Evardone vs COMELEC

Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position
during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In
1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the
recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat.
The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the recommendation of Election Registrar
Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone. Evardone filed
a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing process for
being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this present petition.

Issue 1:
WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers under
the Constitution and BP 337 (Local GovernmentCode) was valid.

Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during
the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of
elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC
Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.The
COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a local
government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines
which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC. Pending the
enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or
revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Codeof 1991,
approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991
will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government
Code (B.P. Blg.337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the
enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P.Blg. 337 was
expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We
therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for
recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.

Secretary of Health vs CA
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; SECRETARY OF HEALTH; HAS ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTION OVER LOCAL HEALTH OFFICER PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE. — On the merits, petitioners’ main contention is that
the court a quo erred in finding that the Secretary of Health has ceased to have
administrative jurisdiction over the person of private respondent in view of the enactment
of the Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The
resolution of the main issue raised by the petitioners calls for the determination of the date
of effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The pertinent provision of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: "Sec. 536.
Effectivity Clause. — This Code shall take effect on January first, nineteen hundred
ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein, after its complete publication in at least one
(1) newspaper of general circulation." It is explicit in the abovestated law that the Local
Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on January 1, 1992. It is an elementary
principle of statutory construction that were the words and phrases of a statute are not
obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993]).
Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action (Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC,
218 SCRA 77 [1993]). In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively
charged before petitioner department in 1991. The case was docketed as Administrative
Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was issued by petitioner Secretary of
Health on December 17, 1991. At the time of the commencement of the administrative
action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No.
119. Under the said laws, the Secretary of Health exercises control, direction and
supervision over his subordinates, which include private Respondent. Consequently,
since jurisdiction has been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private
respondent before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it
continues until the final disposition of the administrative case. This Court already ruled in a
number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until
the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary (Bueno Industrial and
Development Corporation v. Enage, 104 SCRA 600 [1981]). At this juncture, it bears
stressing that private respondent, a civil servant, cannot use the courts of justice as a
shield to prevent the implementation of administrative sanctions of executive agencies
against erring public servants.