Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |1
G.R. No. 192486               November 21, 2012
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD
VIRAY vs.SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Facts
✓On April 28, 1986, Geodetic Engineer Abdon G. Fajardo
prepared a subdivision plan (Fajardo Plan) for Lot
733,registered in the name of Ellen P. Mendoza (Mendoza)
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 141-RP of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in which Lot 733 was
divided into six (6) smaller parcels of differing size
dimensions, designated as: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B, Lot 733-C,
Lot 733-D, Lot 733-E, and Lot 733-F.
✓The following day, Mendoza executed two separate deeds of
absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus
Carlo Gerard Viray (Jesus Viray), and the second deed
conveying Lot 733-A to spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita
Masangcay (Sps. Viray). As of that time, the Fajardo Plan
has not been officially approved by the Land Management
Bureau (LMB), formerly the Bureau of Lands. And at no time
in the course of the controversy did the spouses Viray and
Jesus Viray, as purchasers of Lots 733-A and 733-F,
respectively, cause the annotations of the conveying deeds
of sale on TCT 141-RP.
✓The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding,
Mendoza, Emerenciana M. Vda. de Mallari (Vda. de Mallari)
and respondent spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi (Sps.
Usi or the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733,
executed on August 20, 1990 a Subdivision Agreement,or
the1st subdivision agreement (1st SA). Pursuant to this
agreement which adopted, as base of reference, the LMB-
approved subdivision plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Alfeo S. Galang (Galang Plan), Lot 733 was subdivided into
three lots, i.e., Lots A to C.TCT 141-RP would eventually be
canceled and, in lieu thereof, three derivative titles were
issued to the following, as indicated: TCT 1584-RP for Lot
733-A to Emerencia M. Vda. Mallari; TCT 1585-RP for Lot
733-B to Sps. Jose B. Usi and Amelita B.Usi; and TCT 1586-
RP for Lot 733-C to Ellen P. Mendoza.
✓On April 5, 1991, another Subdivision Agreement (2nd SA)
was executed, covering and under which the 8,148-sq. m.
Lot 733-C was further subdivided into 13 smaller lots (Lot
733-C-1 to Lot 733-C-13 inclusive). The subdivision plan for
Lot 733-C, as likewise prepared by Engr. Galang on October
13, 1990, was officially approved by the LMB on March 1,
1991.
✓Based on the ocular inspection and survey conducted on Lot
733, as an undivided whole, by Geodetic Engr.
AngelitoNicdao of the LMB, Lot 733-A of the Fajardo Plan
that Sps. Viray bought is within Lot 733-B (Galang Plan)
allotted under 1st SA to Sps. Jose and AmelitaUsi; andLot
733-F of the Fajardo Plan is almost identical to the
combined area of Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to
Ellen Mendoza and her children—McDwight, Bismark,
Beverly and Georgenia, and a portion (1,000 square meters)
of Lot 733-C-10 of the Galang Plan awarded to Sps. Jose
and AmelitaUsi.
✓The Usis and Mendoza filed a suit for Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale filed before the RTC, Pampanga assailing the
validity and seeking the annulment of the deed of absolute
sale executed by Mendoza conveying Lot 733-A (Fajardo
Plan) to defendants Sps. Viray.A similar suit for Annulment
of Deed of Absolute Sale commenced by Mendoza against
Jesus Viray, also seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute
Sale conveying Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) to Jesus Viray and
to declare the plaintiff as entitled to its possession.
✈The two cases were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 55, which,
rendered a Joint Decision finding for the Sps. Viray and
Jesus Viray, as defendants, and accordingly dismissing the
separate complaints to annul the deeds of sale subject of
the joint cases.
✈On appeal, the CA, in effect affirmed in toto the RTC
dismissal decision.
✓ A forcible entry case filed on November 19, 1991 by the
late Jesus Viray against the Sps. Usi before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Pampanga, to eject the Usis
from Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan).
✈ The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of Jesus Viray,
which decision eventually became final and executory, the
Usis having opted not to appeal it.
✓The spouses Usi, instead of appealing from theMCTC
Decision, sought, after its finality, its annulment before the
RTC, whichboth RTC and CA, upon appeal, dismissed.
✓ A Petition for AccionPubliciana/ Reivindicatoriawas
instituted on December 12, 2001 by Sps. Usi against the
late Jesus Viray, as substituted by Vda. de Viray, et al.,
before the RTC, Pampanga, involving Lots 733-B, 733-C-1
and 733-C-10 (Galang Plan), asserting that the execution of
the MCTC Decision would oust them from their own lots
even though the dispositive portion of said forcible entry
Decision mentioned Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan)
and not Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 (Galang Plan)
which are registered in their names.
✓Vda. de Viray moved for the dismissal of these publiciana/
reivindicatoria actions on grounds, among others, of
litispendentia and res judicata.
✓An action for Cancellation of Titles or Surrender of Original
Titles with Damages was commenced by Vda. de Viray, et
al., against the Sps. Usi, Mendoza and eight others before
the RTC, Pampanga, seeking the cancellation of TCT Nos.
3614-R.P., 2099-R.P., 2101-R.P., 7502-R.P. and 2103-R.P.
covering Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 as subdivided under the
2nd SA of April 5, 1991 which taken together is basically
identical to Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) sold to Jesus Viray.
✈In sum, of the six (6) cases referred to above, the first four
(4) have been terminated and the main issue/s therein
peremptorily resolved. Only two cases of the original six
revolving around Lot 733 remained unresolved. The first
refers to the petition for review of the decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 which, in turn, is an appeal from the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), a Petition
for AccionPubliciana/ Reivindicatoria and Damages, and the
second is Civil Case No. (02)-1164(M) for Cancellation of
Titles or Surrender of Original Titles with Damages. The
first case is subject of the present recourse, while the
second is, per records, still pending before the RTC,
Pampanga, its resolution doubtless on hold in light of the
instant petition.
The Ruling of the RTC in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M)
✈In Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), the Macabebe, Pampanga RTC
rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the Sps. Usi
for AccionPubliciana/Reivindicatoria, where it held that the
Sps. Usi failed to establish by preponderance of evidence to
support their claim of title, possession and ownership over
the lots subject of their petition.
The Ruling of the CA

✈ The CA rendered the assailed decision, reversing and
setting aside the appealed RTC decision, and declaring as
legal and valid, the right of ownership of petitioner-
appellant respondents spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi
over Lot Nos. 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 covered by TCT
Nos. 1585-R.P., 2092-R.P, and 2101-R.P., respectively.
The Issue
WON the two (2) subdivision agreements dated August 20,
1990 and April 5, 1991, respectively, partake of a bona fide
and legally binding partition contracts or arrangements
among co-owners that validly effectuated the transfer of the
subject lots to respondent spouses Usi, which the validity of
deeds of absolute sale upon which the petitioners hinged
their claim of ownership and right of possession over said lots
depended.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
The subdivision agreements not partition of co-owners
Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and
assignment of a thing held in common by those to whom it
may belong.
Contrary to the finding of the CA, the subdivision agreements
forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for
the partition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733
but were actually conveyances, disguised as partitions, of
portions of Lot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and
portions of the subsequent subdivision of Lot 733-C.
It is fairly clear that Lot 733, even from the fact alone of its
being registered under the name of the late Moses Mendoza
and Ellen Mendoza, formed part of the couple’s conjugal
property at the time Moses’ demise on April 5, 1986. Equally
clear, too, is that Vda. de Mallari became a co-owner of Lot
733 by virtue of the purchase of its 416-square meter portion
on February 14, 1984, during the lifetime of Moses. Be that as
it may and given that the Sps. Usi have not been shown to be
co-owners of Mendoza and Vda. de Mallari prior to the sale by
Mendoza on April 29, 1986 of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo
Plan) to the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, respectively, then the
execution of the 1st SA on August 20, 1990 could not have
been a partition by co-owners of Lot 733. The same could be
said of the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 vis-à-vis Lot 733-C, for the
records are similarly completely bereft of any evidence to
show on how the purported participating co-owners, namely
Sps. Usi, the Sps. Lacap, the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan
became co-owners with Mendoza and her children, i.e.,
McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and Georgenia.
The April 29, 1986 Deeds of Absolute Saleof Lot 733-A and
Lot 733-F are Valid
It must be noted that the RTC, in its decision in Civil Case
Nos. 88-0265-M and 88-0283-M, upheld the validity of the
separate April 29, 1986 deeds of absolute sale of Lots 733-A
and 733-F (Fajardo Plan). The combined area of Lot 733-A
(366 sq. m.) and Lot 733-F (3,501) is less than one half of the
total area coverage of Lot 733 (9,137). The sale of one-half
portion of the conjugal property is valid as a sale. It cannot
be gainsaid then that the deeds, executed as they were by
the property owner, were sufficient to transfer title and
ownership over the portions covered thereby. And the
aforesaid RTC decision had become final and executory as far
back as December 11, 1995 when the Court, in G.R. No.
122287, in effect, affirmed the RTC decision. Likewise, the
MCTC’s decision in Civil Case No. 91 (13) for forcible entry,
declaring Vda. de Viray, as successor-in-interest of Jesus
Viray, as entitled to the physical possession, or possession de
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facto, of Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan), and the RTC’s decision in
Civil Case No. 99-0914M, disposing of the belated appeal of
the MCTC decision in the forcible entry case, have become
final and executory on February 12, 2003 under G.R. No.
154538.
From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza to
respondents Usi. The parties did not execute a valid deed of
sale conveying and transferring the lots in question to
respondents. What they rely on are two subdivision
agreements which do not explicitly chronicle the transfer of
said lots to them.
Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray
(vice Jesus Viray) have, as against the Sps. Usi, superior rights
over Lot 733-A and Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) or portions
thereof.
Res Judicata Applies
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily
prevailing in their cases supportive of their claim of
ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo
Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by the
expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as here, an
accionpubliciana and/or accionreivindicatoria, two of the
three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property.
The third, accioninterdictal, comprises two distinct causes of
action, namely forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue
in both cases being limited to the right to physical possession
or possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership that either party may set forth in his or her
pleadings, albeit the court has the competence to delve into
and resolve the issue of ownership but only to address the
issue of priority of possession. Both actions must be brought
within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand to
vacate following the expiration of the right to possess, in
case of unlawful detainer.
When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted
m o r e t h a n o n e y e a r, o n e m a y a v a i l h i m s e l f o f
accionpubliciana to determine the better right of possession,
or possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the
other hand, accionreivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership which necessarily includes recovery of possession.
Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a judgment
becomes final and executory, it may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what
remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or
execution of the judgment. Any attempt to reopen a close
case would offend the principle of res judicata.
The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda.
de Viray (vice Jose Viray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed
parcels of land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine,
be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession and
vindicate ownership filed by the Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R.
No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose and AmelitaUsi v.
Spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay and Jesus Carlo
Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the conveyances
and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Sps.
Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986
were valid. This determination operates as a bar to the
Usi’sreivindicatory action to assail the April 29, 1986
conveyances and precludes the relitigation between the same
parties of the settled issue of ownership and possession
arising from ownership. It may be that the spouses Usi did not
directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question in their action for annulment of the deed

sale of sale. But it cannot be gainsaid that said action is
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, and affects
the title, of the lot covered by the deed. The prevalent
doctrine, to borrow from Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,"is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of
the case, which is to recover said real property."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated July 24, 2009 and Resolution dated June 2,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 21, 2007 in
Civil Case No. 01-1118(M) of the RTC, Branch 55 in Macabebe,
Pampanga is accordingly REINSTATED.
CASE DIGEST 3: RULE 70 – FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, MARIA PIEDAD represented by
INSPIRACION DANAO vs. SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and
EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
• A COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND DAMAGES
was filed by Bonifacio against Sps.Gurieza before the
Municipal Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
BONIFACIO alleged that he is the absolute owner of the
1/3 middle portion of a parcel of residential land
designated as Lot 1227, located at La Torre, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, withan area of 4,640.98 square meters
which he acquired through intestate succession from his
late father who inherited the same from the latter’s
parents, Alejandro Piedad and Tomasa Villaray. He also
claimed that his ownership of the subject lot took place
even before his father’s death and was validated through
a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition
executed by Alejandro and Tomasa’s legal heirs. Further,
BONIFACIO alleged that before migrating to Hawaii, he
built a bungalow on the subject lot and assigned
numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of which
were Sps. Gurieza.
• However, SPS. GURIEZA allegedly took interest of the
bungalow and the subject lot after learning from an
employee of DENR that Lot 1227 is public land. Using
such information, SPS. GURIEZA had the subject lot
declared under their name for tax purposes, caused a
subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application
for survey authority and titling with the Bureau of Land
Management, CENRO – DENR Nueva Vizcaya.
• When BONIFACIO learned of Sps. Gurieza’s acts, he
authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a protest before the
DENR which deferred further action on their (Sps.
Gurieza’s) application before it. Thereafter, Bonifacio
sent his daughter, Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao, to the
country to personally demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate
the subject lot unconditionally; and for this purpose,
Danao initiated a complaint before the barangay court.
However, during the mediation proceedings, SPS.
GURIEZA refused to heed Danao’s demand and even
challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus, BONIFACIO
was constrained to file the instant case as his last resort.
• SPS. GURIEZA denied Bonifacio’s claim and maintained
that in 1974, the subject lot was a vacant and virginal
public land and that the DENR allowed them to possess
and occupy the same in the concept of an owner. As
such, they acquired the same through acquisitive
prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and
Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |3
validity of the Deed of Confirmation, contending that it
was only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa.
• MTC ruled in Bonifacio’s favor, and ordered Sps. Gurieza
to vacate the subject lot. It found that Bonifacio had a
better right of possession over the subject lot as
evidenced by the house he built thereon as early as the
1950s when he took possession of the said lot, as well as
the affidavits of witnesses who are pioneer residents of
the area, attesting that Sps. Gurieza’s claim over such lot
is preposterous. MTC also found that Sps. Gurieza’s
continuous stay on the subject lot was by Bonifacio’s
mere tolerance and such stay became illegal when they
refused to vacate the said lot despite the latter’s
demand. RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. CA
reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and consequently,
ordered the dismissal of Bonifacio’s Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer and Damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacio’s Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages against Sps. Gurieza is proper. YES
RULING:
• UNLAWFUL DETAINER is an action to recover possession of
real property from one who unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of
his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. The POSSESSION OF THE DEFENDANT IN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER is originally legal but became illegal
due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The ONLY ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IN AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties.
• An EJECTMENT CASE, based on the allegation of
possession by tolerance, falls under the category of
unlawful detainer. Where the PLAINTIFF allows the
defendant to use his/her property by tolerance without
any contract, the DEFENDANT is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand,
failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.
• Thus, under SECTION 1, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, the COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED "within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession" and must allege that: (a) the DEFENDANT
originally had lawful possession of the property, EITHER
by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) eventually, the DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the
plaintiff to defendant of the expiration or the
termination of the defendant’s right of possession; (c)
thereafter, the DEFENDANT remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment
thereof; and (d) WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
• After a judicious perusal of the records, the COURT holds
that Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action
for unlawful detainer. The following established facts
impel this conclusion: FIRST, the evidence shows that as
early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of
the subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house
thereon. Moreover, when HE MIGRATED TO HAWAII,
Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the said
house and lot, the last being Sps. Gurieza. SECOND, when
Bonifacio learned that Sps. Gurieza declared the subject
lot under their name for tax purposes, caused a
subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application
for survey authority and titling with the CENRO–DENR

Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to terminate
their tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and
demanded that they leave immediately, rendering the
Sps.Gurieza’s stay on the subject lot illegal. THIRD,
instead of vacating the subject lot, Sps. Gurieza defied
Bonifacio’s demand and asserted their ownership over
the same. LASTLY, BONIFACIO, THROUGH DANAO, made
his final demand to Sps. Gurieza on January 14, 2008, as
evidenced by a Certificate to File Action issued by the
Barangay Captain of the area where the subject lot was
located, stating that the Sangguniang Barangay had tried
to settle the dispute between the parties but failed to do
so, and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or within
the one (1) year period from his last demand.
CASE DIGEST 4: RULE 70 – FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND REMEDIOS VELASCO
vs.WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, represented
by its President, ALIZA MA, G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
• The SPOUSES MANZANILLA are the owners of a 25,000-
square meter parcel of land in BarangaySan Miguel, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas. On May 24, 1994, they leased a 6,000-
square meter portion of the above-mentioned property
to Waterfields, as represented by its President Aliza R.
Ma (Ma). The PARTIES executed on June 6, 1994 an
Amendment to the Contract of Lease. Save for the
COMMENCEMENT OF THE LEASE WHICH THEY RECKONED
on the date of the execution of the amendment and the
undertaking of the spouses Manzanilla to register the
agreements, the PARTIES agreed therein that all other
terms and conditions in the original Contract of Lease
shall remain in full force and effect. Beginning April
1997, however, WATERFIELDS failed to pay the monthly
rental.
• On July 30, 1998, the SPOUSES MANZANILLA filed before
the MTC a COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AGAINST
WATERFIELDS. They alleged in PARAGRAPH 4 thereof that
they entered into a Contract of Lease with Waterfields on
May 24, 1994, and in PARAGRAPH 5, that the same was
amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. However,
WATERFIELDS had committed violations of the lease
agreement by not paying the rentals on time. And in yet
another violation, it failed to pay the ₱18,000.00
monthly rental for the past six months prior to the filing
of the Complaint, that is, from December 1997 to May
1998 or in the total amount of ₱108,000.00. Demands
upon Waterfields to pay the accrued rentals and vacate
the property were unheeded so the SPOUSES MANZANILLA
considered the contract terminated and/or rescinded.
Hence, SPOUSES filed the Complaint and prayed therein
that the former be ordered to (1) vacate the subject
property and, (2) pay the accrued rentals of ₱108,000.00
as of May 1998, the succeeding rentals of ₱18,000.00 a
month until the property is vacated, the interest due
thereon, attorney’s fees, and cost of suit.
• WATERFIELDS admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
Complaint and alleged that: (1) when the lease
agreement was executed, the property subject thereof
was just bare land; (2) it spent substantial amounts of
money in developing the land, i.e., building of water
dikes, putting up of a drainage system, land filling and
levelling; (3) it built thereon a processing plant for fruit
juices, preserved vegetables and other frozen goods for
which it spent around ₱7,000,000.00; and (4) it caused
the installation in the said premises of an electrical
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system for ₱80,000.00 and water system for
₱150,000.00.
• WATERFIELDS further alleged that although the first two
years of its operation were fruitful, it later suffered from
business reverses due to the economic crisis that hit Asia.
Be that as it may, WATERFIELDS claimed that it did not
fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but was just
utilizing the rental deposit in the amount of ₱216,000.00
(equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment in
accordance with Section 4 of the original Contract of
Lease. Hence, it argued that the SPOUSES MANZANILLA
have no cause of action against it. WATERFIELDS also
asserted that the precipitate filing of the Complaint
against it is tainted with bad faith and intended to cause
it grave injustice considering that it already spent an
enormous amount of almost ₱10,000,000.00 in
developing the property.
• MTC found no merit in Waterfield’s claim that it did not
fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals as it was
applying the rental deposit to its payment of the same.
Consequently, the MTC declared that Waterfields violated
the lease agreement due to non-payment of rental. RTC
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA
concluded that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of
action against Waterfields.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s action for Unlawful
Detainer against Waterfields is proper. YES
RULING:
• For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit,
TWO REQUISITES MUST CONCUR: (1) there must be
failure to pay rent or comply with the conditions of the
lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to
comply and vacate. The FIRST REQUISITE refers to the
existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer,
while the SECOND refers to the jurisdictional
requirement of demand in order that said cause of action
may be pursued. IMPLIED IN THE FIRST REQUISITE, which
is needed to establish the cause of action of the plaintiff
in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the
contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the
defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease
conditions alleged to have been violated.
• Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held that the EVIDENCE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THE
CAUSE OF ACTION IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE is (1)
a lease contract and (2) the violation of that lease by the
defendant.
• It must be stressed that in this case, the VIOLATION OF
THE LEASE THROUGH NON-PAYMENT OF RENT is what
constitutes the cause of action. Hence, ONCE THE
FAILURE TO PAY RENT IS ESTABLISHED, a cause of action
for unlawful detainer arises. The problem, however, is
that the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to when a
cause of action arises. It did not base its determination
of the existence of the cause of action from the fact that
Waterfields failed to pay rents from December 1997 to
May 1998. To it, the CAUSE OF ACTION in this case only
arose after the contract was terminated and the rental
deposit was found sufficient to cover the unpaid rentals.
This is erroneous since as already discussed, it is the
FAILURE TO PAY RENT which gives rise to the cause of
action.
• Prescinding from this, the CA’s acknowledgement that
Waterfields failed to pay rent, as shown by its
declaration that the latter is the debtor of the spouses

Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals, is clearly
inconsistent with the conclusion that no cause of action
for ejectment exists against Waterfields. FAILURE TO PAY
THE RENT must precede termination of the contract due
to nonpayment of rent. It therefore follows that the
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IN THIS CASE
must necessarily arise before the termination of the
contract and not the other way around as what the CA
supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the
contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution of
this case.
• All told, the COURT sustains the RTC in affirming the
MTC's grant of the spouses Manzanilla's Complaint for
ejectment against Waterfields.
Case Digest No 4: DELA CRUZ vs SPOUSES HERMANO
Facts:
• Respondents Anotonio and Remedios Hermano are
the registered owners of a house and lot situated in
Tagaytay City covered by TCT No. T-24503. On June
13, 2002, Antonio sued petitioner, Dela Cruz, before
MTCC of Tagaytay City for ejectment and damges. In
his complaint, he averred that they (spouses
Hermano) are the registered and lawful owners of
the said house and lot, which they use as their rest
house or vacation place. They further alleged that
petitioner occupied and possessed the aforesaid
house and lot sometime on September 1, 2001
pursuant to the alleged Memorandum of Agreement
between her and certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez
without respondents’ authority and consent.
• Petitioner admitted to the existence of TCT No.
T-24503 but contended that the tue and actual
owner thereof was Don Benitez. Allegedly, Antonio
and his wife, respondent Remedios Hermano, had
already sold the property to Benitez; the latter, in
turn, sold it to petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, which they executed on 1 March 2001.
Petitioner claimed that Antonio knew about the sale
and her immediate occupation of the premises. She
also claimed that the place was actually uninhabited
when she occupied it and that it was Benitez who
had provided the keys thereto. Moreover, Antonio
allegedly knew that her caretakers had been
managing the property since March 2001, and that
he never questioned their presence there. Thus,
petitioner contended that estoppel had set in, as he
had made her believe that she had the right to
occupy and possess the property.
• The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the complaint. According
to MTCC, Antonio’s proper remedy was an action for
recovery, instead of the summary proceeding of
ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer. RTC affirmed MTCC’s
decision. CA reversed based on its finding that the
case was an ejectment complaint for forcible entry,
and that Antonio had sufficiently alleged and proved
prior physical possession, as well as petitioner’s
entry and possession by stealth. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a
case of forcible entry.
Ruling:
• NO. After an exhaustive review of the case record,
the Court finds that the Complaint was sufficient in
form and substance, but that there was no proof of
prior physical possession by respondents.
Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |5
• The Complaint’s allegations sufficiently established
the jurisdictional facts required in forcible entry
cases.
• Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires
that in actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged
that the complainant was deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was
filed anytime within one year from the time the
unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This
requirement implies that in those cases, possession
of the land by the defendant has been unlawful from
the beginning, as the possession was obtained by
unlawful means. Further, the complainant must
allege and prove prior physical possession of the
property in litigation until he or she was deprived
thereof by the defendant. The one-year period
within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry into
the land, except when entry was made through
stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted
from the time the plaintiff learned about it.
• The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the
Complaint adequately aver prior physical possession
by respondents and their dispossession thereof by
stealth, because the intrusion by petitioner was
without their knowledge and consent. The Court thus
agrees with the findings of the CA that contrary to
those of the RTC that the case was an action for
ejectment in the nature of accion reivindicatoria,
the case was actually for forcible entry and
sufficient in form.
• Likewise, the Court agrees with the CA’s findings
that the Complaint was timely filed. It is settled that
where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the
one-year prescriptive period should be counted from
the time the person who was deprived of possession
demanded that the deforciant desist from
dispossession when the former learned about it. xxx
And to deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of
the summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder managed
to conceal the trespass for more than a year, would
be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they
are unlawful.
• However, the title to the property of respondents
and their Tax Declaration proved possession de jure,
but not their actual possession of the property prior
to petitioner’s entry.
• Ownership certainly carries the right of possession,
but the possession contemplated is not exactly the
same as that which is in issue in a forcible entry
case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to
possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not one flowing out of ownership. These are
different legal concepts under which the law
provides different remedies for recovery of
possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party
who can prove prior possession can recover the
possession even against the owner. Whatever may be
the character of the possession, the present
occupant of the property has the security to remain
on that property if the occupant has the advantage
of precedence in time and until a person with a
better right lawfully causes eviction.
• Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments
are not conclusive proofs of possession. They are
merely good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner based on the presumption that no one in one’s
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that
is not in one’s actual or constructive possession.

• Respondents, in this case, failed to discharge their
burden of proving the element of prior physical
possession.
Case Digest No 5: ZACARIAS vs ANACAY
Facts:
• On December 24, 2008, petitioner Amada Zacarias
thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias
filed a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/
Unlawful Detainer against respondents, Victoria
Anacay and members of her household. Said
respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land
with an area of 769 square meters in Silang, Cavite
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the
name of petitioner and issued by Municipal Assessor
Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.
• As mediation between the parties was unsuccessful,
the case was referred to MTCC, which rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint, It held that the
allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer
as the claim that petitioner had permitted or
tolerated respondents’ occupation of the subject
property was unsubstantiated. Since petitioner was
deprived of the physical possession of her property
through illegal means and the complaint was filed
after the lapse of one year from her discovery
thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction
over the case.
• The RTC reversed MCTC pointing out that petitioner
did not state that respondents entered her property
through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was
in lawful possession and acceded to the request of
respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008
but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate
the property by that time. It held that the suit is one
for unlawful detainer because the respondents
unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner
after she allowed them to stay there for one year.
• The CA reversed RTCs decision granting respondent’s
petition. For RTC, the MCTC clearly had no
jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive
period for filing an action for forcible entry has
lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into
one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year
period to file her action from the time of her
demand for respondents to vacate the property.
• For petitioner, unlawful detainer was the proper
remedy considering that she merely tolerated
respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to
vacate was made upon them, and they had in fact
entered into an agreement and she was only forced
to take legal action when respondents reneged on
their promise to vacate the property after the lapse
of the period agreed upon.
Issue: W/N the present case partakes that of an unlawful
detainer.
Ruling:
• NO. The invariable rule is that what determines the
nature of the action, as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should
embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1
of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must
show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence. Such remedy is
Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |6
either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible
entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession
of his land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his
right thereto under any contract, express or implied.
• In Cabrera vs Getaruela, the Court held that a
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
• Petitioner’s complaint failed to allege a cause of
action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe
possession by the respondents being initially legal or
tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal
upon termination by the petitioner of such lawful
possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually
tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after
her discovery of their entry into the subject
premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she
discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007.
Such possession could not have been legal from the
start as it was without her knowledge or consent,
much less was it based on any contract, express or
implied. We stress that the possession of the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess.
• In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that
where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case. Thus:
• To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is
essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the
start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy.
• In Sarona vs Villegas: The word "tolerance" confirms
our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance
must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of
action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a
dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court -
provided for in the rules. If one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed,

then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the
possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible
entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well
be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe.
• In Go, Jr. vs CA: It is settled that one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally
occupying the land the moment he is required to
leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of
this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered.
This is where petitioners’ cause of action fails.
The evidence revealed that the possession of
defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint,
considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without
the permission and consent of petitioners and before
them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry
into the land was effected clandestinely, without the
knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible
entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in
Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)]
tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a
cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of
forcible entry x x x.
• The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it
failed to allege how and when entry was effected.
The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in
May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have
enterep the subject property and occupied the
same", as correctly found by the MCTC and CA,
would show that respondents entered the land and
built their houses thereon clandestinely and without
petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of
forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently,
the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the
RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's
ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201286               July 18, 2014
INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner, 
 abandoned her possession over the land and has
vs.
 continuously paid the rent on a month to month basis.
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS,
RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO,
DINA C. ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing
the Resolutions dated 12 May 20112 and 9 March 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784.
The Facts
Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |7
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 1595-A containing an area of 27,551
square meters situated in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-57604.
On 5 February 2003, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 29, a
Complaint  for Recovery of Possession, Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order with Damages and Attorney’s Fees
against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog). At the
time of the complaint, the land was declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 01-08-05410
with an assessed value of ₱57,960 and a market value of
₱264,930.
Respondents’ Claim:
In the Complaint, respondents stated that they were the
co-owners of the land. They alleged that Tagalog
occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on
a month to month basis by virtue of a verbal contract.
Tagalog built a house with light materials on the land and
when a strong typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalog’s house was
damaged. Thereafter, respondents alleged that Tagalog
discontinued payingthe rent and stopped inhabiting the
house.
Sometime before December 2002, respondents demanded
that Tagalog remove the scattered debris on the land,
notified her of their intention to use the land, and
subdivide and develop it for their personal use.
Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate the premises
asserting that the verbal contract of lease was deemed
terminated upon the expiration of the monthly contract.
However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was
still a lessee.
Sometime in January 2003, respondents alleged that
Tagalog constructed a two-storey residential house made
of cement, large steel bars, hollow blocks, sand and
gravel on the land. Respondents informed the Office of
the Municipal Engineer ofBalamban, Cebu of Tagalog’s act
of constructing a house on the land without their consent
and without the required building permit. Respondents
alleged that despite the warning given by the Office of
the Municipal Engineer to stop the construction, Tagalog
still continued withthe construction. Respondents then
referred the matter to the Barangay Captain of Buanoy,
Balamban, Cebu but again, as respondents alleged,
Tagalog only ignored the advice given by the Barangay
Captain.
Petitioner’s Claim:
In her Answer, Tagalog alleged that the lease contract
was still valid and subsisting and had never been
terminated by the parties. She added that she had not
Tagalog denied having been notified of the respondents’
intention to use and subdivide the land and further
alleged that she sought and was granted permission to
repair her dwelling structure and undertook the repair
without enlarging the area of her occupation. Tagalog
admitted being summoned by the Office of the Municipal
Engineer and Barangay Captain and she alleged that both
offices found that she had long ceased the repair work.
As a defense, Tagalog prayed for the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the action was for ejectment and
unlawful detainer which was beyond the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
RTC’s Ruling:

In a Decision dated 5 May 2008, the RTC decided the case
in favor of respondents. The RTC ruled that, in the
complaint, respondents prayed for the recovery of
possession of the leased property as owners. Thus, the
issue of ownership, which was within the original
jurisdiction of the court was primordial and the prayer
for eviction was merely incidental there being no written
contract of lease between the parties.
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated 30 May 2008.
Tagalog then filed an appeal8 with the Court of Appeals.
In a Resolution dated 12 May 2011, the CA dismissed the
case for failure of Tagalog to file the required brief
within the extended period requested. Tagalog filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution  dated 9 March 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue for our resolution iswhether the Regional
Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is for
unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court
or the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was
filed with the RTC, a second level court, the RTC’s
decision should be rendered void for lack of jurisdiction
over the case.
The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. In order to determine
whether the lower court had jurisdiction, it is necessary
to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before
it.
In the present case, the complaint was for recovery of
possession, preliminary mandatory injunction with a
prayer for temporary restraining order with damages
and attorney’s fees.
Based on the allegations in respondents’ complaint, it is
clear that the case involves only the issue of physical
possession or unlawful detainer as defined in Section
1,  Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In De Leon v. CA,  we
held that unlawful detainer is the withholding by a
person from another of the possession of a land or
building to which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An
ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not
possession de jure but physical possession only or
possession de facto, where dispossession has lasted for
not more than one year.
The right to recover possession of the land based on the
expiration of the verbal monthly contract of lease is
governed by Article 1687  of the Civil Code. Since the
lease is paid monthly under a verbal contract of lease
without a fixed period, the lease period is from month to
month. Respondents demanded that Tagalog vacate the
land sometime before December 2002, after the
termination ofthe monthly verbal lease contract. They
filed the complaint with the RTC in February 2003. Since
the complaint was filed within one year from the
expiration of the right to hold possession, this case is
clearly an unlawful detainer suit within the jurisdiction
of the MTC. The conclusion would be different if the
action is for the recovery of the right to possess and
dispossession lasted for more than one year which would
Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |8
justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana. Accion
publiciana is the plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
the land independently of the title and is filed after the
expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the land. In such case, the RTC has jurisdiction.
However, in this case, the unlawful withholding of
possession of the land before the filing of the
complaint with the RTC lasted only for more or less
three months.  Also, neither of the parties brought
forth the issue of ownership which was the reason
given by the RTC for taking cognizance of the action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment,
order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot
be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue
on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal
or even after final judgment. In this case, Tagalog
raised the issue of jurisdiction in her Answer.
Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case before
it. Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to
dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter. In sum, since
respondents' complaint should have been filed with the
MTC, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the
case. The proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It
then follows that the appeal brought before the
appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions
promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without
force and effect.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Resolutions dated 12 May 2011 and 9 March 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784. We DISMISS
Civil Case No. T-1059 without prejudice to the parties
seeking relief in the proper forum. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, G.R. No. 182953
JOSE DERAMA, CATES
RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO
NOLASCO, JESUS Present:
OLIQUINO, NORBERTO
LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO, C A R P I O
BERNARDO FLORESCA, MORALES, J.,
MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE Chairperson,
DIMANDAKO, RICARDO BRION,
PEA, EDUARDO ESPINO, BERSAMIN,
ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VILLARAMA, JR.,
VICTOR SANDOVAL, and
FELICITAS ABRANTES, SERENO, JJ.
MERCY CRUZ, ROSENDO
ORGANO, RICKY BARENO,
ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE Promulgated:
RAMA and PABLO
DIMANDAKO, October 11, 2010
Petitioners,
versus -
MANALITE

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
DECISION
 
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The Case:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the
Decision dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated May
21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
93050.  The case stemmed from a complaint for Forcible
Entry/Unlawful Detainer  filed by respondent Manalite
Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) against AMARA W
CIGELSALO Association (AMARA) and its members.  by mere tolerance.  MAHA tolerated the occupation until
Facts:
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 222603. Through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises
and constructed their temporary houses and an office
building. Petitioners likewise even filed a civil case to
annul MAHAs title on September 2, 1992, but said case
was dismissed by the trial court.  After said dismissal,
MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the
land.  Petitioners pleaded that they be given one year
within which to look for a place to transfer, to which
request MAHA acceded. The said one-year period,
however, was repeatedly extended due to the
benevolence of MAHAs members.  Later on, petitioners
came up with a proposal that they become members of
MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions of the
property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage
Program (CMP).  MAHA again agreed and tolerated
petitioners possession, giving them until December 1999
to comply with the requirements to avail of the CMP
benefits.  Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with
said requirements.  Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA sent
formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the
property.  Upon the latters refusal to heed the demand,
MAHA filed the complaint for  Forcible Entry/Unlawful
Detainer.
In their Answer with Counterclaims, petitioners  denied
the said allegations and averred that they are the owners
of the subject lot, having been in actual physical
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years before
MAHA intruded into the land. They claimed that as the
years went by, they established the AMARA and bought
the subject property from Julian Tallano.  The property
later became known as the Tallano Estate and registered
under TCT No. 498.  They likewise argued that the
allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction
upon the court acting as an ejectment court, and that
the complaint was irregular and defective because its
caption states that it was for  Forcible Entry/Unlawful
Detainer.  MAHA, additionally, had no legal capacity to
sue and was guilty of forum shopping.  Its officers were
likewise fictitious.
MTC’s Decision:
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a
decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action.
The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of
forcible entry, but MAHA failed to establish the
jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in
its complaint. Also, the trial court held that MAHAs
failure to initiate immediate legal action after
Rule 70_Case Digests_LE107_2017 |9
petitioners unlawfully entered its property and its
subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the
petitioners cannot be construed as tolerance in
accordance with law as to justify the treatment of the
case as one for unlawful detainer.
RTC’s Decision:
The RTC rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2006,
reversing the decision of the MTCC.  The RTC held that
the lower court erred in dismissing the case by
considering the complaint as one of forcible entry which
required prior physical possession. The RTC found that
MAHA was able to allege and prove by preponderance of
evidence that petitioners occupation of the property was
all those who wanted to acquire MAHAs rights of
ownership could comply with membership obligations and
dues. Petitioners, however, failed to comply with said
obligations within the given period; thus, their
occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded that
they vacate the property.
CA’s Decision:
In a Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC.  The CA held that while the
complaint in the beginning alleged facts which make out
a case for forcible entry, the rest of the averments
therein show that the cause of action was actually for
unlawful detainer.  The CA noted that the complaint
alleged supervening events that would show that what
was initially forcible entry was later tolerated by MAHA
thereby converting its cause of action into one for
unlawful detainer.  Accordingly, the complaint was filed
within the required one-year period counted from the
date of last demand.  The CA further held that the fact
that the complaint was captioned as both for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer does not render it defective
as the nature of the complaint is determined by the
allegations of the complaint.  The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads,
Petitoner’s Claim:
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of
prior physical possession in actions for forcible entry was
not alleged with particularity in the complaint, as it
merely alleged that respondent had been deprived of its
possession over the property.They also maintained that
they were not withholding possession of the property
upon the expiration or termination of their right to
possess because they never executed any contract,
express or implied, in favor of the respondent.  Hence,
there was also no unlawful detainer.
Issues:
(1) whether or not the allegations in the complaint are
sufficient to make up a case of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer; and
(2) whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the
RTCs decision finding a case of unlawful detainer.
Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature
of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction
over the case are the allegations in the complaint.  In

ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within
the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the  1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 thereof.
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of
action under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for
forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of
a property from the defendant whose occupation thereof
is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a
case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from the defendant whose
possession of the property was inceptively lawful by
virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
possession despite the termination of his right
thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the
complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in dispute until he was
deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the means
provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the  Rules  either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the
complaint of how the possession of defendant started or
continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and
that defendant holds possession of the land or building
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the
complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly
constitute a case of unlawful detainer.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latters right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the
last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired
the property, MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave
them the option to acquire portions of the property by
becoming members of MAHA.  Petitioners continued stay
on the premises was subject to the condition that they
shall comply with the requirements of the CMP.  Thus,
when they failed to fulfill their obligations, MAHA had
the right to demand for them to vacate the property as
their right of possession had already expired or had been
terminated.  The moment MAHA required petitioners to
leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying
the land. Well settled is the rule that a person who
occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Thus, the
RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
As to petitioners argument that MAHA’s title is void for
having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue
was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the
sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession
of the property involved, independent of any claim of
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 10
ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue
involved is the physical or material possession of the
premises, that is possession  de facto  and not
possession  de jure,  the question of ownership must be
threshed out in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby  DENIED  for lack of merit.  The
Decision dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated
May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93050 are hereby  AFFIRMED. With costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011]
SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES
AND DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims that on August 6, 2002 he
and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad, bought a 428-
square meter registered property on 7 Administration St.,
GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City,[1] from Teresita,
Rommel, and Dennis Farrales.] Teresita operated a boarding
house on the property.
Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding
house themselves, they agreed to lease the property back to
Teresita for P30,000.00 a month so she could continue with
her business.[4] But, although the lease had a good start,
Teresita suddenly abandoned the boarding house,[5] forcing
the Abads to take over by engaging the services of Bencio
Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the boarding house
business.[6]
On December 8, 2002 Oscar and Daisy came, accompanied by
two men, and forcibly took possession of the boarding house.
Two days later or on December 10, 2002, the day the Abads
left for abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered and took
possession of the property once again. Because of this, on
March 10, 2003 petitioner Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a
complaint[8] for forcible entry against the two before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.[9]
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized
the place. They claimed ownership of it by inheritance. They
also claimed that they had been in possession of the same
from the time of their birth.[10]That Oscar had been residing
on the property since 1967 as attested to by a March 31, 2003
certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.[11]
The MeTC rendered a decision[16] in favor of Abad, stating
that Oscar and Daisy could not acquire ownership of the
property since it was registered. And, as owner, Abad was
entitled to possession.
Questions Presented The case presents the following
questions:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently allegedin his complaint
the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the
disputed property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his
action; and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved
that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the property in
question.
The Court's Rulings

Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry
to enable first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them:
first, that the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the
property; and, second, that the defendant deprived him of
such possession by means of force, intimidation, threats,
strategy, or stealth.[29]
There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his
complaint that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject
property. The only issue is with respect to his allegation,
citing such property as one "of which they have complete
physical and material possession of the same until deprived
thereof." Abad argues that this substantially alleges plaintiffs
prior physical possession of the property before the
dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction
over the action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible
entry suit is not required to use in his allegations the exact
terminology employed by the rules. It is enough that the facts
set up in the complaint show that dispossession took place
under the required conditions.[30]
It is of course not enough that the allegations of the
complaint make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff
must also be able to prove his allegations. He has to prove
that he had prior physical possession[31] for this gives him
the security that entitles him to remain in the property until
a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.[32]
Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of
the property after buying the same since they immediately
rented it to Teresita who had already been using the property
as a boarding house. Abad claims that their renting it to
Teresita was an act of ownership that amounted to their
acquiring full physical possession of the same.[33]
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in
September 2002.[34] Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand,
have proved that they had been renting spaces in the
property as early as 2001 as evidenced by receipts that they
issued to their lessees. This was long before they supposedly
entered the property, using force, in 2002.
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than
physical possession or possession de facto, not legal
possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Only prior
physical possession, not title, is the issue.[9]
The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a
forcible entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.[40]
G.R. No. 178159 : March 2, 2011.
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioners, v.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands inSan
Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo
(Romualdo) cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow,
Emiliana, got Cruzs permission to stay on the property
provided she would vacate it upon demand.In September
1989, spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the Dionisios)
bought the property from Cruz. In April 2002, the Dionisios
found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was
already Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under
the strength of a "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" dated
April 7, 1977.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 11
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded that Wilfredo
vacate the land but the latter declined, prompting the
Dionisios to file an eviction suit against him before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael, Bulacan.Wilfredo
filed an answer with counterclaims in which he declared that
he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the pre-
trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their
complaint.The Dionisios filed their amended complaint on
August 5, 2003; Wilfredo maintained his original answer.
The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked Wilfredo to vacate
the property and pay rent and costs. The RTC affirmed,
adding that the action was one for forcible entry. The CA,
however, reversed. The CA held that, by amending their
complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed their cause of
action from unlawful detainer to recovery of possession which
fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.Further, since the
amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on
August 5, 2003 marked the passage of the one year limit from
demand required in ejectment suits.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amended complaint changed the cause
of action
2. Whether or not the action is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Effect of amendment of the complaint;
nature of the action.
First issue: To determine if an amendment introduces a
different cause of action, the test is whether such
amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a
liability or obligation which is completely different from that
stated in the original complaint.
Here, both the original and the amended complaint have
identical allegations, and required Wilfredo to defend his
possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on the
land after Emiliana left out of the owners mere tolerance and
that the latter had demanded that he leave.It did not
introduce a new cause of action.
Second issue: Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case since it involved
tenancy relation under the DARABs jurisdiction. But
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. The records
show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he
was a tenant of the land.
Second, the Court ruled that this is not an action for forcible
entry, since the complaint contained no allegation that the
Dionisios were in possession of the property before Wilfredo
occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit.
The Court ruled that this is an action for unlawful detainer:
(1) the defendant has possession of property by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) such possession became
illegal upon plaintiffs notice to defendant, terminating the
latter's right of possession; (3) the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his
property; and (4) within a year from plaintiff's last demand
that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a
complaint for ejectment. If the defendant had possession of
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 12
the land upon mere tolerance of the owner, such tolerance
must be present at the beginning of defendants possession.
Here, while there was no specific allegation of "tolerance" in
the complaint, the Court concedes that the rules do not
require the plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact
language of such rules.The Dionisios alleged that Romualdo
used to be the lands tenant and that when he died, the
Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a
promise that she would leave upon demand.These allegations
clearly imply the Dionisios "tolerance" of her (or any of her
assignees).
RULE 70: CASE #10
G.R. No. 176341, July 07, 2014
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
versus
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only
from the time the demand to vacate was served
upon it and not from the time it began occupying the
disputed premises, petitioner Pro-Guard Security
Services Corporation (Pro-Guard) seeks recourse to
this Court.



This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the
September 6, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58867 which denied the
Petition for Review filed therewith by Pro-Guard as
one of the petitioners. Likewise assailed is the CA’s
January 23, 2007 Resolution3 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereto.
 •


Factual Antecedents
 became final and executory on December 12,


On July 24, 1984, Manuel A. Torres, Jr., (Manuel)
assigned to respondent Tormil Realty and
Development Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of
land located in Pasay City and all the improvements
thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said
corporation.4 Despite the assignment, however, title
to the real properties remained in Manuel’s name as
he neither registered the transaction in the Registry
of Deeds nor provided Tormil the necessary
documents to have the titles over the properties
transferred in its name. Later, Manuel unilaterally
revoked the transaction.

• Subsequently, Manuel, together with two
other persons, one of whom is Edgardo Pabalan
(Edgardo), established Torres Pabalan Realty,
Incorporated (Torres-Pabalan).
• As part of his capital contribution, Manuel
assigned the same aforesaid parcels of land to
Torres-Pabalan.
• Construction of the Torres Building on the
subject real properties was completed in 1985 and
its units rented out.
• Edgardo, who was also then the General
Manager and Administrator of Tormil, acted as the
building administrator and occupied the 2nd floor.
• In March 1987, Tormil filed a case before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
docketed as SEC Case No. 31535 (SEC case) to
compel Manuel to fulfill his obligation by turning
over the documents necessary to effect the
registration and transfer of titles in its name of the
properties assigned to it by Manuel.
• Edgardo also then set up in October 1989 a
law office (law office) with Atty. Augustus Cesar
Azura (Augustus) in the 2nd floor of the building.
Torres Building was thereafter declared by Torres-
Pabalan for tax purposes

• On March 6, 1991, the SEC rendered
judgment in favor of Tormil,7 and this was later
affirmed by the SEC en banc.8
• Manuel appealed to the CA. During the
pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into an
agreement with Edgardo in March 1994 for the rent
of a unit in the 3rd floor of Torres Building. As
payment, Pro-Guard was to provide security services
to Torres-Pabalan.
Subsequently, the CA,9 and later this Court,
10 upheld the ruling in the SEC case such that it
1997.11
• By October 1998, not only were the titles to
the subject parcels of land registered in Tormil’s
name,12 but also the tax declaration over the Torres
Building.13
• On November 5, 1998, Tormil sent letters14
to Edgardo and Augustus (for the law office) and Pro-
Guard asking them to validate their possession/enter
into a lease contract with Tormil and at the same
time settle their past and current rentals.
• Since these letters were ignored, Tormil, on
November 16, 1998 sent them separate demands to
vacate the premises and pay the monthly rental of
P20,000.00 from the time of their occupation
thereof until the same are actually turned over to
Tormil.15
• As these were unheeded, Tormil asserting
right of possession based on its ownership of the
Pasay properties, filed before the Pasay City
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) separate ejectment
suits against Edgardo and Augustus, and Pro-Guard16
which were raffled to Branch 44.

• Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormil’s
ownership of the parcels of land where the building
stands and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was the
owner of the same.
• Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the
building were surreptitiously and unlawfully
cancelled on the sole basis of the SEC Case.
• Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was
paying rentals to the owner, Torres-Pabalan, in the
form of security services provided to the latter. It
likewise called attention to the fact that it was no
longer in the premises as Tormil forcibly ousted it
therefrom.
 disputed properties. It debunked the claim of Edgardo,


Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
 name are invalid, ratiocinating that their issuance by the City


The MeTC adjudged that Tormil has proven its right
to possess the property. Said court brushed aside the
claim that Torres-Pabalan owns the building since its
SEC Certificate of Registration was already
cancelled, and that the construction of the building
was completed in July 1985 or prior to the time said
corporation was incorporated in September 1986.
Finding the defendants’ occupancy of the units as
only upon Tormil’s tolerance, the MeTC concluded
that their possession became unlawful when Tormil
decided to assert its right of ownership over the
building after the ruling in the SEC case was upheld
with finality by this Court.



Thus, in its June 28, 1999 Decision,17 the MeTC
ordered Edgardo and Augustus to vacate the unit
they possessed, as well as to pay attorney’s fees and
costs.
• With respect to Pro-Guard, it
adjudged:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services
Corporation and all persons claiming rights under [it] to
vacate and surrender possession of Unit M, 3rd Floor, Torres
Building, 157 Buendia Ext., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Pasay City;
 Pro-Guard to elevate the case to this Court.


4. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. to
pay [Tormil] the fair and reasonable rental of the premises
[in] the amount of P20,000.00 per month with legal interest
from June, 1995 until the premises is fully vacated;18


Contending that Tormil has no right to possess the building,
the defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City and the same was raffled to Branch 109 thereof. In
the meantime, Pro-Guard informed the MeTC that it had
already vacated the premises as early as March 20, 1999.19
 While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer


Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
 occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation


In its Decision20 dated December 15, 1999, the RTC did not
find merit in the appeal, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to several decision[s] of
the Supreme Court and the provision of Rule 70 of the Revised
Rules of Court to the effect [that] the occupancy and
possession of the subject premises by the defendants-
appellants became illegal when they failed and refused to
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 13
heed the demand letters of herein plaintiff-appellee to
vacate the same and surrender possession peacefully, the
Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the
trial court and hereby affirms the same IN TOTO.


SO ORDERED.21
On appeal to the CA, Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard
reiterated their arguments on Torres-Pabalan’s ownership of
the building and on its right to possess it.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA adjudged Tormil to have sufficiently proven its case
for unlawful detainer. It held that based on its Torrens titles
over the subject parcels of land and the tax declarations over
the building thereon, Tormil has the right to possess the
Augustus and Pro-Guard that the tax declarations in Tormil’s
Assessor are presumed to have been regularly performed.



Ultimately, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC
Decision,22viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE
Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated 15 December 1999 and Order dated
02 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 109 in Civil Case Nos.
99-0618 & 99-[0619] are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.



SO ORDERED.23


In asking for a reconsideration, one aspect which Edgardo,
Augustus and Pro-Guard objected to was the order for them
to pay P20,000.00 monthly rental and the reckoning point of
payment. Pro-Guard, in its Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration,24 argued that the CA should have modified
the RTC judgment by reckoning the payment from the date of
Tormil’s notice to vacate.



The CA found no reason to reverse its judgment,25 impelling
Issue:
WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE [METC] AND THE [RTC] ON THE AWARD OF THE [METC]
IN RECKONING THE DATE OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS IN THE
AMOUNT OF P20,000.00 PER MONTH WITH LEGAL INTEREST
FROM JUNE 1995 UNTIL THE PREMISES IS FULLY VACATED
CONTRARY TO PREVAILING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.26
Ruling


suit, is entitled to the fair rental value for the use and
should not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to
occupy the same, but from the time of the demand to
vacate.



“In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in
prior lawful possession of the property but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration
of his right to possess.”27 In other words, the entry is legal

but the possession thereafter became illegal. Additionally,
the Rules of Court requires the filing of such action within a
year after the withholding of possession,28 meaning that “if
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year,
[then] an ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful
detainer) is proper
 Guard is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit
in March 1994 up to November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-
Guard to possess the premises was not challenged. It was only
after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the
same that it terminated Pro-Guard’s right to possess the unit
it was occupying through a letter to vacate dated November
16, 1998. Hence, it is only from that point that Tormil is
considered to have withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-Guard’s
occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guard’s possession became
unlawful at that same moment. This is supported by the
allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil
initiated the same not because of non-payment of rentals,
but because of withdrawal of tolerance. Tolerance or
“[t]oleration is defined as ‘the act or practice of permitting
or enduring something not wholly approved of,”30 while
tolerated acts are “those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of the property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which one’s property can
give to another without material injury or prejudice to the
owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.”31
 NORMING ARCAL, NORA and ALEX BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC,
With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is
settled that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His
status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term
of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from
the date of the demand to vacate.32
Thus, in Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc.,33 the lessor ended
its tolerance of the sublessees’ occupation of the property
and demanded that they vacate the premises on March 29,
1995. We upheld the ejectment of the sublessees and
ordered them to pay monthly rentals beginning April 1995
until they vacate the premises. Indeed, it is inconsistent to
demand payment of rentals during the period of tolerance.
 40824 dated November 15, 1996 and its Resolution


Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is obliged to
consign the payment of rentals. One legal cause for
consignation is when two or more persons claim the same
right to collect.34 Various claimants to a debtor’s payment
must have the appearance of a right to collect such that
the debtor would have a reasonable doubt, not based on
negligence, as to who is entitled to the payment.35

Whether Pro-Guard was indeed aware of the legal dispute
then pending before the SEC and subsequently before the
courts is of no moment. When the dispute regarding the
validity of Manuel’s assignment to Tormil of the realties
was pending before the SEC, Tormil did not claim to Pro-
Guard that it is the true owner of the premises. It neither
sought payment of rentals which it now claims Pro-Guard
should have consigned during the pendency of its suit
against Manuel. As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-Guard,
the lease contract remained to be then between it and
Torres-Pabalan. The latter was occupying and running the
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 14
building, as evidenced by several tax declarations in its
name which, while not conclusive proofs of ownership,
nevertheless, are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner.36 Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act on
behalf of Torres-Pabalan, administered the premises. Pro-
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord
and tenant between them.37



WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. SP 58867 are MODIFIED in that Pro-Guard is to pay for
the fair and reasonable rental of the premises in the
amount of P20,000.00 per month with legal interest
beginning November 16, 1998 up to the time that the
premises are fully vacated.
RULE 70 #11
G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998
MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA ARCAL, and
VIRGILIO ARCAL, petitioners, 

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN & LETTY
RICAFRENTE, RENIE & CENY RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and
LANIE RICAFRENTE, CORA GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and
FLORIDA RICAFRENTE, CARMEN TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR,
ANCHANG ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA ARGUSON, LIZA
ARGUSON, ACION ARGUSON, BALENG and FELY ARGUSON,
FIDENG and CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO,
ENGAY and SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and NARSING
AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA, NENENG and RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY
and ABET DONES, YOLLY and ED PAULINO, ERIC and
JENNIFER PAULINO, CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and
PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLEN DUEZA, BERTING and NORMA
BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE, DELLY and FREDO
NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO
CLARETE, NENA VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and
NONONG IBONG, CHITA and RESTIE REYES, SONNY and
DONG REYES, and WALLY and DAISY REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS
• This petition seeks the review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
dated January 13, 1997.
• Petitioners as plaintiffs filed on August 31,
1995 a complaint for unlawful detainer before the
Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite against private
respondents as defendants. Subject of the complaint
was a 21,435 square meter parcel of land designated
as Lot No. 780 of the Santa Cruz de Malabon Estate
Subdivision, Cavite and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 26277 in the names of Maria,
Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina 1 Arcal. 2
• The complaint alleged, among others, that:
• Defendants herein occupied the subject parcel of
land described above thru plaintiffs' implied
tolerance, or permission but without contract with
herein plaintiffs. From the dates of their occupancy,
plaintiffs did not collect any single centavo from
defendants, nor the latter pay to plaintiffs any
rental for their occupancy therein;
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 15
• On June 18, 1984, plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio
Arcal, filed an ejectment suit against substantially
all of defendants herein with the Municipal Trial
Court of Tanza, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No.
285 covering the subject parcel of land in dispute:
• Meanwhile, on September 18, [1984],  3  Lucio Arvisu
the alleged son of Gaudencio Arvisu and Natalia
Ricafrente Arvisu, and substantially all defendants
herein filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Trece Martires, Cavite, a civil case for "Annulment of
Title, with Reconveyance and Damages" against Salud
Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal (deceased), Maria
Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal. On May 28,
[1985],  4  the said complaint was ordered to be
dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute.
An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but in
the resolution of the latter Court promulgated on
November 28, 1986, said appeal was considered
abandoned and dismissed for failure of appellants to
file their brief.
• With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs
herein, except Virgilio Arcal, with the Municipal Trial
Court of Tanza, Cavite, the said court rendered a
favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs ordering
defendants therein, among others, to vacate the
property in question and remove residential houses
and improvements introduced therein and return the
possession thereof to plaintiffs. Unfortunately, on
appeal with the RTC, the foregoing decision was
reversed and set aside, and the said complaint for
ejectment was dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of the proper action after the prejudicial
question in Civil Case No. TM-146 is resolved in a fair
and adversary proceeding. Said decision attained
finality for failure of plaintiffs' former counsel to
interpose an appeal.
• Several demands were made by plaintiffs for
defendants to vacate the premises in question, the
last written demand was made by plaintiffs' lawyer
on July 23, 1995, but they proved futile as they
refused and failed, and still refuse and fail to vacate
the premises, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiffs .
• In a Decision dated October 26, 1995, the
municipal trial court held that petitioners are
registered owners of the property and as such
they have the right to enjoy possession thereof.
• On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 23, affirmed in toto the municipal
trial court's decision.6
• Private respondents filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, arguing  inter
alia  that "the respondent trial court erred in not
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the
complaint being one for recovery of right of
possession." 7
• The appellate court, ruling in favor of
private respondents, granted the petition,
reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court and dismissed Civil Case No. 370. 8
• In considering that the complaint was not
one for unlawful detainer, adverting that private
respondents had previously filed complaints
questioning petitioners' ownership of the land, the
appellate court made the following disquisitions:
• In commencing this suit for
unlawful detainer, private respondents are
banking on their allegation that they merely
tolerated petitioners to stay on the
premises in question, but which tolerance
they already withdrew on July 23, 1995.
However, the other allegations and
admissions of private respondents in their
complaint would show that the case is not
one of unlawful detainer as petitioners did
not actually occupy the subject property
upon the tolerance of private respondents.
• Thus, the written demand to
vacate of July 3, 1995 made by private
respondents on petitioners did not
terminate any right of the latter to stay on
the subject premises supposedly founded on
tolerance.
• As further alleged and admitted by
private respondents in their complaint, a
certain Lucio R. Arvisu and substantially all
of petitioners filed against them on
September 18, 1984 an action for
"Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and
Damages" before the RTC of Trece Martires,
Branch 23, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. TM-59. Although that case was later
dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is
no question that its institution constituted
an open challenge to the title of private
respondents over the premises in dispute.
• We are therefore convinced that
the allegations of private respondents in
their own complaint do not sufficiently
support an action for unlawful detainer.
• ISSUE
• RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED
BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
TANZA, CAVITE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN
U N L AW F U L D E TA I N E R S U I T, A N D I N
DISMISSING THE SAME FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION. 10
•
RULING
• We grant the petition. The CA erred in its
decision.
• From a reading of the allegations of the
complaint quoted above, we find that the action is
one for unlawful detainer.
• Petitioners alleged in their complaint that
they are the registered owners of the subject
property. The cases filed by a certain Lucio Arvisu
and several of the private respondents casting doubt
on petitioners' ownership of the property, namely
Civil Case No. TM-59 for 'Annulment of Title, with
Reconveyance and Damages' and Civil Case No.
TM-146 for 'Registration of Claim Under Section 8,
R.A. No. 26,' were resolved with finality adverse to
private respondents. 13
• Petitioners also alleged in the complaint
that the possession of the property by private
respondents was with petitioners' tolerance, 14 and
that they (petitioners) had served written demands
upon private respondents, the latest demand being

on July 23, 1995, but that private respondents
refused to vacate the property. 15
• The rule is that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful upon
demand to vacate made by the owner and the
possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such
demand.  17  A person who occupies the land of
another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The
status of the possessor is analogous to that of a
lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but
whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the
owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the
date of the demand to vacate. 18
• Because of the pendency of the cases
involving ownership, the proceedings in the first
ejectment case were suspended. Petitioners could
not but await the outcome of these cases and
preserve the status quo in the meantime these were
pending. As the Court has stated:
• In giving recognition to the action
of forcible entry and detainer the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in
fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to
preserve the  status quo  until one or the
other of them sees fit to invoke the decision
of a court of competent jurisdiction upon
the question of ownership. It is obviously
just that the person who has first acquired
possession should remain in possession
pending this decision; and the parties
cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage
in a petty warfare over the possession of the
property which is the subject of the dispute.
To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social
order. Therefore, where a person supposes
himself to be the owner of a piece of
property and desires to vindicate his
ownership against the party actually in
possession, it is incumbent upon him to
institute an action to this end in a court of
competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be
permitted, by invading the property and
excluding the actual possessor, to place
upon the latter the burden of instituting an
action to try the property right. 23
• because the disputed property was adjudicated to
• An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the
issue of physical or material possession over the
property or possession  de facto, that is, who
between the plaintiff and the defendant has a
better right to possess the property in
question.  27  Where, however, the issue is who has
the better and legal right to possess or to whom
possession  de jure  pertains,  accion publiciana  is
proper.  28  In the case at bar, petitioners'
complaint for unlawful detainer was confined to
recovery of de facto or physical possession of the
property and was resorted to after private
respondents had indubitably failed in their suits
assailing petitioners' right of ownership.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 16
• Notably, inferior courts retain jurisdiction
over ejectment cases even if the defendant raises
the question of ownership and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding
provisionally the issue of ownership. 
• WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 15, 1996 and Resolution dated January
13, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court in Civil Case No. 370 and the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 23 affirming said disposition of the inferior
court are hereby REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 164277               October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, 

vs.

ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and
Gloria, inherited from their father, the late BibianoQuijano,
the parcel of land in Cebu City.
Eliseo sold a portion of his shareto respondent Atty. Daryll A.
Amante and describing the portion subject of the sale.
Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3
portion of his share to the respondent, with their deed of
absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of
Eliseo’s siblings, and describing the portion subject of the
sale.’
Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition to divide their father’s estate, resulting in the
portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being
adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo.
Petitioner demanded to vacate, but respondent refused.
Hence, complaint for ejectment before MTCC-Cebu, alleging
among others the portion possessed by Respondent was thru
the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her
siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been
subdivided.
MTCC: favored Petitioner.
- Eliseo effectively conveyed to the respondent only
the portion that would ultimately be allotted to him
once the property would be subdivided; that
the petitioner under the deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition, she was its owner with the
consequent right of possession; and that, as such,
she had the right to demand that the respondent
vacate the land.
RTC: reversed.
- the summary proceeding for ejectment was not
proper because the serious question of ownership of
the disputed property was involved.
CA: affirmed.
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 17
- the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the
issue of ownership to determine the question of
possession was well settled.

Issue 1: WON the issue on owenership can be raised in an

ejectment suit.

Ruling 1: Yes. (Book based)

- An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or

unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect
the actual possession or the right to possession of
the property involved.19The sole question for
resolution in the case is the physical or material
possession (possession de facto)of the property in
question, and neither a claim of juridical possession
(possession de jure)nor an averment of ownership by
the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court
from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence,even
if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the
issue but only to determine the question of
possession especially if the question of ownership is
inseparably linked with the question of possession.20
The adjudication of ownership in that instance is
merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving the title
to the property.

Issue 2: WON unlawful detainer is proper, considering

Petitioner alleged possession by mere tolerance

Ruling 2: No.

- To show that the possession was initially lawful, the

basis of such lawful possession must then be
established. With the averment here that the
respondent’s possession was by mere tolerance of
the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved,
for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At
least, the petitioner should show the overt acts
indicative of her or her predecessor’s tolerance, or
her co-heirs’ permission for him to occupy the
disputed property.31 But she did not adduce such
evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not
clear and definite as to his possession of the
disputed property being merely tolerated by Eliseo.

- Considering that the allegation ofthe petitioner’s

tolerance of the respondent’s possession of the
disputed property was not established, the
possession could very well be deemed illegal from
the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful
detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court would not
be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for
forcible entry because the complaint contained no
allegation thathis entry in the property had been by
force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 18
G.R. No. 204926               December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-
fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner, 
 not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
vs.
 square meter of ground before it can be said that he
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Mangaserrepresented by his attorney-in-
factDugeniafiled a complaint for Forcible Entryagainst
respondent Ugaybefore MTC-Caba, La Union, alleging that he
was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land
situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, portion of which is
unlawfully occupied by respondent without his knowledge and
consent.
Respondent answered that petitioner was never in actual
possession of the property occupied by him when he occupied
the same. That, he assured petitioner that he would
voluntarily vacate the premises if he would only be shown to
have intruded into petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries
were pointed out to him.
MTC: favored Respondent.
- petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove
that the lot occupied by respondent was within his
lot titled
RTC: reversed
- petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the
property as evidenced by his OCT and tax
declarations.
CA: reversed
- when the law would speak of possession in forcible
entry cases, it is prior physical possession or
possession de facto, as distinguished from possession
de Jure. What petitioner proved was legal
possession, not his prior physical possession.
Issue: WON Petitioner proved prior physical possession
Ruling: Yes.
- As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry
suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not
possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and
the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment
case."
- The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a
number of cases that while prior physical possession
is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry
cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is
evident from the principle that possession can be
acquired not only by material occupation, but also
by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right.
- Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These
are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations,
succession, execution and registration of public
instruments, inscription of possessory information
titles and the like.The reason for this exceptional
rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does
is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was
able to subject the property to the action of his will.
- If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and
disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession,
then it would create an absurd situation. It would be
putting premium in favor of land intruders against
Torrens title holders, who spent months, or even
years, in order to register their land, and who
religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They
cannot immediately repossess their properties simply
because they have to prove their literal and physical
possession of their property prior to the controversy.
The Torrens title holders would have to resort to
ordinary civil procedure by filing either an
accionpubliciana or accionreinvidicatoria and
undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the
intruders continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of
another man's land. It will defeat the very purpose
of the summary procedure of an action for forcible
entry.
- Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of
petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that
he had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious,
exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of
an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by
provisionally resolving the issue of ownership, the
Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession
of the subject property.
- G.R. No. 203760              
- HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and
natural guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA vs.

SUSAN LUMONTAD
- December 3, 2014
- PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
-
- FACTS:
- Petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the
late Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who was the owner
of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land. Since
his birth, petitioner’s family has lived in the
residential house erected thereon.9 Upon Vicente’s
death, petitioner, together with his mother,
continued their possession over the same. On March
26, 2007, respondent gained entry into the subject
land and started to build a two (2)-storey building
(subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof,
despite petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests.
- Respondent admitted that during Vicente’s lifetime,
he indeed was the owner and in physical possession
of the subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be
the owner of the portion where the subject building
was being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-
TY-002-13031 in her name. Hence, she took
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 19
possession of the said portion not as an illegal
entrant but as its owner.
- The MTC found that Vicente actually subdivided the
subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an
area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while
the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and
where the subject building was erected, was given
to one Anthony de la Paz Javier (Anthony), son of
Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was
eventually acquired by respondent from the latter
through sale. Based on this finding, the MTC
concluded that petitioner had no cause of action
against respondent since she was merely exercising
her rights as the owner of the 172.80 sq. m.
subdivided lot.
- Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s complaint
failed to aver the required jurisdictional facts as it
merely contained a general allegation that
respondent’s entry into the disputed portion was
made by means of force and intimidation, without
specifically stating how, when, and where were such
means employed. With such failure, the MTC
intimated that petitioner’s remedy should either be
an accionpubliciana or an accionreivindicatoria
instituted before the proper forum.
- The RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling.
- The CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the
case to the latter court for trial on the merits.
-
- ISSUE:
- Whether the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling
and ordered the remand of the case to the latter
court for trial on the merits in an action for recovery
of ownership and possession.
- exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by
- RULING:
- The Court disagrees with the findings of both the
MTC and the CA that the allegations in the
petitioner’s complaint do not make a case for
forcible entry but another action cognizable by the
RTC.
- As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, "[t]he
invariable rule is that what determines the nature of
the action, as well as the court which has
jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the
complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint
should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for
which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court]
provides a summary remedy, and must show
enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in
forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily
allege that one in physical possession of a land or
building has been deprived of that possession by
another through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however,
that the complaint should expressly employ the
language of the law, but it would suffice that facts
are set up showing that dispossession took place
under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff
must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of
dispossession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical
possession of the property. This requirement is
jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations
demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter."
- A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that
the required jurisdictional averments, so as to
demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry,
have all been complied with. Said pleading alleges
that petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e.,
Vicente’s, successor-in-interest, was in prior physical
possession of the subject land but was eventually
dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on
March 26, 2007 by respondent who, through force
and intimidation, gained entry intothe same and,
thereafter, erected a building thereon.
- The "how" (through unlawful entry and the
construction of the subject building), "when" (March
26, 2007), and "where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the
subject land) of the dispossession all appear on the
face of the complaint. In Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan, the
Court held that the acts of unlawfully entering the
disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and
excluding therefrom the prior possessor, would
necessarily imply the use of force, as what had, in
fact, been alleged in the instant complaint.
- Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and
express provision of Section 33 (2) of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule
70, of the Rules of Court. Even in cases where the
issue of possession is closely intertwined with the
issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain
exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases, as they are given the authority to make an
initial determination of ownership for the purpose
of settling the issue of possession. It must be
clarified, however, that such adjudication is
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title
to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as
to the issue of ownership.
-
-
- G.R. No. 158231
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 20
- BABY ARLENE LARANOvsSPS. ALFREDO
CALENDACIONand RAFAELA T. CALENDACION
- June 19, 2007
- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
- -
- FACTS:
- Petitioner owns a parcel of  riceland  situated
in  Barangay  Daniw,  Municipality  of  Victoria, Laguna
covered by TCT No. 175241 of the Register of Deeds
of Laguna.  On September 14, 1998, petitioner and
respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the
latter agreed to buy a 50,000-square meter portion
o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s  r i c e l a n d  f o r  P 5 M i l l i o n ,
with P500,000.00 as down payment and the balance
payable in nine installments of  P500,000.00 each,
until September 2001.
- Pending full payment of the purchase price,
possession of the  riceland  was transferred to
respondents under the condition that they shall
account for and deliver the harvest from
said  riceland  to petitioner.  Respondents, however,
failed to pay the installments and to account for and
deliver the harvest from said riceland.
- On March 7, 2000, petitioner sent respondents a
demand letter to vacate the riceland within 10 days
from receipt thereof, but as her demand went
unheeded, she filed on April 5, 2000 a
Complaint against respondents for
unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC.
- Respondents admit the execution of the Contract to
Sell but deny that it contains all the agreements of
the parties. They allege that petitioner has no cause
of action against them because the three-year
period within which to pay the purchase price has
not yet lapsed; that the MTC has no jurisdiction over
the case because the complaint failed to allege that
a demand to pay and to vacate the riceland was
made upon them.
- The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
- Respondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
- WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial
court is hereby affirmed subject to the
modification that defendants are ordered to
pay plaintiff the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P400,000.00), as yearly
reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of said  riceland  computed from
1999 until such time that defendants have
actually vacated the same.
- Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review
with the CA.
- CA rendered a Decision, setting aside the Decision of
the RTC and dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer. 
- ISSUE:
- Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.
-
- RULING:
- Section  1,  Rule  70 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
- Section 1.  Who may institute proceedings,
and when.  Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a  lessor, vendor,  vendee, or
other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and
costs. (Emphasis supplied)
- In unlawful  detainer, the possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue
of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action,
the defendant is in actual possession and the
plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendants right to continue in possession.
- Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor,
must comply with two requisites for the purpose
of bringing an  ejectment  suit: (a) there must be
failure to pay the installment due or comply with
the conditions of the Contract to Sell; and (b)
there must be demand both to pay or to comply
and vacate within the periods specified in Section
2 of Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land and 5
days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers
to the existence of the cause of action for
unlawful  detainer, while the second refers to the
jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that
said cause of action may be pursued.

- Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to
the terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are
necessary to make the vendee  deforciant  in order
that an  ejectment  suit may be filed.  It is the
vendor's demand for the vendee to vacate the
premises and the vendee's refusal to do so which
makes unlawful the withholding of the
possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of
possession giving rise to an action for
unlawful  detainer.  However, prior to the institution
of such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the
installment due or comply with the conditions of the
Contract to Sell and to vacate  the premises is
required under the aforequoted rule.
- Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or
violation of the terms of the Contract to Sell does
not automatically render a person's possession
unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demand
must be alleged in the complaint; otherwise, the
MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
- It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in
the Complaint failed to constitute a case of
unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the
Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had
violated the terms of the Contract to Sell. However,
the Complaint failed to state that petitioner made
demands upon respondents to comply with the
conditions of the contract the payment of the
installments and the accounting and delivery of the
harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day
period granted respondents to vacate even fell short
of the 15-day period mandated by law. When the
complaint does not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
the MTC does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
[A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998]
SALVACION P. ONQUIT vs. JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA,
and SHERIFF IV DANILO O. MATIAS,
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Judge was assigned a forcible entry case which
the complainant and her two brothers were co-defendants.
Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that said
case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it involves tenancy over an
agricultural land. Respondent Judge denied all motions raised
by defendants ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and not those raised by
defendants. Moreover, according to respondent Judge, the
claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would not
automatically divest the court its jurisdiction. Subsequently,
plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which was
approved by respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued against the defendants, including
herein complainant. A seizure order followed which directed
respondent Sheriff to seize the palay from the land in
question. Complainant details several allegations as follows:
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(1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case is an
agricultural riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian
Reform which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not
the respondent Judge's court;
(2) That the plaintiff’s injunction bond was approved by
respondent Judge without first serving a copy
to the complainant resulting in a violation of due process.
Complainant avers that it left her no opportunity to object to
the sufficiency of the bond. Further, a copy of the writ of
injunction was notserved on complainant’s counsel;
(3) That a notice regarding the Motion for Issuance of Seizure
Order was not served on the complainant thereby depriving
her of a chance to oppose it;
(4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying that
complainant and his co-defendants ought to leave the land
because it is certain that they will lose their case;
(5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff, upon the
issuance of the seizure order, he seized all the palay
harvested without issuing a receipt, despite demand therefor,
and delivered the palay to the plaintiff
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave
abuse of authority, bias and grave misconduct in assuming
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as
well as the pleadings and exhibits submitted, we find no
grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct and bias on the
part of respondent Judge.
The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the
forcible entry case did not taint her action with grave
abuse of authority, even if defendant had alleged that the
land in question was under agricultural tenancy, and that
there was an issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the
principle that the courts shall not be divested of
jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the
answer. What determines the nature of an action and a
court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the
plaintiff.Basic is the rule that the material averments in the
complaint, which in this case is for ejectment, determine
the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates
that the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment
case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense
therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. It is the duty of the court to receive
evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy.
In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it
was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the land
in question is an irrigatedriceland, but not tenanted. This
matter was even brought up on a petition for certiorari with
prohibition to the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but
said petition was denied.[20] These antecedents are
sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge did not
act with grave abuse of authority in assuming jurisdiction
over the case filed in her sala.
With regard to the allegation of having failed to furnish to the
defendants a copy of the bond and the writ of preliminary
injunction, we give credence to the findings made by the
Office of the Court Administrator, as follows:
However, Section 8, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court in
conjunction with Section 3, Rule 70 thereof provides that the

party filing the bond shall forthwith served a copy of such
bond on the other party, who may except to the sufficiency of
the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon. This means
that the plaintiff and not the Court or the respondent Judge
for that matter, who is duty bound to serve a copy of the
injunction bond to the defendants. x xx Nevertheless, the
failure of the plaintiff to serve a copy of the injunction bond
to the defendant is merely a formal defect and not a
reversible error. For in this case the defendant may ask the
court to order the plaintiff to serve upon him the copy of the
bond.
On the other hand, the records belie the claim of
complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not
served to (sic) the defendants. Records show that said writ
was served to (sic) the defendants on February 16, 1996 at
their residence but all refused to acknowledge receipt
therefor, nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy
to (sic) the defendants.
[G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996]
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of
the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arastia, Letecia Arastia-
Montenegro and Juanita Arastia (Arastia Siblings), filed a
complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No.
6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) before
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch
48 in its capacity as a Special Agrarian Court. In their answer,
petitioners averred that they had been in continuous and
peaceful possession of their respective tillages since 1950
when the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratix of
the landholding in question and moved for the dismissal of
the case and that RTC has no jurisdiction over the said case.
RTC denied said motion and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering petitioners and/or any other person
acting in their command and/or their behalf to desist and
refrain from occupying their respective portions they are
allegedly cultivating pending the termination of this
litigation, and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this
Court. Subsequently, petitioners filed before SC a petition for
certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the lower court over
the agrarian case which SC dismissed for failure to comply
with Circular No. 1-88, specifically No. 4 thereof. Meanwhile,
petitioners filed before Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint against Estrella
Arastia, alleging that through the use and employ of armed
men, Estrella Arastia forcibly evicted and drove them out of
their landholdings, harvested and appropriated their standing
rice crops, destroyed their vegetable crops, took their deep
well and set fire on their houses. As a consequence thereof,
they suffered damages in the total amount of P3,300,000.00
for which Estrella Arastia should be held liable. They prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order to enjoin defendant therein from preventing
their re-entry and re-occupation of the landholdings pending
the resolution of the case. The case was referred to the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of barangays
San Isidro, Santiago, San Rafael and Lourdes in Lubao,
Pampanga for fact-finding and exploration of the possibility
of an amicable settlement. After conducting the necessary
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 22
proceedings, the BARCs found that petitioners had been in
possession and cultivation of their respective farm holdings.
However, despite receipt of summons and the DARAB orders,
Estrella Arastia did not file an answer nor comply with said
orders. DARAB construed this as her waiver and affirmation of
what had been submitted by petitioners, and that she had no
evidence to submit for its consideration. Based on the
findings of the BARCs, the DARAB issued an order declaring
the 300-hectare land as within the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988; maintaining
petitioners possession and cultivation of their respective
landholdings from where they were forcibly ejected on
September 29, 1989 and restraining the respondent or any
other persons acting in her behalf from entering, intruding,
and disturbing the farming activities of the said petitioners in
their respective farmholdings. On the strength of the said
writ of preliminary injunction from DARAB, petitioners
resumed occupation and cultivation of the subject land. Such
actions resulted in the dispatch of several policemen to the
area. They reminded petitioners of the writ of preliminary
injunction issued earlier in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and
ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their refusal
to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently
charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the
lawful order of persons in authority before the MTC. On the
same day, however, they were released from police custody.
Insisting on their right to work on the land, petitioners again
entered the land. Without a warrant of arrest, herein
respondent police officers arrested petitioners for having
entered the landholding and for resisting and intimidating
said police officers. Petitioners were detained at the
municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on and they were charged
with direct assault upon agents of a person in authority.
Thereafter, the municipal court ordered the transfer of
petitioners to the provincial jail in San Fernando, Pampanga
on the ground that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and the fact that petitioners, having
refused to receive copy of the complaint and the affidavits of
the complainants, did not "intend to file counter-affidavit. On
October 21, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
information for direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3171
before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. On
December 22 and 29, 1992 and January 21, 1993, thirty (30)
of the forty-five (45) petitioners posted bail in the criminal
case for direct assault. In their Memorandum which was
received by the Court on May 17, 1995, petitioners furnished
the information that most if not all of the petitioners were
already released on bail and therefore cannot avail of the
writ of habeas corpus for being moot and academic. And yet,
invoking Soriano v. Heirs of Domingo Magali, Malabanan v.
Hon. Ramentoand Salonga v. Pano where the Court considered
the issues raised notwithstanding that certain events had
supervened to render the case moot and academic,
petitioners insist that dismissal of the case on such ground
should not bar the resolution of this case on the merits.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between
them and the Arastias, petitioners should be reminded that
the allegations in a compliant are determinative factors of
said issue. On this matter, the Court declared:
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 23
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined authority, who interferes with the legitimate exercise of (his)
upon the allegations made in the complaint, rights" as possessors and cultivators of the Arastia property.
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or
If indeed petitioners are tenants of the Arastias under the
not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted
law,they are not without other legal recourses. Certainly,
therein — a matter resolved only after and as a
through their counsel, who appear to be zealous in protecting
result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the
whatever rights petitioners believe they may have, they
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by
should pursue DARAB Case No. 161-P'89 and whatever actions
the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If
are available for them under the Comprehensive Agrarian
such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction
Reform Law of 1988.
would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
Although it is well-accepted that a court should always strive
In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia
to settle the controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no
alleged that she and the rest of the plaintiffs therein were
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation, this rule
the registered owners of the parcels of land in question which
cannot apply if the result would negate the rational
herein petitioners illegally intruded into, damaged and
application of the Rules of Court. Petitioners may not engage
cultivated under the status of holding "actual title over the
in procedural shortcuts to revive the settled issue of the
properties;" that the definite findings and rulings of the DAR
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
showed that "no tenancy relationship" existed between the
Agrarian Case No. 2000 allegedly on the ground of the
parties and that petitioners were definitely not qualified
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties in
beneficiaries of the rights and benefits under Republic Act
the instant petition for  habeas corpus  arising from their
No. 6657 as they were not in any way tenants and/or
arrest for having assaulted persons in authority.
legitimate tillers of the subject land, and that the acts of
[G.R. No. 142503. June 20, 2003]
petitioners violated Section 73 (b) of said law.
ROMUALDO C. PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
Petitioner's raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent.
the complaint did not automatically divest the lower court of QUISUMBING, J.:
jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000. The court had to
continue exercising authority to hear the evidence for the FACTS: Cruz is the owner of a lot he inherited from his
purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction mother,  whoacquired the same from petitioner Romualdo
over the case. In a plethora of cases, this Court has made the Perez. Cruz claimed that Perez requested his permission to
pronouncement that once jurisdiction is vested, the same is build his house on a small portion of said property, as Perez
retained up to the end of the litigation. After such hearing, if had nowhere to erect his dwelling on.This request was
tenancy had in fact been shown to be the real issue, then the granted, as they are close relatives.
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Unknown to Cruz, however, Perez filed an application
It should be pointed out, moreover, that in filing Agrarian
for issuance of title covering the subject land with the
Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia was merely ejecting
DENR.  When Cruz learned of Perez’s design, he immediately
petitioners from the land on the ground that no tenancy
opposed the application.  Accordingly, Cruz demanded that
relationship existed between them. However, her invocation
Perez remove his house from the land and vacate the
of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which considers as a
same.  When petitioner failed to heed the demand,
prohibited act "forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons
respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail
him.
themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform
Program," obviously led the court to docket the case as
Perez denied Cruz’s ownership of the property by
Agrarian Case No. 2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a
claiming to be owner of the lot in question, having inherited
special agrarian court.
the same from his grandmother. He asserted that he had been
Such actions were in consonance with Section 56  and 57 of in continuous possession for many years. To support his claim,
said law which vest upon the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Perez presented Tax Declaration No. 26682 and official
Special Agrarian Court, with jurisdiction over two classes of receipts of tax payments. Perez submitted that the MTC had
agrarian-related cases: (1) "petitions for the determination of no jurisdiction over the case as the issue involved was one of
just compensation to landowners" and (2) "prosecution of all ownership, not mere possession.
criminal offenses" under the same law. A criminal offender
under Republic Act No. 6657 is, pursuant to Section 74 of the On February 12, 1992, the MTC dismissed the case on
law, "(a)ny persons who knowingly and willfully violates the the ground of want of jurisdiction, holding that the main
provisions of this Act."  Thus, the lower court correctly issue is one of ownership, not mere possession de facto.Cruz
assumed jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000. appealed said decision to the RTC.
It was within petitioners' rights to question the issuance of
Meanwhile, on March 31, 1992, the Regional Executive
the writ before this Court through G.R. No. 100663. However,
Director of the DENR, Region III, disapproved the survey of
in filing the petition, they failed to comply with Circular No.
the lot submitted by Perez. Cruz was then directed to file the
1-88. The consequent dismissal of the case for noncompliance
appropriate public land application for the land subject of
with said circular deprived this Court with authority to look
the controversy.
into the validity of the writ once again. To repeat, such
dismissal constituted  res judicata  on the issue of validity of
On June 29, 1992, the RTC Branch 13, rendered its
the writ of preliminary injunction.
decisionreversing the MTC ruling, and ordering the remand of
Consequently, petitioners are treading on shaky ground in the records for trial on the merits.On remand, the MTC
questioning the legality of their arrest in this petition decided for the plaintiff and against the defendant.
for habeas corpus for the reason that the police officers were
enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction illegally issued in Perez appealed. The RTC of Malolos Branch 10 REVERSED
Agrarian Case No. 2000 and, in the same breath, allege that the appealed decision. The question of ownership was
they could use force or "legally resist and even intimidate inextricably intertwined with the issue of possession.  Since
another, be he a private individual or an agent of a person in the issue of possession could not be resolved without first

addressing the question of ownership, the case should have
been dismissed, following case law.
Cruz then elevated the matter to the CA by way of
petition for review.The Court of Appeals held that the
decision of the Regional Director of Lands disapproving the
survey application of petitioner Perez and affirming the right
of respondent Cruz to file the application for titling of the
subject land rendered moot and academic the possessory
action in the RTC.  Said decision awarding the land to Cruz
gave him a better right of possession over the disputed lot as
against Perez, a non-awardee.[15]  It likewise held that the
RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, erred in reversing the decision of
the RTC of Malolos, Branch 13, because said decision already
acquired finality.
Perez then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate
court denied it.
ISSUE: WON MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for
ejectment.
RULING:It is hornbook law that jurisdiction is determined by
the averments in the complaint. In civil cases, if a complaint
is filed involving a subject matter within the jurisdiction of
an inferior court, but if after the trial, it appears that the
subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a
superior court, the inferior court cannot render judgment but
must dismiss the case.
In the complaint for ejectment filed before the Hagonoy
MTC, it was alleged by Cruz that Perez pleaded that he be
allowed to construct his house as he had no other parcel of
land on which to build a house. The complaint further alleged
that it was by mere tolerance that Cruz, now respondent
herein, allowed Perez to occupy a small portion of the lot.
Taking the allegations in the complaint as basis, in our
view, there is no doubt that the case is one for unlawful
detainer.  The Hagonoy MTC had the jurisdiction to hear and
decideCivil Case No. 979.
It was  held that a person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound by the implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.
Anent petitioners claim that the issue is not one of mere
possession but rather of ownership, we held that in
ejectment cases, the defendant cannot deprive the court
of jurisdiction by simply claiming ownership of the
property involved.  Precisely with the aim of preventing a
possible anomaly, the provisions of the Rules of Court
governing unlawful detainer and forcible entry were
revised. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of physical possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.[26]  Should the inferior court make
any determination on the issue of ownership, the same shall
not be conclusive and shall be without prejudice to the right
of the parties to ventilate before the proper court their
claims of ownership over the same land.
The question of ownership is yet to be resolved with
finality and conclusiveness.  Although the DENR has
disapproved the cadastral survey submitted by petitioner
Perez, he could contest respondent Cruz’s application for said
lot, which yet remains to be titled.  That administrative
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 24
agency should be the arena where the parties could tackle
the issue of ownership.
G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA,
petitiomers vs.
MARIA COPRADA, respondent
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: In 1997, petitioners filed an ejectment case against
Coprada before the MCTC of Magdalena, Laguna. Petitioners
claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of
land in Laguna. In 1945, respondent was able to persuade the
petitioners to allow her and her family to use and occupy the
land for their residence.
When respondent’s circumstances have improved, petitioners
verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land
but the latter refused. Petitioners were therefore constrained
to lodge an ejectment case.
Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960’s,
petitioner Victoria offered the said lot for sale for P2,000.00
to the respondent, who readily agreed. The price was paid in
installments and was fully paid in 1962. The agreement was
never reduced to writing.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that laches had
already set in which prevented petitioners from questioning
the validity of the purported sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MCTCs judgment. The RTC
ruled that respondent’s occupation was by virtue of
petitioner’s tolerance. Hence, respondent is bound by an
implied promise that she will vacate property upon demand.
Her possession over the subject property became unlawful
after the petitioners demanded her to vacate.
Respondent filed an MR, which was denied. Dissatisfied,
respondent filed with the CA a petition for review.
The CA granted the petition and reversed the decision of the
RTC, and affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have a valid ground to evict
respondent from the subject property
RULING: Yes.In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied
contract between them. However, defendant's possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demandedthat defendant
vacate the subject property due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess under their contract, and
defendant refused to heed such demand.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties,
the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who
has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is,
however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title to the
property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the
unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of
the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 25
x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno reported that
person illegally occupying his property. This right is petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Petitioners
imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. instead filed a Motion to Quash and Recall the Order dated
April 30, 2003 and/or Special Order of Demolition. The MeTC
denied the motion and issued the Special Order of
Bugarin vs Palisoc
 Demolition,

Sunflower Neigborhood vs CA Hence, this petition.
G.R. No. 157985 ISSUE: are the Orders of the MeTC proper?
FIRST DIVISION RULING:

ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the
ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY mandatory requirements of Section 28[7] of Rep. Act No. 7279
ARQUILLOS, LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL, since there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction
PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY BASOY, FELY BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, or demolition and there had been no consultation on the
JUN BO, ALEX BORRES, ANNA MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE matter of resettlement. They also claim that there was
CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO, ROMULO FERRY, LEONISA neither relocation nor financial assistance given. They insist
GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL, SALOME CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, that the MeTC orders are patently unreasonable, impossible
JEREMIAS JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA MADEJA, JOMARI and in violation of the law.[8]

MANONG, NESTOR MANONG, VALENTIN MANONG, EDMUNDO/ Private respondents for their part argue that Rep. Act No.
FELY MINA, TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION PASCUA, ROMMEL 7279 is not applicable. They aver that there was no proof that
POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO, ARMANDO ROMERO, petitioners are registered as eligible socialized housing
SANCHO VILLAFUERTE, and FERNANDO YAMID,
 program beneficiaries in accordance with procedure set forth
Petitioners, in the Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing the
Registration of Socialized Housing Beneficiaries issued by the
- versus -
 Department of Interior and Local Government and the
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T. Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. They
NEPOMUCENO,
 aver that even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the
Respondents. required notices under the law had already been complied
Promulgated: with. According to them, petitioners were already notified
December 2, 2005
 when the writ of execution was served.[9]
x----------------------------------------- We find for respondents.
- - - - - - - - -x
 Under Section 19,[10] Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil
RESOLUTION Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer
QUISUMBING, J.:
 action is immediately executory to avoid further injustice to
.
 a lawful possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution
The facts in this case, culled from the record, are as follows. is practically ministerial.[11] The defendant may stay it only
The present controversy arose from a complaint for by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond;
ejectment, \ filed before the MeTC by private respondents and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable
Cecilia B. Palisoc and Marina B. Mata. In a decision[4] dated compensation for the use and occupancy of the property
February 27, 2002, the court declared respondents as the during the pendency of the appeal.[12] Once the Regional
rightful possessors of the properties in dispute. It also Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is
ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay to immediately executory under Section 21,[13] Rule 70,
private respondents the rentals.
 without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review,
Petitioners appealed while private respondents moved for before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.[14]
execution pending appeal.MeTC decision with the However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review.
modification that petitioners must start paying rentals from Records show that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the
the date of the appealed decision. RTC decision denying their motion for reconsideration. They
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition had until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review before
to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. RTC denied the motion the Court of Appeals. Instead, they filed a petition for
and granted private respondents motion for execution for certiorari and prohibition. 

failure of petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of
back rentals. Thus, a writ of execution pending appeal was Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of
issued and petitioners were served with the writ and notice appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for
to vacate. an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost
through fault or negligence.[16] Thus, the filing of the
Petitioners filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC decision from
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion becoming final and executory.[17] The RTC acted correctly
to Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section when it remanded the case to the court of origin.

28 of Republic Act No. 7279[5] was not complied with. Private Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the
respondents filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance assailed orders to enforce the RTC judgment.
of Special Order of Demolition. The RTC declared the decision
denying petitioners appeal final and executory, and remanded It also appears that the order of demolition had already been
the records of the case to the MeTC.
 executed. Petitioners had already vacated the area and
However, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and private respondents now possess the properties free from all
Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction occupants, as evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of
before the Court of Appeals. They also filed an Urgent possession dated May 19, 2003. Thus, the instant case before
Vigorous Opposition and Motion to Suspend Proceedings on us has indeed become moot and academic.
respondents Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of WHEREFORE, the petition for review assailing the Order dated
Special Order of Demolition before the MeTC. April 30, 2003 and the Special Order of Demolition dated May
9, 2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque City,

Branch 77, is DENIED for mootness and lack of merit.
 ISSUE: whether petitioners members, who were not parties to
SO ORDERED.


THIRD DIVISION
 RULING:
[G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003]
 Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by
FLORO ARAGAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC,
Branch 77, Paraaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS,
respondents.
 ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the
D E C I S I O N
 judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded
CORONA, J.:
The antecedent facts follow.
 binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she
Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as
executrix of the testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Alfredo Mogar and 46
other persons[4] who were occupying several parcels of land
(Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque
Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These parcels of land are
covered by individual transfer certificates of title[5]
registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui, private
respondents mother.
The MeTC of Paraaque City, eventually decided in favor of
private respondent. On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Mogar et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but
their petition was dismissed. After the dismissal became
final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of
Paraaque City. The writ, however, was not immediately
implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77
of the same court. Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC
of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando
G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of
demolition. However, this petition was denied and
subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge
Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.
The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this
time due to the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the
expropriation case filed by the Municipality of Paraaque
against the Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui.
Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of
the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful
detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower
Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein.
Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint
for prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against
private respondent also with the RTC of Paranaque City,
Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its members should be
excluded from the demolition order as they were not parties
to the original unlawful detainer case. To include their houses
in the demolition would be to deprive them of due process.
This time, Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the
exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner from
demolition.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent
holding that, as the judgment in the unlawful detainer case
had already become final, the execution could not be
enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch
77 issued another alias writ of demolition on September 14,
1998.
In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition,
Sunflower filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a status
quo order. The court granted it. Prior to the issuance of our
resolution, however, the writ of demolition was implemented
on Petitioner thus filed a motion to allow its members to
return to the premises, which was granted. Thereafter, the
court required both parties to submit their memoranda.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 26
the unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land
subject of this case.
 

relating to the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of
ParaNaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of that
case.
We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an
and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes
is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the
permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente lite;
(d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family,
relative or privy of the defendant.[9]
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members
are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to
occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not
dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in question. In
fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by
Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.[10]
Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its
members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as
lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against
the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-
inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however,
has no legal support since its members are trespassers or
squatters who are bound by the judgment.
Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its
members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not included in the original
ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private
respondent filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78,
clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter
under litigation in the unlawful detainer case.[11] Thus,
petitioners members, together with all the parties in the
unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173616               June 25, 2014
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner, 

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and
BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) seeks the nullification of the
Court of Appeals' Resolution1  dated March 29, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
The Resolution dated March 29, 2006 granted the application
for temporary restraining order (TRO) of Bernie G. Miaque,
while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the
writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo despite Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal
to make current the supersedeas bond and to pay to the A TO
the rental and concession privilege fees.
Facts:
Main case of ejectment:
• In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in

Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City, Branch 3. The ATO sought the
following, among others:
(1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently vacate and
peacefully return to the ATO possession of:
(a) the 800-square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting
the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport;
(b) the 310-square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside
the Iloilo Airport Terminal; and
(c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by Miaque
incident to his operation of the Porterage Service
within the Iloilo Airport; and
(2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately pay the ATO
the amount of not less than ₱1,296,103.10, representing
unpaid space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as
of October 15, 2000 plus interest and additional rental
and fees which may be proven during the trial.
MTCC:   judgment is rendered finding [Miaque] to be
unlawfully detaining the following premises and was ordered
to vacate the premises
RTC: affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaque’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.
CA:dismissed Miaque’sthe petition and affirmed the RTC
Decision
• In a new case in the Court of Appeals, Miaque filed a
petition for certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO and/
or writ of preliminary injunction) in CA docketed as CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603, where he assailed the RTC’s Order dated
March 20, 2006which caused the issuance of the writ.
• The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the subsequent writ of
preliminary injunction through the Order dated March 29,
2006 and the Resolution dated May 30,2006, respectively.
According to the ATO, the Court of Appeals ignored the
government’s right under the law, Rules of Court,
jurisprudence and equity to the possession as well as to the
payment of rental and concession privilege fees which, at
the time of the filing of this petition, already amounted to
₱2 Million. Such right had already been decided with
finality by this Court, which affirmed the Decision dated
April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, but the Court of Appeals has repeatedly thwarted
it.  taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the TRO and the subsequent WPI
Held: YES
• Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to the
Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO, effective for
60 days, is moot as its effectivity had already lapsed.
• Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the
key to that question: Sec. 21. Immediate execution on
appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom.
• This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be
appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall
decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in
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civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.
Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by
Section 4, Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court which respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. – Judgments in
actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support,
and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be
declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable
after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal
taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court.
On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion
may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or
granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of
support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party.
The totality of all the provisions above shows the following
significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an
ejectment case appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-
appellant is immediately executory, without
prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom; and
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is
immediately executory -- is emphasized by the fact
that no resolutory condition has been imposed that will
prevent or stay the execution of the RTC’s judgment.
The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under
Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be
compelled by mandamus.Section 21 of Rule 70
presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry
or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the
RTC’s judgment and appeals to a higher court. It
authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of
execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its
due course.5  The rationale of immediate execution
of judgment in an ejectment case is to avoid
injustice to a lawful possessor.5  Nevertheless, it
should be stressed that the appellate court may stay
the writ of execution should circumstances so
require.
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal
RTC or, in the appellate court’s discretion,
suspended or modified.
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is
not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom – reinforces
the first.1The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment
case is enforceable upon its rendition and, upon
motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an
appeal taken therefrom. The execution of the RTC’s
judgment is not discretionary execution under
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, execution of the RTC’s judgment
under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary
execution but a ministerial duty of the RTC. In
connection with the second characteristic of the RTC
judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it, the
consequence of the above distinctions between
discretionary execution and the execution of the RTC’s
judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals is that the former may be availed of in the
RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives due course
to the appeal while the latter may be availed of in the
RTC at any stage of the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
But then again, in the latter case, the Court of Appeals

may stay the writ of execution issued by the RTC
should circumstances so require
• To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of
the judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, which
judgment is not stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, the
Court of Appeals may issue a writ of preliminary injunction
that will restrain or enjoin the execution of the RTC’s
judgment. In the exercise of such authority, the Court of
Appeals should constantly be aware that the grant of a
preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound
discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be
made with great caution.
• In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01
(38), of the RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously
recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the
property and the corresponding obligation of Miaque to
immediately vacate the subject premises. This means that
the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that
Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of
the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of
Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction with the sweeping statement that Miaque
"appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the
premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time
when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ
of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC
in Iloilo City, which is the court of origin of the decision
promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439."
Unfortunately, in its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting
a writ of preliminary injunction in Miaque’sfavor, the Court
of Appeals did not state the source or basis of Miaque’s
"clear legal right to hold on to the [said] premises." This is
fatal.
• The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its
Resolution dated May 30, 2006 is its view that the RTC "has
no jurisdiction to order the issuance of [the] writ of
execution" because, when it gave due course to the
petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the RTC was
already divested of jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
the third paragraph of Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. The Court of Appeals is mistaken. It disregards both
(1) the immediately executory nature of the judgment of
the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that such
judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken
there from. It ignores the nature of the RTC’s function to
issue a writ of execution of its judgment in an ejectment
case as ministerial and not discretionary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution
dated May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01603 is ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals is directed to
conduct its proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603
expeditiously and without delay.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196219               July 30, 2014
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-
TABINO, Petitioners, 
 possession of the subject property is the question on who
vs.
 is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
• Proclamation No. 518  (Proc. 518) excluded from the
operation of Proc. 423  – which established the military
reservation known as Fort Bonifacio situated in the then
municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Pateros and Parañaque,
Province of Rizal and Pasay City – certain portions in said
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reservation known and identified as BarangaysCembo,
South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo,
and Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared the sameopen
for disposition in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No.
274,  and RA 730  in relation to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
• Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300
square meters for disposition to any bona fideoccupants/
residents of said BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West
Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who
have resided in or occupied such areas on or before
January 7, 1986.
• In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a
technical sergeant in the military – and his brother,
respondent Lazaro M. Tabino – a colonel in the military –
occupied a 353-square meter lot in Pembo, Makati City.
Mauricio established residence within the lot, while
respondent continued to reside in Novaliches, Quezon City.
9  The lot was later subdivided into two portions,
denominated as Lots 2 and 3.
• Lot 2 – containing an area of 184 squaremeters – was
applied for coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio, while Lot
3 – containing an area of 169 square meters – was applied
for by respondent. Respondent was later on issued by the
Fort Bonifacio Post Commander a Revocable Permit  to
occupy his lot, but the permit authorized him to occupy an
area of only 150 square meters.
• In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a
Certificate  to such effect was issued by the Bureau of
Lands (now Land Management Bureau).
• On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case
against Mauricio and the latter’s wife, Leoniladela Cruz
(petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
(MeTC).
• The ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent
is the true and sole owner of the 353-square meter lot;
that he used Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing
the 300-square meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the
latter to apply for the purchase of a portion of the lot after
subdividing the same into two smaller lots; that Mauricio’s
stay in the premises is merelyby tolerance of respondent;
that petitioners introduced permanent structures on the
land; and that petitioners refused to vacate the premises
upon respondent’s formal demand. Respondent thus prayed
that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to
pay the former rentals, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.
• Petitioners countered n their Answer1 that respondent had
no right to eject them; that the parties’ trueagreement
was that petitioners would act as caretakers of
respondent’s Lot 3, and for this, respondent would pay
petitioners a monthly salary of ₱800.00; that respondent
failed to honor the agreement; and that relative to Lot 2,
there was a pending Protest filed with the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital Region.
• It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed
Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3. DENR
granted the petitioners and denied the respondent.
MeTC: ruled in favour of the petitioners
The only issue to be resolved in this action to recover
premises. In ejectment cases, the word "possession" means
nothing more than physical possession, not legal
possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law.
RTC: affirmed MeTC’s decision in toto.
CA: Assailed RTC’s decision

• In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the 1994
affidavit – which petitioners do not dispute – should be
taken as an admission by Mauricio that he was merely
appointed by respondent as the caretaker of Lot 2, and
that respondent is the true possessor and owner thereof.
This being the case, petitioners occupy the premises by
mere tolerance of respondent, and are bound to the
implied promise that they shall vacate the sameupon
demand. The CAadded that while respondent was
authorized to occupy only 150 square meters, this was
irrelevant since the only issue that must be resolved n an
unlawful detainer case is actual physical or material
possession, independent of any claim of ownership; since
respondent has satisfactorily shown by preponderant
evidence that he was in actual possession of Lots 2 and 3,
he is entitled to recover the same from petitioners.
• The CA also held that while respondent’s application for Lot
2 was denied by the DENR in its June 13, 2006 Decision–
since he was already an awardee of another lot within Fort
Bonifacio, the issue of possession was not touched upon.
For this reason, the DENR Decision has no bearing on the
unlawful detainer case. Additionally, the DENR rulings are
still the subject of appeals, and thus could not have
conclusive effect.
ISSUE: WON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE DENR IN
RESOLVING CONFLICTING CLAIMS AS TO WHO HAS A BETTER
RIGHT OF POSSESSION BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENT OVER SUBJECT PARCELS OF LOT BE NULLIFIED
BY THE COURT UNDER AN EJECTMENT CASE.
HELD:
• Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not
raise the issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and forum-shopping, after having voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC
trying the ejectment case.
• Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred
in ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. With the
pendency of the DENR Protests – Case Nos. 2004-821 and
2005-939 – respondent’s claim of possession and his right to
recover the premises is seriously placed in issue. If the
ejectment case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to
proceed without awaiting the result of the DENR Protests,
then a situation might arise where the existing structures
thereon would have to be demolished. If petitioners’
position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld with
finality by the courts, then it would mean that respondent
had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject
lots, which thus negates his right to institute and maintain
the ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred
as a consequence of the demolition of petitioners’
residence and other permanent improvements on the
disputed lots.
• On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally
accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of
administrative agencies because of their special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.
• Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical possession
having been ruled upon by the Court in CA-G.R. SP No.
107957, it is well to note that in the case of Estrella vs.
Robles, it was explained that the Bureau of Lands
determines the respective rights of rival claimants to public
lands, but it does not have the wherewithal to police public
lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders
or breaches of the peace among the occupants. Its power is
clearly limited to disposition and alienation and any power
to decide disputes over possession is but in aid of making
the proper awards.
(CITED JURISPRUDENCE)
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In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank,  this Court made the
following pronouncement:
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the
outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v.
Avendaño, and Amagan v. Marayag, we ordered the suspension
of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity. We
explained that the ejectment of petitioners therein would
mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion,
disturbance, inconvenience, and expense. Needlessly, the
court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding
to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary
but the result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust
and probably irreparable.32
On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendaño,which
Samonte refers to, states:
x xxWhere the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal
detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and
the right ofthe plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously
placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more
equitable and just and less productive of confusion and
disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant
inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or
not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any
order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to
await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where
there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public
policy the right to physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession
regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately
be found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession
thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the
courts.34
More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag dictates, thus –
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or
suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial
court (R TC) of another action raising ownership of the
property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on
considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of
petitioners' house would result from the enforcement of
the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgrnent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
August 25, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 107957 is MODIFIED, in that the directive for
petitioners to vacate the subject premises is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016
MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q.
CATACUTAN, REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, FERNANDO Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND TERESITA PUNZALAN,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that their motherhad acquired a parcel of
land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga. They contend that
respondents (Spouses Punzalan) constructed their house on a
portion of said lot without their consent and knowledge. But

petitioners allowed them to stay, thinking that they would
vacate once their need for the property arises. However,
when they made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to
vacate. Thus,petitioners wrote the spouses a formal demand
letter to vacate. Still, they refused to leave the property.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the
MCTC of Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga. The MCTC then
rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner;
The Spouses Punzalan, thus, brought the case before the San
Fernando RTC, which affriemd the decision of MTC.
Aggrieved, the Spouses Punzalan elevated the case to the CA.
CA Reversed the ruling of RTC and ruled in favor of the
Spouses Punzalan for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners insist that their complaint states a cause of action
for unlawful detainer and thus, the MCTC duly acquired
jurisdiction.
Issue: WON complaint states a cause of action for unlawful
detainer and thus, the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in
ejectment cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.The
complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. States:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. -
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.
Under the aforequoted rule, there are two (2) entirely
distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for
forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a
property from the defendant whose occupation thereof is
illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by fierce,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for
unlawful detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from the defendant whose possession of the
property was lawful at the inception by virtue of a contract
with the plaintiff, be it express or implied, but subsequently
became illegal when he continued his possession despite the
termination of his right or authority.
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A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's initial
possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the
property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to
vacate the property.
The Court finds that the allegations actually make up a case
of forcible entry. The Spouses Punzalan constructed their
dwelling house on a portion of petitioners' lot, without the
latter's prior consent and knowledge. This clearly falls under
stealth, which is defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act
to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain
within residence of another without permission.Here, the
evidence clearly reveal that the spouses' possession was
illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated, considering
that they started to occupy the subject lot and thereafter
built a house on the same without the permission and consent
of petitioners. The spouses' entry into the land was,
therefore, effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of
the owners. Consequently, it is categorized as possession by
stealth which is forcible entry.
PETITIONER’S TOLERANCE CAME LATER, NOT FROM INCEPTION
AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.
The allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential
elements of an action for unlawful detainer. The allegation
that the Spouses Punzalan entered the subject property and
constructed their house on a portion of the same without
petitioners' knowledge and consent is more consistent with an
action for forcible entry, which should have been filed within
a year from the discovery of said illegal entry.
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as
these proceedings are summary in nature.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not
contain any averment of fact that would substantiate
petitioners' claim that they permitted or tolerated the
occupation of the property by the Spouses Punzalan right
from the start. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.
Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC
corollarily failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners may be the lawful possessors of the subject
property, but they unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy
to recover possession. Nevertheless, they may still opt to file
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with the proper
RTC.
Petition is DENIED.

[ GR No. 191527, Aug 22, 2016 ]
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS
BAPTIST CHURCH +
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. (BFBC) and Philippine
Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC) filed a case for ulawful detainer
against Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and
Reynaldo Galvan (Galvan) before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), , Angeles City. The complaint sought the ejectment of
FCJBC from the subject parcel of land with improvements,
located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision, Balibago,
Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.
On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into
between PBSBC and BFBC where the latter borrowed money
from the former to enable it to purchase the subject
property. Thereafter, respondent BFBC took possession of the
subject property and held therein their religious activities.
While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property,
Galvan and his companions began attending BFBC's religious
activities at the subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan
apparently was interested on the property because after
some time Galvan formed and incorporated FCJBC and took
control of the subject property.
BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five
(5) days from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per
month beginning October 2001 as reasonable compensation
for its use.
Due to non-compliance with its demand, BFBC and PBSBC
filed a Complaint[6] for unlawful detainer and damages
against FCJBC and Galvan.
The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of BFBC . The MTC
ruled that the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful
detainer.It ordered the FCJBC to vacate and surrender
possession of the subject property to plaintiff within three
(3) months from receipt of this Decision;
Both parties filed their respective appeal memoranda with
the RTC. RTC affirmed the Decision of the MTC. FCJBC
moved for reconsideration, but was denied on November 24,
2006. Thus, FCJBC filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the appellate court.
The appellate court granted the petition, It REVERSED and
SET ASIDE the decision of the RTC. The complaint for unlawful
detainer is DISMISSED.
ISSUE: Whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry.
It is a Forcible Entry.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes
of ;. action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession
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of any land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession
is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the
prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was
originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful
possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs
cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to
continue in possession.[14]
From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer
and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to
wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal
occupation from the beginning - forcible entry; and (b) action
founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally
acquired possession lawfully - unlawful detainer.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine
both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the
court. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the
designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations
in the body of the complaint define and describe. The
designation or caption is not controlling, more than the
allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even
an indispensable part of the complaint. The complaint must
specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or
forcible entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful
detainer, or forcible entry, respectively.
If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed
against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter
possession became illegal, the case is one of illegal detainer
which must be filed within one year from the date of the last
demand
Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice
by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's
right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to
vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.[21]
FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was
bereft of contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise, no
allegation that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession
of the subject property. Neither was there any averment in

the complaint which shows any overt act on the part of BFBC
and PBSBC indicative of permission to occupy the land.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible
entry as it has been long settled that in forcible entry cases,
no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property
and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all
that is necessary. Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC's failure to
allege when the dispossession took place and how it was
effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional
ground.
Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry on the land, except that when entry was made
through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned thereof. If the dispossession did not
occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in
this case, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to
recover possession with the Regional Trial Court.[25]
Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
January 18, 2017 G.R. No. 221071
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners, vs.
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s. He
has two children, namely, Bryan and James Christopher R.
Dizon (James).
Eddie is married to Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona).
Verona was a housewife. She and her mother, together with
Bryan and James, resided in the house erected on a 240-
square-meter lot (disputed property). The registered owners
were "[Verona], married to [Eddie]."
Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a ship. Sometime
in 2009, Verona died.Eddie claimed that he was unaware of
Verona's hospital confinement. It took a while before Eddie's
employer finally permitted him to go home. Verona was
already buried before Eddie's arrival.
Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed), was
shown to Eddie. Its subject was the disputed property
conveyed to herein respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran
(Vida).
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and
Verona's signatures thereat were forgeries. Eddie filed a civil
case for nullification of the Deed, and for payment of
damages and attorney's fees.
MTCC:Vida filed an action for unlawful detainer against the
petitioners. Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of
the disputed property. While the Deed evidencing the
conveyance in her favor was executed, Eddie pre-signed the
same before he left to work abroad. After Verona's death,
Vida tolerated the petitioners' stay in the disputed property.
Vida sent a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate
the disputed property, but to no avail.
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MTCC directed the petitioners and their co-defendants to
turn over to Vida the possession of the disputed property, and
pay monthly rent until the said property is vacated.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the
annulment of sale; title or document do not abate any
ejectment action respecting the same property.
RTC: reversed the MTCC ruling.To justify an action for
unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have
been present at the beginning of the possession. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTCC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
CA: Vida was able to sufficiently allege and consequently
established the requisites of unlawful detainer.
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is
the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
However, where the issue of ownership is· raised, the courts
may pass upon the issue of ownership in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. The Court stresses,
however, that this adjudication is only an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the
issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably
linked thereto. The lower court's adjudication of ownership in
the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue
of ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case
for annulment of the Deed filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vida has a cause of action for unlawful
detainer against the petitioners considering that the Deed she
relied upon in filing her complaint was falsified, hence, null.
RULING: The Court finds merit in the petitioners' arguments.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is
concerned, the registration of the property in said person's
name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to
the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or' records
title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the
Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate
fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith
must concur with registration because, otherwise,
registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title
does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title
binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if
the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose
name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property,
the same remained in the name of the original registered
owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners,
petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-
owners - by succession - of the subject property. As such,
petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the
same, including possession - whether de facto or dejure;
respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right
through an action for ejectment.
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null
and void, the matter of direct or collateral attack is a
foregone conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity
of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct,
as well as to collateral, attack;" petitioners were not
precluded from questioning the validity of respondent's title
in the ejectment case.
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