Secrecy Analysis of a NOMA System with Full
Duplex and Half Duplex Relay
Omid Abbasi
Department of Electrical Engineering
Sahand University of Technology
Tabriz, Iran
Email: om abbasi@sut.ac.ir
Abstract—In 5G wireless communication networks, Non-
Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) has attracted much at-
tention in recent years. This paper investigates physical layer
security of a NOMA system with Full Duplex Relay (FDR) and
Half Duplex Relay (HDR). This system consists of one eavesdrop-
per and two legal NOMA users where a dedicated FDR (or HDR)
assists far user. In order to characterize the secrecy performance
of the considered scenario, new exact expressions are derived
for the Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP) of both FDR and
HDR systems. Monte Carlo simulations are provided to verify
the derived analytical results. Simulations demonstrate that, the
NOMA-FDR system attains better performance compared to the
NOMA-HDR system for both users. Also, we find that far user
has always poor secrecy against near user.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA) [1] is one of the
best candidates for multiple access in fifth generation (5G)
networks. NOMA uses the power domain, which means that
multiple users can be served at the same resource block (e.g.
time/frequency/code). Early studies on NOMA has focused on
spectral efficiency and transmission reliability. In [2], the idea
of users cooperation was first proposed, where the users with
good channel condition act as relays to help the users with
bad channel condition. In [3], a two-user NOMA system was
studied, where a dedicated relay was implemented to improve
the performance of the user with weak channel condition.
In [4], the optimal relay selection scheme was proposed
for cooperative NOMA systems. In [9], a full-duplex (FD)
cooperative NOMA has been proposed to solve the spectral
efficiency problem of half-duplex (HD) cooperative NOMA
systems.
Because of broadcast nature of wireless communications,
eavesdroppers could listen to the legal users messages, which
creates a secrecy challenge in communication. Physical Layer
Security (PLS) reaches to secure transmissions by using the
dynamics in the physical layer [5]. If the capacity of the
legal user channel is higher than that of the eavesdropper
channel, the data can be transmitted at a rate equal to capacity
difference between the legal user and eavesdropper channel
capacity.
PLS has been well studied in many scenarios. For example,
in [10], authors investigated the secrecy performance of full-
duplex relay (FDR) and half-duplex relay (HDR) networks.
Afshin Ebrahimi
Department of Electrical Engineering
Sahand University of Technology
Tabriz, Iran
Email: aebrahimi@sut.ac.ir
The resulting analysis shows that FDR networks have better
secrecy performance than HDR networks. However, there is
a few works on design of secrecy transmission for NOMA.
In [6], authors investigated the maximization of the secrecy
sum rate (SSR) of a SISO NOMA system, where each user
has a predetermind quality of service (QoS) requirement.
They derived the closed-form expression of an optimal power
allocation policy that maximizes the SSR. In [7], the PLS of
using non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) in large-scale
networks have been investigated. In the considered approach,
both the NOMA users and eavesdroppers have been spatially
randomly deployed. Also, a protected zone around the source
node has been adopted to enhance the security of a random
network. Additionally, the authors of [7] in another work
[8] derived new analytical SOP expressions for characterizing
the systems secrecy performance in both single-antenna and
multiple-antenna scenarios. In the single-antenna scheme, they
made a protected zone around the Base Station (BS) to create
a forbidden area for eavesdroppers. In the multiple-antenna
scenario, artificial noise is generated at the BS for further
improving the security.
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of a
NOMA network. This network has two NOMA users, one
Base Station (BS), one relay and one eavesdropper. Relay
could be half duplex or full duplex and is used to decode and
forward the far user message. Obtaining exact expressions for
SOP of both users in FDR and HDR modes and verifying them
by monte carlo simulations are our contribution in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II models the network that we will work on it; Section III
analyzes the secrecy of network in HDR mode; Section IV
investigates secrecy in FDR mode; Section V gives numerical
results to verify analytical expressions; Finally, section VI
summarizes the paper.
II. S YSTEM M ODEL
This paper network consists of a NOMA system with 2
users, an eavesdropper and a relay. NOMA system has a near
user (user 1) and a far user (user 2). We assume there is no
effective direct transmission link between Base Station and
User 2 due to the shadowing effect or obstacles. Therefore,
relay creates this link by decoding second user message that
 Fig. 1. NOMA-HDR system with an eavesdropper Fig. 2. NOMA-FDR system with an eavesdropper

received from base station and forwarding it to the User 2. performs successive interference cancellation (SIC) to remove
This relay can work in half-duplex or full duplex mode. far user message. We assume that relay could perform self
The system model for NOMA-HDR is shown in Fig. 1, interference cancellation perfectly. Also, we overestimated the
where all nodes have a single antenna, and the eavesdropper eavesdropper abilities, so that we assumed eavesdropper has
(E) can intercept the data from both the Base Station (BS) detected previous time slots message correctly.
and relay (R), and the relay applies the decode-and-forward
(DF) protocol. We assume that all channels experience block III. S ECRECY O F NOMA-HDR
Rayleigh fading and that the channels remain constant over A. Secrecy Capacity
one block but vary independently from one block to another.
The channel coefficient for S → R, S → U 1, S → E, R → In this section, we investigate the secrecy of NOMA-HDR
U 2, R → U 1 and R → E are denoted as hSR , hSU 1 , hSEα, system, which is used as a baseline to compare with a full
− duplex scheme. We assume that at time t base station sends
hRU 2 , hRU 1 and hRE , respectively. We have hj = gj dj 2
( j ϵ {SR, SU1, SE, RU2, RU1 and RE}), where gj is √ √
S(t) = Ps a1 x1 (t) + Ps a2 x2 (t), (1)
Rayleigh fading channel coefficient, α is path loss exponent
and dj shows distance between transmitter and receiver of j’s where a1 and a2 are NOMA coefficients that specify amount
link. Indeed, d−α
j ( j ϵ {SR, SU1, SE, RU2, RU1 and RE}) of power that should be allocated to each user. In this paper,
shows variations due to the large scale fading. Note that the we assume that user 1 is near to the base station, and so we
corresponding channel gains, obtained as |gj |2 ( j ϵ {SR, SU1, allocate less power to it (a1 < a2 and a1 + a2 = 1). Received
SE, RU2, RU1 and RE}), are independently exponentially signals at time t at relay, User 1 and eavesdropper is given by
distributed with mean of λgj = 1 ( j ϵ {SR, SU1, SE, RU2, RU1
and RE}). The AWGN noise at nodes R, U1, U2 and E are √ √
denoted as nj and assumed to be independent with variances yj (t) = Ps a1 x1 (t)hsj (t) +
Ps a2 x2 (t)hsj (t) + nj (t),
of σj2 ( j ϵ {R, U1, U2 and E}), respectively. In this study, (2)
we assume that the variance of noise is the same in all nodes, where j ϵ {R, U1 and E}. At time t+1, if relay could
2 2 2 2 2 correctly decode x2 (t), received signals at User 1, User 2 and
i.e. σR = σU 1 = σU 2 = σe = σ . The transmission powers
at S and R are PS and PR , respectively. We also assume eavesdropper is given by
P h2
that PS = PR = P . We define γj = σ2j as a exponentially
λg P d−α √
distributed random variable with mean of λγj = j σ2 j . yj (t + 1) = Pr x2 (t)hrj (t + 1) + nj (t + 1), (3)
In half duplex mode, as we can see in Fig. 1, at the first
time slot base station sends first and second users messages where j ϵ {U1, U2 and E}. The secrecy capacity is defined as
and then relay, User 1 and eavesdropper receive them. User 1 (see [11])
perfectly performs successive interference cancellation (SIC)
to remove second user message. At the second time slot, relay Cs = [Cu − Ce ]+ , (4)
sends far user message and then user 1, eavesdropper and User
2 receive it. where [x]+ = max(x, 0) and Cu and Ce are capacities of data
Fig. 2 shows Full duplex mode, where relay receives and transmission to legal user and eavesdropper, respectively.
sends data simultaneously and we have self interference in Capacity of User 1 data at User 1 and eavesdropper is given
relay node. At each time slot, base station sends data to by
User 1, relay and eavesdropper and simultaneously, relay
forwards previous time slot message of far user, so that User 1 P a1 h2su1 1
2, User 1 and eavesdropper listen to it. Again, User 1 perfectly C1,su1 = log2 (1 + ) = log2 (1 + a1 γsu1 ) (5)
2 σ2 2
 1 P a1 h2se 1 a1 γse X X
C1,se = log2 (1 + ) = log2 (1 + ). ) < 2rs1 ) = prob(Y > 2rs1 ),
SOPh,1 = prob(log2 (
2 P a2 h2se + σ 2 2 1 + a2 γse Y 2
(6) (14)
where PDF and CDF of X and Y are given by
So, from these equations we can obtain secrecy capacity of {
user 1 as 1 − exp(− a1x−1
λγ
), x ≥ 1
FX (x) = su1 (15)
1 1 a1 γse 0, x ≤ 1
C1,HDR = [ log2 (1 + a1 γsu1 ) − log2 (1 + )]+
2 2 1 + a2 γse
1 1 + a1 γsu1 + 1 x−1
= [ log2 ( a1 γse )] .
fX (x) = γ exp(− ) = g1 (x), x ≥ 1 (16)
2 1 + 1+a a1 λsu1 a1 λγsu1
2 γse
(7)

In order to obtain capacity of user 2, because the relay  0, y < 1
FY (y) = 1 − exp(− λγse (1−a
y−1
) = 1 − g2 (y), 1 < y < a12
applies decode and forward (DF) protocol, and user 1 applies  2 y)

successive interference cancellation (SIC), we have 1, y > a12 .

(17)
Cu2 = min(C2,u1 , C2,ru2 , C2,r ), (8) Therefore,
∫ +∞
so that X x
prob(Y > 2rs1 ) = (1 − FY ( 2rs1 )) × fX (x)dx
2 2
1 P a2 h2sj P h2rj 0
C2,j = log2 (1 + + ) ∫ 22rs1 ∫ 22r s1

2 P a1 h2sj + σ 2 σ2 a2 x
(9) = g1 (x)dx + g1 (x)g2 ( 2rs1 )dx.
1 a2 γsj 1 22rs1 2
= log2 (1 + + γrj ), (18)
2 1 + a1 γsj
The first integral of above equation is equal to 1 −
where j ϵ {U1 and E}. Also, we have
exp(− 2a1 λγ−1 ), but it is hard to obtain a solution for the
2rs1

su1
1 P h2ru2 1 second integral. Therefore, Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature
C2,ru2 = log2 (1 + ) = log2 (1 + γru2 ) (10) [12] is applied to find an approximation for it. Assuming
2 σ2 2
g1 (x)g2 ( 22rxs1 ) = g(x),
1 P a2 h2sr 1 a2 γsr
C2,r = log2 (1 + ) = log2 (1 + ). ∫ 22rs1
a1 π22rs1 ∑ √
N
2 2
P a1 hsr + σ 2 2 1 + a1 γsr a2

(11) g(x)dx = 1 − ϕ2n

22rs1 a2 N n=1
So, we can obtain secrecy capacity of user 2 as (19)
22rs1 −1 a1 22rs1 −1 (1 + a2 )
× g( ϕn + ).
1 a2 γsr a2 γsu1 a2 a2
C2,HDR = [ log2 (1 + min( , + γru1 , During this paper, N is complexity-accuracy tradeoff param-
2 1 + a1 γsr 1 + a1 γsu1
1 a2 γse eter and ϕn = cos( (2n−1)π
2N ).
γru2 )) − log2 (1 + + γre )]+ The secrecy outage probability (SOP) of user 2 for the half
2 1 + a1 γse
a2 γsr a2 γsu1 duplex relay scheme is given by
1 1 + min( 1+a 1 γsr
, 1+a 1 γsu1
+ γru1 , γru2 ) +
= [ log2 ( a2 γse )] . SOPh,2 = prob(C2,HDR < rs2 ) =
2 1 + 1+a1 γse + γre
a2 γsr a2 γsu1
(12) 1 1 + min( 1+a 1 γsr
, γru1 + 1+a 1 γsu1
, γru2 )
prob( log2 ( a2 γse ) < rs2 ),
. 2 1 + γre + 1+a1 γse
(20)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
where rs2 is user 2 target secrecy rate.
The SOP of user 1 message for the half duplex relay scheme a2 γsr a2 γsu1
Letting X = 1 + min( 1+a 1 γsr
, γru1 + 1+a 1 γsu1
, γru2 ) and
is given by a2 γse
Y = 1 + γre + 1+a1 γse , we obtain distributions of X and Y.
SOPh,1 = prob(C1,HDR < rs1 ) For variable X, we assume that second term in min function
a2 γsu1
1 1 + a1 γsu1 (13) expressed in (20) (i.e. γru1 + 1+a 1 γsu1
) is always more than the
= prob( log2 ( a1 γse ) < rs1 ), other two terms, and we have X = 1 + min( 1+a a2 γsr
, γru2 ).
2 1 + 1+a 2 γse 1 γsr
Mont-Carlo simulations show that this approximation is cor-
where rs1 is the user 1 target secrecy rate. Note that, because rect. Therefore, (20) becomes
rs1 ≥ 0, we have prob([x]+ < rs1 ) = prob(x < rs1 ), so that
the operator [.]+ can be removed. X
Letting X = 1 + a1 γsu1 and Y = 1 + 1+a a1 γse
, (13) SOPh,2 = prob(log2 ( ) < 2rs2 ) = prob(X < Y 22rs2 )
2 γse Y
becomes (21)
where IV. S ECRECY OF NOMA-FDR

 0, x≤1 A. Secrecy Capacity

 1 − exp(− x−1 x−1
λγ
) exp(− λγsr (1−a1 x)
) In this section, we investigate the NOMA-FDR system.
FX (x) = ru2 (22)

 = 1 − g1 (x), 1 < x < 1
Received signals at time t at relay, User 1 and eavesdropper
 a1
1, x ≥ a11 . is given by
In order to obtain PDF of random variable Y, we consider √ √
a2 γse yj (t) = Ps a1 x1 (t)hsj (t) + Ps a2 x2 (t)hsj (t)
it as sum of two random variables Y1 = 1 + 1+a and
1 γse √ (29)
Y2 = γre . We know that PDFs of sum of two independent + Pr x2 (t − 1)hrj (t) + nj (t)
random variables leads to convolution of the individuals PDFs.
So, we have where j ϵ {U1, R, E}. We also have
√
yu2 (t) = Pr x2 (t − 1)hru2 (t) + nu2 (t) (30)
a2 y−1 1
fY 1 (y) = exp(− γ ), 1 < y <
λγse (1 − a1 y)2 λse (1 − a1 y) a1 We note that hrr (t) is self interference component and
(23) in this paper we assume hrr (t) = 0. We also assume that
1 y user 1 and eavesdropper have detected previous time slot (t-1)
fY 2 (y) = exp(− γ ), y≥0 (24) message successfully.
λγre λre
Capacity for User 1 data at User 1 and eavesdropper is
the same with half duplex mode, except that we don’t have
fY (y) = fY 1 (y) ∗ fY 2 (y) 1
 2 coefficient in full duplex mode. So, we can obtain secrecy

 0,∫y y < 1
capacity of user 1 as
= f (τ )fY 2 (y − τ )dτ = g2 (y),
1 Y1
1<y< 1
a1 γse
a1 C1,F DR = [log2 (1 + a1 γsu1 ) − log2 (1 + )]+
 ∫ a1 f (τ )f (y − τ )dτ,
 1

y> 1 1 + a2 γse
1 Y1 Y2 a1
1 + a1 γsu1 +
(25) = [log2 ( a1 γse )] .
1 + 1+a 2 γse
and (31)
∫ +∞
prob(X < Y 2 2rs2
)= FX (y22rs2 ) × fY (y)dy Capacity of User 2 is the same with half duplex mode,
0 except that we don’t have 12 coefficient in full duplex mode.
∫ 1
a1 22rs2 Moreover, in full duplex mode, the user 2 relayed data -for
=1− g1 (y22rs2 )g2 (y)dy. previous time slot- is not useful for user 1 and eavesdropper
1
(26) because we assume that they have detected previous time slot
data. So, we can obtain secrecy capacity of user 2 as
It is hard to obtain an insightful expression for g2 (y).
Therefore, we use Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature. a2 γsr a2 γsu1
1 + min( 1+a 1 γsr
, 1+a 1 γsu1
, γru2 )
∫ C2,F DR = [log2 ( a2 γse )]+ .
y 1+ 1+a1 γse
g2 (y) = fY 1 (τ )fY 2 (y − τ )dτ (32)
1

π y −1 ∑√
N B. Secrecy Outage Probability
y−1 y+1
= ( ) 1 − ϕ2n fY 1 (( )ϕn + ( )) The secrecy outage probability (SOP) of user 1 message
N 2 n=1
2 2
for the full duplex relay scheme is the same with half duplex
y−1 y+1
× fY 2 (y − (( )ϕn + ( ))). scheme, except that we should replace 2rs1 in (18) and (19)
2 2 with rs1 .
(27)
The secrecy outage probability (SOP) of user 2 data for the
Now, we have an approximation for g2 (y). For integral in full duplex relay scheme is given by
(26), Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature is again applied to ap-
proximate it. We suppose that g(y) = g1 (y22rs2 )g2 (y). SOPf,2 = prob(C2,F DR < rs2 )
a2 γsr a2 γsu1
1 + min( 1+a 1 γsr
, 1+a 1 γsu1
, γru2 )
∫ = prob(log2 ( a2 γse ) < rs2 ).
1
a1 22rs2
1 + 1+a1 γse
SOPh,2 = 1 − g(y) (33)
1
a2 γsr a2 γsu1
1 ∑√
N Letting X = 1 + min( 1+a , 1+a , γru2 ) and Y =
π 1 1 γsr 1 γsu1
=1− ( − ) 1 − ϕ2n (28) a2 γse
1 + 1+a1 γse , (33) becomes
N a1 22rs2 +1 2 n=1
1 1 1 1
× g(( − )ϕn + ( + )). X
a1 22rs2 +1 2 a1 22rs2 +1 2 SOPf,2 = prob(log2 ( ) < rs2 ) = prob(X < Y 2rs2 ) (34)
Y
where


 0, x≤1

 1 − exp(− x−1
λγ
) × exp(− λγsr (1−a
x−1
1 x)
)×
FX (x) = ru2

 × exp(− γ
x−1
) = 1 − g 1 (x), 1 <x< 1

 1,
λsu1 (1−a1 x) a1
x ≥ a1
1

(35)


 0, y<1
FY (y) = 1 − exp(− λγse (1−a
y−1
), 1<y< 1
(36)
 1
1 y) a1
1, y > a1

a2 y−1
fY (y) = exp(− γ )
λγse (1
− a1 y)2 λse (1 − a1 y) Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus transmit SNR
(37)
1
= g2 (y), 1<y< .
a1
Therefore, we have
∫ +∞
prob(X < Y 2 rs2
)= FX (y2rs2 ) × fY (y)dy
0
∫ 1 (38)
a1 2rs2
=1− g1 (y2 rs2
)g2 (y)dy.
1
It is hard to obtain a proper expression for this integral. There-
fore, we use Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature to approximate
it. Assuming g1 (y2rs2 )g2 (y) = g(y)

∫ 1
a1 2rs2
SOPf,2 = 1 − g(y)dy
1

1 ∑√
N
π 1
=1− ( − ) 1 − ϕ2n ×
N a1 2rs2 +1 2 n=1
1 1 1 1
× g(( − )ϕn + (
a1 2rs2 +1 2 a1 2rs2 +1 2
V. N UMERICAL R ESULTS
In this section, simulation results are given to verify the
above analysis. To verify analytical formulas, we used Monte
Carlo simulations by averaging results for 10,000 independent
realities. Default values for parameters are: α = 3, dsu1 =
dsr = dse = dru2 = dru1 = 30 meters, dre =
50 meters, a1 = 0.2, rs1 = rs2 = 0.1, σP2 =
50 dB and N = 100.
Fig. 3 shows secrecy outage probability of NOMA-HDR
and NOMA-FDR systems versus transmit SNR, i.e. σP2 . This
figure verifies our theoretical formulas for SOP of NOMA-
HDR and NOMA-FDR systems for both of users. This figure
indicates that by increasing transmit SNR, in both of HDR and
FDR systems, user 1 SOP decreases. Because user 2 message
is retransmitted by relay and eavesdropper listen to both source
and relay, user 2 has high SOP in FDR and HDR systems.
Also, we see that for SNRs of below 50 dB, by increasing
SNR, SOP of user 2 decreases. On the other hand, for very
high SNR (more than 50 dB), SOP has direct proportionality
Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability versus NOMA coefficient(a1)
+ )).
(39)
with SNR. This is due to the saturation of user 2 SOP. In this
case, in user 2 secrecy capacity formula, most of the times, the
numerator and denominator will be equal to a2 a1 , and we will
be in outage. For HDR system, the situation is worse than
FDR, and in high SNRs, denominator often will be greater
than numerator. Because of the existence of a 21 coefficient in
half duplex scheme, HDR system has higher SOP rather than
FDR system.
Fig. 4 shows SOP of FDR and HDR systems versus the
coefficient a1 . We know that this coefficient must be between
0 and 0.5. This figure shows that for FDR system, user
2 has approximately fixed SOP, but user 1 SOP decreases
by increasing a1 for a1 ≤ 0.2. For a1 > 0.2, user 1
SOP is also constant. For HDR system SOP of user 2 has
direct proportionality with a1 , but user 1 SOP has inverse
proportionality with a1 . For a1 > 0.2 in HDR, user 1 SOP is
also constant.
Fig. 5 shows SOP of FDR and HDR systems versus the
target secrecy rate (rs1 = rs2 ). We see that by increasing rs ,
SOP also increases. This figure shows that for FDR system,
 Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus target secrecy rate(rs1=rs2)
Fig. 6. SOP versus d(se) for HDR system and for 2 value of d(re)
user 1 has SOP=1 for rs > 2, and user 2 has SOP=1 for
rs > 1. It is worthy to note that for HDR system, user 1 has
SOP=1 for rs > 1.2 and user 2 has SOP=1 for rs > 0.8.
Fig. 6 shows SOP of HDR system versus the distance
between source and eavesdropper (dse ). We see that by
increasing this distance, SOP decreases. This means that if
eavesdropper be farther to source, the secrecy increases. This
figure also shows that decreasing distance between relay and
eavesdropper from 50 m to 40 m (assuming that dse is fixed)
has no impact on user 1 SOP, but this increases user 2 SOP.
Fig. 7 shows SOP of FDR system versus the distance
between source and eavesdropper (dse ). We see that as the
distance increases, SOP decreases. This figure also shows that
increasing distance between relay and source from 30 m to 40
m (assuming that dse is fixed) and decreasing distance between
relay and user 2 from 30 m to 20 m, has no impact on user 1
SOP, however it increases user 2 SOP.
VI. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated secrecy performance of
NOMA-FDR and NOMA-HDR systems. We derived exact
Fig. 7. SOP versus d(se) for FDR system and for 2 positions of relay
expressions for SOP of NOMA users in these networks
and verified them using Monte Carlo simulations. Simulation
results showed that FDR system has always less SOP than
HDR system. Also, in both FDR and HDR systems, because of
existing a relay that decodes and forwards far user messages,
near user has much less SOP than far user. Based on analysis
and simulations, we showed that changing the value of NOMA
power coefficient has a little impact on user 2 SOP. Simulation
results also demonstrated that approaching relay to far user,
increases user 2 SOP.
R EFERENCES
[1] Saito, Yuya, et al. ”System-level performance evaluation of downlink
non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA).” Personal Indoor and Mobile
Radio Communications (PIMRC), 2013 IEEE 24th International Sym-
posium on. IEEE, 2013.
[2] Ding, Zhiguo, Mugen Peng, and H. Vincent Poor. ”Cooperative non-
orthogonal multiple access in 5G systems.” IEEE Communications
Letters 19.8 (2015): 1462-1465.
[3] Kim, Jung-Bin, and In-Ho Lee. ”Non-orthogonal multiple access in co-
ordinated direct and relay transmission.” IEEE Communications Letters
19.11 (2015): 2037-2040.
[4] Ding, Zhiguo, Huaiyu Dai, and H. Vincent Poor. ”Relay selection
for cooperative NOMA.” IEEE Wireless Communications Letters 5.4
(2016): 416-419.
[5] Wyner, Aaron D. ”The WireTap Channel.” Bell Labs Technical Journal
54.8 (1975): 1355-1387.
[6] Zhang, Yi, et al. ”Secrecy sum rate maximization in non-orthogonal
multiple access.” IEEE Communications Letters 20.5 (2016): 930-933.
[7] Qin, Zhijin, et al. ”Physical layer security for 5G non-orthogonal
multiple access in large-scale networks.” Communications (ICC), 2016
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2016.
[8] Liu, Yuanwei, et al. ”Enhancing the physical layer security of non-
orthogonal multiple access in large-scale networks.” IEEE Transactions
on Wireless Communications 16.3 (2017): 1656-1672.
[9] Zhong, Caijun, and Zhaoyang Zhang. ”Non-orthogonal multiple access
with cooperative full-duplex relaying.” IEEE Communications Letters
20.12 (2016): 2478-2481.
[10] Chen, Gaojie, et al. ”Physical layer network security in the full-duplex
relay system.” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
10.3 (2015): 574-583.
[11] Gopala, Praveen Kumar, Lifeng Lai, and Hesham El Gamal. ”On the
secrecy capacity of fading channels.” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory 54.10 (2008): 4687-4698.
[12] Hildebrand, Francis Begnaud. Introduction to numerical analysis.
Courier Corporation, 1987.