India and Pakistan at The Edge

Survival
Global Politics and Strategy
ISSN: 0039-6338 (Print) 1468-2699 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20
India and Pakistan at the Edge
Andrew C. Winner & Toshi Yoshihara
To cite this article: Andrew C. Winner & Toshi Yoshihara (2002) India and Pakistan at the Edge,
Survival, 44:3, 69-86, DOI: 10.1080/00396330212331343432
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330212331343432
Published online: 27 Jun 2007.
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India and Pakistan at the Edge 69
India and Pakistan

at the Edge
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Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara
Since India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers in 1998, they have come
twice to the brink of war. The latest crisis came even as US and allied forces
Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 00:05 09 June 2016
were operating in Afghanistan and out of bases in Pakistan. It was set off by
terrorist attacks on the Indian parliament in December and on an Indian army
camp in May. The latter attack killed 30, mostly women and children.1
India blamed Pakistan for both attacks and vowed to respond. Both countries
mobilised their conventional forces and moved them to border areas.
The international response was just as predictable: leading states pressured
Pakistan to rein in cross-border infiltration of militants into Kashmir and urged
India to refrain from military escalation. US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld warned in unusually specific terms about the devastation that a
nuclear exchange between the two would cause.2 Concerns about the impact of a
war – conventional or nuclear – on the US-led war on terrorism were added to
the usual worries arising from crises on the subcontinent.3
The United States has adopted a two-part strategy of pressing Pakistan for a
permanent end to its support for terrorists in Kashmir, and encouraging India to
use the upcoming elections in Kashmir as an opportunity for political change.
Given the demands of Washington’s war on terrorism, it is unclear whether this
strategy will be sustained. In the past, engagement has occurred during a crisis
– both because of concern that a conflict could escalate and because at times
Pakistan in particular has courted such attention to balance India – and has
faded as soon as worry about a large-scale war has passed. While the current
war on terrorism increases the likelihood that the United States and others will
remain engaged in the region for a longer period, the focus still is not on the
fundamental causes of the persistent instability between India and Pakistan.
This needs to change. It is in the interest of the world to see India and Pakistan
make not just one, but a continuing series of moves that bring them back – more
permanently – from the nuclear brink, and it is the duty of leading states to assist
them in this strategic adjustment.
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Andrew C. Winner is a senior staff member at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
(IFPA). Toshi Yoshihara is a research fellow at IFPA and a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. They are co-authors of Nuclear Stability in
South Asia (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2002). The views expressed
in this article are solely those of the authors.
Survival, vol. 44, no. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 69–86 © The International Institute for Strategic Studies
70 Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara
The next crisis and causes of escalation

The next crisis will likely begin over Kashmir. At the birth of an independent
India and Pakistan, control over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was
contested militarily and left unresolved politically.4 The war in 1965, the battles
over the Saichen glacier that began in 1984, the 1990 crisis, the Kargil crisis of
1999, the most recent flare-up and numerous smaller crises all had Kashmir at
their heart. Even in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war that was fought for other
reasons, and which resulted in the creation of an independent Bangladesh, the
issue of Kashmir was never far from the surface.
Pakistan, in part due to its conventional military inferiority, will continue to
have a strong incentive to keep the conflict in Kashmir going to tie down
numerically superior Indian forces. If Islamabad decides to escalate cross-border
infiltrations or if militants already based in Indian Kashmir conduct a series of

spectacular operations, then New Delhi will be forced to respond in some way.
There are several reasons that Pakistan might provoke a war. One would be the
consensus among Pakistani decision-makers that the Kashmir issue cannot be
resolved through negotiations. A second would be the need to divert political
pressure from Islamic radicals, a tactic that has been used by Islamabad in both
Kashmir and Afghanistan. If the continuing American presence removes
Afghanistan as a viable target for this radicalism, Kashmir becomes the only
practical outlet. A third reason might be that the Pakistani military, faced with
an increasingly unfavourable balance of conventional forces, feels that it must
step up pressure on the Indian military in Kashmir in order to draw away
resources that could be used against Pakistan directly.
More generally, the advent of open nuclear deterrence between the two sides
may also have set up a dangerous dynamic, described under the term ‘stability-
instability paradox’.5 Long a staple of strategic theory, the Kargil crisis of 1999
may have provided some evidence for this phenomenon’s actual operation.
In essence, the theory posits that the establishment of nuclear deterrence between
two rivals opens up the possibility of conventional war. In the case of Pakistan
and India, open nuclear deterrence between the two has allowed Pakistan to
neutralise India’s conventional military advantage through the threat of nuclear
response and escalate its own low-intensity conflict in Kashmir.6
Such increases in terrorist activity create both political and military pressure
on New Delhi to react. India has two general response options. The first, which
India pursued in 1999, is to attack the problem directly, conducting counter-
insurgency operations only within Kashmir. The second – essentially Delhi’s
threatened response in the 2002 crisis – is to escalate against Pakistan
conventionally, both to cut off infiltration across the line of control and to
threaten to punish Pakistan more directly. Both of these options, and defensive
moves against a possible Pakistani conventional response, require mobilisation
of Indian forces and movements towards the border.
While India has learned lessons from Kargil and improved its counter-
insurgency techniques in Kashmir, New Delhi clearly felt that such a response
was insufficient in the most recent crisis.7 In May and June 2002, New Delhi
openly threatened to cross the line of control to conduct strikes on the Pakistani
support structure for cross-border operations. India also hinted at a more general
offensive by mobilising large forces and moving them close to the border.
At this point in the crisis, Pakistan is faced with some unpalatable options.
It can back down by stopping cross-border infiltration or ending support for
forces fighting in Kashmir. This could prove difficult because of the recent
precedent: Prime Minister Nazir Sharif was deposed by then Chief of the Army
Staff Pervez Musharraf after such a concession in 1999. Moreover, even if the
Pakistani government chose to back down, some groups operating in Kashmir
would ignore Islamabad’s orders and continue fighting. A second option could
be for Pakistan to hint at, or openly threaten, to use its nuclear forces if India
crosses the line of control or engages in wider conventional strikes against
Pakistan proper. Given the continuing deterioration in the conventional balance

in favour of India, Pakistan may, over time, come to believe that this is its only
option. Islamabad would direct such a threat at New Delhi, hoping both to deter
it and to draw in key outside powers such as the United States. But if both
deterrence and the bid for outside intervention failed, Pakistan could feel distinct
pressure to use its nuclear forces.
What makes this escalation scenario both troublesome and increasingly
plausible is Pakistan’s persistent inability to correct the military imbalance.
Four inter-related weaknesses have locked-in Islamabad’s disadvantages.
First, Pakistan suffers from severe manpower shortages – nearly a 2–1
disadvantage in active duty personnel. Second, geographically, Pakistan lacks the
necessary strategic depth to tolerate a substantial loss of territory during the initial
phases of a conflict. A successful conventional thrust by India into Pakistan’s mid-
point would sever the country in half. Third, an arms embargo by the United
States over the past decade has stymied modernisation efforts and has led to a
steady atrophy in military equipment. Even though China has offered Pakistan
military assistance, particularly in the nuclear and ballistic missile realm, India
enjoys better access to conventional weaponry from cash-starved Russia.
Fourth, Pakistan’s poor economic performance, especially when compared to
India’s healthy growth, strains Islamabad’s ability to finance its modernisation
programmes. Finally, the Bush administration’s eagerness to improve relations
with India could give New Delhi unprecedented access to America’s military
assistance. That access, denied for most of the Cold War, could significantly
exacerbate the military imbalance.
At this juncture, with India and Pakistan either conducting conventional
military operations across the border or threatening to do so, both sides are
also likely to be readying their nuclear forces for signalling resolve and
potential use. During this phase of posturing, deterrence could be undermined
by misinformation, misperceptions and misinterpretations of the sort that have
contributed to past wars and crises.8 In all past crises between these two
countries, there has been a persistent misinterpretation of political signals
and misreading of military and political intelligence.9 Each side has had
flawed assessments of the military balance – either exaggerating its own
capabilities or underestimating those of the opponent. These flawed analyses

are often based on mirror imaging or preconceived notions about the culture
and interests of the other side.10 Communications systems that could have been
used to clear up misunderstandings too often were not used or were used to
spread further disinformation.
There are, moreover, two other troubling deficiencies in the structure of
deterrence. The first is the assumption that the current, relatively balanced
nuclear force structures will remain in place. In fact, nuclear-force developments
continue apace on both sides, as underscored by Pakistan’s recent tests of
existing and new missiles.11 The emergence of a major asymmetry in nuclear
postures, particularly unanticipated ones, could itself produce strategic
instability. While such strategic technical surprises are not likely for the next
five or even ten years, the dynamics of even a slow arms race will continue to
fuel anxieties and suspicions clearly not conducive to nuclear stability.12
The second troubling area is the safety and security of the nuclear weapons
and forces on both sides. India, and more recently Pakistan, have each declared
that steps have been taken to ensure the safety and security of their arsenals.13
Given the secrecy that surrounds such matters in any country, it is difficult to
judge the veracity of these claims.
Addressing the causes of crisis and escalation

The crisis described above may not occur in the near future. It is entirely
conceivable that both India and Pakistan will stumble along for the next ten
years. Periodic crises or tensions may punctuate the relationship without any
serious danger of nuclear escalation, in circumstances that one scholar has
described as ‘ugly stability’.14 Deterrence will hold and the flare-ups in Kashmir
will be contained because India sees it as a sideshow and Pakistan cannot
change the situation. However, existing trends already suggest that the
conditions surrounding the standoff will worsen over the decade.
The four major problems outlined above – Kashmir, the conventional
imbalance, the nuclear balance and chronic misperceptions – could bring the
region too close to a major conventional conflict or a nuclear exchange for any
reasonable degree of comfort. Yet key states – the US in particular – have lacked a
robust and comprehensive strategy to pull India and Pakistan back from the
edge, for three reasons. First, after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the
United States no longer perceived vital strategic interests in the region.
Second, as a power with more to gain from dealing with Pakistan alone, New
Delhi had no interest in allowing the United States to meddle. This reticence was
due in part to lingering Cold War and non-aligned thinking in the Congress
Party and, subsequently, the nationalist agenda of the Bharatiya Janata Party.
Third, and most important, Washington’s lack of engagement was dictated by a
strong set of non-proliferation policies and laws backed by Congress, which
began to dominate US thinking about the region. In 1990, the United States cut
off military assistance to Pakistan and applied sanctions after Islamabad crossed
certain thresholds in its then covert nuclear programme.15
The non-proliferation approach again was at the core of the US, and
international, response to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998.
The United States believed that a dual policy of condemnation and sanctions
might succeed in freezing existing nuclear programmes, and ideally, in rolling
them back. This policy was designed to punish both countries for offending
international norms and to signal to potential future proliferators the high costs
of such actions. At the time, Washington believed that proposing stability
measures to prevent nuclear use was tantamount to an implicit recognition of
their status as nuclear powers. If was feared that this would have ‘broken faith’
with nuclear non-proliferation advocates and opened the Pandora’s box of other
states following suit.16 Laws requiring an aid cut-off in 1990, known as the
Pressler Amendment, and sanctions in 1998, known as the Glenn Amendment,
also left the first Bush and the Clinton administrations with little room for
manoeuvre. Only at the eleventh hour, after India conducted its nuclear tests,
did the Clinton administration attempt to move closer to Pakistan in a failed bid
to keep it from responding to New Delhi in kind.
The balance between the desire to see a stable environment in South Asia
and to support global non-proliferation goals is a delicate one, and how
Washington weighed these two potentially competing goals depended on its
view of the strategic situation at the time. In 1990, the downsides of breaking a
long-standing relationship with Pakistan were difficult to see. In 1998, a closer
examination of the motives for the nuclear tests might have shown that neither
New Delhi nor Pakistan were going to roll back their programmes in the face of
sanctions or condemnation. Indeed, four years after the nuclear tests, neither
New Delhi nor Islamabad have indicated any willingness to give up their
nuclear arsenals, absent a sea-change in the international system.17 The Kargil
crisis of 1999 tipped the scales in favour of a more robust policy of engagement
on stability issues, but the Clinton administration held back. The Bush
administration fared no better until the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the
subsequent military campaign in Afghanistan and the June 2002 crisis.
The obvious risks to US vital interests, regional peace and broader global
stability now demand sustained engagement with both Pakistan and India.
This shift in policy will come at a high price, both financially and politically.
It will be difficult to gain the trust and cooperation of both Islamabad and New
Delhi. A policy that pushes the two states to resolve long-standing differences and
give up on deeply held beliefs will be resisted. However, conditions today are
sufficiently changed to overcome these barriers. A renewed US–Pakistan military
relationship, under the right conditions outlined below, can be achieved without
alienating India. Free of Cold War constraints, Washington can now engage India in
a genuine strategic partnership that addresses common interests in many areas of
the world – such as ensuring the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and managing
the resurgence of China. Similarly, with the right combination of incentives and
reassurance, Pakistan can be weaned from the dream of recovering Kashmir through
force of arms. The Kashmir problem must be at the centre of any new and
comprehensive policy designed to permanently bolster stability in South Asia.
Kashmir
Historically, international involvement in the Kashmir dispute has been sporadic
and not very effective. The reasons for this include the perceived strategic
insignificance of the region during the Cold War and Indian resistance to
involving outside powers. Solutions, therefore, have in the past been left to the two
states involved and the Kashmiri people themselves. As recently as January 2002,
US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that ‘the United States is always ready to
assist its two friends. But it must be a dialogue between the two parties’.18
This attitude needs to change. While the United States cannot solve all of the
issues, it can take several key steps that will lessen possibilities for potential
escalation. The first it has already done – pressuring Pakistan to stop supporting
terrorist groups that cross the Line of Control into Kashmir. The second is to
increase the inviolability of the line of control itself. To do this, a small group of
key countries, likely led by the US due to its capabilities with high-tech
monitoring, should deploy a reasonably sized monitoring force with both
ground and air components. The Open Skies Treaty – a Cold War-era agreement
that still allows for regular surveillance overflights of several countries – and the
aircraft and procedures that were designed to support it provide one model.19
The size and capabilities of the force could be worked out with contributing
nations and the two sides. Indian and Pakistani participation in the force
should be strongly encouraged, with an eye to eventually phasing out the
international component once the Kashmir issue is closer to an overall
settlement. Information gained on unauthorised cross-border movements would
be instantly communicated to the authorities in both countries.
As a key part of a move toward a permanent settlement, the United States –
and ideally the other permanent members of the Security Council – should
express their willingness to recognise the line of control as the international
border between the two countries. This move would have two beneficial effects
on long-term stability. First, it would signal to Pakistani hard-liners the limits of
acceptable solutions for Kashmir – the territory currently under the control of
each state would no longer be considered disputed by the United States and
other major powers. The Kashmir issue would then become one of governance
rather than territorial control. Second, making the line of control an international
border reduces some of India’s options for conventional escalation in a future
Kashmir conflict. While New Delhi may still consider it necessary to conduct
military strikes into the Pakistani portion of Kashmir, in doing so it will be
violating an internationally recognised border. The current thinking – that
strikes across the line of control are somehow less destabilising or escalatory
than crossing the international border farther south – would be changed,
potentially raising the threshold for that type of Indian retaliation.
Because the Kashmir issue is tied to regime legitimacy, particularly in
Pakistan, a statement by the United States that the line of control should be
considered the international border might meet strong resistance and lead to
internal instability or the overthrow of the Musharraf government. However,
this risk can be minimised through adequate diplomatic preparation and a
package of military and diplomatic support by the United States for Pakistan, as
described below. The establishment of an internationally recognised border,
however, should not await resolution of all other issues in Kashmir. That has
been the situation up until now, and more than 50 years after Kashmir was
divided, no resolution has been reached.
In addition, to push New Delhi to address the longer-standing political
problem, the United States and other key countries should endorse an enhanced
autonomous status for Kashmir within India and within the newly recognised
borders. That autonomy would not necessarily replicate the pre-1952 status that
Kashmir enjoyed: economics, demographics and politics have changed
significantly since then. Instead, the United States, working with its allies and
other countries such as Russia, should encourage negotiations between New
Delhi and Kashmiri authorities to determine on a point-by-point basis the exact

parameters of that autonomous status. Although less important for stability,
Pakistan should be similarly encouraged to consider political changes of the
same type for the portion of Kashmir under its control. Bringing in other states
with interests in South Asia such as Japan, the G-8 should also encourage cross-
border economic cooperation and provide incentives to make it happen.
The continued successful prosecution of the war against al-Qaeda in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan should help the Kashmir situation. A successful
crackdown on radical Islamist groups within Pakistan should lower the level of
terrorist activities in Kashmir; al-Qaeda operatives already there would be more
constrained in their ability to cause trouble. Given the resources being expended
by the United States and its coalition partners already in South Asia, it might of
course be wondered why these countries would want to take on increased
responsibility for this region. First, the future costs associated with not
addressing it could be catastrophic. Second, to some degree, this responsibility
has already been taken on. The role of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage in conveying to India Pakistani President Musharraf’s pledge of a
‘permanent end’ to encouraging terrorist activity in Kashmir had the effect of
making Washington the guarantor of the agreement.20 Such a role should be
formalised within a larger political framework.
The conventional military balance

The prevailing conventional military imbalance is most amenable to potentially
stabilising change. Altering the balance of forces, at least in terms of bean
counting, could be made relatively transparent. If adjusted properly, the desired
result, greater security for both sides, would also be more visible. Moreover, the
conventional imbalance is the crucial problem that could bring both sides to the
nuclear brink. A more stable military situation could provide mutual reassurance
on the basis of which both sides could move beyond the current stalemate. Greater
balance on the conventional front would discredit some of the unilateral military
solutions that hotheads on either side may count on to solve the Kashmir
problem. (Which is not to say that a conventional rebalance, by itself, would
eradicate the lingering belief among the more extreme elements in India and
Pakistan that a silver bullet exists and is only waiting to be fired).
Pakistan needs greater confidence in its ability to hold off an Indian
conventional assault. Islamabad’s insecurity in this regard is at the heart of its
first-strike nuclear posture. Thus, Pakistan’s military needs a major boost in
capabilities. Intuitively, this may seem counter-productive – because arms build-
ups tend to fuel security dilemmas. Yet a carefully calibrated modernisation
programme, tailored to Pakistan’s defensive needs, could ease its anxieties and
thereby loosen its tight grip on the nuclear trigger. Islamabad would no longer
have to fear a ‘use it or lose’ scenario regarding its nuclear arsenal. A more
capable defence that could thwart a quick Indian victory would also provide the
necessary time for Pakistan to seek international intervention.
Pakistan’s main objective in a war with India would be to prevent armoured

forces from overrunning defensive positions and to deny its adversary control of
the skies. Bolstering Pakistan’s defence in these two areas would require
substantial outside assistance. While the United States restored military
assistance for Pakistan, including training and some arms sales, such support
has thus far been modest in scale and sophistication. The United States should
more fully revive arms sales to Islamabad with weaponry focused primarily on
halting an Indian combined arms-thrust through Pakistan’s Punjabi heartland.
One effective means of righting the military imbalance would be to sell
Pakistan a limited number of fighters or attack helicopters armed with air-to-
surface missiles. Short-range, precision-guided munitions would enhance
Pakistan’s anti-armour capabilities without substantially increasing its long-
range offensive power. To protect its airspace, Pakistan should receive improved
fixed air-defence capabilities. This would serve to blunt India’s efforts to gain
undisputed air superiority or to conduct early strikes against key Pakistani
targets, including nuclear weapons-related facilities. Most important, bolstering
the systems and software that support military operations would go a long way
toward strengthening Pakistan’s defence. All of these deliveries would have to
enjoy substantial preferential terms in order to ease the financial burden on a
virtually bankrupt economy.
There are, of course, some obvious potential problems and sources of
resistance to such a move. A convincing case on the strategic imperatives of a
conventional military balance would have to be made to the US Congress, with
its concerns about Pakistan’s democracy and pursuit of WMD. Memories of the
traumatic arms embargo of 1990 might compel Pakistan to reject such overtures.
However, attractive terms for the sales and the supply of capabilities unmatched
by others would make the offer harder to refuse. Moreover, the United States
would not have to undertake this task alone. Reliable allies, such as the United
Kingdom, could also play a more prominent role to help insulate Washington
from criticism. Above all, the arms sales would have to be conditioned on
explicit and verifiable Pakistani pledges finally to cut off all support for
terrorism. If the deliveries were phased to Islamabad’s actual implementation of
these pledges, it would not be a bad deal for India.
To be sure, the line between offensive and defensive capabilities can be blurry:
there is no distinction between an ‘offensive’ and a ‘defensive’ combat aircraft.
The classic dilemma over intentions and capabilities immediately surfaces in
debates on arms sales. Pakistan might be emboldened to employ the newly
proffered weapons for offensive or other destabilising purposes. Indeed, there is
an unfortunate precedent: Islamabad converted its US-made F-16 fighters to drop
nuclear weapons. (The United States had transferred the fighters in an attempt to
stem proliferation by boosting Pakistan’s confidence in its conventional abilities).
In addition, a more confident Pakistan might be tempted to increase its insurgency
activities in Kashmir with less fear of punishment.
Several factors outweigh these legitimate concerns. First, India poses a
strategic threat to Pakistan while the reverse is not true. In a major conventional
war, a decisive Indian victory and some form of occupation of Pakistan are
entirely conceivable. Reaching the other side of Pakistan is a short trip for Indian
forces while occupying New Delhi or reaching other critical Indian cities is beyond
the capabilities of even a revitalised Pakistani military. Geographic realities
ensure that this fundamental asymmetry will persist. Second, the conventional
military imbalance is real and growing in India’s favour. Most worrisome, India’s
qualitative advances, the keys to achieving decisive victories over Pakistan, will
continue to accelerate if Islamabad’s military is allowed to languish. To correct
this disparity and to help Pakistan keep up with India, the United States and
others should focus on qualitative solutions to holding off an Indian conventional
offensive. While it is often difficult to calculate exactly how much equipment is
‘just right’ (bean-counting is often an art form rather than a science), using quality
to offset quantity has been a time-tested formula for aiding the numerically
weaker side.
Third, these severe disadvantages have spawned an acute inferiority
complex among Pakistani defence planners. Its first-strike nuclear policy and the
strategy of bleeding India in Kashmir all stem from this ingrained sense of
weakness. The United States should therefore make a concerted effort to shatter
this psychology of inferiority. To a certain extent, the transfer of arms would
reduce the rationale (or perhaps the excuse) for Pakistan to maintain military
postures that have contributed to the possibility of escalation. Fourth, in any
event, India enjoys sufficient qualitative and quantitative military superiority to
ensure the destruction of Pakistan even if at a higher cost. As noted earlier, the
objective of the conventional arms sales is to ensure that Pakistan can
potentially inflict enough pain that widening the war becomes less alluring for
New Delhi in times of crisis.
It will also be objected that by upgrading military relations with Pakistan, the
United States would produce a backlash in India, frittering away the progress of
recent years in forging closer ties with New Delhi. Such fears are overblown.
Under a balanced approach, the United States need not ignore India’s security
interests. Washington should continue to enhance its military-to-military
cooperation with India, with focus on improving India’s counter-insurgency
capabilities within Kashmir. A more effective ability to combat cross-border
infiltration and to prevent surprise attacks resembling those of the 1999 Kargil
crisis or the most recent one would diminish New Delhi’s determination to
conduct punishing strikes across the line of control – another key step towards
nuclear war. If India can successfully develop such a garrison force, this would
neutralise New Delhi’s perceived inability to respond effectively to a Pakistan-
supported insurgency operating under the protective cover of Islamabad’s
nuclear umbrella. Further, if Islamabad observes its promises to cut off support
to terrorism as a part of US arms sales to Pakistan, the persistent haemorrhaging
of Indian forces in Kashmir would decline. Such an outcome would then isolate
and contain the Kashmir problem, easing pressures for India to escalate
horizontally, through large-scale conventional mobilisations elsewhere that
most worry Pakistan. The United States and possibly its allies with experience
in counter-insurgency warfare should engage in special-operations training and

exercises with Indian forces. America’s recent joint counter-terrorism training
with the Philippines could provide a useful model. In addition, helping India to
enhance intelligence operations within Kashmir and across the line of control
would enable New Delhi to better anticipate and prepare for any sub-
conventional military moves. The United States can also offer combat-support
assistance such as improving India’s command-and-control as well as
surveillance and reconnaissance assets. It should be noted that India has
already been devoting substantial energy to this area since the Kargil crisis of
1999. However, more progress can be achieved with American assistance, and
tailored military assistance would ease fears that America’s military relationship
with Pakistan could harm India’s security. Substantive US help would also
underscore its commitment to stamp out terrorism and send a clear signal to
Pakistan that Washington will not tolerate cross-border infiltrations.
Creating a more equal military balance would ensure that both sides will be
less confident in their abilities to change the status quo by military means
without incurring substantial pain. The rivalry would then be locked into a more
stable stalemate: India cannot easily threaten Pakistan conventionally and
Pakistan cannot gain from low-intensity warfare in Kashmir. This short-circuits
many of the escalatory triggers that invariably lead both countries to nuclear
decisions in gaming scenarios. These short-term measures would then form the
stepping stones to addressing longer-term problems.
The nuclear conundrum

Arresting the worrying trends in the nuclear balance will be more difficult.
The Clinton administration’s failed efforts to pressure both sides to roll back
their nuclear weapons demonstrate the inherent irreversibility of a successful
nuclear breakout. The United States should at least tacitly acknowledge that
nuclear weapons are in South Asia to stay, and concentrate instead on ways to
prevent their use.
First, there is a real and possibly growing potential for accidental nuclear war
brought about by poor safety, security or nuclear command and control in each
country.21 Unfortunately, given the extreme secrecy surrounding their nuclear
programmes, meaningful and detailed discussions on the integrity of security or

safety arrangements are virtually impossible. Nevertheless, it may be useful for
the United States and other established nuclear powers to provide information
or even technologies associated with safety mechanisms to both sides.22
Measures to help each country are warranted, even if they run afoul of some
non-proliferation policies.
Second, the most dangerous element in this delicate balance is strategic
technical surprise: the sudden emergence of a capability that would be perceived
as giving one side a decisive and irreversible advantage. Some modest levels of
transparency beyond the current opaqueness in doctrine and capabilities that
prevails on both sides would alleviate the anxieties produced by uncertainty.
Third, India and Pakistan should also be encouraged to enhance general
public awareness of the consequences of nuclear war. The naiveté demonstrated

by the average citizen on the street during the most recent crisis was particularly
alarming. It suggests that the domestic threshold for supporting the employment
of nuclear weapons is probably quite low. The public might readily pressure the
governments to escalate.
Misperceptions
Long-held misperceptions about an opponent’s intentions and capabilities are
difficult to correct. Efforts to do so, particularly if driven from the outside, may even
harden those preconceived notions. A sustained dialogue on military matters
and security concepts, as agreed to in the Memorandum of Understanding that
was part of the Lahore Declaration in 1999, will help – but not enough.23
Misperceptions during past crises stemmed from lack of adequate intelligence,
failure to communicate and faulty analysis. Sales or provision of intelligence –
such as overhead imagery derived from either commercial sources or an aerial
platform – could help the lack of information in peacetime and possibly even
during future crises. While this type of information is only useful in some
instances – for instance when India lost track of a major Pakistani ground
formation during the 1987 Brasstacks crisis – offering both sides such capabilities
would cost the United States or other members of the Security Council very little.24
Communication is less of a problem in technical terms. Hot-lines and other
methods of communication are available, although they could be upgraded – again
along the lines proposed in the Lahore Declaration. The United States and Russia
should offer technical assistance and financial help to upgrade existing systems.
The real problem area, however, is faulty analysis and misreading of the
other side’s intentions, particularly the potential for misjudging the other side’s
thresholds for escalation. Planners on each side are over-confident that they
know each other’s thresholds.25
The difference in Indian responses to the crises in Kargil in 1999 and in June
2002 illustrates the problem. In 1999, Indian politicians made a conscious
decision not to cross the Line of Control when responding to the Pakistani-
sponsored intrusions, even though that decision meant a less effective military
campaign and higher casualties. This decision was made, in part, because it
was felt that Pakistan might panic and escalate if Indian forces – particularly air
forces – crossed the line of control and conducted operations against Pakistan
proper.26 Despite the fact that the situations on the ground in Kashmir were fairly
analogous in June 2002, India threatened cross-Line of Control and even cross-
border actions.
It is unclear why New Delhi believed this time around that such actions
would not provoke a Pakistani nuclear response. One possibility is that India
believed that US military presence in Pakistan would stay Islamabad’s hand.
This is plausible, but not at all certain if Pakistan felt that its sovereignty was
threatened by Indian moves. Another more dangerous possibility is that, in
response to lessons learned in Kargil, India has developed a variety of rapid-
response military capabilities designed to deter a Pakistani move to use nuclear

weapons.27 Whether such options, in the midst of Pakistani deployment of its
nuclear forces, would deter Pakistani decision-makers or spook them into a
quick salvo is open to serious question.
Pakistan, in turn, has continued to misread New Delhi’s resolve in some
cases and intentions in others. In part this is due to the single-minded focus of
Pakistan’s military on New Delhi. One recent study of Islamabad’s nuclear
doctrine concludes,
Kargil demonstrates that, despite over 50 years of conflict and interaction, the
Pakistan military suffers from a terrible case of strategic myopia – it perceives India,
and only India, as the threat, but persistently misjudges it.28
Even New Delhi’s declared second-strike nuclear doctrine, something that is

eminently sensible for a large power with conventional superiority, is not fully
believed by policymakers in Islamabad.29 This could lead to dangerous
responses by Pakistan in some future crisis if Islamabad believes that New Delhi
is preparing its own nuclear first strike.
It would help for these misplaced assumptions to be tested in a manner that
might induce some caution in future crises. One way to do this would be for the
United States or other powers to hold regular simulations with each side to test
their assumptions about war and escalation. These ‘tabletop’ exercises would,
at least initially, not be bilateral between India and Pakistan. Rather, the hosting
country would play the role of the opponent and would control the game. In this
manner, the United States could test and offer alternate outcomes to the
assumptions that the Indian and Pakistani military and security specialists
would bring to the table.
Dialogues and some exercises of this sort have been conducted in the past
with the involvement of the United States.30 However, Indian and Pakistani
participants were drawn from the circuit of non-official security experts.
Such ‘track two’ efforts at dialogue and confidence-building have become a
cottage industry in South Asia largely because officials from the two sides often
refuse to meet or engage in serious dialogue. The problem with track-two efforts
is that it is unclear whether information from the meetings ever gets to those
with real decision-making power. This hurdle can be overcome by cutting out
the middle-men and women. The United States should issue formal, high-level
invitations for India and Pakistan to participate in these types of exercises on a
regular basis as part of regular political-military dialogues with each state.
If either or both sides want to discuss issues such as arms purchases or
technology transfer, part of the price should be to engage in these simulations.
These exercises also should encourage each side to model the effects of a
nuclear exchange in a more serious way. Rather than presenting figures for
death and destruction, the US should provide planners and decision-makers for
each country with the tools to calculate the impact of nuclear exchanges or even
large-scale conventional attacks.
Diplomatic strategy
Almost every one of these proposals has been put forward at one point or
another in the history of the Pakistani–Indian relationship. Some were never
seriously discussed, others were agreed to but never implemented, and still
others were rejected by one or both of the parties to the conflict. A serious attempt
at bolstering nuclear stability for the long-run requires sustained attention and a
more comprehensive approach by leading states, in particular the United States.
To be sure, the timing for such comprehensive solutions may not look good in
either Pakistan or India, given their overheated domestic politics. From an
international perspective, however, the timing could not be better. Because of the
war on terrorism and heightened risks of nuclear war, international engagement
in the region is at an all-time high. Moreover, US involvement in the issue of
cross-border infiltration has put Washington in the role of guarantor of that
arrangement, at least for the time being. Finally, US engagement is no longer
constrained by Cold War assumptions. It may be possible for the US and other
great powers to work with India and Pakistan on specific issues without it being
interpreted as a geo-strategic ‘tilt’ towards one or the other.31
In the United States in particular, it would be critical to have solid
congressional backing for such an approach: if possible, a congressional
expression of support in the form of a ‘South Asian Relations Act’. Such a
resolution would convey that peace and stability in South Asia is a vital national
interest of the United States. The language should be sufficiently broad to avoid
locking the United States into any overt commitment to either side. The act, in
essence, should sustain a high level of strategic ambiguity about the conditions
under which Washington would consider intervention. The bill should contain
pledges of US financial assistance to reward progress as a carrot and hint at
possible military measures should war threaten to break out. For example, the
resolution should reiterate a critical American demand that any meaningful
security relationship, especially arms sales, must be contingent upon verifiable
Pakistani efforts to end cross-border terrorism.
Admittedly, gaining the necessary consensus for such a broad policy would
be difficult to say the least. Non-proliferation advocates, democracy backers and
even the Congressional Caucus on India might all object to some or all of the
provisions of such an act. The bill should therefore incorporate the concerns of
these interest groups to show America’s bipartisan support for peace in the
region and to express the comprehensiveness of US interests in South Asian
security. Putting some of these issues in the context of the current war on
terrorism may help overcome some of the likely opposition. Finally, specific
proposals on the nuclear dimension of the bill should be modelled after the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) initiative between the US and four states of
the former Soviet Union (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), a highly
successful effort that enjoys bipartisan support.
Bolstered by such congressional support, Washington should seek more
formal bilateral security arrangements with both sides. A memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with each state would serve as the official basis for the
enhanced military cooperation recommended above, while avoiding the

potential entanglements associated with the guarantees of a mutual defence
treaty. The MOUs should reinforce the message contained in the congressional
statement that the United States would view instability in South Asia with grave
concern. The memoranda should also specify the types of cooperative military
activities that Washington wishes to pursue, including exercises, training,
regular military exchanges, and arms sales. Such an explicit approach to
security ties would help to reassure Pakistan and India that the United States
has the political will to stay the course in the region.
Internationally, the strategy should be endorsed by the other major powers
with interests and influence in South Asia – the permanent members of the
Security Council and Japan. These states should be encouraged to develop their
own supporting two-part strategies to bolster stability in the region. The first part
should address Kashmir, noting that the ongoing conflict presents a threat to
international peace and security and that the states would take the issue to the
Security Council for action if either country resorted to force. The states would
express their support for India to negotiate with Kashmiri leaders a new form of
autonomy. A special escrow fund for development would be established that
could have funds disbursed in both Indian and Pakistani Kashmir as progress
was made on demarcating the final portions of the border and if both countries
participated in the monitoring project. More incentives could be built in as
successive elections take place in Indian Kashmir and as autonomy provisions
are negotiated. For example, Security Council members could more explicitly link
India’s aspirations to become a permanent member to a lasting and peaceful
resolution to Kashmir.
The second part of a multilateral strategy would cover the nuclear aspects of
the struggle. The states would endorse the goals of UNSC Resolution 1172 of
1998, the document that the council adopted just after the nuclear tests by each
side. In that resolution, the council urged India and Pakistan to not resume
nuclear testing, to act with restraint towards one another, and to give up their
nuclear development programmes. A new UN Security Council resolution may
cover this part of the strategy, recognising that as India and Pakistan take steps
toward that ultimately desirable goal, whatever nuclear capability they have
should be safeguarded against theft or inadvertent use – a matter of newly

increased importance post-11 September. States would be urged to act bilaterally
to assist with securing and safeguarding nuclear materials as well as delivery
systems – shifting the focus from non-proliferation to stability. Language would
have to be parsed carefully to reach consensus and avoid going over the line into
legal acceptance of the two as nuclear weapons states. A reasonable, and
useful, ambiguity should be possible.
Conclusion
The road between Islamabad and New Delhi is littered with failed attempts at
detente. But resigned acceptance of the status quo carries with it an ever-
increasing probability of large-scale conventional war and possibly a nuclear
exchange. The costs of such an outcome would be horrendous.

Nuclear war on the subcontinent would be an unimaginable humanitarian
disaster.32 The amount of outside assistance necessary to alleviate human
suffering and to manage nuclear fallout throughout the region would be
staggering. Such a conflict would also have consequences well beyond the
subcontinent. The nuclear taboo, which has been in place for over five decades,
would be shattered. If one side prevails decisively, others may come to view
nuclear weapons as ‘normal weapons’ that can be used successfully to
achieve political goals. A nuclear war could lead to two failed states on the
subcontinent, permanently traumatising societies and disrupting broader
geopolitical order in Asia. The remnants of nuclear infrastructure could then fall
into the hands of rogue commanders or terrorists, raising the prospect of
multiple, nuclear-armed Afghanistans.
The measures proposed above carry risks. However, the potential costs of
inaction are much higher. If they fail to grapple with the problem, the United
States and other leading states should not be surprised if nuclear deterrence in
South Asia fails.
Notes
1
For a concise description of how the and their implications for crisis
current crisis began and escalated, see interaction, see Andrew C. Winner
Alexander Evans, ‘India, Pakistan, and and Toshi Yoshihara, Nuclear Stability
the Prospect of War’, Current History, in South Asia, (Cambridge, MA:
April 2002. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
2
Thom Shanker, ‘12 Million Could Die 2002). Available on the internet at:
at Once in an Indo-Pakistan Nuclear http://www.ifpa.org/pdfs/nssa.pdf.
10
War’, The New York Times, 27 May Michael P. Fischerkeller, ‘David
2002. versus Goliath: Cultural Judgments in
3
Barry Bearak, ‘Indian Leader’s Threat Asymmetric Wars’, Security Studies 7,
of War Rattles Pakistan and the US’, Summer 1998, and author’s
The New York Times, 23 May 2002. interviews with senior Indian and
4
For a comprehensive treatment of the Pakistan military planners,
origins of conflict between Pakistan September–October 2000.
11
and India, see Sumit Ganguly, The Howard W. French and Raymond
Origins of War in South Asia: Indo- Bonner, ‘At Tense Time, Pakistan
Pakistan Conflicts Since 1947, (Boulder, Starts to Test Missiles’, The New York
CO: Westview Press, 1996). Times, 25 May 2002.
5 12
The concept was first developed in Recent reports indicate that the
discussions of US and Soviet nuclear introduction of new capabilities, such
doctrines and policy. See Glenn H. as missile defence (which, if used to
Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and shield the Indian population, may
the Balance of Terror,’ in Paul undermine Pakistani confidence in its
Seabury (ed.), The Balance of Power nuclear deterrent), may occur earlier
(San Francisco: Chandler, 1965) and than expected. However, the general
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American long lead-time associated with
Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell acquisition, deployment and training
University Press, 1984). For a will ensure that their impact on the
discussion of the concept in the Indo- nuclear equation will be years away.
Pakistani context, see P.R. Chari, See Peter Slevin and Bradley Graham,
‘Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk ‘Indian Arms Plan Worries State
Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Department’, Washington Post, 23 July
Paradox in South Asia’, in Michael 2002, p. 13.
13
Krepon and Chris Gagné (eds), The Douglas Frantz, ‘US and Pakistan
Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Discuss Nuclear Security,’ The New
Weapons and Brinksmanship in South York Times 1 October 2001.
14
Asia Report No. 38 (Washington DC: Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Stability in South
The Stimson Center, 2001). Asia’, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
6
Kargil Review Committee, From 1997).
15
Surprise to Reckoning. The Kargil Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why
Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Countries Constrain Their Nuclear
Sage Publications, 1999), p. 22. Capabilities (Washington, DC: The
7
Ibid. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995),
8
Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, p. 188.
16
Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, For a complete statement of the
(Lexington, KY: The University of Clinton administration’s position, see:
Kentucky Press, 1996), p. 117. Strobe Talbott, ‘Dealing with the
9
For a detailed discussion of past crises Bomb in South Asia’, Foreign Affairs,
24
vol. 78, no. 2, March–April 1999, pp. The 1986–87 crisis was precipitated by
110–122. a large-scale Indian conventional
17
Scholars have offered three models military exercise, named Brasstacks,
for why states pursue nuclear near the Pakistani border. Each side
weapons. Only one, which postulates ascribed the worst possible intentions
that states will refrain from acquiring to the other, mobilised and moved
nuclear weapons if international forces, leading to a crisis and war-
norms are against it, would support scare that was eventually resolved
non-proliferation policies intended to through high-level talks between the
dissuade other states from going protagonists. For the definitive
nuclear. Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do description and analysis of the crisis,
States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three see Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz
Models in Search of a Bomb’, Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and
International Security, vol. 21 no. 3 Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond:

(winter 1996/1997). Perception and Management of Crisis in
18
Secretary Colin L. Powell, ‘Joint Press South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar
Availability with Indian Foreign Publishers and Distributors, 1995).
25
Minister Jaswant Singh,’ January 17, Author’s interviews with senior
2002, available on the internet at: Indian and Pakistani military
http://www.state.gov/secretary/ planners, September-October 2000.
26
rm/2002/7338.htm. Author’s interview with Indian
19
John H. Hawes and Terasita C. officials, September 2000.
27
Schaffer, ‘Risk Reduction in South Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and
Asia: A Role for Cooperative Aerial Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts
Observation’, in Nuclear Risk- Under the Nuclear Umbrella (Santa
Reduction Measures in Southern Asia Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 57.
28
W.P.S. Sidhu, Brian Cloughley, John Timothy D. Hoyt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear
H. Hawes and Teresita Schaffer (eds), Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic
(Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Myopia’, Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 6
Center, 1998) (November/December 2001), p. 974.
20 29
Glenn Kessler, ‘A Defining Moment in Author’s interview, October 2000.
30
Islamabad’, Washington Post, 22 June Brad C. Hayes, Research Report,
2002. International Game ’99: Crisis in South
21
See Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Asia, 28-30 January 1999 (Newport:
Proliferation in South Asia’, Asian Center for Naval Warfare Studies,
Survey, vol. 41, no. 6, November/ Naval War College, 1999).
31
December 2001, p. 1078. The Nixon administration adopted a
22
For a recent discussion of the types of policy of tilting toward Pakistan in the
assistance that could be rendered, see: 1971 war as part of its opening to
David Albright, ‘Securing Pakistan’s China, and that word became
Nuclear Infrastructure’, A New shorthand for US policy toward one
Equation: US Policy toward India and side or the other thereafter in South
Pakistan after September 11, Working Asia. Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies:
Papers Number 27 (Washington DC: The United States and Pakistan 1947-
Carnegie Endowment for 2000 (Washington DC: Woodrow
International Peace, May 2002). Wilson Center Press, 2001), p. 194.
23 32
The Lahore Declaration as released by The Natural Resources Defense
the Indian Ministry of External Council has conducted its own study
Affairs, February 21, 1999. of the consequences of a nuclear war
in South Asia. Deaths range from 2.8

million, with 1.5 million severely
injured, to nearly 30 million killed
depending on the number of
weapons used and whether they were
air-burst or ground-burst. The full
report is available at: http://
www.nrdc.org/nuclear/
southasia.asp.

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Survival

Global Politics and Strategy

ISSN: 0039-6338 (Print) 1468-2699 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsur20

India and Pakistan at the Edge

Andrew C. Winner & Toshi Yoshihara

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330212331343432

Published online: 27 Jun 2007.

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Download by: [McMaster University] Date: 09 June 2016, At: 00:05

India and Pakistan

Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara

The next crisis and causes of escalation

infiltrations or if militants already based in Indian Kashmir conduct a series of

Pakistan proper. Given the continuing deterioration in the conventional balance

capabilities or underestimating those of the opponent. These flawed analyses

Addressing the causes of crisis and escalation

Delhi and Kashmiri authorities to determine on a point-by-point basis the exact

The conventional military balance

Pakistan’s main objective in a war with India would be to prevent armoured

in counter-insurgency warfare should engage in special-operations training and

The nuclear conundrum

programmes, meaningful and detailed discussions on the integrity of security or

public awareness of the consequences of nuclear war. The naiveté demonstrated

response military capabilities designed to deter a Pakistani move to use nuclear

Even New Delhi’s declared second-strike nuclear doctrine, something that is

enhanced military cooperation recommended above, while avoiding the

should be safeguarded against theft or inadvertent use – a matter of newly

exchange. The costs of such an outcome would be horrendous.

International Security, vol. 21 no. 3 Sumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond:

in South Asia. Deaths range from 2.8

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