the RTC Quezon City. RTC dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to show that respondents abused their
discretion.
Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chief’s Resolution before the NAB.
NAB dismissed the appeal for late filing and lack of merit.
Mamauag, et al. filed MR but NAB denied. Thus, Mamauag, et al. sought relief from the CA.
CA ruled in favor of Mamauag, et al. Hence, the NAB’s recourse to this Court represented by OSG.
Issues: Whether the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to move for
reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority.
Ruling: The petition has no merit.
A disciplinary action is appealable only if it involves either a "demotion or dismissal from the service." If the
disciplinary action is less than a demotion or dismissal from the service, the disciplinary action "shall be final
and executory. Thus, a decision imposing suspension on a PNP member is not subject to appeal to a higher
authority.
Administrative disciplinary action connotes administrative penalty. If the decision exonerates the respondents
or otherwise dismisses the charges against the respondents, there is no disciplinary action since no penalty is
imposed. The provision that a penalty less than demotion or dismissal from service is final and executory does
not apply to dismissal of charges or exoneration because they are not disciplinary actions. This gives rise to two
crucial questions.
First, can a party appeal from a decision of the disciplining authority dismissing the charges against a PNP
member? Second, if a decision dismissing the charges against a PNP member is appealable, who can appeal —
the PNP or the private complainant, or both?
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority.
Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal.
One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the
penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously
heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party
appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an
anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being
impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent.
In any event, a private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of "either party" who can appeal under Sec.
43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government which is the real party in
interest. In short, private complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under Sec.43 and 45 who can appeal the
decision of the disciplining authority.
Thus, Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against Mamauag, et al.
by the CPDC District Director in the Resolution of 10 April 1995. The motion for re-investigation filed by
Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from the decision of the CPDC District Director.
The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge Angeles’ appeal in the guise of a motion for re-
investigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief pursuant to the
appeal is void. Thus, the Decision of the CPDC District Director dismissing the charges against
Mamauag, et al. stands and is now final and executory.

15
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the CA with MODIFICATION. We
REVERSE the Resolution of PNP Chief Recaredo Sarmiento II and REINSTATE the Resolution of CPDC
District Director dismissing the charges against P/Insp. John Mamauag, SPO2 Eugene Almario, SPO4 Erlinda
Garcia, and SPO1 Vivian Felipe, who are all entitled to back salaries and other benefits as provided under
Section 48 of RA. 6975. SO ORDERED.

9. G.R. No. 188487 February 14, 2011 NACHURA, J.:

VAN LUSPO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Luspo, the then Chief of the Fiscal Services and Budget Division of the ODC, is indicted for having
allegedly issued the ASAs without prior authority from his superior, Domondon, Chief Directorate for
Comptrollership. His issuance and signing thereof were allegedly made without a prior program request from
the Office of the Directorate for Personnel as mandated by the logistic requirements of the PNP. Likewise, he
supposedly violated GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8 when he failed to make any budget proposal relative to the
purchase of CCIE for North CAPCOM in 1992. He also allegedly charged the amount of the ASAs to "Personal
Services Fund" without a realignment authority from the DBM. These, according to the prosecution, are badges
of evident bad faith and of manifest partiality towards Tugaoen that led to a ₱10 million injury to the coffers of
the PNP.
At the trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses together with documentary evidence sought to
establish that Domondon, Luspo, et al. acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality when they failed to
observe the logistic requirement of North CAPCOM prior to the preparation of the 2 ASAs.
The accused filed, upon leave of court, a Consolidated Motion for Demurrer to Evidence, arguing in the main
the inadmissibility, under the best evidence rule, of the photocopies of the ASAs, the 100 checks, the original
printout of the full master list and detail list of the checks from the PHC, and the bank statement prepared by
the UCPB.
Claiming that the investigations conducted by the PNP were custodial in character and not merely
administrative, the accused argued that the sworn statements of Tugaoen, Duran and Montano should not be
admitted in evidence because they were not assisted by counsel when the same were elicited from them.
Sandiganbayan denied the consolidated motion and ruled on the admissibility of the challenged exhibits.
Trial then resumed for the presentation of evidence for the defense.
None of the accused took the witness stand. The defense did not dispute the events that transpired, but they
stressed that they did not commit any prohibited act. To debunk the case for the prosecution, Luspo and his co-
accused Domondon presented Leonilo Lapus Dalut , Program and Budget Officer of the Directorate for
Personnel, PNP, from 1989 until 1993.
Sandiganbayan found sufficient evidence inculpating Luspo, Duran, Montano, and Tugaoen for conspiring and
confederating with one another to deprive the government/PNP of ₱10 million.
Luspo, Duran, Montano and Tugaoen separately moved for reconsideration, but their motions were denied.
Luspo filed a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118487.
Issue: In G.R. No. 188487, Luspo ascribes that Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Ruling:
It bears emphasis that the charge against Luspo’s co-accused Domondon consisted of the same omissions. Both
offered similar documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence for their exoneration, but the same were
appreciated only in Domondon’s favor. The Sandiganbayan shelved Luspo’s claim that he was authorized by
Domondon to sign the ASAs in the former’s behalf, and tagged the same as self-serving and unsubstantiated.
In its consolidated comment, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB through the OSP,
harks back to the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion and lobbies for its affirmation.
We disagree with the Sandiganbayan.
The records reveal that had the trial court expanded the range of its probing, it would not have arrived at
divergent conclusions regarding the two accused.
Generally, factual findings of the anti-graft court are conclusive upon the Supreme Court, except where: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts and the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by evidence on record.
The last instance attends in the instant case. Clear and unmistakable in the resolution of the OMB-AFP that,
Domondon issued a Memorandum delegating to Luspo the authority to sign for him (Domondon) and on his
behalf, allotments for personal services in the amount not exceeding Five Million Pesos (₱5,000,000.00), and

16
in his absence, the amount of ₱20,000,000.00. This was, in fact, the hammer that drove the nail and linked
Domondon to the conspiracy theory advanced by the prosecution.
Sandiganbayan absolved Domondon of any liability in the issuance of the ASAs by virtue of the Delegation of
Authority and Schedule of Delegation issued by Nazareno, authorizing him (Domondon) to charge CCIE to
"personnel services 01," and to release funds therefor, irrespective of amount, without need for a prior request
program from the Directorate of Personnel. The Sandiganbayan also took judicial notice of the OMB Order and
Memorandum of the OMB’s legal counsel in Criminal Case No. 20191, stating that Domondon committed no
prohibited act in authorizing the issuance of the ASAs for RECOM since GHQ-AFP Circular No. 8 allowed the
charging of CCIE to either the Personal Services Fund or Maintenance and Other Operating Expense Fund.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that these pieces of evidence debunked the prosecution’s allegation that the ASAs
were charged against Personal Services Fund without the necessary realignment authority from the DBM. As
such, the court negated Domondon’s culpability for the crime charged. We see no reason to treat Luspo
differently because the authority delegated by Nazareno to Domondon inevitably passed down to the latter’s
sub-delegate, Luspo.
The ensuing disquisitions should enlighten.
In general, national government agencies (NGAs), such as the PNP, receive their yearly budgetary allocation
from the DBM through an Advice of Allotment. The amount represented therein is, in turn, distributed/sub-
allocated by NGAs to their support units or departments through the issuance of an ASA (also known as Sub-
Allotment Advice). In the PNP, the power to sub-allocate the agency’s funds is vested by R.A. 6975 in the PNP
Chief.
The law also empowers the PNP Chief to delegate his myriad duties and authority to his subordinates, with
respect to the units under their respective commands:
Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials with respect to
the units under their respective commands, in accordance with the rules and regulation prescribed by the
Commission.
This was observed through the organizational structure of the PNP. Administrative and operational support
units were put in place to assist the PNP Chief in the command and direction of the police force. One such unit
is the ODC, which assists the PNP Chief with the management of the financial resources of the PNP.
Under the ODC’s wing is the Fiscal Services and Budget Division, charged with the implementation of the
plans, policies, rules, and regulations governing disbursement and collection of funds for the PNP.
In sum, the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership assists the PNP Chief in determining how the PNP
funds will be sub-allocated to the regional commands and their support units. Any determination made would
then be executed by the Fiscal Services and Budget Division by issuing an ASA with Nazareno’s signature as the
chief financial director of the PNP, in favor of the appropriate command or support unit.
Section 26 of R.A. No. 6975 also empowers the PNP Chief to issue implementing policies for the
micromanagement of the entire force.
In the exercise of such power, Nazareno issued a letter-directive entitled "Delegation of Authority," wherein he
delegated to his subordinate officers several of his customary authority, ranging from the approval or
disapproval of projects to the signing of correspondence and working papers in his behalf.
The OSP questions the validity of the sub-delegation, arguing that Domondon cannot further delegate an
already delegated task. The contention is untenable.
We reckon the kind of duties discharged by public officers.
Public officers exercise discretionary and/or ministerial duties. A duty is discretionary if the officer is allowed
to determine how and when it is to be performed and to decide this matter one way or the other and be right
either way. It is not susceptible to delegation because it is imposed by law as such, and the public officer is
expected to discharge it directly and not through the intervening mind of another.
A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an
act wherein nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is practically a mechanical act;
hence, what can be done by the delegate may be sub-delegated by him to others.
Based on the foregoing yardstick, was the task delegated by Nazareno to Domondon discretionary or
ministerial?
A reading of the significant provisions of the "Delegation of Authority" discloses that the duty delegated to
Domondon was merely ministerial.
Domondon, as the Chief Director of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, assists the PNP Chief in
determining how the PNP funds would be sub-allocated to the regional commands and their support units. Any
determination made by Domondon and Nazareno would then be implemented by Luspo, as the head of Fiscal
Services and Budget Division, by preparing an ASA and then submitting the same to Nazareno for his
signature. To shorten the process, Nazareno delegated the routine act of affixing his signature to the ASA to his
financial assistant, Domondon.

17
Verily then, the duty delegated by Nazareno to Domondon was the ministerial duty of signing ASAs to effect the
release of funds. Being merely ministerial, Domondon was allowed to sub-delegate, as he did sub-delegate, the
task to his subordinate, Luspo. As such, the signature affixed by Luspo to the ASAs had the same effect as if it
was made by Nazareno himself.
Therefore, Luspo, in the same manner as Domondon, had satisfactorily adduced evidence of good faith to
overturn and repudiate the imputation of evident bad faith against him. He committed no prohibited act in
signing and issuing the assailed ASAs because there is ample documentary and testimonial evidence showing
that.
There is nothing on record to show that Luspo was spurred by any corrupt motive or that he received any
material benefit when he signed the ASAs.
There is likewise no proof that Luspo acted with palpable bias or favor towards Tugaoen. The prosecution failed
to show that it was Luspo’s duty to search for, negotiate and contract with suppliers. The only deduction extant
from the prosecution’s evidence is that, being then the Chief of the Fiscal Services and Budget Division of the
Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, it was Luspo’s duty to distribute the funds allocated to the PNP
by the DBM by the issuance of an ASA in favor of the force’s regional commands. Once the funds were released
from his custody through the ASAs, his responsibility ceased and it then devolved upon the recipients of the
ASA to see to it that the funds were legally and properly disbursed for the purpose for which they were released.
He had no control over the disbursement, and thus, he could not be blamed if the funds were eventually
expended for unauthorized or illegal purposes.
Lastly, the prosecution cannot link Luspo as a conspirator to defraud the PNP/government on the strength
merely of his signature, nor can a valid assumption be made that he connived with Duran and Montano, who
subsequently disbursed the ASAs.
Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proferred to indicate that the accused had taken part in
the "planning, preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government" for,
otherwise, any "careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have
(only) been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds" really responsible for that irregularity.
Again, Luspo committed no prohibited act; neither did he violate any law, rule, or internal order when he
signed the ASAs. Logically, his signature in the ASAs cannot be considered as an overt act in furtherance of
one common design to defraud the government.
Given the above premises, the acquittal of Luspo is inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Van Luspo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is hereby ACQUITTED.
The bailbond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED. SO ORDERED.

10. G.R. No. 170463 February 2, 2011 CARPIO, J.:

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GSIS vs. ALBERT VELASCO & MARIO MOLINA
Facts: Respondents were charged administratively with grave misconduct and were placed under preventive
suspension for 90 days due to their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees
denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager,
petitioner Winston Garcia.
Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice President Madarang for the implementation of his step increment. SVP
Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS
(petitioner GSIS Board) which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations,
and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion.
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board Resolution
approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees effective year 2002. Respondents’
request was again denied because of their pending administrative case.
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled.
Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution. Respondents
claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases
violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. Respondent
Molina also added that he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution was enacted.
Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were ineffective because they were not registered with the
University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioners filed motion to dismiss but trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and granted
respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed MR but the trial court denied petitioners’ motion and granted respondents’ petition for
prohibition.

18
Petitioners filed MR but the trial court denied petitioners’ motion.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the CSC, not the trial court, has jurisdiction because the case involves claims of employee benefits.
2. Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President and General Manager
exercising quasi-legislative and administrative functions is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC.
3. Whether internal rules and regulations need not require publication with the Office of the National
Administrative Register for their effectivity, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC.
4. Whether a regulation, which disqualifies government employees who have pending administrative cases
from the grant of step increment and Christmas raffle benefits is unconstitutional.
5. Whether the nullification of GSIS Board Resolutions is beyond an action for prohibition, and a writ of
preliminary injunction cannot be made permanent without a decision ordering the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.
Ruling: The trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for prohibition.
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be. It is also a
personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it
may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had
jurisdiction over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.
Petitioners also argue that Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 need not be filed with the UP Law Center ONAR
since they are, at most, regulations which are merely internal in nature – regulating only the personnel of the
GSIS and not the public.
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only
those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines for
receiving and publication of rules and regulations, "interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public," need not be filed
with the UP Law Center.
Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS.
No need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.
Petitioners insist that petitioner GSIS Board has the power to issue the assailed resolutions. It was within the
power of petitioner GSIS Board to disqualify respondents for step increment and from receiving GSIS benefits
from the time formal administrative charges were filed against them until the cases are resolved.
First, entitlement to step increment depends on the rules relative to the grant of such benefit. In point are
Section 1(b), Rule II and Section 2, Rule III of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1990.
In the initial implementation of step increments in 1990, an incumbent shall be granted step increments
equivalent to one (1) step for every three (3) years of continuous satisfactory service in a given position
occupied as of January 1, 1990.
A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have rendered at
least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an incumbent. To
determine whether service is continuous, it is necessary to define what actual service is. "Actual service" refers
to the period of continuous service since the appointment of the official or employee concerned, including the
period or periods covered by any previously approved leave with pay.
Second, while there are no specific rules on the effects of preventive suspension on step increment, we can
refer to the CSC rules and rulings on the effects of the penalty of suspension and approved vacation leaves
without pay on the grant of step increment for guidance.
Third, on Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in
any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered
within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated.
Therefore, on the matter of step increment, if an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated
like an employee on approved vacation leave without pay, then it is only fair and reasonable to apply the
same rules to an employee who was preventively suspended, more so considering that preventive suspension
is not a penalty. If an employee is preventively suspended, the employee is not rendering actual service and
this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his government service. Consequently, an employee who
was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time of his preventive

19
suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The
grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days,
that an official or employee was serving the preventive suspension.
Fourth, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given
the benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven.
In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days. Therefore, after serving the
period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents
should have been reinstated and, after serving the same number of days of their suspension, entitled to the
grant of step increment.
On a final note, social legislation like the circular on the grant of step increment, being remedial in character,
should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons to be benefited. The liberal approach
aims to achieve humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision and Order of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 03-108389. We DECLARE the assailed provisions on step increment in GSIS Board
Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 VOID. We MODIFY the Decision of the RTC and rule that GSIS Board
Resolution Nos. 197, 306 and 372 need not be filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center. SO
ORDERED.

11. G.R. No. 164679 July 27, 2011 BRION, J.:

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO ANDUTAN, JR.,
Facts: Andutan was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the
Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of Sec.3(a), (e) and (j) of
R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
As government employee, Andutan, likewise administratively charged of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been separated from the service,
Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and
perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations.
After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari before
the CA.
CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman ruling. Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the
decision of the CA.
Issues:
I. Does Sec. 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a
year after the act was committed?
II. Does Andutan’s resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?
III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman’s findings supported by substantial
evidence?
Ruling: We rule to deny the petition.
Sec. 20(5) are merely directory; the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an investigation a year
after the supposed act was committed.
Administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character
of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the
punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
public’s faith and confidence in our government proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or
omission if the complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative
investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt,
even if the administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Sec. 20(5), the Ombudsman
was well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of the
Ombudsman’s authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who had
already resigned. On this issue, we rule in Andutan’s favor.

20
Andutan’s resignation divests the Ombudsman of its right to institute an administrative complaint against
him.
Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Sec.20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the
Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public
servant at the time the case was filed.
The Ombudsman argued – in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA – that Andutan’s
retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as he is charged with an offense
he committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned
prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the
commission of an offense while in the public service.
The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases where the officers
or employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from service. CA
noted that "the administrative cases were filed only after Andutan was retired; hence the Ombudsman was
already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the cases.
Challenging the CA’s interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of the cited Civil
Service Memorandum Circular to the first sentence. Further, according to the Ombudsman, "the court a quo
ignored the second statement in the said circular that contemplates a situation where previous to the
institution of the administrative investigation or charge, the public official or employee subject of the
investigation has resigned.
Jurisprudence held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative case
that was filed prior to the official’s resignation.
Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The
resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she
shall still be answerable.
Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said
administrative case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited cases, the
Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the
continuation of a case already filedor to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains.
The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning,
since he knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him is
unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign.
Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post, while the administrative case was filed exactly one (1) year and
two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman’s sweeping
assertions in light of these facts.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman
filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsman’s position
that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to
prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions of
Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38.
We disagree with the Ombudsman’s interpretation that as long as the breach of conduct was committed while
the public official or employee was still in the service a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his
administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication. If we agree with this interpretation, any official –
even if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority
of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation
of the law – which is to improve public service and to preserve the public’s faith and confidence in the
government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned. Likewise, if the act committed by the
public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress
the same.
Conclusion
Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what
assumption of public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil
servants to serve their constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman’s resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed
by Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding

21
that Andutan is no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the
Ombudsman’s factual findings.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman’s petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the
decision of the CA which annulled and set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico
P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. No. 183445 September 14, 2011 MENDOZA, J.:

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION vs. CALIXTO
CATAQUIZ
Facts: Respondent was appointed as GM of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA).
A majority of the members of the Mgt. Committee and the rank-and-file employees of the LLDA submitted to
DENR Sec. Gozun their Petition for the Ouster of Cataquiz on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional
behavior and management incompetence.
Sec. Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an inquiry into the allegations against
Cataquiz. The investigating team recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) for proper investigation.
Sec. Gozun reported that there is prima facie evidence to support some accusations against Cataquiz which
may be used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted that respondent lost
his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz be relieved from his position and
that he be investigated by PAGC.
Concerned Employees of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), expressed their support for the
petition to oust Cataquiz and formally filed its Affidavit Complaint before PAGC.
PAGC issued a Resolution recommending to the President that the penalty of dismissal from the service with
the accessory penalties of disqualification for re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government
retirement benefits be imposed upon Cataquiz. Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima Valdez.
OP adopted by reference the findings and recommendations of PAGC.
Aggrieved, Cataquiz filed his MR and/or for New Trial arguing that: (1) prior to the issuance by the PAGC of its
Resolution and by the OP of its Decision, he was already removed from office, thereby making the issue moot
and academic; and (2) he cannot be found guilty for violating a resolution which was foreign to the charges
against him or for acts which did not constitute sufficient cause for his removal in office, as shown by acts and
documents which subsequently became available to him, entitling him to a new trial.
OP issued an Amended Resolution, imposing on Cataquiz the penalties of disqualification from re-employment
in the government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits, in view of the fact that the penalty of dismissal
was no longer applicable to him because of his replacement as GM of the LLDA.
Cataquiz elevated his case to the CA via a petition for review raising the same issues presented in his MR
and/or New Trial before the OP.
The CA promulgated its Decision which reversed and set aside the Amended Resolution of the OP. In so
resolving, the CA reasoned that the accessory penalties of disqualification from employment in the government
service and forfeiture of retirement benefits could no longer be imposed because the principal penalty of
dismissal was not enforced, following the rule that the accessory penalty follows the principal penalty. The CA
also agreed with Cataquiz that he could not be held liable for a violation of Board Resolution No. 68 of the
LLDA, which when examined, was found not to be related to fishpen awards. The applicable rule would be
Board Resolution No. 28, as suggested by Cataquiz himself. Said resolution though would be an invalid basis
because it was not approved by the President pursuant to Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850 (An Act Creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority). Finally, the CA found that the offenses charged against Cataquiz under
R.A. No. 4850 constituted acts that were within his authority as GM of the LLDA to perform.
OP and the PAGC (petitioners) filed this petition for review.
Issues:
(1) Whether the CA made an incorrect determination of the facts of the case warranting review of its factual
findings by the Court;
(2) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz serves as a bar to the decision of
the OP;
(3) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in
the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior
to the issuance by the PAGC and the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively; and
(4) Whether Cataquiz can be charged with a violation of Board Resolution No. 28, despite the clerical error
made by the PAGC in indicating the Board Resolution number to be No. 68.

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Ruling: The Court finds merit in the petition.
Findings of fact of the appellate court can be reviewed
As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. There are, however, several recognized exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed
by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
In this case, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of PAGC which recommended Cataquiz’ dismissal for
violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to Sec. 46(b)(27), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O.
292. Likewise, the Investigating Team of the DENR also agreed that there exists evidence that could sustain a
finding of respondent’s violation of several laws and regulations.
The result of PAGC’s investigation, however, was simply brushed aside by the CA, without citing any evidence
on which its findings were based.
Without any analysis of the evidence on record or a comprehensive discussion on how the decision was arrived
at, the CA absolved Cataquiz of the acts he was accused of committing during his service as General Manager of
the LLDA.
This Court finds that there is substantial evidence to justify the conclusion of PAGC that Cataquiz should be
punished with the penalty of dismissal, along with its accessory penalties, for committing acts prejudicial to
the best interest of the government and for giving undue advantage to a private company in the award of
fishpens.
The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding of
administrative liability.
It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of
their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for
the same act. Obviously, administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. In the
case of People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court elaborated on the difference between administrative and criminal
liability:
The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first,
the difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions
imposed; and second, the principle that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related
provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action
against Cataquiz. His absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive upon the OP, which subsequently
found him to be administratively liable. The pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect
the respondent from further administrative prosecution. A contrary ruling would be unsettling as it would
undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service and uphold the
time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.
Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.
Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite his removal from
his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his service as General
Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to suffer the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the
OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the charges against him with the imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its
corresponding accessory penalties is valid.

23
It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee. As such, he was under the direct disciplining
authority of the President who could legitimately have him dismissed from service. This is pursuant to the well-
established principle that the President’s power to remove is inherent in his power to appoint. Therefore, it is
well within the authority of the President to order the respondent’s dismissal.
Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of dismissal impossible.
Consequently, citing the rule that the accessory follows the principal, he insists that the accessory penalties
may no longer be imposed on him.
The respondent is mistaken.
Despite the resignation from government service by the employee found guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful
and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition
of the penalty of dismissal impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
benefits with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if
the most severe of administrative sanctions – that of separation from service – may no longer be imposed on
the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of
administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the
forfeiture of benefits.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in public
service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits can still be imposed on the respondent,
notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal penalty of dismissal because of his removal from
office.
PAGC’s typographical error can be corrected.
It is clear from the pleadings submitted before PAGC – particularly in the Affidavit Complaint filed by CELLDA
against Cataquiz and in the Counter-Affidavit submitted by the latter – that the resolution referred to as having
been violated by the respondent was Board Resolution No. 28, and not No. 68, as was erroneously indicated in
the PAGC Resolution. Thus, pursuant to the rule that the judgment should be in accordance with the
allegations and the evidence presented, the typographical error contained in the PAGC Resolution can be
amended. Clerical errors or any ambiguity in a decision can be rectified even after the judgment has become
final by reference to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
court.
A careful perusal of the PAGC’s discussion on the violation of the questioned board resolution discloses that
PAGC was undoubtedly referring to Board Resolution No. 28 which approved the policy guidelines for public
bidding of the remaining free fishpen areas in Laguna de Bay, and not Resolution No. 68 which had nothing at
all to do with fishpen awards. Therefore, the reference to Board Resolution No. 68, instead of Board Resolution
No. 28, in the PAGC Resolution is unmistakably a typographical error on the part of PAGC but, nonetheless,
rectifiable.
Moreover, the respondent’s counter-affidavit shows that he had knowledge of the fact that he was being
charged with violation of Board Resolution No. 28. He even argued that the said resolution was an invalid and
illegal administrative rule. His position was that the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of LLDA was
an unreasonable exercise of its legislative power because the enabling law of LLDA, R.A. No. 4850, did not
require the public bidding of free fishpen areas. Then, in his MR before the OP, he argued that the resolution
was invalid because it was never approved by the President, contrary to Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850.
The question then is whether Board Resolution No. 28 falls under that category of rules subject to approval
by the President. The answer is in the negative.
The Revised Laguna de Bay Zoning and Management Plan allocated 10,000 hectares of the lake surface areas
for fishpen operators. In the event that the area would not be fully occupied after all qualified operators had
been assigned their respective fishpen areas, the residual free areas would be opened for bidding to other
prospective qualified applicants. Accordingly, Board Resolution No. 28 simply set forth the guidelines for the
public bidding of the remaining free fishpen areas in
Laguna de Bay. It did not require presidential approval because it did not regulate any fisheries development
activities. Hence, the questioned resolution cannot be declared invalid on the basis of the CA’s ratiocination
that the resolution lacked the approval of the President.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE reinstating
the Decision of the Office of the President. SO ORDERED.

13. G.R. No. 187858 August 9, 2011 BRION, J.:

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CSC vs. RICHARD CRUZ
Facts: Respondent is Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD) was charged with grave
misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD GM Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging
statement against GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors. The dishonesty charge stemmed
from the respondent’s act of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized
DTR for three working days.
The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave misconduct, he stressed that three of
the four witnesses already retracted their statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that
he never failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was caused by technical computer
problems. The respondent submitted documents showing that he rendered overtime work on the three days
that the CMWD questioned.
GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the expiration of his preventive
suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.
The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the CSC, which absolved him of the
two charges and ordered his reinstatement. CSC found no factual basis to support the charges of grave
misconduct and dishonesty.
In ruling that the respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC held:
Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct for his alleged utterance of such maligning statements,
"MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL MANAGER". However, such utterance, even if it were
true, does not constitute a flagrant disregard of rule or was actuated by corrupt motive. To the mind of the
Commission, it was a mere expression of disgust over the management style of the GM and the Board of
Directors, especially when due notice is taken of the fact that the latter officials were charged with the
Ombudsman for various anomalous transactions.
In ruling that the charge of dishonesty had no factual basis, the CSC declared:
The Commission is not swayed that the failure of Cruz to record his attendance while claiming overtime pay
therefor, amounts to dishonesty. Cruz duly submitted evidence showing his actual rendition of work on those
days. The residents of the place where he worked attested to his presence thereat on the days in question.
The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable office rules for his failure to log in
and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.
The CMWD and the respondent separately filed MR against the CSC ruling. CMWD questioned the CSC’s
findings and the respondent’s reinstatement. The respondent claimed that he is entitled to back salaries in light
of his exoneration from the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The CSC denied both motions.
Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the CA via separate petitions for review under
Rule 43 of the ROC. The CA dismissed the CMWD’s petition and this ruling has lapsed to finality. Hence, the
issue of reinstatement is now a settled matter. CA ruled in the respondent’s favor on the issue of back salaries.
This ruling is the subject of the present petition.
Issue: Whether the respondent is entitle to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal.
Ruling: We deny the petition for lack of merit.
We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period he was
suspended from work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position.
The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As
the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the respondent in making the
complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the
respondent’s evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on the days in question.
We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these factual findings.
However, on the legal issue of the respondent’s entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA’s
conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable
rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty
(claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.
The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service
nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.
Respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement
to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his
preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

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14. G.R. No. 184980 March 30, 2011 ABAD, J.:
DANILO MORO vs. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR.
This case is about the right of the petitioner to be reinstated through an action for quo warranto against the
present holder meantime that petitioner has appealed from the Ombudsman’s decision dismissing him from
the service for, among other grounds, misconduct in office.
Facts: Ombudsman charged respondent Castillo, then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ)
Accounting Center of the AFP, with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. Ombudsman alleged that Del Castillo made false statements in his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities from 1996 to 2004 and that he acquired properties manifestly out of proportion to his reported
salary.
GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center by virtue of GHQ AFP
Special Order 91 (SO 91). Through the same order, petitioner Danilo Moro, then Chief Accountant of the
Philippine Navy, took over the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
Meantime, Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six months and eventually
ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5, 2007. The penalty imposed on him included cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government. Del Castillo filed MR, which is pending to this date.
Following the lapse of his six-month suspension Del Castillo attempted to reassume his former post of GHQ
Chief Accountant. But, he was unable to do so since Moro declined to yield the position. Consequently, Del
Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against Moro with the RTC of Parañaque City.
Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsman placed
Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter’s period of suspension already lapsed, he was entitled
to resume his former post and Moro was but a usurper.
For his part, Moro pointed out in his Answer that his appointment under SO 91 as GHQ Chief Accountant was a
permanent appointment. Indeed, the GHQ had already reassigned Del Castillo to the PAF Accounting Center
even before the Ombudsman placed him under preventive suspension. Del Castillo was, therefore, not
automatically entitled to return to his former GHQ post despite the lapse of his suspension.
During the pendency of the quo warranto case before the RTC, Del Castillo refused to report at the PAF
Accounting Center despite a memorandum from the AFP Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel that
carried the note and approval of the AFP Chief of Staff. Del Castillo insisted that he could not be placed under
the PAF since he was the GHQ Chief Accountant.
RTC dismissed Del Castillo’s petition, holding that Moro held the position of GHQ Chief Accountant pursuant
to orders of the AFP Chief of Staff. Moreover, RTC found Del Castillo’s reassignment to the PAF Accounting
Center valid. Under the CSC Rules, a reassignment may be made for a maximum of one year. Since Del
Castillo’s preventive suspension kept him away for only six months, he had to return to the PAF to complete his
maximum detail at that posting. Besides, Ombudsman’s Order, which directed Del Castillo’s dismissal from the
service for grave misconduct, rendered the petition moot and academic. The RTC denied Del Castillo’s MR.
Instead of appealing from the order of dismissal of his action, Del Castillo filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. CA reversed the RTC Decision. Notwithstanding the procedural error, the CA gave due course to the
petition on grounds of substantial justice and fair play. It held that Del Castillo’s reassignment exceeded the
maximum of one year allowed by law and that SO 91 was void since it did not indicate a definite duration for
such reassignment. Further, the CA held as non-executory the Ombudsman’s dismissal of Del Castillo in view
of his appeal from that dismissal. With the denial of his MR, Moro filed this petition via Rule 45 of the ROC.
Issue: Whether Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ
Accounting Center that he once held.
Ruling:
An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the ROC may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the
person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming that
he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive
suspension ended. He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the
same could not exceed one year. Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could
last not later than March 31, 2007. By then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as
GHQ Chief Accountant.
But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. Del Castillo,
on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman. Consequently, he cannot
reassume the contested position.

26
Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that only decisions of the Ombudsman that
impose the penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or a fine of one
month salary are final, executory, and unappealable. Consequently, when the penalty is dismissal as in his case,
he can avail himself of the remedy of appeal and the execution of the decision against him would, in the
meantime, be held in abeyance.
But, the Lapid case has already been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.
Simeon Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH. The Court held in Datumanong that Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order 7, as amended by Administrative Order 17, clearly provides that an appeal shall not stop a
decision of the Ombudsman from being executory. The Court later reiterated this ruling in Office of the
Ombudsman v. CA.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject
public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action
for quo warranto may be dismissed.
Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the
Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissal order
was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo
warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision CA and
REINSTATES the decision of the RTC which dismissed the complaint for quo warranto.SO ORDERED.

15. G.R. No. 178021 January 25, 2012 MENDOZA, J.:

REP. OF THE PHIL., represented by the CSC vs. MINERVA PACHEO
Facts: Pacheo was a Revenue Atty IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the BIR in Revenue Region No. 7
(RR7), Quezon City.
BIR issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Chief,
Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga. The BIR cited exigencies of the
revenue service as basis for the issuance of the said RTAO.
Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter addressed to Rene Banez, then CIR. She complained
that the transfer would mean economic dislocation since she would have to spend ₱ 200.00 on daily travel
expenses or approximately ₱ 4,000.00 a month. It would also mean physical burden on her part as she would
be compelled to wake up early in the morning for her daily travel from Quezon City to San Fernando,
Pampanga, and to return home late at night from San Fernando, Pampanga to Quezon City. She was of the
view that that her reassignment was merely intended to harass and force her out of the BIR in the guise of
exigencies of the revenue service. She considered her transfer from Quezon City to Pampanga as amounting to
a constructive dismissal.
BIR Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group denied Pacheo’s protest for lack of merit.
Pacheo appealed her case before the CSC. CSC granted Pacheo’s appeal. The Commission, however, held that
the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is justified as she is not entitled thereto since she is deemed not to
have performed any actual work in the government on the principle of no work no pay.
Accordingly, Pacheo should now be reinstated to her original station without any right to claim back salary as
she did not report to work either at her new place of assignment or at her original station.
Pacheo moved for reconsideration. She argued that the CSC erred in not finding that she was constructively
dismissed and, therefore, entitled to back salary.
CSC dened Pacheo’s MR.
Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a petition for review.
CA reversed the CSC Resolution and ruled in favor of Pacheo.
The CSC moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA .
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Pacheo’s assignment constitutes constructive dismissal and, thus, entitling her to
reinstatement and backwages. Was Pacheo constructively dismissed by reason of her reassignment?
Held: The Court agrees with the CA.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him
away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of
those who are in the Civil Service.

27
Constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency head’s
unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the
employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or
reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or
menial job.
The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work either in her
original station in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San Fernando, Pampanga negates her claim
of constructive dismissal in the present case being in violation of Section 24 (f) of P.D. 807 [now Executive
Order (EO) 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6)]. It further argues that the subject RTAO
was immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the CSC. It was, therefore, incumbent on Pacheo to
have reported to her new place of assignment and then appealed her case to the CSC if she indeed believed that
there was no justification for her reassignment.
Anent the first argument of CSC, the Court cannot sustain the proposition. It was legally impossible for Pacheo
to report to her original place of assignment in Quezon City considering that the subject RTAO No. 25-2002
also reassigned Amado Rey Pagarigan as Assistant Chief, Legal Division, from RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga
to RR7, Quezon City, the very same position Pacheo formerly held. The reassignment of Pagarigan to the same
position palpably created an impediment to Pacheo’s return to her original station.
The Court finds Itself unable to agree to CSC’s argument that the subject RTAO was immediately executory.
The Court deems it necessary to distinguish between a detail and reassignment, as they are governed by
different rules.
A detail is defined is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional,
technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may
appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be exeicutory
unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
On the other hand, a reassignment is defined An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency; Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or
salaries.
The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place where the employee is to be
moved and in its effectivity pending appeal with the CSC.
Based on the definition, a detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment
requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is
immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
The lateral movement of Pacheo as Assistant Chief, Legal Division from Quezon City to San Fernando,
Pampanga within the same agency is undeniably a reassignment. The OSG posits that she should have first
reported to her new place of assignment and then subsequently question her reassignment. It is clear, however,
that there is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment prior to questioning an alleged invalid
reassignment imposed upon an employee. Pacheo was well within her right not to report immediately to RR4,
San Fernando, Pampanga, and to question her reassignment.
Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of tenure, which is
assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of
unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court is not unaware that the BIR is authorized to assign or reassign internal revenue officers and
employees as the exigencies of service may require. This authority of the BIR, however, should be prudently
exercised in accordance with existing civil service rules.
Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement and back wages? The
Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to reinstatement, but finds Itself unable to sustain the ruling that
she is entitled to full back wages and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence that an illegally dismissed civil
service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full
back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that respondent Minerva Pacheo is hereby ordered reinstated without loss of seniority
rights but is only entitled to the payment of back salaries corresponding to five (5) years from the date of her
invalid reassignment. SO ORDERED.

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16. G.R. No. 191560 March 29, 2011 BRION, J.:
LUIS MARIO GENERAL vs. ALEJANDRO URRO
Facts: PGMA appointed Imelda Roces as acting Commissioner of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian
sector. PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner. When Roces died, PGMA appointed
the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces.
PGMA appointed Alejandro Urro in place of the petitioner.
DILG Head Executive issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents. The letter uniformly reads.
You have just been appointed COMMISSIONER xxx National Police Commission. xxx Attached is your
appointment paper duly signed by Her Excellency, President Macapagal Arroyo.
After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010, the petitioner filed the present
petition questioning the validity of the respondents’ appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the
constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
Urro took oath of office as NAPOLCOM Commissioners before DILG Secretary.
The newly elected President, Benigno Aquino III, issued E.O. No. 2 "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking
Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight
Appointments."
Issues:
1. What is the nature of the petitioner’s appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner?
2. Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro
as NAPOLCOM Commissioner?
I. Nature of petitioner’s appointment
A staggered term of office is not inconsistent with an acting appointment
Petitioner does not expressly claim that he was issued a permanent appointment; rather, he claims that his
appointment is actually a regular appointment since R.A. No. 6975 does not allegedly allow an appointment of
a NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity.
Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is
made.
Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A basic
distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary
appointee can be removed even without hearing or cause. Under the second classification, an appointment can
either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad
interim appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress. Presidential appointments that require no
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or
an ad interim appointment.
What the petitioner may have meant is a permanent (as contrasted to a temporary or acting) appointment to
the office of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner, at least for the duration of the unexpired portion of his predecessor
(Roces).
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments,
unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment
is repugnant to the nature of the office involved.
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions
by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another
appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he
is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from the service does not import removal but merely the
expiration of term — a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the
constitutional provision on security of tenure since no removal from office is involved.
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and the limitations on or qualifications in the exercise of
this power are strictly construed. In the present case, the petitioner posits that the law itself, R.A. No. 6975,
prohibits the appointment of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity by staggering his term of
office.
The purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority’s opportunity to appoint a
majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its
policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the
issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary
appointments that the Administrative Code grants.

29
Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., involving the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), is an example of how this Court
has recognized the validity of temporary appointments in vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on
staggered basis. Under the charter of the PTA, the members of the PTA’s governing body are all presidential
appointees whose terms of office are also staggered. The Court sustained the temporary character of the
appointment extended by the President in favor of the PTA GM, even if the lawalso fixes his term of office at six
years unless sooner removed for cause.
The petitioner’s claim that the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is not allowed based on
the staggering of terms of office does not have any statutory basis.
President’s appointing authority (and the strict construction against any limitation on or qualification of this
power), the prohibition on the President from issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or there
must be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the office and the temporary appointment. No such
limitation on the President’s appointing power.
The petitioner does not even allege that his separation from the office amounted to an abuse of his temporary
appointment that would entitle him to the incidental benefit of reinstatement.
The petitioner is estopped from claiming that he was permanently appointed
Petitioner when called to relinquish his office in favor of respondent Urro, the petitioner was quick on his feet
to refute what appeared in his appointment papers.
A person who accepts an appointment in an acting capacity, extended and received without any protest or
reservation, and who acts by virtue of that appointment for a considerable time, cannot later on be heard to
say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for cause.
II. An acting appointee has no cause of action for quo warranto against the new appointee
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment, he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain
the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability
at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement
to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his
suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
The petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a condition precedent to the
consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents’ appointments. The petitioner’s failure in this
regard renders a ruling on the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary. Neither do we need to pass
upon the validity of the respondents’ appointment. These latter issues can be determined more appropriately in
a proper case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

17. G.R. No. 184219 January 30, 2012 REYES, J.:

SAMUEL ONG vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL.
Facts: Ong joined the NBI as a career employee occupying the position of NBI Director.
Petitioner received Memorandum informing him that his appointment, being co-terminus with the appointing
authority's tenure would end effectively thus he would be occcupying his position in a de facto/hold-over status
until his replacement would be appointed.
Ong filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto. He sought for the declaration as null and void of (a) his
removal from the position of NBI Director III; and (b) his replacement by respondent Bessat. Ong likewise
prayed for reinstatement and backwages. The CA denied Ong's petition.
Issues: CA erred in holding that since Ong held a co-terminous appointment, he is removable at the pleasure
of the appointing authority.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
The memorandum did not remove Ong from the position of Director III. Assuming arguendo that it did, the
defect was cured when the President, who was the appointing authority herself, in whose hands were lodged
the power to remove, appointed Bessat, effectively revoking Ong's appointment.
Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was "co-terminus
with the appointing authority." His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be
revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.
This Court likewise finds no error in the CA's ruling that since Ong held a co-terminous appointment, he was
removable at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law except those employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature.
The appointment is temporary as Ong did not have the required CES eligibility.

30
An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is
being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee
meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility.
Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in
the career executive service a permanent one.
Indeed, the law permits, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the
absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in
the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be
conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility.
Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place
upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board
Ong never alleged that at any time during which he held the Director III position, he had acquired the requisite
eligibility. Thus, the right to security of tenure did not pertain to him at least relative to the Director III
position.
The next logical query to be resolved then is whether or not Ong, as an appointee holding a position "co-
terminus with the appointing authority," was entitled to remain as Director III. Negative.
Ong's appointment was temporary and co-terminous. CA correctly ruled that in quo warranto proceedings, the
petitioner must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another and in the
absence of the said right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial. Stated
differently, where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not
prohibited.
This Court recognizes Ong's lengthy service rendered to the government and deeply commisserates with his
earlier plight. However, we cannot grant Ong the reliefs he sought as law and jurisprudence clearly dictate that
being a temporary and co-terminous appointee, he had no vested rights over the position of Director III.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered by the is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

18. G.R. No. 178454 March 28, 2011 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FILIPINA SAMSON vs. JULIA RESTRIVERA.
Facts: Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission.
Petitioner agreed to help respondent to register her land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task
because it was found out that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return the ₱50,000,
respondent sued her for estafa and administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a
public officer before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty and suspended her from office for 6 months without pay. Upon MR,
Ombudsman reduced the penalty to 3 months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman,
petitioner’s acceptance of respondent’s payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Violating the
mandate that public officials and employees shall endeavor to discourage wrong perception of their
roles as dispenser or peddler of undue patronage.
The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for
holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was dismissed upon a finding that she
was not guilty of fraud or deceit; hence misconduct cannot be attributed to her.
Held: On the first issue, SC agreed with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them. The
Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public
official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. The jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any
public officer or employee during his/her tenure. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating to acts
or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or
employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does
not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman
may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from
the performance of official duty.

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On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she
cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.
"Professionalism" is the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a profession. A professional refers
to a person who engages in an activity with great competence. To call a person a professional is to describe him
as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or polished. The observance of professionalism also means
upholding the integrity of public office by endeavoring "to discourage wrong perception of their roles as
dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage." Thus, a public official or employee should avoid any appearance of
impropriety affecting the integrity of government services.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of professionalism
by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public duty. Petitioner’s act
deprived the government of her committed service because the generation of a certificate of title was not within
her line of public service. While it may be true that she did not actually deal with the other government
agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, petitioner’s act of accepting the money from
respondent with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a
perception that she is a fixer.
CA rejected petitioner’s argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those "wrong perceptions" or the
"impression of influence peddling." It is not the plurality of the acts that is being punished but the commission
of the act itself.
However, SC held that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 for the
reason that the act complained of is not at all related to petitioner’s discharge of her duties as department head
of the Population Commission.
But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action under R.A.
No. 6713?
We also rule in the negative.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved
by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Conversely, one cannot be found guilty of
misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence.
In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner’s violation of an established and definite rule of action or
unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent could merely point
to petitioner’s alleged failure to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner
allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for undelivered work.
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution that public
office is a public trust. However, respondent’s allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that belongs to
another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even say what acts of interference
were done by petitioner. Neither did respondent say in which government agency petitioner committed
interference. And causing the survey of respondent’s land can hardly be considered as meddling in the affairs of
another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population Commission. It does not show
that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government agency. The survey shows only that
petitioner contracted a surveyor. Respondent said nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did.
The survey shows that petitioner also started to work on her task under their agreement. Thus, respondent’s
allegation that petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is not entirely correct. Rather, petitioner
failed to fully accomplish her task in view of the legal obstacle that the land is government property.
However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.
The common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that petitioner still failed to return the amount she
accepted. For reneging on her promise to return the amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a
public officer.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision of the CA, as well as the Decision of the Ombudsman and
ENTER a new judgment as follows:
We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and ORDER petitioner to return to
respondent the amount of ₱50,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum. SO ORDERED.

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19. G.R. No. 169042 October 5, 2011 BRION, J.:
ERDITO QUARTO vs. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO, CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
DENNIS VILLA IGNACIO, LUISITO TABLAN, RAUL BORILLO, & LUIS GAYYA
Facts: Petitioner and respondents are employees of DPWH.
DPWH conducted an investigation and discovered that several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare
parts of hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not
actually take place, resulting in government losses of approximately ₱143 million for ten-month period alone.
The counsel of the DPWH charged before the Ombudsman several high-ranking DPWH officials and
employees – including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals who purportedly benefited
from the anomalous transactions – with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation, and violations of RA No.
3019 and the Administrative Code.
The petitioner denied the allegations against him, claiming that he merely relied on his subordinates when he
signed the job orders and the inspection reports. In contrast, the respondents admitted the existence of
irregularities in the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles, and offered to testify and
to provide evidence against the DPWH officials and employees involved in the anomaly in exchange for their
immunity from prosecution.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several
informations charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of
official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman granted the respondents’ request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and
cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
Petitioner filed a certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity in the
respondents’ favor. The Sandiganbayan, however, dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and advised
the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsman’s actions before SC. Hence, this present petition.
Issue: Petitioner argues that the Ombudsman should have included the respondents in the informations since
it was their inspection reports that actually paved the way for the commission of the alleged irregularities. By
excluding the respondents in the informations, the Ombudsman is engaged in "selective prosecution" which is
a clear case of grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they must
be included first in the informations filed with the court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for
their discharge so that they can be utilized as state witnesses.
Held: SC dismiss the petition on two grounds:
First, petitioner failed to avail of the remedies available before filing certiorari; and, second, the principle of
non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, the petitioner
failed to establish that the grant of immunity to the respondents was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
I. The petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law
Petitioner failed to file MR against the assailed resolutions. Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the
inclusion of the respondents in the informations before filing the present petition. He initially and erroneously
filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan. We remind the petitioner that the remedy from the
Ombudsman’s orders or resolutions in criminal cases is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with this
Court. The petition likewise fails even on the merits.
II. The respondents’ exclusion in the informations is grounded on the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity
Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law upon the
respondent. In the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to, to compel the
respondent to take action; it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be
exercised.
In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different from an
ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion in
determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be
established for the filing of information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack
thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except
when he gravely abuses his discretion, i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
If the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals while impleading all others, the
remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the information all persons who
appear responsible for the offense involved.
In the present case, the Ombudsman granted the respondents immunity from prosecution pursuant to RA No.
6770 which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding

33
being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its
constitutional functions and statutory objectives."
III. Nature of the power to grant immunity
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative. The exclusive power of
Congress to define crimes and their nature and to provide for their punishment carries the power to immunize
certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them, the solution and
prosecution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact. In the exercise of this power, Congress
possesses broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and the extent of the immunity to be granted.
RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was formulated with the vision of making the Ombudsman the
protector of the people against abusive and corrupt government officers and employees. Congress saw it fit to
grant the Ombudsman the power to directly confer immunity to enable his office to effectively carry out its
constitutional and statutory mandate of ensuring effective accountability in the public service.
IV. Considerations in the grant of immunity
While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is lodged
elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of
the process and is essentially an executive function.
RA No. 6770 empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to "such terms and conditions" as he may
determine.
V. Extent of judicial review of a bestowed immunity
The Court generally defer to the judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the
Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know the relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently in his
possession and the kind, tenor and source of testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case.
We intervene only when there is a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown. This limitation
similarly reflects on the petitioner, who himself is bound to clearly and convincingly establishes that the
Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity in order to fully establish his case.
Based on these considerations, we shall now proceed to determine whether the petitioner has clearly and
convincingly shown that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to the
respondents.
Va. Absolute necessity for testimony of the respondents
We find that the petitioner failed to clearly and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion in granting immunity to the respondents. We observe petitioner’s lack of argument addressing the
"absolute necessity" of the respondents’ testimony. In fact, the petitioner simply concluded that the
requirement of "absolute necessity" does not exist based on the Ombudsman’s "evidence," without even
attempting to explain how he arrived at this conclusion.
We note that the respondents’ proposed testimony tends to counteract the petitioner’s personal defense of good
faith (i.e., that he had no actual participation and merely relied on his subordinates) in approving the job
orders and in his concurrence with the inspection reports. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, the respondents
narrated the accused DPWH officials/employees’ flagrant disregard of the proper procedure and the guidelines
in the repair of DPWH service vehicles which culminated in losses to the government. This kind of statement
cannot but impact on how the Ombudsman viewed the question of "absolute necessity" of the respondents’
testimony since this testimony meets the defense of good faith head-on to prove the prosecution’s allegations.
Under these circumstances, we cannot preempt, foreclose, nor replace with our own the Ombudsman’s position
on this point as it is clearly not without basis.
Vb. The respondents do not appear to be the "most guilty"
In considering the respondents’ possible degree of guilt, we are aware of their admission that they resorted to a
"short-cut" in the procedure to be observed in the repairs and/or purchase of emergency parts of DPWH
service vehicles. However, this admission does not necessarily result in making the respondents the "most
guilty" in the premises.
The character of the respondents’ involvement vis-à-vis the crimes filed against the DPWH officials/employees,
coupled with the substance of the respondents’ disclosures, compels this Court to take a better view that
Ombudsman saw the higher value of utilizing the respondents themselves as witnesses instead of prosecuting
them in order to fully establish and strengthen its case against those mainly responsible for the criminal act, as
indicated by the available evidence.
VI. The respondents’ administrative liability has no bearing at all on the immunity granted to the
respondents
The fact that the respondents had previously been found administratively liable, based on the same set of facts,
does not necessarily make them the "most guilty." An administrative case is altogether different from a
criminal case, such that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for
the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts. The quantum of proof required in an

34
administrative proceeding - substantial evidence. The requirement of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
that the proposed witness should not appear to be the "most guilty" is entirely different from those applicable
in administrative proceedings.
VII. The policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutory powers cautions a
stay of judicial hand
The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible within our governmental system and
structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and
improper influence. Consistent with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise
of his investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses), and
respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service."
We deem it neither appropriate nor advisable to interfere with the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to the
respondents where the petitioner has not clearly and convincingly shown the grave abuse of discretion that
would call for our intervention. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

20. G.R. No. 166495 February 16, 2011 MENDOZA, J.:

ROQUE FACURA & EDUARDO TUASON vs. CA, RODOLFO DE JESUS & EDELWINA
PARUNGAO
Facts: The case arose from a Joint Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason
against De Jesus and Parungao for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, being notoriously undesirable, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, De Jesus and Parungao alleged that they were mere rank-and-file employees
who had no knowledge of or participation in personnel matters; that their actions in issuing the two sets of
appointments were all documented and above-board; that as subordinate employees, they had no discretion on
the matter of the retroactive appointments of the 9 confidential staff specifically requested by the Board
members; and that the re-issuance of the second set of appointments effective December 12, 2001 was duly
approved by Administrator Jamora. They denied any financial damage on the part of LWUA since the
retroactive payment of salaries was justified under the DBM letter approving the hiring of personnel retroactive
to the date of actual services rendered by them.
Ombudsman recommended the outright dismissal of the case, ratiocinating that the Ombudsman did not have
the jurisdiction to resolve the issues of fraudulent appointments of the nine confidential staff and their alleged
overpayment to the damage of LWUA and the government and to decide on the status of De Jesus as a
dismissed employee which belonged to the primary jurisdiction and technical expertise of the CSC.
Said recommendation was disapproved by the Ombudsman and the case was referred for review to Special
Pros. Without conducting a preliminary conference or investigation, Special Pros. came up with the assailed
Review and Recommendation finding De Jesus and Parungao guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, gross
neglect of duty, and falsification.
Facura and Tuason filed their MR but the same was denied. The Ombudsman found that during De Jesus’
dismissal from the service at the LWUA, and despite the advice of the CSC to await the final resolution of his
appeal, De Jesus illegally issued appointments to several co-terminous employees. The appointments were
found to have been prepared and issued by De Jesus and Parungao after the former had been terminated from
LWUA, therefore, without authority to sign/act on any official LWUA document/official matter, which fact he
was fully aware of, thereby making the solemnity of the documents questionable. All said appointments were,
thus, found to be fraudulent, illegal, and of no legal force and effect. Since these were also prepared and
initialed by Parungao, a conspiracy to commit falsification through dishonesty was found to have been present.
It was also found that the DBM approved the LWUA request on retroactivity of payment of back salaries
because not all facts attendant to the illegal appointments had been disclosed to said office. The deliberate
concealment of the illegal appointment papers was dishonest. The attachment of the illegal appointments to
the LWUA Disbursement Voucher for payment of backsalaries, to the prejudice and damage of the government,
was also cited as another deliberate concealment and distortion with false narration of facts.
The Ombudsman also viewed the second set of appointment papers as to have been issued for no apparent
reason and designed to legalize the illegal appointments. Thus, dishonesty on the part of De Jesus was found to
be present for acting against a series of orders issued by the CSC and for the falsification of the illegal
appointment papers.
Aggrieved, De Jesus and Parungao filed a petition for review with the CA, praying for the issuance of a TRO
and/or preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the implementation of the order of dismissal against them.

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The CA, in its Resolution deferred action on the application for TRO and gave Facura and Tuason time to
comment.
After the petition to the CA was filed, LWUA implemented the order of dismissal against De Jesus and
Parungao.
CA granted the application for TRO. Facura and Tuason filed their Manifestation with Extremely Urgent
Motion for Dissolution of the issued TRO but CA denied Facura and Tuason’s motion to dissolve the TRO, and
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of De Jesus and Parungao.
The CA found that the right to appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty other than public
censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than one month or a fine equivalent to more than one
month’s salary, granted to parties by Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act) should generally carry
with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. The right to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was
deemed to be in order because De Jesus’ and Parungao’s right to be protected under R.A. No. 6770 was found
to exist prima facie, and the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right.
Facura, Tuason and LWUA moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution, which motion was opposed by De
Jesus and Parungao. Their MR were denied by the CA.
Facura and Tuason then filed the present Petition for Certiorari in the SC questioning the CA’s resolution.
Issue: Whether an appeal of the Ombudsman’s decision in administrative cases carries with it the suspension
of the imposed penalty;
Held: The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by
the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.
For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an
administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under
the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion
given to the CA in Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the
Rules of Court. Specialis derogat generali. When two rules apply to a particular case that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman
decision from being executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions of the Ombudsman, namely, those
where the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a penalty of suspension of more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to more than one month’s salary. Hence, the dismissal of De Jesus and
Parungao from the government service is immediately executory pending appeal.
Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins his appeal, he
shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the removal. There is no such thing as a vested interest in an
office, or an absolute right to hold office, except constitutional offices with special provisions on salary and
tenure. The Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman being procedural, no vested right of De Jesus and
Parungao would be violated as they would be considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the
salary and emoluments they did not receive in the event that they would win their appeal.
Having ruled that the decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory pending appeal, The Court finds
it unncessary to determine whether Facura and Tuason were heard before the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue: Whether De Jesus was rightfully dismissed from the government service, and whether Parungao was
righfully exonerated by the CA.
Conclusiveness of Judgment
De Jesus contends that under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment and/or res judicata, the present case
is bound by the decision of this Court in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan.
The original complaint filed with the Ombudsman by Facura and Tuason spawned two cases, an administrative
proceeding docketed as OMB-C-A-0496-J, which is the subject of this present case, and a proceeding for the
determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0712-J.
As to the criminal charges, probable cause was found to be present by the Ombudsman, and nine (9)
informations for falsification of public documents were separately filed against De Jesus and Parungao with the
Sandiganbayan. After his Motion to Quash was denied, De Jesus filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
entitled De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan. This petition was resolved in favor of De Jesus with the finding that the
evidence could not sustain a prima facie case. His Motion to Quash was granted for lack of probable cause to

36
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. The Court stated that there was no reasonable ground to
believe that the requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present, finding that nothing in the two sets of
appointment papers constituted an absolutely false narration of facts.
As a result, the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan were consequently dismissed. Copies of the
decisions of this Court and the Sandiganbayan were submitted to the CA through a Manifestation with Most
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion.
De Jesus cited the case of Borlongan v. Buenaventura to support his argument that this administrative case
should be bound by the decision in De Jesus v. Sandiganbayan. In Borlongan, similar to the situation prevailing
in this case, the complaint-affidavit filed with the Ombudsman also spawned two cases – a proceeding for the
determination of probable cause for the filing of criminal charges, and an administrative case subject of the
petition. In said case, this Court found that its factual findings regarding the proceeding for the determination
of probable cause bound the disposition of the factual issues in the administrative case under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment, as both the probable cause proceeding and the administrative case require the
same quantum of evidence, that is, substantial evidence. Furthermore, the factual backdrop in the proceeding
for the determination of probable cause, which this Court declared as insufficient to hold respondents for trial,
was the same set of facts which confronted this Court in the administrative case.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman, Tuason and LWUA argued that the doctrine of res judicata would only
apply to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to administrative matters.
Held: The Court agrees with De Jesus insofar as the finding regarding the falsification of official documents is
concerned.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them. Simply put, conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Although involving different causes of action, this administrative case and the proceeding for probable cause
are grounded on the same set of facts, involve the same issue of falsification of official documents, and require
the same quantum of evidence - substantial evidence, as was similarly found in Borlongan, and correctly relied
upon by De Jesus.
It was ruled in De Jesus that there was no reasonable ground to believe that the requisite criminal intent or
mens rea was present. Although the presence of mens rea is indeed unnecessary for a finding of guilt in an
administrative case for falsification of official documents, it was expressly found by this Court in De Jesus that
there was no absolutely false narration of facts in the two sets of appointment papers.
Hence, the finding that nothing in the two sets of appointment papers constitutes an absolutely false narration
of facts is binding on this case, but only insofar as the issue of falsification of public documents is concerned,
and not on the other issues involved herein, namely, the other acts of De Jesus and Parungao which may
amount to dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as charged in the complaint.
Contrary to Tuason and LWUA’s contentions, the factual finding of this Court in De Jesus as to the absence of
falsification is based on the same evidence as in this administrative case. There are, however, other evidence
and admissions present in this case as cited by Tuason and LWUA which pertain to other issues and not to the
issue of falsification.
Meanwhile the doctrine that res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the
exercise of administrative powers, has been abandoned. Hence, res judicata can likewise be made applicable
to the case at bench. Thus, given all the foregoing, the factual finding in De Jesus that there was no false
statement of facts in both sets of appointment papers, is binding in this case.
Even granting that the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable to the case at bench, this Court
finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings in De Jesus based on a careful review of the
evidence on record. The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory requirement for a finding of
falsification of official documents as an administrative offense. What is simply required is a showing that De
Jesus and Parungao prepared and signed the appointment papers knowing fully well that they were false.
The Court, however, believes that in this case, at the time each set of appointment papers were made, De Jesus
and Parungao believed they were making true statements. They prepared and signed the first set on the basis of
the inter-office memoranda issued by the Board members appointing their respective confidential staff
conformably with DBM approval. The second set was prepared to correct the retroactive appointments to
conform to the CSC reportorial requirements, and the same was also approved by Administrator Jamora. There
was no reason for De Jesus and Parungao to believe such to be false. Irregular it is perhaps, not being in
conformity with the CSC rules on accreditation, but not false. Therefore, this Court finds that no falsification of
official documents occured.

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21. G.R. No. 188630 February 23, 2011 MENDOZA, J.:
FILOMENA VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts: Petitioner was occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27.
Petitioner and her husband Armando obtained several loans from the Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CABMPCI).
Armando defaulted in the payment of his own loan. CABMPCI GM, Martinez, filed a civil case for collection of
sum of money against Armando before the RTC. CABMPCI presented a certification, received and signed by
petitioner, attesting that she and Armando promised to settle their obligation.
The trial court declared Armando in default and rendered a decision ordering him to pay the total amount of
₱1,107,210.90, plus fine and interest at the rate of 3% per month and the cost of collection. Armando filed a
petition for prohibition before the CA alleging that he should not be made to pay said loan as the same had long
been fully paid. CABMPCI failed to comment which was deemed as waiver to refute the claim of payment
contained in the petition. CA promulgated a decision nullifying the RTC decision on the ground that the
obligation had already been settled.
Martinez filed an administrative case with the Ombudsman which found petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct
and imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. Petitioner filed a MR but the Ombudsman denied it.
Martinez filed a MR while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and For Reconsideration.
The CA denied both motions.
A criminal case was also filed against the petitioner before MCTC which convicted the petitioner and imposed
the penalty of five (5) years of imprisonment and disqualification to hold office.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC which affirmed the MCTC Decision.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.
The OSG then filed a Manifestation and Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over the petition.
CA, however, agreed with the OSG and dismissed the petition.
After the CA denied petitioner’s MR, she filed the subject petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Court resolved to deny the petition.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioner had taken a wrong procedure. After the RTC rendered an adverse decision, she should have sought
relief from the Sandiganbayan which exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of RTC whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher or
military and PNP officer, exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper RTC, MeTC, MTC, and
MCTC, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
In this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. An appeal erroneously taken to
the CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
The peculiar circumstances of the case, however, constrain the Court to reconsider its position and give the
petitioner a chance to bring her case to the Sandiganbayan. The Court notes that the CA eventually decided the
administrative case filed against petitioner in her favor. This administrative case (where only substantial
evidence is required) is so intertwined with this criminal case (where evidence beyond reasonable doubt is
required). The CA pointed out that Martinez had issued an Official Receipt and Certification that petitioner had
indeed paid her loan. The said receipt was signed by Martinez herself as the General Manager of CABMPCI,
attesting to the payment of the loan. The CA further ruled that Martinez failed to prove that the petitioner
exerted undue influence in obtaining the loans.
The civil case against Armando was also finally resolved in his favor since the obligation had already been
settled. This civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal cases filed against petitioner.
The filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an afterthought considering that the civil case
against her husband and the administrative case against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
The Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the petitioner a chance to seek relief from the Sandiganbayan.
The Court likewise makes exception to the general rule that the mistakes and negligence of counsel bind the
client. Doubtless, the filing of the appeal before the CA by the petitioner’s former counsel was not simple
negligence. It constituted gross negligence.
The rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client may not be strictly followed where observance
of it would result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so
require. In rendering justice, procedural infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants. If the

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strict application of the rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, this Court is not without
power to exercise its judicial discretion in relaxing the rules of procedure.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the
most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court's findings
of fact, the other elements that are to be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. All these factors are attendant in this
case.
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.
Petitioner’s liberty here is at stake. The MCTC convicted her and imposed upon her the penalty of five (5) years
imprisonment and the disqualification to hold office. This MCTC decision was affirmed by the RTC. If she has
to suffer in prison, her guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt, availing all the remedies provided
for under the law to protect her right. It is highly unjust for her to lose her liberty only because of the gross
negligence of her former counsel.
With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the interest of substantial justice
that the criminal case against her should be reviewed on the merits by the proper tribunal following the
appropriate procedures under the rules. Our legal culture requires the presentation of proof beyond
reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even
property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a
probability of guilt. The primary consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients in their counsel requires from the latter a high standard
and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every lawyer should serve
his client in a meticulous, careful and competent manner. He is bound to protect the client’s interests and to do
all steps necessary therefor as his client reasonably expects him to discharge his obligations diligently.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Filomena Villanueva is given the chance to file the necessary petition for review before the Sandiganbayan,
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. SO ORDERED.

22. G.R. No. 187107 January 31, 2012 VELASCO, JR., J.:
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA vs.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA)
Facts: Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions.
Respondent NEA is a GOCC. NEA Board issued the reorganization plan and implemented an early retirement
program which was availed by some employees and left NEA before the effectivity of the reorganization plan.
The other employees of NEA who did not avail the early retirement program were terminated after effectivity of
the reorganization plan. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to terminate all NEA employees; and
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
Held: Petition must be dismissed.
SC Has Jurisdiction over the Case
Respondents argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
The petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of
hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case
involving as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all told, who were
effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
The Remedy of Injunction Is still Available

39
Respondents allege that the remedy of injunction is no longer available to petitioners as the assailed NEA
Board resolutions have long been implemented.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board may have long been
implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated by other government agencies in the
reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy of injunction.
The Power to Reorganize Includes the Power to Terminate
Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the
power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower complement.
Such contention is erroneous.
It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it.
Here, petitioners have failed to discharge such burden of proof.
Petitioners have the burden to show that: (1) the abolished offices were replaced by substantially the same units
performing the same functions; and (2) incumbents are replaced by less qualified personnel.
Mere allegations without hard evidence cannot be considered as clear and convincing proof.
Next, petitioners state that the NEA Board should not have abolished all the offices of NEA and instead made a
selective termination of its employees while retaining the other employees.
Petitioners argue that for the reorganization to be valid, it is necessary to only abolish the offices or terminate
the employees that would not be retained and the retention of the employees that were tasked to carry out the
continuing mandate of NEA.
The Court already ruled and upheld the policy of the Executive to terminate all the employees of the office
before rehiring those necessary for its operation.
The privatization necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was
a need to terminate employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized
companies. The privatization and restructuring was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was
for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.
Evidently, the fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating all the incumbent employees of NPC and, later
on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that ground alone, vitiate the bona fides of the reorganization.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Resolution issued by the NEA Board of Directors are
hereby UPHELD. SO ORDERED.

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