Omnibus Cases - Remedial Law

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J. Leonardo De Castro Cases
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
BERNABE L. NAVIDA, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.
TEODORO A. DIZON, Jr, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 125078, May 30, 2011
FACTS: In 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by Citizens of
12 foreign countries, including the Philippines. The plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly
sustained from their exposure to DIBROMOCHLOROPROPANE (DBCP), a chemical used to kill worms,
while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually consolidated in the Federal
District Court of Texas. The cases therein involved the petitioners herein. The defendants, Shell Oil Co.,
prayed for the dismissal of the cases on the ground of Forum non Conveniens. The Federal District Court
conditionally granted the motion to dismiss of the defendants and ordered the plaintiffs (petitioners herein)
to commence the suit in their home country. A total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City (Petitioners
Navida et. al.) filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. The defendants named there in
were: Shell Oil Co., Dow Chemical Co., Del Monte Co., and others.
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City
issued an order dismissing the complaint hodling that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because
the cause of action against the defendant foreign companies took place abroad and had occurred beyond
the territorial domain of the Philippines and that the filing of the case in US Courts divested the RTC of its
own jurisdiction. Also, the court held that the case filed in US involves the same parties, same rights and
interests, hence, there exists litis pendentia, as such, the subsequent case (Philippine case) must be
dismissed. Another joint complaint for damages against the same defendants (Shell Oil Co., et. al.) was
filed by petitioners Abella, et. al. in Davao City grounded on the same cause of action (injury due to
exposure to nematocides) contained in DBCP). The RTC of Davao dismissed the case based on the
opinion of legal experts (former Justice Secretary and Ret. Justices of the SC) that the Philippines is an
inconvenient forum for this kind of damage suit and that mass sterility will not qualify as a class suit injury
within the contemplation of Philippine Laws.
All the cases where brought to the SC on the question of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present cases.
HELD: YES.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular
court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by
anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
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(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of
the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).60
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where
the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to
nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such
exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive
system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants – a quasi-
delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the
acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or
otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, "without informing the
users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and application."
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the
ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict
which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual
claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of
the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted
from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the
Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The
factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably
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occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have
reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of,
would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims
for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the
appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons
of all the defendant companies
It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quo lack jurisdiction over the
cases filed before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies in the action
below. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this connection, all the defendant
companies designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and to represent them in the
proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance
in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation
of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s
jurisdiction.
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of the instant case. What is
more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the courts a quo, continues until
the termination of the proceedings.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.
FATIMA MACUD, Respondent.
EN BANC, GR No. 177531, September 10, 2009
FACTS: As a requirement for her appointment as Teacher I of DepEd, Marawi City, Fatima Macud
submitted her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) to the CSC Regional Office. Therein, she declared that she
successfully passed the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) in Iligan City. In the
examination of Macud’s PDS, it was found that there is a disparity in Macud’s date of birth, dissemblance
in the picture attached to her PDS and in her application form, and her signature appearing in her PDS is
likewise different from the signature in her application form. These facts clearly show that Macud
deliberately allowed another person to take for and in her behalf the PBET. Macud was charged with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. Macud failed to
attend in the formal investigation conducted by the CSC Regional Office XII but in her answer, she denied
all the allegations. CSCRO XII found Macud guilty of the charges and was dismissed from service.

Furthermore, her Civil Service Eligibility was revoked and cancelled. Macud elevated the matter to the CA
by way of petition for certiorari questioning the jurisdiction of CSCRO XII, stating that CSCRO XVI
(ARMM) has jurisdiction since she was assigned to a public school in Marawi City within the territorial
jurisdiction of ARMM.
CA ruled in favor of Macud held that SC ruled that RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers)
specifically covers and governs the administrative proceedings involving public school teachers. Thus, the
CSC does not have jurisdiction over an administrative case against public school teachers because such
is lodged with the Investigating Committee created pursuant to RA 4670. CSC brought the matter to the
SC.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case.
HELD # 1: YES.
In the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special laws such as R.A.
4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil
service, including public school teachers. To quote from that decision:
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the
performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP
officers and employees, whether they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain
provisions of law, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and
answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and
governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government to
hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it
may, we cannot interpret the creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as – R.A. Nos. 8292
and 4670 allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies – as having divested the CSC of its inherent
power to supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold
otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill
professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly amend the
Constitution itself.
Indeed, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, we held:
It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary
authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other
hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987... It is basic that the 1987
Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment… However, repeals by
implication are not favored, and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently
conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670
reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers should be construed as
referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the
DECS.
ISSUE #2: Whether Macud may still question the jurisdiction of CSC after having participated in the
proceedings therein.

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HELD # 2: NO.
Moreover, it is now too late for respondent to challenge the jurisdiction of the CSC. After participating in
the proceedings before the CSC, respondent is effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the CSC’s
jurisdiction. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raised anytime, this, however, admits of
an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.
Here, respondent participated actively in the proceedings before CSCRO XII and voluntarily submitted to
its jurisdiction with the filing of her Answer, Motion to Reset the Hearing, Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as in seeking affirmative relief from it and in subsequently filing an appeal to the
CSC Central Office. In all these instances and even in her petition with the CA, respondent never raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the CSC. Her only jurisdictional objection was that her case should have
been investigated by CSCRO XVI (ARMM), as she was a teacher in a public school located within the
geographical area of the ARMM. However, by invoking the jurisdiction of CSCRO XVI-ARMM,
respondent, in effect, fully recognized the jurisdiction of the CSC to hear and decide the case against her.
One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate a tribunal’s decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction,
just to secure affirmative relief against one’s opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has
time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. The
defense of lack of jurisdiction fails in light of respondent’s active participation in the administrative
proceedings before the CSC.
EDDIE T. PANLILIO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LILIA G. PINEDA, Respondents.
EN BANC, GR No. 181478, July 15, 2009
FACTS: The parties herein were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province of
Pampanga during the May 14, 2007. On May 18, 2007, the Board of Canvassers of Pampanga
proclaimed Panlilio as the duly elected governor of Pampanga, having garnered the highest number of
votes over Pineda. Pineda filed an election protest on the grounds, among others, that the votes for her
were deliberately misread by the chairmen of boards of election inspectors and that votes legally cast in
her favor were considered stray.
COMELEC, Second Division, issued an order giving due course to the protest and directed the revision of
ballots pertaining to the protested precincts of the Province of Pampamnga.
Panlilio’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the same division.
Subsequently, Panlilio filed an Omnibus Motion to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration at the
COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc issued an order denying Panlilio’s Omnibus Motion for lack
of merit, holding that the assailed orders of COMELEC Second Division were interlocutory orders, which
are not one of the orders required by Sec. 5(c) Rule 3 and Sec. 5 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure to be certified to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution. Hence, Panlilio brought his case to the
SC.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC En Banc may properly take cognizance of the subject Motion for
Reconsideration.
HELD: YES.

In cases where a COMELEC Division issues an interlocutory order, the same COMELEC Division should
resolve the motion for reconsideration of the order.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the
COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 5, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governs motions for reconsideration of
decisions of a COMELEC Division, as follows:
SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
In Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the import of this rule in this wise:
Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for
reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the
COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely
disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be done in the case after its
issuance, that order is interlocutory.
GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, Petitioner,

vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KALOOKAN CITY, BRANCH 120, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
KALOOKAN CITY, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HEIRS OF GREGORIO BAJAMONDE AND
SATURNINA MENDOZA, AND THE REMINGTON REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 139672, March 4, 2009
FACTS: Gonzales or Maysilo estate in Malabon, Rizal was expropriated by the Philippine government
with the understanding that the latter would resell the property to its occupants. However, the said plan
was not implemented hence a complaint was filed by the tenants. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation
(GAUF) later on sought to intervene on the ground that the tenants entered into an agreement or
“Kasunduan” with it conveying their priority rights to purchase the disputed lots. GAUF was able to
register in its name with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City the title of the lots which was awarded to
Bajamonde. Eventually, the compromise agreement was declared null and void for being a forgery.
Hence, the lower court ordered to restore the lots to the real owner Bajamonde who sold it to Remington
Realty Development, Inc. GAUF filed a petition for annulment of the court orders which was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether GAUF may still question the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
and over its person.
HELD: NO.
Quite the contrary, the trial court having acquired jurisdiction not only over the subject matter of the case
but also over the parties thereto, it was unnecessary to institute a separate action to nullify petitioner’s
title. Having voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court through the process of
intervention, it is rather too late in the day for the petitioner to now turn its back and disclaim that
jurisdiction, more so where, as here, an adverse judgment has already been rendered against it. Case
law teaches that if the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of the parties, its
ruling upon all questions involved are mere errors of judgment reviewable by appeal. Any error in the
judgment of the trial court should have been raised by petitioner through appeal by way of a petition for

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review with the CA. Having failed to file such an appeal, petitioner cannot anymore question the final and
executory order, in a petition for annulment with the CA, as petitioner did in this case.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,

vs.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Pampanga, Register of Deeds of Angeles City, Benjamin Poy
Lorenzo, Lavernie Poy Lorenzo, Diosdado De Guzman, Rosemary Eng Tay Tan, Leandro De
Guzman, Benjamin G. Lorenzo, Antonio Manalo, and Socorro De Guzman, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. Nos. 155322-29, June 27, 2012
FACTS: BCDA is a government owned and controlled corporation which was created pursuant to the
national policy of accelerating the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military
reservations and their extensions into alternative productive uses for the promotion of economic and
social development of Central Luzon and the entire country in general.
The then President Ramos created and designated the areas covered by the Clark Special Economic
Zone (CSEZ) as those consisting of the Clark military reservations, among others. These lands were
transferred to the BCDA which shall determine how to utilize and dispose of such lands. However, it was
later on found out that tiles over parcels of land within the CSEZ had already been issued in the names of
private individuals.
In view of this findings, the BCDA filed separate complaints for cancellation of title. The RTC issued an
order dismissing the cases for being prematurely filed and declared that it is the Department of Agrarian
Reform which has jurisdiction over the case. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Which, between Regional Trial Court and the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?
HELD: RTC.
Based on the provisions of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, it can be inferred that - for a
case to fall within the ambit of DARAB’s jurisdiction, the issue must be one that involves an agrarian
dispute.
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The complaints did not
contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that the issue to be resolved in this case
involved an agrarian dispute.
Since the issue to be resolved was who between the two contending parties has a valid title over the
disputed properties, the case involves a controversy relating to the ownership of the subject properties,
which is beyond the scope of the phrase "agrarian dispute”.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company

vs.
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.,
First Division, G.R. No. 163067, February 06, 2013
FACTS: Judge Zeus Abrogar of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, rendered a
Decision approving the Compromise Agreement submitted by PLDT and respondent Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) where the said parties stipulated, among others, that PLDT
guarantees that all the outgoing telephone traffic to Hongkong destined to ETPIs correspondent therein,
Cable & Wireless Hongkong Ltd., its successors and assigns, shall be coursed by PLDT through the ETPI
provided circuits and facilities between the Philippines and Hongkong and that the said agreement shall
take effect and shall continue in effect until November 28, 2003, provided that a written notice of

termination is given by one party to the other not later than November 28, 2001. In the absence of such
written notice, this Agreement shall continue in effect beyond November 28, 2003 but may be terminated
thereafter by either party by giving to the other a prior two year written notice of termination. The RTC
resolved the pending incidents over the case notwithstanding the termination of the compromise
agreement. PLDT elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the RTC Order and ruled
that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC Makati may still take cognizance of the preset case, considering the expiration
of the compromise agreement on November 28, 2003.
HELD: NO.
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights
will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot
cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
As a result of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement, there is nothing for the RTC-Makati to
enforce and/or act upon.
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011
FACTS: The case stemmed when petitioner applied before the RTC the registration of a parcel of land
with improvements located in City of Dumaguete under PD 1529. The respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss averring that (1) the subject property cannot be registered since the subject property is a
foreshore land, thus inalienable and not disposable and (2) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter since PD 1529 refers only to alienable and disposable lands. The RTC decreed that the instant
application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit. In its Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contended that the dismissal of its application was
premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet to present evidence to prove
factual matters in support of its application, such as the subject property already being alienable and
disposable at the time it was occupied and possessed by petitioner. Respondent based its Opposition (on
technical and substantive grounds; violation of Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and
6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court (no explanation why it did not resort to personal service). In its Order, the RTC initially agreed with
respondent, however, it issued another order setting aside its order in the interest of justice and resolving
to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues of the case. Respondent sought recourse
from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court challenging the RTC Orders for having been issued by the RTC in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondent reiterated that the RTC Order dismissing the case
had already attained finality. The defects of the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner rendered the
same as a mere scrap of paper, which did not toll the running of the prescriptive period to appeal the RTC
Order. The Court of Appeals found merit in the Petition of respondent, set aside the RTC Orders and
grant the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it set aside the order of
dismissal of the case and resolved to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in said
case.
HELD # 1: NO.

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The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act is performed
with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
[28]
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Procedural rules were
conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than
serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. In Basco v. Court of
Appeals, the SC allowed a liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites
of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, as illustrated in well-settled cases. to wit “Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to
resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities”
ISSUE # 2: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
HELD # 2: YES.
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost
entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, as amended by Act No. 2347, jurisdiction over all applications for registration of
title to land was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFI) of the respective provinces in which the
land sought to be registered was situated. Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions,
is acquired upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the end of the
litigation. The land registration laws were updated and codified by the Property Registration Decree, and
under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land registration was still vested on the CFI
of the province or city where the land was situated.
BF HOMES, INC. and THE PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORP., (PWCC)
Petitioners,
versus
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 171624, December 6, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners BF Homes and PWCC are owners and operators of waterworks systems delivering
water to over 12,000 households and commercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions in Parañaque City,
Las Piñas City, Caloocan City, and Quezon City. The water distributed in the waterworks systems owned
and operated by BF Homes and PWCC is drawn from deep wells using pumps run by electricity supplied
by MERALCO. Petitioners alleged that MERALCO disconnected its electricity supply which disrupted
water supply in its covered areas because of an unpaid electric bills amounting to P4,717,768.15.
Petitioners requested to apply their electric bill against their refund in the amount of P11,834,570.91

based on the ruling in Republic v. MERALCO decided with finality by the Supreme Court. However,
MERALCO denied petitioners’ request. Thus, petitioners filed a Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and for the Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order] against MERALCO
before the RTC. MERALCO in its answer sought the dismissal of the RTC Petition on the ground, among
others that RTC has no jurisdiction to award the relief prayed for by petitioners because MERALCO is a
utility company whose business activity is wholly regulated by the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC). The latter, being the regulatory agency of the government having the authority over the
respondent, is the one tasked to approve the guidelines, schedules and details of the refund.
ISSUE: Which tribunal, as between the RTC and the ERC, has jurisdiction over the subject matter to
resolve who has jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction?
HELD: ERC.
A careful review of the material allegations of petitioners in their Petition before the RTC reveals that the
very subject matter thereof is the off-setting of the amount of refund they are supposed to receive from
MERALCO against the electric bills they are to pay to the same company. This is squarely within the
primary jurisdiction of the ERC. Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule
43(u) of the EPIRA over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the
exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities, and over all cases involving disputes between and
among participants or players in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules and
Regulation provides that the ERC shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that are essential in
the discharge of its functions as in independent quasi-judicial body. Indubitably, the ERC is the regulatory
agency of the government having the authority and supervision over MERALCO. Thus, the task to
approve the guidelines, schedules, and details of the refund by MERALCO to its consumers, to
implement the judgment of this Court in the MERALCO Refund cases, also falls upon the ERC. By filing
their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes and PWCC intend to collect their refund without submitting to
the approved schedule of the ERC, and in effect, enjoy preferential right over the other equally situated
MERALCO consumers.
Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only
such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies
even if the question involved is also judicial in nature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy
involving a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially when the question
demands the sound exercise of administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The court
cannot arrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initially lodged
with the administrative body of special competence.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151,
then it was also devoid of any authority to act on the application of BF Homes and PWCC for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction contained in the same Petition. The ancillary and provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an incident of an independent action or
proceeding.
RULE 1
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO TIOTIOEN, Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION, GR No. 167215, October 8, 2008
FACTS: Evaristo Tiotioen applied for judicial confirmation and registration under the Torrens System of 2
parceks of land in Pico, La Trinindad, Benguet. He was substituted by his heirs when he died on June 21,

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1997. Santiago A. Santiago, the Municipality of La Trinindad, and the Republic via DENR and OSG,
opposed the application. Republic opposed the registration of Tiotioen on the ground that the parcels of
land belong to the communal forest of La Trinidad, Benguet, and are therefore, inalienable land of the
public domain, which have not been classified and considered as disposable and alienable. Land
Registration Court ruled in favor of Tiotioen and granted the application The petitioner (Republic) and the
Municipality of La Trinidad received a notice of the adverted decision of the LRC on September 6 and 7,
2001, respectively. The Municipality timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
LRC. On the other hand, the OSG (representing the Republic) was not furnished with a notice of such
resolution. The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial on January 4, 2002 when it
received the letter dated December 19, 2001 of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OSG filed the subject
notice of appeal for the petitioner only on January 11, 2002 which the LRC denied for having been filed
beyond the 15 day reglementary period to appeal which the said court reckoned from September 6, 2001.
CA affirmed the decision of the LRC. Republic now brings the case to the SC claiming that the OSG is
entitled to be furnished with copies, notices, and decision of the trial court, and that the date of service of
such copies to the OSG is the reckoning period in counting the timeliness of its appeal. Since OSG was
not furnished a copy of the order of the LRC, the prescribed period within which to file petitioner’s appeal
did not commence to run and, therefore, its notice of appeal should not be treated as filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic was validly deprived of its right to appeal.
HELD: NO.
In deciding this case, this Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of an appeal by the
State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the mistake or error
on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to appeal from a judgment
of the court. In Director of Lands v. Medina, we said:
Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal of the
government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded
that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding.
As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, "to dismiss the Republic's appeal
merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the case" and to ignore
the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the
crux of the government's case "would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian
doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony."
Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be "cautious about not
depriving of a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities."
In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al., we recognized the importance of the facts and issues involved and gave
due course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was even filed beyond
the reglementary period to do so.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and
lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and
more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of
the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected watershed
area, which allegedly preserves the main source of water of the Municipality of La Trinidad. Relative
thereto, the petitioner raises substantial factual and legal issues which should be decided on their merit
instead of being summarily disposed of based on a technicality.
MCA-MBF COUNTDOWN CARDS PHILIPPINES INC., AMABLE AGUILUZ, et. al., Petitioners,
vs.
MBF CARD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, Repondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 173586, March 14, 2012
FACTS: Respondent MBF Card and Petitioner MCA-MBF Countdown cards entered into negotiations for
the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement in the Philippines, wherein MBF Card would own 40% of the
capital stock and MCA-MBF owning 60% of the capital stock thereof. But before both the respondent and
petitioner could agree on drafts of the JVA and pending negotiations thereon, Amable Aguiluz wrote MBF
Card that he had already incorporated a company with the SEC named MCA-MBF Countdown Cards
Philippines Inc. MBF Card remitted on January 21, 1994 the amount of US$74,074.04 to the bank
account of MCA-MBF which was to be applied as MBF Card’s payment of its 40% shareholding in the
JVA. However, without the prior authority of MBF Card, MCA-MBF began to promote, market, and sell the
Countdown Discount Cards to the public, using the “Countdown” name, logo and trademark. MBF Card
requested MCA-MBF to stop all selling activities as these were not authorized by MBF Card, but MCA-
MBF proceeded to cause publication and promotion, as well as selling of the same. MBF Card filed a
complaint for Recovery of Money, Unfair Competition and Damages with Application for Preliminary
Injunction against MCA-MBF. The trial court ruled in favor of MBF Card, ordering MCA-MBF to desist
from promoting, marketing and selling Countdown Discount Cards and to refund to MBF Card the amount
remitted with legal interest, plus attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. On appeal, the CA dismissed the
same for failure of the MCA-MBF to file the Appellant’s brief within 45 days from receipt of notice,
pursuant to Sec. 1(e) of Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, MCA-MBF elevated the
matter to the SC alleging that the CA erred in dismissing the case based on procedural technicalities
without considering at all whether the petitioner’s appeal deserved full consideration on the merits.
ISSUE: How should procedural rules be construed?
HELD: Liberally in favor of a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the action.
Confronted with the necessity to justify their failure to file their Appellants’ Brief before the Court of
Appeals, all that the petitioners could offer was that the lawyer who was handling the case resigned from
the law firm shortly after they received the notice to file the Brief, while other counsels have been handling
voluminous cases, numerous court appearances, and out of town hearings. Petitioners did not allege that
the other lawyers of the firm were not informed of the appellate court’s notice to file the Brief. Petitioners
did not even ask the court for an extension. Instead, petitioners claim that the rules concerning the filing
of the Appellant’s Brief are mere "insignificant and harmless technicalities" and argue that because of the
alleged merits of their case, they do not have to prove that their failure to file the said brief was excusable:
In light of the merits of petitioners’ appeal as will be further discussed below, and in accordance with the
jurisprudence discouraging dismissal of appeals grounded on pure technicalities, whether or not the
inadvertence resulting in the late filing of the appellant’s brief is excusable is already beside the point. The
focus should have been on whether or not the appeal deserved full consideration on the merits, and this
can only be determined if a preliminary consideration of the merits is made.
This contention, which in effect advances that the appellate court does not even deserve a valid
explanation for the appellant’s failure to its Brief, cannot be countenanced. Liberality is given to litigants
who are worthy of the same, and not to ones who flout the rules, give explanations to the effect that the
counsels are busy with other things, and expect the court to disregard the procedural lapses on the mere
self-serving claim that their case is meritorious.

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In Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines v. Tanghal-Salvaña, this Court held:
Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if the parties are to expect fair results
therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Furthermore, petitioners’ characterization of the rules concerning the filing of the Appellant’s Brief as
"insignificant and harmless technicalities" is downright improper as it is contrary to established
jurisprudence. In Casim v. Flordeliza, this Court particularly held that:
It would be incorrect to perceive the procedural requirements of the rules on appeal as being merely
"harmless and trivial technicalities" that can just be discarded. As this Court so explained in Del Rosario
vs. Court of Appeals –
"Petitioners' plea for liberality in applying these rules in preparing Appellants' Brief does not deserve any
sympathy. Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a
party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. In People vs. Marong, we held
that deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate. These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases. In an age
where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, these rules need to be followed by appellants with
greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to the whims and caprices of appellants."
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO

GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN
TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009
FACTS: Respondent (Pacana) filed a case for recovery of ownership and possession of propertybefore
the RTC of Cagayan De Oro, relative to a lot she allegedly inherited from her mother, who in turn was the
sole heir and child of Juan Gabatan. She alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan the lot was
entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan. She made several demands to surrender to her the lot, but to
no avail.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother was the daughter of Juan Gabatan; that he
died without issue and that his siblings are his true heirs. The RTC favored respondent. The CA affirmed.
It ruled on the issue of heirship on the basis of a photocopied Deed of Sale of a portion of the lot, whereby
the siblings of Juan Gabatan acknowledged Pacana’s mother as Juan’s heir. Thus, this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: May the present case which presents an issue on heirship, subject of special proceedings, be
determined in a civil case for recovery of ownership and possession of property?
HELD: YES.
As a general rule:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property.This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. .
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
However, x x x in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan, especially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case, had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also
the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon. X x x To still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of
the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
RULE 2
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et. al., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 185590 December 03, 2014
FACTS: Ley Construction and Development Corp. (LCDC), a general contracting firm, applied with
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Petitioner), for the opening of a Letter of Credit. Petitioner issued
a Letter of Credit in favor of the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises Limited in the amount of USD
802,500. The obligation covered by the Letter of Credit has long been overdue and unpaid,
notwithstanding repeated demands for payment thereof. Petitioner, therefore, instituted a complaint to
recover the amount. The trial court ruled that the petitioner bank failed to establish its cause of action and
to make a sufficient case. Hence, the case was dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the CA claiming that the
trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of LCDC on the ground that the bank failed to
establish a cause of action. The CA found no merit in the petitioner’s appeal, holding that Cabrera, the
bank’s only witness, was incompetent to testify on the exhibits since he did not prepare them. Hence, the
case reached the SC via petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, with the bank claiming that it has
been able to establish its cause of action by preponderant evidence.
ISSUE: Whether MBTC was able to establish its cause of action.
HELD: YES.
The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint. Three essential
elements must be shown to establish a cause of action. In this case, the legal rights of the petitioner Bank
and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently established in view of the failure of the
Bank's evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal relationship.

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That the Bank’s cause of action was hinged on the Letter of Credit is unmistakable. Taken as a whole, the
Bank’s allegations make a cause of action based on the Letter of Credit. The Trust Receipt was
mentioned incidentally and appears only in paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint. In stark contrast, the Letter of
Credit figures prominently in the Complaint as it is mentioned in almost all of the paragraphs of Part 2
(Statement of Cause of Action Against Defendant LCDC and Spouses Manuel and Janet Ley). More
tellingly, in paragraph 2.15, the Bank speaks of "the obligation covered by the aforesaid Letter of Credit."
Moreover, under paragraphs1.2(b) and 2.16 of the Complaint, the spouses Ley have been impleaded as
co-defendants of LCDC on account of their execution of a Continuing Surety Agreement in the Bank’s
favor to guarantee the "prompt payment of the obligations contracted by defendant LCDC from the
plaintiff inclusive of the subject Letter of Credit." In short, the Bank seeks to hold liable (1) LCDC for its
obligations under the Letter of Credit, and (2) the spouses Ley for their obligations under the Continuing
Surety Agreement which stands as security for the Letter of Credit and not for the Trust Receipt.
RULE 3
ORMOC SUGARCANE PLANTERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., et. al., Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HIDECO SUGAR, et. al., Respondents
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 15660 August 24, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners are associations organized by and whose members are individual sugar planters (Planters).
Respondents are sugar centrals engaged in grinding and milling sugarcane delivered to them by
individual planters. The milling contract between the petitioners and respondents provides:
34% - of the sugar and molasses from milling belong to the respondent sugar centrals;
65% - shall go to the planters;
1% - shall go to the association to which the planter belongs; and if planter does not belong to an
association, will revert to the central.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a petition for Arbitration under RA 876, claiming that respondents violated
their milling contracts when they gave the 1% share to the individual planters who do not belong to any
association, instead of reverting said share to the centrals. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground of lack of cause of action because no such contract exists between them and the planters.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the respondents to nominate 2 arbitrators.
Aggrieved, respondents went to the CA which reversed the RTC ruling, holding that the petitioners and
respondents had no milling contracts, hence, petitioners had no legal personality to bring the action
against the respondents.
Petitioners elevated the case to the SC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have the legal personality to demand arbitration.
HELD: NO.
The right to demand arbitration is predicated on the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between the
parties except when arbitration is expressly required by the law. Also, the party who demands the right of
arbitration must be privy to the agreement upon which he invokes his right, otherwise, he has no legal
personality to pursue a claim.

In an agreement for arbitration, the ordinary elements of a valid contract must appear, including an
agreement to arbitrate some specific thing, and an agreement to abide by the award, either in express
language or by implication.
During the proceedings before the CA, it was established that there were more than two thousand (2,000)
Planters in the district at the time the case was commenced at the RTC in 1999. The CA further found
that of those 2,000 Planters, only about eighty (80) Planters, who were all members of petitioner OSPA,
in fact individually executed milling contracts with respondents. No milling contracts signed by members
of the other petitioners were presented before the CA.
By their own allegation, petitioners are associations duly existing and organized under Philippine law, i.e.
they have juridical personalities separate and distinct from that of their member Planters. It is likewise
undisputed that the eighty (80) milling contracts that were presented were signed only by the member
Planter concerned and one of the Centrals as parties. In other words, none of the petitioners were parties
or signatories to the milling contracts. This circumstance is fatal to petitioners' cause since they anchor
their right to demand arbitration from the respondent sugar centrals upon the arbitration clause found in
the milling contracts. There is no legal basis for petitioners' purported right to demand arbitration when
they are not parties to the milling contracts, especially when the language of the arbitration clause
expressly grants the right to demand arbitration only to the parties to the contract.
Simply put, petitioners do not have any agreement to arbitrate with respondents. Only eighty (80) Planters
who were all members of OSPA were shown to have such an agreement to arbitrate, included as a
stipulation in their individual milling contracts. The other petitioners failed to prove that any of their
members had milling contracts with respondents, much less, that respondents had an agreement to
arbitrate with the petitioner associations themselves.
NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, Petitioner,

vs.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011
FACTS: Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of Makati City a
Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring
the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon respondent’s motion, the trial court authorized
respondent’s counsel to personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate
General in Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner NM Rothschild
& Sons. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the
Complaint on the following grounds, among others: (a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner (defendant) due to the defective and improper service of summons; and (b) the
Complaint failed to state a cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner. The trial
court denied the Motion to Dismiss ruling that (1) there was a proper service of summons through the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a
license to do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom summons and other legal processes
maybe served; and (2) the Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioner was denied by the trial court prompting respondent to seek redress via a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying its Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals dismissed respondent’s petition and ruled that since
the denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order, it cannot be the subject of a Petition for
Certiorari, and may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after

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trial. On December 12, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Resolution denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Notwithstanding the foregoing, petitioner filed Pettion for review
on Certiorari to the Supreme Court arguing against the ruling of the appellate court that (a) an order
denying a motion to dismiss may be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari; and (b) the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding that it had not validly acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner and that the plaintiff had no cause of action. Respondent, on the other hand, posits that: (a) the
present Petition should be dismissed for not being filed by a real party in interest and for lack of a proper
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping; (b) the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that certiorari
was not the proper remedy; and (c) the trial court correctly denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest considering that the latter was no longer
existing as a corporation at the time the petition was filed.
HELD # 1:YES.
In the memorandum submitted by petitioner before the Supreme Court, petitioner started to refer to itself
as Investec Australia Limited (formerly "NM Rothschild & Sons [Australia] Limited") and captioned said
Memorandum accordingly. Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists
as a corporation under the laws of Australia under said new name. It presented documents evidencing
the process in the Australian Securities & Investment Commission on the change of petitioner’s company
name from NM Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited to Investec Australia Limited. The submissions of
petitioner on the change of its corporate name satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the present Petition
for Review on the ground of not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest. While the
Supreme Court stand to its pronouncement in Philips Export B.V. v. Court of Appeals, the importance of
the corporate name to the very existence of corporations and the significance thereof in the corporation’s
right to sue, shall not go so far as to dismiss a case filed by the proper party using its former name when
adequate identification is presented. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. There is no doubt that the
party who filed the present Petition, having presented sufficient evidence of its identity and being
represented by the same counsel as that of the defendant in the case sought to be dismissed, is the
entity that will be benefited if this Court grants the dismissal prayed for. Since the main objection of
respondent to the verification and certification against forum shopping likewise depends on the supposed
inexistence of the corporation named therein, we give no credit to said objection in light of the foregoing
discussion.
ISSUE # 2: Whether an order denying a motion to dismiss, an interlocutory order, may be questioned in a
special civil action for Certiorari.
HELD # 2: YES.
The general rule is that the denial of a Motion to Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for
Certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
However, if the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of Certiorari may be justified. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant: [S]uch
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. A mere error in
judgment on the part of the trial court would undeniably be inadequate to reverse the disposition by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE # 3: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the herein petitioner
considering the defective and improper service of summons.
HELD # 3: YES.

Petitioner (defendant) by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents
manifested their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active
participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the
court's jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
ISSUE # 4: Whether the motion to dismiss should be granted considering that respondent’s complaint
failed to sufficiently state cause of action or that there is an absence of cause of action.
HELD # 4: NO.
The argument that there is an absence of a cause of action (as opposed to the failure to state a cause of
action) is not a ground in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16of the Rules of Court.
Rather, such defense raise evidentiary issues closely related to the validity and/or existence of
respondent’s alleged cause of action and should therefore be threshed out during the trial. As regards the
allegation of failure to state a cause of action, while the same is usually available as a ground in a Motion
to Dismiss, said ground cannot be ruled upon in the present Petition without going into the very merits of
the main case. It is basic that "[a] cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another." Its elements are the following: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of
the defendant to respect the plaintiff's right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of
such right. The Supreme Court held that to sustain a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist and not only that the claim was defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. In the case at bar, respondent asserts in the Complaint
that the Hedging Contracts are void for being contrary to Article 2018of the Civil Code. Respondent
claims that under the Hedging Contracts, despite the express stipulation for deliveries of gold, the
intention of the parties was allegedly merely to compel each other to pay the difference between the value
of the gold at the forward price stated in the contract and its market price at the supposed time of delivery.
Whether such an agreement is void is a mere allegation of a conclusion of law, which therefore cannot be
hypothetically admitted. Quite properly, the relevant portions of the contracts sought to be nullified, as
well as a copy of the contract itself, are incorporated in the Complaint. The determination of whether or
not the Complaint stated a cause of action would therefore involve an inquiry into whether or not the
assailed contracts are void under Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue to be determined in
Civil Case No. 05-782. Indeed, petitioner’s defense against the charge of nullity of the Hedging Contracts
is the purported intent of the parties that actual deliveries of gold be made pursuant thereto. Such a
defense requires the presentation of evidence on the merits of the case. An issue that "requires the
contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits
of the case, should not be within the province of a mere Motion to Dismiss."
RULE 7
ATTY. FACUNDO T. BAUTISTA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BLAS O. CAUSAPIN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, Respondent.
First Division, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2044, June 22, 2011
FACTS: An administrative Complaint filed by Atty. Facundo T. Bautista against Judge Blas O. Causapin,
Jr. Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 32 of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, for gross ignorance of
the law and gross misconduct for issuing orders which granted defendants’ motions for extension of time
to file their answer to the complaint without notice of hearing and the Resolution which summarily

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dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs Reynaldo Mesina and Nancy Polangco did not sign
the verification and certification on non-forum shopping attached to the complaint, in violation of Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court, without ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion to declare defendants in default.
ISSUE # 1: Whether Judge Causapin correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of a proper certificate of
non-forum shopping.
HELD: NO.
No doubt this Court has held that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient and constitutes a
defect in the petition. The attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and
the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by
his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as or similar to the current petition. However, the Court
has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect
to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. All
the petitioners, being relatives and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest
thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition filed by the respondents. Thus,
when they filed the instant petition, they filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their
rights over the properties in question.
Without notice and hearing, Judge Causapin dismissed the complaint in the said civil case because of the
purported defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping. Before a complaint can be dismissed for lack of
a proper certificate of non-forum shopping, notice and hearing are required.
ISSUE # 2: Whether Judge Causapin correctly granted defendants’ motions for extension of time to file
answer without hearing.
HELD # 2: NO.
As prescribed by the Rules of court, a movant shall set his motion for hearing, unless it is one of those
which a court can act upon without prejudicing the rights of the other party. The prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that a motion without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.
Yet the rule requiring notice of hearing is not unqualifiedly applicable to all motions, and there are motions
which may be heard ex parte, as Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court also clearly
acknowledges.
In Amante v. Suñga, the Court declared that:
The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where notice to
the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte
motion "made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and
usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties." As "a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice
demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard..."
Considering that a motion for extension of time may be acted upon by the court ex parte or without
hearing, then it need not contain a notice of hearing. It is equally unnecessary for the court to wait until

motion day, under Rule 15, Section 736 of the 1997 Rules of Court, to act on a motion for extension of
time.
FLAVIO S. SUAREZ, JR., RENATO A. DE ASIS, FRANCISCO G. ADORABLE, JOVEN ANDALOC,

ONOFRE G. BAGAYO, GENITO J. BANGGO, WENDELINO L. BERONDO, NAPOLEON P. BULOS,
ISIDRO S. DADANG, TEODORO P. DOTARO, NOIDA T. DUNGOG, EROLITO A. EDROZO,
ROBERTO A. EMPHASIS, GIDEON S. GEONZON, LAMBERTO S. GEONZON, JAIME A. HERRERA,
CARLOS V. JACINTO, JERRY B. JUMAMIL, ALLAN P. LACIDA, CLAUDIO B. LACIDA, EDWIN L.
LAGBAS, VERONICA H. LEUTERIO, EDILBERTO L. LUCOT, AVELINO S. MANQUIQUIS, LYDIO R.
NOVISES, ROGELIO T. PANSACALA, BERNARDINO N. PERNIA, JOAQUIN R. QUINDO, CARMELO
A. RABOR, RODOLFO C. REYNES, PRIMO C. SUERTE, TEODULO D. TANUDRA, MYRNA E.
VALDEHUEZA, RAMON T. VERSOLA, PABLEO S. LOZANO, SE MARTINEZ, JH TORRION, CA
TAMIROY and AR ANTIPOLO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 150180, October 17, 2008
FACTS: Respondent National Steel Corporation adopted an organizational streamlining program that
resulted in the retrenchment of seven hundred employees in its main plant in Iligan City, among whom
were herein petitioners. Notices were sent to the employees and specifically stated that their services
were terminated and they will each receive a separation package in accordance with the retrenchment
program. Respondent and NASLU-FFW signed a new CBA, and pursuant thereto, the retrenched
employees were given their salary differentials, for which they executed and signed another release and
quitclaim.
Nothing was heard from the retrenched employees for two and half years after their separation from the
company, when herein petitioners wrote respondent demanding payment of retirement benefits under the
CBA. They claimed that they were qualified for optional retirement after having rendered services for at
least ten (10) years. Respondent rejected petitioners claim, forcing petitioners to file a complaint for
payment of retirement benefits against respondent. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the NLRC
reversed it on appeal. Aggrieved with the NLRC resolution, respondent company elevated the matter to
the CA by way of a petition for certiorari and the CA granted the respondent company’s petition. The
present petition was filed with the SC by thirty-nine of hundreds of private respondents involved in CA-
G.R. No. 51734. After the filing of the parties memoranda in this case, two groups of other private
respondents in CA-G.R. No. 51734 (Maria Theresa Labastida, et al. and Alexander Bongcawel, et al.)
filed separate motions for intervention. In their motion for intervention, Maria Theresa Labastida, et al.
prayed that should the Supreme Court decide in favor of the petitioners the same award should also
apply to other complainants-appellants before the 5th Division, NLRC while Alexander Bongcawel, et al.
prayed that they be allowed to intervene in the proceedings herein and/or be included as petitioners in
this case. The petitioners also argued that the respondent committed forum shopping.
ISSUE #1: Whether the respondents committed forum shopping.
HELD # 1: No.
In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that from shopping
is the act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking
another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum by appeal or a special civil action of certiorari.
Even assuming that separate actions have been filed by two different parties involving essentially the
same subject matter, no forum shopping is committed where the parties did not resort to multiple judicial
remedies.
The case pending before the CA, Twelfth Division, was the petition for review filed by NASLU-FFW
wherein respondent was not impleaded as a party. Respondents failure to disclose the existence of such

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a case in its certification against forum shopping, assuming respondent already had notice of the filing of
the said case at the time it filed its own CA petition, is not fatal to its petition before the CA.
ISSUE #2: Whether the intervention is proper.
HELD # 2: No.
The intevenor’s own appeal/petition for review of the CAs Decision in CA-G.R. No. 51734 has already
been denied with finality by the SC Third Division. They cannot now re-open their case or recover their
lost appeal by intervention in the present case. In any event, intervenors interest in the present case is
only insofar as a judgment in favor of petitioners might inure to their benefit. Considering the Supreme
Court’s Decision is adverse to petitioners, there is no reason for allowing said motions for intervention.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROSELITO TACULOD y ELLE, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Two separate Informations were filed against the appellant for violations of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act. During the trial of the case, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of four police officers. On the other hand, only the appellant
Roselito Taculod y Elle testified in his defense. The appellant denied the charges filed against him and
that he only came to know about such charges at the police station. RTC rendered judgment finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. From the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, the trial court concluded that the appellant was validly arrested in
a buy-bust operation after having been caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to PO1 Montefrio
and, thereafter, found to possess additional plastic sachets of drugs in his person. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals fully affirmed the appellant’s conviction. The appellant, thus, filed an appeal before the
Supreme Court. The appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by insisting that the
prosecution failed to establish the exact time of the alleged buy-bust operation. He also argued that the
testimonies of the police officers should not have been accorded full faith and credit.
ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of the police officers should prevail over the defense of denial of the
appellant.
HELD: YES.
Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant could only muster a defense
of outright denial, with nary any evidence to adequately support his version of the events that led to his
arrest. As held in People v. Hernandez, the defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably viewed
by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defense of denial and
frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.
In light of the above disquisition, the Court is convinced the elements of the offenses charged had been
sufficiently proven in this case.

RULE 9
HEIRS OF DOMINGO VALIENTES, Petitioners,

vs.
Hon. REINERIO (Abraham) B. RAMAS, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 29, 9th Judicial
Region, San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur and Vilma V. Minor, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 157852 December 15, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners claim that they are the heirs of Domingo Valientes who, before his death, was the
owner of a parcel of land. In 1939, Domingo Valientes mortgaged the subject property to secure his loan
to the spouses Leon Belen and Brigida Sescon (spouses Belen). In the 1950s, the Valientes family failed
to retrieve the subject property from the spouses Belen.
Through an allegedly forged document purporting to be a deed of sale of the subject property between
Domingo Valientes and the spouses Belen, the latter obtained TCT No. T-5,427 in their name. Upon the
death of the spouses Belen, their surviving heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement with partition and
sale in favor of private respondent Vilma Valencia-Minor, the present possessor of the subject property.
on August 20, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for the "CANCELLATION OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-5,427, RECONVEYANCE, WITH ACCOUNTING, RECEIVERSHIP AND
APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY INJUNCTION PLUS DAMAGES."
Private respondent Minor filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 98-021 on the grounds of
forum shopping and litis pendentia. RTC issued an Order granting the Motion for Reconsideration by
dismissing the case on the ground of forum shopping.
On appeal, The Court of Appeals rendered a decision that despite agreeing with petitioners that there
was no forum shopping, litis pendentia or res judicata in the filing of Civil Case No. 98-021, the Court of
Appeals, asserting that it has the discretion to review matters not otherwise assigned as errors on appeal
if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case,
held that Civil Case No. 98-021 cannot prosper on the grounds of prescription and laches.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals validly dismissed the case motu proprio on the grounds of
prescription and laches.
HELD: YES.
The second sentence of Secton 1, Rule 9 does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts to dismiss
cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds – (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription – provided that the ground for dismissal is
apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
We therefore rule that private respondent Minor cannot be deemed to have waived the defense of
prescription, and that the Court of Appeals may consider the same motu proprio. Furthermore, as regards
the pronouncement by the Court of Appeals that Civil Case No. 98-021 is likewise heavily infirmed with
laches, we rule that the Court of Appeals is not in error when it considered the same motu proprio. While
not included in the above enumeration under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, we have ruled in
previous cases that laches need not be specifically pleaded and may be considered by the court on its
own initiative in determining the rights of the parties
SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES,

- versus –

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FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21,
BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, BANSALAN,
DAVAO DEL SUR, and SPOUSES GUALBERTO & RENE CABAHUG-SUPERALES,
First Division, G.R. No. 154462, January 19, 2011
FACTS: This case originated from a Complaint for forcible entry filed by respondents spouses Superales
against the spouses Leynes. The spouses Leynes were served with the summons on May 10, 2000. The
last day of the 10-day period within which the spouses Leynes should have filed their answer, May 20,
2000, fell on a Saturday. The next working day was May 22, 2000, a Monday, on which the spouses
Leynes did file their Answer with Counterclaim explaining that they were not able to file their answer
timely because they had to serve first a copy of said pleading on the spouses Superales counsel, whose
office was approximately one-hour ride by bus and added that they were not even sure if the office of the
[
spouses Superales counsel was open on Saturdays. The spouses Superales subsequently filed an Ex
Parte Motion for Judgment in which they prayed that since the spouses Leynes failed to file their answer
to the Complaint within the prescribed period, then judgment could now be rendered based on the
evidence and allegations contained in the Complaint. The MCTC rendered its Judgment denying the
spouses Leynes Motion to Admit Belatedly Filed Answer and resolving entirely in the spouses Superales
favor. Aggrieved, spouses Leynes appealed the MCTC Judgment to the RTC, however, affirmed the
appealed MCTC Judgment and refused to reconsider its earlier decision. The spouses Leynes then filed
a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction with the CA, however, the CA dismissed the spouses Leynes petition outright for being the
wrong remedy and for failure to state the material dates. Aggrieved, spouses Leynes filed to the Court a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the (1) Resolution of the CA dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction of petitioners
spouses Leynes; and (2) Resolution CA denying the spouses Leynes Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the spouses Leynes should be declared in default for their failure to file their answer to
the spouses Superales Complaint within the reglementary period.
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court emphasized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, that non-working
days (Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) are excluded from the counting of the period only when
the last day of the period falls on such days. Rule 22 does not provide for any other circumstance in
which non-working days would affect the counting of a prescribed period. The spouses Leynes were
served with the summons on May 10, 2000. The last day of the 10-day period within which the spouses
Leynes should have filed their answer, May 20, 2000, fell on a Saturday. The next working day was May
22, 2000, a Monday, on which the spouses Leynes did file their Answer with Counterclaim. Based on the
aforequoted rules, the spouses Leynes answer was filed within the reglementary period, and they were
not in default. The MCTC should not have rendered an ex parte Judgment against them. Court personnel
were at the MCTC on May 20, 2000, a Saturday, in compliance with the Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 2-99. Administrative Circular No. 2-99 should not affect the manner by which periods set by
the rules or the courts are computed under Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.Administrative
Circular No. 2-99 is an administrative issuance signed by then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide to govern
the attendance of judiciary officials and employees. It cannot amend or take precedence over the Rules of
Court, duly approved by the Court en banc and published for the information of and compliance by the
public. In fact, Administrative Circular No. 2-99 itself states that it supersedes and modifies accordingly
any previous Orders or Circulars on the matter, but not the Rules of Court.

RULE 14
DATU PAX PAKUNG S. MANGUDADATU, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELO O. MONTILLA,
respondents.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 179813, December 18, 2008
FACTS: Datu Pax Pakung S. Mangudadatu (petitioner) and Angelo O. Montilla (private respondent) were
congressional candidates for the First District of Sultan Kudarat during the 2007 national elections.
Petitioner won and was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the said congressional district.
Respondent filed with the HRET a Petition of Protest contesting the results of the elections and the
proclamation of petitioner.
The Secretary of the HRET caused the service of summons upon petitioner through registered mail at his
residence requiring him to file an Answer to the protest. The HRET received the Registry Return Receipt
Card showing that a certain Aileen R. Baldenas received the summons.
No answer was received from the petitioner hence the HRET considered petitioner to have entered a
general denial of the allegations of the protest. When the petitioner knew this, he filed a motion to
reconsider alleging that he never received the summons and Baldenas was not a member of his
household or his employee. The HRET denied the said motion for reconsideration hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether summons was validly served through registered mail.
HELD: NO.
The HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served. Since Rule 80 of the
HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far
as the latter may be applicable and not inconsistent therewith xxx, pertinent sections of the Rules of Civil
Procedure relative to the authorized modes of service of summons should be applied. The said sections
provides that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to
him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If however efforts to find him personally
would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, i.e., by leaving
copies of the summons at his dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein or by leaving the copies at his office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways,
through the Hon. Secretary, HERMOGENES EBDANE, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO A. DOMINGO, Respondent
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 175299 September 14, 2011
FACTS: Respondent Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages
against (DPWH), Region III.
Domingo averred that, he entered into seven contracts with the DPWH Region III for the lease of his
construction equipment to said government agency. After the completion of the projects, Domingo
claimed that the unpaid rentals of the DPWH Region III amounted to P6,320,163.05. Despite repeated
demands, Domingo asserted that the DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations. Domingo was, thus,
compelled to file the above case for the payment of the balance.

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Summons together with the complaint were served to DPWH Region III through Nora Cortez, Clerk III of
said. DPWH Region III was declared in default and judgment was rendered in favor of Domingo.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
It argued that it was not impleaded as an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. The seven
contracts sued upon in the trial court stated that they were entered into by the DPWH Region III for and in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, which purportedly was the real party to the contract. The
Republic also averred that since no summons was issued to OSG, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Republic.
ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the Republic upon serving summons to DPWH
Region III office.
HELD: NO.
Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines,
service may be effected on the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public
corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as the law
or the court may direct.
In the instant case, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically
named as defendant the DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its
regional office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest in Civil
Case No. 333-M-2002. Thus, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in
this case should have been served on the OSG.
In sum, the Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons, hence, the RTC failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the Republic. Consequently, the proceedings had before the trial
court and its Decision are hereby declared void.
SPOUSES GERMAN ANUNCIACION and ANA FERMA ANUNCIACION and GAVINO G. CONEJOS,
Petitioners,
vs.
PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA and GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, Respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title. The summons, together with the copies of the
complaint, were then served on respondents’ lawyer, Atty. Pizarro. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently, a Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss was filed by respondents, alleging petitioners’ failure to pay the required filing fee as additional
ground. Thereafter, a Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was filed, citing the following grounds: lack
no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; over the subject matter; and that the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents. The MR was
also denied. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA. But the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA
held that the filing of the earlier motions to dismiss did not waive the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants, hence, there is no voluntary appearance on the part of
respondents/defendants. The CA also held that the service of summons upon Atty. Pizarro was improper;
therefore the complaint on that ground alone should be dismissed. Hence, petitioners sought recourse

before this Court raising grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in dismissing the
complaint.
ISSUE #1: Was there voluntarily appearance on the part of the defendants despite their filing of the
motions to dismiss?
HELD # 1: YES.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Voluntary Appearance – The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.
The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of the respondents under the
aforequoted provision of the Rules. The same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss as an additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint, the
failure of plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the respondents.
ISSUE # 2: Was the rule on omnibus motion rule violated when the respondents filed the subsequent
Supplemental Motions to Dismiss?
HELD # 2: YES.
Respondents’ Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss were clearly
in violation of Rule 15, Section 8. Omnibus motion. – Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a
motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available,
and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Rule 9, Section 1, in turn, states: Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Applying the foregoing rules, respondents’ failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their
persons in their very first motion to dismiss was fatal to their cause. They are already deemed to have
waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. The trial court plainly abused its discretion
when it dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants.
Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion to
dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.
We likewise cannot approve the trial court’s act of entertaining supplemental motions to dismiss which
raise grounds that are already deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to file
piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiff’s cause of
action.
ISSUE # 3: Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of improper service of summons?
HELD # 3: NO.
A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. It should be
difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally appears before a Court complaining

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that he had not been validly summoned, that the case filed against him should be dismissed. An alias
summons can be actually served on said defendant. A trial court should be cautious before dismissing
complaints on the sole ground of improper service of summons considering that it is well within its
discretion to order the issuance and service of alias summons on the correct person in the interest of
substantial justice.
RULE 16
ADDITION HILLS MANDALUYONG CIVIC AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES & HOLDINGS, INC., and HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY
BOARD, DENR, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 175039, April 18, 2012
FACTS: Megaworld constructed a condominium project over a parcel of land it owns in Lee Street, Brgy.
Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City after securing the necessary clearances, licences and permits. Addtion
Hills Mandaluyong Civic and Social Organization (AHMCSO) filed a complaint before the RTC of Pasig
City to annul the Building permit granted to Megaworld and to prohibit the issuance of Certificate to Sell
Condo units. Megaworld filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action and that jurisdiction
over the case was with the HLURB and not with the regular courts. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner,
holding the building permit and certificate to sell issued to Megaworld are null and void. Upon appeal, the
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC on the ground that AHMCSO failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before seeking judicial intervention from the courts. The matter was elevated to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the case should be dismissed, considering the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
HELD: YES.
We have consistently declared that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
In the case of Republic v. Lacap, we expounded on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the related doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this wise:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all
the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
It is true that the foregoing doctrine admits of exceptions, such that in Lacap, we also held:

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules.
There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. x
x x.
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, we find that none of the aforementioned
exceptions exist in the case at bar.
What is apparent, however, is that petitioner unjustifiably failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before seeking recourse with the
trial court. Under the rules of the HLURB which were then in effect, particularly Sections 4 and 6 of
HLURB Resolution No. R-391, Series of 1987 (Adopting the 1987 Rules of Procedure of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board), a complaint to annul any permit issued by the HLURB may be filed before
the Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA). Therefore, petitioner’s action to annul the Certificate of
Locational Viability (CLV) and the Development Permit issued by the HLURB on October 25, 1994 and
November 11, 1994, respectively, in favor of private respondent for its Wack-Wack Heights Condominium
Project should have been properly filed before the HLURB instead of the trial court.
It does not escape the attention of the Court that in its Reply, petitioner admitted that it had a pending
complaint with the HLURB involving private respondent’s the Development Permit, the Certificate of
Registration and License to Sell Condominium Units, aside from complaints with the Building Official of
the Municipality (now City) of Mandaluyong and the MMDA, when it instituted its action with the trial court.
As discussed earlier, a litigant cannot go around the authority of the concerned administrative agency and
directly seek redress from the courts. Thus, when the law provides for a remedy against a certain action
of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all
remedies provided therein. It is settled that the non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of
Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.
HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN, FOR HIMSELF AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF: NILO M. DE

GUZMAN, ANGELINO DE GUZMAN, JOSEFINO M. DE GUZMAN, ESTRELLA M. DE GUZMAN,
TERESITA DE GUZMAN, ELSA MARGARITA M. DE GUZMAN, EVELYN M. DE GUZMAN, MA. NIMIA
M. DE GUZMAN, ANTOLIN M. DE GUZMAN, AND FERDINAND M. DE GUZMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
TABANGAO REALTY INCORPORATED, Respondent.
FACTS: Sometime in 1980, Serafin de Guzman and Josefino de Guzman applied for, and were granted,
authority to distribute oil and lubricating products manufactured and marketed by Filipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (FSPC). In the course of their business, Serafin and Josefino purchased on credit
oil and lubricating products from FSPC, but they eventually failed to pay for their credit purchases from
FSPC. Thus, FSPC filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for sum of money against Serafin and
Josefino. After trial, RTC-Manila rendered judgment ordering Serafin and Josefino to pay their
outstanding obligations to FSPC. Since Serafin and Josefino no longer appealed, the judgment became
final and executory. RTC-Manila granted the motion of FSPC and ordered the issuance of a writ of

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execution. FSPC levied upon a parcel of land situated in Cavite in the name of spouses Serafin and
Amelia de Guzman. The property was sold at a public auction, in favor of Tabangao Realty, Inc. The
spouses De Guzman did not redeem the subject property within one year from registration of the
Sherifff’s Certificate of Sale. In 2001, the De Guzmans filed a Complaint for quieting of title against
Tabangao Realty before RTC-Trece Martires. Tabangao Realty, instead of filing an answer, filed a Motion
to Dismiss based on two grounds: (a) the Complaint failed to comply with the requirements on certification
against forum shopping; and (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. On March 2002, RTC-
Trece Martires issued an Order, dismissing the case. The De Guzmans filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but RTC-Trece Martires denied the same in May 2002. The De Guzmans filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 directly with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the motion to dismiss, on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, admits the truth
of the facts alleged therein.
HELD: NO.
While the general rule is that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the
complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein, there are exceptions to the general
rule.
As held in Vergel de Dios v. Bristol Laboratories Phils., Inc. (4 Phil. 311, 317-322, 1974), in order to
sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the
cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For
the purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts which are well
pleaded in the complaint. Thus, it has been ruled that a demurrer admits only such matters of fact as are
sufficiently pleaded; that the demurrer does not admit the truth of mere epithets charging fraud; nor
allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous statement of law. The admission of the truth of material
and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or
conclusions drawn therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from
facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.
Examples of allegations considered by this Court as conclusions of law are: that defendant had incurred
damages as a consequence of the “malicious and unjustified” institution of the action; that “with intent of
circumventing the constitutional prohibition that ‘no officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law,’ respondents “maliciously and illegally for
the purpose of political persecution and political vengeance, reverted the fund of the salary item x x x and
furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective July 1, 1960”; that the “defendant usurped
the office of Senator of the Philippines.”
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
GATEWAY PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: GPHI instituted a civil case for Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage over its properties and
ask for a TRO against PNB. According to GPHI, its mother corporation, GEC, had an agreement with
PNB that the properties in issue would stand merely as temporary securities pending the outcome of
another case. RTC did not issue a TRO in favor of GPHI, and so the properties were subsequently sold at
a public auction.

Later on, GPHI initiated a case for Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale of the above properties, asserting
that PNB knew that the mortgaged properties were never intended to be used as permanent collateral for
GEC, but one which was simply used as an unregistered security until GPHI incurs in default in paying
the obligation of GEC to PNB.
PNB moved for the dismissal of the later case on the ground of litis pendentia since the two cases above
essentially involve the same issues. The RTC dismissed the case, but the CA reversed it, ruling that the
requisites of litis pendentia did not exist. Hence, this case before the SC.
ISSUE # 1: When is litis pendentia a ground for the dismissal of a case?
HELD # 1:
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. [t]here is litis pendentia or another action pendente lite if the following requisites are present:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
With respect to the first requirement of litis pendentia, x x x identity of parties does not mean total identity
of parties in both cases. It is enough that there is substantial identity of parties. The inclusion of new
parties in the second action does not remove the case from the operation of the rule of litis pendentia.
Whether there is an identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second
action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or nature of the two
actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions, the two actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action;
otherwise, it is not.
ISSUE # 2: Is litis pendentia applicable in this case so as to warrant the dismissal of the later case for
Annulment of the Foreclosure Sale?
HELD # 2: NO.
The ultimate question that the trial court would have to resolve in both cases is whether the real estate
mortgage over the properties of GPHI was actually intended to secure the loan obligations of GEC to
PNB so much so that PNB can legally foreclose on the mortgaged properties should GEC fail to settle its
loan obligations. X x x the well-entrenched rule is that a party cannot, by varying the form of action, or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. The two cases x x x contained an identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same factual allegations. Thus, any doubt
as to the act of GPHI of splitting its cause of action has since been removed.
RULE 17
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
EXPLORER MARITIME CO., LTD., OWNER OF THE VESSEL M/V "EXPLORER", WALLEM PHILS.
SHIPPING, INC., ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. AND FOREMOST INTERNATIONAL PORT SERVICES,
INC., respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 175409, September 7, 2011

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FACTS: Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC), as insurer-subrogee, filed with the RTC of
Manila a Complaint against respondents. PCIC sought to recover from the respondents a sum of money
allegedly representing the value of lost or damaged shipment paid to the insured, interest and attorney's
fees. The case was docketed and was raffled to Branch 37. On the same date, PCIC filed a similar case
against respondents Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc., Asian Terminals, Inc., and Foremost International
Port Services, Inc., but, this time, the fourth defendant is "the unknown owner of the vessel M/V
"Taygetus." This second case was docketed and was raffled to Branch 38. Respondents filed their
respective answers with counterclaims in Civil Case pending before Branch 37. PCIC later filed its answer
to the counterclaims. Later, PCIC filed an ex parte motion to set the case for pre-trial conference, which
was granted by the trial court. However, before the scheduled date, PCIC filed its Amended Complaint.
The "Unknown Owner" of the vessel M/V "Explorer" and Asian Terminals, Inc. filed anew their respective
answers with counterclaims. Foremost International Port Services, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss, which
was later denied by the trial court. On December 5, 2000, Respondent common carrier, "the Unknown
Owner" of the vessel M/V "Explorer," and Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that PCIC failed to prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. PCIC allegedly
filed its Opposition, claiming that the trial court has not yet acted on its Motion to Disclose which it
purportedly filed on November 19, 1997. In said motion, PCIC supposedly prayed for the trial court to
order respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. to disclose the true identity and whereabouts of
defendant "Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V 'Explorer.'" The trial court dismissed the case for failure of
petitioner to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, PCIC
allegedly realized that its Motion to Disclose was inadvertently filed with Branch 38 of the RTC of Manila,
and not with Branch 37. PCIC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was later denied. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration
filed. PCIC filed Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the civil case for failure of PCIC to prosecute is proper.
HELD: YES.
The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal of the Civil Case for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the
same for an unreasonable length of time is correct and proper. The inaction was thus already almost
three years. There is therefore no question that the failure to prosecute in the case at bar was for an
unreasonable length of time. Consequently, the Complaint may be dismissed even absent any allegation
and proof of the plaintiff's lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the defendant
resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. PCIC could have filed a motion for the
early resolution of their Motion to Disclose after the apparent failure of the court to do so. If PCIC had
done so, it would possibly have discovered the error in the filing of said motion much earlier. Finally, it is
worth noting that the defendants also have the right to the speedy disposition of the case; the delay of the
pre-trial and the trial might cause the impairment of their defenses.
PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO C. MILAN, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of "A. MILAN TRADING," and
LAURA M. MILAN, Respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010
FACTS: The instant case was commenced upon the fling of Complaint for Sum of Money by petitioner
PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. against respondents Antonio C. Milan and Laura M. Milan. PCI Leasing
alleged that it extended loans to respondents for which feeds of assignment were duly executed by
respondents. Under the terms of the deeds, respondents sold, assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing
the former’s rights to various checks for and in consideration of the amounts obtained. Subsequently,

when PCI Leasing presented the checks for payment, the same were dishonored and despite repeated
demands, respondents failed to settle their obligations. PCI Leasing was then compelled to litigate to
enforce payment of the total loan obligation. The RTC issued summons to respondents however the
summons and the copy of the complaint were returned unserved for the reason that when the process
server went to the respondents’ residence, he was told by the neighbors that the respondents had already
transferred to an unknown location. PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons which the
RTC scheduled for hearing. During the hearing of the motion, there was no appearance from the
counsels of PCI Leasing and respondents. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed the case. PCI Leasing sought
a reconsideration but was denied. PCI Leasing fled a 1otice of appeal in an attempt to challenge the order
of the RTC. The RTC rendered a resolution dismissing the notice of appeal on the ground that the same
was filed beyond the reglementary period. Without fling a Motion for reconsideration, PCI Leasing
assailed the resolution before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The appellate court dismissed outright the petition holding that the petition for certiorari
was filed out of time and the Notice of Appeal involved questions of law which it has no jurisdiction
ISSUE #1: Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the case on the ground of the failure of the plaintiff’s
counsel to appear on the scheduled hearing.
HELD: NO.
In the present case, PCI Leasing explained that its counsel merely came late during the hearing
scheduled for the said date, arriving at the time when Judge Domingo-Regala was already dictating the
order of dismissal. Said hearing was not even for the presentation of the evidence in chief of PCI Leasing,
where the latters presence would be indispensable, but merely for the issuance of Alias Summons.
Incidentally, the Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is non-litigious in nature,
which does not require a hearing under the Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC
without prejudicing the rights of the respondents.
It can hardly be said that PCI Leasing engaged in a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the Civil
Case or committed a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.
In Calalang v. Court of Appeals, the court underscores that unless a party's conduct is so negligent,
irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-
appearance, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the
desired end.
ISSUE #2: Whether the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time thereby warranting the denial thereof.
HELD # 2: YES.
In accordance with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Said
period shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration as held by in the case of
Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated October 13,
2000, which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. On January 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a Resolution,
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Said Resolution was received by PCI Leasing on January 17,
2001. Therefore, PCI Leasing should have filed its Notice of Appeal within 15 days from January 17, 2001
or until February 1, 2001. PCI Leasing actually filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001 or 114 days
after receipt of the Resolution denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

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RULE 18
RN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
A.I.I. SYSTEM, INC., respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 166104, June 26, 2008
FACTS: AII Systems, Inc. filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against RN Development Corporation,
seeking to collect the outstanding balance of the purchase price of the pipes and fittings, valves and
electrical panels which the latter allegedly ordered from the former. However, due to various reasons, the
pre-trial in this case has been reset for five times. Because of this, the lower court dismissed the case for
lack of interest. The counsel for respondent, upon receiving the order dismissing the complaint,
immediately filed a motion for reconsideration which explained his late arrival for four (4) minutes. The
said MR was denied hence an appeal was made to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the case and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court correctly dismissed the case for failure of the respondent’s counsel to
appear on time during pre-trial, considering that the latter was 4 minutes late.
HELD: NO.
It is the policy of the Court to afford every litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Since rules of procedure are mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, courts must avoid the rigid application thereof which
tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. The interest of justice will be better served by
the continuation of the proceedings and final disposition of the case on the merits before the trial court.
Pre-trial is not a mere technicality in court proceeding for it is essential in the simplification and the
speedy disposition of disputes. The Court observed in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals that:
Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet
to this day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory
treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save
perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or,
wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial device is not thus put to full use. Hence it has failed in
the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial,
if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much
difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled.
RULE 19
THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE MINDANAO STATEUNIVERSITY represented by its Chairman,

Petitioner,
vs.
ABEDIN LIMPAO OSOP, Respondent
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 172448 February 22, 2012
FACTS: Osop was appointed as a substitute for another professor of Mindanao State University General
Santos City (MSU-GSC). After 4 years, MSU-GSC, through Muslim and Ramos, informed Osop that in

view of the return of the person for whom Osop is serving as substitute, Osop’s temporary appointment
have to end and was advised that his services will not be renewed and must cease from reporting to duty
immediately. Osop filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
Muslim and Ramos. The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the Civil
Service Commission is the sole arbiter involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by Civil
Service Law. However, the CA reversed RTC’s decision and ordered that RTC should hear and try the
case. Muslim then filed petition for Certiorari before the SC but was denied. Meanwhile, Osop amended
its complaint and impleaded MSU as defendant. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Osop by
ordering Muslim and Ramos and MSU to give teaching loads by reinstating Osop. Aggrieved, Muslim in
his personal capacity filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction. After Muslim and Osop filed its Memorandum, MSU, anchoring its right to intervene on Rule 19
Sec 1, filed a motion to intervene stressing that it has legal interest in the controversy considering that,
ultimately, it will be the one liable for the relief Osop prays for, particularly Osop’s reinstatement at MSU-
GSC. The CA held that the motion is a stray pleading and denied MSU’s intervention on the ground that
Sec 2 Rule 19 of Rules of Court allows intervention only at any time before rendition of judgment by the
trial court.
ISSUE: Whether MSU may avail of the remedy of intervention.
HELD: NO.
Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest
which may be affected by such proceedings.The right to intervene is not an absolute right; it may only be
permitted by the court when the movant establishes facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing it. While undoubtedly, MSU has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail
itself of the remedy of intervention simply because MSU is not a third party in the proceedings herein.
In Osops Amended Complaint before the RTC, MSU was already impleaded as one of the
defendants MSU came under the jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons. It
participated, where it was represented by Atty. Fontanilla, counsel for Muslim and Ramos, who was
deputized by the OSG as counsel for MSU. MSU adopted the Answer to the Amended Complaint of its
co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos, and also joined Muslim and Ramos in subsequent pleadings filed
before the RTC. Evidently, the rights and interests of MSU were duly presented before the RTC.
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 184589 , June 13, 2013
FACTS: The parcel of land under consideration was sold to Landicho in 1965. It was thereafter sold
several times, and as the old TCTs of the vendors were cancelled, new TCTs were accordingly issued to
the buyers. The sale of the subject property could be traced from Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc;
then to Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc; and finally, to herein respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable
Association, Inc. Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject property in favor of
herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later, Landicho died. Rodriguez filed an
Omnibus Motion before the RTC. Rodriguez alleged therein that the Decision of the CFI in Land Reg
which confirmed Landicho’s title over the subject property has not been executed. As Landicho’s
successor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that Decree of Registration be
issued in his name.
PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case. PCCAI justified
its intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest

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therein as the registered owner of the subject property under. Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion constituted a
collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence.
Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case. The RTC favorably
acted on Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion and ordered Land Registration Authority to issue a decree of
registration while the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is likewise directed to issue an original
certificate of title of the subject property. PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The
said order denying the MR was subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the intervention of PCCAI was proper.
HELD: YES.
The subject property is presently covered by a certificate of title in the name of PCCAI. As the registered
owner, PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the subject property. The issuance of another certificate of
title to Rodriguez will adversely affect PCCAI. Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to
intervene may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in several cases.
The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on
intervention. Such action was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent
the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in Rodriguez’s name. For this
reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.
RULE 35
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. TORRE, CONRADO U. PUA, GREGORIO V. MANSANO, JERRY
CORPUZ and ESTELITAACOSTA, Respondents
First Division, G.R. No. 166330, September 11, 2013
FACTS: Smart entered into a contract with one Sebastian whereby they stipulated, among others, that
the former will lease the land of the latter and construct and install thereon a cellular base station. During
the construction, herein respondents, owners of the properties around and close to the cellular base
station, then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for abatement of nuisance and
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the
noxious fumes and constant noise from the tower were a health hazard to the residents in the area.
Smart, after filing an answer and pre-trial brief, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, contending that
there was no need for a full-blown trial. The RTC granted said motion, holding that the allegations of
herein respondents were merely speculative. The Court of Appeals reversed said order and denied
Smart’s ensuing Motion for Reconsideration. Smart, thus, elevated the case to the Supreme Court via
Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether Smart is entitled to a summary judgment.
HELD: NO.
For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must establish two requisites: (a) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the
motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of
the pleadings of a moving party, including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a
material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing
party fails, the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which

requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is a sham, fictitious, contrived
or a false claim.
The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents,
affidavits or counter affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment
called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on record must be
viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all
favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
Summary judgment cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual issues disputed or
contested by the parties. Without presentation by the parties of evidence on the contested or disputed
facts, there was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base station a nuisance and ordering
petitioner to cease and desist from operating the same.
Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case, i.e., on one hand, respondents' health,
safety, and property, and on the other, petitioner's business interest and the public's need for accessible
and better cellular mobile telephone services, the wise and prudent course to take is to remand the case
to the RTC for trial and give the parties the opportunity to prove their respective factual claims.
RULE 36
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 71, CRESENCIANO RABELLO, JR.,
SHERIFF IV, RTC-BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY; AND EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS
WIDOW, ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175393, December 18, 2009
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CELSO LAVIÑA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Pasig City, Branch 71, CRESENCIANO RABELLO,
JR., Sheriff, RTC-71, PASIG CITY, and EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow,
ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, Respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 177731
FACTS: The Zulueta spouses obtained a loan from GSIS which was secured by a mortgage on the
subject lots. The mortgage was eventually foreclosed and GSIS acquired ownership of the said lots.
Eduardo M. Santiago, transferee of the rights and interests over the subject lots, asked for the
reconveyance of the same through a letter addressed to GSIS. Antonio Zulueta, Santiago’s predecessor-
in-interest and represented by the latter, filed an action for reconveyance of the excluded lots against
GSIS in the Regional Trial Court Pasig City Branch 71. Antonio was then substituted by Santiago who
was later on substituted by his wife, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago. The RTC rendered a decision
against GSIS. Rosario then moved that a writ of execution be issued, which was opposed by GSIS on the
ground that its funds and properties were exempt from execution. In the Order granting the motion for
issuance of writ of execution, the RTC fixed the current fair market value of the subject lots, which were
ordered reconveyed to private respondent, at P35,000.00 per square meter, or a total of
P1,166,165,000.00 computed on the basis of an aggregate area of 33,319 square meters. The RTC
subsequently denied the ensuing motion to quash the same. GSIS then filed (1) with the Court of Appeals
a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to annul the order of RTC Pasig denying its motion to quash the writ of
execution and (2) with the RTC Pasay City a Petition for Mandamus with prayer for temporary mandatory

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restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to compel PNB and DBP (respondent banks) to release
the deposit made by petitioner by allowing petitioner GSIS to withdraw its funds and monies deposited in
respondent banks. The CA partially granted the petition and allowing the immediate partial execution of
the RTC Pasig decision. RTC Pasay, on the other hand, issued a TRO. GSIS then filed with the Supreme
Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which was dismissed by the Court for being violative of the
rule on non-forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court may modify the RTC decision.
HELD: NO.
It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must
become final at some definite point in time.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro
tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void. None of
these has been shown to be present to justify the "modification" of the judgment. Parenthetically, the
modification was made not by the same court (CFI of Pasig) that rendered the judgment.
None of the exceptional circumstances to this doctrine exist in this case. The modification that would
result should the petition be granted would not involve merely clerical errors, but would entail presentation
of alleged newly-discovered evidence that should have been raised as affirmative defenses during trial.
Moreover, the judgment involved herein has been upheld, and not declared void, by this Court.
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, Petitioner,

vs.
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 169254 August 23, 2012
FACTS: Respondent DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the National Labor
Relations Commission against DLSU. Respondent union asserted that the creation of escrow accounts
was not an act of neutrality as it was influenced by the Aliazas factions’s letter and was an act of
interference with the internal affairs of the union. Labor Arbiter Pati dismissed the complaint for unfair
labor practice against petitioner for lack of merit. On March 15, 2003, respondent sent a letter to petitioner
requesting for the renegotiation of the economic terms for the fourth and fifth years of the then current
CBA but the petitioner denied the respondent’s request. The Second Division of the NLRC affirmed the
Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in a
Resolution. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor issued a Decision in OS-AJ-0015-2003, finding petitioner
guilty of Unfair Labor Practice. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the Decision of the Secretary of
Labor, petitioner assailed the same in the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. Respondent filed
the third notice of strike and citing among others petitioner’s alleged violation of the CBA and continuing
refusal to bargain in good faith. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a petition for assumption of jurisdiction
for this third notice of strike. Again, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor,
in resolving OS-AJ-0033-2003, cited its earlier Decision in OS-AJ-0015-2003, and consequently declared
that petitioner committed an unfair labor practice. Nonetheless, petitioner moved for the reconsideration
of the Decision of the Secretary of Labor but it was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Order of the Secretary of Labor and dismissed the said petition. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated both
the assailed decisions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in a minute resolution dated July 20,
2005 due to the petition’s “failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate

court." The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on September 21, 2005 and entry of
judgment was made on November 3, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether the findings of the Secretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals may still be disturbed at
this point.
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court held that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals, as
well as the conclusions derived therefrom, were amply supported by evidence on record. Thus, in line
with jurisprudence that such findings are binding on this Court, we see no reason to disturb the same.
Both G.R. No. 168477 and this petition are offshoots of petitioner’s purported temporary measures to
preserve its neutrality with regard to the perceived void in the union leadership. While these two cases
arose out of different notices to strike filed, it is undeniable that the facts cited and the arguments raised
by petitioner are almost identical. Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek only one relief, that
is, to absolve petitioner from respondent’s charge of committing an unfair labor practice. For this reason,
we are constrained to apply the law of the case doctrine in light of the finality of resolutions in G.R. No.
168477. In other words, our previous affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ finding – that petitioner erred in
suspending collective bargaining negotiations with the union and in placing the union funds in escrow
considering that the intra-union dispute between the Aliazas and Bañez factions was not a justification
therefor — is binding herein. Moreover, we note that entry of judgment in G.R. No. 168477 was made on
November 3, 2005, and that put to an end to the litigation of said issues once and for all.
The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.
RULE 39
YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, Complainant,

vs.
SERGIO V. PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite.
Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, A.M. No. P-11-2972, September 28, 2011
FACTS: Alicia Panganiban instituted a complaint against Juanito Corpuz, charging him with violation BP
Blg. 22. The trial court allegedly rendered a judgment based on the Compromise Agreement executed by
Panganiban and Corpuz. When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under the Compromise
Agreement, Panganiban filed Motions for Execution which was favorably acted upon by the trial court.
Consequently, respondent sheriff demanded to herein complainant, Corpuz’ wife, to surrender a Toyota
Town Ace Noah which was registered in Yolanda’s name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if
Yolanda would refuse to do so. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and to avoid further indignities,
Yolanda surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but she did not sign any document which
Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign.
ISSUE: Whether a sheriff can properly levy the subject property on the presumption that the same is
conjugal
HELD: NO
Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules laid down under Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court when he did not give Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under in cash,

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certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his
property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the
vehicle that belonged to Juanitos wife, Yolanda.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not
have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a
third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.
A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The sheriff
may be liable for enforcing execution on property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of
execution affords him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.
UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS' SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIAN CLINICS, INC. and DR. LOURDES MABANTA, Respondents.
FACTS: Marian Clinics, Inc. and University Physicians’ Services, Incorporated entered into a Lease
Agreement whereby the former leased to the latter the Marian General Hospital and four schools for a
period of ten years. The land, buildings, facilities, fixtures and equipment appurtenant thereto, including
the Soledad Building, were included in the lease. Later, UPSI filed a complaint for specific performance
against MCI and prayed for the delivery of the Certificates of Occupancy of the buildings leased, for the
correction of the defects in the electrical installations thereon, and damages. UPSI sent a letter to MCI,
informing it of the filing of the complaint and the suspension of payment of the monthly rentals until the
resolution of the case. MCI then sent a demand letter to UPSI for the payment of the rent. Thereafter,
MCI and Dr. Lourdes F. Mabanta filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against UPSI which was later on
dismissed on the finding that (1) UPSI’s suspension of rental payments was justified; and (2) there was
no ground to cause the rescission of the lease and warrant the ejectment of UPSI.
During the pendency of these cases, MCI ceded to the Development Bank of the Philippines some of the
leased buildings, including certain facilities, furniture, fixtures and equipment found therein, in full
settlement of MCI’s debt to DBP. The Deed of Cession of Properties in Payment of Debt (Dacion en
Pago) contained an annex which listed the properties ceded to DBP. Upon the execution of the dacion en
pago, UPSI paid P60,000 of the monthly rental to DBP as the new owner of the properties subject of the
dacion en pago. The RTC affirmed the City Court Decision dismissing MCI’s unlawful detainer case. The
intermediate appellate court rendered its Decision reversing the rulings of the lower courts. According to
the CA, the absence of the certificates of occupancy for two of the leased buildings, being a matter
between the owner of the building and the city government, did not impair the peaceful and adequate
enjoyment by UPSI of the premises and the alleged defective electrical installations on the premises
leased is no justification for the refusal to pay rentals, as, under Article 1663 of the Civil Code, the lessee
may have said installations properly reinstalled at the expense of the lessor.
UPSI counters that the remedy of MCI is to file an action for recovery of personal properties or collection
of the value thereof, as these actions have totally different and distinct cause of actions from that of
ejectment. UPSI points out that the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is possession
de facto, i.e., who between the party litigants has a better right of possession, and therefore an order to
replace or pay the value of a leased property has no place in such action. UPSI argues that it was
precisely because the cause of action of MCI was ejectment that the IAC merely directed UPSI to vacate
the leased premises and not to replace or pay the value of the appurtenances of the leased properties if
allegedly lost or destroyed.

ISSUE: Whether the subject writ of execution conformed substantially to the promulgated judgment.
HELD: YES.
It is settled that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform,
more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision
To begin with, it cannot be disputed that the subject matter of the lease agreement between the parties
included real and personal properties.
As discussed in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the basis for the obligation of UPSI to return, and in
certain circumstance, replace or pay the value of the above-mentioned appurtenances in the leased
properties is both law and contract.
Article 1665 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he lessee shall return the thing leased, upon the
termination of the lease, just as he received it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of time,
or by ordinary wear and tear, or from an inevitable cause." Article 1667 likewise states that "[t]he lessee is
responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves that it took place without his
fault." In other words, by law, a lessee is obliged to return the thing(s) leased and be responsible for any
deterioration or loss of the properties, except for those that were not his fault.
The IAC’s final and executory July 18, 1985 Resolution, ordering UPSI "to vacate the leased properties,
including the fixtures, supplies and equipment" was in effect a judicial termination of the lease. Upon the
termination of the contract, UPSI’s duty to return and/or replace the leased properties arose. The return
and/or replacement of the leased properties being a necessary consequence of the termination of the
lease, the November 5, 1990 Order of the execution court did not vary the IAC judgment which ordered
the restitution of the leased assets.
JORGE Q. GO, petitioner,

vs.
VINEZ A. HORTALEZA, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court- Office of the Clerk of Court, Dagupan
City, respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, A.M. NO. P-05-1971, June 26, 2008
FACTS: Herein respondent was charged with Abuse of Authority and Illegal Exaction in connection with
the implementation of the writ of execution issued against petitioner. Upon order of the MTC, respondent
released to the complainant, complainant’s Toyota Corolla. However, according to complainant, before
effecting the release of the said vehicle, respondent demanded from complainant’s representative the
amount of P5,000.00, which purportedly would answer for the expenses in the implementation of the writ
of execution. Complainant claimed to have repeatedly demanded to no avail the return of the said
P5,000.00 or the issuance of an official receipt if the aforementioned expenses could properly be charged
to complainant, the losing party in the MTC case. Hence, this complaint praying for the imposition of
appropriate sanctions on respondent.
ISSUE: Whether respondent’s act of demanding and receiving money from complainant is in accordance
with his duties as sheriff under Rule 39.
HELD: NO.
Respondent sheriff departed from the procedure prescribed by the Rules in the collection of payment for
sheriff’s expenses in implementing a writ of execution. Respondent as an officer of the court should have
shown a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Instead, he failed to comply with
his duties under the law and to observe proper procedure dictated by the rules.

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Time and again we have ruled that high standards of conduct are expected of sheriffs who play an
important role in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute final judgments of the
courts. Thus, when a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial duty to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. This duty, in the
proper execution of a valid writ, is not just directory, but mandatory. He has no discretion whether to
execute the writ or not.5 He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the decision.
The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute judgments and orders of the court to which they belong. It must
be stressed that a judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party.
It is said that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law. It is
also indisputable that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. Hence, the
officers charged with this delicate task must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable
dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other
processes of the courts of justice would be futile.
In accordance with Section 9, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, the steps that must be followed
before an interested party pays the sheriff’s expenses are: 1) the sheriff must make an estimate of the
expenses to be incurred by him; 2) he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; 3) the
approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and ex-
officio sheriff; 4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and 5) the
executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ.
Any unspent amount should be refunded to the party making the deposit. Thereafter, the sheriff must
render a full report.
TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 170007, April 7, 2014
FACTS: In anticipation of the expiration of the 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between the petitioner and the respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, the parties started
negotiations for a new CBA. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer, the union
manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith, prompting the union to file a Notice of Strike in
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The company then filed a Petition for Assumption
of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor and Employment which was granted. Convinced that such a
strike would have adverse consequences on the national economy, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment ruled that the labor dispute between the parties would cause or likely to cause a strike in an
industry indispensable to the national interest. Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute of the parties. The union thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
alleging that the issue is the unfair labor practice of the company in the form of bad faith bargaining and
not the CBA deadlock. The CA found the position of the union untenable, that the authority of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest
includes questions and controversies arising from the said dispute, including cases over which the Labor
Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
ISSUE #1: Whether the petition is barred by res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
HELD #1: YES.
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is

conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The only identities thus
required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel are identity of parties and identity of issues.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit.
ISSUE #2: Whether finality of the Decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment rendered the
controversy between the union and the company moot.
HELD #2: YES.
In particular, with the finality of the decision, the labor dispute, covering both the alleged bargaining in bad
faith and the deadlock, between the union and the company was settled with finality. As the said Decision
settled essentially the same questions being raised by the union in this case, the finality of the said
Decision rendered this case moot. The union cannot be allowed to use this case to once again unsettle
the issues that have been already settled with finality by the final and executory Decision of the Secretary
of Labor and Employment.
ISSUE #3: Whether the present petition of the union, assailing the existence of bad faith and deadlock,
involves questions of fact which cannot be properly raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court
HELD #3: YES.
The existence of bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. The crucial question of whether or not a
party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns on the facts of the individual case,
and good faith or bad faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. Thus, the issue of whether or not
there was bad faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union is a question of fact.
It requires that the reviewing court look into the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is substantial
enough to show such bad faith.
The issue of whether there was already deadlock between the union and the company is likewise a
question of fact. It requires the determination of evidence to find whether there is a "counteraction" of
forces between the union and the company and whether each of the parties exerted "reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining."
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
EDGARDO V. GUEVARA, Respondent.
FACTS: Edgardo Guevara, obtained a judgment in his favor rendered by US District Court ordering BPI
Securities Corp. (BPISC), formerly Ayala International Finance Limited (AIFL) and Anthona, to pay him
the amount of US 49,450.00 as sanction for filing of a suit against Guevara which was unfounded. Given
the continuous failure and/or refusal of BPISC to comply with the order of the US Court, Guevara
instituted an action for the enforcement of the same before the RTC of Makati. RTC rendered a decision

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in favor of Guevara and ordered BPISC to pay him the said amount, with legal interest, plus attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses. BPISC appealed to the CA on the ground that the trial court erred in not
passing upon the merits or validity of Guevara’s defenses upon the enforcement of the foreign judgment
in the Philippines, including the defense that BPISC was deprived by the US Court of its right to defend
itself against the sanction. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. As the motion for reconsideration of BPISC
was denied by the CA, the case was elevated to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the foreign judgment obtained by Guevara was valid and enforceable in this jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions that vary in
different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced
simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is
the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement. An action for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For
an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action
in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is
susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is
entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction
of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
limitations on review [are] in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to
protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of
defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and – in a larger sense – to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer’s Case of 1599 stated to be
the goal of all law: “rest and quietness.” If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation.

Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e.,
“want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule
on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
As the foregoing jurisprudence had established, recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or
final order requires only proof of fact of the said judgment or final order. In an action in personam, as in
the case at bar, the foreign judgment or final order enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the
party attacking the foreign judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming its
presumptive validity. A foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, particularly, want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
The fact of a foreign final order in this case is not disputed. It was duly established by evidence submitted
to the RTC that the U.S. District Court issued an Order on March 13, 1990 in Civil Action No. H-86-440
ordering petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA, to pay respondent the sum of US$49,450.00 as sanction for filing
a frivolous suit against respondent, in violation of Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The next question then is whether petitioner was able to discharge the burden of overcoming the
presumptive validity of said Order. The Court rules in the negative. Petitioner attempts to convince the
Court that it is necessary to look into the merits of the Order dated March 13, 1990 because the U.S.
District Court committed clear mistake of law and fact in issuing the same. The Court, however, is not
convinced. A Philippine court will not substitute its own interpretation of any provision of the law or rules
of procedure of another country, nor review and pronounce its own judgment on the sufficiency of
evidence presented before a competent court of another jurisdiction. Any purported mistake petitioner
attributes to the U.S. District Court in the latter’s issuance of the Order dated March 13, 1990 would
merely constitute an error of judgment in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction, which could have been
corrected by a timely appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, HONORABLE VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ, in

his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and THE GENERAL INVESTIGATION BUREAU-A,
Represented by MARIA OLIVIA ELENA A. ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
JESUS D. FRANCISCO, SR., Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 172553, December 14, 2011
FACTS: Ligorio Naval filed a complaint before the Ombudsman accusing Jessie Castillo, mayor of
Bacoor, Cavite, of violating pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in relation to
the award of the construction of the municipal building of Bacoor, Cavite, worth more than 9 Million
Pesos, to St. Martha’s Trading and General Contractors. Naval alleged that the latter was not qualified for
the award; its license had expired at the time the contract was signed, and was classified as belonging to
Category "C," hence, may only undertake projects worth 3 Million Pesos or lower.
Castillo submitted certifications to the effect that the contractor was not a holder of an expired license,
and was classified as a Category "A" contractor. The Ombudsman favored Castillo and dismissed the
complaint.
Later on, it was recommended that the case be revived with the inclusion of additional respondents who
are the members of the Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee of the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite), one of whom is Jesus Francisco. They were ordered to be preventively suspended. When
Francisco received the order, he filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which was favored by the CA. The
Ombudsman filed an MR but was denied hence this instant petition.

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ISSUE: Whether res judicata applies, considering the absence of absolute identity of parties.
HELD: YES.
Although there was no absolute identity of parties, a shared identity of interest by the parties in both
cases is sufficient to invoke the coverage of the principle or res judicata. The substitution of parties will
not remove the case from the doctrine of res judicata; otherwise, the parties could renew the litigation by
the simple expedient of substitution of parties.
SPS. ELIZABETH S. TAGLE & ERNESTO R. TAGLE, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RTC, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 97, SPS. FEDERICO and ROSAMYRNA
CARANDANG and SHERIFF CAROL BULACAN, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 162738 July 8, 2009
FACTS: Carandangs mortgaged several properties with the Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC).
Unable to pay their mortgage obligation, the Carandangs ceded or assigned the subject property, among
others, to PBC by way of a Dacion En Pago with Right to Repurchase. Carandangs, by virtue of a Deed
of Assignment, sold the right to repurchase the subject property to the Tagles.
Tagles refused to honor their obligation to the Carandangs under the Deed of Assignment. Hence, the
Carandangs filed a complaint for rescission of contract against the Tagles.
The RTC decided in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to reimburse the down payment given
to them. the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and declared that the Tagles were bound by the
parties’ Deed of Assignment.
Upon motion of the Carandangs, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. In the process,
certain personal properties of the Tagles consisting of various paintings and artworks of petitioner Ernesto
R. Tagle were sold at public auction.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari. They argue that the written notice of sale served on their private
secretary is invalid. According to petitioners, the notice served on their secretary was in violation of
Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules which purportedly requires that the notice of sale be given to the
judgment debtor and no other person.
ISSUE: Whether there was invalid service of notice of sale that will render the auction sale void.
HELD: NO.
Section 15, Rule 39 states:
SEC. 15. Notice of sale of property on execution. Before the sale of property on execution, notice thereof
must be given as follows:
(d) In all cases, written notice of the sale shall be given to the judgment obligor, at least three (3) days
before the sale, except as provided in paragraph (a) hereof where notice shall be given at any time before
the sale, in the same manner as personal service of pleadings and other papers as provided by Section 6
of Rule 13.
Verily, following Section 6, Rule 13, the written notice of sale to the judgment obligor need not be
personally served on the judgment obligor himself. It may be served on his counsel, or by leaving the
notice in his office with his clerk or a person having charge thereof. If there is no one found at the
judgment obligor’s or his counsel’s office or if such office is not known/inexistent, it may be served at the
residence of the judgment obligor or his counsel and may be received by any person of sufficient age and
discretion residing therein. Thus, petitioners’ theory (that only written notice of sale served on petitioners’
themselves would be valid) is utterly bereft of merit.

ASTORGA AND REPOL LAW OFFICES, represented ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES, Complainant,
vs.
LEODEL N. ROXAS, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 66, MAKATI
CITY, Respondent
FIRST DIVISION, A.M. No. P-12-3029 August 15, 2012
FACTS: Complainant Astorga and Repol Law Offices filed administrative complaint against respondent
Leodel N. Ro as, Sheriff IV of RTC, Branch 66, Makati City, for willful neglect of duty, relative to Civil Case
No. 01-1002, entitled FGU Insurance Corporation v. NEC Cargo Services, Inc. and Albert T. Tamayo,
Third Party Defendant.
In that case, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of FGU and against NEC Cargo Services, Inc. The
decision became final and executory, FGU filed a Motion for Execution which was granted by the RTC
and the Writ of Execution was accordingly issued.
Respondent levied upon the personal properties, consisting of office equipment, found inside the NEC
office. However, Catalon filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim, asserting ownership over the levied
properties. Since FGU failed to post an indemnity bond in favor of third party claimant Catalon,
respondent did not proceed with the scheduled auction sale.
The Sheriff’s Report dated August 7, 2006, prepared by respondent, declared the levy upon the personal
properties in the NEC office lifted, cancelled, and without effect; and stated that the same personal
properties were released to Catalon and the original copy of the Writ of Execution and all pertinent papers
were temporarily returned to the RTC unsatisfied.
Since then, there appears to have been no further development in the execution of the RTC Decision
dated in Civil Case No. 01- 1002.
Repeated follow-ups were again made by the complainant but to no avail, still no action from respondent
and no periodic reports.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Roxas was able to comply with his duties under Rule 39.
HELD: NO.
Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in
full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be
enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every (30) days on the proceedings taken
thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall
set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties.
Herein respondent had undeniably failed to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution Respondent
received a copy of said Writ also on July 10, 2006 and he filed a Sheriff’s Report on August 7, 2006.
According to his Report, respondent had to lift and cancel the levy on the office equipment found inside
the NEC office given Catalon’s third party claim over said properties and the failure of FGU to post an
indemnity bond in Catalon’s favor, thus, the Writ of Execution was returned to the RTC unsatisfied. The
Sheriff’s Report dated August 7, 2006 was the first and last filed by respondent in connection with the Writ
of Execution, until the instant administrative complaint was filed against him. For almost two years,
respondent was completely remiss in filing the mandated periodic reports on the Writ of Execution.

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Ultimately, it is apparent that respondent did not file any periodic report because he had nothing to state
therein as he failed to take any further action to satisfy the Decision and implement the Writ of Execution.
LUCIA NAZAR VDA. DE FELICIANO, Complainant,

vs.
ROMEO L. RIVERA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT,
VALENZUELA CITY, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, A.M. No. P-11-2920 September 19, 2012
FACTS: In Civil Case No. 9316, the MeTC rendered on October 10, 2007 a Decision in complainant’s
favor. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Barangay Council of
Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City, represented by their Barangay Chairman Vitaliano Lota and all
barangay officials and persons claiming rights from them to immediately vacate the subject premises and
restore peaceful possession thereof to the herein complainant.
RTC affirmed the decision.
Complainant filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the RTC.
respondent sheriff served a notice addressed to the Barangay Council of Barangay Ugong, represented
by their Barangay Chairman Lota, and all barangay officials: to vacate within ten (10) days upon receipt
hereof the subject properties together with all the improvements existing thereon pursuant to the Writ of
Execution.
Thereafter, no other action was undertaken by respondent to implement the subject Writ of Execution. In
his comment, respondent failed to complete the eviction because Lota filed a motion to quash the Writ.
Respondent cited Quilo v. Jundarino, where the Court ruled that the prudent course of action of the
Sheriff was to defer implementation of the writ of execution until a determination of the motion to quash.
In the end, respondent prayed that he be absolved from any administrative liability.
ISSUE: Whether the sheriff should defer the implementation of the writ of execution upon filing of motion
to quash the writ by the other party.
HELD: NO.
The Court reiterates that it is the mandatory and ministerial duty of the sheriff to execute judgments
without delay "unless restrained by a court order." Quilo is an exception to the general rule, but
respondent’s reliance on the case is misplaced. There are particular circumstances in Quilo which
justified the pronouncement of the Court that it would have been more prudent for Sheriff Jundarino to
defer implementation of the writ of execution until a determination of the motion to quash the same.
Sheriff Jundarino was liable for misconduct for his unreasonable insistence on implementing the writ of
execution on March 27, 2008 despite the fact that Quilo’s motion to quash said writ was already
scheduled for hearing the very next day, March 28, 2008. Moreover, Quilo was precisely questioning in
his motion to quash the proper address where the writ should be implemented, whether at No. 2519
Granate St., Sta. Ana, Manila or at No. 2518 Granate St., San Andres Bukid, Manila.
No such compelling circumstances exist in the case at bar. Lota had just filed a motion to quash the Writ
of Execution, and the motion was not yet even set for hearing.

LEY CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LC BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS, INC.,

METRO CONTAINER CORPORATION, MANUEL T. LEY, and JANET C. LEY, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INTERNATIONAL BANK, EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, METRO MANILA, AND CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO
SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners Ley Construction and Development Corporation secured 52 loans from PCIB. As
collateral for said loans, petitioners executed real estate mortgages over several of their properties and
chattel mortgages over their equipment and machinery. Petitioners were able to pay some of their
obligations, but 18 of the 52 loans remained unpaid. PCIB filed separate requests for extrajudicial
foreclosure with the sheriffs of Pasig City RTC.
To forestall the scheduled auction sales, petitioners, filed a Complaint for injunction and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a TRO before the Makati City RTC. The preliminary injunction was granted but
it was lifted when PCIB filed a Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner then filed an Emergency Motion for Reconsideration and motion to Expand Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Application for Temporary Restraining Order.
However, such was not the only remedy resorted to by petitioners to thwart the effect of the February 23,
1993 Order. Petitioners similarly filed two separate complaints in another venue. The first, filed with the
Manila RTC Branch 34, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with prayer for TRO against PCIB and
the sheriff of Valenzuela City. The second, also a complaint for Injunction with the Manila RTC Branch 54.
Both cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute, forum shopping and the other is because the appeal
was filed not within the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether res judicata is applicable in this case.
HELD: YES.
The instant petition is denied on the ground of res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment.
Jurisprudence provides that the concept of res judicata embraces two aspects. The first, known as "bar
by prior judgment," or "estoppel by verdict," is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as "conclusiveness
of judgment," otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. The bar by prior judgment requires the following elements to be
present for it to operate:
(1) A former final judgment that was rendered on the merits;

(2) The court in the former judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and,
(3) Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions.
In contrast, the elements of conclusiveness of judgment are:

1. Identity of parties; and
2. Subject matter in the first and second cases
Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a particular
point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties will be final and conclusive

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in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the
adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and distinct issue arising
in the second. Hence, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or
cause of action.
THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC., represented by ATTY. ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA;

ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT CITY AND PARKS OFFICE, represented by its Officer-in Charge,
Cordelia C. Lacsamana; and THE BUSOL FOREST RESERVATION TASK FORCE, represented by
its Team Leader, Victor Dictag, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, in his capacity as Regional Hearing Officer, NCIP-CAR; ELIZABETH
MAT-AN, for herself and as representative of the heirs of Rafael; JUDITH MARANES, for herself
and as representative of the heirs of Molintas; HELEN LUBOS, for herself and as representative of
the heirs of Kalomis; MAGDALENA GUMANGAN QUE, for herself and as representative of the
heirs of Gumangan; Spouses ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY and LUCIA AMPAGUEY; and Spouses
CARMEN PANA YO and MELANIO PANAYO, Respondents.
FACTS: Herein private respondents claiming that their parents inherited from their ancestors several
parcels of land in what is now known as the Busol Watershed Reservation, filed before the NCIP a
Petition for Injunction, with an application for TRO, and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
to enjoin the Baguio District Engineer’s Office, the Office of the City Architect and Parks Superintendent,
and petitioners The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. and the Busol Task Force from fencing the Busol
Watershed Reservation.
In their Petition before the NCIP, private respondents claim that they are members of the Ibaloi and
Kankanaey tribes of Baguio City. Their ancestors’ ownership of the properties now known as the Busol
Watershed Reservation was allegedly expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 issued by Governor
General Leonard Wood.
NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng issued a TRO. Thereafter, he issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against respondents, ordering them to refrain, cease and desist from implementing
their fencing project during the pendency of the above entitled case in any portion of petitioners’ ancestral
land claims within the Busol Watershed Reservation.
Respondent claimed that PD No. 1818 has been effectively superseded by Republic Act No. 8975. The
prohibition is thus now delineated in Section 3 of said latter law, which provides:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary
restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the
government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:..
Section 6. Penal Sanction. — In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may incur under
existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of
at least sixty (60) days without pay. (Emphasis added.)
ISSUE #1: Whether NCIP correctly took cognizance of the present case for injunction involving a
government infrastructure project.

HELD # 1: YES.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the prohibition covers only judges, and does not apply to the
NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 605 and Presidential Decree No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts.
Accordingly, we cannot nullify the assailed Orders on the ground of violation of said laws.
ISSUE #2: Whether res judicata applies in this case.
HELD #2: NO, but the petition should be granted in view of the stare decisis principle.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and counter-
arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed Reservation.
The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except that
different writs of injunction are being assailed.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R.
No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are
constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. The Court explained the principle
of stare decisisin Ting v. Velez-Ting:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt
to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction,
the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE #3: Whether private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by NCIP.
HELD # 3: NO.
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents were entitled to the relief
granted by the Commission. Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families
as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights over
the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction that claimants show
the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of
the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein.
UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS' SERVICES, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIAN CLINICS, INC. and DR. LOURDES MABANTA, Respondents.
FACTS: Marian Clinics, Inc. (MCI) and University Physicians’ Services, Incorporated (UPSI) entered into
a Lease Agreement whereby the former leased to the latter the Marian General Hospital (MGH) and four
schools for a period of ten (10) years.
The land, buildings, facilities, fixtures and equipment appurtenant thereto, including the Soledad Building,
were included in the lease, for which a monthly rental of P70,000 was agreed upon.
UPSI filed a complaint for specific performance against MCI, alleging that (1) MCI failed to deliver
Certificates of Occupancy on certain buildings, and (2) there were some defective electrical installations
that caused the issuance of a Condemned Installation Notice by the Office of the City Electrician of the
City of Manila. UPSI sent a letter to MCI, informing it of the filing of the complaint and the suspension of
payment of the monthly rentals until the resolution of the case.

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MCI and Dr. Lourdes F. Mabanta filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against UPSI.
IAC ruled that MCI may now require UPSI to vacate the leased premises. Defendant is likewise directed
to return and deliver the leased facilities, equipments, supplies, etc., listed in the Summary of Inventory
with Annex "A" or pay the plaintiff their value in the amount of P5,534,818.50 within the period of two
months from receipt of this order.
During execution, the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, acting on MCI’s "Motion for the Delivery of Leased
Facilities/Equipment/Supplies and/or the Payment of their Value if Defendant cannot Deliver Them,"
issued an Order dated November 5, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads: Accordingly,
Defendant University Physician Services, Inc. is hereby directed to replace the equipment, facilities,
supplies, etc. as reflected in the inventories. Annexes "A" to "A-8" and "B" to "B-8".
ISSUE: Whether the order in execution of the RTC is null and void for having totally changed the final
judgment sought to be executed
HELD: YES.
It is settled that "a writ of execution must conform substantially to every essential particular of the
judgment promulgated. Execution not in harmony with the judgment is bereft of validity. It must conform,
more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
It cannot be disputed that the subject matter of the lease agreement between the parties included real
and personal properties.
As discussed in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the basis for the obligation of UPSI to return, and in
certain circumstance, replace or pay the value of the above-mentioned appurtenances in the leased
properties is both law and contract
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner,

vs.
GROUP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (GMC) AND LAPU-LAPU DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING
Corporation (LLDHc), Respondents.
G.R. No. 167000, June 8, 2011
GROUP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (GMC), Petitioner,

vs.
LAPU-LAPU DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING Corporation (LLDHc) and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Respondents.
FACTS: Lapu-Lapu Development & Housing Corporation (LLDHC), the owner of the subject lots located
in Lapu Lapu City, and the GSIS entered into a Project and Loan Agreement for the development of the
said lots where they agreed that the latter to extend a Twenty-Five Million Peso-loan (P25,000,000.00) to
LLDHC , and in return, LLDHC will develop, subdivide, and sell its lots to GSIS members. LLDHC
executed a real estate mortgage over the subject lots in favor of GSIS. LLHDC failed to fulfill its
obligations, thus GSIS foreclosed the mortgage, acquired the subject lots after being the lone bidder in
the public auction, and eventually was able to consolidate its ownership over the subject lots. Group
Management Corporation (GMC) then offered to purchase on installments the subject lots from GSIS,
which was approved by the latter. LLDHC filed a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure with Writ of
Mandatory Injunction against GSIS before the RTC of Manila Branch 38. GSIS having failed to execute a
Final Deed of Sale in its favor, GMC likewise instituted its own complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages before the Lapu-Lapu RTC. The Lapu-Lapu RTC decided in favor of GMC and dismissed

LLDHC’s complaint-in-intervention and subsequently denied the Notices of Appeal filed by both GSIS and
LLDHC. The Manila RTC, on the other hand, decided in favor of LLDHC, holding that GSIS was unable to
prove the alleged violations committed by LLDHC to warrant the foreclosure of the mortgage over the
subject lots. LLDHC and GSIS filed their separate appeals to the Manila RTC decision. Armed with the
said Manila RTC’s decision, LLDHC then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment of the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision, which was dismissed by the said court. The dismissal then
became final and executory. LLDHC then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme
Court, which was likewise dismissed on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a
petition which is evidently another petition to annul the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision. Thus, a writ of execution
of the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision was issued by the said court. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the Manila RTC decision thus resulting in the filing of the GSIS of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court. On the theory that the Manila RTC decision was a
supervening event that should stop the execution of the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision, LLDHC filed a Petition
for Certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals praying that GMC and the Lapu-Lapu
RTC be ordered to cease and desist from proceeding with the execution of its decision.
ISSUE: Whether the Manila RTC decision constitutes a supervening event that should prevent the
implementation of the writ of execution of the Lapu-Lapu RTC decision.
HELD: NO.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to
new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the
parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.
Both GSIS and LLDHC claim that the execution of the decision and orders in Civil Case No. 2203-L
should be stayed because of the occurrence of "supervening events" which render the execution of the
judgment "impossible, unfair, unjust and inequitable." However, in order for an event to be considered a
supervening event to justify the alteration or modification of a final judgment, the event must have
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.
Since the Manila RTC decision does not constitute a supervening event, there is therefore neither reason
nor justification to alter, modify or annul the Lapu-Lapu RTC Decision and Orders, which have long
become final and executory. Thus, in the present case, GMC must not be deprived of its right to enjoy the
fruits of a final verdict.
TOBIAS SELGA and CEFERINA GARANCHO SELGA, Petitioners,

vs.
SONY ENTIERRO BRAR, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MARINA T. ENTIERRO, Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 175151 September 21, 2011
FACTS: Francisco Entierro died intestate and left behind a parcel of land located in Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. Francisco’s spouse, Basilia Tabile and legitimate children, Esteban, Herminia, Elma,
Percival, and Gilda, all surnamed Entierro executed a Deed of Sale with Declaration of Heirship. In said
Deed, Basilia, et al., declared themselves to be Francisco’s only heirs who inherited the subject property;
and at the same time, sold the subject property to petitioners, spouses Tobias Selga and Ceferina
Garancho Selga. By reason of said sale, the certificate of title in Francisco’s name was cancelled and
replaced by a new one in petitioners’ names.
Seven years later, respondent Sony Entierro Brar filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale with Damages
against petitioners. Respondent claimed that she was one of the legitimate children of Francisco and
Basilia, and that she had been preterited and illegally deprived of her rightful share and interests in the
subject property as one of Francisco’s legal heirs.

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RTC rendered judgment declaring the annulment of the Deed of Sale with Declaration of heirship and
adjudicating ownership of the subject lot in the name of Sony Entierro Brar being one of the legitimate
heirs of spouses Francisco Entierro and Basilia Tabile one eleventh (1/11) share and ten eleventh (10/11)
share in the name of Tobias Selga married to Ceferina Garancho.
Respondent informed petitioners that she was exercising her right to redeem petitioners’ ten-eleventh
(10/11) share in the subject property, in accordance with the final and executory Decision of RTC. In their
Reply-Letter dated August 20, 1997, petitioners’ counsel rejected respondent’s demand.
This prompted respondent to institute a Complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners invoked the defenses of res judicata and/or forum
shopping, arguing that the cause of action pleaded by respondent was among those that had already
been litigated in Civil Case for Annulment of Sale. In its decision, RTC agreed with petitioners and
dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the present action is barred by res judicata in view of the finality of the decision in the
Civil Case for Annulment of Sale involving the same parties.
HELD: YES.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled
by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without
fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior
judgment:
(a) Finality of the former judgment;
(b) The court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action.
It is not disputed that the Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC in the Annulment of Sale case had become
final and executory. Petitioners no longer appealed the said decision.
There is also no question that RTC-Branch had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in and that
its Decision was a judgment on the merits, i.e., one rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case.
Controversy herein arises from the fourth requirement: the identity of parties, subject matter and,
particularly, the causes of action between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573. There is identity of
parties. Civil Case for Annulment of Sale and Complaint for Legal Redemption and Damages were both
instituted by respondent against petitioners. There is also identity of subject matter. Both cases involved
respondent’s rights and interests over the subject property as Francisco’s legitimate child and compulsory
heir. Finally, there is identity of causes of action which is depriving respondent of her rights and interests
over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner.

Heirs of MAXIMINO DERLA

vs.
Heirs of CATALINA DERLA Vda. de HIPOLITO, MAE D. HIPOLITO, ROGER ZAGALES, FRANCISCO
DERLA, SR., JOVITO DERLA
First Division , G.R. No. 157717, April 13, 2011
FACTS: Hipolito, pursuant to Republic Act No. 5743 filed Sales (Fishpond) Application No. with Bureau of
Lands over the subject fishpond area covered by his Fishpond Permit. The Municipality of Panabo
opposed Hipolito’s application on the ground that it will disrupt the development of Panabo. The
Municipality of Panabo’s opposition was dismissed and Hipolito’s Fishpond Sales Application was given
due course. The Municipality of Panabo filed two motions for reconsideration but both were denied by the
Office of the President. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Panabo filed with the CFI of Tagum, Davao del
Norte, Civil Case for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction against Hipolito, Assistant Secretary Zamora,
the Acting Director of Lands and the District Lands Officer. Consequently, the Office of the President
revoked its ruling on Hipolito’s application. Hipolito’s motion to reconsider this decision was denied.
Hipolito filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CFI of Davao, praying for the declaration of nullity of the
decision of the Office of the President and the reinstatement of the its latter Decision. The CFI of Davao
dismissed Hipolito’s Petition.
Sometime after the EDSA Revolution, Catalina filed a petition with the Office of the President for the
Revival of the Fishpond Sales Application of her late husband Hipolito. Catalina’s petition was referred to
the then Ministry of Agriculture and Food (now Department of Agriculture) for an updated comment and
recommendation. On the basis of the above findings and recommendation, the Office of the President,
through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, granted Catalina’s petition.
The petitioners, lessees of the subject fishpond, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
the Office of the President but it was denied. Upon the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources’ (DENR) request, the Office of the President declared its November 11, 1991 Resolution final
and executory. The petitioners filed a complaint for the Annulment and Cancellation of Original
Certificates of Title before the RTC of Panabo, Davao but the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground
of prior judgment, statute of limitations, waiver, abandonment and/or estoppel pursuant to pars. (e) and
(f), Sect. 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petitioners assert that there can be no res judicata as the November 11, 1991 decision in O.P. Case
No. 4732 is null and void for having overturned an earlier final and executory decision and for not giving
them an opportunity to be heard.
ISSUE: Whether res judicata may be applied considering that O.P. Case No. 4732 is an administrative
case.
HELD: YES.
In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, the SC enumerated the elements of res judicata as follows:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the same parties.
There can be no mistake as to the presence of all the elements of res judicata in this case. The parties,
although later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, have been the same from the very
beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subject fishpond area. The concerned agencies and the
lower courts have validly ruled on the rights to the subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents
covering it, and even the actions associated and related to it. The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly
the same subject matter involved in O.P. Case No. 4732 and the petition before the SC. With regard to
the identity of the causes of action, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action

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but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of
action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment.
While it is true that the Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, it has also limited the latter to
proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take on an
adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies.
The Supreme Court held in Fortich v. Corona that the rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial
acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers.
ENGR. JOB Y. BESANA, HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
HON. CONRADO M. ESTRELLA III, in his capacity as Administrator of the National Electrification
Administration, Petitioners,
vs.
RODSON F. MAYOR, Respondent.

AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Intervenor.
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Mayor against the late Job Y. Besana- then General
Manager of AKELCO, for grave misconduct, serious irregularity etc. before the NEA. Besana was ordered
dismissed. Such dismissal was confirmed by the NEA Board of Administrators in a resolution in July
1992. Besana was notified but he did not appeal.
In 1993, Besana questioned his dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of Aklan and got a favorable ruling.
However, on appeal by AKELCO to the NLRC, the latter ruled otherwise.
In 1998, Besana formally filed his appeal before the Office of the President which declared the dismissal
to be without effect. Mayor assailed this before the CA, alleging that the OP acted without jurisdiction. The
CA favored Mayor. Besana filed a Motion for Reconsideration positing that Mayor is not the real party in
interest in this case. This was denied by the CA ruling that such matter is being raised for the first time
before this Court.
CA ruled that Besana’s dismissal had already attained finality sometime after July 1992 since Besana
failed to appeal his dismissal. In addition, the appellate court held that the OP lacked jurisdiction to review
the decision of the NEA Board. Hence, the instant Petition.
ISSUE # 1: May Besana still question the legal standing of Mayor in filing the administrative complaint?
HELD # 1: NO.
Mayor had been participating therein without his legal interest being questioned. X x x It is well-settled
that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points
of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative
agency or quasi-judicial body, need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for
the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue
raised for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.

ISSUE # 2: May he still question his dismissal in 1992, which he did not appeal? What is the effect of his
failure to timely appeal his dismissal?
HELD # 2: NO.
Besana dismissal as General Manager of AKELCO already attained finality and, thus, the same
constituted res judicata.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been adjudicated by
a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises
in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. The doctrine of res
judicata is founded on a public policy against re-opening that which has previously been decided, so as to
put the litigation to an end. Matters settled by a court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or
invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the courts and the taxpayers, creates
uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158916, March 19, 2014
FACTS: In a deed of donation inter vivos, Cornelio and his wife donated 2 lots to their son, Angel Miguel.
A new owner’s duplicate was later on issued on the latter’s name. Subsequently in 1977, Cornelio filed a
complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation (civil case no. 1185) on the ground that one of the
lots donated was given a technical description designated to another lot. The same was dismissed for
lack of cause of action; the allegations of the complaint were really for reformation of instrument because
it essentially sought the correction or amendment of the deed of donation to conform to the alleged true
intention of the donors to donate. Also, the death of Cornelio and his wife extinguished their personal right
to pursue the case, an intransmissible right. Angel later on caused the subdivision of the lot in issue into
four smaller lots and donated them to his 4 sons.
In 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Angel’s TCT and its 4 derivatives (civil
case no. 2735), alleging that Angel had the lot in trust for the heirs of the donors. Thus, petitioners
argued, the sons of Angel as his heirs should return the ownership and possession of the same.
Respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint, asserting that the petitioners’ cause of action in
the later case is already barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 as the issue of Angel’s
ownership and possession of the lot. The RTC dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
dismissal. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: What are the elements of res judicata which would warrant the dismissal of the later case for
nullity of title in this instance?
HELD:
The following are the elements of res judicata:
(1)the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2)the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(3)the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4)there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action.

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Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as explained in Section
47(c) of the same Rule. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the
two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior judgment” would apply. If as between the two
cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
“conclusiveness of judgment” applies.
The concept of conclusiveness of judgment further: The doctrine states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit, and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, as far as concerns the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a
different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. The
only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties
and identity of issues.
Identity of parties is a requisite in the application of conclusiveness of judgment. So long as the parties or
their privies are identical, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in
the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
Further, conclusiveness of judgment calls for identity of parties, not causes of action, and “there is identity
of parties not only when the parties are the same but also those on privity with them, as between their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigation for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity, or when there is substantial identity of parties.” In the
present case, appellants were the successors in interest of petitioner Cornelio in Civil Case No. 1185
against respondent Angel, whereas in Civil Case No. 2735, appellees were the successors in interest of
Angel. Undeniably, there is substantial identity of parties in the said two cases.
However, for res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue.
x x x For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact, or matter in
issue has previously been either “directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action” by a competent court. In this case, the issue of the transfer pursuant to the deed of donation to
Angel of the lot and, corollarily, his right over the said property has been necessarily involved in Civil
Case No. 1185.
RULE 41
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J.

CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL
JONGCO, Petitioners,
vs.
ISMAEL VELOSO III, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010
FACTS: Herein petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent. MeTC decided in favor of
petitioners but this was however reversed by the RTC. When both parties moved for the reconsideration
of the RTC decision, the RTC issued an Order dated February 23, 2001 modifying its previous ruling.
After successive appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision of the RTC dated
November 29, 2000 which reversed the decision of the MeTC, became final and executory. Whilst

respondent's appeal of the MeTC judgment in the unlawful detainer case was pending, respondent filed
before the RTC-Branch 227 on November 26, 2002 a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages
against the petitioners. On September 2, 2003, the RTC-Branch 227 issued a Resolution dismissing
respondent's complaint. Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2004. However, the
RTC-Branch 227 dismissed respondent's appeal for being filed out of time. The CA resolved to give due
course to respondent's appeal.
ISSUE: Whether respondent timely filed his appeal.
HELD: YES.
Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to
the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the
trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of
only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the
original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
RULE 43
ELOISA L. TOLENTINO, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ROY M. LOYOLA et al., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 153809, July 27, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondents with Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Public Documents and, administratively, for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Gross Neglect
of Duty, and Falsification of Official Documents. The Ombudsman ordered the dismissal of the instant
administrative Complaint for lack of merit. The respondent moved for a reconsideration which was
however denied. Petitioner appealed the Ombudsman’s dismissal order to the Court of Appeals but the
appellate court merely affirmed the assailed ruling.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court may prosper in case the
respondent is exonerated by the Ombudsman for an administrative charge
HELD: NO.
The appointments made by respondent Loyola could not be considered grave misconduct and
dishonesty. There were vacant positions causead by the creation of positions and these vacancies should
be filled up. There is misconduct if there is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action.
In the case, evidence show that respondents Loyolas did not transgress some definite rule of action. Had
there been a transgression in the creation of positions and appointments, the Civil Service Commission
should have so stated when the appointments were submitted for approval.
The assailed ruling of the Ombudsman obviously possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject
to appeal. The pertinent provision in this case is the old Section 7, Rule III of Ombudsman Administrative
Order No. 7, Series of 1990 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).

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The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant in an
administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the
administrative charge, as in this case. The complainant, therefore, is not entitled to any corrective
recourse, whether by motion for reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the
courts, to effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the right to appeal but only
in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed is higher than public censure, reprimand, one-month
suspension or a fine equivalent to one month salary.
Moreover, elementary is the rule that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they
are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the
Ombudsman that a review of factual findings may aptly be made. In reviewing administrative decisions, it
is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the
sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all
over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would
thereby result.
ERNESTO FRANCISCO JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et. al., Respondents.
EN BANC, GR No. 154117 October 2, 2009
FACTS: On April 16, 2001, Ernesto Francisco Jr., filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman,
alleging irregularities in the transactions entered into by Joseph Estrada, et. al. involving the government
acquisition of the lands for the right of way of the C-5 link. He contends that it was due to the personal
intervention of Estrada and Mike Velarde that the government was able to close the deal within 2 and a
half working days. Francisco also alleges that the 9 parcels of land sold to the government were
outrageously overpriced and that the government was defrauded because the lands involved in the deal
were underdeveloped. The Office of the Ombudsman resolved to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. In
his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner alleges that serious errors of law have been committed by the
Ombudsman in not finding the respondents guilty of violating the Plunder Law and Anti Corrupt Practices
Act. The MR was denied by the Ombudsman, hence, the appeal to the SC.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a comment arguing that the assailed resolution and order it issued are
not appealable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as it did not raise any question of law and that Rule
45 is not the proper mode of appeal in questioning any final order or resolution of the office of the
Ombudsman.
Private respondents Velarde aver that the "courts" referred to in Section 1 Rule 45 are "the courts that
compose the integrated judicial system and do not include quasi-judicial bodies or agencies such as the
Office of the Ombudsman." They claim that the proper mode of appeal in questioning the final judgment,
order, or resolution of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies is provided under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Which, between Rule 65 and Rule 43, is the proper remedy?
HELD: Rule 65.

The decision of the Ombudsman on a complaint involving the finding of probable cause in criminal cases
involving public officials may be reviewed by the Supreme Court via Rule 65 and not Rule 43. Petition for
review under Rule 43 as mode of review only applies to decisions of the Ombusman over administrative
cases.

Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief from final judgments, orders, or resolutions of quasi-
judicial bodies or agencies like the Office of the Ombudsman, as has been repeatedly held by this Court,
we find that the remedy of appeal under Rule 43 posited by private respondents Velarde is not proper
either. This Court subsequently held that under the ruling in Fabian, "all appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure." Said remedy, therefore, is not applicable to cases involving criminal or
non-administrative charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, which is the situation in the case
before us now. Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed under Rule 65, and not
Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case involves a significant amount of money that was already released by the government to a
private institution, AMVEL, as purchase price for the road right-of-way in a major infrastructure project that
was undertaken by the former and that naturally affected the general public. Therefore, even if this case
was erroneously filed as shown above, and may be dismissed outright under the rules, the Court deems it
appropriate to brush aside technicalities of procedure, as this involves matters of transcendental
importance to the public; and to consider the petition as one for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Respondents argue further that the petition should be instantly dismissed for failing to raise purely
questions of law. It is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and its jurisdiction is limited to errors of
law. As we held in Tirol v. Commission on Audit, "There is a question of law in any given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact arises when
the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem — beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and
to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation
of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot
be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting
evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.
Even if the issues involved here are factual, petitioner invokes the power of the Court to reverse the
decision of the Ombudsman by alleging that the latter acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, as in Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman,
we find that:
[The] Order and the Resolution of the Ombudsman are based on substantial evidence. In dismissing the
complaint of petitioner, we cannot say that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion so as to
call for the exercise of our supervisory powers over him. This court is not a trier of facts. As long as there
is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman's decision, that … decision will not be overturned.

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JOSE SANTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMITTEE ON CLAIMS SETTLEMENT, and GSIS, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 158071, April 2, 2009
Facts: On August 16, 1986, Jose Santos retired from DAR after 21 years of service. He was reemployed
in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in 1989. In 1997, he availed of early retirement under
RA 660. He requested and received from the GSIS a tentative computation of retirement benefits
amounting to P667,937.40. He formally applied for retirement in January 1998. However, on May 4,
1998, the GSIS informed Santos that he could no longer retire under RA 660 but he could do so under
RA 8291, under which he is entitled to a reduced benefit of P81,557.20. This computation did not
consider his 21 years of service with the DAR. Santos appealed to GSIS Committee on Claims.
Unfortunately, it affirmed the GSIS Operating Unit’s computation. Santos filed a complaint before the
GSIS Board of Trustees, which affirmed the ruling of GSIS Committee on Claims. Aggrieved, Santos filed
with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. CA dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the issue raised (whether Santos can retire under RA 8291 or
RA 660) was a pure question of law and that it is only the SC which has jurisdiction to entertain the same.
Hence, Santos brought the matter to the SC.
Issues: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the issues raised in the present Rule 43 petition.
HELD: YES.
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory
Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act
6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural
Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments,
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
xxx
Section 3. Where to appeal. – An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.
Thus, the question on whether petitioner can retire under RA 660 or RA 8291 is undoubtedly a question
of law because it centers on what law to apply in his case considering that he has previously retired from

the government under a particular statute and that he was re-employed by the government. These facts
are admitted and there is no need for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented.
As a general rule, appeals on pure questions of law are brought to this Court since Sec. 5 (2) (e), Art. VIII
of the Constitution includes in the enumeration of cases within its jurisdiction "all cases in which only an
error or question of law is involved." It should not be overlooked, however, that the same provision vesting
jurisdiction in this Court of the cases enumerated therein is prefaced by the statement that it may "review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," the
judgments or final orders of lower courts in the cases therein enumerated. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure constitutes an exception to the aforesaid general rule on appeals. Rule 43 provides for an
instance where an appellate review solely on a question of law may be sought in the CA instead of this
Court.
Undeniably, an appeal to the CA may be taken within the reglementary period to appeal whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, law, or mixed questions of fact and law. As such, a question of fact or
question of law alone or a mix question of fact and law may be appealed to the CA via Rule 43.
However, a remand of the case to the CA would serve no useful purpose, since the core issue in this
case, i.e., under which law petitioner can retire, can already be resolved based on the records of the
proceedings before the GSIS. A remand would unnecessarily impose on the parties the concomitant
difficulties and expenses of another proceeding where they would have to present the same evidence and
arguments again. This clearly runs counter to the Rules of Court, which mandates liberal construction of
the Rules to attain just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of any action or proceeding.
In discussing the merits of the case, SC still affirmed the ruling of the GSIS, holding that, as a re-
employed member of the government service who is retiring during the effectivity of RA 8291, petitioner
cannot have his previous government service with the DAR credited in the computation of his retirement
benefit. Neither can he choose a mode of retirement except that provided under R.A. 8291.
PEDRO GABRIEL, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.
MURMURAY JAMIAS, et. al., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 156482 September 17, 2008
Facts: Upon Martin Jamia’s death in 1958, his wife, Delfina, and 6 children, namely, Inanama, Murmuray,
Langit, Dalisay, Liwawa and Isagani, all surnamed Jamies, and respondents herein, inherited the Jamias
estate. Said heirs partitioned among themselves the whole property at 1/7 each for which the heirs were
issued separate and individual titles corresponding to their respective portions of the estate. After the
death of Delfina, the whole Jamias estate was identified by DAR as covered by Operation Land Transfer
(OLT), pursuant to PD 27 and the petitioners herein, Gabriel, et. al., as farmer-beneficiaries, were issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT). Claiming that their landholdings were erroneously covered by OLT
since they already have individual Torrens titles covering the same, Jamias, et. al., filed with the DAR a
petition for retention of 7 hectares each of the Jamies estate and for the cancellation of the CLTs issued
to the petitioners covering the portions thereof. DAR Minister granted the petition of Jamias, which was
affirmed by the DAR secretary. CA affirmed the DAR Ruling, holding that the distribution of land titles to
the petitioners was improper, considering that the same made during the pendency of the repondent’s
petition for retention with the DAR. The petitioners appealed the CA’s decision to the SC. SC denied the
petition for lack of merit, and such resolution became final and executory. Pursuant to the Resolution,
Jamias, et. al. separately filed with DARAB their petition for cancelation of the emancipation patents
covering the land. Petitioners moved for a dismissal of the petitions on the ground that DARB has no
jurisdiction. Such was denied by the DARAB. Petitioners raised the matter to the CA. The CA dismissed
outright the petition for review due to deficiency in form and substance for failure to incorporate and/or

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attach the documents materially referred to therein, in violation of Par. C, Sec. 6 of Rule 43 in relation to
Sec. 7, Rule 43, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, the case was elevated to the SC.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the dismissal of the petition by the CA for failure to attach the necessary documents
was proper.
HELD # 1: YES.
Under Rule 43, Section 6(c) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for review shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein and other supporting papers. Failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
requirements of a petition for review is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition pursuant to
Section 7 of the same Rule.
Here, it is not disputed that the petitioners failed to attach to their petition filed with the CA copies of the
required documents and/or pleadings.
Petitioners’ assertion in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition that (a) the
foregoing documents/pleadings were not material to the issues they raised and (b) anyway, the records of
the case may be ordered elevated by the CA, cannot excuse them from failing to comply with a
requirement of a petition for review under Rule 43. We reiterate here that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process as it is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice. Thus, one
who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so
often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
ISSUE # 2: Which, between DARAB and the RTC, has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
HELD # 2: DARAB
It is well-settled that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and provincial
adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to an
agrarian dispute or controversy and the implementation of agrarian reform laws. Pertinently, it is provided
in the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure that the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and related agrarian reform laws. Such jurisdiction
shall extend to cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority.
This Court has had the occasion to rule that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put
the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents may
be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. Section 12(g) of P.D. No. 946 (issued
on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the
cancellation of emancipation patents issued under P.D. No. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases
was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
For sure, the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate of title is
issued, for, such certificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such transfer,
and there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA, on which it was grounded, be void. The same
holds true in the case of a certificate of title issued by virtue of a void emancipation patent.

From the foregoing, it is therefore undeniable that it is the DARAB and not the regular courts which has
jurisdiction herein, this notwithstanding the issuance of Torrens titles in the names of the petitioners. For,
it is a fact that the petitioners’ Torrens titles emanated from the emancipation patents previously issued to
them by virtue of being the farmer-beneficiaries identified by the DAR under the OLT of the government.
The DAR ruling that the said emancipation patents were erroneously issued for failing to consider the
valid retention rights of respondents had already attained finality. Considering that the action filed by
respondents with the DARAB was precisely to annul the emancipation patents issued to the petitioners,
the case squarely, therefore, falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
RULE 45
MARITA C. BERNALDO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE OMBUDSMAN, and THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Bernaldo, together with the engineers involved in the Almacean River project, were
charged by herein respondent Ombudsman for Falsification, Dishonesty and Prejudicial Conduct. Herein
petitioner was subsequently found guilty of the same by herein respondent Ombudsman.
On appeal to respondent Court of appeal, it affirmed the decision of respondent Ombusman, hence this
petition.
Petitioner contends that her conviction is without bases, on the ground that the letter report which was
used as a basis for the administrative charge, is hearsay and self-serving. The person who made such
was not presented as a witness and such findings were not based on actual facts.
However, respondents contend that the contention of herein petitioner raises questions of fact which is
beyond the scope of Rule 45.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the letter report which was used as basis in the administrative charge against herein
petitioner may be a valid basis for her conviction in a separate criminal charge.
HELD # 1: NO.
This Court has consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact where the decision of the Ombudsman is not supported by substantial
evidence, but based on speculations, surmises and conjectures, as in the present case, this Court finds
sufficient reason to overturn the same.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the subject question of fact, viz, that the percentage of completion of the Almacen
River II Project has been bloated in the Statement of Work Accomplished and the Certificate of Final
Inspection and Certificate of Final Acceptance signed by petitioner, may properly be raised in a Rule 45
petition.
HELD # 2: YES.
Anent the preliminary matter regarding the mode of appeal to this Court, the principle that only questions
of law shall be raised in an appeal by certiorarii under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court admits of certain
exceptions, , namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is
a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of

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both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
To be sure, when the lower court or administrative tribunal fails to take into account certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion is likewise an accepted exception to the
prescription under Rule 45.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES-BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, Petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE ROXAS AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, Respondents.
FACTS: Then President Quezon issued Proclamation No. 678, converting forest land situated in San
Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro as Matchwood Forest Reserve. In the meantime, respondent Roxas filed with
the Bureau of Lands Homestead Application covering a parcel of land which was approved. Petitioner
Republic then filed with the RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion against
respondents Roxas and the ROD over the subject property, alleging that such property was within the
Matchwood Forest Reserve and could not be the subject of private appropriation and ownership. The
RTC, however, rendered a Decision in respondent Roxas’s favor. On appeal, CA ruled that respondent
Roxas’s compliance with substantive and procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands belied
the allegation that respondent Roxas obtained grant and title over the subject property through fraud and
misrepresentation.
ISSUE: Whether resort to Rule 45 is proper in this case.
HELD: YES.
It is already a well-established rule that the Court, in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions as recognized by jurisprudence, to wit:
(1) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
The case at bar falls under several exceptions, i.e., the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and the findings of fact are contradicted
by the evidence on record As a result, we must return to the evidence submitted by the parties during trial
and make our own evaluation of the same.

GEMMA ONG A.K.A. Maria Teresa Gemma Catacutan, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 169440, November 23, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the RTC for Infringement under Section 155 in relation to Section
170 of Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code. She was then convicted of the crime
charged which was affirmed by the CA. In the petition herein, petitioner insists that the fact that her name
was only mentioned for the first time in the amended affidavits yields to the conclusion that she was not in
the subject premises when it was searched and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
perjured. She further claims that the courts below were wrong in finding that she never protested that she
was mistakenly identified.
Respondent People of the Philippines, in its comment, claims that a perusal of the issues in Gemma’s
petition readily discloses that only questions of fact have been raised, which are not reviewable in an
appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether questions of fact may be raised in the present Rule 45 petition.
HELD: YES.
The basic rule is that factual questions are beyond the province of this Court, because only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review. However, in exceptional cases, questions of fact in order to
resolve legal issues are taken cognizance, such as when there was palpable error or a grave
misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Although submission of issues of fact in an appeal by
certiorari taken to this Court is ordinarily proscribed, this Court nonetheless retains the option in the
exercise of its sound discretion, taking into account the attendant circumstances, either to decide the
case or refer it to the proper court for determination. (Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals) Since the determination of the identity of Gemma is the very issue
affecting her guilt or innocence, this Court chooses to take cognizance of this case in the interest of
proper administration of justice.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Chief of the Philippine National Police,
Petitioner,
vs.
THI THU THUY T. DE GUZMAN, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), a contractor

accredited by the PNP for the supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the
delivery of various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of
buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts. Due to non-payment of the construction materials,
respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of the contract between the petitioner and the respondent on the strength of
the documentary evidence presented and offered in Court and on petitioner’s own stipulations and
admissions during various stages of the proceedings. Hence this petition, praying for the reversal of the
lower courts’ decisions on the ground that "the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law by
affirming the decision of the trial court."
ISSUE: Whether questions of fact may be raised in the present petition for review under Rule 45.
HELD: NO.

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The petition under Rule 45 must not involve the calibration of the probative value of the evidence
presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed, and the only issue that should be left for
the Court to decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was
appropriate.
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is whether the Court can
resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it will be a question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration
of the probative value of the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed,
and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether or not the conclusion drawn by the
CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the controversial LBP check are central to the issue, the
resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire records of the case including the transcribed
testimonies of the witnesses. Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive62 and this Court will only
review them under the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGORATA, Judge of RTC, et. al., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 170375, July 7, 2010
FACTS: Sometime in the early 1900s, Dona Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of
land in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. The Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered its decision that only
one half of the two parcels of land is owned by Dona Demetria. In 1914, SC upheld the LRC decision. In
1978, Teofilo Cacho, claiming to be Dona Demetria’s son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for
reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs) which was opposed by the Republic, National
Steel Corporation, and Iligan City. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Teofilo, and ordered reconstitution
and reissuance of title. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that Teofilo failed to
establish that he is a real party in interest and because of the absence of a new survey since 1914.
Teofilo appealed to the SC. In 1997, SC reversed the CA and reinstated the decision of the RTC, finding
that Teofilo was able to establish himself as a real party in interest. As a result of this 1997 Cacho case,
new OCTs were issued in Dona Demetria’s name. The dispute over the subjects land did not end with the
1997 Cacho case. Four other cases involving expropriation case, quieting of title, ejectment, and
cancellation of title reached the SC which were consolidated in this decision considering they involve
similar issues and originated from the same case.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the simultaneous filing of petitions under both Rule 45 and 65 is proper.
HELD # 1: NO.

In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule
45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this
Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is
that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors
of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
But in the same case, the Court also held that:
This Court, x x x, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the
interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the
same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.63
It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing
Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two
separate remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the
Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the
allegations therein as errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules
45. Before the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with
the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution64 dated January 23,
2006, granted the Republic a 30-day extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The
Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the direct filing to the Supreme Court violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.
HELD # 2: NO.
According to Rule 41, Section 2(c) of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises
only questions of law.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole,
and the probability of the situation.
Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether Civil Case No. 106 should
have been dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct
resort by the Republic to this Court is proper.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, Petitioners,

vs.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEU), Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION, GR No. 16550, October 8, 2008
FACTS: Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) and SCBEU entered into a CBA which provided, among others,
for medical benefits. At the time of the signing of the CBA, the group hospitalization insurance plan in
force was the policy issued by Philamlife. After the signing of the CBA, SCB changed its insurance
provider from Philamlife to Maxicare to allegedly provide its employees with improved medical benefits

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Subsequently, SCBEU charged SCB with unfair labor practice before the DOLE for gross violation of the
economic provisions of the CBA and diminution or removal of benefits. SCBEU contested the exclusion of
the outpatient medicine reimbursements of the employees and the maternity benefits granted to the
spouses of the male employees in the new policy of Maxicare. SCB argued that outpatient medicine
reimbursement was not expressly provided for in the Philamlife policy and that the maternity benefits in
the CBA were exclusive to its female employees only. DOLE ruled in favor of SCBEU, holding that SCB
provided for maternity benefits to the spouses of male employees as a matter of practice, hence, SCB
cannot unilaterally revoke the same. SCB elevated the case tp the CA through Certiorari but the CA
dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling of the DOLE. Hence, SCB brought the case to the SC via
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In its comment, SCBEU contends that
the petition must fail as it raises questions of fact when it should be limited to questions of law. SCBEU
claims that there is no real and material conflict between the findings of the DOLE and the CA so as to
claim that this case is an exception to the rule that only questions of law are elevated to the SC under
Rule 45. Petitioner argues that when the facts are undisputed, the the question of whether or not the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the CA is correct is a question of law.
ISSUE: Whether the issues raised by SCB are questions of law, as contemplated in Rule 45.
HELD: NO.
With respect to the procedural issue, we agree with respondent that the issues raised by the bank are
essentially questions of fact that cannot be the subject of this petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised on appeal by certiorari.
Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts and that it is neither
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh the evidence of the parties all over again. The ruling in
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc. elucidates the distinction of a question of law and a question of
fact as follows:
… A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of
facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
xxx xxx xxx
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or
the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual. Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or
rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether
or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence
submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain
documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to
their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party
are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.
Petitioner wants this Court to determine if (i) the maternity benefits provided to its female employees
extend to the spouses of its male employees and if (ii) its employees are entitled to "outpatient medicine
reimbursements" as a matter of company practice. Indeed, petitioner, in phrasing the issues in this

Petition, urges this Court to scrutinize the "evidence based on record." Such language militates against
petitioner’s contention that the Petition involves purely questions of law.
We disagree with petitioner that the conclusion drawn by the appellate court from the "evidence based on
record" is a question of law. This is the opposite definition of a question of law. Petitioner’s reliance on the
ruling in Commissioner of Immigration v. Garcia that "when the facts are undisputed, then the question of
whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom by the Court of Appeals is correct is a question of law" is
misplaced. In the present case, the facts are disputed. Respondent claims that there is an existing
company practice entitling petitioner’s employees to "outpatient medicine reimbursements" and entitling
the spouses of its male employees to maternity benefits. Petitioner persistently argues the contrary. Both
parties point to their CBA and various documents inclined to prove or disprove their respective factual
contentions.
This case likewise does not fall within any of exceptions to the rule that only questions of law are proper
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The findings and conclusions of
the appellate court show that the evidence and the arguments of the parties had all been carefully
considered and passed upon. There are no "relevant facts" that will justify a different conclusion which the
said court failed to consider. There are likewise no factual conclusions of the CA and the DOLE which are
in conflict.
SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
GOYU & SONS, INC., GO SONG HIAP, et. al., Respondents
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent (Intervenor).
FACTS: Goyu & Sons, with individual respondents Go Song Hiap, et. al.(as individual guarantors),
incurred various obligations to Solidbank in connection with the financing of Goyu’s business as exporter
of solid doors. As additional security, Goyu obtained several fire insurance policies issued by Malayan
Insurance which endorsed in favor of Solidbank for all the obligations incurred by Goyu. In 1992, fire
gutted one of the buildings of Goyu. Goyu filed a claim for indemnity with Malayan Insurance but was
denied on the ground that the insurance policies were claimed by other creditors of Goyu. RCBC, one of
Goyu’s creditors, also filed with Malayan a claim for the proceeds of Goyu’s insurance policies. Malayan
likewise denied this claim by RCBC Goyu filed against Malayan and RCBC a complaint for specific
performance in RTC of Manila, Branch 3, praying that Malayan be ordered to pay Goyu the amount
representing 10 insurance policies In the meantime, Solidbank filed an action for collection of sum of
money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, also with the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, against
Goyu and individual guarantors, and Malayan. RTC, Branch 3, issued an interlocutory order requiring the
proceeds of Goyu’s 10 insurance policies to be deposited with the said court. It subsequently ruled in
favor of Goyu and ordered its clerk of court to release immediately to GOyu the amount deposited. The
CA affirmed this decision. The case reached the SC which affirmed the decision of both the RTC and the
CA. Meanwhile, RTC Branch 14, where the action for collection of sum of money was filed, rendered a
decision in favor of Solidbank and ordered Goyu and Sons, including the individual creditors to pay
Solidbank. RTC Branch 14 issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision which was
served to the Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, requesting the delivery of the deposited amount to the
sheriff in favor of Solidbank.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC Branch 14, holding that Solidbank had the legal authority to
withdraw the amount by virtue of the final and executory judgment rendered in its favor. However, upon
Motion for Reconsideration, the CA reversed its order by ordering Solidbank to restitute to the RTC
Manila the amount earlier withdrawn, ruling that no court, other than one having jurisdiction over the
properties in custodia legis, has a right to interfere with and change possession over the same. CA
denied the Omnibus Motion filed by Solidbank seeking reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

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ISSUE # 1: Whether the property held in custodia legis by one court may be withdrawn by virtue of an
order from a co-equal court.
HELD # 1: NO.
When the proceeds of fire insurance were placed under custodia legis of Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila
in Civil Case No. 93-65442, they were placed under the sole control of such court beyond the interference
of all other co-ordinate courts. We have held that property attached or garnished by a court falls into the
custodia legis of that court for the purposes of that civil case only. Any relief against such attachment and
the execution and issuance of a writ of possession that ensued subsequently could be disposed of only in
that case.
The garnishment of property operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the
property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis,
under the sole control of such court. A court which has control of such property, exercises exclusive
jurisdiction over the same, retains all incidents relative to the conduct of such property. No court, except
one having supervisory control or superior jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to interfere with and
change that possession.
In the case at bar, therefore, the order to deposit the proceeds of fire insurance policy numbers F-114-
07402 and F-114-07525 brought the amount garnished into the custodia legis of the court issuing said
order, that is, the RTC of Manila, Branch 3, beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such
as the RTC of Manila, Branch 14. Accordingly, the act of the sheriff in the case at bar in levying on the
deposited insurance proceeds was likewise a patent nullity.
As a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance [now RTC] of a judicial district are a
coordinate and co-equal courts [where] one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue
interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of
this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have
the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the resort to Rule 45 before the Supreme Court was proper.
HELD # 2: NO.
This Court has, on several occasions, held that a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper remedy
for interlocutory orders. A resolution which does not completely dispose of the case on the merits is
merely an interlocutory order and, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal
may be taken therefrom.
The assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 23, 1997 and April 28, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No.
51894, which required SOLIDBANK to restitute with legal interest the amount withdrawn by it from the fire
insurance proceeds deposited in custodia legis with the RTC of Manila, are very clearly merely
interlocutory orders, as they do not dispose of the appeals by Solidbank, GOYU, and MICOon the merits.
Accordingly, a petition for review on certiorari is not the proper remedy. Instead, where the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court allows certiorarias a mode of redress.25 As it stands, the petition for review
of SOLIDBANK is the wrong remedy and perforce should be dismissed.
On considerations of equity and liberality, this Court can treat the present petition as a Petition for
Certiorari filed under Rule 65. Certiorari, however, requires not a mere error injudgment, but a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. We shall now proceed to determine
whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
ISSUE # 3: Whether a Motion for Reconsideration may validly be dispensed with in the present case,
considering that the Rule 45 petition was treated by the Supreme Court as a Rule 65 petition.
HELD # 3: YES.
This Court has settled that as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua nonin order that certiorari shall lie. However, there are settled exceptions to this Rule, one of which is
where the assailed order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quohas no jurisdiction, which is evident
in this case.
The Notice of Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf brought the property into the custodia
legis of the court issuing the writ, that is, the RTC Makati City Branch 64, beyond the interference of all
other co-ordinate courts, such asthe RTC of Cebu, Branch 6. "The garnishment of property operates as
an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction
of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. A court
which has control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same, retains all incidents
relative to the conduct of such property. No court, except one having supervisory control or superior
jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to interfere with and change that possession."
RHODORA PRIETO, Petitioner,

vs.
ALPADI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS: Rhodora Prieto, then employed as an accounting clerk and cashier of the Alpadi Group of
Companies, was charged with estafa before RTC Manila Br. 8 on account of her receipt of rental
payments from the tenants of her employer and her refusal to remit the same to the latter. The RTC
granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by Prieto and denied the private complainant’s ensuing Motion for
Reconsideration. The private complainant elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65 which annulled and set
aside the RTC decision. The PAO, Prieto’s counsel before the RTC and the Court of Appeals, received a
copy of the Resolution dated November 12, 2009 on November 24, 2009, hence, giving Prieto until
December 9, 2009 to appeal the adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Atty.
Allan Julius B. Azcueta (Azcueta), Public Attorney II of the PAO, filed on December 4, 2009 a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court, requesting an extension of 30
days from December 9, 2009, or until January 8, 2010, within which to file Prieto’s appeal of the Decision
dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals. On January 12,
2010, Atty. Azcueta filed before the Court a Manifestation with Motion alleging that Prieto no longer
desires to continue with the appeal which resulted in issuance of the SC of a resolution terminating the
case. However, on February 10, 2010, Prieto, through another counsel, Atty. Xilexferen P. Barroga
(Barroga) of Barroga, Nario & Associates Law Offices, filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for the reversal of the Decision dated August 28, 2009 and
Resolution dated November 12, 2009 of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether Prieto’s appeal should be allowed.
HELD: NO.
Time and again the Supreme Court has declared that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing
an appeal has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such
deviation.

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The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless
and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him
on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable.
Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform
him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.
HEIRS OF RODOLFO CRISOSTOMO (EUPROCINIA, ROYCE and IRISH CRISOSTOMO), petitioners

vs.
RUDEX INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
FIRST, DIVISION, G.R. No. 176129. August 24, 2011
FACTS: Crisostomo spouses bought a house and lot at Patricia South Villa, Imus, Cavite, for a price of
P833,000.00 on installment basis. Payments of P60,000.00 were made, promissory note was executed
and postdated checks to cover the installment amortizations were issued. Crisostomo family moved in to
their new house; however, construction defects and inadequate facilities in the subdivision were
discovered. Thus, Crisostomo discontinued paying their monthly amortizations and asked for a rescission
of the contract. A letter of complaint was delivered to the respondent, wherein he rescinded their Contract
to Sell, demanded the refund of all the payments he had made, and reiterated that he would no longer
pay the monthly amortizations. Rodolfo filed a Complaint for violation of Presidential Decree Nos. 1344
and 957, and Board Resolution No. 579 of 1995, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Administrative remedies were all exhausted. On September 15, 2006, the petitioners filed their
Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. However, this was dismissed outright in a Resolution for
being filed out of time, the deadline being September 14, 2006. The Court of Appeals said that the
petitioners were already granted a 15-day extension and yet no justification or reason was given to
explain why they still filed beyond the extended period.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court may exercise equity jurisdiction, considering that the absence of
intent to delay the proceedings on the part of the petitioner.
HELD: YES.
This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid an
unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no element
of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day delay does not
justify their petition’s dismissal.
In Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzales v. Pennisi, this Court elucidated on the rules on
reglementary periods, to wit:
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded
so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and
compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The
purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the
administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.
n this case, the last day for filing the petition for review was on September 13, 2006. The petitioners
entrusted the drafting of their petition with their counsel, who in turn entrusted the attaching of the
required annexes to the petition with her secretary. The secretary resigned from her job sometime later to

avoid giving her employer "problems for unexpected absences in the future." Aside from this, the
petitioners also submitted an Affidavit from the secretary, who narrated her ordeal that day and why she
was not able to inform her employer of the whereabouts of the petition. A certification from the doctor of
one of the secretary’s children was also submitted to prove that the secretary indeed brought her children
to the doctor on September 14, 2006, the deadline for filing the petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.
ALEXANDER B. GATUS, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondent
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 174725, January 26, 2011
FACTS: Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, he was a covered member of the SSS. He
optionally retired from Central Azucarera de Tarlac upon reaching 30 years of service at the age of 62
years.
He was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary Artery Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable
Angina. His medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
Sometime in 2003, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him on the
ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic smoking, was not work-related. Convinced that he
was entitled to the benefits, he assailed the decision but the SSS maintained its position. The SSS also
denied his motion for reconsideration. He elevated the matter to the ECC, which denied his appeal.
Gatus appealed to the Court of Appeals and contends that he had contracted the disease due to the
presence of harmful fuel smoke emission of methane gas from a nearby biological waste digester and a
railway terminal where diesel-fed locomotive engines had "spew(ed) black smoke;" and that he had been
exposed for 30 years to various smoke emissions that had contained carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
sulfur, oxide of nitrogen and unburned carbon.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner is not entitled to compensation benefits under Presidential
Decree No. 626.
On appeal, petitioner vehemently denies the established fact that petitioner is a cigarette smoker by
saying that there is no competent evidence to prove he had that habit. What petitioner would like this
Court to do is to pass upon a question of fact, which the ECC, the SSS, and the Court of Appeals have
used to deny his claim for compensation.
ISSUE: Whether Gacus’ claim may be the subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
HELD: NO.
The matter of petitioner’s cigarette smoking, established by two competent government agencies and the
appellate court, is thus a matter that cannot be questioned before us via petition for review. This is not
allowed under Section 1 of Rule 45, which states that "[t]he petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth." Hence, questions of fact may not be taken up in a petition for review on
certiorari such as this case now before us. As we have held previously:
A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts while a question
of law exists if the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. There is a question of fact if
the issue requires a review of the evidence presented or requires the re-evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses. However, if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence, the question is one of law.

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ROMULO TINDOY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
FACTS: SPO1 Romulo Tindoy, together with his fellow police officers PO1 Manuel Fernandez and PO3
Ariel Sanchez, was charged with the crime of Homicide. Petitioner, together with PO1 Fernandez and
PO3 Sanchez responded to a call for police assistance regarding a case of domestic violence. It was
reported that the victim was beating his common-law wife Elsie at their residence. The couple was
nonetheless invited to the police station for questioning.
While in the station, PO1 Fernandez and PO3 Sanchez dragged the victim to the comfort room. From the
comfort room door Elsie saw the three policemen throw fistic blows on the head of the victim with each
hand held by petitioner and PO3 Sanchez.
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Consolacion Viernes, mother of the victim
Dominador Viernes, Elsie Fernandez, common-law wife of the victim and alleged eyewitness, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, the designated Medico-Legal Officer of Bulacan who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim, Dr. Raul Palma, the neurosurgeon who examined the victim when he was brought to the
Makati Medical Center for a CT-scan, and Dr. Nestor Bautista, the neurologist who examined the images
imprinted in and made the official findings of the result of the CT-scan.
The trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner and his co-accused guilty of the crime of
Homicide. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On Appeal, the petitioner contends that CA committed reversible error in not finding that the trial court
misappreciated the evidence presented during trial.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court should review the factual determinations by the lower court which
were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
HELD: NO.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an appeal to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari should raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth in the
petition. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. Thus, the Court may be minded to review the factual
findings of the CA only in the presence of any of the following circumstances: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the
factual findings are based; (7) the findings of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.
Perusal of the record shows that, none of the above exists in this case. Nonetheless, we shall address
petitioner’s lament.
The trial courts are in a better position to decide questions of credibility having heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION (GMC)

vs.
ERNESTO CASIO et al
First Division, G.R. No. 149552 March 10, 2010
FACTS: GMC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the decision of the CA setting aside the Voluntary Arbitration Award of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Cebu City when the latter dismissed the Complaint filed by
respondents Casio, et al. against petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) for unfair labor practice,
illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and payment of moral and exemplary damages. GMC, in its petition,
avers among others that: (1) in reviewing and reversing the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the Court
of Appeals departed from the principle of conclusiveness of the trial judges’ findings; and (2) the findings
of the Voluntary Arbitrator as to the legality of the termination from employment of Casio, et al. are well
supported by evidence. On the other hand, Casio, et al. counters that GMC failed to identify the specific
pieces of evidence supporting the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 45 is the proper remedy of the petitioner.
HELD: NO.
In general, in a petition for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the petitioner can raise only questions of law - the Supreme Court is not the proper venue to consider a
factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. A departure from the general rule may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court [or
quasi-judicial agency, as the case may be], or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on record.
Whether Casio, et al. were illegally dismissed without any valid reason is a question of fact better left to
quasi-judicial agencies to determine. In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator was convinced that Casio, et al.
were legally dismissed; while the Court of Appeals believed the opposite, because even though the
dismissal of Casio, et al. was made by GMC pursuant to a valid closed shop provision in the CBA, the
company still failed to observe the elementary rules of due process. The Court is therefore constrained to
take a second look at the evidence on record considering that the factual findings of the Voluntary
Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals are contradictory.
F.A.T. KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ONLINE NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner, F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. (FAT KEE) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of selling computer equipment and conducting maintenance services for the units it sold.
ONLINE is also a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of selling computer units,
parts and software. ONLINE sold computer printers to FAT KEE. However, FAT KEE failed to pay its
obligations to ONLINE without any valid reason. ONLINE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against
FAT KEE.
During the trial FAT KEE insisted that the conversion rate they agreed upon was P34:US$1 and not P40
as insisted by ONLINE. The RTC dismissed the complaint of ONLINE for the latter’s failure to establish its
claim. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. FAT KEE filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution.
FAT KEE contests the argument of ONLINE that the instant petition is fatally defective for the failure of
the former to attach the transcript of stenographic notes of the RTC proceedings. FAT KEE counters that

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there is no need to annex the said TSN given that ONLINE does not dispute the accuracy of the quoted
portions of the transcripts and the petition does not request for a reevaluation of the evidence of the
parties. Assuming arguendo that the TSN should have been attached to the petition, FAT KEE begs for
the relaxation of the rules so as not to frustrate the ends of substantive justice. FAT KEE also rejects the
contention of ONLINE that the petition raises only factual issues, which are not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari. FAT KEE argues that the Court of Appeals likewise erred in re-evaluating the
evidence and substituted its own interpretation of the testimonies of the witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether the non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN renders the petition of FAT KEE
fatally defective.
HELD: NO.
The non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN does not render the petition of FAT KEE fatally
defective.
Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court indeed requires the attachment to the petition for review on
certiorari such material portions of the record as would support the petition. However, such a requirement
was not meant to be an ironclad rule such that the failure to follow the same would merit the outright
dismissal of the petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, the Supreme Court may require or
allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within such
periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate. More importantly, Section 8 of Rule 45
declares that if the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the
complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice. Given that the
TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms part of the records of the instant case, the failure of FAT
KEE to attach the relevant portions of the TSN was already cured by the subsequent elevation of the
case records to this Court. This pronouncement is likewise in keeping with the doctrine that procedural
rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
WILFREDO Y. ANTIQUINA, Petitioner,

vs.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and/or MASTERBULK, PTE., LTD., Respondents.
First Division , G.R. No. 168922, April 13, 2011
FACTS: Wilfredo Y. Antiquina was hired, through respondent manning agency Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation (MMC), to serve as Third Engineer on the vessel, M/T Star Langanger. He suffered a
fracture on his lower left arm after a part fell down on him and was signed off the vessel at Port Said,
Egypt and was repatriated to the Philippines. He filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for permanent
disability benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees against herein respondents. In their
defense, respondents contended that petitioner’s monetary claims were premature by reason of the
latter’s refusal to undergo the operation recommended by the company designated physician. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. Respondents appealed contending that the Labor Arbiter had no basis
to award disability compensation for failure of petitioner to present the CBA and proof of membership to
AMOSUP. NLRC dismissed respondents’ appeal. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents and held that although the evidence were filed for
the first time on appeal, it would have been prudent upon the NLRC to look into them since it was not
bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity. It also held that the award of medical
unfitness benefits has no basis since the petitioner failed to show evidence of his membership in
AMOSUP.
In his motion for reconsideration, petitioner claimed that it was only by inadvertence that he previously
failed to attach a copy of the CBA. Attached as annexes to his motion were: (a) a purported copy of the
CBA; and (b) a copy of his monthly contributions as union member during the period that he was
employed by respondents. Respondents objected to the annexes of petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration on the grounds that his belated filing violated their right to due process and that the list of
monthly contributions he presented did not prove he was a member of AMOSUP since the said list did not
contain any validation/signature of an AMOSUP officer. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether factual issues were correctly raised in the present petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.
HELD: YES.
The resolution of the foregoing issues entails a review of the facts of the case which ordinarily would not
be allowed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, only
questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
However, this principle is subject to recognized exceptions. In the labor law setting, the Court will delve
into factual issues when conflict of factual findings exists among the labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the
Court of Appeals. Considering that in the present case there were differing factual findings on the part of
the Court of Appeals, on one hand, and the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, on the other, there is a need for
the Supreme Court to make its own assiduous evaluation of the evidence on record.
However, what petitioner belatedly presented on appeal appears to be a CBA between respondent
Masterbulk and the Singapore Maritime Officers’ Union, not AMOSUP. The stipulation regarding
permanent medical fitness benefits quoted in petitioner’s Position Paper and relied upon by the Labor
Arbiter in his decision, cannot be found in this CBA.
FELIMON MANGUIOB, PETITIONER,

VS.
JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, RTC, BRANCH 12, DAVAO CITY AND ALEJANDRA VELASCO,
RESPONDENTS.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 152262, February 15, 2012
FACTS: Manguiob and Velasco entered into a partnership. Velasco provided the capital, while Manguiob
was the industrial partner. The partnership ceased to operate at Velasco’s option. In this case, both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals ordered Manguiob to return to Velasco her capital contribution, as
established during the trial and evidenced by receipts signed by Manguiob.
Manguiob raised in this petition for certiorari that the value of the non-cash assets of the partnership be
deducted from the amount he was adjudged to pay Velasco. However, no evidence was introduced or
received for the purpose of ascertaining the actual status of the non-cash assets despite the parties
admission of their existence.
ISSUE: Is the issue on the status of the non-cash asset a question of law, which the Supreme Court may
take cognizance of in a petition for review on certiorari?
HELD: NO. A proper resolution on the distribution of the non-cash assets obviously necessitates, inter
alia, a determination of the proceeds or whereabouts of these non-cash assets.
Section 1, Rule 45 in force: Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
The distinction between a question of law and one of fact has long been settled.

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A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is
a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Thus, since this Court is required to review and evaluate the evidence on record, and even receive new
evidence to decide the issue of whether the value of the non-cash assets should be deducted from what
Manguiob was adjudged to pay Velasco, the issue then is definitely one of fact, and one that is
impermissible, as this Court is not a trier of facts.
Furthermore, records show that this issue was not even submitted by the parties during the trial. An issue
raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by
estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently,
issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
RULE 58
BRO. BERNARD OCA et al., Petitioner,

vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent.
FACTS: The Board of Trustees of St. Francis School resolved to remove respondent Laurita Custodio as
a member of the Board of Trustees and as a member of the Corporation pursuant to Sections 28 and 91
of the Corporation Code. Subsequently, respondent was issued a Memorandum signed by petitioner Bro.
Bernard Oca, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Trustees, wherein she was informed of her
immediate removal as Curriculum Administrator. In reaction to her removal, respondent filed with the trial
court a Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction against petitioners again
assailing the legality of the membership of the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School. A status quo order
was then issued by the court, allowing respondent to continue discharging her functions as school
director and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and actually discharging
functions as school officer to continue performing their duties until the application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is resolved.
ISSUE: Whether the manner of the issuance of the assailed status quo order violated the right of the
petitioners to due process.
HELD: YES.
Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable
and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. It further states that, unlike a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist
order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory
injunctive relief.
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quo order in an intra-corporate suit such as the case at
bar is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
which reads:

SECTION 1. Provisional remedies. - A party may apply for any of the provisional remedies provided in the
Rules of Court as may be available for the purposes. However, no temporary restraining order or status
quo order shall be issued save in exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties and the posting of
a bond.
Moreover, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which in fact seeks
injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: i.e., the application must be
verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond. In the present case, the Manifestation and Motion,
through which respondent applied for injunctive relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely
signed by her counsel and was unverified.
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner

vs.
SANGGUNIANG BARANGGAY, et. al., Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 156686 July 27, 2011
FACTS: The SB of Brgy. Sun Valley issued a resolution directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners
Assoc. (Petitioners) to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to vehicular Traffic at all hours daily, except
from 11pm to 5am, at which time the said streets may be closed for the sake of the residents’ security.
Petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with a prayer for the issuance of TRO with the
RTC of Paranaque City on grounds that, among others, there are other alternative routes available and
that it would subject the subdivision to traffic congestion and hassles of public places, thus, destroying the
character of the subdivision. The SB of Brgy. Sun Valley filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies under the LGC. RTC ruled in favor of the SB of Brgy. Sun Valley,
holding that the petitioner failed to exhausted administrative remedies under the LGC. Petitioner raised
the matter to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC. The petitioners went to the SC arguing that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable because when petitioner filed the
case, it did not have the luxury of time to elevate the matter to the higher authorities under the LGC. The
petitioner claims that the tenor of the resolution of the SB necessitated the immediate filing of the
injunction case to forestall the prejudicial effect of said resolution that was to take effect two days later,
hence, no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy except to file the case.
ISSUE: Whether the injunctive relief may be had, considering the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies
HELD: NO.
Petitioner’s recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of
Parañaque City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city or municipality,
through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component
barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
We do not see how petitioner’s act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case,
wherein we held:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust
of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine
is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity

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and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.
It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s actions to see if it acted within the
scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within the
local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court committed no reversible
error in dismissing the case for petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the requirement
under the Local Government Code that the closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an
ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads belong to the
City Government of Parañaque.
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner to show
ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do. In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on
the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
ILDEFONSO M. VILLANUEVA, JR., and SHERIFF DIOSCORO F. CAPONPON, JR. and MULTI-LUCK
CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS: In 1998, Multi-Luck Corporation (Multi-Luck) filed a collection suit against Alberto T. Looyuko
(Looyuko) as sole proprietor of Noah’s Ark Merchandising Inc. (NAMI).
The complaint pertained to three (3) dishonored United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks with an
aggregate amount of P8,985,440.00 issued by Looyuko/NAMI to Mamertha General Merchandising which
were indorsed to Multi-Luck, who claimed to be a holder in due course of such checks.
The RTC of Bacolod rendered a Decision ordering Looyuko/NAMI to pay Multi-Luck the value of the three
(3) UCPB checks. Looyuko/NAMI did not file an appeal. Hence, the Decision became final and executory.
When Bacolod RTC issued a writ of execution, Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for injunction with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC, Pasig City which it
granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Pasig RTC may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
the judgment of Bacolod RTC.
HELD: NO.
No court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. This doctrine of non-
interference is premised on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

BP PHILIPPINES, INC. (FORMERLY BURMAH CASTROL PHILIPPINES, INC.), Petitioner,

vs.
CLARK TRADING CORPORATION, Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner had entered into a Marketing and Technical Assistance Licensing Agreement and a
Marketing and Distribution Agreement (agreements) with Castrol Limited, U.K., a corporation organized
under the laws of England, and the owner and manufacturer of Castrol products.
Under the terms of the agreements, Castrol Limited, U.K. granted petitioner the title "exclusive wholesaler
importer and exclusive distributor" of Castrol products in the territory of the Philippines. Under the
Variation, "territory" was further clarified to include duty-free areas.
However, Clark Trading Corporation, owner of Parkson Duty Free, is a duty free retailer operating inside
the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Parkson Duty Free sells, among others, imported duty-free
Castrol products not sourced from petitioner.
Petitioner claimed that respondent, by selling and distributing Castrol Products not sourced from
petitioner in the Philippines, violated petitioner’s exclusive rights under the agreements. Despite a cease
and desist letter sent by petitioner, respondent continued to distribute and sell Castrol products in its duty-
free shop. And because of that, BP Phil Inc. filed a Complaint for "injunction with prayer for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages" in the RTC against respondent Clark
Trading Corporation.
The RTC denied petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, there being no
sufficient justification for the relief.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to injunction against third-persons on the basis of its marketing and
distribution.
HELD: NO.
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or
proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction
seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with,
the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until
the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without
the court issuing a final injunction.
As we have already stated, the writ of injunction would issue:

Upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts
which are violative of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights.
Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.
Respondent not being able to prove and establish the existence of a clear and actual right that ought to
be protected, injunction cannot issue as a matter of course. Consequently, the Court does not find any
ground for the award of damages.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCO T. FALCON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 71 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY and BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
Respondents.
FACTS: The Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project (the MRP/V Project) was implemented in line
with the DFA’s mandate to improve the passport and visa issuance system. Having qualified after the
bidding, the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) then permitted DFA to engage in
direct negotiations with BCA International Corporation (BCA). Later on, both the DFA and BCA imputed
breach of the Amended BOT Agreement against each other. BCA then filed a Petition for Interim Relief
under Section 28 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9285), with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, presided over by respondent Judge Falcon. The RTC ordered
the issuance of a TRO restraining the DFA, BSP, et.al., from awarding a new contract to implement the
Project or any similar electronic passport or visa project, or if such contract has been awarded, from
implementing such or similar projects. The RTC, after due hearing, likewise granted BCA’s application for
preliminary injunction. The DFA and BSP then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Supreme Court which was followed by an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was granted by the Court.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the RTC may effectively enjoin the implementation a national government project
under Republic Act No. 8975.
HELD # 1: NO.
No court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a “national government project” unless the matter is
one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act complained of is
enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.
Lower courts are without jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief on national government projects as
mandated by Republic Act No. 8975. "National government projects", as defined in said law, refer to all
current and future national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including
projects undertaken by government-owned and -controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic
Act No. 6975, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-
Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or
installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation,
maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the subject e-passport subject may be considered as "engineering works or a
service contract" or as "related and necessary activities" under Republic Act No. 8975 which may not be
enjoined
HELD # 2: NO.
Under Republic Act No. 8975, a "service contract" refers to "infrastructure contracts entered into by any
department, office or agency of the national government with private entities and nongovernment
organizations for services related or incidental to the functions and operations of the department, office or
agency concerned." On the other hand, the phrase "other related and necessary activities" obviously
refers to activities related to a government infrastructure, engineering works, service contract or project
under the BOT Law. In other words, to be considered a service contract or related activity, petitioners
must show that the e-Passport Project is an infrastructure project or necessarily related to an
infrastructure project. This, petitioners failed to do for they saw fit not to present any evidence on the
details of the e-Passport Project before the trial court and this Court. There is nothing on record to

indicate that the e-Passport Project has a civil works component or is necessarily related to an
infrastructure project.
Indeed, the reference to Section 30.4 of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9184 (a provision specific to the
procurement of goods) in the BSP’s request for interest and to bid confirms that the e-Passport Project is
a procurement of goods and not an infrastructure project. Thus, within the context of Republic Act No.
9184 – which is the governing law for the e-Passport Project – the said Project is not an infrastructure
project that is protected from lower court issued injunctions under Republic Act No. 8975, which, to
reiterate, has for its purpose the expeditious and efficient implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects.
ISSUE # 3: Whether DFA and BSP should be faulted for not complying with the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.
HELD # 3: NO.
The policy on the hierarchy of courts, which petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule.
For indeed the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special
civil actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.
The Court deems it proper to adopt a similarly liberal attitude in the present case in consideration of the
transcendental importance of an issue raised herein. This is the first time that the Court is confronted with
the question of whether an information and communication technology project, which does not conform to
our traditional notion of the term "infrastructure," is covered by the prohibition on the issuance of court
injunctions found in Republic Act No. 8975, which is entitled "An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from
Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions,
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." Taking into account the current trend
of computerization and modernization of administrative and service systems of government offices,
departments and agencies, the resolution of this issue for the guidance of the bench and bar, as well as
the general public, is both timely and imperative.
SPS. GONZALO T. DELA ROSA & CRISTETA DELA ROSA, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN VALDEZ and SPOUSES POTENCIANO MALVAR AND LOURDES MALVAR,
Respondents.
FACTS: A Complaint for Quieting of Title and Declaration of Nullity of Transfer Certificates of Title
involving the subject property, filed before the RTC by Manila Construction Development Corporation of
the Philippines (MCDC), against Spouses Dela Rosa and Juan, Jose, Pedro and Maria, all surnamed De
la Cruz. Complaints-in-intervention were filed in the said case by North East Property Ventures, Inc.
(NEPVI), and spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar. The spouses Malvar were the grantees/assignees
under a Deed of Absolute Transfer/Conveyance over the subject property executed by the spouses Dela
Rosa. Plaintiff MCDC, Intervenor North East Property Ventures, Inc. and Intervenor Valdez spouses and
Malvar spouses under separate applications have commonly prayed for the relief of mandatory injunction.
The RTC granted the joint prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction of the
spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar.
The spouses Dela Rosa filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, but it was denied
by the RTC. Aggrieved, the spouses Dela Rosa filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
but the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The spouses Dela Rosa filed a Motion for

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Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision, however, it was denied for lack of merit by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution
The spouses Dela Rosa then filed a Paetition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which placed
the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar in possession of the subject property.
HELD: YES.
The Supreme Court held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction in favor of the spouses Valdez and spouses Malvar. RTC Orders were
based on substantial evidence and pertinent jurisprudence.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitive or mandatory:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when
it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
The joint application for mandatory injunction of the Intervenors Valdez spouses and Malvar spouses is
meritorious. Firstly, because neither the plaintiff MCDC nor the intervenor North East Property Ventures,
Inc. has shown by credible facts to underwrite the clear legal right to be entitled to the relief of injunction
since their proprietary right or rights of dominion under their respective muniments of title were subject to
conditions which were not complied with correspondingly. Secondly, consequentially because the parties
primarily and ultimately affected by the continuing and manifold acts of dispossession are the intervenors,
the spouses Juan Valdez and Apolinaria Valdez and the Malvar spouses, who evidently by the facts and
circumstances borne out by the pleadings and by the evidence, have already shown to have established
clear legal rights to be entitled to the relief of writ of mandatory injunction.
The grant of preliminary writ of mandatory injunction to place in possession of the property in question
intervenors Valdez Spouses including Intervenors Malvar Spouses would be justified and consistent with
the ruling that:
"In effect, petitioner’s occupation of the land in question, after the denial of its application for
Miscellaneous Sales Patent, became subsequently illegal. Petitioner’s members have, as a consequence,
become squatters whose continuous possession of the land may now be considered to be in bad faith.
This is unfortunate because squatters acquire no legal right over the land they are occupying.
Although as a general rule, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction, transfer property in
litigation from the possession of one party to another, this rule admits of some exceptions. For example,
when there is a clear finding of ownership and possession of the land or unless the subject property is
covered by a torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner.”

SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 179665 April 3, 2013
FACTS: During the period from 1992 to 1996, China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to
Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI), which amounted to P139,999,234.34, exclusive of interests and other charges.
To secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety
agreements and contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land. In a letter addressed to CBC, SBI
requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties and the implementation of a
dacion en pago of the New Cubao Central property. CBC sent SBI a letter dated stating that the loans
had been completely restructured effective March 1, 1999 in the amount of P218,540,646.00. On the
aspect of interests and charges, CBC suggested the updating of the obligation to avoid paying interests
and charges.
Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account
within ten days from receipt thereof. Claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC
were iniquitous and unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and
MFII filed a Complaint "To Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order" in the RTC of Pasig City.
The trial court granted the application of SBI and MFII for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
for they were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ. CBC
sought reconsideration but the trial court denied it. Subsequently, CBC filed a "Motion to Dissolve
Injunction Order" but this was denied. Aggrieved, CBC filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition of CBC, set aside the Orders of RTC and dissolved
the injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City. SBI and MFII filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated September 18, 2007.
ISSUE: Whether the SBI and MFII were able to satisfy the requisites for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
HELD: NO.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual
and existing substantial rights. A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante,
upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected
exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that
the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury.
There is no clear right that warrants the extraordinary protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by
SBI and MFII to exist in their favor. Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged
properties shielded from foreclosure by CBC on the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges
imposed by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous and unconscionable. As debtor-
mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from
foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and
confiscatory rate of interest
Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such
constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law,
or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is,
it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may
only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of compensation.

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PALM TREE ESTATES, INC. and BELLE AIR GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondent.
First Division , G.R. No. 159370, October 3, 2012
FACTS: PTEI entered into a seven-year term loan agreement6 with PNB for the amount of P320 million.
As security for the payment of the loan, a Real Estate Mortgage over 48 parcels of land together with the
buildings and improvements thereon, was executed by PTEI in favor of PNB. PNB demanded payment of
PTEI’s outstanding obligations which amounted to P599,251,583.18. Thereafter PNB denied PTEI’s
request for another restructuring of its past due indebtedness which amounted to P621,977,483.61. As
PTEI defaulted in its payment of past due loan with PNB, the bank filed a Petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The following day, PTEI’s President, Kenichi Akimoto, wrote a
letter to PNB’s President, Feliciano L. Miranda, Jr., requesting for "another 30 days to settle" PTEI’s
"accrued obligations.
To enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the mortgage, PTEI and BAGCCI filed a Complaint in the RTC for
breach of contracts, nullity of promissory notes, annulment of mortgages, fixing of principal, accounting,
nullity of interests and penalties, annulment of petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, injunction, damages,
with prayer for temporary restraining order, and writ of preliminary injunction. RTC issued an Order
ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Reconsideration of the above order was denied in
an Order. Thereafter, PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders.
ISSUE: Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was correctly issued by the trial court.
HELD: NO.
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean
hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and
(2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
In this case, the hands of PTEI were not unsullied when it sought preliminary injunction. It was already in
breach of its contractual obligations when it defaulted in the payment of its indebtedness to PNB.
Moreover, PTEI had sought the rescheduling or deferral of its payment as well as the restructuring of its
loan. This Court has held that a debtor’s various and constant requests for deferment of payment and
restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was
unable to settle his obligation.
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the right to be protected,
and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. In view of PTEI’s
failure to settle its outstanding obligations upon demand, it was proper for PNB to exercise its right to
foreclose on the mortgaged properties. It then became incumbent on PTEI and BAGCCI, when they filed
the complaint and sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, to establish that they have a
clear and unmistakable right which requires immediate protection during the pendency of the action.
PTEI and BAGCCI failed to show a clear and unmistakable right which would have necessitated the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the writ of injunction was wrongfully issued by the Trial
Court.

MAYOR HADJI AMER R. SAMPIANO, SOMER ABDULLAH, SALIC TAMPUGAO, ANTHONY ABI,
SAGA POLE INOG, TORORAC DOMATO, KING MARONSING, MARGARITA SOLAIMAN, HADJI
ACMAD MAMENTING and BILLIE JAI LAINE T. OGKA, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Malabang,
Lanao del Sur, Respondent.
First Division, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009
FACTS: Mayor Sampiano charged Judge Indar with gross and wanton ignorance of the law for issuing an
order deferring PNB Marawi to release the IRA of Balabagan Municipality. This was premised upon a
pending petition filed by another mayoralty candidate questioning the Comelec decision which annulled
the latter’s proclamation as the winning candidate. Such an order, according to Sampiano, is tantamount
to a TRO, hence, its issuance thereof on the same day of its application violates the Rules of Court. The
Office of the Court Administrator recommended to this Court that Indar be found guilty of ignorance of the
law for violating the Rules on Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Does the subject Order constitute a TRO thereby warranting the application of Rule 58?
HELD: YES.
A cursory reading of the said Order reveals that it was in effect a TRO or preliminary injunction order. The
Order directed PNB to hold or defer the release of the IRA to Sampiano x x x while the petition is pending
resolution of the trial court and unless ordered otherwise by the court. Hence, Rule 58 applies. X x x
Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court x x x expressly prohibit the grant of preliminary injunction without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. However, courts are authorized to
issue ex parte a TRO effective only for seventy-two (72) hours if it should appear from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter could be heard on notice. Within the aforesaid period of time, the Court should conduct a summary
hearing to determine if a TRO shall be issued. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period, the
judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction. At the end of
such period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of any judicial declaration to that effect,
leaving the court no discretion to extend the same.

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RULE 63
ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City;
SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO;
HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 137794, August 11, 2010
SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES and LOURDES EMBORES, SPS. ROBERTO AND EVELYN PALAD,
DENNIS HENOSA and CORAZON LAURENTE, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 52, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan
City; HON. ELEANOR R. KWONG, Presiding Judge, Branch 51, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan
City; HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Caloocan City; VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS, represented by her attorney-in-fact MR. MENELIO C.
SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO, ALFREDO TAN, MANUELITO ESTRELLA; and HON. JUDGE ANTONIO
FINEZA, Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Respondents.
FACTS: The instant cases are consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 137794 seek to declare null and void the proceedings in ejectment case
before the Metropolitan Trial Court Caloocan City, Branch 49, and a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, Branch 124; while
the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 pray for the nullity of the following ejectment proceedings before the
different branches of the Caloocan City MeTC: (1) Civil Case No. 99-25011, Branch 52; (2) Civil Case No.
22559 and Civil Case No. 18575, Branch 49 and its appeal to the RTC, Branch 131; (3) Civil Case No.
00-25892, Branch 51; and (4) Civil Case No. 00-25889, Branch 51.
G.R. No. 149664 was considered closed and terminated by the Court’s Resolution dated August 30,
2006.
What remains to be resolved, therefore, are the issues raised in G.R. No. 137794.
In their bid to declare null and void the proceedings in the Recovery case and the Ejectment cases,
petitioners argued that the Caloocan City MeTC, where the Ejectment cases were filed, and the Caloocan
City RTC where the Recovery case was pending, were divested of jurisdiction since the Quezon City RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their motions to suspend proceedings.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopts the position of petitioners in praying that the orders
denying the motion to suspend proceedings and the proceedings that transpired in the Ejectment cases
be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the
action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or contract has not been violated. Since
the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC had already been violated as early as December 8, 1997 by
the Caloocan City RTC in the Recovery case, or before the filing of this instant petition, resort to Rule 63
of the Rules of Court would not lie. Respondent Bautista insists that the instant recourse of petitioner
Matienzo was resorted to as a ploy to substitute the filing of certiorari under Rule 65, which she already
lost since the 60-day period had already expired. Respondent points out that direct resort to this Court
violates the rule on the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory relief. An action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under
Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under Rule 63.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ resort to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court is correct.
HELD: NO.
The recourse by petitioners cannot be countenanced since a court order is not one of those subjects to
be examined under Rule 63. The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the
denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for
reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari
also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC.
While a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching
implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner
tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or
when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.
Petitoner Matienzo obviously availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute for a petition for
certiorari, a remedy which she sadly lost by inaction. It must be recalled that on December 8, 1997, the
Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 denied Matienzo’s motion to suspend proceedings. She moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied on May 14, 1998. She received the Order denying her motion
for reconsideration on June 9, 1998. She had 60 days therefrom to question the same before the Quezon
City RTC. It was only on March 25, 1999 that petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her motion
for reconsideration, albeit wrongly before this Court. From this, it can be inferred that petitioner Matienzo’s
recourse is a belated attempt designed to salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her
motion to suspend proceedings.
RULE 65
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

vs.
TH
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (4 DIVISION) and HENRY BARRERA, Respondents
First Division, G.R. Nos. 153952-71, August 23, 2010
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence of Mayor Henry E. Barrera (Mayor
Barrera) and dismissed the 14 counts of violation of Sections 3(e) and 9 of Republic Act No. 3019 on the
ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, were not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan judgment, the People filed the present
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper without a previously denied motion
for reconsideration.
HELD: NO.

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The general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for
reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration, petitioners must show concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. They must
demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the assailed Resolution, acted capriciously, whimsically
and arbitrarily by reason of passion and personal hostility. Such capricious, whimsical and arbitrary acts
must be apparent on the face of the assailed Resolution.These, they failed to do.
The People in the instant case absolutely failed to provide any explanation as to why it did not first move
for reconsideration of the challenged Sandiganbayan judgment before seeking a writ of certiorari from this
Court. We therefore cannot find any concrete, compelling, and valid reason to except the People from the
aforementioned general rule of procedure.
SPOUSES JESSE CACHOPERO and BEMA CACHOPERO, Petitioners,

vs.
RACHEL CELESTIAL, Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Miscellaneous Sales Application)with the
Bureau of Lands. Petitioner filed a protest, claiming preferential right over the land. However, on an ocular
inspection, the Bureau found that the subject land was outside the commerce of man and thus, denied
the petitioner’s protest. Petitioner thereafter filed an ejectment case against the respondent.
Subsequently, respondent filed another MSA which the petitioner once again protested against. The
DENR Regional Executive Director declared that the land is suitable for residential purposes and in the
light of the conflicting interest of the parties, ordered that the land be sold at public auction. Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order but was denied by the OIC Regional Executive
Director of Region XII. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner then moved for the dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied respondent’s
petition. The CA on the other hand, reversed and set aside the decision of the CA and ordered the DENR
to process the MSA of the respondent. Petitioner contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
respondent’s petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC may validly take cognizance of the subject petitions for certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition, considering the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
HELD: YES.
Appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari.
An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a
commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari
requires the commencement of a new and original action therefore, independent of the proceedings
which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the RTCs
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the instant case falls under the
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, which provides “that such is
inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he
should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the
matter as a result of a patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and
adequate remedy”.

This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances
when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which
are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when
the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the
claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto
proceedings.
SPOUSES ROGELIO MARCELO and MILAGROS MARCELO, Petitioners,

vs.
LBC BANK, Respondent.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 183575, April 11, 2011
FACTS: Petitioners obtained two loans from respondent LBC Bank which was secured by a real estate
mortgage. As a consequence of default in payment of the said loans, LBC Bank sought the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. LBC Bank, being the highest bidder, bought the mortgaged
property in a public auction. Spouses Marcelo failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period.
As a result, LBC Bank’s Mecauayan Branch Manager, Ricardo B. Milan, Jr. (Milan), executed an Affidavit
of Consolidation of Title. LBC Bank filed with the RTC a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
over the foreclosed property which was granted. Spouses Marcelo moved for reconsideration, contending
that LBC Bank’s consolidation of title was invalid since the affidavit of consolidation was executed by
Milan who was allegedly unauthorized to do so, which was denied. Spouses Marcelo filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA which was initially granted. In a motion for reconsideration filed by LBC Bank, CA
rendered an Amended Decision granting the motion for reconsideration "in the interest of substantial
justice." The CA considered the documents submitted by LBC Bank, namely, the Affidavit of its Chief
Finance Officer and the Secretary’s Certificate, "showing that LBC Bank ratified the questioned
consolidation of the subject property."
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals may admit new evidence in a special civil action for certiorari.
HELD: YES.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to receive new evidence
and perform any act necessary to resolve factual issues. (Maralit v. Philippine National Bank)
Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 (An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, amending for the purpose of Section Nine of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 as amended, known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the Court of Appeals —
pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari — is specifically given the
power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES JOEL UMANDAP and FELICIDAD UMANDAP, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 166298 November 17, 2010
FACTS: The spouses are owners of an agricultural land in Palawan. In 1989, the DAR placed the said
land under the coverage of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and the Landbank offered to
compensate the spouses the amount of Php3.4 Million. Since the spouses rejected the offer, a summary
administrative proceeding was filed before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to fix the value of just
compensation. The adjudicator fixed the value of just compensation of the land at P23.9M. LBP,
dissatisfied with the valuation, filed before the RTC a petition for judicial determination of Just
Compensation. The spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging the LBP had no cause of action against

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them and that the petition failed to attach the proper certification against forum shopping. RTC dismissed
the petition. LBP refiled the petition, this time with the required certificate against forum shopping. The
spouses filed a MD anew, pointing out that under the DARAB Rules, the refiled petition was filed beyond
the 15 day period requirement. RTC dismissed the petition of LBP. LBP appealed to the CA which
affirmed the RTC ruling that certiorari is not the proper remedy since the order of the RTC was with
prejudice, as it is based on res judicata. The dismissal, therefore, was a final order against which, an
appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether the remedy of appeal by certiorari was proper in assailing the RTC order.
HELD: YES.
It is the inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.
Petitioner LBP’s first, third and fourth assignments of error deal with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the
elevation of the case to it via a Petition for Certiorari was improper. The Court of Appeals held that since
the June 30, 2003 Order was based on res judicata, it was rendered with prejudice, and is therefore a
final order against which appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy. The Court of Appeals therefore
added that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the appellate court also considered
the fact that there was no prior Motion for Reconsideration before the filing of the Petition for Certiorari.
These grounds relied upon by the Court of Appeals in asserting that certiorari is improper in the case at
bar – namely (1) the pronouncement that appeal is the proper remedy, and (2) the failure of LBP to file a
Motion for Reconsideration – both stem from the clause in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that
requires that there must be "no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law" before a Petition for Certiorari may be filed. We explained the rationale and applicability of this
clause in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company -
Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of
law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute
sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the
appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not
the mere absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that
must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.
Likewise, we enumerated in Tan v. Court of Appeals the instances where certiorari was allowed despite
the presence of other legal remedies:
It must also be stressed that what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies. Thus, even when appeal is
available and is the proper remedy, a writ of certiorari has been allowed when the orders of the lower
court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction. Certiorari may also be availed of where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient and that to strictly observe the general rule would
result in a miscarriage of justice. x x x.
The February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003 Orders, although without prejudice to the refiling of the action,
nonetheless finally disposed of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation docketed as
Civil Case No. 3750, and are thus, appealable. The failure of LBP to file an appeal within fifteen days
from its May 29, 2003 receipt of the April 30, 2003 Order caused the right to appeal this Order to lapse.
This failure is not excused when LBP itself made the choice to refile the Petition for Judicial Determination
of Just Compensation instead of appealing the Order dismissing the original one. At this point, neither
should LBP be allowed to file a Petition for Certiorari to assail the February 3, 2003 and April 30, 2003

Orders since, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Appeal, which had been available to LBP, became unavailable to it because of no other reason than the
choice made by LBP itself.
On the other hand, in assailing the June 30, 2003 Order, the remedies of a motion for reconsideration
(with the RTC) and an appeal (to the Court of Appeals) had both been available to LBP when it received
said Order. However, LBP opted instead to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
apparently in order that it could assail not only the June 30, 2003 Order, but the February 3, 2003 and
April 30, 2003 Orders as well. The question that thus arises is whether an appeal and/or a motion for
reconsideration from the June 30, 2003 Order, although available, are nevertheless inadequate, or if
there is a danger of failure or miscarriage of justice without the writ.
After a careful deliberation on this matter, this Court resolves that the novel issues presented by this
Petition, particularly those dealing with the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC in the
determination of just compensation in agrarian reform cases, demand a meticulous review of the rules
pertinent to the case at bar. This Court is of the view that at the very core of this case is a jurisdictional
issue, one not reviewable in an ordinary appeal, to wit: considering our previous pronouncement that
adjudicators are empowered only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to
be paid to the landowners, leaving to the court the ultimate power to decide, and considering the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC in the determination of just compensation, did the SAC act without
jurisdiction in outrightly dismissing the petition for the determination of just compensation?
Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation
cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear
import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving
petitions for the determination of just compensation. In accordance with the said Section 57, petitioner
properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies while rules of procedure cannot.
In the case at bar, the refiling of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation was done
within five days from the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing the original
petition, during which time said dismissal could still be appealed to the Court of Appeals. The SAC even
expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the period within which a complaint dismissed
without prejudice may be refiled. The statutorily mandated original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC,
as well as the above circumstances showing that LBP did not appear to have been sleeping on its rights
in the allegedly belated refiling of the petition, lead us to assume a liberal construction of the pertinent
rules. To be sure, LBP’s intent to question the RARAD’s valuation of the land became evident with the
filing of the first petition for determination of just compensation within the period prescribed by the DARAB
Rules. Although the first petition was dismissed without prejudice on a technicality, LBP’s refiling of
essentially the same petition with a proper non-forum shopping certification while the earlier dismissal
order had not attained finality should have been accepted by the trial court.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANGEL U. DEL VILLAR, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 163091 October 6, 2010
FACTS: Del Villar was hired by Coca Cola as the Transportation Services Manager, preparing the budget
for the vehicles of the Company nationwide. As such, Del Villar enjoyed the use of a company car,
gasoline allowance, and annual foreign travel, among other benefits. As a result of company
reorganization, Del Villar was designated as Staff Assistant to the Corporate Purchasing and Materials

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and Control Manager. Del Villar has ceased to be entitled to the benefits entitled to his former position.
Del Villar, believing he was demoted the company to force him to resign, filed with the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC a complaint against the Coca-Cola for illegal demotion and forfeiture of company privileges.
Coca-cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was merely exercising its inherent
management prerogative to transfer an employee from one position to another. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision in Del Villar’s Favor holding that the company, in filing a MD, hypothetically admitted
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, and ordered the company to reinstate Del Villar to his
former job level, return the car to him and to compensate him for lost privileges. Coca-cola appealed to
the NLRC, and while the case was still pending, Del Villar was terminated from the company due to
reorganization. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the NLRC, holding that there was no demotion since
there was no diminution of salary and that there was no bad faith or malice on the part of the company.
The Court of Appeals favored Villar, finding that there was a demotion and bad faith was attendant. The
company appealed to the SC alleging that the CA erred in giving due course to Del Villar’s petition for
Certiorari as the same remedy was filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
HELD: YES.
The Company points out that Del Villar received a copy of the NLRC Decision dated February 26, 1999
on March 17, 1999. Twelve days later, on March 29, 1999, Del Villar filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
thus, interrupting the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari. The NLRC denied Del
Villar’s Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated April 26, 1999, a copy of which Del Villar
received on May 21, 1999. From May 21, 1999, Del Villar only had 48 days more, or until July 8, 1999,
within which to file his petition for certiorari; but he only did so 60 days later, on July 20, 1999. Clearly, Del
Villar’s Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53815 was filed 12 days late and way beyond the
reglementary period as provided under the Rules of Court.
We do not agree.
While CA-G.R. SP No. 53815 was pending before the Court of Appeals, Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court was amended anew by Supreme Court Circular No. 56-2000, which took effect on September 1,
2000, to read:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days.
It is clear that under Supreme Court Circular No. 56-2000, in case a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed has been filed, the 60-day period to file a petition for
certiorari shall be computed from notice of the denial of such motion.

The crucial question now is whether Supreme Court Circular No. 56-2000 should be applied retroactively
to Del Villar’s Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 53815.
We answer affirmatively. As we explained in Perez v. Hermano:
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the petition starts to run from receipt of
notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is filed.
In Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission [G.R. No. 141959, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA
533-538], we described this latest amendment as curative in nature as it remedied the confusion brought
about by Circular No. 39-98 because, "historically, i.e., even before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, a party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration to
file a petition for certiorari." Curative statutes, which are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to
validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal
requirements, by their very essence, are retroactive and, being a procedural rule, we held in Sps. Ma.
Carmen and Victor Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge Benito Legarda (G.R. No. 139067, 23 November
2004] that "procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent."20
In the instant case, Del Villar filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated February 26,
1999. Del Villar received a copy of the NLRC Resolution dated April 26, 1999, denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, on May 21, 1999. As already settled by jurisprudence, Del Villar had a fresh period of 60
days from May 21, 1999 within which to file his Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Keeping in mind the rule that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day
included, exactly 60 days had elapsed from May 21, 1999 when Del Villar filed his Petition with the
appellate court on July 20, 1999. Hence, without a doubt, Del Villar’s Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 53815 was seasonably filed.
PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. and the MEMBERS OF ITS BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
petitioners
vs.
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION and the SECURITIES INVESTIGATION CLEARING
DEPARTMENT HEARING PANEL consisting of the Hon. Hearing Officers ENRIQUE L. FLORES,
JR., ALBERTO P. ATAS, and YSOBEL S. YASAY-MURILLO, respondents.
FACTS: TMBC acquired Manila Stock Exchange (MSE) Seat No. 97, registered in the name of Roberto
K. Recio (Recio), through an execution sale. MSE, although at first refused the registration and contested
the ownership was later acknowledged the legal or naked ownership of, or proprietary right over, MSE
Seat No. 97 by TMBC. Before the acknowledgment of MSE's title, the Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc.
(PSEI) was incorporated unifying the MSE and the Makati Stock Exchange (MKSE) into one exchange.
The PSEI issued a certificate of membership to Recio as Member No. 29. Believing that MSE Seat No. 97
became PSE Seat No. 29, TMBC sought to rectify the PSEI's listing of Recio as a member. TMBC sought
PSEI's recognition of its legal ownership of PSE Seat No. 29. However, PSEI's repeatedly refused.
Petition for Mandamus with Claim for Damages, at the SEC SICD was filed in order that PSEI
acknowledge TMBC's proprietary interest or legal or naked ownership of PSE Seat No. 29 and for TMBC
to register said seat. A motion to dismiss was filed on the grounds that the SEC had no jurisdiction to try
and hear the same; the petition failed to state TMBC's cause of action against petitioners; and the remedy
of mandamus was improper.
ISSUE: Whether mandamus is the proper remedy.

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HELD: YES.
As to the propriety of mandamus as a remedy, petitioners claim it was not their ministerial duty to
acknowledge the proprietary, legal or naked ownership of TMBC over PSE Seat No. 29. True, the Court
has invariably ruled that generally, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus. However, the Court has also
declared that the general rule does not apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority.These exceptions apply to the present case. As aptly observed
by the CA and we quote:
It is beyond cavil that the MSE had already recognized the legal or naked ownership of private
respondent to MSE Seat No. 97, but for reasons only known to them, the PSE Board of Governors, who
are members of the MSE, adamantly refused to recognize the corresponding seat in the PSE. In fact, it is
not seriously disputed that MSE Seat No. 97 became PSE Seat No. 29 upon the latter’s incorporation.
Petitioners’ dubious claim that they could not acknowledge the proprietary interest of respondent TMBC
over the seat since allegedly even respondent Roberto K. Recio was not a recognized member due to his
failure to so apply is belied by the facts. For one thing Mr. Recio was issued a Certificate of Membership
by the PSE. For another, Mr. Recio’s name has consistently appeared as a member of the PSE in the
PSE’s Monthly Report. Given these facts, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner’s refusal to acknowledge
respondent TMBC’s proprietary right over PSE Seat No. 29 was grossly unjust and tyrannical and,
therefore controllable by the extraordinary writ of mandamus.
SPOUSES ALVIN GUERRERO AND MERCURY M. GUERRERO, petitioners

vs.
HON. LORNA NAVARRO DOMINGO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 201,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LAS PIÑAS CITY & PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
FACTS: Pilar Development Corporation (PDC) and spouses Alvin and Mercury Guerrero (spouses
Guerrero) entered into a Contract to Sell whereby PDC agreed to sell to the spouses Guerrero house and
lot. The total consideration for the sale is P2,374,000.00 with a downpayment of P594,000.00 and a
balance of P1,780,000.00 payable in 120 months commencing on May 30, 1997. PDC filed a Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer against the spouses Guerrero. The Complaint alleged that the spouses Guerrero
made no further payment beyond June 1, 2000 despite repeated demands, prompting PDC to cancel the
Contract to Sell on November 19, 2001 by sending a Notice of Cancellation to the spouses Guerrero
dated November 23, 2001. The Complaint was filed with the MeTC of Las Piñas City. The spouses
Guerrero responded with a pleading captioned Answer with Reservation alleging that it is impermissible
to blend "causes of action such as 'cancellation, extinguishment or rescission of contract' (which are
beyond pecuniary estimation) and 'ejectment (unlawful detainer).'" Spouses Guerrero filed a Petition for
Prohibition with the RTC of Las Piñas City praying that the Complaint in Civil Case be quashed. MeTC
rendered its Decision in favor of PDC. The spouses Guerrero appealed the MeTC Decision to the RTC of
Las Piñas City. RTC denied the Petition for Prohibition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether prohibition is the correct remedy.
HELD: NO.
[The] spouses Guerrero could have filed a Motion to Dismiss to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction by the
MeTC if the same had been warranted. Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that

Motions to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter are exceptions to the
pleadings that are prohibited in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases.
Before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." The Court is convinced that in the case at bar, a Motion
to Dismiss or an Answer is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in opposing the jurisdiction of the
MeTC. Being in possession of the subject property, the step of filing a Motion to Dismiss or an Answer
instead of resorting to an extraordinary writ under Rule 65 would have even favored the spouses
Guerrero, as there is no threat of dispossession until the MeTC renders its judgment on the action.
SIMEON M. VALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent.
First Division, G.R. No. 146175, June 30, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner filed his application for retirement benefits with GSIS and sought the CSC’s opinion on
whether his 2 years and 3 months stint as MECO Director can be accredited as government service
among others. The CSC, in its opinion denied the accreditation.
The GSIS computed his retirement benefits on the basis of the CSC’s opinion. Displeased, petitioner
sought reconsideration, but the CSC denied it. On appeal, the CA affirmed the CSC’s opinion. For the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to this Court thru petition for certiorari under
rule 65, seeking for the correct interpretation of the GSIS Act of 1997, which states that only full-time
services with compensation are included in computing retirement benefits.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the application of laws.
HELD: NO.
It is an elementary principle that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used if the proper
remedy is appeal. Being an extraordinary remedy, a party can only avail himself of certiorari, if there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Here, appeal is the
correct mode but was not seasonably utilized by the petitioner. Resort to this petition for certiorari is,
therefore, improper because certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.
Petitions for certiorari are limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. For, it is basic
that certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general
utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an
inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where
the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It is
not to be used for any other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous
conclusions of law or fact, as what petitioner would like the Court to venture into. A petition
for certiorari not being the proper remedy to correct errors of judgment as alleged in the instant case, the
herein petition should be dismissed.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
RADIOMARINE NETWORK, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL) and Radiomarine entered into a contract to sell wherein
the latter agreed to purchase the subject lot located in Makati City and to give the amount of

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P180,000,000.00 as down payment. Any outstanding unpaid obligation, which PILTEL owed
Radiomarine, would be deducted from the obligations of the latter. The balance, if any, should be paid on
or before April 30, 1997. PILTEL wrote a letter to Radiomarine expressing its willingness, on a purely best
effort basis, to purchase from the latter 300,000 units of various models of Motorola, Mitsubishi and
Ericsson brand cellular phones and accessories for the entire year of 1997. Radiomarine failed to pay its
outstanding balance alleging that PILTEL reneged on its commitment to purchase 300,000 units of
cellular phones and accessories from respondent and instead purchased the units from other
persons/entities. PILTEL then returned to Radiomarine the amount of P50,000,000.00, which is part of
the P180,000,000.00 down payment under their contract to sell. Radiomarine then filed an action seeking
either the rescission of the Contract to Sell or the partial specific performance of the same before the RTC
Makati, which granted Radiomarine’s motion for summary judgment. PILTEL then filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with an application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Radiomarine filed a motion for execution before the
RTC Makati, which was opposed by PILTEL. Radiomarine then brought to the attention of the CA
PILTEL’s alleged pursuance of simultaneous reliefs before the trial court and the Court of Appeals that all
seek to nullify the November 13, 2000 Resolution of the trial court granting the summary judgment. The
RTC Makati granted Radiomarine’s Motion for Execution. While the petition for certiorari was still pending
before the CA, PILTEL filed before the RTC Makati a Notice of Appeal which was granted. The CA then
dismissed PILTEL’s petition for certiorari.
ISSUE # 1: Whether PILTEL committed forum shopping.
HELD # 1: YES.
PILTEL filed different actions to different courts thereby declaring it by the court as guilty of forum
shopping. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and raising substantially the same issues either pending in,
or already resolved adversely by some other court, or to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should
not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other. There is res judicata when (1) there is a final judgment or
order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment
or order is on the merits; and (4) there is between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action. For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of the parties or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
ISSUE # 2: Whether PILTEL correctly resorted to a petition for certiorari before the CA in assailing the
order of the RTC which granted Radiomarine’s motion for summary judgment.
HELD # 2: NO.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that a petition for certiorari is available only
when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A
petition for certiorari cannot coexist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and the
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. As
the Court has held, these two remedies are "mutually exclusive."

In this case, the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact it is the appropriate remedy,
because it assails not only the Resolution but also the two Orders. It has been held that "what is
determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies."
EMERITA MUÑOZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR. and SAMUEL GO CHAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011
EMERITA MUÑOZ, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES SAMUEL GO CHAN and AIDA C. CHAN, and THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Respondents.
FACTS: Muñoz, sister of Emilia Ching, lived in the subject property located in Quezon City with the Emillia
and her husband Yee, hereinafter called Spouses Ching. For Muñoz’s services to the Spouses Ching,
Yee allegedly executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Muñoz transferring the subject property to the
latter. The property was then sold by Muñoz to Emilia Ching, who then sold the same to the Spouses Go
who became the registered owners thereof. The Spouses Go obtained a loan from BPI secured by a
mortgage on the subject property, which was subsequently foreclosed and obtained by BPI.
The present case is a consolidation of two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by Muñoz.
In the first case for forcible entry (G.R. No. 142676), Muñoz questions the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of RTC QC Br. 88 which dismissed the forcible entry case filed by Muñoz
against the Yabuts, who allegedly ousted Muñoz of the possession of the subject property and which
nullified the MeTC decision granting the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction filed by
Muñoz. In the second case for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale (G.R. No. 146718), Muñoz
questions the CA decision affirming the decision of RTC QC Br. 95 denying Muñoz’s Motion for an Alias
Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT against BPI and
Spouses Chan.
ISSUE: Whether the Yabuts correctly resorted to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in questioning the
MeTC order granting Muñoz’s motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against the Yabuts in
the action for forcible entry.
HELD: NO.
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits
petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to
expedite the disposition of cases. Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do
not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. An order granting a preliminary
injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and unappealable.
The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is plain enough. Its further
exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut is
clearly covered by the said prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC-Branch
88. While the circumstances involved in Muñoz’s forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
Yabut are admittedly very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut from the prohibition. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation

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is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with
the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muñoz in the
event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the
subject property (i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muñoz the possession of the subject property
on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
on February 2, 1994 by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth).
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, in her Capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, SP Civil Action No. 98-2004, HON. MARIA A.
CANCINO-ERUM, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 46, Civil Case No. 127-93, SHERIFF RONNIE LAMPITOC, and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. NO. 145408 August 20, 2008
FIRST DIVISION
FACTS: MIAA filed a civil action for ejectment against CBL with the Pasay City MTC. The MTC rendered
a decision in favor of MIAA, and ordered CBL to vacate the leased premises and to pay rental in arrears,
attorney's fees and costs. MTC decision became final and executory for failure of CBL to appeal the
same. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the MTC. However,
CBL failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement. Hence, MIAA filed a
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, which was granted by the MTC. CBL filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure with the Pasay City RTC In the RTC,
CBL insisted that the alias writ of execution was issued by the MTC with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. RTC dismissed the petition which prompted CBL to file a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 42 with the CA but the CA dismissed it. Unperturbed, CBL filed an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction which the
CA denied. CBL then filed special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with
application for writ of preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order. The Court denied
the petition for "failure of the petition to sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the CA in rendering the challenged resolutions which, on the contrary, appear to be in
accord with the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.”
ISSUE: Whether the resort to Rule 65 is proper
HELD: NO.
For a special civil action on certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the
remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is
proscribed from assailing the decision or final order of said court via Rule 65 because such recourse is
proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
Here, it is apparent that CBL's immediate issue is with the CA's Decision and its related Resolutions
which denied CBL's erroneously filed Petition for Review under Rule 42 against the RTC. The proper

remedy for CBL in this situation, as correctly pointed out by the CA, should have been an ordinary appeal
to the CA since the RTC decision was made in the exercise of the RTC's original jurisdiction.
Moreover, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any
case, regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a Petition for Review, which would be a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case. Thus, CBL has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,

vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
Respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 142549, March 9, 2010
FACTS: Angeles was one of the petitioners in a prior land case before the RTC involving Maysilo Estate
(covered by OCT 994 dated April 19, 1917- upon which the claims of the petitioners are based). Said
case has attained its finality and an order was issued directing the Registers of Deeds of Caloocan and
QC to issue TCTs in their names.
The RD refused to comply with the RTC order because the LRA Administrator was directed so by the
DOJ pursuant to a finding that the OCT 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent;and that there is only one
OCT 994 which was registered on May 3, 1917.
Angeles contends that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty. Hence, she filed a
case for Mandamus.
ISSUE # 1: Did the RD unlawfully neglect to comply with the RTC order when it followed the directive of
the LRA and DOJ not to issue TCTs to petitioners, hence, warranting the issuance of a writ of mandamus
against them? When is the issuance of the writ of mandamus proper?
HELD #1: NO. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantialdoubt exists.It is nonetheless likewise available to
compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise
of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of either.
ISSUE # 2: Did public respondents (RD, LRA and DOJ) have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant
petitioner’s request?

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HELD #2: YES. In Laburada v. LRA, x xxConsidering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the
integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance
of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If
the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this
case, mandamus cannot issue.
x x x the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases
where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land.
xxx There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order,
given the finding xxx that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner x xx anchored their
rights, did not exist.
SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NELLY SIAPNOSANCHEZ and INOCENCIO
BERMA, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment against private respondents. Subsequently,
DARAB found that both private respondents were beneficiaries under PD 27 and that they are no longer
tenants but owners of the property in issue. Hence, the ejectment would therefore not lie against them.
Petitioner-spouses received a copy of the DARAB decision and were granted an extension of 15 days to
file their petition. Said petition was filed but was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of
Appeals for late filing. Hence, this petition under rule 65, citing as ground grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA.
ISSUE: Was the petition under rule 65 proper and was the allegation of grave abuse of discretion
sufficient to avail the remedies under rule 65?
HELD: NO.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to
only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. X x
x. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so

because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be
manipulated to suit one’s purpose.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to
"truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From
the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an
act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross.
MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA NG STAYFAST PHILS., INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, STAYFAST PHILIPPINES, INC./ MARIA ALMEIDA,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013
FACTS: For refusal of Stayfast to negotiate with NLMS-Olalia as its sole and exclusive bargaining agent,
the latter conducted a strike. To this, Stayfast terminated some of the union’s members.
A complaint was filed for unfair labor practice. Said complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. On
appeal, the NLRC and subsequently the CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Stayfast questioned the timeliness of the petition which
was filed 52 days after petitioner’s receipt of the Decision of the CA. They point out that petitioner should
have filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from receipt of a copy
of the CA’s Decision.
ISSUE. Was the remedy of certiorari under rule 65 proper?
HELD: NO. A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to
only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. X x
x. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal.
Even assuming that a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in this case, petitioner failed to comply
with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration
is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Also, petitioner was not able to establish its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is so
because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be
manipulated to suit one’s purpose.

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The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to
"truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From
the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an
act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross.
RULE 68
VIOLA CAHILIG and ANTONIO G. SIÑEL, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO G. TERENCIO, Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8; THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, Kalibo, Aklan; and MERCANTILE CREDIT RESOURCES
CORPORATION, Respondents
FACTS: Soterania G. Siñel executed deeds of real estate mortgage covering a portion of Lot 402,
consisting of 2,882 square meters, located at Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan, in favor of Moneytrend
Lending Corporation, as security for two promissory notes. Moneytrend Lending Corporation assigned the
promissory notes and deeds of real estate mortgage to private respondent Mercantile Credit Resources
Corporation.
In view of the non-payment of the loans, private respondent caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages. It then acquired the mortgaged property as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
subsequently issued in favor of private respondent. Soterania Siñel failed to redeem the property within
the prescribed period and a final deed of sale was issued by the Sheriff on March 19, 2001 in favor of
private respondent.
However, when they inspected the property after it was foreclosed, it was Viola Cahilig, the daughter of
Soterania G. Siñel, the previous owner, who was in possession of the same. The Sheriff received a third
party claimant’s affidavit executed by petitioner Antonio Siñel, Jr., who claimed that he and his siblings
bought the property from their mother, Soterania Siñel attaching thereto copies of the deeds of sale in
their favor. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the
alias writ of possession
In IFC v. Nerta (19 SCRA 181) it was held that in Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, the
possession of the property sold may be given to the purchaser by the sheriff after the period of
redemption had expired unless a third person is actually holding the property adverse to the mortgagor.
An ordinary action for the recovery of possession is not necessary.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the private respondent, considering the
claim made by Cahillig.
HELD: YES.
The obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.

In the present case, petitioners failed to adduce evidence showing that the deeds of sale in their favor
were recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds or that they were annotated on the tax declaration of
Soterania Siñel in order to affect the subject property insofar as third persons are concerned, specially
private respondent and its predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners likewise failed to prove that private
respondent and its predecessor-in-interest had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged sale of the
subject property in their favor prior to the filing of the third-party claim. Lastly, petitioners did not dispute
the testimony of private respondent’s Corporate Secretary, Jhett Tolentino, who stated that it was
Soterania Siñel who was in possession of the subject property when the mortgage was constituted, which
was later assigned to private respondent, and that it was only after the subject property was foreclosed
that the same was possessed by petitioner Viola Cahilig. Thus, in light of the foregoing, the alleged sale
of the land in dispute, even if true, does not bind private respondent.
RULE 70
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Respondents.
FACTS: Air Transportation Office (ATO) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque before the
MTCC Iloilo City Br. 3, which ruled in favor of ATO. The said decision was affirmed by RTC, the CA, and
the Supreme Court. Upon the lifting of the TRO issued by the CA, ATO filed an urgent motion for the
execution of the RTC Decision, which was granted by the RTC. The CA, however, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the respective
Decisions of the MTCC and the RTC. On the basis that the supersedeas bond of Miaque has already
lapsed, the RTC granted the ATO’s urgent motion for execution and issued a Writ of Execution. In a
separate petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
however, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writs of
execution
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in the
present ejectment suit.
HELD: NO.
Section 21, Rule 70 provides that the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases appealed to it shall be
immediately executory and can be enforced despite the perfection of an appeal to a higher court. To
avoid such immediate execution, the defendant may appeal said judgment to the CA and therein apply for
a writ of preliminary injunction. In this case, the decisions of the MTCC, of the RTC, and of the CA,
unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the property and the corresponding
obligation of Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the RTC,
and the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of the
said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction with the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right to hold
on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time when he shall have been duly ejected
therefrom by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC.

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CHARLES LIMBAUAN, petitioner,
vs.
FAUSTINO ACOSTA, respondent.,
FACTS: The late Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the Tala Estate- a government
property supposedly devoted for a leprosarium. In 1984, a beerhouse thereon was constructed without
Faustino’s consent. It was later on, conveyed to Charles Limbauan. Charles stopped paying rentals to
Faustino.
Sometime in February 1995, the Congress passed RA 7999, converting a portion of the Estate to
residential lots. After this passage, Faustino filed a complaint against Charles for ejectment and for failure
to pay his rentals.
On January 2, 1996, Faustino sent a demand letter to Charles to vacate the property within five (5) days
from notice. Charles received the letter on January 10, 1996, but he ignored it. On February 7, 1996,
Faustino filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the MTC.
Upon suggestion of the Court, Faustino sent another demand letter to Charles, dated March 7, 1996, this
time within fifteen (15) days from notice. Charles received the letter on March 13, 1996, but refused to
vacate. Faustino forthwith filed on May 16, 1996 a Motion to Approve Attached Amended Complaint with
the Court which was granted by the Court. In his Answer, Charles alleged, inter alia that Faustino had no
cause of action, the property being owned by the government, hence, had no right of possession over the
property and collect rentals therefore.
The MTC favored of the Faustino. Pending this case, Faustino died without proper substitution. Charles
appealed to the RTC, which merely affirmed the MTC decision. On petition for review, the CA affirmed the
RTC’s ruling. Hence, this case.
ISSUE # 1: What are the requirements in bringing a suit for ejectment case?
HELD # 1:
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows: Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against
lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced
only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the
lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting
such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.
The demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the action for unlawful detainer is anchored on the
non-payment of rentals. The same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful detainer suit must be
commenced only if the lessee fails to comply after the lapse or expiration of fifteen (15) days in case of
lands and five (5) days in case of buildings, from the time the demand is made upon the lessee. The
demand required and contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 70 is a jurisdictional requirement for the purpose
of bringing an unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay rent. It partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must
be pursued before resorting to judicial action such that full compliance with the demand would render
unnecessary a court action.
Hence, it is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites must concur, namely:
(1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease and (2) there must be
demand both to pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified in Section 2, particularly, 15
days in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence of

the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of
demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued.
ISSUE # 2: Did the MTC commit jurisdictional error when it granted Faustino’s Motion to Approve
Attached Amended Complaint?
HELD # 2: NO.
The said motion was rightly granted by the MTC in accordance with Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules of Court, to wit: Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading once as
a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any
time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Under this provision, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading whether a new cause of action
or change in theory is introduced, at any time before the filing of any responsive pleading. Undoubtedly,
when respondent filed his Amended Complaint on May 16, 1996, no responsive pleading had yet been
filed by petitioner, thus, the MTC validly admitted the said amended complaint.
It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance
of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities. This principle is generally recognized in order that the real controversies between the
parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary
delay to prevent circuity of action and needless expense
ISSUE # 3: Did the failure of the counsel to inform the court of the death of Faustino and to initiate a
substitute render the ejectment case moot and academic?
HELD # 3: NO.
It is well settled that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of
the death of his client and no substitution of such party is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and
the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. Moreover, the decision rendered shall
bind his successor-in-interest. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for recovery of real
property, is a real action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs have taken his
place and now represent his interests in the instant petition. Hence, the present case cannot be rendered
moot despite the death of respondent.

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
FELICIANO B. DUYON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS and ELEONOR P.
BUNAG-CABACUNGAN, Respondents.
FACTS: Feliciano Duyon was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over a parcel of land he had
been tilling since 1957. Apparently, the same parcel of land was also covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title under Emancipation Patent, issued to Eleonor Bunag-Cabacungan on June 6, 1989 Duyon
discovered this and filed a complaint for misconduct or abuse of authority and for violation of RA No. 3019
and Falsification of Public Documents under Art. 171 of the RPC against Bunag-Cabacungan, for
allegedly taking advantage of her official position to cause the issuance of the TCT, being an employee of
the Municipal Agricultural Office of Nueva Ecija Office of the Ombudsman found the spouses Bunag-
Cabacungan guilty of simple misconduct. Upon appeal, the Office of Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon
issued a joint order dismissaing the criminal as well as administrative case against Cabacungan for
insufficiency and lack of evidence. Bunag-Cabacungan filed a Petition for Review before the CA, seeking
the reversal of the decision of the Ombudsman with respect to the administrative aspect of the case,
while Duyon filed his own Petition for Certiorari before the CA, assailing the Joint Order of the
Ombudsman dismissing the criminal and administrative case. CA, acting on Duyon’s appeal, dismissed
the petition for failure to avail the proper mode of appeal (with respect to the administrative disciplinary
aspect of the case) and for lack of jurisdiction (with respect to the criminal aspect of the case). Hence, the
case was elevated to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of an Ombudsman case.
HELD: NO.
Duyon was correct in his insistence that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect
of an Ombudsman case. "The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.
Bunag-Cabacungan's argument that the Court of Appeals now has appellate jurisdiction to review both
the administrative and criminal aspects of orders and decisions of the Ombudsman because of the
September 15, 2003 amendment to Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the
Ombudsman deserves no merit at all.
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, reads:
SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in
case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Bunag-Cabacungan's contention that the phrase "in all other cases" has removed the distinction between
administrative and criminal cases of the Ombudsman is ludicrous. It must be stressed that the above-
quoted Section 7 is provided under Rule III, which deals with the procedure in administrative cases. When
Administrative Order No. 07 was amended by Administrative Order No. 17, Section 7 was retained in
Rule III. It is another rule, Rule II, which provides for the procedure in criminal cases. Thus, the phrase "in
all other cases" still refers to administrative cases, not criminal cases, where the sanctions imposed are
different from those enumerated in Section 7.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that in the case before us, the Court of Appeals went beyond its
jurisdiction by touching on the criminal aspect of the Decision and Joint Order of the OMB for Luzon in
OMB-L-A-03-0111-A and OMB-L-C-03-0125-A. As such, the Court of Appeals' ruling on the criminal
aspect of the aforementioned cases is void.
RULE 110
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENE ROSAS, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder. The prosecution presented two
witnesses, Wilfredo and Antonio. On the other hand, accused-appellant’s version is hinged mainly on
denial and alibi. The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged.
This decision was upheld by the CA. Accused-appellant now herein insists that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses whose
testimonies he pictured as inconsistent and fabricated. He also avers that the prosecution failed to
establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime as nobody actually saw him shoot the victim.
In his last-ditch effort to relieve him of liability for the crime charged, accused-appellant argues that he
cannot be convicted of murder because the Information failed to state that treachery was a qualifying
circumstance.
ISSUE: Whether Rosas should be acquitted on the ground that the Information failed to state treachery as
a qualifying circumstance.
HELD: NO.
In a case of murder, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does
not require the use of such words to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It
is not the use of the words qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher category, but the
specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a
higher category. It is sufficient that the qualifying circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise
the accused of the charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding
surprises during trial.
The Information in this case sufficiently alleged the qualifying circumstance of treachery, thus:
"xxx, accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and
with treachery, attack, assault and shot Nestor Esatcio, xxx."
Not only was treachery sufficiently alleged, it was likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence on record. It is a well-entrenched rule that treachery is present when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend

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directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning,
done in a swift and unexpected attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.
RULE 111

vs.
JULIET OLACO y POLER, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Olaco was charged with qualified theft committed against private complainant Ruben Vinluan.
After trial, RTC found her guilty of the crime charged. Olaco filed an appeal before the CA which was
denied with modifications. Olaco’s counsel still filed, on behalf of his deceased client, a Notice of Appeal,
which the CA gave due course. During the pendency of the said appeal, Olaco died.
ISSUE: Whether the death of accused-appellant during the pendency of her appeal extinguished not only
his criminal liability but also his civil liability
HELD: YES.
Olaco’s death during the pendency of her appeal, extinguished not only her criminal liability for qualified
theft committed against private complainant Ruben Vinluan, but also her civil liability, particularly the
award for actual damages, solely arising from or based on said crime.
As held in People vs. Bayotas, death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of
the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
Clearly, it is already unnecessary for us to rule on Olaco’s appeal. Olaco’s appeal was still pending and
no final judgment had been rendered against her at the time of her death. Hence, whether or not Olaco
was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that Olaco did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by her death, following Article
89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas.

STA LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner

vs.
CITY OF PASIG, Respondent
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor
First Division , G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several
parcels of land all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of
Pasig (Pasig). A parcel of land owned by Sta. Lucia was later consolidated with another which was
situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). Upon Pasig’s
petition to correct the location, the Land Registration Court, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read
that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City. Cainta filed a petition for the settlement
of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the Antipolo RTC. Pasig filed a Complaint against Sta.
Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests on the disputed lots.Sta.
Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending
petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented
a "prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case. The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial
question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both
cases are civil, as in the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether a prejudicial question exists in the instant case so as to stay the proceedings in the
second until the resolution of the first.
HELD: YES.
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed
The Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance the proceedings in view of the fact that the outcome of the
boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasig’s and Cainta’s rights. In
the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area
are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,
whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan
and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because
territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. x xx.
It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial question," as appearing in the cases involving
the parties herein, had been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to its ordinary meaning,
than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, even without the impact of the
connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state that a trial court may control its own
proceedings according to its sound discretion.

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vs.
JAIME AYOCHOK y TAULI, Accused-Appellant.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 175784, August 25, 2010
FACTS: The trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder. CA affirmed RTC judgment
with modifications. Ayochok, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA conveying his intention
to appeal to the Higher Court. Subsequently, Ayochok died. Given his death, the Court is now faced with
the question of the effect of such death on the present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the death of accused-appellant during the pendency of his appeal extinguished not only
his criminal liability but also his civil liability.
HELD: YES.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b)
Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
DANTE HERNANDEZ DATU, Petitioner,

vs.
FACTS: Datu was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Acts of Lasciviousness punishable
under RA 7610 committed against his daughter, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
appeal. While the petition for review under Rule 45 was pending before the Supreme Court, Datu died.
ISSUE: Whether civil indemnity should be awarded to the private complainant.
HELD: NO.
It is evident that venturing into the merits of petitioner’s appeal given the circumstance of his untimely
demise has become superfluous because, even assuming this Court would proceed to affirm the lower
court’s judgment of conviction, such a ruling would be of no force and effect as the resultant criminal

liability is totally extinguished by his death. Consequently, his civil liability arising from the crime, being
civil liability ex delicto, is likewise extinguished by his death. Since his appeal was still pending before this
Court, there was no final judgment of conviction upon which an award of civil indemnity could be based.
This Court holds that the death of petitioner extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the assailed Court of Appeals’ Decision
dated March 31, 2005, affirming petitioner’s conviction by the trial court, had become ineffectual.

vs.
DOMINGO PANITERCE, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Informations were filed charging Paniterce with six counts of rape of his daughters AAA and
BBB. Paniterce when arraigned pleaded not guilty to all the charges. After trial on the merits of the cases,
the RTC rendered a decision sentencing Paniterce to suffer the penalties of imprisonment and to pay for
moral and exemplary damages. Paniterce was committed to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
On appeal, the appellate court rendered a decision affirming the RTC judgment. Paniterce, through
counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to Supreme
Court the aforementioned Decision of the appellate court. The Court of Appeals gave due course to
Paniterce's Notice of Appeal and directed its Judicial Records Division to elevate to Supreme Court the
original records. Supreme Court required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections to confirm the commitment of Paniterce at the Bureau of Corrections and
submit his report. Paniterce filed his Supplemental Brief, while the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation. However, the Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections,
informed SC that Paniterce had died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterce's Death Certificate was
attached to said letter.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the Paniterce prior to final judgment extinguishes both personal and
pecuniary penalties.
HELD: Only the liabilities ex delicto.

The Supreme Court ruled that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case.
Clearly, because Paniterce's appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been
rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex
delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death. Consequently, the decision of Court of Appeals finding
that Paniterce is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering
him to indemnify his victims had become ineffectual.
RULE 112

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RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ACTING THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, MARYDEL B. JARLOS-MARTIN, EMMANUEL M. LAUREZO
AND ILUMINADO L. JUNIA, JR., Respondents.
FACTS: Rodolfo Agdeppa filed an administrative complaint against Marydel B. Jarlos-Martin (Jarlos-
Martin), Emmanuel M. Laurezo (Laurezo), and Iluminado L. Junia, Jr. (Junia) which arose from another
administrative complaint filed against him by Junia, Jr., then Group Manager for the Project Technical
Services Group of the National Housing Authority (NHA) on account of an NHA project whose contractor
was allegedly overpaid. An information was filed before RTC QC Br. 91 against Agdeppa for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Agdeppa then filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against Jarlos-Martin,
Laurezo, and Junia. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Agdeppa’s complaint and denied his
ensuing Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the Court may look into the existence of probable cause in the instant case.
HELD: NO.
In general, the Court follows a policy of non-interference with the exercise by the Office of the
Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, in respect of the initiative and independence
inherent in the said Office, which, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the
preserver of the integrity of the public service.”
The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains
from interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy Ombudsman,
except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the Ombudsman’s determination of probable
cause may only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion defined as such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it
must be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation
of law.

HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION and HYMAN YAP, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT), JOSE JORGE E. CORPUZ, in his
capacity as the Chief of the PNP-Special Task Force Group-Visayas, PHILIP YAP, FATIMA
CIMAFRANCA, and EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 170217
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION, including its Incorporators, Directors,
Officers: PHILIP YAP, STANLEY T. YAP, ELAINE JOY T. YAP, JULIE Y. SY, HYMAN A. YAP and
OTHER PERSONS UNDER THEIR EMPLOY, JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, IN THE PREMISES
LOCATED AT HPS BUILDING, PLARIDEL ST., BRGY. ALANG-ALANG, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU,
Respondents.
FACTS: Two applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code for Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 were filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 55 for unauthorized installation of telephone communication
equipment following the complaint of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) it was
able to monitor the use of the respondents in their premises of Mabuhay card and equipment capable of
receiving and transmitting calls from the USA to the Philippines without these calls passing through the
facilities of PLDT. Armed with the two warrants, police team searched the premises of HPS Corporation
located at HPS Building, Plaridel St., Brgy. Alang-Alang, Mandaue City, Cebu and seized the articles
specified in the said search warrants. Probable cause was the found during the preliminary investigation.
Two motions to quash the search warrants were then filed by the respondents on the grounds that the
same did not refer to a specific offense; that there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants
were general warrants and were wrongly implemented. After due hearing, the RTC granted the motion to
quash the search warrants. PLDT then filed a Notice of Appeal and, subsequently, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The CA 4th Division granted the petition for certiorari. The CA
18th Division, on the other hand, dismissed PLDT’s appeal and affirmed the RTC. PLDT then filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC’s findings that there was no probable cause in issuing the subject warrants is
already conclusive.
HELD: NO.
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., this Court held that the quantum of evidence required to prove
probable cause is not the same quantum of evidence needed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt
which is required in a criminal case that may be subsequently filed. We ruled in this case that the
determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, “probable
cause” is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not
present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. Taken together,
the aforementioned pieces of evidence are more than sufficient to support a finding that test calls were
indeed made by PLDT’s witnesses using Mabuhay card with PIN code number 332 1479224 and, more
importantly, that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that HPS Corporation, et al. had probably
committed the crime of Theft through illegal ISR activities exists. To reiterate, evidence to show probable
cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt which, at this
juncture of the criminal case, is not required.

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ROBERTO ALBAÑA, KATHERINE BELO, GENEROSO DERRAMAS, VICENTE DURAN, RICARDO
ARAQUE, MERLINDA DEGALA, GABRIEL ARANAS, ERNESTO BITOON and JUVIC DESLATE,
Petitioners,
vs.
PIO JUDE S. BELO, RODOLFO DEOCAMPO and LORENCITO DIAZ, Respondents.
En Banc, G.R. No. 158734 October 2, 2009
FACTS: The instant case is related to Albaña v. Commission on Elections decided by the Supreme Court.
The case involved exactly the same set of facts and issues as in this case, except that what was
challenged therein was the October 21, 2003 Resolution of the COMELEC, which annulled the
proclamation of petitioners as the duly elected municipal officials of Panitan, Capiz during the May 2001
elections.
A COMELEC resolution found a probable cause against petitioners for election offense, specifically for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Republic Act No. 6646. The said resolution directed
the filing of the necessary Information. It also found basis to disqualify petitioners and ordered the
assignment of the disqualification case to a COMELEC division. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration thereon, alleging that the COMELEC did not make any findings of fact in its resolution,
and that there was even no disquisition as to the merits of the affidavits of their witnesses and the
evidence presented by them. The COMELEC issued a Resolution denying the said motion for lack of
merit and for having been filed out of time.
The herein petition assails the earlier Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc directing the filing of
appropriate information against the herein petitioners and the docketing of the disqualification case
against them.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC correctly found the existence of probable cause to justify the filing of a
criminal Information against the petitioners for violation of Section 261 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election
Code
HELD: YES.
There is sufficient evidence to establish that the acts committed by petitioners constituted an election
offense, and that there is probable cause to hold them for trial.
In Baytan v. Commission on Elections, we held:

“It is well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the
COMELEC’s sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the
COMELEC’s exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.”
In the present case, the determination by the COMELEC of the existence of probable cause was based
on the affidavits of respondents and their witnesses. In their sworn statements, they categorically
declared that the May 2001 elections in Panitan, Capiz were tainted with widespread vote-buying,
intimidation and terrorism committed before, during and after the voting. Petitioners’ alleged acts of
terrorism and of giving money to influence and induce the voters and to further their chances of victory
are clear grounds for election offense under Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. Indeed,
questions of vote-buying, terrorism and similar acts should be resolved in a full-blown hearing before a

regular court. Accordingly, the COMELEC was correct in finding that there was probable cause and in
recommending the filing of the necessary criminal Information against the petitioners.
Moreover, petitioners’ claims of denial of due process, fabrication, hearsay evidence and revenge, as
motive for the complaint against them, are matters of defense best ventilated in the trial proper rather
than at the preliminary investigation. The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of only such
evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and the accused
is probably guilty thereof. There is sufficient evidence to establish that the acts committed by petitioners
constituted an election offense, and that there is probable cause to hold them for trial.
RULE 113
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y CRUZ,
Accused-Appellants
First Division , G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011
FACTS: The accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of the offense of illegal transport of
marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. In
this case, Chief Inspector Sapitula, received a tip that a huge amount of marijuana would be transported
from Baguio City to the Manila pier, which will then be loaded on vessels bound for Iloilo. Acting on the
information he received, Chief Inspector Sapitula dispatched PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco to the
corner of Raxabago and Juan Luna Streets, where they were supposed to watch out for two females and
one male. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco posted their mobile patrol car near said corner. From
where they were at, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco spotted three persons, two females and one
male – who turned out to be accused-appellants – alighting from a taxi at the corner of Raxabago and
Juan Luna Streets, each carrying a traveling bag. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco then followed
accused-appellants until one of them, Dequina, dropped her traveling bag. The traveling bag fell open
and inside, PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco saw dried leaves in transparent plastic bags. It was only
then that the two police officers apprehended accused-appellants and their persons and belongings
searched. Accused-appellants did not refute that they were indeed transporting prohibited drugs when
they were arrested.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrests and subsequent search made by the police officers are valid
considering the herein accused were caught in the act of transporting illegal drugs.
HELD: YES.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by
a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: (a)When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean to carry or convey from one place
to another. The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were
caught in flagrante carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue
and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequinas traveling bag to determine its content because when the

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latter noticed the police officers presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped
her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a
crime was then actually being committed by the accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was legally
justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their
lawful arrest.

vs.
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias Botong, and RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias Mac-Mac, Accused-
Appellants
FACTS: Police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched the latter persons without a warrant
after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and
witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel
de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. Police
officers had no prior knowledge of the suspects’ identities, and they completely relied on their confidential
informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that
box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box
contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the
box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrests under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and subsequent
search made by the police officers are valid considering the accused persons are allegedly into an illegal
drug deal.
HELD: NO.
The circumstances hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a felonious enterprise. None of the police
officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant
himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested
suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their
possession, contained shabu. In this case, the police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or
circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that
accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of accused-
appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accused-
appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence
as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal of
accused-appellants is inevitable.

GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants,

vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.
First Division , A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666, September 5, 2012
FACTS: A verified complaint was filed against MTC Judge Javellana for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave
misconduct and others," filed by complainant Public Attorneys.
In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a
warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to Dwelling,
Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon requirement under
Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a
prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the
complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein
complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and (d) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled
People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial,
despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material
facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.
ISSUE #1: Whether the respondent judge was correct in issuing a Warrant of Arrest in People v. Cornelio
for Malicious Mischief.
HELD #1: NO.

Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in violation of
Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that "the court shall not
order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required." Judge Javellana never
claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted for
the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally
unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge
Javellana’s court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from
Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same
accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or
made applicable to the other.
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case,
and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
ISSUE #2: Whether the respondent judge was correct in denying the Motion to Dismiss in People v.
Celeste, et al. for Trespass to Dwelling.
HELD #2: NO.

Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in
People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case
was never previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

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A case which has not been previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without
prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an
exception to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express
provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellana’s argument
that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v.
Celeste, et al. was not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this
ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit without
prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
ISSUE #3: Whether the respondent judge was correct in refusing to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al. and
People v. Celeste, et al. based on evidence presented.
HELD #3: YES.

Judge Javellana is correct that the appreciation of evidence is already within his judicial discretion. Any
alleged error he might have committed in this regard is the proper subject of an appeal but not an
administrative complaint. Judge Javellana is reminded though to adhere closely to the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure in hearing and resolving said cases.

vs.
ROBERT VELASCO, Accused-Appellant
First Division , G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013
FACTS: The trial court found appellant Roberto Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
three counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court also found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. The Court of appeals sustained the
ruling of the trial court. Appellant argues on the preliminary issue surrounding the validity of his
warrantless arrest and that the trial court erroneously gave probative weight and credence to the alleged
victim’s incredible and uniform testimony which casts doubt on her truthfulness.
ISSUE #1: Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant is illegal.
HELD #1: NO.

Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to
raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the
objection is deemed waived.
Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario
would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the
illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the appellate court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the rape victim.
HELD #2: NO.

It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the credibility of the
testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better

position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide
who among them is telling the truth. Lastly, in order for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of
a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant
for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor
inconsistencies in her testimony.
In the case at bar, we are in full agreement with the Court of Appeals that no fact or circumstance exists
to warrant a reversal of the trial court’s assessment that the victim’s testimony is credible and worthy of
belief. We also concur with the findings of the appellate court that the testimony of the victim was made in
a candid and straightforward manner, even on extensive cross-examination. In sum, the alleged
discrepancies in the victim’s testimony were not significant enough to successfully tilt the scales of justice
in favor of appellant.

vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @”DON”, Accused-Appellant
First Division , G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014
FACTS: Version of the prosecution: P/Insp. Fajardo and her team set up a buy bust operation against
alias Don. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias
Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the
deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of shabu forP250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following
day in a restaurant where alias Don is subsequently arrested and illegal drugs are seized.
Version of the defense: Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory
Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. The drugs allegedly came from two (2) cases owned by
SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope was intended for presentation in
court. Accused claimed that he was “framed-up”.
ISSUE: Whether the subject warrantless arrest of and seizures are valid.
HELD: YES.
[T]he Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People
v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused
enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them
before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit
of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without
warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court
holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.

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RULE 115

vs.
GIOVANNI OCFEMIA y CHAVEZ, Accused-Appellant.
FIRST DIVISION, GR No. 185383, September 25, 2013
FACTS: Based on a tip from a confidential informant, a team headed by PS/INSP Vargas conducted a
buy-bust operation against Ocfemia y Chavez in Guinobatan, Albay on February 21, 2003. PO2 Aldea
acted as the poseur-buyet and gave five marked P100 bills to Chavez. Chvez handed a heat-sealed small
plastic sachet of shabu to PO2 Aldea. Thereafter, the other team members rushed to the scene and
apprehended Chavez. He was later brought to the police station. Chavez was charged with illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under RA 9165. When Chavez took the witness stand, he denied the charge and
claimed that he was framed up by the police. The prosecution presented Judge Bagagnan, already
retired by that time, as rebuttal witness. Judge Bagagnan confirmedthat he conducted the preliminary
investigation in Chavez’s case and that based on the evidence presented before him, he found probably
cause to indict Chavez. The RTC, then presided by Judge Volante, considered the case for submission.
In an order dated June 6, 20006, RTC notified that Judge Volante had already been replaced by
Presiding Judge Vasquez and directed the parties to manifest within 5 days from notice whether they
want the case to still be decided by Judge Volante, otherwise, it would already be decided by Judge
Vasquez. While the prosecution did not submit such a manifestation, Chavez wished for Judge Volante to
decide the case. RTC promulgated its Decision on August 31, 2006, penned by Judge Vasquez,
convicting and sentencing Chavez of the crime charged. Chavez appealed to the CA questioning the
authority of Judge Vasquez to render and promulgate the assailed decision. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Hence, the matter was elevated to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the right to due process of Chavez was violated when Judge Vasquez rendered and
promulgated the decision, despite the manifestation of Chavez that Judge Volante should be preferred
since the latter was the one who received the evidence.
HELD: NO.
Basically, a case once raffled to a branch belongs to that branch unless reraffled or otherwise transferred
to another branch in accordance with established procedure. When the Presiding Judge of that branch to
which a case has been raffled or assigned is transferred to another station, he leaves behind all the cases
he tried with the branch to which they belong. He does not take these cases with him even if he tried
them and the same were submitted to him for decision. The judge who takes over this branch inherits all
these cases and assumes full responsibility for them. He may decide them as they are his cases, unless
any of the parties moves that his case be decided by the judge who substantially heard the evidence and
before whom the case was submitted for decision. If a party therefore so desires, he may simply address
his request or motion to the incumbent Presiding Judge who shall then endorse the request to the Office
of the Court Administrator so that the latter may in turn endorse the matter to the judge who substantially
heard the evidence and before whom the case was submitted for decision.
This will avoid the "renvoir" of records and the possibility of an irritant between the judges concerned, as
one may question the authority of the other to transfer the case to the former.
If coursed through the Office of the Court Administrator, the judge who is asked to decide the case is not
expected to complain, otherwise, he may be liable for insubordination and his judicial profile may be
adversely affected. Upon direction of the Court Administrator, or any of his Deputy Court Administrators
acting in his behalf, the judge before whom a particular case was earlier submitted for decision may be
compelled to decide the case accordingly.

Eventually, the Court observed in the Whereas Clauses of A.M. No.04-5-19-SC that despite existing
administrative circulars and its Resolution in Mabunay, "judges who are promoted or transferred to other
stations leave many undecided cases, thereby unfairly creating additional workload for judges who are
subsequently appointed thereto," hence, the Court resolved to adopt guidelines under which "cases
assigned to judges who have been transferred, detailed or assigned to any branch within or outside the
judicial region of the same court or promoted to a higher court shall be managed and decided."
It is clear from the foregoing that the reason behind A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC is primarily administrative, i.e.,
to establish an orderly system for the management and disposition of cases of a trial court in the event of
transfer, reassignment, or promotion of its presiding judge. It intends to prevent conflict between the
transferred judge and the new judge, and confusion as to when, where, and how case records shall be
transferred and decisions shall be promulgated in such cases. It does not touch upon any jurisdictional
issue and, in general, does not have any effect on the validity of the decision or resolution of either the
transferred judge or the new judge.
A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC actually recognizes that both the transferred judge and the new judge can decide
the case but gives consideration to the preference of the parties. Indeed, Judge Volante was the
presumed choice of plaintiff-appellee and the expressed option of accused-appellant to decide Criminal
Case No. 4594. Under A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, Judge Vasquez should have endorsed the case to the OCA,
which, in turn, would have authorized Judge Volante to decide the case. Nonetheless, while Judge
Vasquez may face administrative liability (after appropriate administrative proceedings) for his failure to
comply with A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, his Decision dated August 31, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 4594 is
completely valid absent any showing that it had been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or in
violation of accused-appellant’s constitutional right to due process.
Contrary to accused-appellant’s averment, he was not denied due process of law just because of Judge
Vasquez’s lapses in the observance of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC. Worth reproducing herein are the
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals on the matter:
Contrary to accused-appellant’s argument, it bears to stress that he was not at all denied of due process.
As held by the Supreme Court, due process means giving every contending party the opportunity to be
heard and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor (Co vs. Calimag, 334
SCRA 20, 26 [2000]). When a party has been afforded a chance to present his or her own side, he cannot
feign denial of due process (Pascual vs. People, G.R. No. 160540, March 22, 2007).As in this case,
accused-appellant was sufficiently given the opportunity to be heard, to defend himself and to confront his
accusers on the offense hurled against him. Hence, due process was not denied to the accused-appellant
by the mere issuance of a judge of a decision based on the records despite the fact that said judge was
not the one who conducted the trial and receive the evidence of the parties.
Furthermore, the situation wherein the judge rendering the decision in a case was not the same judge
who heard the case and received evidence from the parties is not new or unique. In
People v. Paling, the Court upheld the validity of such a decision, ratiocinating that:
The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not render the
judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. Citing
People v. Competente, this Court held in People v. Alfredo:
"The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses,
does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal of the Decision
would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it was carefully studied, with
testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from the Court carefully passed upon."

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Further, "it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on the basis of the
records on hand." This is because the judge "can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common experience,
knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and procedural
due process of law." Considering that, in the instant case, the transcripts of stenographic notes taken
during the trial were extant and complete, there was no impediment for the judge to decide the case.
MONICO V. JACOB and CELSO L. LEGARDA, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Respondents.
First Division, G.R. No. 162206 November 17, 2010
FACTS: Several public officers and private individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob),
President, and Celso L. Legarda (Legarda), Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for perpetrating the so-called “tax credit scam”. On April 14, 2000,
petitioners and the four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued an Order giving the
prosecution a period of sixty days within which to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take
appropriate action on the said motion for reconsideration of accused movants and to inform the Court
within the same period as to its findings and recommendations including the action thereon of the
Honorable Ombudsman. Months passed, and then, an entire year passed. There was still nothing from
the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.Considering the time that had lapsed, the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division expressly warned the prosecution that should it fail to resolve the
reconsideration/investigation, it would order the dismissal of the cases
Once again, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division gave the prosecution another chance. The arraignment
and pre-trial were then reset to 20 August 2001. In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense
verbally and consistently invoked their right to speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In
the course of more than one year, however, the kept affording the prosecution one chance after another.
The sixty days granted to the prosecution became more than four hundred days – still, there was no
resolution in sight.
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued a verbal order dismissing the cases. The prosecution filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division issued an Order setting aside
said verbal order of dismissal. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash. In an
Omnibus Resolution, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in the prosecution’s favor and denied all
the motions filed by the accused.
ISSUE #1: Whether there was a violation of the petitioners’ right to speedy trial to warrant the dismissal of
the criminal case.
HELD: NO.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c)
the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
The prosecution attributed the delay in the criminal proceedings to:

1) the 23 motions for reinvestigation or reconsideration filed by the accused, which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in its April 17, 2000 Order; and
2) the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its reinvestigation and submit its report within
the 60-day period fixed by the said graft court.
Even though there was a delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by
petitioners and their co-accused by reason thereof, the weighing of interests militate against a finding that
petitioners’ right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them would have justified the
dismissal of Criminal Cases. The Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of the criminal cases was unwarranted
under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute
the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE#2: Whether petitioners have been put in double jeopardy.
HELD # 2: NO.
To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:
(1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
frustration thereof.
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or
termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.
RULE 116

vs.
JOSELITO A. LOPIT, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: In three (3) separate Informations, accused-appellant was charged with three (3) counts of rape
committed against his own 14-year old daughter AAA. During the pre-trial conference, accused-appellant,
assisted by counsel, manifested his desire to plea-bargain. In open court, he expressed willingness to
plead guilty in one rape case, on the condition that the Informations in the other two be withdrawn. Victim
AAA, assisted by her mother BBB and the provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto. Thus,
accused-appellant entered a new plea of guilty to the crime of rape. This was done with the assistance of
counsel de oficio. The accused-appellant hopes that his penalty will be reduced by such admission. In
addition, he also reasoned that he lacks money to fight the case.
ISSUE: Whether Section 3 Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure on “plea of guilty to capital
offense” was satisfactorily complied with.
HELD: NO.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to

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prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his
behalf. Under the foregoing Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a
capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability;
and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires.
The trial court should have taken the necessary measures to see to it that accused-appellant really and
freely comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea but it did not. It failed to
explain to accused-appellant that the penalty imposable for the crime attended by the qualifying
circumstance of minority and filiation, as alleged in the Information against him, is death, whether or not
he pleads guilty and regardless of the presence of other mitigating circumstances. Accused-appellants
justification that he had no money to defend his case and his belief that the penalty would be reduced if
he pleaded guilty were not sufficient reasons for the trial court to allow a change of plea from not guilty to
one of guilty. It was the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused did not labor under this mistaken
impression.
RULE 126

vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Calantiao was involved in a shooting incident, wherein he was subsequently subdued
by police officers. Said police officers recovered from therein appellant a black bag containing two bricks
of marijuana leaves and a magazine of stainless ammos. The recovered pieces of evidence were
properly marked and documented.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant for violation of R.A. 9165. It further
held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search
after herein appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.
Moreover, the trial Court found all the elements of the offense to have been duly established by the
prosecution. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, hence this appeal.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the subject search and seizure of marijuana is valid under the Plain View Doctrine.
HELD # 1: YES.
Plain view doctrine is not applicable when frisked during arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order
to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its discovery
was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." "The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification –
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and
permits the warrantless seizure."
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black
bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to
Calantiao’s lawful arrest.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the subject pieces of evidence are inadmissible on the ground of failure to comply
with the chain of custody.
HELD # 2: NO.
Failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody will not render the evidence inadmissible, provided
that the integrity of such is preserved.
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody
because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time it was
brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination. This Court has no reason to overrule the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized drugs to have not been
broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in evidence.
Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the
presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the
foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs with regularity,
and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to discharge
such burden.
It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself admits
this. His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being framed for
having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and frame-up.
However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court.

vs.
ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, Accused-Appellant.
First Division , G.R. No. 176066 , August 11, 2010
FACTS: On January 25, 2000, two male informants reported that appellant Tuan was selling marijuana in
her place of dwelling. Acting on such report, SP02 Fernandez verified such complaint through a test buy
of the said illegal drug. Upon verification, a search warrant was requested and was issued by Judge
Cortes. During the search, the police officers discovered and confiscated nine (9) blocks of marijuana in
the dwelling of herein appellant.

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Appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda was convicted with the trial Court for illegal possession of marijuana,
punishable under R.A. 6425. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court,
hence this appeal.
Appellant contends that there were inconsistent testimonies during the trial and that the search warrant is
void for failing to comply with the Constitutional and Statutory requirements due to lack of probable cause.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the alleged inconsistent testimonies during the trial were correctly admitted.
HELD # 1: YES.
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses
These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that
they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal
possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence.
Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their
credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the search warrant was validly issued.
HELD #2: YES.

Probable Cause to issue a search warrant is determined by the Judge upon examination and hearing.
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued
upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
Such substantial basis exists in this case.
Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s
residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and
Tudlong, the informants.

SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by
Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant.
He testified before Judge Cortes.
SPOUSES JOEL and MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City,
Respondents.
FACTS: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed to annul the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta
Marimlas Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized, and the
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Petitioners claim that the search warrant was
issued in violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC (Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the
Enforceability of Search Warrants) and Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. They aver that the application for search warrant filed by SI Lagasca was not personally
endorsed by the NBI Head, Director Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director Nasol and
that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy Director Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization
letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated.
Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No.
99-10-09-SC, which was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the application for
search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later
law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court correctly denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and
to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration.
HELD: YES.
Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from
delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant
heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or
other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head,
as long as it is not inconsistent with law. Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of endorsing the
application for search warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law
unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols endorsement had the
same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in
the questioned Orders that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the authority to sign for and in behalf of
Director Wycoco is unassailable.
A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided
therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC
are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive
Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be
an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

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EVIDENCE
RULE 129
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES RODOLFO T. TIU AND VICTORIA N. TIU, Respondents.
First Division, G.R. Nos. 173090-91, September 7, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines and private respondents Spouses Rodolfo and Victoria
Tiu entered into a Credit Line Agreement, and subsequently entered into a Restructuring Agreement.
Such agreement contained a clause wherein respondents confirmed their debt. In addition, herein
respondents mortgaged their residential property to secure such debt to herein petitioner.
Due to the failure of herein respondent to comply with their obligation, herein petitioner extra judicially
foreclosed such residential property. As such, herein respondent instituted an action to declare such
Extrajudicial Foreclosure, null and void. They averred that the loan entered into with herein petitioner was
already fully paid. They likewise contend that their consent was vitiated when they signed the
Restructuring Agreement.
The trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner and held that herein respondents were not
able to present any evidence as to vitiated consent. On appeal, the appellate Court reversed the decision
of the trial Court, hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Restructuring Agreement provided for an admission of debt of herein
respondents and it was entered into voluntarily.
ISSUE: Whether the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the subject Restructuring Agreement, a
notarized document, was sufficiently overcome.
HELD: NO.
As pointed out by the trial court, the Restructuring Agreement, being notarized, is a public document
enjoying a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence
must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. The spouses Tiu, who attested before the notary
public that the Restructuring Agreement "is their own free and voluntary act and deed," failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove otherwise.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (also known as Philtrust Bank), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent Forfom Development Corporation is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of
land, subject of this this case. They subsequently discovered that such properties were transferred to
herein petitioner due to a mortgage. As such, herein private respondent instituted a case against herein
petitioner, Spouses Claveria and the Register of Deeds, and alleged that the transfer was procured
through fraud and conspiracy.
In its defense, petitioner denied the allegations of herein private respondent and averred that their co-
defendants Spouses Claveria mortgaged the said properties to them to secure an obligation.

The trial Court rendered its decision in favor of herein private respondents. On appeal, respondent Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial Court and held that herein petitioner is not a mortgagee in
good faith, hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that in the Answer to Interrogatories, it was stated that it followed a standard
operating procedure in accepting the property as security. Petitioner further contends that since such
document is a public document, it is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its content.
ISSUE: Whether the subject notarized document, which evidences that petitioner followed the standard
operating procedure, is conclusive as regards the contents thereof.
HELD: NO.
In notarized documents, the presumption of official duty applied only to the portion wherein it is stated that
such is sworn and subscribed before a notary public
Notarized documents (e. g. the notarized Answer to Interrogatories in the case at bar is proof that
Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories) are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to the portion wherein
the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the
date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that
affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution.
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of the different
kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As
regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to by the person
making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion,
wherein the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her,
on the date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that
affidavits, being self-serving, must be received with caution.
Philtrust, therefore, presented no evidence rebutting the following badges of bad faith shown in the
records of the case. Even though circumstantial, the following adequately prove by preponderance of
evidence that Philtrust was aware of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated upon Forfom.
VICENTE MANZANO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
MARCELINO GARCIA, Respondent.
FACTS: A parcel of land was issued in the name of herein private respondent Garcia. The said parcel of
land was the subject of a deed of pacto de retro sale, allegedly executed by herein respondent to
Constancio Manzano, the predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioner Manzano. When Contancio died,
herein private respondent filed an action for annulment of the said deed, on the ground that such was a
forgery.
The trial Court rendered its decision and upheld the validity of the deed of pacto de retro sale. On appeal,
the appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial Court and held that the deed was forged. hence this
petition.

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Petitioner contends that the appellate Court erred when it held that the deed was forged, without
presenting an expert witness, and such deed should enjoy the presumption of regularity due to its
notarization.
ISSUE: Whether the presumption of regularity that the subject notarized deed enjoys is conclusive.
HELD : NO.
The fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption of
regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.
Thus, in Eulogio v. Apeles, where the party insisting on the presumption of regularity of a notarized deed
of sale admitted that the same was notarized without his presence, this Court held that "such fact alone
overcomes the presumption of regularity, since a notary public is enjoined not to notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein." In
the case at bar, even more convincing evidence of the irregularity was presented as it was the notary
public himself who testified that the person who appeared before him was not respondent Garcia. Since
the very official who attested to the crucial facts in the notarization – i.e., that the persons who personally
appeared before him are the same persons who executed the deed of conveyance – admitted in open
court the falsity of said manifestation, the reliability of the Acknowledgment that clothes the document with
a presumption of regularity is completely shattered. We, therefore, agree with the Court of Appeals that
the presumption of regularity of the notarized deed of pacto de retro sale was sufficiently overcome by the
testimony of Atty. Mediante.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO BASALLO y ASPREC, Accused-Appellant.
First Division, G.R. No. 182457, January 30, 2013
FACTS: An Information charging Basallo with rape was filed before Branch 32, RTC of Agoo, La Union.
Basallo remained at large for more than two years after the original issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him thus leading to the archiving of his case. When he was finally arraigned, he entered a plea of
not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC convicted and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC judgment.
Basallo questioned the decision of the Court of Appeals in that the latter should not have taken judicial
notice of certain psychological concepts in explaining the behavior of the private complainant after the
alleged rape incident.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly took judicial notice of the said psychological concepts.
HELD: YES.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and even
the victim’s lack of resistance especially when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify
voluntariness or consent. Furthermore, we have emphatically ruled that the failure of a rape victim to
shout, fight back, or escape from the scoundrel is not tantamount to consent or approval because the law
imposes no obligation to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle.
Jurisprudence tell us that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge
and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. We also stated in another case

that delay and vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of
witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained.
TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
FACTS: In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997, Toshiba declared input VAT
payments on its domestic purchases of taxable goods and services. It then filed its amended VAT returns
for the first and second quarters of 1997, reporting the same amount of input VAT payments but, this
time, with zero-rated sales. Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF One-Stop Shop) two separate applications for tax
credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of 1997. In its petition for review before
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Toshiba and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue entered into a
stipulation of facts during pre-trial such that Toshiba "is a duly registered value-added tax entity in
accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code” and that "is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax
on its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code”. The CTA ruled in favor
of Toshiba, in view of the admissions of the CIR. After the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, the
CIR elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the CTA, holding that the export sales
of Toshiba were VAT-exempt, not zero-rated, transactions. The CA thus concluded that Toshiba is not
entitled to a refund
ISSUE # 1: Whether the issues on the VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export sales may still be
considered by the Supreme Court.
HELD # 1: NO.
Upon the failure of the CIR to timely plead and prove before the CTA the defenses or objections that
Toshiba was VAT-exempt under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, and that its export sales were VAT-
exempt transactions under Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, the CIR is deemed to
have waived the same, as provided for under Section 1 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
During the pendency of CTA Case No. 5762, the proceedings before the CTA were governed by the
Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, while the Rules of Court were applied suppletorily.
It is axiomatic in pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by
due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings. The Court cannot simply grant the plea of the
CIR that the procedural rules be relaxed based on the general averment of the interest of substantive
justice. It should not be forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to
secure a just determination of every action. Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, the
Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, it never intends to forge a weapon for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in
proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these
rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the stipulation during the pre-trial that Toshiba "is a duly registered value-added tax
entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code” and that "is subject to zero percent (0%) value-
added tax on its export sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code” bound the
CIR such that it he can no longer contradict the same in a Motion for Reconsideration.

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HELD # 2: YES.
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially
when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require proof.
RULE 130-A

vs.
EMILY MENDOZA y SARTIN, accused-appellant.
FACTS: The Special Operations Group (SOG) of the WPD, U.N. Avenue, Manila received information
from a confidential informant that one Emily Mendoza, a pregnant woman, was selling shabu in
Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila. Acting on this information, SOG conducted a buy-bust operation which led to
the arrest of accused- appellant Mendoza and a sachet of white crystalline substance was seized from
her possession. The plastic sachet containing shabu was marked, kept, and delivered to the forensic
chemist by the same officer who received it from Mendoza. Ching, the poseur-buyer, marked the plastic
sachet he bought from Mendoza with “SOG-1” after the buy-bust team arrested her. Thereafter, the
marked plastic sachet, together with the laboratory request, was delivered by Ching himself to Macapagal
for examination. Macapagal’s Chemistry Report showed that she received a plastic sachet marked “SOG-
1” for examination at around 3:20 p.m. After she completed her examination at 5:20 p.m., she placed the
same marked plastic sachet in a small brown envelope, which she in turn dated, signed, and sealed with
a staple wire. Mendoza was charged before the RTC, Branch 23 of the City of Manila, of violating Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
Mendoza denied that she sold shabu to Ching and that she was only framed –up. The RTC rendered its
Decision finding the accused, GUILTY, of the crime charged against her, beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision, affirming the RTC’s judgment of conviction.
ISSUE #1: Whether the prosecutor’s failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph
of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 renders Mendoza’s arrest
illegal or the items seized from her inadmissible.
HELD #1: NO.

While the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality it is not, “as it is almost always impossible
to obtain an unbroken chain.”
The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure
to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article
21 of Republic Act No. 9165, will not render Mendoza’s arrest illegal or the items seized from her
inadmissible. In the case at bar, it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs
had been preserved. The prosecution had submitted enough evidence to account for the crucial links in
the chain of custody of the seized shabu, starting from its confiscation from Mendoza up to its
presentation as evidence in the RTC.

ISSUE #2: Whether the failure of prosecution to coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement agency
(PDEA) as required under Article 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 renders the arrest of accused -appellant
illegal.
HELD #2: NO.

Supreme Court has declared that coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is
not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust operations.
Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation. This Court has declared that
coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust operations. Neither Section
86 of Republic Act No. 9165 nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations make PDEA’s participation a
condition sine qua non for the conduct of a buy-bust operation, especially since a buy-bust operation is
merely a form of an in flagrante arrest, which is sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE #3: Whether the defense by the accused-appellant that she was framed-up may be given
credence
HELD #3:
The Supreme Court has invariably viewed the common and standard defenses of denial and frame-up in
drugs cases with disfavor for being easily concocted.
For a police officer to frame her up, he must have known her prior to the incident. However, the informant
had to introduce Ching to Mendoza before the sale of the shabu took place. Mendoza testified that she
did not know Ching or the other police officers prior to her arrest. Moreover, Mendoza herself admitted
that not only should she be considered as part of the urban poor, but that she also had no means of
income. Her very circumstance belies her claim that the police officers charged her with this crime
because she refused to pay the P50,000.00 they were allegedly extorting from her. For such defenses to
succeed, they must be proven with strong and convincing evidence. Mendoza has not given this Court
anything except her bare assertions.

vs.
SONNY PADUA y REYES, accused-appellant.
FACTS: District Drug Enforcement Unit (DDEU), Southern Police District (SPD), Taguig City, acting on
the information from a confidential informant, conducted a buy-bust operation which led to the
apprehension of herein accused- appellant Sonny Padua (Sonny) and seizure from the latter several foils
of shabu by PO2 Aguilar, a member of the buy-bust team. Two separate informations were filed before
the RTC against appellant for illegal sale and possession of shabu under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. Evidence for the prosecution adduced before the RTC consisted of the sole
testimony of witness PO2 Dante Aguilar of the District Drug Enforcement Unit (DDEU), Southern Police
District (SPD), Taguig City and the several documentary and object evidence supporting the allegations
of the prosecution . The trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The appellate court ruled
that the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers was proper and there was no irregularity in
the conduct of the same. Accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, thus, his arrest was lawful
and the sachets of shabu confiscated from him were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that there was no evidence of any improper motive on the part of
prosecution witness PO2 Aguilar, who was a member of the team who conducted the buy-bust operation.
ISSUE #1: Whether the prosecution failed to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule in handling the
subject drug confiscated from accused-appellant.

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HELD #1: NO.
Non-compliance with the stipulated procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous
drugs, among others, is provided under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as
follows: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Section 21(a), Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision,
stipulates: “(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.” Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, there is no broken chain in the custody of the seized items, found
to be shabu, from the time PO2 Aguilar got the shabu, to the time it was turned over to the investigating
officer, and up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination.
ISSUE #2: Whether the presentation of witnesses who had come in contact with the subject drugs is
crucial to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.
HELD #2: NO.

Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court.
There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such
requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been
broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable
that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand.
The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons such as the investigator and the forensic chemist, is
not a crucial point against the prosecution—the prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its
case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
ISSUE #3: Whether the presentation of the informant as a witness for prosecution is essential for the
conviction of accused.
HELD #3: NO.

It is well-settled that the testimony of an informant in drug-pushing cases is not essential for conviction
and may be dispensed if the poseur-buyer testified on the same.Informants are almost always never
presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.

ISSUE #4: Whether the allegations of the accused-appellant that he was framed-up may be given
credence.
HELD #4: NO.
When police officers have no motive for testifying falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
PO2 Aguilar straightforwardly narrated the circumstances leading to the consummation of the sale of
illegal drugs, the possession of four plastic sachets of shabu and the arrest of accused-appellant.
Credence was properly accorded to the testimony of prosecution witness PO2 Aguilar who is a law
enforcer. The testimony of the police officers carried with it the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. When police officers have no motive for testifying falsely against
the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties
and no evidence whatsoever was presented that would suggest any improper motive on the part of the
police enforcers. This Court accords great respect to and treats with finality the findings of the trial court
on the matter of credibility of witnesses, absent any palpable error or arbitrariness in its findings.
ISSUE #5: Whether a prior surveillance is necessary for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust
operation
HELD #5: NO.
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the
conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long
as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom
thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.

vs.
REYNALD DELA CRUZ Y LIBANTOCIA, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Based on a call from an informant that someone was selling shabu at Yale Street, Cubao,
Quezon City, a team from the Cubao Police Station 7 conducted a buy-bust operation which led to the
arrest of the herein accused- appellant Dela Cruz. PO2 Ocampo obtained one plastic sachet containing
shabu from Dela Cruz during the buy-bust operation and marked the sachet with his initials “JO”. A
request for laboratory examination of “[o]ne (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
undetermined amount of suspected white crystalline substance marked ‘JO’” was signed by Chief of the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit . The plastic sachet was submitted to Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, who, upon receipt, marked the sachet with her initials “YCM”; and issued Chemistry Report
stating that “[q]ualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to
the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug”. Dela Cruz was charged with violation
of Section 5, Article II3 of Republic Act No. 9165. Dela Cruz denied any criminal liability and claimed
frame-up by the police.
After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding Dela Cruz guilty as charged. The RTC gave credibility
to the prosecution’s version, considering the following inconsistencies in the defense’s account. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusion of the RTC. The Court of Appeals cited the
presumption of regularity in the police officers’ performance of their official duties. Dela Cruz alleges that
the police officers failed to establish the identity of the illegal drug, the corpus de licit of the case.

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ISSUE #1: Whether the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized item alleged
to be shabu and establish the identity of the illegal drug, the corpus delicti of the case.
HELD #1: NO.

Non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
In People v. Naquita, 560 SCRA 430 (2008), we expressly declared that non-compliance with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from
him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Dela Cruz did not present any evidence at all to substantiate his allegation that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the shabu presented as evidence at his trial had been compromised at some
point. To the contrary, records show that there had been substantial compliance with the prescribed
procedure.
ISSUE #2: Whether the allegations of the accused appellant that the police officers performed their duties
irregularly and that he had been framed up may be given credence.
HELD #2: NO.

It is equally settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Dela Cruz utterly failed to prove that in testifying
against him, PO2 Ocampo was motivated by reasons other than the duty to curb the sale of prohibited
drugs.
Frame-up is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can be easily
concocted, hence, commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-
being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the police officers’ alleged rotten reputation, accept in
every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists. Bare denials cannot prevail
over the positive identification by PO2 Ocampo of Dela Cruz as the person who sold him the shabu.

vs.
NELLY ULAMA y ARRISMA, accused-appellant.
FACTS: The Makati City Police Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council
(MADAC) operatives conducted a buy-bust operation against accused and appellant. Immediately after
appellant’s arrest and in her presence, poseur-buyer Bill marked the plastic sachet with the markings
“NAU.” This piece of evidence was turned over directly to the (DEU) where it was included in the items
subject to laboratory examination by the PNP Crime Laboratory of the Southern Police District Office. An
examination of the lower left portion of the said document would bear out a mark stamp of the PNP Crime
Laboratory showing that the request letter along with the accompanying evidence specimens was
delivered by poseur-buyer Bill at 4:45 p.m. on April 10, 2003. Furthermore, Physical Science Report No.
D-443-0317 which was signed and prepared by PINSP Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas (Rivera-Dagasdas)
indicates that the plastic sachet with the markings “NAU,” which was recovered from appellant and listed

as item “D” in the said document, yielded 0.3 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu. The same report likewise indicates that the evidence specimen was received at 4:45
p.m. on April 10, 2003 and that the laboratory examination conducted by PINSP Rivera-Dagasdas was
completed at 6:45 p.m. on the same date. Appellant was prosecuted and charged for violation of
Sections 5 and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The trial court convicted appellant of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the confiscated items
considering that it was not made clear if the plastic sachet of shabu allegedly confiscated from the
accused was the same specimen examined at the crime laboratory.
HELD: NO.
The Court is aware of the stringent requirements laid down in Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act
No. 9165 which states that: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately, after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. However, minor deviations from the foregoing procedure would not necessarily result in an
acquittal. In the past, we have also declared that “the failure to conduct an inventory and to photograph
the confiscated items in the manner prescribed under the said provision of law x x x cannot be used as a
ground for appellant’s exoneration from the charge against him/her.”
On the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs, the rule
is that it does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him/[her]
inadmissible. The requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
are not inflexible. What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
Moreover, the appellant’s allegation that the chain of custody of the illegal drugs taken from her was not
firmly established cannot be countenanced. On the contrary, there is enough evidence which can account
for the crucial links in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachet of shabu starting from its
seizure from appellant up to its examination by the forensic chemist.

vs.
REYNALDO NACUA, accused-appellant.
FACTS: The Philippine National Police (PNP) in Cebu City executed and filed before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu a Joint Affidavit charging accused-appellant and his common-law wife, Teresita
Villanueva-Nacua (Teresita), of selling and delivering methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as
shabu, at their residence at 0475 Dela Rama Compound, D. Jakosalem Street, Sitio Taup, Barangay
Cogon Ramos, Cebu City. Cebu City Police Officers (CCPO) conducted a surveillance of the house of
accused-appellant and Teresita (Nacua couple) and executed a “test-buy” operation during which they
bought and received from the Nacua couple a sachet of suspected shabu. The CCPO did not mark the
subject specimen in the presence of the accused-appellants but they did so upon returning to their police
office. The police officers immediately submitted the sachet and its contents for forensic examination at
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office (RCLO), Cebu City and the specimen submitted weighing
0.02 grams, tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The Information against the Nacua
couple, filed before RTC-Branch 58 of Cebu City was based on the test buy of CCPO which is the sale of
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet of white crystalline substance, weighing 0.02 gram, locally

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known as shabu, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug. The RTC promulgated
its Decision finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The Court
of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 (Chain of
Custody Rule), which is intended to safeguard the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu that he
allegedly sold and delivered to the police officers during the purported “test-buy”.
HELD: NO.
Given the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugs which are indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by accident or otherwise, there must
be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and after the seizure of
dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer thereof for examination, and
at all times up to their presentation in court. Such measures are described with particularity under Section
21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9165.
In this case, there was a total disregard of the requirements of law and jurisprudence. The prosecution
even admits that the police officers acquired the sachet of shabu presented in court against accused-
appellant in a mere “test-buy” operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague, and PO1 Aniñon. The police
officers, after supposedly buying the sachet of shabu from the Nacua couple for Two Hundred Pesos
(P200.00), left the residence of the Nacua couple, without recovering the marked money or effecting the
couple’s arrest. The police officers brought the sachet of suspected shabu all the way back to their police
station, and only there marked the said item, without the presence of the accused and/or other
disinterested witnesses.

vs.
REYNALDO “ANDY” SOMOZA y HANDAYA, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Based on a confidential information that accused-appellant is engaged in the repacking and
selling of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, and conducting his business in
his residence at Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City, the NBI coordinated with the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in Dumaguete City and discreet inquiries and surveillance were made to verify the information.
Subsequently, this led to a positive test buy of shabu from accused-appellant, an application for a search
warrant and the conduct of a buy-bust operation. Before being captured, however, accused – appellant
threw away on the other side of the fence some of the marked bills and a metallic tube containing a
tooter. A coin purse with six sachets containing powdered crystalline substance was found in his pocket
when he was searched and were marked appropriately. Only P800.00 worth of marked money,
consisting of the P500.00 bill and three pieces of P100.00 bills, was recovered.
In its Joint Judgment, the trial court found accused-appellant GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal sale of 0.50 gram of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II, of RA No. 9165 and illegal
possession of 0.69 gram of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. It found the
testimonies of the law enforcers, credible and consistent, corroborated by the statements of Kagawad
Talavera and media representative Elloren and backed by object and documentary evidence sufficiently
established the guilt of accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals found nothing irregular in the buy-bust
operation. The non-presentation of the entire amount of P1,000.00 marked money did not diminish the
integrity of the buy-bust process, especially considering the circumstance that accused-appellant threw
the money while trying to evade arrest. Moreover, the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs does not hinge on the presentation of all the marked money used in the buy-bust operation.

ISSUE: Whether the failure of the prosecution to present the full amount of the marked money used in the
buy-bust operation renders the buy-bust operation invalid.
HELD: NO.
The non-presentation of the marked money, or the presentation of mere photocopies of the marked
money, does not render the buy-bust operation illegal or invalid.
This Court has already held in People v. Ambrosio, 427 SCRA 312 (2004), that the non-presentation of
the entire amount of the marked money is not a mortal blow to the prosecution’s case. It has also been
held that the non-presentation of the marked money, or the presentation of mere photocopies of the
marked money, does not render the buy-bust operation illegal or invalid. Nor is the presentation of the
marked money material in the prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs as the omission to present
the marked money may be overlooked as a peripheral matter. As this Court ruled in People v. Ara, 609
SCRA 304 (2009) In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money
does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proved and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. x x x.

vs.
ASIR GANI y ALIH and NORMINA GANI y GALOS, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: the RTC found Normina G. Gani guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. The main assertion of Gani on her appeal was the failure of the buy bust team to comply with the
rules on the custody of seized drugs provided under RA 9165, particularly the inventory process
immediately after her arrest, thus, rendering the case dismissible. The appeal was denied.
ISSUE: Will the non-compliance with RA 9165 render the items seized inadmissible as evidence?
HELD: NO.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1)
the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance
seized as evidence
Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a
physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of
arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the
chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee,

vs.
JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE, Accused–Appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant was found guilty of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accused–appellant appealed his case to the CA, questioning his
conviction on the basis of what he claimed as non–compliance with the rule on chain of custody of seized
illegal drugs. In particular, the accused–appellant points to the following violations of the chain of custody
requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations: the

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seized items were marked and subjected to inventory not at the scene of the buy–bust but at the police
station; the marking and inventory of the seized drugs were conducted in the presence of the buy–bust
team but without the accused–appellant or his representative; and, no photographs were taken during the
inventory.
ISSUE# 1: Whether failure to raise the issue of non–observance of the chain of custody requirement
during trial is fatal to the case of the accused
HELD #1: YES.

Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE #2: Whether the chain of custody requirement under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and
its implementing rules and regulations was sufficiently complied with to warrant denial of accused–
appellant’s appeal
HELD #2: YES.

The chain of custody is basically the duly recorded authorized stages of transfer of custody of seized
dangerous drugs, from their seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. The function of the chain of custody requirement is to
ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that
unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed. Thus, the chain of custody
requirement has a two–fold purpose: (1) the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items, and (2) the removal of unnecessary doubts as to the identity of the evidence.
The law recognizes that, while the presentation of a perfect unbroken chain is ideal, the realities and
variables of actual police operation usually makes an unbroken chain impossible. With this implied judicial
recognition of the difficulty of complete compliance with the chain of custody requirement, substantial
compliance is sufficient as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending police officers.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JOSE GALVEZ y BLANCA, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: Appellant Galvez was accused and charged with five counts of rape; he allegedly raped AAA.
During the trial, it was noted by the trial Court that there were discrepancies in AAA’s testimonies and that
the physical evidence presented is contrary to the statement of AAA that she was raped many times.
The prosecution presented Dr. Viray, who examined AAA on July 4, 2002. He presented his conclusion
that AAA is no longer a virgin; that there are no external signs of application of any trauma; and that there
was a shallow healed laceration at 9:00 o’clock position on complainant’s hymen.
Herein appellant merely denied the allegations against him.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant with one count of rape and acquitted
the same in the other cases. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence
this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the accused was correctly convicted, considering that the physical evidence presented
negates that AAA was raped.
HELD: NO.
It is not indispensable that marks of external bodily injuries should appear on the victim of rape
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe both AAA and accused-appellant directly and to test
their credibility by their demeanor on the witness stand, was completely persuaded by the above
testimony of AAA as regards the events of June 21, 2002. Other than the fact that we give great weight to
the findings of fact of the trial court, an independent reading of said testimony compels us to conclude
that AAA’s version is indeed worthy of credence especially when compared to the bare denial of accused-
appellant who did not even offer an alibi. As observed by the Court of Appeals, AAA’s testimony is
"unflinching and resolute" and "passes the test of credibility nary any indication whatsoever of a
concocted testimony." Furthermore, it is almost cliché to add that "[c]ourts usually give credence to the
testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because,
normally, no person would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details
of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice
Accused-appellant likewise attacks AAA’s credibility on the ground that the physical evidence presented
yielded no proof of external signs of physical injuries, implying that this negates the contention that AAA
was raped. We disagree. The shallow healed laceration at 9:00 o’clock position on complainant’s hymen,
presented in the testimony of Dr. Viray, is in fact convincing physical evidence of the rape, especially
considering the age of AAA and the fact that accused-appellant used a knife to threaten her. Thus, in
People v. Cuadro, we held:
Further, the medical findings of Dr. Obedoza are indicative of rape. It is not indispensable
that marks of external bodily injuries should appear on the victim of rape. Considering
that in the commission of the first, second and third rapes, appellant threatened the victim
with a knife, it is logical that no external injuries would appear on her body. What is more
telling is that the victim, at her young age, sustained lacerations in her genitalia. We have
ruled that lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration.
RULE 130-B
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED CARMEN CRUZ-ZAMORA, Petitioners,

vs.
MULTIWOOD INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: Zamora filed a complaint against Multiwood for failure to pay her 10% commission for the
contracts with Edsa Shangrila, Makati Shangrila and Diamond Hotel.
Multiwood asserted that Zamora was not entitled to receive commissions for the said projects on the
ground that those were construction contracts while their Marketing Agreement spoke only of the sale of
Multiwood products.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Zamora. When Multiwood appealed to the CA, the CA reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the exhibits which were only marked during the testimony of the defense witness but
were not offered in evidence before the trial court may be considered.

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HELD: NO.
The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified (Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court).
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court
in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap
of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as
exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.
RULE 130-C

vs.
RICARDO PAMINTUAN y SAHAGUN, accused-appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with the crime
of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353. He was accused of committing abusive acts and [lascivious] conduct upon the person of AAA, a
minor, 11 years old, by having carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. AAA testified that
accused-appellant was her uncle since the latter was the cousin of her father, BBB. He was also the
common-law husband of her mother, CCC, as her parents had already separated. AAA related that
accused-appellant succeeded in abusing her seven times. The Medico-Legal noted down in her report
that there was “[n]o evident injury at the time of examination but medical evaluation cannot exclude
sexual abuse. Further investigation, such as witnessed account or careful questioning of the child is
required.” For his defense, accused-appellant denied AAA’s accusation of rape against him and stated
that CCC’s children had a grudge against him, as they did not want him to live with their mother. The RTC
of Manila, Branch 38, adjudged accused-appellant guilty of statutory rape.The RTC found that AAA was
only about 11 years old when she was raped by accused-appellant. The trial court gave more weight to
her testimony, which was found to be categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and delivered in a frank
manner. The trial court also downplayed the absence of injuries on the part of AAA as a result of the
sexual abuse, citing rulings of the Court that such may be attributed to numerous factors and that the
hymen of the victim need not be penetrated or ruptured for rape to be consummated. The appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE #1: Whether the testimony of the child victim may be given weight and credit considering that no
gynecological injuries was found on the victim
HELD #1: YES.

Jurisprudence teaches that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman
or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Moreover, we held in People v. Oden,
427 SCRA 634 (2004), that “the spontaneity with which the victim has detailed the incidents of rape, the
tears she ha[d] shed at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency almost throughout
her account dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony.”
ISSUE #2: Whether the denial of the accused of the crime attributed to him may overcome the testimony
of the child victim
HELD #2: NO.

A mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration
by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.
The accused-appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged is insufficient to exculpate him. Well
established is the rule that “a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes
attributed to him.” The Court also finds unconvincing the reason ascribed by accused-appellant on the
part of AAA to accuse him of rape, i.e., that AAA and her siblings disapproved of him as their mother’s
common-law husband. We find this argument flimsy and totally bereft of any corroboration. We already
ruled that “[m]otives such as resentment, hatred, or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full
credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. Further, ill motives become inconsequential if the rape
victim gave an affirmative and credible declaration, which clearly established the liability of the accused.”

vs.
RICARDO PIOSANG, accused-appellant.
FIRST, DIVISION, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013
FACTS: Upon the sworn complaint of AAA’s mother, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed with the
RTC an Information charging accused-appellant with rape upon the person of one [AAA] a minor, 4 years
of age, by then and there inserting his penis into the vagina of said complainant and thereafter had carnal
knowledge of her. At the trial, AAA’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of CCC, who
personally witnessed the rape, and by the medico-legal findings which reported healed lacerations on
AAA’s genital area and AAA’s non-virgin physical state. In contrast, accused-appellant denied the
allegations and averred that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the time of AAA’s rape.
He denies raping AAA and points to CCC, instead, as the perpetrator. Accused-appellant calls attention
to CCC’s initial refusal to reveal the incident when confronted by the latter’s mother, DDD.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping AAA. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modifications the RTC judgment increasing the award for damages in favour of the victim.
ISSUE #1: Whether there is cogent reason for the Supreme Court to review the findings of fact of the trial
court.
HELD #1: NONE.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court.
As a general rule, on the question whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense,
the trial court’s choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more
competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and
deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best
position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth. There is no
cogent reason for us to depart from the general rule in this case.
ISSUE #2: Whether the testimony of the child victim, AAA, may be given weight and credit by the court.
HELD #2: YES.

Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she
is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in
fact been committed.
AAA, who was six years old by the time she testified in court, had consistently, positively, and
categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete
with details of the rape. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when

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a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not
true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA
could not have invented a horrible story.
ISSUE #3: Whether the denial by the accused of his participation in the crime may prevail over the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
HELD #3: NO.

As between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on
the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
In contrast, accused-appellant averred that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the time
of AAA’s rape. We have oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand,
and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense
of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was
committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at
the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. In the case at bar, AAA
was raped in the detached comfort room of accused-appellant’s house on July 8, 1998, at which time,
accused-appellant claimed that he was in the garage of the very same house. Obviously, accused-
appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of commission of the crime.

vs.
ROEL VERGARA y CLAVERO, accused-appellant.
FACTS:Accused-appellant Vergara, being then the stepfather of one [AAA], was charged before the RTC
with the rape of AAA, a minor, 9 years of age The prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA, the
private offended party herself, and Dr. Remigio R. Camerino (Camerino), the physician who physically
examined AAA for signs of sexual abuse. The prosecution also submitted several documentary exhibits,
particularly: AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth; AAA’s Sworn Statement dated September 14, 2004 in which
AAA recounted how, where, and when accused-appellant raped her; the Letter-Request for AAA’s
Medico-Legal Examination; the result of AAA’s Pregnancy Test confirming her pregnancy at only nine
years of age; the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA’s son; and a picture of AAA’s son. In his defense,
[accused-appellant] interposed the lone defense of alibi, alleging that he was not in their house on the day
of the incident but was at work as a cook in a restaurant, less than a kilometer or about a 30minute walk
away from their house. The RTC convicted accused-appellant for simple statutory rape, and not for
qualified rape as charged. The trial court reasoned that it could not appreciate the aggravating or
qualifying circumstance of relationship alleged in the Information, particularly, accused-appellant being
AAA’s stepfather, because, as admitted by the parties and proved during trial, accused-appellant was not
legally AAA’s stepfather, but merely the common-law spouse of AAA’s mother. The Court of Appeals
wholly affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC against accused-appellant.
ISSUE #1: Whether the testimony of the child victim recounting the rape incident may be given weight
and credence.
HELD #1: YES.

It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, because when a
woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
ISSUE #2: Whether the defense of alibi by the accused-appellant that he was not in the place of the
incident when AAA was raped may be accorded greater weight than the positive declaration of the victim
HELD #2: NO.

Denial and alibi constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the positive declaration of a credible witness.
In contrast, accused-appellant’s bare denial and uncorroborated alibi deserve scant consideration. The
defense of alibi should be considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because
it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it is easily fabricated. Denial and alibi constitute
self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive
declaration of a credible witness. AAA’s positive testimony that she was sexually ravished by accused-
appellant, coupled with the appalling fact that she got pregnant at her tender age, certainly deserve more
credence and greater evidentiary weight than that of accused-appellant’s uncorroborated defenses.
For alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must not only prove that he was somewhere else when the crime
was committed, he must also convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the
locus criminis at the time of the incident.
In the present case, however, accused-appellant himself admitted that his place of work was less than a
kilometer or a mere 30-minute walk away from his house, where AAA was raped. Given the short
distance between these two places, it was not physically impossible for accused-appellant, in the
afternoon of September 12, 2004, to have left his work for a short while to go home and commit the rape
of AAA.

vs.
DANTE DEJILLO and GERV ACIO "Dongkoy" HOYLE, JR., Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Romeo saw clearly Aurelio and accused-appellants on the barangay road, just four meters away.
Accused-appellant Gervacio, alias Dongkoy, had his left arm on Aurelio’s right shoulder and with his right
hand, held and raised Aurelio’s left hand to shoulder level. Accused-appellant Dante then stabbed Aurelio
with a knife at the left side of the latter’s body. Accused-appellants ran away leaving Aurelio behind.
Aurelio was still standing but already staggering. Romeo was about to help Aurelio but he was chased
away by three men, one armed with a knife. Romeo went home to Ong Farm at Sitio Caong, San
Francisco, Ubay, Bohol, where he was arrested later that morning.
Florenda asked accused-appellant Gervacio to help her carry Aurelio home but accused-appellant
Gervacio pulled up Aurelio’s T-shirt and said, "So, he was hit because he was stabbed by Ramie
Puracan." Yet, as Florenda was embracing Aurelio, Aurelio was able to whisper in Florenda’s left ear that,
"I was stabbed by Dante while Dongkoy held me."
Accused-appellants assert that there was no dying declaration made by Aurelio and that the same was a
mere afterthought of the prosecution witnesses which must not be given any evidentiary weight. Accused-
appellants further point out that defense witness Petronilo, Sr. was likewise present when Aurelio was
found wounded and he categorically testified that Aurelio was not able to answer when asked who
stabbed him.

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ISSUE: Whether the statement made by Aurelio to Florendo pointing the accused-appellants as the
perpetrator of the crime qualifies as a dying declaration.
HELD: YES.
About thirty minutes or so before his death, the slain victim in this case, Aurelio "Boy" Basalo, uttered a
statement identifying the two accused, Dante Dejillo and Gervacio "Dongkoy" Hoyle, as his assailants.
The statement was testified to by three prosecution witnesses, namely: 1.) Florenda Basalo Dolera, the
victim’s sister; 2.) Amelita Basalo, the victim’s niece, and 3.) rebuttal witness, Saul Curiba.
Florenda Dolera clearly, positively, and convincingly testified that she was the first person to arrive at the
spot where her wounded brother lay on the ground, after she heard his faint cries for help; that when she
realized he was not just drunk but was wounded because Hoyle, Jr. then pulled up her brother’s shirt,
telling her he was stabbed by Ramy Puracan, she embraced her brother, who, with his lips near her ear,
whispered, "I was stabbed by Dante while Dongkoy held me." The second requisite is also present.
Aurelio Basalo gave such declaration under the consciousness of an impending death as shown by the
serious nature of his wound which in fact resulted in his death thirty minutes or so after he was found with
a stab wound on his left chest.
The requisites for admitting such declaration as evidence – an exception to the hearsay rule – are four,
which must concur, to wit: a.) the dying declaration must concern the crime and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death; b.) at the time it was made the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death; c.) the declarant was competent as a witness; and d.) the
declaration was offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide in which the decedent was
the victim.
NARCISO C. LOGUINSA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (5th DIVISION), Respondent.
FACTS: A Special Audit Teams were created to conduct Financial and Compliance Audit on the
Municipalities of Banaybanay, Manay, San Isidro and Boston, and Cash Examination of their respective
Municipal Treasurers. The audit found a shortage attributable to accused-appellant. Lumpay gave the
accused a copy of the report. Upon seeing the report, accused affixed his signature thereto.
A case for Malversation of Public Funds was filed against the accused. The RTC and the CA convicted
the accused of the said charge.
Petitioner insists that the fact that he signed the cash examination report should not have been
understood that he admitted his shortage, it only meant that an acknowledgment or a demand on him to
produce his shortage had been made. In fact, petitioner asserts that he never admitted his shortage.
Petitioner puts forward as his second assignment of error the assertion that his constitutional right to due
process was denied when his pleas for a re-audit and review of his case and account had been denied
outright by respondent court.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the signature of the accused in the cash examination report is equivalent to an
admission.
HELD # 1: YES.
Cash examination report contains entries made in the performance of official functions and is, thus,
sufficient by itself to establish prima facie the truth of the facts stated therein without the need of

presenting other evidence following the rule laid down by Section 44, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence.
As regards to petitioner’s claim that his signature on the cash examination report does not in any way
equate to an admission of the shortage reflected therein, we find the same to be incredulous given that
the natural presumption is that a person does not sign an official document, such as General Form No.
74(A) or cash examination report in this case, in blank (as petitioner claims) or without first informing
himself of its contents. Petitioner, who was a ranking government treasurer thus conceivably a person of
stature and intelligence, is presumed, by common logic, to know better than sign any document which he
knows would render him responsible, administratively or even criminally. In signing the assailed
document, petitioner acknowledged and certified that the amount therein stated is his accountability.
Only substantial evidence showing the contrary can possibly counteract such a documentary
acknowledgment. As borne out by the records of the instant case, petitioner was unable to present such
proof.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the accused was denied of due process on the ground that his pleas for a re-audit
and review of his case and account had been denied outright by respondent court.
HELD # 2: NO.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. In the case at bar, a perusal of the records would
indicate that petitioner was not denied any of the above due process guarantees that would warrant the
respondent court to review the factual findings of the court a quo and to order a re-audit of the process
that uncovered the shortage in petitioner’s accounts.
The findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded by the
appellate court high respect if not conclusive effect. Well-settled is the rule that unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts of substance and value which, if considered, might
affect the outcome of the case, its findings carry great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. In line
with our earlier conclusion that the first and second audits at issue were in proper order, we find that the
respondent Sandiganbayan did not err in denying petitioner’s request for a re-audit.

vs.
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA," Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the RTC found that
appellant, with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving him of
his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This incident was witnessed by
Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified appellant in court.
Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato.
When Renato recounted the events of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his
other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital
but he later on died.
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and the CA affirm the
decision.

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Issue: Whether the declaration of Florendo to Renato qualifies as a dying declaration and is therefore
admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother Renato has
complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being
stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was
appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression of the cause and the
surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There being
nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent to testify
had he survived.It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness. Lastly,
the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death. We reproduce the
statement of the RTC:
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. The
victim, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the
appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules, statement made by a person under the
consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of
his death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of herein
appellant.
It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing incident and after receiving adequate
care and treatment, because the apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a
consequence of appellant’s stabbing him in the chest.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,

vs.
LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO, Accused-appellant.
FACTS: This is an Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of accused-
appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
BBB left AAA in their house to look for BBB’s youngest daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached
the bridge her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost.
AAA and the accused appellant were already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost that she
was the mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB
asked her who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made
by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by accused appellant, which ended when a
certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When accused-appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the former
that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and sought help from their
neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangayofficials at the outpost.
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested that by
merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate. AAA, who was crying while being
asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite
her protestations.
ISSUE: Whether AAA’s mental condition affects her credibility as a witness.
HELD: NO.

AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the assault in her
testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she was asked at the
barangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we have ruled in a litany of cases, when
a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to
prove that rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, immaturity are
generally badges of truth. Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the physical
examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the
testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was stipulated upon by the prosecution
and the defense.

vs.
JERRY BATULA, alias “Cesar,” accused-appellant.
FACTS: An information charging Batula of Rape was filed with the RTC. The prosecution presented the
testimonies of AAA, the victim; BBB, the mother of AAA; Samuel Labanda (Labanda), an eyewitness to
the circumstances immediately following the rape; and Dr. Felino Gualdrapa (Dr. Gualdrapa), the
physician who conducted the physical examination of AAA.
The RTC rendered its decision convicting Accused of the crime charged, which was affirmed by the CA.
Batula assails the conflicting statements of AAA and her mother BBB. AAA testified that she did not know
the name of the man who ravished her as that was the first time that she saw him. Yet, BBB narrated on
the witness stand that AAA told her that she (AAA) had been raped by a man named Cesar. Batula
asserts that such contradiction reveals the malicious intent of AAA’s parents in implicating him in AAA’s
rape. Batula further imputes ill motive on the part of AAA’s parents, averring that it was CCC, AAA’s
father, who was taking care of the marijuana plantation which Batula and his brother Gil discovered on
the mountain, and that BBB and CCC were afraid that Batula might report the marijuana plantation to the
authorities.
ISSUE: Whether acquittal is in order on the ground that the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses
was rendered questionable by inconsistencies and malicious intent.
HELD: NO.
The credible and straight forward testimony of the victim, and the equally credible testimony of Samuel
Labanda who saw Jerry Batula passed him by immediately after the rape when the former hid when he
heard a voice being suppressed, but a little of it came out corroborated the fact, of the presence of
accused thereat. Samuel Labanda saw Jerry Batula covering his front with his right hand while the left,
held the bolo, squares with the recollection of the minor-victim to that effect. The testimony of the victim
that the accused had a bolo which was also corroborated by Samuel Labanda, is therefore true. And this
court takes cognizance that in mountain barangay in this province, men carry bolo/knife the least, and/or
a gun at most. Although, there is a slight contradiction which hand of the accused held what, it however
does not affect the prosecution’s cause, the same being only on minor point.
Moreover, the medical evidence likewise lends credence to AAA’s testimony. It is well-settled that when
the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal knowledge. Lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
The purported inconsistency between the testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB merely refers to a
minor detail. The central fact is that Batula, by means of force, threats, and intimidation, and use of a
bolo, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Whether AAA was able to name Batula as the
perpetrator immediately after the rape or AAA was able to identify Batula as her rapist at a later time,

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does not depart from the fact that Batula raped AAA. We have said time and again that a few
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in
actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead
of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they
discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.

vs.
WILLIAM MANGUNE y DEL ROSARIO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: An information was filed in the RTC charging Mangune with the crime of Rape.
The prosecution first presented AAA, who, in her Sworn Statements and testimony, accused her father,
Mangune, whom she identified in open court, of raping her on May 7, 2003, in his house in Muntinlupa.
AAA alleged that Mangune started raping her when she was just a little girl. She said that since she was
so young when the first rape occurred, her first clear memory of her father raping her was in 1994, when
she was in Grade III.
On May 7, 2003, AAA finally told her mother about the rapes, the last of which occurred that same
morning. AAA averred that at around 5:30 in the morning, while she was sleeping inside her room, she
felt her shorts being removed and something heavy go on top of her. Realizing it was her father, AAA
testified that she tried to fight back but was overpowered, at which point, Mangune was able to insert his
penis into her vagina. AAA stated that her shouts and pleas were met with slaps on the face and a scary
look from her father, prompting her to simply keep quiet. When her mother and aunt fetched her at around
noon later that day, she told them about the rapes, and her mother immediately brought her to Camp
Crame to be medically examined.
Explaining the finding that there were "[n]o external signs of application of any form of trauma," Carpio
said it meant that aside from the genital organ, there were no injuries noted in the other parts of the
body. Upon cross-examination, Carpio stated that his findings were consistent with AAA’s allegations in
the sense that the findings of healed deep lacerations in the hymen were compatible with the allegation of
several incidents of sexual abuse.
The RTC convicted the Accused and this decision was affirmed by the CA.
Mangune asseverates that the lower courts should have acquitted him based on reasonable doubt as
AAA’s testimony is not worthy of belief for having been fabricated. He supports such assertion by making
much of the fact that AAA did not sustain any external physical marks, as shown by the medico-legal
findings, despite her testimony that he slapped her many times on the face. This, Mangune insists, makes
AAA’s testimony incredible.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of AAA is unreliable on the ground that she did not sustain any external
physical marks despite her testimony that the accused slapped her many times on the face.
HELD: NO.
While the victim testified that she was slapped many times by the accused-appellant, which caused her to
become unconscious, the doctor found no trace or injury on her face. The absence of any injury or
hematoma on the face of the victim does not negate her claim that she was slapped. Dr. Lao also testified
that if the force was not strong enough or if the patient’s skin is normal, as compared to other patients
where even a slight rubbing of their skin would cause a blood mark, no hematoma will result.

But, even granting that there were no extra-genital injuries on the victim, it had been held that the
absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of the crime of rape. The
same rule applies even though no medical certificate is presented in evidence. Proof of injuries is not
necessary because this is not an essential element of the crime.
Furthermore, Mangune could not impute any ill motive on AAA or his wife that would explain why he was
charged with such a heinous crime. We have ruled that "[a]bsent evidence showing any reason or motive
for a witness to falsely testify against the accused, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive
exists and the testimony should be accorded full faith and credit."

vs.
RADBY ESTOYA y MATEO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On April 5, 2006, around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, AAA was sleeping on her aunt’s bed
when she was awakened because someone was on top of her. When she realized that it was appellant,
she attempted to shout but her resistance was subdued by his threat that he will stab her with a knife.
She realized that appellant had undressed her and suddenly felt appellant’s penis entering her vagina.
Due to fear, the two (2) nephews of AAA and her brother CCC, hurriedly ran out of the house to report
AAA’s ordeal to DDD, a neighbor.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) AAA, the victim; (2) BBB, AAA’s aunt; and (3) CCC,
AAA’s brother. The prosecution also submitted, among other documentary evidence, AAA’s Birth
Certificate, establishing that AAA was born on September 18, 1991 and was 14 years old at the time of
the incident; and the Medico Legal Report of Dr. Pierre Paul F. Carpio (Carpio) dated April 5, 2006,
finding "a shallow fresh laceration at 6 o’clock position" of the hymen and "clear evidence of penetrating
trauma to the hymen."
RTC convicted the accused which was affirmed by the CA.
Estoya points out several purported inconsistencies, ambiguities, and improbabilities in the evidence of
the prosecution, viz, (1) CCC alleged in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was able to enter the house
and thereupon, he saw AAA naked and crying while Estoya was on top of AAA, but on cross-examination,
CCC admitted that he only saw AAA crying as Estoya already closed the door and CCC was unable to
enter the house; (2) BBB’s testimony was hearsay because she was in Manila at the time of the incident
and she only received a text message from her sister, AAA’s mother, that AAA had been raped; (3) AAA
testified that Estoya surreptitiously entered the room where AAA was sleeping, however, it is very
doubtful that Estoya could have gained entrance into the house with no one from the household noticing;
and (4) it is contrary to human experience that AAA, as she was being raped, did not cry out aloud or
manifest a tenacious resistance to repel the impending threat on her honor.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the lack of resistance from AAA during the alleged rape renders her testimony
unreliable.
HELD # 1: NO.
Estoya further attempts to raise doubts in AAA’s testimony by questioning AAA’s failure to offer tenacious
resistance during the supposed sexual assault. We are not swayed. We must keep in mind that AAA was
only 14 years of age at the time of the rape, and at such a tender age, she could not be expected to put
up resistance as would be expected from a mature woman. Also, Estoya had threatened AAA that he
would stab her with a knife if she resisted. In any case, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the
burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is

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exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for
life and personal safety.
ISSUE # 2: Whether ill motive attended the reporting of the crime thereby casting doubt as to the victim’s
reliability.
HELD # 2: NO.
Estoya has failed to allege and prove any improper motive on AAA’s part for AAA to falsely accuse
Estoya of rape. Since there was no showing of any improper motive on the part of the victim to testify
falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of the crime, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence. We have in many cases held that no young Filipina would publicly admit that she had been
criminally abused and ravished, unless it is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. We
simply cannot believe that a 14-year old girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of
her private parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and
scandal of a public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.
ISSUE # 3: Whether the inconsistent statements made by AAA impair her credibility as a witness.
HELD # 3: NO.
Said inconsistencies do not at all damage CCC’s credibility as a witness. It is doctrinally settled that
discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness’ affidavit and testimony in open court do not
impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or
absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. We also add that CCC was only 10 years of
age when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and testified in court. It is not difficult to imagine that
CCC was also overwhelmed by the circumstances, young as he was when these all happened. The
important thing is that CCC was consistent in saying that he saw Estoya with AAA in BBB’s house; he
saw AAA crying; and he immediately ran to ask help from their neighbor, DDD. Moreover, as we
pronounced previously herein, AAA’s testimony alone already established the elements of rape
committed against her by Estoya. At most, CCC’s testimony on the events that occurred on April 5, 2006
is merely corroborative.
ISSUE # 4: Whether Estoya’s denial and alibi may be upheld.
HELD # 4: NO.
On April 5, 2006, at around 3:00 p.m., Estoya claimed to be at his house, which was only around six to
seven meters away from BBB’s house, where AAA was raped. The very short distance between the two
houses does not foreclose the possibility of Estoya’s presence at BBB’s house at the time of AAA’s rape.
Lastly, Estoya did not present any evidence to corroborate his alibi. He averred that he spent the day with
his nephews and nieces, yet he did not present a single one to support his averment. In the face of AAA's
unwavering testimony and very positive and firm identification of Estoya as her assailant, Estoya could no
longer hide behind the protective shield of his presumed innocence, but he should have come forward
with credible and strong evidence of his lack of authorship of the crime.

vs.
WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA, and DENNIS DAYAON y TUPIT, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC convicting the
accused of Robbery with homicide.

Perlie, the surviving victim testified that accused-appellant Diu embraced Perlie while accused-appellant
Dayaon and De la Cruz held on to Nely. Perlie was able to break loose by elbowing accused-appellant
Diu, but accused-appellant Diu grabbed Perlie’s bag, which contained her work uniform, personal effects,
and P1, 800.00 cash. Perlie ran away to ask for help from people nearby. Meanwhile, accused-appellant
Dayaon and De la Cruz were embracing Nely from behind. As she tried to go near Nely, Perlie saw
accused-appellant and De la Cruz stabbing Nely, passing a knife to each other. Perlie described the knife
as double bladed and approximately seven inches long. After the stabbing, Nely was left lying face down
on the ground, covered in blood. The entire incident took place within two minutes. Two men then helped
Perlie bring Nely to the Ospital Ning Angeles, where Nely was pronounced dead on arrival. Perlie
recovered Nely’s bag and upon checking its contents, she discovered that P50.00 was missing.
Accused-appellants contend that the RTC heavily relied on Perlie’s testimony, the certainty and veracity
of which on material points are highly questionable. Accused-appellants called attention to the following:
(1) the crime happened late at night, so it was very dark, and Perlie could not have seen clearly the
culprits’ faces; (2) Perlie had not seen accused-appellants before so she could not have recognized them
instantly; (3) it would have been impossible for Perlie to identify the exact knife used in Nely’s stabbing,
and she was only led on to believe that she was being presented with the very same knife by the police
officers’ suggestive remarks; (4) Perlie was merely informed by police officers that the men who assaulted
her and Nely had been apprehended, but Perlie was not required to identify accused-appellants; (5) there
is no proof, other than Perlie’s own statements, that robbery took place and the original police
investigation only focused on homicide; (6) accused-appellants were illegally arrested without warrants;
and (7) except for the fact that accused-appellants were at the scene of the crime, there was no other
positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy.
ISSUE # 1: Whether it is impossible for Perlie to recognize accused-appellants as the culprits during the
commission of the crime due to the darkness of the place
HELD # 1: NO.
As to the lighting condition along Colorado Street the night of October 3, 2003, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals both believed Perlie’s recollection that there were many streetlamps with light as bright as sun
rays. In fact, it was bright enough that Perlie was able to see and describe not only the facial features of
accused-appellants, but their facial expressions as well. In contrast, accused-appellant Dayaon’s
testimony that it was very dark and that there was only one streetlamp along Colorado Street the night of
October 3, 2003, was inconsistent and unreliable. At first, accused-appellant Dayaon testified that it was
so dark that he could not see anything at all; subsequently, he claimed that he saw De la Cruz from 15
meters away approaching people he could not see well enough to tell if they were girls; and even later, he
stated that he saw the two girls walking on the other side of the street, as the girls were closer to his and
accused-appellant Dayaon’s position than De la Cruz.
ISSUE # 2: Whether it is impossible for Perlie to identify the exact knife used in the crime.
HELD# 2: NO.
Perlie’s certainty that the knife shown to her at the police station and during trial was the very same knife
used in the stabbing of Nely was wholly dependent on the police officer’s representation to her that it was
such. Nevertheless, failure of the prosecution to present the weapon used in Nely’s stabbing is not fatal to
its case. Presentation of the knife used is not essential to prove homicide. The fact and manner of Nely’s
death were duly established by evidence on record. Perlie saw accused-appellant Dayaon and De la Cruz
embrace Nely, then stab Nely with a double-edged knife that was approximately seven inches long. Nely
was declared dead on arrival at the hospital due to multiple stab wounds.
ISSUE # 3: Whether there is proof that the robbery took place other than the self-serving statement of
Perlie.
HELD # 3: YES.

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Once more, accused-appellants are challenging Perlie’s credibility. Time and again, the Court has held
that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear,
straightforward, and worthy of credence by the trial court, as in the case of Perlie’s testimony. The
trustworthiness of Perlie’s testimony is further bolstered by its consistency and details. In her Sworn
Statement executed on October 4, 2003, only a day after the incident, Perlie already mentioned that she
and her sister were victims of a "hold-up" and that her shoulder bag, containing P1,800.00 cash and her
work uniform, was taken. On the witness stand, under oath, she retold how after embracing her, accused-
appellant Diu grabbed her shoulder bag with the P1,800.00 cash, her work uniform, and her other
personal belongings. The P1,800.00 cash was not some random amount that Perlie conjured, but it was
her salary from the hotel.
ISSUE # 4: Whether the conviction should be overturned on the ground of the illegality of the arrest of the
accused-appellants.
HELD # 4: NO.
We note that nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the irregularity
of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly
arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have
waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court
trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the
validity of the conviction of the accused
ISSUE # 5: Whether there is positive and convincing evidence of the conspiracy.
HELD # 5: NO.
The actuations of accused-appellants and De la Cruz were clearly coordinated and complementary to one
another. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the
commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. As the RTC declared, "the
actions of the three accused, from the deprivation of the eyewitness Perlie of her personal belongings by
accused Diu to the stabbing of the victim Nely by accused Dayaon and De la Cruz, Jr., are clear and
indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive Perlie and Nely of their personal belongings, and that
by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, stabbed and killed victim Nely Salvador." The absence
of proof that accused-appellants attempted to stop Nely’s killing, plus the finding of conspiracy, make
accused-appellants liable as principals for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

vs.
EDMUNDO VITERO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: AAA was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody on top of her. When she opened her
eyes, she saw her own father mounting her. After stripping AAA naked, accused brought out his penis
and inserted it into AAA’s vagina and made a pumping motion. At the same time, he was kissing her lips
and neck and fondling her breasts. AAA felt searing pain and her vagina bled. She started to cry, but he
was unmoved and warned her not to make any noise. She tried to resist his lewd desires, but her efforts
were in vain. She did not shout for help because she feared accused who had a 20-inch knife beside him

might kill her. After ravishing AAA, accused dressed himself and went back to sleep. Because of the
harrowing experience she suffered from the hands of her own father, AAA was not able to sleep anymore.
AAA did not report her ordeal to her grandparents for fear they would only scold her.
She finally found AAA in the house of her employer in Lian, Batangas in November 2000. BBB asked
AAA if she was indeed raped by her father. AAA disclosed that accused ravished her six (6) times while
they were still living in her grandparents’ house. He usually raped AAA at night when she and her siblings
were already sleeping in their room.
Accused-appellant essentially argues that AAA’s testimony was "highly incredible and illogical" as she
had ample opportunity to ask for help. According to AAA herself, at the time of the alleged rape, her
siblings were sleeping right beside her and accused-appellant in the room, while her grandparents were
right in the next room. Accused-appellant also highlights AAA’s delay in reporting the purported rape and
instituting a criminal case against him, and further implies that AAA might have some sinister or ulterior
motive in falsely charging him with rape. Moreover, accused-appellant’s alibi that he was living and
working in Manila from 1996 to 2000 was corroborated by two witnesses.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the presence of ample opportunity to ask for help impairs the credibility of AAA’s
testimony that she was raped by the accused.
HELD # 1: NO.
Different people react differently to different situations and there is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a frightful experience. While the reaction of some women, when
faced with the possibility of rape, is to struggle or shout for help, still others become virtually catatonic
because of the mental shock they experience. In the instant case, it is not inconceivable or improbable
that [private complainant], being of tender age, would be intimidated into silence by the threats and
actions of her father.
We have also previously pronounced that in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the moral
ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby forcing her to do
whatever he wants. Otherwise stated, the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow
the victim into submission to his beastly desires. Even so, it is notable in this case that accused-appellant
did not only use his moral ascendancy and influence over AAA as her father, he employed actual force
and intimidation upon her. AAA recounted on the stand that accused-appellant "boxed" her on her right
shoulder, near her armpit. When AAA tried to push accused-appellant away from her and to turn her body
away from him, accused-appellant pulled her back. Additionally, accused-appellant had a 20-inch knife
close by as he was sexually molesting AAA.
ISSUE #2: Whether the delay of AAA in reporting the crime is a manifestation of sinister and ulterior
motive to falsely charge accused of the crime.
HELD # 2: NO.
As for AAA, not only was her rapist her own father, but she was also living amongst her father’s relatives.
AAA was even brought far away from her hometown in Albay and made to stay with accused-appellant’s
sister in Batangas, isolating her from people and places she had known all her life. It was only when BBB
finally found AAA in 2000 and took AAA with her did AAA felt safe enough to narrate to BBB what
accused-appellant did to her two years ago.
Indeed, the vacillation of a rape victim in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair her
credibility as a witness. Delay in reporting the crime neither diminishes her credibility nor undermines her
charges, particularly when the delay can be attributed to a pattern of fear instilled by the threats of one
who exercises moral ascendancy over her.

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vs.
ABEL DIAZ, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: At early dawn of March 30, 2003, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody on top
of her. While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming from outside illuminated her room and
allowed her to recognize the then shirtless accused-appellant as the intruder. Startled, she pushed the
accused-appellant away and shouted "Umalis ka sa harap ko! Go away!" but she was not able to free
herself as he held her hands and he was straddling her. She called Ditse but the accused-appellant
boxed her stomach and told her not to make any noise or else he would stab her. Because of the pain
caused by the punch, Mara almost lost consciousness but she continued to struggle. Despite her
resistance, however, the accused-appellant was able to raise her loose shirt and removed her panty. She
continued to resist the accused-appellant’s advances but the latter boxed her thighs, numbing her legs.
Weakened by her struggle, the accused-appellant was able to penetrate her.
When Ate arrived, she accompanied Mara and Ditse to the police station to report the incident.
Thereafter, they went to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital where Mara was examined. The medical
examination of Mara showed that she had multiple "hematoma" or bruises in the neck and lower jaw. She
also had a bruise in the front portion of her thigh. She also suffered abrasions in her genitalia which,
according to the examining doctor, meant that there was sexual intercourse within the past 24 hours.
Another proof of recent intercourse was the presence of sperm cells in her vagina.
The accused assails the credibility of Mara as her identification of him was contrary to human experience
as she admitted that her room was dark and she was not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the
alleged assault. For him, the prosecution failed to prove the element of force or intimidation as there was
an absence of any "real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm that would
overpower the mind of the victim and prevent her from offering resistance." While claiming that she was
verbally threatened of being stabbed, Mara admitted that she did not see any knife in his possession.
Mara also failed to make an outcry during the two hours that the accused-appellant allegedly stayed in
her room.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt considering the
alleged unreliability of the witness.
HELD # 1: YES.
We also affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that Mara’s credibility was not eroded by her testimony
that the accused-appellant tarried for two hours in her room. The Court of Appeals said it well: when one
is being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be reasonably expected to
keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last minute. Indeed, for a woman undergoing the
ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the accused-appellant, every moment is like an eternity of hell
and the transit of time is a painfully slow crawl that she would rather forget. In addition, the precise
duration of the rape is not material to and does not negate the commission of the felony. Rape has no
regard for time and place. It has been committed in all manner of situations and in circumstances thought
to be inconceivable.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the prosecution was able to prove that force and intimidation attended the alleged
sexual intercourse.
HELD # 2: YES.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution sufficiently proved the element of force or
intimidation which attended the sexual assault against Mara. It cannot be denied that the accused-

appellant forcibly held, repeatedly punched and violently ravished Mara. The injuries which she sustained
in the neck, thigh and genital areas, documented in the medico legal-report of the examination conducted
on the very same day her person was violated, trump accused-appellant’s contrary claim. Weak and in
pain, the repeated threats of being stabbed coupled with the blows already inflicted on her, certainly
intimidated Mara and created a numbing fear in her mind that her assailant was capable of hurting her
more and carrying out his threats.

vs.
MERCIDITA T. RESURRECCION, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: After receiving information that accused-appellant was illegally peddling shabu, the Makati City
SAID-SOTF constituted a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team then spotted accused-
appellant approaching a store. The informant introduced PO2 Lique to accused-appellant as his friend
who wanted to buy shabu. PO2 Lique then handed the marked bills to accused-appellant who handed to
PO2 Lique in exchange a heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu. PO2 Lique held accused-
appellant’s right shoulder to signal the consummation of the transaction. Abellana immediately came to
PO2 Lique’s aid in apprehending accused-appellant.
RTC convicted the accused and on appeal the CA affirm the appealed decision.
Accused-appellant is trying to make an issue of the alleged inconsistency between PO2 Lique’s sworn
affidavit and his testimony before the RTC. In his sworn affidavit, PO2 Lique averred that accused-
appellant voluntarily emptied her pockets and handed over to the police the canister containing the 12
heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu. When he testified before the trial court, PO2 Lique narrated that
accused-appellant had refused to obey the order for her to empty her pockets so that PO2 Lique himself
checked accused-appellant’s pockets wherein he found the said canister, which he immediately
confiscated.
ISSUE: Whether acquittal is in order on the ground of inconsistency of the testimony of the witness and
the unreliability of the pieces of evidence presented.
HELD: NO.
The inconsistency is trifling and does not affect any of the elements of the crime charged. Regardless of
who emptied accused-appellant’s pockets, the important fact was that the canister was actually found
inside accused-appellant’s pockets and in her possession. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
testimony referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the
witnesses’ credibility. More so, an inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is
not a ground to reverse a conviction.
Although no photograph of the seized items was submitted in evidence, the same does not render void
and invalid the confiscation and custody of the seized items as long as their integrity and evidentiary
value had been properly preserved by the apprehending officers, as in this case. The testimonies of police
officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit, in view of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence, when lined against an
unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the accused red-
handed is given more weight and usually prevails. In order to overcome the presumption of regularity,
there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties
or that they were prompted with ill motive, none of which exists in this case.

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vs.
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: An Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed against accused-
appellants.
The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were
causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At
around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street.
Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted: "Anong
pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a knife from
Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, Vergara and
Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to
the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.
As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo’s finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven.
ISSUE: Whether the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt, considering the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
HELD: YES.
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are
that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is a
showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the
findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had
the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern
if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. The
rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed
firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial courts are in a
better position to decide the question of credibility.
A careful review of the records reveals that accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of the
trial court with concrete evidence that it had overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the
Court of Appeals when it stated that:
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted
by [appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and
stabbed him repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife handed to him by
[appellant Inocencio]. This is an overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all
[appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and self-defense. Denial is an intrinsically weak
defense, which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily fail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
JOEL AQUINO y CENDANA @ "AKONG," Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Upon reaching the nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his companions had a shabu session while
Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay Five
Hundred Pesos (P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money. Appellant shouted at the victim
demanding him to pay. Bing suggested to her companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus, the victim
mounted his tricycle and started the engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind
the victim while appellant and Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the toolbox of the
tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the
victim’s side. After the victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while appellant drove the
tricycle to his friend’s house where they again stabbed the victim using the latter’s own knife. Then they
loaded the victim to the tricycle and drove to a grassy area where appellant and his companions dumped
the body of the victim. Thereafter, they returned to appellant’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of
appellant about the death of his father but the sister of appellant only told him to sleep.
Appellant challenges his conviction by arguing that the trial court was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt because it only relied on the incredible and inconsistent testimony of Jefferson Lita –
the sole eyewitness presented by the prosecution. He contends that if Jefferson was indeed present
during the murder of his father, Jesus Lita, then it would be highly inconceivable that Jefferson would
have lived to tell that tale since he would most likely be also killed by the perpetrators being an
eyewitness to the crime. Furthermore, appellant maintains that he cannot possibly have committed the
crimes attributed to him because, on the night that Jesus was murdered, he was asleep in the barracks of
a construction site somewhere in Dasmariñas City, Cavite.
ISSUE # 1: Whether acquittal is in order on the ground of the inconsistent statements of the witness.
HELD # 1: NO.
Jurisprudence also tells us that when a testimony is given in a candid and straightforward manner, there
is no room for doubt that the witness is telling the truth. A perusal of the testimony of Jefferson indicates
that he testified in a manner that satisfies the aforementioned test of credibility. More importantly, during
his time at the witness stand, Jefferson positively and categorically identified appellant as one of the
individuals who stabbed his father.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the alibi of the accused proves his innocence.
HELD # 2: NO.
Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to
be at San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan when Jesus was murdered. His own testimony revealed that the
distance between the locus delicti and Dasmariñas City, Cavite is only a four to five hour regular
commute. Thus, it would not be physically impossible for him to make the round trip between those two
points from dusk till dawn of September 5-6, 2002 and still have more than enough time to participate in
the events surrounding the murder of Jesus.
Furthermore, the only person that could corroborate appellant’s alibi is his friend and former co-worker,
Paul Maglaque. However, we have consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense of alibi when
it is corroborated by friends and relatives since we have established in jurisprudence that, in order for
corroboration to be credible, the same must be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. Clearly, due
to his friendship with appellant, Maglaque cannot be considered as a disinterested witness.

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vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her].
Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts
of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus.
Under the same circumstances with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings were asleep,
[Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and
held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
On the last incident, AAA’s mother saw the accused in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while
the latter was asleep.
Accused described the layout of their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual
abuses could have happened. All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine
how he could possibly still go about with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the
same. Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as it failed to
indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted.
Pareja defense rests on attacking the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed,
AAA acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
ISSUE # 1: Whether AAA is a credible witness, considering the alleged inconsistencies in his testimony.
HELD # 1: YES.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account
has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. The inconsistencies mentioned
by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was
being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAA’s ordeal. The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important
only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the
evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes
relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the
date of the commission of the crime." Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime.
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the
victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that
no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that
failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that
the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission
by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or
common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence. In this case, AAA’s lack
of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she
ever spoke of the incident.
ISSUE # 2: Whether it is impossible for the accused to have sexually abused the victim considering that
their house was so small that they have to sleep beside each other, and the fact when the alleged

incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything
unusual was happening.
HELD # 2: NO.
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his
beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us
were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies constraints
of time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr., we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped
space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less
disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them
around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members
to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed.
One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are
not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in
appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are
present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have
repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time and place," and rape can be
committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
ISSUE # 3: Whether the medical report is an indispensable evidence to prove rape.
HELD # 3: NO.
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole
testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado, we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert
testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she was
examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim
of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the
prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja
cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

vs.
EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the RTC which found him guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following eyewitness account of Mark
Almodovar:
He witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing the fat man repeatedly on different parts of his
body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the fat man’s personal belongings, including his

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ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left. He followed them to a place which he described
as far and there, he saw them buried the knife and covered it with soil.
Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was assisted in his testimony by Daniel
Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990.
Accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness. Accused-appellant argued that,

being a deaf-mute who cannot make known his perception to others as he has no formal education on
sign language, Mark is unqualified to be a witness.
Accused-appellant highlighted Mark’s failure to identify him as the perpetrator of the crime in the two
instances that he was presented to Mark in a line-up. This made Mark’s alleged positive identification of
accused-appellant doubtful.
ISSUE # 1: Whether Mark is disqualified to testify on the ground that he is a deaf-mute.
HELD # 1: NO.
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that
"all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses." A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as his/her
sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with
others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in
this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to
make observations and he/she can make those observations known to others.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the
Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the
Deaf since 1990 and possessed special education and training for interpreting sign language. The trial
and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for Mark. No ground to disturb that
finding exists.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the failure of Mark to identify the accused in a police line-up renders his testimony
doubtful.
HELD # 2: NO.
Accused-appellant’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of him fails. Indeed, the law requires
not simply an eyewitness account of the act of committing the crime but the positive identification of the
accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-
appellant in a police line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police
line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of the accused
as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open court. Nevertheless, the records show that
Mark identified accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the victim in a police line-up on February 18,
2003 and, more importantly, in open court in the course of Mark’s testimony.


vs.
SALVADOR C. DACO, accused-appellant.
EN BANC, G.R. No. 168166, October 10, 2008
FACTS: Under automatic review is the decision of the CA affirming the ruling of the RTC which found
herein accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of qualified Rape against
his own daughter and sentenced him to suffer the extreme penalty of death on each count.
The instant appeal was anchored on the catch-all argument that accused-appellant's guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The arguments advanced by accused-appellant mainly revolve on the issue of credibility. In trying to cast
doubt on the credibility of the victim, accused-appellant points out the following discrepancies between
the former's sworn statement given during the preliminary investigation and her testimony in open court:
1. AAA testified that on October 7, 1999, when accused-appellant fetched her from the house of her
friend and brought her to the copra kiln, her niece was with them, but in her sworn declaration she made it
appear that she was alone, as gleaned from her statement that she went back to her friend's house alone.
2. AAA testified that during the November 1999 rape incident, only she and the accused-appellant were in
their house as her mother was working in the mountain; and as to her siblings, she did not know where
they were at that time. In her sworn declaration she stated that during the time that she was raped, her
siblings were inside the house, sleeping.
3. AAA testified that when she was raped by the accused-appellant sometime in December 1999, only the
two of them where inside the house; however, in her sworn statement, she stated that her nephews and
niece were inside house.
4. During the January 2000 rape event, AAA testified that the incident happened during daytime, but in
her sworn statement, AAA categorically declared that she was raped at around 9:00 o'clock p.m.
5. Regarding the rape incident that took place in February 2000, AAA testified that they only had one (1)
house and that all the members of the family including accused-appellant were sleeping in just one room.
She also declared that she revealed her ordeal only to her elder sister. However, in her sworn
declaration, she stated that accused-appellant was able to rape her in February 2000 because her mother
and siblings were then staying in their other house, and that she was able to reveal said incident to her
mother.
6. As to the rape incident that took place in March 2000, she stated in her sworn statement that their
house had two (2) rooms and that she slept in the other room not occupied by her parents. However,
when she gave her testimony in court, she stated that their house had only one (1) room.
7. Anent the last rape, accused-appellant contends that the victim's claim that there was total darkness
inside the culvert where she was allegedly raped is unbelievable, considering that according to the victim
the incident took place during daytime and the culvert was located just beside the road.
ISSUE: Whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt considering that AAA’s
inconsistent statement renders her testimony doubtful.
HELD: YES.
To begin with, inconsistencies between a witness' sworn declaration and her testimony in open court do
not necessarily impair her credibility. In several cases we have held that discrepancies between the

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statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit her, since ex parte affidavits tend to be incomplete and inaccurate. Hence, affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to declarations made in open court.
It is settled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and
collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their
testimonies, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant. In fact, honest inconsistencies on
minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime,
especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.

vs.
DOMINGO DOMINGUEZ, JR., alias "SANDY," Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On appeal is the decision of the CA which affirmed with modifications the Decision of the RTC
convicting accused-appellant Domingo Dominguez, Jr., also known as "Sandy," of three counts of rape
and two counts of attempted rape of his minor daughter.
Accused-appellant asserted his innocence and asked for his acquittal from all the charges.
Anent the three counts of qualified rape, accused-appellant denied the accusations and questioned the
motive of AAA in charging him with said crime. Accused-appellant pointed out that it was implausible that
AAA would not tell her mother and siblings about the alleged rapes. It was also incredible that AAA would
still accompany accused-appellant repeatedly to the coconut farm despite her having been previously
sexually assaulted by him, with AAA knowing that their seclusion was another opportunity for accused-
appellant to sexually assault her again. Accused-appellant averred that AAA’s unexplained silence and
continuous acquiescence to the sexual abuses supposedly committed against her made her accusations
dubious.
ISSUE: Whether AAA’s credibility is rendered doubtful by her unexplained silence and continuous
acquiescence to the sexual abuses supposedly committed against her.
HELD: NO.
We find completely understandable AAA’s silence and apparent assent to the sexual abuses of her father
for a period of time. No standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim following her
defilement, particularly a child who could not be expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult. More
importantly, in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the moral ascendancy and influence over his
daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants. Otherwise stated, the
moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly
desires. AAA sufficiently explained that fear of her father’s authority and shame kept her from revealing to
others her ghastly ordeal at the hands of her own father. Moreover, AAA’s fear of physical harm if she
defied her father was real. By accused-appellant’s own admission, on cross examination, he had used
physical force to discipline his children whenever he was angry or mad.
We find no reason to doubt AAA’s credibility, and accord great weight and respect to the findings of the
trial and appellate courts that her testimonies are consistent, candid, and straightforward. Accused-
appellant’s bare denial, as opposed to AAA’s positive testimonies, and accused-appellant’s
uncorroborated allegation of ill motive on AAA’s part in filing the criminal charges, are bereft of evidentiary
value.


vs.
ROGER TEJERO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On appeal is the Decision of the CA, which affirmed with modifications the Decision of the RTC
finding accused-appellant Roger Tejero (Tejero) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape
committed against AAA.
Tejero’s instant appeal is anchored on the catch-all argument that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Tejero challenges AAA’s credibility considering: (1) AAA’s concealment of the alleged
rapes for more than six months after they happened without a satisfactory explanation for the delay in
reporting the same; (2) AAA’s failure to take precautionary measures to prevent the successive rapes
committed against her; and (3) AAA’s untruthful account that Tejero pointed a gun at her during one of
the rape incidents.
ISSUE: Whether the AAA’s credibility is rendered doubtful by her delay in reporting the crime and her
failure to take precautionary measures to prevent the successive rapes.
HELD: NO.
AAA’s delay in reporting the rapes does not undermine her credibility. In a long line of cases, the Court
pronounced that the failure of the victim to immediately report the rape is not necessarily an indication of
a fabricated charge. It is quite understandable how AAA’s tender age, AAA’s regard for Tejero as her
stepfather, Tejero’s threat to kill AAA and her whole family, and Tejero’s physical proximity to AAA and
her family (Tejero lives in the same house with AAA and her family) could all have easily convinced AAA
that Tejero’s threat was real and discouraged AAA from immediately reporting the rapes to anyone.
Equally unsuccessful is Tejero’s attempt to destroy AAA’s credibility by questioning the latter’s failure to
take precautionary measures to prevent the successive rapes. Again, AAA is a young girl who had been
raped and threatened by someone she considers her stepfather and who lives with her and her family in
the same house. The Court need not require AAA to prove that she fought back or protected herself in
some way to stop the rape or to keep the rape from happening again. It is not accurate to say that there is
a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims, as not every victim can be expected to act
conformably with the usual expectation of mankind and there is no standard behavioral response when
one is confronted with a strange or startling experience, each situation being different and dependent on
the various circumstances prevailing in each case.

vs.
ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA a.k.a. JUNIOR; JOEY PAMPLONA a.k.a. NATO and JESSIE
GARCIA Y ADORINO, Accused-Appellants.
En Banc, G.R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009
FACTS: Appellants Garchitorena, Pamplona and Garcia were charged and accused of the crime of
Murder.
During the trial, prosecution presented Dulce Borero, the sister of the victim, who was an eye-witness to
the commission of the aforesaid crime. On the other hand, defense presented their alibis and pointed out
the inconsistent statement of Dulce during direct and cross examination.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellants of the crime of Murder. On appeal,
the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.

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Appellants contend that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to the
inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses affect their credibility.
HELD: NO.
The seeming inconsistencies between her direct testimony and her cross-examination testimonies are not
sufficient ground to disregard them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan Noel y Molet and
Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz, we ruled that:
“minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against
memorized falsities.”
Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility of Borero or her narration of the incident.
On the contrary, they showed that her account was the entire truth. In fact, her narration was in harmony
with the account of defense witness Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn Statement of Borero
and her testimony before the lower court were in complete congruence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RANDY MAGBANUA alias "BOYUNG" and WILSON MAGBANUA, Accused-appellants.
FACTS: Appellants Randy and Wilson Magbanua were accused and charged for the violation of R.A.
6425. It was alleged in the information that herein appellants were flagged down while driving a vehicle,
due to their failure to follow the instructions given by the arresting officers in this case.
When the window was rolled down, the arresting officers smelled the scent of marijuana coming from
inside the car. As such, they requested for herein appellants to alight from the vehicle, and examined the
back seat of the vehicle, wherein they discovered four bricks of marijuana. The arresting officers
confiscated the four bricks of marijuana, without issuing a receipt for such, and arrested herein
appellants.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellants for the violation of R.A. 6425. On
appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.
Appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to the
inconsistencies of the testimonies of the arresting officers and due to the failure of the same to issue a
receipt for the confiscated items.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the alleged inconsistencies of the testimonies of the arresting officers affect their
credibility.
HELD # 1: NO.
Inconsistencies as to immaterial or minor matters shall not affect the credibility of witnesses

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the two (2) police officers pointed out by the accused-
appellants are not material but relate only to minor matters. What is essential in a conviction for violation
of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is that the possession of the prohibited drug must
be duly established.
As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate each other on material points, the minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to
strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or rehearsed.
Even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements.
Generally, courts give full faith and credit to police officers for they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner. Courts cannot simply set aside their testimonies where there is no showing
that the search conducted on the accused-appellants was clearly violative of their constitutional rights or
the said search was a mere ploy to extort on the part of the police officers.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the failure on the part of the arresting officers to issue a receipt on the confiscated
items affects the integrity of the subject pieces of evidence thereby rendering the same inadmissible.
HELD # 2: NO.
Failure to issue a receipt will not render the confiscated evidence inadmissible, provided that such
evidence is properly preserved.
As long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, the failure to issue a receipt will not render the items seized/confiscated
inadmissible as evidence. As held by the Court in People v. Alvin Pringas, what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Here, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The seized drugs
were immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded to the Crime
Laboratory for examination.
MARIA TORBELA, represented by her heirs, namely: EULOGIO TOSINO, husband and children:
CLARO, MAXIMINO, CORNELIO, OLIVIA and CALIXTA, all surnamed TOSINO, APOLONIA TOSINO
VDA. DE RAMIREZ and JULITA TOSINO DEAN; PEDRO TORBELA, represented by his heirs,
namely: JOSE and DIONISIO, both surnamed TORBELA; EUFROSINA TORBELA ROSARIO,
represented by her heirs, namely: ESTEBAN T. ROSARIO, MANUEL T. ROSARIO, ROMULO T.
ROSARIO and ANDREA ROSARIO-HADUCA; LEONILA TORBELA TAMIN; FERNANDO TORBELA,
represented by his heirs, namely: SERGIO T. TORBELA, EUTROPIA T. VELASCO, PILAR T.
ZULUETA, CANDIDO T. TORBELA, FLORENTINA T. TORBELA and PANTALEON T. TORBELA;
DOLORES TORBELA TABLADA; LEONORA TORBELA AGUSTIN, represented by her heirs,
namely: PATRICIO, SEGUNDO, CONSUELO and FELIX, all surnamed AGUSTIN; and SEVERINA
TORBELA ILDEFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ANDRES T. ROSARIO and LENA DUQUE-ROSARIO and BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS
AND MORTGAGE BANK, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners Torbela Siblings entered into a contract with herein private respondent Dr. Rosario
over a parcel of land, through a Deed of Absolute Quit Claim. It was stated in such Deed of Absolute Quit
Claim that herein private respondent merely borrowed the subject parcel of land for a consideration.

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However, herein private respondent Dr. Rosario mortgaged the said property and obtained a loan. Due to
the failure of private respondent Dr. Rosario to comply with the obligation entered into, private respondent
Banco Filipino extra judicially foreclosed the subject property.
As such, herein petitioners instituted an action to nullify the said mortgage and to recover the subject
property. The trial Court rendered its decision and held that the mortgage entered into between herein
private respondents valid and binding.
On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this petition.
Petitioners contend that the executed Deed of Absolute Quitclaim is an admission on the part of herein
private respondent Dr. Rosario, as to his liability and capacity over the said parcel of land.
ISSUE: Whether the appellate Court correctly affirmed the decision of the trial Court which went beyond
the validly executed Deed of Absolute Quitclaim.
HELD: NO.
The Parol Evidence Rule provides that when the terms of the agreement have been reduced into writing,
it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. A
party may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim since he
did not put in issue in his pleadings any of those allowed by the Rules.
Dr. Rosario may not modify, explain, or add to the terms in the two written Deeds of Absolute Quitclaim
since he did not put in issue in his pleadings (1) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the
Deeds; (2) failure of the Deeds to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto; (3) the
validity of the Deeds; or (4) the existence of other terms agreed to by the Torbela siblings and Dr. Rosario
after the execution of the Deeds
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from claiming or asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A
based on his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the said
Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed conclusive upon him. Under Article 1431 of the
Civil Code, "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." That admission
cannot now be denied by Dr. Rosario as against the Torbela siblings, the latter having relied upon his
representation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appelle,

vs.
CATALINO DULAY y CADIENTE, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Dulay was accused and charged for violation of R.A. 9165, for selling shabu, a
dangerous drug. During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Guadamor, the poseur buyer, PO1 Robles
and PO1 Barbosa, as arresting officers.
In his defense, herein appellant denied the allegation and averred that at the time when the alleged crime
was committed, he was sleeping with his wife in their place of dwelling, unidentified men entered their
house and brought him to the barangay headquarters and to the drug enforcement unit. He further
alleged that he was framed-up.

The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant for the violation of Section 5, R.A.
9165. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because one of
the arresting officers failed to identify him during the trial.
ISSUE: Whether the identification of the accused by the arresting officers is indispensable in upholding
the conviction of said accused.
HELD: NO.
The necessity of asking the witness to identify the accused in court is for the purpose of being able to
pinpoint said accused to be the very same person referred to in the testimony.
It is significant to reiterate at this point that it is the trial court which is deemed to be in a better position to
decide the question of credibility of PO1 Guadamor, as well as those of the other witnesses, since it had
the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and
the scant or full realization of their oath. The trial court found PO1 Guadamor to be credible, and our
examination of his testimony does not give us any reason to find otherwise. As we have often repeated,
the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect absent a
showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case.
Whatever defect that may have been caused by the failure of PO1 Barbosa to identify the accused-
appellant in court was cured by the testimony of accused-appellant himself that PO1 Barbosa was part of
the arresting team.
The necessity of asking the witness to identify the accused in court is for the purpose of being able to
pinpoint said accused to be the very same person referred to in the testimony. As regards the testimony
of PO1 Barbosa, it has to be established that accused-appellant was the very same person that was
arrested by the team which includes PO1 Barbosa at around 5:20 p.m. on September 23, 2003. Having
himself affirmed his own arrest at the hands of the group of PO1 Barbosa on the same date and time,
accused-appellant cannot now assert that he was not the person referred to in PO1 Barbosa’s testimony.
Furthermore, accused-appellant was, in fact, positively identified in court by PO1 Robles and the poseur-
buyer himself, PO1 Guadamor. Accused-appellant’s persistent assertion that PO1 Robles and PO1
Barbosa were too far at ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the alleged transaction does not
disprove their ability to positively identify accusedappellant, as they have testified that they eventually
went closer to the scene when PO1 Guadamor gave the signal. Neither was the proximity of PO1 Robles
and PO1 Barbosa relevant to prove the details of the transaction since their account was merely to
corroborate the already convincing testimony of PO1 Guadamor.

vs.
NOEL T. ADALLOM, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Adallom was charged and accused of two counts of Murder and one count of
Attempted Murder. During the trial, prosecution presented Babelito, the brother of Villareal, which
positively identified the appellant. Herein appellant interposed the defenses of alibi and denial. He averred
that he was playing billiard when he heard gunshots, but continued playing until his wife fetched him. He
further stated that upon reaching home he was suddenly arrested and accused of the murder of Villareal,
Hina and Babelito.

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The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant, but acquitted him for the murder of
Hina. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.
Appellant contends that that the testimony of Babelito is not credible, on the ground of the relationship of
the witness to the victim.
ISSUE: Whether the credibility of the witness is tainted in view of his relationship with the victim.
HELD: NO.
Jurisprudence dictates that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when
the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.
The accused-appellant is not successful in proving the incredibility and improbability of the testimonies of
the [prosecution’s] two eye witnesses, hence, his arguments on the slight difference in the location and
nature of gunshot wounds as opposed to the position of the assailant as testified by the witness are not
sufficient to overturn the eyewitness accounts of Diorito and Babelito. The positive identification of the
witnesses is more than enough to prove the accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In contrast, accused-appellant proffered the defenses of denial and alibi, which are the weakest of
defenses in criminal cases. The well-established rule is that denial and alibi are self-serving negative
evidence; they cannot prevail over the spontaneous, positive, and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who pointed to and identified the accused-appellant as the malefactor. "Indeed, alibi is easy to
concoct and difficult to disprove.

vs.
ANICETO BULAGAO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Bulagao was accused and charged with two counts of rape; it was alleged that he
raped AAA. During trial, AAA gave her testimony as to how and when she was raped by herein appellant.
However, a year after, during the presentation of defense evidence, AAA was presented as witness and
recanted her earlier statements.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant for the crime of rape. On appeal, the
appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court.
Appellant contends that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the
ground that AAA recanted her testimony.
ISSUE: Whether guilt was still proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering the withdrawal of AAA’s
testimony.
HELD: YES.
Recantation does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony of the witness

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible.
The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not
contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one of
comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous
testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances
under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed.
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is usually the lone eyewitness.
Thus, in People v. Sumingwa, where the rape victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by
her father, this Court held:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By the very nature of this
crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When
a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling
examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such
testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable
doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere
retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAA’s accusation and
recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made in open court, by testifying for the
defense. Unlike in cases where recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the
opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid details of the alleged rape
by her "adoptive" brother, but also when she claimed that she made up her previous rape charges out of
anger. As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even after
examining the young witness as she made a complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal
adage that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an entirely
new significance in this case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect
examinations, and re-cross examinations both as a prosecution and defense witness. Still, the trial court
found that the private complainant’s testimony for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of belief.

vs.
GERRY SABANGAN AND NOLI BORNASAL, Accused.
GERRY SABANGAN, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: On December 27, 1999, deceased Abe Felonia, was gunned down by an unknown assailant.
The identity of the assailant was later on discovered, through the sworn statements executed by the
witnesses and through open court identification that herein appellant Sabangan shot the deceased.
During the trial and upon the motion of the prosecution, in accordance to the testimony of a witness,
accused Bornasal was included in the amended information.
Appellant Sabangan provided his alibi that he was not in the crime scene when the alleged shooting
occurred, but was in another place that would require at least one hour travel. Accused Bornasal likewise
provided his alibi that he was not in the crime scene.
The trial Court convicted accused Bornasal and Sabangan for the crime of Murder. On appeal, the
appellate Court acquitted Bornasal on the ground that his participation was not proven beyond

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reasonable doubt nor were there circumstantial evidence to prove the same. However, the appellate
Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court as to appellant Sabangan, hence this appeal.
Appellant, resting on his alibi, contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt
ISSUE: Whether the alibi of the accused is sufficient to uphold an acquittal.
HELD: NO.
Alibi is a weak defense and can be overturned by positive identification
There is no cogent reason for the Court to overturn the credence and evidentiary value accorded by both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the positive identification of Sabangan as Felonia’s assailant by the
disinterested witnesses of the prosecution, rather than Sabangan’s alibi, corroborated by his relatives,
that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime.
Alibi is a telltale sign of weak defense and not an explanation of innocence. In order to give credence to
the defense of alibi, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other
place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part
of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown with clear and convincing evidence that at the time of
the commission of the crime charged, the accused is in a place other than the situs of the crime such that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the situs criminis when the crime was committed.
Furthermore, contrary to Sabangan’s contention, there appears no irregularity in the conduct by the
investigating police officers of the out-of-court identification of Sabangan by the witnesses.
The following ruling of the Court in People v. Teehankee, Jr. is instructive on the conduct of and test for a
valid out-of-court identification:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru

show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to
identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-up where a witness identifies the suspect
from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances
test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure


vs.
RAMIL MORES, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: The prosecution’s evidence tends to show the following: Daryl Famisaran was chatting with his
friends at the Madugo [B]ridge. While they were conversing, (appellant) passed by, stopped before them
and with a grenade in his hand, talked to them in this wise: "Gusto nyo pasabugin ko ito?" ("Do you want
me to explode this"). After (appellant) had left, they immediately dispersed. In the evening of the same
date, he (Daryl) was at Roxas Gymnasium where a ball was being held. While the dancing was going on,
Daryl saw again (appellant) at a distance of about five (5) armslength on the same row or line from them.
(Appellant) was then with accused Delio Famor and they were whispering to each other. It was at this
point that he saw (appellant) pulled out a round object, which Daryl knew to be a grenade, from
(appellant’s) left pocket, transferred it to his right hand and then threw it on the floor as if rolling a ball.
The narrative of Daryl Famisaran regarding the incident was corroborated by Esteban Galaran, Jr.
According to Esteban, he knew (appellant) and accused Famor because they were former members of
Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit (hereinafter called CAFGU for brevity). Famor was subsequently
acquitted.
Appellant contends that since his co-accused Famor purportedly successfully proved his alibi, then it
follows that appellant should also be acquitted. Appellant argues that since the prosecution insists that
both he and Famor were together when the grenade throwing incident occurred then the acquittal of
Famor on the basis that he was not present at the crime scene totally destroys the prosecution’s theory of
the case. Thus, appellant should be exonerated from any wrongdoing. Appellant likewise claimed that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were fraught with inconsistencies and should not have been
given credit by the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether the appellate court was correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses.
HELD: YES.
Contrary to appellant’s protestation, the Court finds no cogent reason to question the veracity of the
testimony of Famisaran as well as that of the other witnesses for the prosecution. The Court have
reiterated in jurisprudence that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when
the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court. In all, the Supreme Court concurs with the trial court in setting aside the inconsequential
differences in the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies and in pointing out that their testimonies actually
corroborated each other as to rolling of a grenade onto the dance floor and their respective positions from
the blast.
Finally, the Court cannot subscribe to appellant’s theory that his continued presence at the vicinity of the
Municipality of Roxas right after the grenade throwing incident negates his guilt of the crime charged and
that his absence in court proceedings subsequent to his arraignment should not be taken against him. We
have elucidated on this point in one recent case wherein we held that non-flight does not necessarily
connote innocence, to wit: Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits
behave differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may escape or
flee – a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt – while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to
create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion from other members of the community.

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vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
EN BACN, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
FACTS: Herein accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape committed against AAA, the victim.
In convicting him, the prosecution presented the victim’s cousin who allegedly saw the whole incident.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but modified the penalty to death and increased fines of civil
indemnity to PHP 75,000, PHP 25,000 as exemplary damages and PHP 50,000 as moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses warrant the acquittal
of Sarcia.
HELD: NO.
In rape cases, the accused cannot capitalize on the inconsistencies in testimonies of the witnesses when
such inconsistencies cover inconsequential details such as the time or place of commission because they
do not form part of the elements of the offense. He cannot also bank on the delay of the filing of the
offense because it is established in jurisprudence that the delay is justified due to victim’s fear of public
stigma.
The Court ruled that inconsistencies in testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details do not
affect the veracity of their testimonies when the principal occurrence and positive identification of accused
is made and indeed proves that such inconsistencies speaks of spontaneity and the unrehearsed nature
of such undertaking. Inability of the victim, AAA, to recall the exact date of the incident cannot discredit
credibility of victim since it is not an essential element of the crime. Neither is the delay in filing the crime
a stain on the credibility of witnesses since it is common for rape victims to prefer silence for fear and lack
of courage. Furthermore, the employment of force, threat, intimidation are not elements of statutory rape,
only “carnal knowledge” must be proven to have taken place. Alibi or denial is the weakest defense as it
is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.

vs.
ALBERTO BUBAN, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: The victim was an orphaned minor who lived in her cousin’s house after her parents died. In four
occasions, she was forced by the accused to have carnal knowledge with him. As a result, four
informations of rape were filed against him. The accused defended himself that there was no rape
because according to him, they were in fact lovers. He was unable, however, to show any love letter or
picture which would prove that fact. After trial of the four informations, the trial court found the accused
guilty on all four counts. On appeal, the accused interposed a number of defenses. Accused-appellant
puts at issue the credibility of victim, specifically as regards the third rape which occurred on January 29,
1996. He avers that it is contrary to human nature and experience that after having been previously raped
twice, victim would still feel comfortable, in the presence of appellant, as she was able to speak to him
casually as if nothing traumatic happened between them and she even managed to sleep in her room
without locking its door while accused-appellant was in the sala watching television. At the outset,
accused-appellant puts at issue the credibility of AAA.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction of accused-appellant is proper, considering the discrepancies in the
testimony of the victim as regards the dates of the commission of the crime.

HELD: YES
In cases of rape, the discrepancies in the testimony of the victim as to the dates of the commission of the
offense do not negate the finding of guilt. What is material in the offense is the occurrence of rape and not
the date of commission.
The credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the guilt of a person accused of rape. By the
very nature of this crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. Thus, in rape
cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that
such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. Else wise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, suffices to warrant a
conviction for rape.

vs.
ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with rape committed against AAA. In convicting accused-
appellant, the trial court took into consideration the witnesses presented by the prosecution: AAA, the
victim herself; the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the physical examination of AAA; and the
police investigator on duty. The lone evidence for the defense was Amistoso’s testimony. The RTC found,
and the CA affirmed, that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
and circumstances necessary for convicting Amistoso for the qualified rape of AAA. The RTC accorded
credence and weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially the victim AAA, and
disbelieved the denial and alibi of Amistoso.
ISSUE: Whether the factual findings of the trial court as regards the credibility of the witness may be
disturbed by the Supreme Court.
HELD: NO.
When it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial
courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said
findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so
because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of
witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their demeanor and
behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of
testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness,
sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" — all of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such
witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case, its assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the CA.

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vs.
JESUSA FIGUEROA y CORONADO, Accused-Appellant
FACTS: There were originally two Informations filed against accused-appellant Figueroa: Illegal
possession of dangerous drug (shabu) and unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell, give away, distribute
and deliver dangerous drug (shabu).
On July 2, 2004, at about 12:00 noon, the informant called the Desk Officer of the Special Operation Unit
1 of PNP AIDSOTF, who in turn relayed to P/SUPT. YABUT that accused-appellant FIGUEROA had
informed him that she already had a stock of good quality shabu.
A team, composed of P/SUPT. YABUT, PS/INSP. GARCIA, PO2 PINILI and PO3 CALLORA, was then
formed to conduct the buy-bust operation, with PO3 CALLORA designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-
bust money was prepared.
The RTC rendered its Decision acquitting accused-appellant in Criminal Case No. 04-2432, but convicting
her in Criminal Case No. 04-2433(attempt to sell).
On appeal, Accused-appellant concludes that the testimony of PO3 Callora regarding the alleged sale
transaction is purely hearsay, and therefore inadmissible and without probative value, as it was the
informant which is competent to testify on the alleged agreement to sell drugs.
ISSUE: Whether the testimony of PO3 Callora is hearsay, therefore, inadmissible.
HELD: NO.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, we have held that the hearsay rule does not
apply where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. In the case at bar, the testimony of PO3 Callora as regards the conversations between the
informant and accused-appellant is admissible insofar as it established that said information led the police
officers to prepare for and proceed with the buy-bust operation. The conversation between the informant
and the accused-appellant was not necessary to prove the attempted sale of shabu, as said attempt to
sell was already clear from accused-appellant’s actuations on July 2, 2004, which were all within the
personal knowledge of PO3 Callora and testified to by him, to wit: (1) when accused-appellant arrived at
the scene, she waived at the informant and PO3 Callora and approached them while driving her Toyota
Revo; (2) upon reaching PO3 Callora and the informant, accused-appellant asked PO3 Callora where the
money was, while the latter asked for the shabu; (3) accused-appellant showed PO3 Callora a Chowking
plastic bag containing a sachet of white crystalline substance; (4) when PO3 Callora was about to give
her the money, accused-appellant sensed that there were police officers around the area, and drove
away; (5) PO3 Callora and the informant boarded the car of PS/Insp. Garcia, and they chased her to C-5
Road corner Kalayaan Avenue.

vs.
MARCIAL MALICDEM y MOLINA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: The crime of Murder was charged against Appelant Malicdem for stabbing WILSON S. MOLINA,
inflicting upon him a fatal stab wound on the vital part of the body, causing his untimely death. The
witnesses testified that Bernardo and Joel, met with Wilson near the artesian well. At around 9:00 p.m.,
while they were seated on the septic tank, appellant arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his
godson, Rogelio Molina (Rogelio). They answered in the negative. They noticed that appellant was

reeking of alcohol and was drunk. Appellant asked again for the whereabouts of Rogelio. As they stood to
leave, appellant suddenly embraced Wilson and lunged a six-inch knife to the left part of his chest. The
appellant invoked self-defense to justify his participation in the cause of death of Wilson.
The RTC, after observing inconsistencies in the testimonies of the appellant and his wife, found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and declared: Undoubtedly, the prosecution was
able to prove clearly and convincingly that appellant killed Wilson not in self defense.
On appeal, Appellant posits that the CA misinterpreted the facts and circumstances of the case. He avers
that the prosecution’s version of the events was highly incredible since it was testified to that there was no
grudge between the appellant and victim prior to the incident.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct affirming the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
HELD: YES.
Time and again, this Court has stated that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction, it generally
defers to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses especially if such findings are affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. This must be so since the trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their
deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules, some of which are
that (1) the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing
that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the trial
court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to
examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is
telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Given the factual circumstances of the present case, we see no need to depart from the foregoing rules.

vs.
RONALDO SALUDO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Saludo was charged with 4 counts of rape committed against AAA, 14 year old girl. The
prosecution presented the oral testimonies of AAA, the victim; CCC, AAA’s mother; and Dr. Palomaria,
the physician who physically examined AAA. AAA testified that accused succeeded in raping her and
threatened her that she and CCC will be killed should she tell to anybody what have transpired. It was
only when CCC noticed AAA’s abdomen becoming bigger that AAA divulged what happened to her.
AAA's testimony is corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Palomaria, testified that AAA had an old
hymenal laceration at 1, 3, 5 and 9 o’clock positions and was, in fact, pregnant at the time of the
examination. For Saludo’s defense, accused maintains his innocence. The defense presented oral
testimonies of 4 witnesses that AAA eloped with a certain Manongsong and it was Manongsong, not
Saludo, who impregnated AAA. Accused recalls that the only reason, the complainant and her mother
would charged him of rape is because of his uncalled for remarks “ Mabuti pang ako ang nakabuntis, yon
palay magpapabuntis din lamang, mabuti pa na ako na nang may ganansiya pa”. However, he explains
that it was merely a practical joke he played. For rebuttal, AAA and Manongsong belie the defense
witnesses testimonies. They disclaim that there was no pamanhikan that ever took place, as they were
not sweetheart.

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The RTC found Saludo guilty of the crime charged. Saludo questioned the ruling of the RTC by
essentially challenging AAA’s credibility and the weight attributed by the RTC to the prosecution’s
evidence. Saludo harps on the following purported holes in AAAs testimony: (1) AAA did not categorically
state that accused-appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina; (2) according to AAA, the
rapes happened at night, but she did not say that there was enough light for her to clearly identify
accused-appellant; (3) AAA and CCC gave contradicting reasons as to why the alleged rapes were
divulged almost three months after the first alleged rape took place; and (4) AAA did not offer any
tenacious resistance during the alleged sexual assaults, thus, the requisite of force and intimidation for
the crime of rape was lacking.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the assessment of the credibility of witness and the probative weight thereof, as well
as the conclusions of the trial court, may be disturbed by the Supreme Court.
HELD # 1: NO.
In People v. Malejana, citing People v. Flores, the Court ruled that when the credibility of the witnesses is
at issue, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court, the latter being in a better position
to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial unless certain facts of substance and value had been overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the results of the case. The underlying reason for this principle is that the trial
court has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and is able to detect that there’s sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt of the accused. Only the judge trying the case
can see all these on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. Reviewing
the records of the case, the Supreme Court did not find any fact or circumstance overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied by the RTC, which, if considered, would have warranted a modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case. Consequently, SC accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, to
the factual findings of the RTC, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the
probative weight thereof, as well as the conclusions of the trial court based on its factual findings,
especially since such findings had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE # 2: Whether purported defects in AAAs testimony, as pointed out by accused-appellant,

diminished AAA’s credibility.
HELD # 2: NO.
It should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence. Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from
the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they
would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified were not true. As put down on
record, AAA broke down and cried as she was giving her testimony before the RTC. Such tears were a
clear indication that she was telling the truth. As it has been repeatedly held, no woman would want to go
through the process, the trouble and the humiliation of trial for such a debasing offense unless she
actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is but a response to the compelling need to seek and
obtain justice.
Moreover, AAAs testimony is corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Palomaria. It is well-settled that
when the victim’s testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal knowledge. Lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.
Accused-appellants contention that AAA could not have positively and clearly identified her assailant
because the rapes were committed at nighttime, deserves scant consideration. It is true that it was
nighttime when appellant perpetrated the dastardly acts. However, the darkness was not such as to

absolutely preclude anyone from seeing anything as AAA was already familiar with appellants physical
feature. Thus, it has been held that identification of a person is best established through familiarity with
his physical feature. Assuming that AAAs hut was in total darkness when the rapes happened, the same
did not prevent AAA from recognizing her attacker because of their geographical propinquity during the
violation.
ISSUE # 3: As between alibi as defense and testimony of the prosecution’s witness, which prevails?
HELD # 3: The testimony of the prosecution’s witness.

The SC has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial
and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Fundamental is the rule in evidence that alibi
is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For it to prosper, it is
not enough for the accused to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed; they
must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time. In this case, accused-appellant completely failed to establish that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the rape incidents
happened. Moreover, accused-appellants allegation that these cases were filed as a result of his jokes is
apparently unconvincing. Such is a very flimsy reason for a woman, especially a minor, to file a rape
case. The humiliation brought about by going to open court and submitting oneself to medical
examination is too much a burden for a woman, such as private complainant, which cannot be merely
surpassed by jokes allegedly uttered by the accused-appellant.

vs.
MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERA, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Marilyn Santos, with Arlene Valera as the look out, sold 6 sachets of shabu to PO2 Aninias, the
poseur-buyer, in a buy bust operation in Muntinlupa. Consequently, the two were charged and convicted
by the RTC of crime of illegal sale of shabu. The convicts questioned the credibility of the witnesses
against them based on certain inconsistencies relative to the buy- bust operation, to wit: who between
Marilyn Santos and Arlene Valera actually transacted with the poseur-buyer; the kinds of vehicles used in
the alleged entrapment and distance of the parking from the convict’s house; the kinds of boodle money
used; who among the 2 policemen handcuffed the convicts; and the number of officers who brought the
substance to the crime lab. The CA, however, sustained the conviction of the RTC.
The convicts raised for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court, that the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs had been seriously compromised, based solely on the allegation that the other requirements
of RA 9165 were not complied with.
ISSUE # 1: Will the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution affect the conviction for illegal
sale of shabu?
HELD # 1: NO. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. X x x What is material to the prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. These inconsistencies, which

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may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What is
important is that the testimonies agree on the essential facts and that the respective versions corroborate
and substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.
ISSUE # 2: Will the non-compliance with the requisites of RA 9165 as regards the custody and disposition
of illegal drugs render void the seizure and custody thereof?
HELD # 2: NO.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 stipulates x
x x that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. X x x Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.

vs.
JONATHAN "UTO" VELOSO y RAMA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: RTC Naga City found appellant Jonathan Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of rape for violating AAA, 12-year old minor. The CA affirmed RTC’s findings, and so this case before the
Court. Appellant posited before this Court that he should be acquitted on the ground that the
inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: Are the inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness-victim sufficient to stain his credibility?
HELD: NO.
We have often reiterated the jurisprudential principle of affording great respect and even finality to the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The trial judge is the one who hears the testimony of
the witnesses presented firsthand and sees their demeanor and body language. We also have stated
that: Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. X x x
Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer
to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The trial court’s assessment
of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and binding. X x x
In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full
weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands
sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not
true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will --
as in this case - - motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled that when a woman,
more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the
ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony -- provided it is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

VS.
JOSEPH SERRANO AND ANTHONY SERRANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
First Division, G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010
FACTS: Accused-appellants Joseph and Anthony Serrano were charged with violation of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. When arraigned,
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the poseur-buyer, the other members of the buy-bust
operation team and the forensic chemist. The object and documentary evidence for the prosecution
includes the five heat-sealed plastic sachets allegedly recovered from the accused-appellants at the time
of the arrest; Chemistry Report confirming that the contents of the said plastic sachets were shabu and
the marked money used in the buy-bust operation. In their defense, both accused-appellants denied the
charges against them and offered no documentary evidence.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting the brothers Joseph and Anthony Serrano. In arriving at its
Decision, the RTC relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty in ascribing
greater credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court further held that in the
absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against
the accused-appellants, the testimonies of the former are entitled to full faith and credit.
In view of the imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment on the accused-appellants, the case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision affirmed the
RTC. Accused-appellants appealed their convictions before the Supreme Court through a Notice of
Appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court should disturb the findings of the trial court as regards the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses.
HELD: NO.
The degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in this instance. Hence, there is no reason to
deviate from both the lower courts findings and conclusions that accused-appellants committed the
offenses charged.
Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve
the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts;
and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason
for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their
testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Here, the records bear out that all the elements of the offense have been established beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court finds the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, straightforward and
corroborative of each other. Their testimonies sufficiently proved that a legitimate buy-bust operation took
place wherein the accused-appellants were apprehended. Moreover, the shabu subject of the sale was
brought to, and properly identified in, court. Accused-appellants were likewise positively identified as the
persons who sold the sachet containing the crystalline substance which was later confirmed to be shabu
according to the Chemistry Report of the forensic chemist.
In view of the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the denials of the
accused-appellants must fail. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness; it is self-
serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of

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credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the categorical testimony that rings of
truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. and SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ALMA ARZAGA, MARIA
LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 134269, July 7, 2010
JOSE MARIE V. AQUINO, minor and represented by his parents DR. ERROL AQUINO AND ATTY.
MARILYN AQUINO; LORENZO MARIA E. VELASCO, minor and represented by his parents
FRANCISCO VELASCO AND ROSANNA VELASCO; CHRISTOPHER E. WALMSLEY, minor and
represented by his parents GERALD WALMSLEY AND MA. TERESA WALMSLEY; JOANNA MARIE
S. SISON, minor and represented by her parents BONIFACIO SISON AND JOSEPHINE SISON; and
MATTHEW RAPHAEL C. ARCE, minor and represented by his parents RAPHAEL ARCE AND MA.
ERISSA ARCE, Petitioners,
vs.
LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION and LAWPHIL, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 134440
LUISA QUISUMBING, ARTURO SENA, KSL CORPORATION, SLV MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
and LAWPHIL, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF MUNTINLUPA, THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., SPOUSES FELIPE AND
MARY ANNE ALFONSO, AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION),
Respondents.
FACTS: Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to Spouses Yuson who subsequently sold the same
to Spouses Alfonso with a limitation that the subject property shall be used exclusively for the
establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school. ALI turned
over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties to the Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA). Spouses Alfonso, on the other hand, opened on the same lot The Learning Child
Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten
classes, which eventually expanded and offered a grade school program. AAVA filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso arising from the
alleged breach of contract. AAVA alleged, among others, that the same is a violation of the Deed of
Restrictions and of Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 (MMC No. 81-01), otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region, which classified Ayala
Alabang Village for zoning purposes as a low-density residential area, or R-1, thereby limiting the use of
the subject property to the establishment or operation of a nursery and kindergarten school, and
Barangay Ordinance No. 03, Series of 1991. The owners of properties within the vicinity of TLC the filed a
complaint-in-intervention seeking the same relief as AAVA and prayed for damages. The RTC initially
rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA and dismissed the complaint-in-intervention but set aside the
same and reversed itself on the Spouses Alfonso’s Motion for Reconsideration, holding that with the
reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject property, the earlier residential
classification can no longer be enforced. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed RTC and dismissed
both complaint and complaint-in-intervention. While the Motion for Reconsideration of TLC and the
spouses Alfonso was still pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its Sangguniang
Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a

parcel of land. The Municipality then filed a Petition for the approval of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The HLURD deferred action but the Office of
President set aside the same and declared the resolution valid, to which the Court of Appeals affirmed,
thus the third petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE # 1: Whether AAVA is barred by estoppel from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions.
HELD # 1: NO.
Estoppel by deed is "a bar which precludes one party from asserting as against the other party and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted
in it."
Estoppel has been characterized as harsh or odious, and not favored in law. When misapplied, estoppel
becomes a most effective weapon to establish an injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man’s mouth from
speaking the truth and debars the truth in a particular case. Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere
argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential elements by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA’s acts
so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the acts allegedly performed by ALI, viz, requesting for the reclassification of the
subject property and assenting thereto, bind AAVA.
HELD # 2: YES.
Since they are acts performed by another person jointly interested with AAVA, the same are covered
under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule pursuant to Section 29 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We have to clarify that ALI’s statements, if damaging to AAVA, would be binding on the latter. The
general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the
title of the subject property, expressly state that: "2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation,
easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or
the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the
Ayala Alabang Village Association.

vs.
ALBERTO M. BASAO alias "Dodong," JOVEL S. APOLE, MELQUIADES L. APOLE, ESTRELITA1 G.
APOLE, ROLANDO A. APOLE alias "Bebot," VICENTE C. SALON, JAIME TANDAN, RENATO C.
APOLE alias "Boboy," ROLANDO M. OCHIVILLO alias "Allan," LORENZO L. APOLE, JOHN DOE,
PETER DOE and MIKE DOE, Accused,
JOVEL S. APOLE, ROLANDO A. APOLE, and RENATO C. APOLE, Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Accused-appellants, together with seven identified co-accused was charged with Robbery with
Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for Ransom) and Serious Illegal
Detention. They pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges against them. After the pre-trial proceedings,
trial ensued. The prosecution called to the witness stand private complainant Emelie Lopio Hashiba and
her brother Crisologo Pamad Lopio, who testified. Both Emelie and Crisologo positively identified the
three accused-appellants in court. Private complainant Yasumitsu Yasuda Hashiba was also supposed to
take the witness stand for the prosecution and identify the other accused in the case, but Yasumitsu was
unable to give his testimony for lack of competent Japanese interpreters. Thus, for lack of evidence, the
prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the charges against accused which the RTC granted in

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its Orders. During their turn, the defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellants Rolando Apole
and Jovel Apole and dispensed with the testimony of accused-appellant Renato Apole as he would be
merely corroborating those of the first two. Accused-appellants denied the charges against them. The
cases were submitted for decision without any documentary evidence for the prosecution and the
defense. On April 20, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Joint Decision finding the accused JOVEL APOLE y
SALVADOR, ROLANDO APOLE y ARANA, and RENATO APOLE y CANTORNE, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The cases were forwarded to the Court of Appeals on automatic
review and the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision agreeing with the findings of fact and judgments of
conviction of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the court is correct in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s
witnesses.
HELD: YES.
The settled rule is that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well
as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is
more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.
Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed.
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb, and is, therefore, conclusively bound by the findings of fact
and judgments of conviction rendered by the RTC, subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
testimonies of Emelie and Crisologo established beyond reasonable doubt the commission by accused-
appellants of the crimes of robbery by a band and kidnapping for ransom.

vs.
ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: An Information4 was filed before the RTC, charging Zafra with the crime of qualified rape of his
minor daughter. Zafra pleaded not guilty to the charge upon his arraignment. Thereafter, the parties held
their pre-trial conference, wherein they stipulated on the facts that AAA was the daughter of Zafra, and
that she was only 17 years old on December 14, 2001. The RTC rendered its Decision, giving credence
to the prosecution’s version, found Zafra guilty of qualified rape of his minor daughter, and sentenced him
to death. Zafra appealed to the Court of Appeals, imputing error on the part of the RTC for relying on
AAA’s inconsistent testimony and thereafter convicting him despite the prosecution’s failure to rebut the
presumption that he is innocent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision, modifying the amount
of moral damages awarded and the imposable penalty. Zafra denied the charge against him and asserted
that AAA filed this case because he scolded her and because of his quarrel with his wife and in-laws.
ISSUE: Whether the denial and ill-motive defense of the accused should be sustained.
HELD: NO.
AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable
for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge. In the case, for
instance, of People v. Melivo, wherein the accused claimed that the complainant, his 16-year old
daughter, together with her mother, concocted the charge of rape in retaliation against his maintaining a
mistress, and because his daughter bore a grudge against him, this Court therein held:

These allegations, we stated earlier, are not enough to overcome the fact that the consequences of filing
a case of rape are so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts about filing charges
against her assailant. It takes much more for a sixteen year old lass to fabricate a story of rape, have her
private parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a lifetime of ridicule.
Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young
woman to concoct a story which would put her own father for the most of his remaining life to jail and drag
herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame.
Moreover, Zafra’s claim that his wife wanted him in jail is contrary to AAA’s testimony that her own
mother, Zafra’s wife, tried to dissuade her from filing this case against him.
Zafra’s defense of denial must necessarily fail. It is a well-settled doctrine that such defense will only
prosper upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence substantiating it. Otherwise, it is a self-
serving assertion that deserves no weight in law, and which cannot prevail over the positive, candid, and
categorical testimony of the complainant.

vs.
CARLITO ESPENILLA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Espenilla was convicted of the crime of simple rape under the Revised Penal Code for
raping AAA, a grade 2 pupil in Masbate City. Another case for rape was also filed against AAA’s
grandfather, but the same was dismissed due to the latter’s death.
AAA was represented by her father, BBB, in filing the complaints. However, BBB, later on filed an
Affidavit of Recantation, testifying that he initiated the case because of the misunderstanding between
him and AAA’s grandfather regarding the administration of the latter’s property. Hence, he wanted the
cases against the two accused be dismissed. On cross examination, BBB testified that he indeed filed the
cases as he was truly informed by his daughter that she was raped. But when asked by the Court during
a clarificatory hearing, BBB easily changed his answer and claimed that what he stated in his Affidavit of
Recantation was the truth.
The trial court found credence in AAA’s version of events and, thus, convicted appellant of the felony of
simple rape.
ISSUE # 1: May the accused in a rape case be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim as
appreciated by the lower court?
HELD # 1: YES.
It is a settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things.
X x x the issue of credibility of witnesses is resolved primarily by the trial court since it is in a better
position to decide the same after having heard the witnesses and observed their conduct, deportment and
manner of testifying; accordingly, the findings of the trial court are entitled to the highest degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it over looked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would otherwise affect the result of
the case. X x x the trial judge’s evaluation, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, binds the Court, leaving
to the accused the burden to bring to the Court’s attention facts or circumstances of weight that were
overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted by the lower courts but would materially affect the

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disposition of the case differently if duly considered. Unfortunately, appellant failed to discharge this
burden.
Conventional wisdom cemented in jurisprudence dictates that no young Filipina would publicly admit that
she had been criminally abused and ravished unless it is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect
her honor; and that no young girl would concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts and undergo the expense, trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, unless she was, in fact, raped.
ISSUE # 2: May the Court rely on the weight of a recantation for purposes of proving guilt in a rape case?
HELD # 2: NO.
A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does
not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with instances where the recantation of testimony by the rape victim
herself was not accepted by the Court when her previous testimony appeared more trustworthy and
believable. X x x we reiterated the rationale for upholding a rape victim’s original testimony over that of
her subsequent recantation in this wise:
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally
unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim’s testimony is
straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and
confidence and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the
crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent
retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony.
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly unreliable for there
is always the probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to the
test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on
the stand
Thus, with more reason, we cannot ascribe any weight to the recantation of the charges by the victim’s
father when the victim’s own categorical testimony remains on record.
RULE 131
CENTURY SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES DANILO T. SAMONTE and ROSALINDA M. SAMONTE, Respondents.
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from the two loans extended by petitioner to respondents,
which was secured by a promissory note and deed of real estate mortgage executed by respondents in
favor of petitioner.
When respondents defaulted in the payment of their loans by the latter part of 1999, petitioner initiated
before the notary public extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties.

Hence, petitioner caused the publication of a Notice of Sale dated November 12, 1999, prepared by
Notary Public Enriqueto I. Magpantay (Magpantay), in the Challenger News – a weekly newspaper of
general circulation – on November 15, 22, and 29, 1999. The public auction sale took place as scheduled
on December 9, 1999, with petitioner as the winning and highest bidder.
The parties executed a Contract of Lease whereby petitioner leased one of the foreclosed properties to
respondents for a period of one year, It was acknowledged in said contract that petitioner acquired the
real property subject of the lease as the highest and winning bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale,
conducted pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended; that petitioner was in the process of consolidating its
title over the said real property as the redemption period expired without respondents having exercised
their right of redemption; and that respondents had recognized the valid and legal right of petitioner as the
absolute owner of the leased real property. Petitioner eventually consolidated its titles to the foreclosed
properties.
Respondents filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of their real
properties. Among respondents’ contentions was that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings initiated
by petitioner failed to comply with the posting requirements under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as
amended. On the other hand, petitioner insisted that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was duly conducted
in accordance with law.
Petitioner argues that the publication of the notice of sale already constitutes sufficient compliance with
the notice requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended. The absence of actual posting of the notice of
sale, or the lack of or defect in the certificate of posting, should not invalidate a public auction when the
same notice of sale had been published.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the burden of proof rests upon respondent to prove non-compliance of the
foreclosure under the law.
HELD # 1: YES.
In this case, it was respondents who instituted Civil Case No. 01-1564 seeking the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgaged properties on the ground of non-compliance with the
requirements of the law on the posting of the notices of sale. Thus, the burden falls upon respondents to
prove the fact of non-compliance; but respondents miserably failed in this regard. Respondents did not
present any evidence at all to establish that the notices of sale were not posted as required under Section
3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Instead, respondents merely focused on how Notary Public Magpantay’s
Certificate of Posting was worded, and emphasized on technicalities and semantics.
Respondents insist that the phrase "on the 15st day of November 1999, I have caused the posting of
three (3) copies of Notice of Sale" in the Certificate of Posting meant that Notary Public Magpantay
posted the notices for only one day, i.e., on November 15, 1999. This is a rather specious interpretation of
the aforequoted phrase. It is more logical and reasonable to understand the same phrase as to mean that
the notices were posted beginning November 15, 1999 until the issuance of the certificate on December
9, 1999. There is also no basis to require the notary public’s certificate to exactly state that the notices of
sale were posted at "public places." Notary Public Magpantay’s use of the words "conspicuous places" in
his certificate already satisfactorily complies with the legal requirement for posting. The adjective "public"
may refer to that which is "exposed to general view," and "conspicuous" is a synonym thereof.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents’ mortgaged properties was valid on
the ground that the legal requirements on the notice of sale were complied with.
HELD # 2: YES.
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than
posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an announcement or notice

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published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership
of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its location may be,
which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general
circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By
such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend
the public sale, and the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.
In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the sale
through the newspaper publication. There is completely no showing that the property was sold for a price
far below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or even an intimation of
collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent bank. This being so, the alleged
non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will not justify the setting aside of the sale.
ISSUE # 3: Whether respondent is estopped to question the validity of the foreclosure of the mortgage
considering his acknowledgment of its validity in the contract of lease with petitioner.
HELD # 3: YES.
Finally, the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the
validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the
foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or
lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, "[t]he tenant is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them." The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees carries with it a
recognition of the lessor’s title. As lessees, then respondents are estopped to deny their landlord's title, or
to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in
possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel
applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and
may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.
The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the RTC:
Further, this Court upholds the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under
the equitable principle of estoppel. [Herein respondents’] admitted execution of the
Contract of Lease alone establishes that they do not have any cause of action or are
estopped from impugning the validity of the subject extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
In the Contract of Lease, [respondents’] clearly acknowledge that the subject extrajudicial
foreclosure sale was conducted in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended; that they
failed to redeem the foreclosed properties within the redemption period; and that
[petitioner] has valid and legal right and title as absolute owner of the foreclosed
properties. [Respondents] failed to mention or question the validity of the Contract of
Lease in their Complaint. There being no evidence presented that [respondents]
executed the Contract of Lease by mistake or through violence, intimidation, undue
influence, or fraud, [respondents] are bound by the stipulations therein and to the
consequences thereof.

RAMONA RAMOS and THE ESTATE OF LUIS T. RAMOS, Petitioners,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, OPAL PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS (SPV-AMC), INC. and GOLDEN
DRAGON STAR EQUITIES, INC., Respondents.
FACTS: Luis Ramos and PNB entered into a Credit Line Agreement in the amount of P50,000,000.00.
Luis Ramos obtained an availment of P7,800,000.00, which was evidenced by a promissory note.
Pledged as security for the availment were two official warehouse receipts (quedans) for refined sugar
issued by Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery (Noah’s Ark).
The spouses Luis Ramos and Ramona Ramos (spouses Ramos) also obtained an agricultural loan
of P160,000.00 from PNB, which was secured by the real estate mortgage. The spouses Ramos fully
settled the agricultural loan of P160,000.00. They then demanded from PNB the release of the real estate
mortgage. PNB, however, refused to heed the spouses’ demand.
The spouses Ramos filed a complaint for Specific Performance against the PNB. PNB countered that the
spouses Ramos had no cause of action against it since the latter knew that the real estate mortgage
secured not only their P160,000.00 agricultural loan but also the other loans the spouses obtained from
the bank. Specifically, PNB alleged that the spouses’ sugar quedan financing loan ofP15,600,000.00
remained unpaid as the quedans were dishonored by the warehouseman Noah’s Ark.
The spouses Ramos won the case in the RTC but the CA reversed the decision.
Petitioners principally argue that the scope and coverage of the real estate mortgage excluded the sugar
quedan financing loan. Petitioners assert that the mortgage contained a blanket mortgage clause or a
dragnet clause, which stated that the mortgage would secure not only the loans already obtained but also
any other amount that Luis Ramos may loan from PNB.
PNB responded that the issue of whether the parties intended for the real estate mortgage to secure the
sugar quedan financing loan was never raised in the RTC or in the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the same
cannot be raised for the first time in the motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision and in
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Sps. Ramos are precluded to set up the issue of the coverage of debts secured by
the Real Estate Mortgage on the ground that it is a new argument which cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.
HELD: YES.
When the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, petitioners foisted a new argument in their
motion for reconsideration that the parties did not intend for the sugar quedan financing loan to be
covered by the real estate mortgage. Before this Court, petitioners are now reiterating and expounding on
their argument that their sugar quedan financing loan was beyond the ambit of the previously executed
real estate mortgage. We rule that such a change in petitioners’ theory may not be allowed at such late a
stage in the case.
The general rule is that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the
lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. Petitioners’ new theory, on the
other hand, was only raised much later on the spouses’ motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision dated November 8, 2006, or after a period of more or less seventeen years since the

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execution of the credit line agreement. The Court, therefore, finds itself unable to give credit to the new
theory proffered by petitioners since to do so would gravely offend the rights of PNB to due process.
Jurisprudence, nonetheless, provides for certain exceptions to the above rule. First, it is a settled rule that
the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, provided that its application does not
result in a mockery of the tenets of fair play. Second, as held in Lianga Lumber Company v. Lianga
Timber Co., Inc. in the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of the appellate court, a party
may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require
presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.
None of the above exceptions, however, applies to the instant case. As regards the first exception, the
issue of jurisdiction was never raised at any point in this case. Anent the second exception, the Court
finds that the application of the same in the case would be improper, as further evidence is needed in
order to answer and/or refute the issue raised in petitioners’ new theory.
RULE 132-C
THE HEIRS OF ROMANA SAVES, namely: FIDELA ALMAIDA, EMILIANO ALMAIDA, JESUS
ALMAIDA, CATALINA ALMAIDA, ALFREDO RAMOS, GINA RAMOS, LUZ ALMAIDA, ANITA
ALMAIDA, PETRA GENERAL, EDNA GENERAL, ESTHER ALMAIDA, DIONISIA ALMAIDA,
CORNELIA ALMAIDA, FELIMON ALMAIDA (represented by SINFROSA ALMAIDA); The Heirs of
RAFAELA SAVES, namely: JULIANA DIZON, HILARIA DIZON, JOVENCIO DIZON, MAURA DIZON,
BABY DIZON & ULDARICO AMISTOSO (represented by ULDARICO AMISTOSO); The Heirs of
JANUARIA SAVES, namely: FELICIDAD MARTINEZ, MARLOU MARTINEZ, ROWENA MARTINEZ,
BABY LOU MARTINEZ, BOBERT MARTINEZ, JERRY MARTINEZ (represented by FELICIDAD
MARTINEZ); The Heirs of MAXIMO SAVES, namely: ELPIDIO AMIGO, CELESTINA DEMETRIA
AMIGO, MEREN (daughter of SEVERA SAVES), FRUTO ROSARIO (represented by ELPIDIO
AMIGO); The Heirs of BENEDICTA SAVES, namely: AUTEMIA JUCOM, CATALINA JUCOM,
DOLORES JUCOM, SERGIA JUCOM, BENEDICTA JUCOM, JOSEFINA JUCOM, FLORDIVIDA
REMETILLO, FELINA REMETILLO and ANNA MARIE REMETILLO, (represented by AUTEMIA
JUCOM), Petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, namely: REMEDIOS SAVES-ADAMOS, LUZ SAVES-
HERNANDEZ and DODONG SAVES, and ENRIQUETA CHAVES-ABELLA, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 152866, October 6, 2010.
FACTS: Gaudencia Valencia sold the entire Lot No. 382 to Enriqueta Chavez Abella, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 110 was issued in the name of Enriqueta Chavez, who was married to Charles
Abella. Meleriana Saves (Heir of Romana Saves), wrote her relatives in Negros Oriental, the herein
appellees, asking them to verify from the Register of Deeds information pertaining to Lot 382, as they
were among the heirs entitled to said property. A case for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental by plaintiffs-appellees (Heirs of Romana Saves),
alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 382 was fraudulently acquired by Gaudencia Valencia, and that
Gaudencia Valencia fictitiously sold the lot to her grandchild Enriqueta Chaves Abella. The trial court
rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners, Declaring the Deed of Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale null
and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the same declaring Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 110 in the name of Enriqueta Chaves Abella as valid and subsisting.
ISSUE: May the Court of Appeals consider evidence not formally offered in the trial court as basis for the
herein assailed Court of Appeals ruling in contradiction with Section 34, Rule 134 of the Revised Rules of
Court?

HELD: YES.
While it is a basic procedural rule that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered, evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the
following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
Petitioners draw attention to the fact that respondents did not formally offer Exhibits “7”, “8” and “13” at
the trial court proceedings. In accordance with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
trial court did not consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals allegedly utilized the
same as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial court’s decision. It is a basic procedural rule that
the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest
their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is
presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and
object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to
review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. However, in People v. Napat-a, citing
People v. Mate, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted
and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same must
have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case. In the case at bar, the records would show that the above
requisites have been satisfactorily complied with respect to Exhibit “7”.
RULE 133
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff

vs.
ALFREDO PASCUAL Y ILDEFONSO Accused-Appellant.
EN BANC, G. R. No. 172326, January 19, 2009
Facts: Appellant Alfredo Pascual was accused and charged for the crime of Rape with Homicide.
During the trial, the prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses. They testified that due to the celebration
of Noche Buena, herein appellant had a drinking spree and was allegedly drunk. They saw herein
appellant running away from the crime scene, and upon checking, they saw the body of the victim
Lorelyn, dean and almost naked.
Appellant denied the charged crime against him and presented his alibi. Defense presented the DNA
examination by the National Bureau Investigation, which stated that no DNA sample from the appellant
was found in the body of the victim.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant Pascual for the crime charged. On
appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court.
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because his
conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and due to the negative DNA test results.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the result of the DNA examination entitles herein appellant to an acquittal.
HELD # 2: NO.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

COMMISSION
REMEDIAL LAW
Verily, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt. Thus, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained only when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the culprit.
Here, the circumstances testified to by the prosecution witnesses lead to the inevitable conclusion that
the accused-appellant is the author of the crime charged.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Here, while the DNA analysis of the victim’s vaginal smear showed no complete profile of the accused-
appellant, the same is not conclusive considering that said specimen was already stained or
contaminated which, according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete and
good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that generally, with the vaginal smear, they
could see if there is a male profile in the smear. However in this case, when they received the vaginal
smear on the stained slide, the same had already undergone serological analysis. Hence, according to
the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the specimen subject of this case was inconclusive. In light of
this flawed procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not entitle accused-appellant
to an acquittal.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Bernardo was administratively charged and civilly charged by the Ombudsman
for acquiring unexplained wealth. He was subsequently convicted of the same by herein petitioner Office
of the Ombudsman.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of herein petitioner, hence this petitioner.
Petitioner contends that there are factual and legal bases to uphold its findings, particularly as to the
administrative liability for Dishonesty of respondent. It further asserts that the findings of fact of an
administrative agency akin to itself must be respected, as long as such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or preponderant.
ISSUE: Whether substantial evidence is present so as to render the herein respondent administratively
liable.
HELD: YES.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a finding of
guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial
evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the
Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case
falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the findings set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by evidence
on record.
The issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for the charge of
Dishonesty is one of fact, which is not generally subject to review by this Court. Nonetheless, a review of
the facts of the instant case is warranted considering that the findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the
Court of Appeals were not in harmony with each other.

EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES "NONONG NONOY
ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large, TITING GALI BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO large,
TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a. "NEGRO MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG
DELA CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO
ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG ITCOBANES,"
and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos, Reinario and Edelbrando, all surnamed Estonilo, Itcobanes and
Dela Cruz were accused and charged of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault.
During the trial, Felix, the son of deceased District Supervisor of Public Schools, Floro, testified that
before the death of his father they had an encounter with appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonillo, wherein
said appellant scolded his father with regard to program celebration of the Federation of 7th Day
Adventist and his support to Cotero, to the extent of uttering threatening words. The following day, his
father was gunned down. Antipolo testified that he was an eye-witness to the crime committed. Serapion,
testified that he heard gun shots coming from the inside of the school and saw herein appellants. They
were able to identify some of the appellants during the trial.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellants of the crime charged. On appeal, the
appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.
Appellants contend that prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt because their
conviction was based on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the present conviction based on circumstantial evidence is proper.

COMMISSION
REMEDIAL LAW
HELD: YES.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
The prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point to the accused-
appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floro’s support for Vicente
Cotero, who was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the prosecution
was able to establish that the accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The
prosecution witness, Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s house when they were plotting to kill
Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness
to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the
accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he heard the gunshots. Serapion also
recounted having heard one of them said "mission accomplished sir," after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The
testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.
issue may be established by inference. It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Here,
the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present
when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered
by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness account as well as Serapion’s testimony.

vs.
BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @ BERNING, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Appellant Dela Cruz was accused and charged for the crime of Rape with Homicide. During the
trial, the trial Court noted the fact that there were no eye witnesses to the commission of the crime.
However, BBB, the sister of the victim AAA, testified that he saw herein appellant bloodied and running
away from the crime scene.
The trial Court rendered its decision and convicted herein appellant based on circumstantial evidence and
the testimony of BBB. On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this
appeal.
Appellant contends that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the
ground his conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and that the witnesses presented were not
credible
HELD: YES.
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrator’s crime when these
are credible and sufficient, and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the
complex crime of rape with homicide.

We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to
testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is
rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed.
Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial
evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. Direct evidence
proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the
factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder
must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then, circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon
free.
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there was
overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented to point that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of committing the crime of rape with homicide. As we have stated before, circumstantial evidence may be
resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrator’s crime when these are credible and sufficient, and
could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with
homicide.
Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim
is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the
primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. The
trial court’s assessment of the witnesses' credibility is given great weight and is even conclusive and
binding. x x x.
Given that in the present case, the courts a quo have sufficiently addressed the question on the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB and appellant does not present to this Court any scintilla of
evidence to prove that the testimony of the witness was not credible, the Court must uphold the identical
assessment of the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses did not detract from BBB's credibility as a witness.

vs.
RENATO LAGAT Y GAWAN A.K.A. RENAT GAWAN AND JAMES PALALAY Y VILLAROSA,
Accused-Appellants.
FACTS: Appellants Lagat and Palalay were accused and charged for the crime of Qualified Carnapping.
It was alleged in the information that they helped one another to steal away a tricycle, driven and owned
by Biag. In the course of the carnapping, Biag was assaulted by herein appellants, which resulted to his
death.
Although there were no eye witnesses to the commission of the said crime, the trial Court rendered its
decision based on circumstantial evidence presented during the trial and convicted herein appellants. On
appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.
Appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the ground
that their conviction was based on circumstantial evidence.

COMMISSION
REMEDIAL LAW
HELD: YES.
To justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
issue may be established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and
coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be
proved.
Hence, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must
be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence presented, excluding those that are inadmissible,
show that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat
and Palalay beyond reasonable doubt. We considered the following pieces of evidence as convincing:
First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the tricycle the same day that it, together
with its owner Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying station, with the stolen tricycle packed
with cavans of palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they
saw the Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia PNP why they were in possession of
Biag’s tricycle.
Fifth, Biag’s wallet and his tricycle’s registration papers were found in the tricycle upon its
inspection by the Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biag’s body bore hack wounds as evidenced by the post-mortem autopsy done on him,
while his tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to
kill Biag in order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two accused conspired is not essential as it may
be inferred from their conduct before, during, and after their commission of the crime that they acted with
a common purpose and design. The pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution are consistent with
one another and the only rational proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused are guilty of
killing Biag to carnap his tricycle.


vs.
JULIE VILLACORTA GIL (A. K. A. Julie Villasorca Gil), accused-appellant.
Second Division, G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008
FACTS: Appellant Gil was accused and charged for the crime of Destructive Arson with Homicide.
Appellant denied the allegations and averred that the fire started due to a defective gas stove.
Furthermore, although herein appellant admitted the authenticity of the presented written extra judicial
confession, she stated that it was done against her will.
The trial Court rendered its decision and found herein appellant guilty for the said crime. Such decision
was based on circumstantial evidence presented during trial and on the extra judicial confession of herein
appellant.
On appeal, the appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court, hence this appeal.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the ground
that her conviction was based on circumstantial evidence and an invalid extra judicial confession.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the accused-appellant was correctly convicted on the basis of circumstantial
evidence.
HELD # 1: YES.
Circumstantial Evidence may be a basis for a conviction of a crime.
This Court agrees with the plaintiff-appellee that the RTC has passed upon enough circumstantial
evidence to hold the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
plaintiff-appellee correctly cites the ruling in People v. Gallarde, which distinguished the two types of
positive identification of a perpetrator of a crime and discussed their legal importance, thus:
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of
being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as
the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where,
although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he
may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime
as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second
type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when
taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the
only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime
to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitness are the only ones allowed to
possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody
can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary
that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a
proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its
conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to
prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go
free and the community would be denied proper protection.

COMMISSION
REMEDIAL LAW
The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following: the testimony of Kagawad
Rodolfo Lorenzo about the behavior and remarks of the accused-appellant at the time she caused a
public disturbance and threatened to cause chaos and arson and to drag her neighbors into this turmoil,
two days prior to the conflagration; the testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he saw the burning
mattress in the room of the accused-appellant, the latter said to him in the vernacular: "Pabayaan mo na
iyan. Damay-damay na tayo."; the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at the time he tried to
chase the accused-appellant during the fire incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant remark:
"Damay-damay na tayo diyan, huwag ninyo nang patayin ang sunog."; and the testimony of Kagawad
William Lim that the accused-appellant approached and admitted to him immediately after the incident
that she was the person responsible for the conflagration. The aforementioned circumstantial evidence
would constitute positive identification of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime charged,
to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had the motive to commit the crime, and the series of
events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her neighborhood -- the fire that started in her
room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as immediately before and after the fire-- sufficiently
points to the accused-appellant as the author of the said crime.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the extrajudicial confession of the accused is admissible of evidence,

notwithstanding the absence of counsel.
HELD # 2: YES.
Extra Judicial confession may be admissible, despite the absence of counsel
Regarding her extrajudicial confession, the plaintiff-appellee correctly adverted to the ruling in People v.
Andan as to the admissibility of the verbal confession made by the accused-appellant, which she made
not only to Kagawad William Lim but also to Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in progress.
Moreover, as correctly held by the CA, even if the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the
evidence presented by the prosecution is more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
ROMEO D. LONZANIDA, Petitioner,

-versus-
First Division, G.R. Nos. 160243-52 July 20, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Romeo D. Lonzanida, then Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, was charged
with 10 counts of Falsification of Public Document before the Sandiganbayan by notarizing the Joint
Affidavits allegedly executed by certain Querubin and Aniceto who are incapable of signing the said
affidavits. Petitioner’s signature also appeared as the attesting officer in the Affidavits of Ownership of
parcels of a 117 hectare public land, making it a public or official document, 9 of which were alleged to be
without the participation of the indicated affiants.
In handing down a verdict of guilty, the Sandiganbayan appreciated against petitioner the following factual
circumstances: 1) Petitioner did not deny having signed as subscribing officer the thirteen Joint Affidavits;
2) Even as petitioner admitted that he signed as subscribing officer the subject Joint Affidavits, he denied
that he knew Roberto Querubin and Roberto Aniceto, the affiants therein; 3) A Joint Affidavit is an
indispensable requirement in an application for a tax declaration; 4) It was upon the submission of the
Joint Affidavits, Affidavits of Ownership, Certification from CENRO and the sketch plan that Tax
Declarations were issued in favor of the thirteen applicants for Tax Declaration; 5) Of the thirteen
applicants for Tax Declarations, three were minor children of petitioner; one was a two-month old child of
Municipal Treasurer Cecilia Legrama; and, three were the children of Assistant Municipal Treasurer
Romulo Madarang; 6) None of the 7 children were more than thirty years old, yet, there was a declaration

in the Affidavits of Ownership that the affiants were in possession of the subject lot for more than thirty
years; 7) Two of the alleged applicants for tax declaration, Elsie de Dios and Efren Tayag, never applied
for the issuance of a Tax Declaration in their favor nor filed any document relative to the said application;
8) Petitioner issued a Mayors Certification dated February 19, 1996 attesting that the thirteen applicants
for Tax Declaration were the actual occupants of Lot No. 5504 and had been in possession of the same
for more than thirty years; and, 9) The applicants for Tax Declaration executed a Special Power of
Attorney giving Madarang the authority to sell the land subject thereof and to receive the proceeds of the
sale.
Unable to accept the judgment of conviction, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a
petition for review on certiorari imputing errors against the Sandiganbayan that the court a quo relied on
purely circumstantial evidence in justifying the conviction of petitioner when the facts from which the
inference were derived were not established thereby departing from the ruling of the Supreme Court in
People v. Genobia, 234 SCRA 699, on judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan may rely purely on circumstantial evidence in justifying the
conviction of petitioner.
HELD: YES.
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to
setting felons free. The standard that should be observed by the courts in appreciating circumstantial
evidence was extensively discussed in the case of People of the Philippines v. Modesto, et al. thus:
. . . No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will
suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and
with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. It has been said, and we believe correctly, that
the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. From all the
circumstances, there should be a combination of evidence which in the ordinary and natural course of
things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Stated in another way, where the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to convict the accused. The evidence presented by the prosecution, albeit mostly circumstantial,
is sufficient to warrant petitioner’s conviction. The following requisites for circumstantial evidence to
sustain a conviction were met, to (a) There is more than one circumstance;(b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

vs.
JULIE VILLACORTA GIL (A. K. A. Julie Villasorca Gil), accused-appellant.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008
FACTS: Julie Gil was convicted of the crime of Destructive Arson with Homicide sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering her to pay civil indemnity and funeral and burial expenses
to the heirs of the deceased victim. The pieces of evidence presented consist of various witnesses and
Julie Gil’s written confession. When the case was directly elevated to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review, Gil argued that her written confession is inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidence may be used as a basis in finding an accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt

COMMISSION
REMEDIAL LAW
HELD: YES.
Although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able
to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is
the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is one of the types of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an
unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author
of the crime to the exclusion of all others.

vs.
ALLAN NIEGAS y FALLORE, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS: Mila Fernandez worked for Augusto Manikis, Jr. as the nanny of his son, James. She testified
that in 2002, she took James outside the house. She saw Augusto’s driver, Niegas, who offered to take
them to Jollibee. They used Augusto’s car. However, from Jollibee, Niegas take them to Laguna, together
with unknown men.
Augusto was then informed by a caller to produce P10 million in exchange of his son. After series of
negotiations, Augusto and the Kidnappers settled for P1.7 million. Augusto was instructed to bring the
money to Sta. Mesa. The following day, James and Fernandez were returned to Augusto. Augusto never
saw Niegas since the kidnapping incident. He later on learned that Niegas was arrested. The RTC found
Niegas guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Hence, the defense filed this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court was correct in convicting the accused of kidnapping despite the absence
of direct evidence to establish his criminal culpability.
HELD: YES.
The testimonies of Fernandez and Augusto, which were believed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, clearly attribute all the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention to accused-appellant
Niegas and his companions, collectively. The mere circumstance that accused-appellant Niegas did not
personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the crime is irrelevant when conspiracy is
proven, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. While it is mandatory to prove it by competent
evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced from the mode, method,
and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RULE 92
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,

vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
FACTS: Nilo Oropesa (petitioner) filed a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as
guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke. The petitioner
presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett,
and the respondent’s former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the petitioner filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The
petitioner failed to file his written formal offer of evidence. Respondent filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to
Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his
Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner
from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence. His motion was
granted by the court. The trial court also granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence. On appeal, the
petitioner asked that the CA’s decision should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible
error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the
overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondent’s incompetence.
ISSUE # 1: Whether respondent may be considered an "incompetent" person as defined under Section 2,
Rule 92 of the Rules of Court.
HELD # 1: NO.
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
The evidence presented by the petitioner which did not include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
ISSUE #2: Whether the CA properly granted the demurrer to evidence.
HELD #2: YES.
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.

COMMISSION
REMEDIAL LAW
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts." We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain
exceptional circumstances; however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is also long settled
that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this
Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are
deemed final and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record." We therefore
adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of
respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar
PREROGATIVE WRITS
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007.
Upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary
Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the
name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security
and public safety. After finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion
under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of amparo on the
ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ
Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal
basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed. CA rendered the assailed Decision
dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance
of the subject HDO, thereby entitling him to the issuance of the prerogative writ of amparo.
HELD: NO.
The writ of Amparo shall be issued if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is
being committed.
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to
travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because
the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule
whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon
are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. While the right to life under
Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other
rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life. The
right to liberty, on the other hand, refers to the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint
or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the

citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted
to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion." Here, the
restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed
against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in
the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security,
for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

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2015 BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, et. al., Petitioners,

All the cases where brought to the SC on the question of jurisdiction.

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Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

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xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, we held:

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EDDIE T. PANLILIO, Petitioner,

Panlilio’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the same division.

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GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, Petitioner,

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CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, Petitioner,

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,

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ISSUE: How should procedural rules be construed?

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In Amante v. Suñga, the Court declared that:

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FLAVIO S. SUAREZ, JR., RENATO A. DE ASIS, FRANCISCO G. ADORABLE, JOVEN ANDALOC,

ISSUE #1: Whether the respondents committed forum shopping.

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ISSUE #2: Whether the intervention is proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

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SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES,

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DATU PAX PAKUNG S. MANGUDADATU, petitioner,

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