People vs.

Cuizon
GRN 109287 (April 18, 1996)

Topics: Warrantless Arrest, Search and Seizure

Facts:

Cuizon and his wife were under surveillance by the NBI for drug activities.
Receiving a report of the spouses arriving from Hong Kong, carrying a big
quantity of shabu, a team of NBI agents was organized to intercept the suspects.

After the arrival of the spouses Cuizon, the NBI agents saw the spouses handed
four travelling bags to two of their receiving companions, who boarded a separate
taxi in leaving the airport.

Because the NBI team failed to apprehend the spouses and their companions
due to communication problems, the team decided to follow the spouses’
companions, who received the 4 bags, to the Manila Peninsula Hotel.

In coordination with the chief security officer of the hotel, the NBI team entered
the suspects’ hotel room. After introducing themselves as NBI agents, the
suspects’ allowed them to search their bags in the presence of the CSO. The
search yielded a considerable quantity of shabu.

Immediately thereafter, the NBI team proceeded to the house of the spouses
Cuizon. Retrieved from the search of the Cuizons’ residence was another bag also
containing shabu and a .38 caliber firearm.

The four were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI. An information
was filed against the spouses Cuizon and one their companions for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The trial court found them guilty of conspiring
in the unlawful transport of shabu into the country.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the warrantless arrests against the appellants was legal
and valid.
2. Whether or not the incidental warrantless search and seizure was legal
and valid.

Ruling:

The instant case does not fall under the exceptions for warrantless arrest.

Well entrenched is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made
without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority and that any
evidence obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.

However, the right against warrantless arrest and seizure is not absolute. Under
the Rules, an arrest without warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or
a private person, when:

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

 1) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
3) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

At the time of their arrest the appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in their
hotel room and the Cuizon was in bed resting with his wife and child inside his
home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed, or
being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen.

The prosecution also failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it.
Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of
luggage to the other two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense
of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the
case, there was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe
that the accused were then and there committing a crime. The act per se of
handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true, cannot
in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under
suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically
at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public.

Moreover, one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage
that they contained shabu hidden beneath some secret panel or false bottom.
The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and
dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned,
was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly received that morning, to the
effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of
shabu.

The instant case does not fall under the exceptions for warrantless search
and seizure.

The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any
warrant, and not on the occasion or as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest,
was indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat could not be admissible in
evidence. All the evidence seized are considered fruit of the poisonous tree and
are inadmissible as against him, and thus, he should be acquitted

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

People vs. Aruta
GRN 120915 (April 3, 1998)

Facts:

Acting on an informant’s tip that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from
Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana, the OIC of NARCOM of Olongapo
City assembled a team.

During the operation, the informant pointed out to the team who Aling Rosa was.
Having ascertained her identity, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. The team leader asked Aling Rosa about the
contents of her bag, which the latter handed over.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana. The team
confiscated the bag and the accused-appellant was brought to the NARCOM
office for investigation. During the investigation, she claimed that immediately
prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where she watched
the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her help
in carrying a shoulder bag, who was nowhere to be found after she was arrested.

She was arrested and charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial
on the merits, the trial court found her guilty for carrying and transporting
prohibited drugs.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search resulting to the arrest was lawful
and valid.

Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit.

The Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution. This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section

12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
c. the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
d. plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

 amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable

cause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not
be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause,
in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief
that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. Probable cause
likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a

sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure, to wit:

1. Police surveillance based on information supplied by informers (People v.

Tangliben);
2. No reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity
of the suspect could not be readily ascertained (People v. Malmstedt);
3. Search of a moving vehicle in checkpoints (People v. Bagista);
4. Suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information an
area was a haven for drug addicts (Manalili v. CA).

In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the
bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors
and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the
information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless
searches and seizures in each of the cases.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a
warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-
appellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested by a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person, when in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was

she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant
was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude
that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana
that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant
because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason
whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime,

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither
sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of
any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless
arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellants bag, there being no probable cause
and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise,
the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search
was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in
favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as
evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and,
therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be
incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken,
and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such
search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.

As to the contention that the appellant waived of objections to the illegality of the
warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby,
silence should not be lightly taken as consent. The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Furthermore, waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid

warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be
presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is
to retain its vitality for the protection of our people.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

People vs. Azfar Hussain
GRN 126379 (June 26, 1998)

Facts:

A search warrant was applied for against Azfar Hussain for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. In the application and in the affidavit thereto appended
a for search warrant, the law enforcers wrote down a description of the place to
be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant:
premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The warrant also specified
that the search be limited only to the premises herein described.

The following day, by virtue of the search warrant against Hussain issued at Apt.
No. 1, adjacent to Abigail Store, four Pakistani nationals were arrested and
various firearms and explosives were seized.

Private respondents pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and submitted their
motion to quash the search warrant and to declare the evidence obtained
inadmissible.

The public respondent, Judge Casanova, granted the motion to quash search
warrant. Consequently, the private respondents filed their motion to dismiss.

The Solicitor General commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to

nullify the quashal order issued by the public respondent, which the CA
dismissed for lack of merit. The CA concurred with the observations of Judge
Casanova, that the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the
Search Warrant and that the search was not accomplished in the presence of the
lawful occupants of the place, or any member of the family.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was validly issued?

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

At the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five distinct
places in the area involved: the store known as Abigail Variety Store, and four
separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a
single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no
connecting doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to
any of the others. Each of the five places is independent of the others, and may
be entered only through its individual front door.

However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical

configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers
failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1
in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant -- which directs that the
search be limited only to the premises herein described, Abigail Variety Store Apt

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

1207 -- thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store --
they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply
assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly
indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge
Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient particularization of the
general identification of the place in the search warrant.

Contrary to the contention of the Solicitor General, the place to be searched, as

set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe
the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if
not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization
of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the
Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the
police officers conducting the search.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing
that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things
to be seized.

It does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on
probable cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under
oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is
essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched, the manifest
intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.

There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional

requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched;
and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant
provision that any evidence obtained in violation shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

People vs. Balingan
GRN 105834 (February 13, 1995)

Facts:

The Narcotics Intelligence Division of the PNP-Baguio City received a telephone

call from an unnamed male informant. He passed the information that Jean
Balingan was going to Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Acting on the
information, a surveillance team was formed to monitor Balingan’s movements.

The surveillance yielded positive results. After seeing move out from her
residence with a gray luggage, the police officers followed her until she boarded
a bus bound for Manila.

Upon instructions of the team leader, the bus carrying Balingan was stopped at
the Kennon Road Checkpoint. The team leader boarded the bus and announced
a routinary check-up. He identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and
asked her permission to check her luggage. Eliciting no response from Balingan,
the police officer opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and found
suspected marijuana in it. She was arrested and charged for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

In her defense, Balingan claimed that she was carrying nothing but her purse
and handkerchief when she left her house and boarded the bus bound to Manila.
And when the vehicle was flagged down by policemen at a checkpoint at Kennon
Road, the officer who boarded the bus insisted that she was "Susan" and that
she owns the gray bag they from somewhere.

After the trial, she was convicted for the crime of illegal transportation of
prohibited drugs as charged.

Issue: Whether or not the search done inside the bus and consequent seizure of
the marijuana were in violation of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The Court found no merit in appellant's argument that the marijuana flowering
tops should be excluded as evidence, they being the products of an alleged illegal
warrantless search.

Search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three well-recognized exceptions thereto, to wit: a search
incidental to an arrest; a search of a moving vehicle; and seizure of evidence in
plain view.

The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction
of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport
contraband from one place to another with impunity. Furthermore, a warrantless

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

Valmonte vs. De Villa
GRN 23988 (September 29, 1989)

Facts:

The National Capital Region District Command was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and
peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As
part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints
in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the

residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or
court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred where
a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of stop and search without a search warrant
in military checkpoints is lawful and valid.

Ruling:

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in

other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded
as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of
public security.

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

United Laboratories vs. Isip
GRN 163858 (June 28, 2005)

Facts:

Ernesto Isip is the owner of Shalimar Philippines, which was accused by UNILAB
for manufacturing counterfeit UNILAB products, particularly Revicon
multivitamins.

As a result of UNILAB’s investigation and allegation on the counterfeiting

practices of Isip, an NBI special investigator filed an application for the issuance
of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the Shalimar
Building, which housed Shalimar Philippines.

In the application for a search warrant, it specified the seizure of finished or

unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly Revicon multivitamins and all
paraphernalia, receipts, documents related in the manufacture, distribution or
sales of the counterfeit multivitamins. The court granted the application and
issued a search warrant directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search
of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571,
Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.

When the search warrant was implemented, no fake Revicon multivitamins were
found, but they found sealed boxes at the first and second floors of the Shalimar
Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of Isip, contained
bottles of Disudrin and Inoflox, which were registered UNILAB products.

The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to

Suppress Evidence." They contended that the implementing officers of the NBI
conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the building
at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in "open display"
were allegedly found. They pointed out, however, that such premises was
different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and second
floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. The respondents, likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin
and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of properties to be seized
in the search warrant.

UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the
search was limited to the first and second floors of the Shalimar building located
at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They
averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application,
Rabe’s affidavit, as well as the joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the
building where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571, Aragon Street
corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson
Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila was the old address, and the new address was No.
1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained that the warrant was
not implemented in any other place.

The trial court issued an order granting the motion of the respondents, on the
ground that the things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those
described in the search warrant. In a later date, trial court issued an advisory

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the
respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been
quashed.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by UNILAB in collaboration with the NBI
agents contending that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view
doctrine. However, the trial court denied the motion reiterating that the seized
items were not in the list of items authorized to be taken.

Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified under
the plain view doctrine and are legally admissible as evidence.

Ruling:

The Court rejects the contention of the petitioner.

A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched

and the things to be seized. The officers of the law are to seize only those things
particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.

Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the
executing officer may be seized by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as
plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the confluence of the essential requirements for the doctrine to apply,
namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an
initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject
to seizure.

The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement

the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for being
present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition of the
fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating
evidence not covered by the warrant, they should not be required to close their
eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are investigating
or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to
obtain another warrant.56 Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate
expectation of privacy and there is no search within the meaning of the
Constitution.

The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of
discovery of the object or the facts therein available to him, determine probable

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

cause of the object’s incriminating evidence. In other words, to be immediate,
probable cause must be the direct result of the officer’s instantaneous sensory
perception of the object. The object is apparent if the executing officer had
probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity. The incriminating
nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without
the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment
of seizure.

The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must
not have known in advance of the location of the evidence and intend to seize it.
Discovery is not anticipated.

The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of
certainty as to the incriminating character of evidence. It requires merely that
the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause
to associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a
viewed object and criminal activity.

Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances

tending to prove the guilt of a person.

Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires

that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution
and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or useful
as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or
more likely than true. A practical, non-traditional probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected must be
seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law
enforcement.

In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued
by the court a quo as among the properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The
warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize "counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording,
manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for
sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins." The implementing officers
failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed
boxes which, when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to
contain Inoflox and Disudrin. The existence of the boxes were not illegal per se
and that even the NBI admitted that it cannot tell without proper examination
or assay that the Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from
respondent’s place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in favor
of legality.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

Padilla vs. CA
GRN 121917 (March 12, 1997)

Facts:

Robin Padilla figured in a hit and run accident while traversing Angeles City.
When the PNP Angeles City was able to intercept his vehicle, the police officers
saw a gun tucked on the left side of Padilla when he alighted with both his hands
raised. The police officer made a move to confiscate the gun, but Padilla held the
former’s hand alleging the gun was covered by legal papers.

While the police officer and Padilla were arguing about the hit and run incident,
a senior police officer saw a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in Padilla’s
back right pocket. Suspecting that Padilla was also carrying a rifle inside the
vehicle, the senior police officer opened the vehicle’s door and saw a baby
armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front of the driver’s seat. When asked by
the police for the papers of the rifle, Padilla answered angrily that they were at
his home.

Padilla was brought to the Traffic Division of the PNP Angeles city, where
appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm and ammunition magazines.
During the investigation, Padilla admitted possession of the firearms and was
not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the
three firearms.

He was correspondingly charged with illegal possession of firearms and

ammunitions and convicted by the trial court for violation thereof.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and
ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule.

Ruling:

There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but
that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense,
(ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements
concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a
hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point
that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense,
but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once
to the scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the
incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using
his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report
to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he
found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned
near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and
run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen
(who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting
petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It
was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than
collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better
trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein
petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which
an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own
life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when
law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is precisely
through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not
become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein,

cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want
of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take
action. The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving
vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in
which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police
authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable
and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in
criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of
an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine),
petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing
another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in
the presence of a peace officer.

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be

justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There
was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and
run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves
at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for
themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number
(PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and
run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified
personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.

As to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search

warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, the Court upheld.

The five well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property
is valid, are as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section

12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the
right to be where they are;
c. the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
d. "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the

authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying
into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within
"plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies
to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to
the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has been held that:

"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal

offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense
being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the
taking of the corpus delicti."

"Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in

plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant."

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III

 gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged
search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped
him from assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search
incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).

Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search
of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense.

This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be
searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control
and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that
search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule.

Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In

connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when,
as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like
herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense.

Jeremy Jesus DP Bueno III