Indian and Pakistani Views On Nuclear Deterrence

This article was downloaded by: [University of Toronto Libraries]
On: 03 February 2015, At: 00:17

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Comparative Strategy
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20
Indian and Pakistani views on nuclear

deterrence
a a
Gregory F. Giles & James E. Doyle
a
Weapons Proliferation and Strategic Planning Operation ,
Science Applications International Corporation , McLean, VA,
USA
Published online: 24 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Gregory F. Giles & James E. Doyle (1996) Indian and Pakistani views on
nuclear deterrence, Comparative Strategy, 15:2, 135-159, DOI: 10.1080/01495939608403064
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495939608403064
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever
as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any
opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the
authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of
the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with
primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,
actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in
relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms
& Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/
terms-and-conditions
Indian and Pakistani Views on Nuclear Deterrence
GREGORY F. GILES
JAMES E. DOYLE
Weapons Proliferation and Strategic Planning Operation
Science Applications International Corporation
McLean, VA, USA
While officials in India and Pakistan have been virtually silent on the issue of nuclear
deterrence in South Asia, a small number of nonofficial strategists in both countries
are moving to fill the void. They describe the current low-level nuclear standoff as
"recessed deterrence." Nuclear weapons advocates within this group have voiced
Downloaded by [University of Toronto Libraries] at 00:17 03 February 2015
their dissatisfaction with the status quo, ostensibly because nuclear ambiguity
undermines stability. This has led them to promote the concept of "minimum
deterrence," described essentially as a scaled-down version of the superpower
assured destruction doctrine. Generally, strategists that favor nuclear deployment
have high confidence that India and Pakistan would be responsible nuclear powers.
They also contend that just as nuclear deterrence stabilized U.S.-Soviet relations, so
too can it work for South Asia. Other analysts are more skeptical, both of the premise
behind minimum deterrence and the observance of nuclear restraint in the
subcontinent. They likewise question the applicability of the superpower model of
deterrence for India and Pakistan.
The arms race between India and Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable
prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons. Both nations have nuclear weapons development programs and
could, on short notice, assemble nuclear weapons.
R. James Woolsey, Then-Director of Central Intelligence, February 1993 [1].
Comments such as these by Woolsey underscore the high stakes nature of nuclear
proliferation in South Asia. They also provide a benchmark against which to compare
South Asian views on the subject. For example, do the Indians and Pakistanis themselves
believe that a state of mutual nuclear deterrence exists today in South Asia? Is it stable?
Under what conditions might each side resort to nuclear use? Against which targets? How
might a shift to open nuclear deployments affect the Indo-Pak standoff? Answers to these
questions bear not only on the stability of South Asia but on the wider applicability and
effectiveness of arms control measures now under discussion, such as a fissile material
production cutoff and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
The purpose of this article is to shed some light on Indian and Pakistani thinking
about nuclear deterrence in South Asia. This represents something of a challenge, since it
The authors wish to thank John Sandrock for providing helpful comments on an earlier version
of this study. This article does not necessarily respresent the views of Science Applications
International Corporation or the U.S. government.
135
Comparative Strategy, 15:135-159, 1996
Copyright © 1996 Taylor & Francis
0149-5933/96 $12.00+ .00
136 G. F. Giles and J. E. Doyle
remains the official position of both India and Pakistan that they do not possess nuclear
weapons. While officials in both countries have not publicly ventured much beyond this
stance, the topic is being discussed actively by other elements of the elite structure, such
as the think tank and military and scientific communities. To tap into this discussion, a
survey of South Asian literature was conducted, drawing upon such professional and
scholarly publications as the Indian Defence Journal; Strategic Analysis, the publication
of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi; and the Pakistan
Army Journal. A series of interviews with key political, defense, and scientific figures
was conducted by Gregory Giles in New Delhi and Islamabad in 1993. Follow-on
discussions with some of these individuals have taken place since then [2]. In addition,
this analysis draws on the views of U.S. military officers who had served in India and
Pakistan since the 1980s and had worked closely with each country's military
establishment.
The article begins by assessing Indian attitudes toward different aspects of nuclear
deterrence. Pakistani views on the same subjects are then examined. Where applicable
distinct schools of thought are identified, as is any evolution in their thinking. The last
section provides a brief comparison of Indian and Pakistani views on nuclear deterrence,
outlining some areas of common ground, divergent priorities, and possible gaps in
thinking.
Indian Views on Nuclear Deterrence

India stands out as the only nation to openly conduct a nuclear test yet not go on to
become an officially acknowledged nuclear weapons state. This abeyance since the 1974
"peaceful" nuclear explosion has, in part, contributed to a lag in Indian strategic thinking
[3]. Indian defense specialists themselves admit that "our endeavors to research strategic
doctrine remained minimal and primarily oriented towards an understanding of the
dilemma of the superpowers" [4]. With the advances in Pakistan's nuclear program since
the mid-1980s, however, a small number of nonofficial strategists have been devoting
relatively more attention to the specific requirements of deterrence in South Asia. The
following highlights some of their thinking.
The Basis for Deterrence in South Asia
A glance at India's security environment shows that the country is flanked by two
adversaries, China and Pakistan—the former an acknowledged nuclear weapons state and
the latter a de facto nuclear weapons state. India has gone to war with both of these
nations in the past and many of the underlying causes of tension between each have not
been resolved. Despite these commonalities, there are appreciable differences as to how
the Indian strategic community measures the extent of the threat posed by China and
Pakistan, as well as the requirements for deterrence of each.
In the case of China, there continues to be a split between those Indian analysts who
see Beijing as a direct, if long-term, threat and those who view it more benignly. Bahbani
Sen Gupta, a senior research fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi falls
into the latter category, as does Ravi Rikhye, an outspoken critic of the Indian defense
Indian and Pakistani Views on Nuclear Deterrence 137
establishment, now living in the United States. India's nuclear proponents comprise the
former group and include such notables as K. Subrahmanyam, perhaps India's leading
civilian strategist, former Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General K. Sundarji (ret.), and R.
R. Subramanian, a senior research associate at the Ministry of Defense-funded IDSA.
Skeptics of the Chinese "threat" often draw attention to the fact that India has
managed to live with a nuclear-armed China since the mid-1960s. Hardliners, however,
are less than reassured.
The argument that China has not employed nuclear blackmail against us from
1964 to date and therefore is unlikely to do so in the future is questionable.
During this period, China was a fledgling nuclear weapon power with missiles
deployed in soft [above] ground launchers, which were totally vulnerable to
Soviet nuclear attacks. . . . Today, she has nuclear powered submarines
capable of carrying nuclear ballistic missiles.... With the passage of time this
capability will continue to grow, and with the acquisition of even a minimum
deterrent in the second strike mode against the USSR and the USA, it is
probable that China might indulge in nuclear blackmail when dealing with
nonnuclear countries [5].
In contrast, there appears to be greater consensus within the Indian strategic

community that Pakistan's nuclear advances should not go unanswered. Concern about
possible nuclear asymmetry vis-a-vis Pakistan has been evident since the early 1980s, and
has been at the center of more recent Indian discussions of deterrence and its
requirements.
Notably Indian strategists have rejected the notion that India could deter a nuclear-
armed Pakistan solely with conventional forces, regardless of their size. As early as 1982,
K. Subrahmanyam observed that
it is the considered view of knowledgeable military men who have thought

about this problem that the entire Indian army including the mountain
divisions if concentrated on the Western border cannot deter Pakistan with a
few nuclear weapons if India has none. The knowledge that the adversary has
nuclear weapons and one's own side does not have them will inhibit the Indian
army from concentrating its forces for a counter-attack lest it should offer a
tempting target for nuclear attack. The threat of use of the nuclear weapons
will send the civil population fleeing in panic from Punjab, hampering the
[Indian army's] operations and bringing them to a virtual standstill [6].
In essence, "[a] nuclear weapon can be deterred only by a nuclear weapon" [7].
Along these lines Indian officials (at the time, Defense Minister K. C. Pant, Minister
of State for Defense Raja Ramanna, and COAS General Sundarji), have indicated that
Indian troops would not be placed at a disadvantage in facing a nuclear-armed adversary.
After his retirement, comments by Sundarji suggested that India may well have taken
concrete steps to fulfill this commitment.
I am telling you in straightforward terms: an Indian planner should assume

that Pakistan has a certain nuclear-weapons capability, and similarly, any
prudent Pakistani military planner ought to assume that India has got a certain
nuclear-weapons capability. And plan on that basis [8].
For many Indian defense specialists, it is this presumption that both India and'
Pakistan could deploy nuclear weapons on short notice that serves as the basis for Indo-
Pak deterrence [9]. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (ret.), director of IDS A, has developed a
term to describe this standoff, "recessed deterrence" [10]. Similarly India's presumed
nuclear weapons preparations and testing of the Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile
are seen as a "shadow deterrent" [11] vis-a-vis China, which could be converted into
actual military capability should the need arise.
Not all Indians are heartened by such notions, however. Writing in 1991, Lt. Gen.
Mathew Thomas (ret.), then-editor of the respected Indian Defence Review, offered the
following comment.
The general assumption amongst so-called knowledgeable Indians is that if

Pakistan assembles a half a dozen bombs, India would have put together
twenty. If any progress to that end has been made, it has been kept such a
closely guarded secret that it neither reassures the Indian people nor deters our
potential adversaries [12].
These comments underscore an inherent tension between India's policy of nuclear

ambiguity and the requirements of deterrence. In essence, how to confidently deter your
adversary when political imperatives prevent you from making the full extent of your
nuclear preparedness known to him? Dissatisfaction on this account has encouraged some
Indian strategists to look beyond "recessed" or "shadow" deterrence.
One such concept, for which there is broad support among nuclear weapon
advocates, is minimum deterrence. Definitions vary, but General Sundarji characterizes
minimum deterrence as essentially a scaled down or more "sensible" version of massive
urban/industrial retaliation, otherwise known in the West as mutual assured destruction
(MAD). Minimum deterrence differs from recessed deterrence in that it calls for open
deployment of nuclear weapons. In essence, India should deploy a nuclear force that
could survive an attack and still inflict "unacceptable damage" on the adversary in the
"second strike mode" [13]. In Sundarji's view, as countries modernize and democracy
takes root, their thresholds for unacceptable damage decline. In particular, he sees
Pakistan and India as "soft" in this regard. Similarly, "what China considered acceptable
damage in 1950 would be way above what they would consider acceptable today" [14].
As a result, the level of destructive capacity needed to support a minimum deterrence
posture would not be large.
In the case of an adversary being a small country [i.e., Pakistan] even up to 1

[megaton equivalent or] MTE (say 50 x 20 KT weapons) might do. Even for
deterring a large country [i.e., China] one is most unlikely to require more
than 4 MTE [15].
Brigadier V. K. Nair (ret.) offers an alternative and more detailed accounting of the
requirements of minimum deterrence.
Against Pakistan the strategy would rely on threatening to inflict damage to

the extent of degrading that country's capability of continuing as a
socioeconomic entity. Targets should include: six metropolitan centers
including port facilities; one corps sized offensive formation in its
concentration area; three sets of bottle necks in the strategic communication
network; five nuclear capable military airfields; two hydroelectric water
storage dams. A total of 17 nuclear engagements [16].
In Nair's view China's vast strategic depth, nuclear superiority, and dispersed
industrial base pose a greater targeting challenge. He concludes that the key to deterring
China lies not in threatening societal destruction, but
threatening to generate dangerous imbalances between that country and her

primary adversaries [i.e., the United States and Russia], and to seriously retard
her economic growth to further aggravate global imbalances. Initially, India
needs to create a weapons capability to pull out five to six major industrial
centers plus two ports to service China's SSBN fleet. This makes a total of
eight nuclear strikes [17].
With this target base, Nair then factors in weapons yields (e.g., two 1-megaton
weapons per city), reliability (assuming only one out of three weapons detonates on
target), and a post war reserve (20% of the base force). He concludes that India could
meet its strategic objectives with 132 nuclear weapons [18].
Side-by-side comparisons of Sundarji and Nair show some important similarities and
dissimilarities. For instance in Sundarji's view, India does not need to develop large
fission or thermonuclear weapons. Yet Nair's plan calls for India to develop both types of
weapons. Notably by adding nuclear counterforce targets in Pakistan and China, Nair
indicates that his strategy is not strictly one of urban/industrial retaliation. Elements of
counterforce targeting can be seen in Sundarji's writings, as well.
Although minimum deterrence is being pushed by such nuclear hardliners as
Sundarji and Nair, ironically the concept has been criticized for not going far enough.
According to Brig. V. P. Naib (ret.),
security depends upon assuming the worst possible case and developing the
ability to cope with it. We must be able to absorb the total weight of a nuclear
attack on our nuclear stockpiles and installations, on our air, ground and naval
capability to make war, our vital industrial complexes, oil installations, on our
cities and on our people. We can only do this by having in readiness a reliable
ability to inflict unacceptable damage at any time during the strategic
exchange, or as Mr. McNamara termed it, "an assured destruction capability."
This is the true meaning of deterrence and it cannot be achieved by the so-
called minimum deterrence nor by the government's bland assurances that "it
will be able to retaliate at short notice, when the need arises" [19].
The Stability of Deterrence under Present Circumstances
As suggested above, there is a growing body of opinion within the Indian strategic
community that nuclear ambiguity actually prevents India and Pakistan from achieving a
more stable deterrent relationship. At the forefront of this argument is General Sundarji.
I believe that the continuance of an ambiguous nuclear policy from now on

will.be downright dangerous for two reasons. The first, due to the possibility
of a war between India and Pakistan being triggered through miscalculation of
each others' nuclear status, as well as ignorance of the nuclear doctrines that
the two countries are likely to go by, which would culminate in a tragic
nuclear exchange. The second, due to the difficulties of ensuring the safety of
nuclear warheads and the prevention of unauthorized use when in a
clandestine state [20].
These sentiments are found elsewhere in the Indian literature [21], among nuclear
proponents and skeptics alike. In particular P. R. Chari, a senior research associate at the
Center for Policy Research and moderate on the nuclear issue, has raised a number of
specific questions that India and Pakistan need to address in the interest of stability.
What are the impermissible actions that could lead the two countries to
demonstrate their nuclear option in an overt manner?—Are the intended
deterrent/compliance patterns premised on a counter-city (population centers
are targets) or on a counterforce (military/economic assets are targets)
strategy?—Will the ultimate release authority be vested in the President in
Pakistan, and the Prime Minister in India?—Up to what level will authority be
delegated to actually utilize nuclear weapons in a conflict (army
chief/divisional commander/battalion commander, and similarly, in the air
force chain of command?)
These are uncomfortable questions. But their consideration cannot be avoided if one
enters the nuclear game. Indeed, complete assurance about these questions is vital to both
avert and manage future crises [22].
Thresholds for Nuclear Escalation and Use
Indian commentary reflects a greater interest in ascertaining Pakistan's thresholds for

nuclear use rather than India's. This focus stems, in part, from Indian expectations as to
who would be more likely to resort to nuclear use in a future Indo-Pak war. As K.
Siibrahmanyam has observed, "[n]o Indian strategist dealing with [the] nuclear issue
favors the first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatsoever" [23]. In
contrast, there is some expectation in India that Pakistan may very well resort to first use,
either in response to a conventional counteroffensive by India or as a result of inherent
instabilities in Pakistan's nuclear posture [24].
In general terms, General Sundarji has identified certain actions that both India and
Pakistan should refrain from if war and nuclear escalation are to be avoided.
Leaders on both sides have to understand that any act which threatens the core
vital interests of the other side will trigger responses which may end in a
nuclear exchange. Attempting to change the status quo territorially by blatant
covert operations; or destabilizing or balkanizing one another by overt
conventional operations; all these fall into that category [25].
On one particular point, Sundarji has been particularly clear.
[A senior Pakistani officer has said] that if there was a weak regime in India
and if Pakistan had a nuclear weapon capability, there was a possibility of
detaching Kashmir from India. That will be a great miscalculation, which I

want to make clear to anybody in Pakistan. No [Indian] regime, however
Mickey Mouse it might be, can sit on its hands and do nothing if [Pakistan]
makes military moves to annex Kashmir [26].
Should war with Pakistan break out, Sundarji has observed that "the Indian high
command must think through that they should not go past a certain threshold" that might
trigger nuclear use "[b]ut they cannot be sure of what Pakistan thinks the threshold is.
One must go with impressions and guesses" [27]. Consequently, Sundarji has called for
the Indian armed services to commission a special study to assess the "nuclear reaction
thresholds" for "both China and Pakistan under varying circumstances in different
scenarios" [28].
Absent such a study, India's nonofficial strategists have speculated that Pakistan
might employ nuclear weapons in a number of circumstances and for a variety of means.
These include:
• to prevent the fall of the city of Lahore—located less than 20 miles from the
border with India [29];
• to destroy a concentrated Indian mechanized force on Pakistani soil [30];
• to eliminate base support areas of Indian offensive forces [31];
• to decapitate the Indian leadership by attacking New Delhi and/or theater-level
army headquarters [32]; and,
• to degrade to the extent possible, India's nuclear weapons capability [33].
Restraints on Nuclear Threats and Use
As noted above, there is widespread support among Indian strategists for a no-first-use
declaration by India. K. Subrahmanyam also sees signs of official support for no-first-use
in the May 17, 1990 parliamentary address by Minister of State for Defense Ramanna.
Speaking at the height of the Kashmir crisis, Ramanna reportedly stated that "[f]or India
to initiate a nuclear attack in the subcontinent would be a betrayal of the human spirit"
[34]. K. Subrahmanyam thinks the Indian government should go even further and make
an explicit no-first-use declaration. He, along with Thomas [35], believes that a prior
declaration of India's nuclear weapons capability is not a prerequisite. Sundarji also
supports no-first use but in his view, nuclear ambiguity prevents such a declaration [36].
142 G. F. Giles andJ. E. Doyle
Other commentary raises the possibility that India might forego the use of nuclear
weapons altogether. As early as 1987, "no retaliation" was suggested by H. K. Srivastava,
then the principal of the National Defense Academy in Khadakwasla, as a "rational"
response by India to Pakistani nuclear use [37]. More recently, it was observed that "its
foreign policy philosophy, its inherent sense of moderation and international pressures
could prevent India from a retaliatory nuclear strike" [38]. Even remarks by K.
Subrahmanyam suggest that India could be quite reluctant to authorize nuclear use: "One
cannot conceive of any objective, political, economic or ideological reason which would
justify the use of nuclear weapon[s] in the sub-continent" [39].
Of course, any response by India will be influenced by the specifics of the preceding
attack. For example, if Pakistan's first use of a nuclear weapon took place on its own soil
against "invading" Indian troops, international perceptions that Islamabad was acting in
legitimate self-defense could lower India's propensity to hit back with nuclear weapons of
its own. Alternatively should a Hindu fundamentalist (i.e., Bharatiya Janata Party-led)
government be in power at the time, the propensity to use nuclear weapons against
Pakistan could be higher.
In any event, a number of Indian strategists see built-in restraints as to the scope of
Indo-Pak nuclear use. With regard to targets, Thomas has observed that
it is unlikely that either India or Pakistan will use mass destruction weapons to
attack civilian targets, to either break the will of its adversary or terrorize it
into submission. The history of wars on the sub-continent shows that both
sides have refrained from attacking civilian targets, and which is fully borne
out by tallies of war losses. Both are equally vulnerable and it would make no
sense to make each other thirst for revenge [40].
Cross-border family ties are seen as an additional reason why India and Pakistan
would not direct nuclear weapons against each other's cities [41]. These arguments,
however, stand in marked contrast to the urban targeting focus of minimum deterrence, as
advocated by Sundarji and Nair. Sundarji attempts to reconcile this dichotomy by noting
that such threats are needed to prevent actual use. Moreover urban targeting would be less
morally repugnant, in his view, if nuclear weapons were to have been used against India
first [42].
As for the potential scale of nuclear use, R. R. Subramanian believes that "[b]etween
India and Pakistan at most one or two nuclear weapons would be used" [43]. One analysis
cited in the Indian literature, however, shows that even relatively limited nuclear use
against Indian and Pakistani military targets could produce as many as 500,000 to
600,000 civilian fatalities, not to mention even more injuries [44].
The Impact of Open Nuclear Deployments on Deterrence
Not surprisingly advocates of open nuclear deployment in India foresee tangible benefits
for deterrence. In the view of General Sundarji, for example, it would permit India and
Pakistan to reduce mutual suspicions by making clear what actions could trigger a nuclear
response by the other. More broadly, it would allow India to lay down a constitutional
chain of command for nuclear weapons release and delivery. It also would permit the
promulgation of safety and control measures, thereby reducing the chances of

unauthorized or accidental nuclear use. Sundarji even asserts that open nuclear
deployments would reduce pressures for a nuclear arms race, since the present ambiguity
only encourages India and Pakistan to "take counsel of their worst fears and over-insure"
[45].
Where open nuclear deployment is seen as disadvantageous is largely in the political
realm. Thomas, for example, thinks that it would be a "mistake for India to own up to its
readiness because this would give Pakistan's clandestine efforts of the last 12 years or so
a retroactive justification" [46]. J. Singh recognizes this dilemma as well, but concludes
that the risk of legitimizing Pakistan's nuclear program is outweighed by the "imperatives
of national security" [47].

More recently, General Sundarji has reconsidered the necessity of openly deploying
nuclear weapons. This appears to stem from a more realistic appraisal of what the
political traffic in New Delhi will bear. Sundarji now contends that deterrence could be
served equally well if India were in a position to move from concealed separate storage of
nuclear components to a fielded force within 24 hours [48].
The Relevance of the Superpower Model of Deterrence for South Asia
Indian analysts simultaneously criticize and praise the superpower model of deterrence.
On the one hand, the large nuclear weapons inventories built by the United States and the
former Soviet Union are described as "obscene." Their potential for triggering global
"nuclear winter" or outright annihilation of the human race is nothing less than immoral.
Specific doctrines developed in the West, such as massive retaliation, flexible response,
nuclear warfighting, and MAD, are widely discredited [49].
At the same time, these strategists praise nuclear deterrence for having prevented the
outbreak of war between the superpowers. They firmly believe that nuclear deterrence
could play a similar role in South Asia. Some strategists go even further and draw an
important contrast between the superpower and Indo-Pak standoffs. In their view U.S.-
Soviet nuclear threats lost much of their credibility over time, since the potential for
escalation to full-scale nuclear war made any use of nuclear weapons unthinkable. In
essence, the prospects of triggering nuclear winter or worse eventually made nuclear
deterrence moot for the superpowers. By comparison while Indo-Pak nuclear use would
cause "considerable," perhaps even "horrendous," damage to the combatants, it would not
threaten life on the planet. Hence these strategists contend that Indo-Pak threats to use
nuclear weapons carry more credibility and therefore, as far as South Asia is concerned,
nuclear deterrence is still a viable proposition [50].
From the Indian perspective, any effort by the major powers to discourage India and
Pakistan from adopting nuclear deterrence can be attributed only to racism. In the words
of K. Shakar Bajpai, India's former external affairs secretary,
East-West deterrence is said to have preserved world peace for 40 years but
the rationale is not always considered safe for other confrontations: others
cannot be trusted to act as sanely, soberly, Caucasianally. Even if the world's
controlling powers will not accept that deterrence would apply universally,
Pakistan and India provide one case where it would [51].
The perceived relationship between mutual possession of nuclear weapons and the
absence of superpower war has given nuclear advocates in India a useful argument with
which to advance their agendas. By the same token, moderates have drawn on other
aspects of major power deterrence to advocate nuclear restraint. With particular regard to
a no-first use declaration, Thomas has observed the following: "[S]ince China and the
Soviet Union have given each other the same assurance, there is no case for arguing that a
similar move in the subcontinent would have a discriminatory connotation" [52].
Some Further Views on Deterrence from India

There is a small but influential group, in Congress (I), in the officialdom and
in the academic community that believes the time is past for non-proliferation
efforts in South Asia: that the urgent need is to ensure that the nuclear balance
of terror stays at a low level in the region; and that all steps are taken to ensure
that nuclear deterrence is effective and stable.
Gen. K. Sundarji (ret.), "A New Equation," India Today,

Oct. 31,1991, p. 187.
Deterrence is . . . a word connected with the maintenance of peace as such,

and is usually connected with the possession of ultimate weapons. The logic
of deterrence, namely that neither country possessing nuclear weapons will
start a war, depends on many assumptions. For example, the fear that the user
nation will suffer as much damage as the attacked nation. This could happen
by the spread of damage by shock waves of radio active fall out. The first
strike could provoke a second strike from the attacked country if it has
survived or its allies, and a second strike could be far more devastating. A
small number of such weapons are sufficient for mutual annihilation of
countries, and this itself is sufficient deterrence to cast doubts on the outcome
of a nuclear military adventure. The possession of nuclear weapons also gives
confidence to the conventional forces, in that it confines the possible worst
outcome of war, to only a stalemate. (The possibility of total annihilation is
not considered.)
On the other side, there are also factors that work against the use of nuclear
weapons as deterrents. The possession of the capability itself might tempt one
to use it, to get the benefits of a first strike. The delivery systems may not be
sufficiently accurate to get on to the target and a false landing particularly
inside one's own country can take place. The long term maintenance of these
weapons in a state of readiness, with all possible accidents reduced to a
minimum is an expensive and complicated affair. These possibilities become
deterrents to deterrence, and weaken the whole logic.
Dr. Raja Ramanna, "Security, Deterrence, and the Future," United Services
Institute Journal (July-September 1992), pp. 285-286.
Even the possession of a nuclear weapon by India may fail to deter Pakistan so
long as India does not retaliate to effectively punish the aggressor, by
destroying its war potential and neutralizing its political will.
Wing Comdr. Amar Zutshi (ret.), "Dilemma of Indian Defence and

Deterrence," Indian Defence Review, p. 86.
No knowledgeable Indian nuclear strategist (who can all perhaps be counted

on the fingers of one hand) has subscribed to massive retaliation, mutual
assured destruction, counter force, nuclear warfighting, destroying the
adversary's war sustaining capability and other such doctrines. The Indians
who favor exercise of [the] nuclear option by India do not even believe in the
doctrine of deterrence but only on the need to resort to it when the adversaries
have nuclear weapons and believe in the doctrine of deterrence themselves.
K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Restraint Regime,"

unpublished monograph prepared for the 42nd Pugwash Conference on
Science and World Affairs, 11-17 September 1992, Berlin, Germany.
Pakistan Views on Nuclear Deterrence

In-depth analyses of nuclear deterrence in Pakistan are rare. Most publicly available
writings seldom venture beyond the assertion that Pakistan's nuclear potential deters
Indian aggression. Recently, however, some commentary has appeared that addresses
nuclear deterrence in relatively more detail. This is due, in part, to the willingness of
several key Pakistani officials to discuss the topic now that they have returned to private
life [53]. This section provides a review of this recent commentary and an assessment of
nuclear deterrence from the Pakistani perspective.
The Basis for Deterrence in South Asia
A variety of perceived threats from India has prompted Pakistan to search for a viable
deterrent. Bolder use of conventional forces [54], chemical or biological weapons, and
guerrilla warfare all have been considered as potential candidates in this regard and have
been found lacking [55]. For example, one Pakistani officer has observed that
"conventional deterrence tends to become unstable as soon as the expectation of victory is
anything but infinitesimal" [56]. Consequently, there is widespread agreement amongst
Pakistani defense specialists that it is the country's nuclear capability that provides the
central basis for strategic deterrence against India. This view coincides with a broader
public support for nuclear weapons in Pakistan [57]. While differences of opinion exist
regarding the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear deterrence and on the
requirements and conditions for maintaining it, none of the sources reviewed denied that
India and Pakistan have achieved a state of mutual, if officially unacknowledged, nuclear
deterrence.
India's presumed nuclear weapons manufacturing capability and delivery systems are
widely cited by Pakistani commentators as justification for Pakistan's nuclear program
[58]. The relative imbalance in conventional forces also is frequently seen as a reason for
pursuing a nuclear program.
Pakistan's present conventional armed forces are hardly a match for their
Indian counterpart, either in number or in firepower. No amount of acquisition
of sophisticated weaponry either through cash purchases or foreign assistance
can bridge the gap in this sphere. It must, therefore possess a suitable deterrent
which would make India think ten times before embarking on a military
adventure against Pakistan. Such a deterrent, to be credible, must be an

appropriate mix of the nuclear and conventional forces [59].
Borrowing from Western concepts, Pakistani analysts have described nuclear

weapons as "the great equalizer" offsetting India's conventional superiority and making
real deterrence affordable for Pakistan [60]. Other observers note that while Pakistan
cannot achieve nuclear parity with India, a limited nuclear deterrent capability is better
than none and does not suffer the same instabilities as an imbalance in conventional
military power [61].
In recent years nuclear proponents throughout the Pakistani elite structure have taken
the argument further, asserting that Pakistan's nuclear capability is a proven deterrent to
Indian aggression. Shortly after resigning as president in 1993 Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a
longtime nuclear advocate, claimed that Pakistan's nuclear program had deterred India
from attacking Pakistan on three occasions during the previous 9 years [62]. In the first
instance, Khan went so far as to claim that Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had
intended to attack Pakistan in 1984, but these plans were not executed because India
feared Pakistan's nuclear capability and because Gandhi was assassinated just prior to the
launch date [63]. During 1986-87 and again in 1989-90, interactive army mobilizations
(triggered by India's Brasstacks exercise and the Kashmir uprising, respectively) raised
Indo-Pak tensions to near-war levels. In the view of nuclear hawks such as Khan and
Mushahid Hussain, adviser to then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, "the only reason such
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian armies did not convert
into military conflict was because of the nuclear factor" [64]. General Mirza Aslam Beg
provides a military endorsement of this view.
When two countries or two blocs possess these weapons, neither dares use
them because of mutual fear. It prevents war from breaking out and it is a
highly effective weapon to check war, because both sides are afraid of each
other. In connection with India and Pakistan, too, a similar benefit has been
reaped with the achievement of nuclear capability. Now there is a correct
equilibrium between the countries. Far from talk of nuclear war, there is no
danger of even a conventional war between India and Pakistan. If India alone
had nuclear capability and Pakistan did not have it, then there would have
been another India-Pakistan war. Now, they are facing the Kashmir problem.
As compared to previous years, there is no possibility of an Indian-Pakistan
war now [65].
A unique aspect of the deterrent relationship between India and Pakistan is that
political imperatives have encouraged both sides not to officially acknowledge possession
of nuclear weapons. In turn, this ambiguity has left many of the technical dimensions of
deterrence, such as the vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear capability to a surprise attack
by India, ill defined. Indeed Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, former director of Pakistan's Inter-
Services Intelligence Agency, has dismissed the survivability issue as a U.S.
preoccupation [66]. Apparently nuclear proponents assume that even if India initiated a
war, Pakistan would maintain the ability to retaliate. A widely held belief seems to be that
as long as India cannot rule out Pakistani retaliation, it will be deterred from starting a
war.
Ironically, for many years uncertainty has been seen as the heart of Indo-Pak
deterrence. As President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq observed in the late 1980s:
With respect to . . . nuclear capabilities, if they create ambiguity, that

ambiguity is the essence of deterrence. The present programs of India and
Pakistan have a lot of ambiguities, and therefore in the eyes of each other, they
have reached a particular level, and that level is good enough to create an
impression of deterrence [67].
General Beg has made similar claims.
The very fact that the people believe that we have the nuclear capability serves
as deterrence. They keep repeating that we have the nuclear capability and we
assert that we do not have it, and it is this state of uncertainty and ambiguity
which serves as a meaningful deterrence [68].
More recently, however, nuclear ambiguity has been seen by some Pakistani
strategists, including General Beg, as destabilizing. This view is discussed in greater
detail below.
The Stability of Deterrence under Present Circumstances
In contrast to earlier confidence in deterrence under conditions of nuclear ambiguity,

other lines of Pakistani commentary indicate a concern over the issue of credibility. For
example, in 1988 Lt. Col. Masood Navid Anwari, then an active duty army officer who
had served at Pakistan's General Headquarters, drew attention to Henry Kissinger's
dictum: "Deterrence = capability + will to use the capability + the enemy's knowledge of
both the capability and willingness to use it" [69]. For Anwari, this had direct
implications for Pakistan.
On the psychological plane we need to properly motivate our nation for the
kind of response desirable for creating deterrence. We need to inculcate such
qualities of audacity and risk taking in our national character, which would
give us the required moral ascendancy over our adversaries. Once done, this
would not only give credibility to the use of our destructive capacity but
would also serve as deterrence in itself [70].
A perceived need to bolster the credibility of its nuclear deterrent may partly explain
Pakistan's efforts since the mid-1980s to test the limits of ambiguity. For example, during
the 1987 Brasstacks crisis, Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of the uranium enrichment facility
at Kahuta, hinted at Pakistan's ability to build a nuclear bomb. In 1991, former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto told reporters that "Pakistan has sufficient nuclear information
that in the event of a threat it could rapidly produce a deterrent" [71]. A year later,
Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan asserted in an interview that his country
possessed "elements which if put together, would become a [nuclear] device." He further
indicated that this included "cores" of highly enriched uranium [72].
Doubts about the wisdom of ambiguity have been voiced elsewhere. General Beg, in
particular, appears to have come full circle.
Both India and Pakistan must learn the lessons of the nuclear age. It is a myth
that nuclear secrecy enhances security. Perhaps survival in the nuclear age
depends upon transparency in the nuclear field. This is because too much
secrecy leads to suspicion which can in turn lead to unpredictable behavior
based on fear and mistrust [73].
Dr. Munir Khan, former head of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, may have
drawn a similar link between nuclear transparency and stability when he remarked in
1993 that "the basis for deterrence is confidence in each other's command and control
arrangements" [74].
Thresholds for Nuclear Escalation and Use
Specific events that could lead to consideration of nuclear use are not identified well in
Pakistani commentary. Nevertheless, numerous unresolved disputes between Pakistan
and India could spark new crises or wars. The conflict in Kashmir and the border dispute
in the area of the Siachen glacier are two possible triggers for renewed fighting [75].
In the event of war, nuclear use could be considered if Pakistan's army faced the
prospect of strategic defeat. General Beg has recently asserted, "Pakistan will not hesitate
to use a nuclear bomb to prevent the collapse of its conventional forces in the event of a
war with India" [76]. If Pakistan faced a sizable loss of territory to Indian forces it also
might consider nuclear use. For example, if India captured Lahore or drove on to the
Indus River, Pakistan's leadership could well see a threat to the country's existence. In
referring to the possibility that Pakistan would resort to nuclear use in such a situation, A.
Q. Khan reportedly claimed during the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis that "if driven to the
wall there will be no option left" [77]. Notably, however, none of the sources reviewed
gave a specific idea of how far an Indian invasion would have to advance into Pakistan or
how much damage it would have to inflict on Pakistan's army before nuclear use would
be contemplated.
The expected intensity and short duration of another war between India and Pakistan
could rapidly force the issue of escalation on the Pakistani leadership. In such an event, a
number of possible nuclear strike options could be considered. For instance, a nuclear
demonstration shot could be conducted as a way of communicating to India that
Pakistan's vital interests were threatened. United States defense attache's who had served
in Pakistan found little interest within the Pakistani military for this concept, however
[78]. A second option could be to attack Indian troops that had crossed into Pakistani
territory. A third possibility for use could be against other strategic military targets in
India including nuclear-capable air bases, nuclear facilities, or troop concentrations.
Finally, an urban target could be considered. Interestingly, M. Khan considers this option
to be a greater possibility than use against military targets, such as cantonments [79]. In
contrast Brig. A. R. Siddiqi (ret.), editor of Pakistan's Defence Journal, observes that with
the "virtual disappearance of the dividing line between cities and the cantonments, as
much in India as in Pakistan, . . . . the distinction between a counterforce and
countervalue target... becomes wholly academic" [80].
Short of actual use, nuclear weapons could serve Pakistan's interests in another way,
namely, by triggering international intervention. In the view of some former U.S. defense
attaches, the potential for nuclear escalation is looked on favorably by some Pakistani
army officers as a means of triggering crisis management efforts by outside powers (i.e.,
the United States) [81]. This so-called strategy of "catalytic intervention" would mesh
with Pakistan's long-held interest in seeking outside mediation of its disputes with India.
Restraints on Nuclear Threats and Use
Pakistani views on nuclear restraint can be divided into two schools of thought. The first
school, generally comprising nuclear proponents, contends that the likelihood of nuclear
war in South Asia is virtually nonexistent. They argue that past wars have shown that
Pakistan and India have observed limits on the use of force, such as avoiding direct
attacks on civilians and cities, and will continue to do so. This school adamantly rejects
the notion that Pakistan is prone to nuclear use because it is an irresponsible Third World
nation or because the military has played a key role in the political leadership of the
country [82]. For example, General Beg described allegations that he was prepared to use
nuclear weapons against India in 1990 as a " 'cock-and-bull' story to create doubts about
Pakistan's maturity and sense of responsibiliy to handle a capability which [it] appear[s]
to have aquired" [83].
The second school of thought has less confidence in the observance of nuclear
restraint. Those who subscribe to this school tend to be skeptics of nuclear deterrence
generally. Pervez Hoodbhoy, an outspoken nuclear physicist and professor at Quaid-e-
Azam University, has emerged as a spokesman of this school. His concern over the
adequacy of nuclear restraint stems in part from accounts of the 1990 crisis.
Hitherto the general assumption has been that if hostilities commence, they
shall do so in a controlled way and conventional weapons will be used.
Unsheathing the nuclear sword would then either cause the war to stop, or
gradually escalate into a nuclear one. But, if our nuclear hawks are correct in
saying that Pakistan suddenly brandished the bomb in May 1990 before a
single shot had been fired, then the next war may begin and end with a horrific
nuclear exchange, which would destroy tens of millions of lives in both
countries [84].
Hoodbhoy believes that incentives to preempt remain strong and risks continue to be
high that nuclear facilities on each side could suffer early attack in a future war. Yet the
lack of any focused analysis on the tensions between preemption and the faith that
normative disincentives against nuclear use will remain strong during crises is a paradox
of Pakistani strategic thought.
The Impact of Open Nuclear Deployments on Deterrence
As noted above greater nuclear transparency, if not open deployment, is seen by some
Pakistanis as bolstering nuclear deterrence. Without much in the way of supporting
evidence, advocates of this view argue that open deployments will enhance the credibility
of deterrence and thereby stabilize it. They assume that India already has the bomb and
that Pakistan would need only to deploy a small number of its own nuclear weapons to
achieve "minimum deterrence." Having done so, the argument goes, military competition
would then vanish. It is also argued that open nuclear deployments would enable Pakistan
to reduce expenditures on conventional forces [85].
Critics, on the other hand, have offered relatively more detailed arguments of the
potentially deleterious effects of open nuclear deployments. For example, it has been
observed that covertness (i.e., no testing, no deployment, and no declaration) has imposed
constraints that have kept the pace of nuclearization in both India and Pakistan slower
than it otherwise would have been. In particular, India may have been constrained from
developing nuclear warheads for its missiles, as well as boosted nuclear weapons and
even thermonuclear designs. The ostensible pause in South Asia's nuclear weaponization
might be broken by the declaration of a weapons capability. As noted in the Pakistani
press, an alleged German intelligence document claims that India's Bhabha Atomic
Research Center has been instructed to ensure that, within 2 months of a Pakistani nuclear
test, a second Indian test would be carried out. The same action might follow if Pakistan
declared its nuclear weapons capability. According to Hoodbhoy:
A declaration that Pakistan possesses a nuclear deterrent would be the ultimate

folly. It would be like manna from heaven for the Indian defense
establishment and hawks of the Subrahmanyam type. This delight is for
obvious reasons: after a Pakistani declaration it would be a no-holds-barred
game where India enjoys all the advantages [86].
The Relevance of the Superpower Model of Deterrence for South Asia
Many Pakistani analysts assert that nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan is
similar to the relationship that existed between the United States and the former Soviet
Union. Mushahid Hussain summarizes this view: "If the bomb stabilized US-Soviet
relations after WWII, why can it not play the same role in South Asia" [87]? These
advocates of the "superpower deterrence relationship rarely address the issue in any detail,
however.
Other Pakistani observers are critical of the comparison between South Asian and
superpower deterrence. These critics argue that the superpower deterrence relationship
was not always stable, especially during the 1950s, the 1960s, and again during the early
to mid-1980s. An adversarial political relationship, distrust, and constant technological
competition for strategic advantage are identified as sources of instability in that
relationship. The assumption that rationality strongly influenced the adversary's behavior
could not always be made with confidence. Under these circumstances deterrence was
difficult to establish and less reliable. Other problems experienced by the superpowers
were false alarms, accidents, and unforeseen events that at times raised the alert levels of
nuclear forces and made inadvertent war more likely. Similar weaknesses are believed to
exist in the Indo-Pakistani deterrent relationship [88].
Key distinctions between South Asia and the superpowers are likewise seen as
undermining the stability of deterrence in the former. These factors included lack of
strategic depth and space-based early warning. Because India and Pakistan border one
another, little time is available to make decisions during a crisis. According to this view,
there thus will be strong motivations for both sides to adopt " 'launch-on-warning
strategies in order to avoid preemption1" [89]. All of these observations on the perceived
weaknesses of deterrence have led one Pakistani military analyst to assert that
perhaps the most tragic paradox of the nuclear age . . . is that nuclear
deterrence, which has provided a relatively high measure of peace and
stability, is based upon foundations that are becoming increasingly fragile
[90].
While these views are in the minority, they indicate that questions are being asked in
the Pakistani strategic community that could lead to a more open and detailed analysis of
the prospects for stable deterrence in South Asia.
Some Further Views on Deterrence from Pakistan
India and Pakistan, locked in a limited deterrence relationship, must recognize

that their securities are interdependent and must think and act in cooperative
terms. Strategy of deterrence may be [an] inevitable option for them to adopt
but it is a strategy which is not totally infallible. It may not provide a perpetual
peace in the Subcontinent. The weakness of strategies like massive retaliation
and limited nuclear war is a part of [Cold War] history . . . and its lessons must
be revisited over and over again by both in order to draw [the] most
economical and secure answers to their security dilemmas.
Lt. Col. Muhammad Ashraf Saleem, "Nuclear Deterrence: A Subcontinental

Logic," Defence Journal (November-December 1993), p. 28.
Pakistan's smaller size and greater accessibility to Indian aircraft, especially

the nuclear-capable deep-strike Jaguar and missile, the 300-km range Prithvi,
makes it more vulnerable to India in case of a nuclear exchange. India's size
and strategic depths are two of its major invaluable assets. All that may very
well look like part of a worst-case scenario. But wouldn't an India-Pakistan
nuclear war be the materialization of a most horrifying nightmare? Wouldn't
that be? The main point to be recognized and accepted about nuclear conflict
is that is its wholly unwinnable and therefore, unworthy of waging at all.
Brig. A. R. Siddiqi (ret.), "Balancing the Nuclear Debate," Defence Journal,

(November-December, 1993), p. 11.
With a nuclear capability, you cannot conquer the other country's capital, but
it is a deterrent against breaking out of war.
Former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, "Ex-President Discusses Nuclear

Program," FBIS-NES, July 26, 1993, p. 70.
It is a hard fact that on two occasions in the last few years that Pakistan and
India almost went to war, during "Exercise Brasstacks" in 1987 and the early
stages of the Kashmir Uprising in 1990, the only reason such eyeball-to-
eyeball confrontation between the Pakistani and Indian armies did not convert
into military conflict was because of the nuclear factor. Otherwise, India
would have browbeaten Pakistan into submission by its periodic brandishing
of the nuclear sword.
Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan and the Nuclear Question," National

Development and Security (August 1992), pp. 195-196.
Let India and Pakistan both become nuclear weapon states openly and without
reservations. They are both mature nations which need no counseling on their
international responsibilities and conduct.
Gen. K. M. Arif (ret.), Quoted in The News, Mar. 18,1993
A missile race in the region will be a tension multiplier . . . [India's] Prithvi

missile is Pakistan specific. It endangers all Pakistani cities, and economic
areas. The missile is nuclear capable. It gives us no reaction time—only two to
three minutes. What can we do in that short period? How [should] Pakistan
. . . react to protect itself? India is pushing us into a missile race.
President Farooq Ahmad Khan Legari, "Legari Addresses Indian Missile

Threat," FBIS-NES, June 1,1995, p. 53.
Indian and Pakistani Views Compared

As demonstrated above, thinking about the requirements of deterrence in South Asia is
still at an early stage. Certain basic concepts have been put forward in India and Pakistan,
but the level of articulation varies considerably. The focus of discussion in each country
shows both some common ground and some differing priorities, as well as significant
potential for misunderstandings and possible gaps in thinking.
As for common ground, the concept of minimum deterrence has appeal in both
countries. Although definitions of minimum deterrence vary, nuclear advocates usually
point to its implicit sense of moderation and restraint. This may well be in order to coax
otherwise reluctant leaderships in New Delhi and Islamabad to take the next step, that is,
to openly declare and deploy their respective nuclear weapons capabilities. While these
nuclear proponents couch their arguments in terms of enhancing stability, the true
underlying motivation may be a desire for international prestige.
The concept of minimum deterrence is itself not without problems, however.
Notably, its assumption that nuclear stockpiles would be kept limited has been openly
challenged [91]. The purported targeting policy that would support minimum deterrence
(i.e., urban/industrial retaliation) similarly deserves closer scrutiny, in light of an apparent
interest on the part of some Indian strategists in exploring a counterforce option. In this
regard it is ironic that while Indian strategists denounce "nuclear warfighting" as a
Western think tank aberration, they have themselves slipped into using its vocabulary.
By the same token, there is agreement between other defense specialists in both India
and Pakistan that moving to open minimum deterrence postures would not be in the best
interests of either country. A reluctance to legitimize each other's nuclear weapons
capability as well as fear of triggering a nuclear arms race are the arguments most often
cited in this regard. These observers do not necessarily advocate rolling back each
country's nuclear program, however. Rather, they tend to support the adoption of
confidence building measures to stabilize the existing "recessed" deterrent relationship.
Another commonality centers on nuclear restraint. In particular Indian and Pakistani
strategists point to conduct in past Indo-Pak wars to make the argument that neither side
would use nuclear weapons or at least would not do so indiscriminately, that is, against
cities. As noted earlier, however, public opinion in both India and Pakistan points to a
considerable fear that each would be the victim of a nuclear attack by the other. While the
polls cited in this article provide no more than a "snapshot," they suggest that a possibly
significant gap exists between the thinking of defense specialists and the public at large.
Within the Indian strategic community itself, there is an apparent discrepancy over
claims that cities would not be subject to attack, since urban/industrial retaliation figures
prominently in discussions of minimum deterrence. As for Pakistan, one Indian strategist
notes that
Pakistan's technological status precludes her ability to generate a potential for

pin point strikes. This in turn suggests that Pakistan's nuclear doctrinal thrust
be directed to deterrence by threatening counter value targets [92].
While it is not clear from the available literature what targeting preferences Pakistan
may have, even a limited use of nuclear weapons against field armies in the densely
populated border zone could well generate sufficient collateral damage and fallout to
deprive a city-avoidance strategy of any meaning.
An area where Indian and Pakistani priorities diverge, and where the potential for
miscalculation is considerable, is the question of thresholds to nuclear use. Indian
strategists have demonstrated a keen interest in drawing out the Pakistanis regarding what
actions would push them to use nuclear weapons. Again, the argument is advanced in the
name of enhancing stability. Pakistan, however, has shown virtually no interest in
articulating such thresholds. Indeed a survey of the Pakistani literature turned up only one
specific reference in this regard, namely, General Beg's assertion that Pakistan would use
nuclear weapons to prevent the collapse of its conventional forces. Pakistan's reluctance
to take up the issue could reflect internal uncertainty as to where "red lines" should be
drawn. Alternatively, Pakistan may intentionally be cultivating uncertainty over the issue
for fear of making South Asia safe for certain types of Indian conventional operations.
While there is a growing sensitivity to nuclear weapons safety and use control in
India and Pakistan, it appears to be a higher priority for the latter. This stems, in part,
from a desire to reassure the international community that Pakistan's nuclear program is
under tight control. For instance, on a recent trip to the United States, General Beg noted
that five top officials are involved in decisionmaking for the nuclear program: the
president, prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, and chief of army staff (the
scientist directing the program also would be present, apparently in the capacity of
technical adviser) [93]. General Beg asserts that ultimate control always has resided with
the prime minister.
With regard to apparent gaps in thinking, the lack of discussion in Pakistan about
nuclear force survivability is noteworthy. Admittedly, this may be a function of gaps in
the literature search rather than in Pakistani thinking. Nevertheless, it raises the question
of whether Pakistani military planners believe that they have the matter in hand or if there
has been a reluctance to acknowledge problems for fear of undermining the credibility of
Pakistan's nuclear threat. The issue of credibility, as mentioned earlier, weighs heavily in
Pakistani thinking about deterrence generally.
Last, while not necessarily a "gap" in thinking, there appears to be little interest
among Pakistani analysts in a decapitation strategy [94]. Regardless, some Indian
strategists remain concerned that India is vulnerable in this regard.
The Indian polity is even more susceptible to decapitation than the American
instance for reasons of proximity, tenuous command links and limitation of
resources to spare for defensive measures [95].
As a result these strategists have advocated that India create a national command
authority, one with an order of political and military succession and alternate command
posts, to ensure that in the event that Indian leadership perishes in a nuclear attack on
New Delhi, retaliation would still be assured [96].
Conclusion
The preceding analysis demonstrates that Indian and Pakistani thinking about nuclear
deterrence, as reflected in the open literature and in private conversations, is not highly
developed. There is an appreciation that a low-level (i.e., recessed) deterrent relationship
exists, but that relationship is not well-defined. Efforts to give it more definition are
leading analysts in both countries to consider open nuclear deployments under the guise
of "minimum deterrence." Yet, there are varying interpretations as to what constitutes
minimum deterrence and how stable it would be. There also are a number of other
strategic issues that have yet to be fully addressed, such as Indian and Pakistani
thresholds for nuclear use. Continued close tracking of this emerging discussion will be
important, particularly to the extent that it might influence official Indian and Pakistani
thinking on these topics and ultimately the stability of Indo-Pak deterrence.
Notes
1. Testimony by Director of Senate Central Intelligence, Governmental Affairs Committee,

February 24, 1993, p. 12.
2. From India those interviewed include General K. Sundarji (ret.), former chief of army
staff; K. Subrahmanyam, The Economic Times; Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (ret.), director of the
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyis (IDSA); P. R. Chad, Center for Policy Research; Maj.
Gen. D. Banerjee, deputy director of IDSA; and R. R. Subramanian, IDSA. Other former high-
ranking military officers were interviewed, but asked not to be identified. In Pakistan interviews
were conducted with Akram Zaki, then-secretary general of the Foreign Ministry; Gen. Mirza
Aslam Beg (ret.), former chief of army staff; Munir Khan, former head of Pakistanfs Atomic
Energy Commission; Lt. Gen. Syed Refaqat (ret.), former chief of staff to President Zia; and Pervez
Hoodbhoy of Quaid-e-Azam University.
3. Also at play is the perceived connection between strategic planning and offensive
planning, the latter being anathema for most Indians. See K. Subrahmanyam, "Nuclear Policy,
Arms Control, and Military Cooperation," unpublished monograph prepared for a conference on
"India and the Cold War," March 7-9, 1993, New Delhi, p. 4.
4. Indian Defence Review Research Team, "Grappling with the Dynamics of Nuclear
Strategy: Policy Formulation for a Nuclear India," Indian Defence Review (July 1989): 49.
5. Lt. Gen. K. Sundarji, "Strategy in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence and Its Application to
Developing Countries," unpublished monograph, June 21, 1984, pp. 8-9.
6. K. Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives (New Delhi: ABC Publishers,1982), p.
204. The previous year, the College of Combat in Mhow published Combat Paper No. 1, entitled
"Effects of Nuclear Asymmetry on Conventional Deterrence." This work was edited by then-Lt.
Gen. Sundarji, commandant of the college at the time.
7. Ibid., p. 205.
8. Michael O'Rourke, "Nuclear Stand-Off," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 13, 1990,
p. 26. See also, Gen. K. Sundarji (ret.), "The Nuclear Threat," India Today, Nov. 30, 1990, p. 90.
9. In the broader context of Indian public opinion, a May 1992 survey of 1,500 Indian
literates, including 757 college graduates, in New Delhi, Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay showed
that 91% said they had read at least a "fair amount" about Pakistan's "ability to assemble a nuclear
device." A majority (69%) were at least "somewhat concerned" about this. See "Most Indian Elites
See Continuing National Defense Needs," USIA Opinion Research Memorandum, Aug. 7, 1992,
pp. 1-2. Data provided to USIA by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion. According to USIA,
"[p]olls since April 1989 have consistently shown that Indian elites widely believe India should
assume Pakistan has already developed its own nuclear capability in formulating its own nuclear
policy'."
10. George Perkovich, a U.S. scholar, has characterized this arrangement as nonweaponized
deterrence. See his article, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," Foreign Policy (Summer 1993):
85-104.
11. This term was coined by Gen. K. Sundarji in "Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India,
Parts I-II," an advance copy of a two-part article published by Trishul, the professional journal of
the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington, India (December 1992 and July 1993).
12. Lt. Gen. Mathew Thomas (ret.), "IDR Comment," Indian Defence Review (January
1991): 17.
13. K. Sundarji, "Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India; Part I," pp. 7-9.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Brig. V.K. Nair (ret.), Nuclear India (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992), p. 144.
17. Ibid., pp. 144-45.
18. Ibid.
19. Brig. V. P. Naib (ret.), "The Nuclear Threat," Indian Defence Review (January 1993):
61-62.
20. Former Military Chief Discusses Nuclear Options," Joint Publication Research Service,
Proliferation Issues (JPRS TND) Jan. 7, 1993, p. 11.
21. See, for example, Wing Comdr Amar Zutshi (ret.), "Dilemma of Indian Defence and
Deterrence," Indian Defence Review (January 1991): 87.
22. P. .R. Chari, "Nuclear Dialogue," Economic Times, May 21, 1993, p.
23. K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Restraint Regime," unpublished
monograph prepared for the 42nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Berlin,
September 11-17, 1992, p. 5.
24. From the Indian perspective, Pakistan's limited strategic depth, delivery means, and
economic resources will produce a "lame duck nuclear weapons capability," which in turn "may
induce Pakistan to opt for a preemptive strike." See Nair, Nuclear India, pp. 49-66. In broader
terms a poll taken in March 1987 by The Sunday Observer, a national Indian weekly, reported that
75% of respondents feared that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons against India. See Andrew
Bilski, et. al., "In the Shadow of the 'Islamic Bomb,'" Maclean's, Mar. 23, 1987, p. 24. This poll
followed closely on the heels of the Brasstacks crisis and A. Q. Khan's alleged claim that Pakistan
could "produce the bomb" (see below). Additionally, details regarding the pollís methodology
could not be ascertained.
25. Sundarji, "The Nuclear Threat," p. 90.
26. Michael O'Rourke, "Nuclear Stand-Off," p. 26.
27. Quoted in Steve Coll, "South Asia Retains Its Nuclear Option," The Washington Post,
Sept. 30, 1991), p. Al.
28. K. Sundarji, "Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India, Part II," pp. 7-8. General Sundarji
is unaware if the Government of India or its armed forces have undertaken such a study. Remarks at
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), March 14, 1994.
29. "Indian Bomb Advocated," JPRS-TND, Aug. 8, 1990, p. 33.
30. K. Subrahmanyam, "Pakistan's Nuclear Capability and Indian Response," Strategic
Analysis 12 (March 1984): 975.
31. Thomas, "IDR Comment," p. 18.
32. Nair, Nuclear India, p. 64.
33. Sundarji, "The Nuclear Threat."
34. K. Subrahmanyam, "No First Use Policy," Economic Times, May 26, 1993.
36. Gen. K. Sundarji (ret.), "A New Equation," India Today, Oct. 31, 1991, p. 187.
37. H. K. Srivastava, "Nuclear India: Problems and Praxises," Combat Journal 14 (April
1987): 36.
38. Zutshi, "Dilemma of Indian Defence and Deterrence," p. 87.
39. K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indi-Pakistan Nuclear Restraint Regime," p. 5.
41. Savyasaachi Jain, "Indo-Pak Scenario; Is N-War Inevitable?" India Week, June 22-28,
1990, as reprinted in Pakistan's Defence Journal (December 1990): 29.
42. Gen. K. Sundarji (ret.), "Nuclear Proliferation: An Indian View," presentation at SAIC,
March 14, 1994.
43. Ibid.
44. See S. Rashid Niam, "Asia's Day After: Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan?," in
Stephen P. Cohen, ed., The Security of South Asia (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp.
250-282. Nair makes extensive use of this work, though for his own ends, in Nuclear India.
45. The analysis is derived from Sundarji, "A New Equation."
47. "Indian Defense Analyst Rejects Proposal for Nuclear Weapon Free Zone," BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, March 17, 1992.
48. Remarks by Gen. K. Sundarji (ret.) at SAIC, April 19, 1995.
49. See, for example, Sundarji, "Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India; Part I," pp. 5-9,
and K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Restraint Regime," pp. 4-5. This professed
antipathy toward Western nuclear doctrine helps explain the appeal of minimum deterrence,
namely, that it is more in line with India's sense of moderation.

50. This view is expressed in Brig. D. Banerjee, "Relevance of Nuclear Weapons and the
Third World," Indian Defence Review (January 1989): 107. See also, K. Subrahmanyam, ed., India
and the Nuclear Challenge (New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), p. 121; and Gen. Sundarji's remarks in
O'Rourke, "Nuclear Stand-Off," p. 26.
51. K. Shakar Bajpai, "Nuclear Exchange," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 24,1993, p.
24.
53. This includes Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, former chief of the army staff; former President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan; and Munir Khan, recently retired head of the Pakistani Atomic Energy
Commission.
54. For example, in the late 1980s, General Beg explicitly added an offensive component to
Pakistan's conventional strategy: "Simply stated, the broad strategy that we are going to follow is
that, while defending all territories of Pakistan, including Kashmir, the Pakistan army plans to
launch sizable offensives, thus carrying the war into the enemy territory." See "General Mirza
Aslam Beg's Major Presentations," Defence Journal (June-July 1991): 41.
55. Lt. Col. Masood Navid Anwari, "Deterrence—Hope or Reality," Pakistan Army Journal
29 (March 1988): 48-50.
56. Ibid., p. 49. Anwari frequently cites noted French strategist Andre Beaufre.
57. A 1991 Gallup poll of 1,000 people living in urban areas of Pakistan's four provinces
found that 87% favored Pakistan having nuclear weapons. Only 7% opposed the idea. The poll had
a margin of error of 3%. See "Poll Says Pakistanis Want Nuclear Bomb," The Washington Times,
June 19, 1991, p. A2. This poll also indicated that 51% feared India would use nuclear weapons
against Pakistan in the event of war. See "Pakistan: Polls Show Strong Distrust of India and the
United States," Inter Press News Service, June 24, 1991.
58. See "General Beg on Nuclear Tension With India," Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, Near East & South Asia (FBIS-NES), June 24, 1993, pp. 42-43; and Farat Khalid, "India's
Nuclear Capability and Delivery System," Pakistan Army Journal (March 1988): p. 3.
59. "Air Marshal Sees Need for Nuclear Deterrent," JPRS-TND, Dec. 23, 1988, p. 18.
60. Lt. Col. Israr Ahmad Ghumman, "Pakistan's Geostrategic Environment and Military
System," Pakistan Army Journal (March 1990): 34.
61. Lt. Col. Khalid Munir Khan, "Pakistan's Sovereignty: Alone or With Foreign
Collaboration," Pakistan Army Journal (March 1990): 45.
62. "Ex-President Discusses Nuclear Program, Politics," FBIS-NES, July 26, 1993, pp, 69-
71.
63. Earlier that month Pakistan had been concerned that Indian military leaders were urging
the prime minister to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities at Kahuta. See "Pakistan Concerned About
Attack on Atomic Plants," The Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1984, p. A28.
755 G. F. Giles andJ. E. Doyle
64. Muchahid Hussain, "Pakistan and the Nuclear Question," National Development and
Security (August 1992): 195-96.
65. "General Beg Claims Country Conducted 'Cold' Nuclear Test," FBIS-NES, August 3,
1993, p. 56.
66. Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia," p. 89.
67. Leonard Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1990), p. 100.
68. General Mirza Aslam Beg's "Major Presentations," p. 41.
69. Anwari, "Deterrence—Hope or Reality," p. 52.
70. Ibid.
71. Rodney W. Jones, "Old Quarrels and New Realities: Security in Southern Asia after the
Cold War," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1992): 113.

72. See "Pakistan Official Affirms Capacity for Nuclear Device," The Washington Post,
Feb. 7,1992, p. A18.
73. "General Beg on Nuclear Tension with India," p. 44. Beg has gone so far as to advocate
debating the nuclear issue in the Pakistani Parliament, noting that "every detail should be made
available to the public." Politics, however, may have been Beg's primary motivation in this case.
See "General on Bhutto's Commitment to Nuclear Program," The Frontier Post, Jan. 7, 1993, story
carried by the Middle East News Network, Jan. 7, 1993. Recently, Beg announced the formation of
his own political party.
74. Gregory F. Giles, "India—Pakistan Trip Report," SAIC, McLean, Virginia, May 12,
1993, p. 8.
75. See, for example, Gus Constantine, "Indo-Pakistani Violence Could Erupt into Nuclear
War, Kashmir Leader Says," The Washington Times, Sept. 15, 1993, p. A12.
76. "Pakistan Has Bomb: General," Montreal Gazette, July 29, 1993, p. D8.
77. Seymour M. Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," The New Yorker, Mar. 29, 1993, p. 59.
78. Gregory F. Giles, "The Military and Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan: A
Workshop Summary," SAIC, McLean, Virginia, July 28, 1993, p. 10.
79. According to Khan, "If [nuclear weapons] are used against cities—which will be the
targets, not military cantonments, hence they are terror weapons—then what?" in Giles, "India—
Pakistan Trip Report," pp. 7-8.
80. Brig. A. R. Siddiqi (ret.), "Balancing the Nuclear Debate," Defence Journal 19 11-12
(1993): 9.
81. Giles, "The Military and Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan: A Workshop
Summary," p. 8.
82. For arguments against the view that the military has control of nuclear decision making,
see Hussain, "Pakistan and the Nuclear Question," p. 194.
83. Giles, "India-Pakistan Trip Report," p. 4.
84. Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Nuclear Deterrence—An Article of Faith?" The News, Mar. 17,
1993, p.
85. Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Overt Better than Covert?" The News, Mar. 18, 1993, p.
86. Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Choices," The News, Mar. 22, 1993, p.
87. Hussain, "Pakistan and the Nuclear Question," p. 197.
88. Hoodbhoy, "Nuclear Deterrence—An Article of Faith?"
89. Hoodbhoy, "Overt Better Than Covert?"
90. Lt. Col. Khalid Latif, "The Strategy of Deterrence and the Superpowers Conflict,"
Pakistan Army Journal (December 1986): 2-7.
91. Hoodbhoy, "Overt Better Than Covert?"
92. Nair, Nuclear India, pp. 57-59.
93. Gregory F. Giles, personal discussion. General Beg has since elaborated on Pakistan's
nuclear command structure in his article entitled, "Who Will Press the Button?" The News, Apr. 23,
1994, p.
94. Siddiqi stands out as the only Pakistani commentator found by the authors to have
addressed this issue specifically. He acknowledges that New Delhi, as "the national center of
command and control at the highest level" would be a tempting target, but counters that a nuclear
attack on the Indian capital "would also carry the inescapably collateral risk of doing irreparable
damage to such precious landmarks of Muslim heritage as Delhifs Shahi mosque." See "Balancing
the Nuclear Debate," p. 10.
95. Ibid., p. 113-114.
96. See, for example, Sundarji, "Nuclear Deterrence: Doctrine for India, Part II," pp. 6-7,
and Nair, Nuclear India, chap. 7.

Indian and Pakistani Views On Nuclear Deterrence

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Indian and Pakistani Views On Nuclear Deterrence

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [University of Toronto Libraries]

On: 03 February 2015, At: 00:17

Indian and Pakistani views on nuclear

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495939608403064

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

R. James Woolsey, Then-Director of Central Intelligence, February 1993 [1].

Indian Views on Nuclear Deterrence

The Basis for Deterrence in South Asia

In contrast, there appears to be greater consensus within the Indian strategic

it is the considered view of knowledgeable military men who have thought

I am telling you in straightforward terms: an Indian planner should assume

The general assumption amongst so-called knowledgeable Indians is that if

These comments underscore an inherent tension between India's policy of nuclear

In the case of an adversary being a small country [i.e., Pakistan] even up to 1

Against Pakistan the strategy would rely on threatening to inflict damage to

China lies not in threatening societal destruction, but

threatening to generate dangerous imbalances between that country and her

The Stability of Deterrence under Present Circumstances

I believe that the continuance of an ambiguous nuclear policy from now on

Thresholds for Nuclear Escalation and Use

Indian commentary reflects a greater interest in ascertaining Pakistan's thresholds for

On one particular point, Sundarji has been particularly clear.

detaching Kashmir from India. That will be a great miscalculation, which I

Restraints on Nuclear Threats and Use

The Impact of Open Nuclear Deployments on Deterrence

promulgation of safety and control measures, thereby reducing the chances of

of national security" [47].

The Relevance of the Superpower Model of Deterrence for South Asia

Some Further Views on Deterrence from India

Gen. K. Sundarji (ret.), "A New Equation," India Today,

Deterrence is . . . a word connected with the maintenance of peace as such,

Wing Comdr. Amar Zutshi (ret.), "Dilemma of Indian Defence and

No knowledgeable Indian nuclear strategist (who can all perhaps be counted

K. Subrahmanyam, "An Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Restraint Regime,"

Pakistan Views on Nuclear Deterrence

The Basis for Deterrence in South Asia

adventure against Pakistan. Such a deterrent, to be credible, must be an

Borrowing from Western concepts, Pakistani analysts have described nuclear

With respect to . . . nuclear capabilities, if they create ambiguity, that

General Beg has made similar claims.

The Stability of Deterrence under Present Circumstances

In contrast to earlier confidence in deterrence under conditions of nuclear ambiguity,

particular, appears to have come full circle.

Thresholds for Nuclear Escalation and Use

Restraints on Nuclear Threats and Use

The Impact of Open Nuclear Deployments on Deterrence

A declaration that Pakistan possesses a nuclear deterrent would be the ultimate

The Relevance of the Superpower Model of Deterrence for South Asia

Some Further Views on Deterrence from Pakistan

India and Pakistan, locked in a limited deterrence relationship, must recognize

Lt. Col. Muhammad Ashraf Saleem, "Nuclear Deterrence: A Subcontinental

Pakistan's smaller size and greater accessibility to Indian aircraft, especially

Brig. A. R. Siddiqi (ret.), "Balancing the Nuclear Debate," Defence Journal,

Former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, "Ex-President Discusses Nuclear

Mushahid Hussain, "Pakistan and the Nuclear Question," National

Gen. K. M. Arif (ret.), Quoted in The News, Mar. 18,1993

A missile race in the region will be a tension multiplier . . . [India's] Prithvi

President Farooq Ahmad Khan Legari, "Legari Addresses Indian Missile

Indian and Pakistani Views Compared

Pakistan's technological status precludes her ability to generate a potential for

1. Testimony by Director of Senate Central Intelligence, Governmental Affairs Committee,

namely, that it is more in line with India's sense of moderation.

Cold War," Washington Quarterly (Winter 1992): 113.