The importance of solo patrol in policing a liberal society: a response to

John Blundell

Roy Bailey

Introduction

In his recent article in Economic Affairs, John Blundell (Blundell, 2007) asserts
that police officers must patrol alone wherever possible, citing the evidence
from an American study that solo patrol is no more dangerous than working in
pairs. Moreover, the same study claims that the deployment of solo patrols
actually improves the response times (Skolnick and Bayley, 1986, p. 101).
Blundell, in developing this theme, argues that foot and bike officers should
also be deployed on solo patrol. Such a policy, he notes, would lead to a
much better relationship with the public. This contrasts to the current position,
where officers predominantly patrol in pairs, talking and interacting with each
other and failing to engage meaningfully with the community. Not only does
this practice lead to alienation from the public, it is also wasteful of scarce
resources, effectively halving police presence. Solo patrol, conversely, would
enable officers to establish communication and trust, leading to a greater
degree of public confidence in the police. Such a visible and consistent police
presence would also encourage the public to pass on vital information and
intelligence, resulting in higher detection rates.

Police deployment strategies impact significantly on the key relationship

between the police and the public and their importance in the context of
policing a liberal society cannot be overstated. The issue of solo patrol is
highly charged and there is a clear dichotomy of views between ‘management
cops’ and ‘street cops’. Indeed, such is the antipathy of ‘street cops’ to solo
patrol, there is little likelihood of community policing ever becoming firmly
established. In 1992, as a serving Thames Valley Police superintendent, I
undertook some research into the arguments for, and against, double crewing
of police patrol vehicles (Bailey, 1992). Although the research was primarily
directed at police patrol vehicles, its findings are equally valid to foot patrol
officers. In this article, I will summarise my earlier research in the context of
police deployment strategies. As will be seen, the evidence supports
Blundell’s assertion that there should be more solo patrol.

The first aim of my research was to examine the available literature in order to
determine the relevant issues. Once these had been identified, it was
necessary to test the perceptions of patrol officers, and a questionnaire was
devised to obtain and analyse the views of a representative sample of officers
from three different police areas within the Thames Valley force. Ninety four
officers were interviewed. In addition to the survey, data was collected from
the central command and control computer over a seven day period covering
the same three areas. The intention was to compare and contrast the findings
with those gleaned from the survey and then to comment in the context of
prior research.

Literature Review
The key findings from the review of the literature highlight some important
issues. Dealing first with policing style, the 1981 Police foundation study,
based on a survey of twenty eight cities, and an experiment in Newark, New
Jersey, reported a distinct improvement in the fear of crime when officers were
deployed on foot patrol. In addition, there was an evident increase in
confidence vis-à-vis neighbourhood safety. Moreover, the police began to
view the police service more positively (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Moore and
Kelling, 1983). Policing style has a discernible impact on crime detection,
since the prime determinant of success is information given to the police by
members of the public (Reiss, 1971; Chatterton, 1976; Sanders, 1977;
Ericson, 1981; Mawby, 1979; Burrows and Tarling, 1987; Steer, 1980). Less
than 25% of crime is solved by real detective work. The importance of this is
that the police cannot afford to alienate the public. Without public cooperation,
police effectiveness would be terminally impaired.

The public’s view of policing is at odds with that of the police. There are
significant differences between the police and the public in terms of job
evaluation. The service element of policing is rated more highly by the public
than by the police (Jones and Levi, 1983). The police were often criticised for
not patrolling local streets, for not possessing key interpersonal skills and for
generally being out of step with the local community. McConville and
Shepherd, 1992 (page 44) noted that:

‘Throughout all police areas, there was a clear, almost universal

demand for officers to patrol on foot rather than by car. People do not
confuse fast response to 999 calls, which they value, with cruising
around neighbourhoods in cars, which has no obvious benefit for them.
The primary concern is not crime related and foot patrols offer them
what they seek – approachability, accountability and symbolic
reassurance.’

The culture of the operational patrol officer is ‘essentially aggressive and

action centred, and stands in opposition to the ideals of community beat work’
(Ibid – page 184).

There is a significant gulf in understanding between operational officers

(street cops) and senior managers (management cops). Robert Reiner
(Reiner, 1985 – page 93) noted that:

‘Management cops are derided by “street wise” operational officers.

The depth of the gulf is due to the different, often contradictory,
functions of the two levels.’

Job satisfaction is a key determinant in policing style. Younger and aspiring

officers do not value foot patrol. It is seen as low status and as little more than
a necessary first step to promotion and the more specialised and glamorous
aspects of police work. Policies geared to promoting more foot patrol may be
met with opposition from those being targeted (Kinsey, 1985)
Importantly, the number of major incidents requiring the presence of two or
more officers is relatively low in any twenty four hour period (Gray,
unpublished research by Kent police inspector, 1987). Supervisors rarely
attend incidents (Ekblom and Heal, 1982; Shapland and Vagg, 1988; Gray,
1987) and the dominant tendencies are to respond to incidents by sending a
vehicle (Ibid)

General patrol cars were passively ‘laid up’ for long periods of time waiting for
something to happen. Furthermore, the general perception of those drivers
was that they were there to respond to incidents. Not only was their time not
used constructively, their supervisors appear to condone the practice (Gray,
unpublished research by Kent police inspector, 1987)

There is a strong belief among officers that they are undermanned and that
they had the greatest difficulty in coping with the everyday demand, let alone
major incidents. The researchers found no evidence in support of this claim
and that even though there were sufficient resources, supervisors were
unwilling, or unable, to break out of the typical pattern of deployment and use
their officers proactively (Shapland and Hobbs, 1988)

Single crewing policies impact negatively on police morale. When such a

policy was introduced in part if Bristol in 1988, officers felt it would not work
because of the increased risk of assault (Ibid). The role of control room
operator is a complex one and any system of graded response involving a
strategy of single crewing will fail unless there has been sufficient planning
and training (Ibid).

The view of the street cops

The arguments cited against single patrol by operational officers can, in the
main, be rebutted. These centre on safety, effectiveness and morale.

Although there is a general perception that solo patrol increases their

vulnerability there is no evidence to support this fear (Wilson and Brewer,
1992). It is argued that single crewing leads to a waste of resources because
of the need to send additional ‘back-up’ when required. Double crewed cars, it
is said, require less back-up. Again, there is little evidence to support this and
the vast majority of incidents do not require more than one officer (Shapland
and Hobbs, 1988; Gray, 1987) Another argument is that single crewing
compromises road safety in that drivers need to concentrate on their driving
rather than looking elsewhere. This is contradicted by a study into the
incidence, causation and cost of police vehicle accidents (Evans, 1988).
Single patrol officers, it is alleged, will be less productive in terms of process
generated: research findings have been mixed on this issue, some supporting
the claim and others rebutting it (Bardswell and Bentley, 1971; Wilson and
Brewer, 1971). It is argued that solo patrol officers would soon be overloaded
with paperwork, compared with double crewed patrols, where there would be
fairer distribution. This has more to do with the proper execution of graded
response, where there is a fairer distribution of work.
The street cops also argue that foot patrol officers are unable to provide a
speedy response to incidents, causing public dissatisfaction (there is some
evidence to support this - Shapland and Hobbs, 1988) and that single crewing
would have a negative impact on morale. Again, this is borne out by two
studies (Shapland and Hobbs, 1988; Wilson and Brewer, 1992).

The view of the management cops

Senior police managers (management cops) would not appear to have the
same views and a policy of single patrolling would be welcomed by the
majority because of the positive impact it would have in relation to several
problems. Firstly, it would enable a more effective use of scarce resources
and would release officers for deployment in more proactive capacities.
Secondly, it would improve the relationship with the public, as more foot patrol
officers could be deployed. In addition, there would be more personal
interactions with the public. Solo patrol officers would be more civil and less
aggressive in their dealings with the public. This means there would be fewer
complaints against the police. This is an interesting point since research
suggests that complaints against the police involving allegations of serious
assault are much more likely to occur when two or more officers are deployed.
Indeed, nine out of every ten concerned incidents involving two or more
officers. This requires careful interpretation, though, since the incidents in
question had attracted a heavy police presence (Maguire and Corbett, 1991)
However, assaults on police are more prevalent where double crewed patrols
are involved, perhaps suggesting a confrontation is more likely when two or
more officers are in attendance (Cooper and Godley, 1981)

Survey of operational officers

A number of interesting findings emerged from my survey, some of which

identify clear patterns and others which highlight the need for further research.

 A substantial majority of officers (65%) were deployed in vehicles, with

only 27% on foot and 4% on cycles. The predisposition for vehicle use,
especially double crewing, is a consistent feature. When deployed,
65% of officers were deployed in pairs
 Genuine emergencies occur relatively infrequently. 47% of respondents
did not deal with any during their last tour of duty, with a further 35%
claiming that, at most, there were only one or two genuine
emergencies during their shifts. 51% of officers felt that the number of
genuine emergencies was below average, therefore perpetuating the
perception (some would say myth) that the police were always under
pressure. However, nearly half (47%) thought that the number of
genuine emergencies was either average or above average, thus
negating the assertion that the police are always under pressure
 Of the incidents attended, 35% of respondents said that none of the
incidents required more than one officer, with a further 46% claiming
that only one to three incidents needed two or more officers. Thus for
the vast majority of incidents, double crewing was unnecessary.
 Possibly of interest is that more women than men (47% against 32%)
thought no incidents required more than one officer
 The fear of violence, particularly that directed at the police, is a core
feature of the arguments used by respondents in support of double
crewing and 61% cited incidents in the past where violence had been
used. However, during the period of this study, violent incidents were
few and far between
 A majority of respondents saw their role primarily as law enforcers and
crime fighters. Just 9% of them said they had given ‘advice’
 There is a predisposition to attend incidents ‘mob handed’. 19% of
respondents attending incidents said that ten or more officers were
deployed, with a further 27% claiming that two officers handled the
incident. Only 12% said the incident was handled by one officer
 Supervisors rarely attend incidents, with 83% of respondents claiming
that either no supervisory support was given at incidents or, at most,
only one incident was attended by a supervisor
 Officers are overwhelmingly in favour of twenty-four hour double
crewing, irrespective of any evidence to the contrary. Officers with ten
or more years service are less dogmatic about double crewing
 There is a vast gulf in policing ethos between senior police managers
and operational officers. 75% of respondents felt that senior managers
were not in touch with ordinary operational policing and 96% felt the
senior managers would not be able to appreciate their position on
double crewing
 The biggest risk factor in the incidence of assault on police would
appear to be two or more officers in attendance at an incident. In 60%
of reported assaults, officers were deployed in pairs.

Central data collection

Data was obtained centrally from the command and control computer for each
of the three police areas (Oxford, Slough and High Wycombe) over a seven
day period. The results, in the main, supported the survey findings and
confirmed the patterns highlighted in previous studies.

Overall, there was little difference in the average time taken to deal with
incidents, irrespective of deployment status. Although all three police areas
appeared reluctant to use foot patrols and area beat officers for incident
response, the average time, when they were used, was only a few seconds
slower than for single crewed cars. This, to some extent, contradicts the
evidence from the Shapland and Hobbs study.

Miscellaneous incidents, at 30.4%, accounted for the biggest category of

response deployments. Next came activated burglar alarms at 17%. Public
order incidents were higher in Oxford at 10% than in Slough (5.2%) and High
Wycombe (6.7%)

The infrequent attendance of supervisors at incidents is confirmed by the data

(which suggests that 11% of incidents were attended by supervisors). This
tends to support the view that there is a gap in understanding between the
different groups of officers. Given that sergeants and inspectors rarely see
their officers in operational settings, it is reasonable to assume that senior
police managers must be much more remote

Incidents involving assault appeared quite rare, particularly in High Wycombe,

where they accounted for only 0.5% of incidents (Slough 3% and Oxford
2.6%). No officers were assaulted during the week in any of the three police
areas.

Conclusions

It is clear from all the evidence available that police deployment strategies
have a major impact on the critical relationship between the police and the
public. Importantly, without the full cooperation and consent of the public, the
police would be unable to function and the crime detection rate would sink to
an unacceptable level. Furthermore, the public’s view of policing would
appear to be out of line with that of operational officers. Whilst the public
emphasises the service aspect of policing, the street officers see themselves
as crime fighters, placing little value on ‘community policing’. Whilst there has
been considerable rhetoric from senior police managers about the value of re-
engaging with their communities, they will face enormous challenges from
their officers, not least because such strategies will involve the imposition of
solo patrol in many instances.

The practice of ‘double crewing’ is deeply embedded within operational police

culture. In recent years, with the introduction of health and safety legislation,
the image of patrol officers has changed dramatically. Not only do they
demand to patrol in pairs, they now wear protective clothing and carry an
assortment of items to satisfy health and safety considerations. Today’s police
uniform is more akin to that of the military. Given their new image and the
training to support their use of batons, pepper spray (captor) and tazers, there
must be some confusion amongst operational officers about their role within
the community.

There is a huge gulf in understanding between street cops and management

cops. Whilst there is much presentational gloss from chief officers about their
commitment to community policing, the reality on the ground is rather
different.

The majority of reasons cited by officers in defence of patrolling in pairs can

be refuted and yet they would resist fiercely any attempt by their managers to
impose solo patrol. Community policing, with its implication of solo patrol, is
not an attractive career option for young aspiring officers, it is not action-
centred and it is not exciting. However, not only is the current practice
wasteful of expensive resources, it inflicts long-term cumulative damage on
the relationship with the public. When in pairs, officers will spend much of their
time talking with each other. Their engagement with the community will, at
best, be marginal and, at worst, non existent. Moreover, they are more likely
to take ‘executive’ action when in pairs and more likely to be assaulted and be
the subject of complaints. Contrast this with area beat officers, who have been
used to solo patrol, often in ‘problem’ estates, and there is a significant
difference in attitude. The ‘world’ view of an experienced area beat officer is
more sanguine and there is a strong interdependence with his or her
community. They will be more in tune with the needs, problems and
frustrations of their communities and have a more positive attitude towards
their neighbourhoods. They are more likely to receive good quality information
and intelligence and the public will feel they are getting good value.

What is needed now is a real commitment from chief officers to support the
introduction of community policing. There must be a career structure and an
appraisal system which visibly recognises and rewards area beat officers.
There should be prominent role models within the service who have achieved
success via the community policing route. The default deployment strategy
should be solo patrol and officers should be encouraged to engage with their
communities. Indeed, this should be assessed in both quantitative and
qualitative terms. There may even be an argument for including community
feedback so that the views of the public are given some force. There will
remain a need for double crewing but it should be just one of a range of
deployment strategies based on identifiable need. Officers should be actively
discouraged from patrolling in pairs and supervisors should spend more time
out on the streets supporting their staff and enforcing solo patrol. Given the
inherent cultural challenges, none of this will be accomplished easily.
However, for the police service to regain and then maintain the support of the
public, real change is necessary. The time for lip service is over.

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Roy Bailey is a former Thames Valley police superintendent with extensive
experience in operational policing. His roles in the service also included CID,
drug squad, community liaison and training. He now works as a business
consultant for Suracle, an IT company, where he is Public Sector Lead.

Abstract

Police deployment strategies have a direct bearing on the general relationship

with the public. In this article, Roy Bailey reviews his earlier research and
argues that not only is routine deployment of officers in pairs wasteful of finite
resources, it can lead to increased alienation from the public.