Constitutional Law II | Atty.
Renato Galeon
POLICE POWER
AMELIA CABRERA VS MANUEL LAPID
GR No. 129098 December 6, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner accused respondents of violating
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Petitioner stated that she entered into a lease
agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan
over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting
it to fishpond operations. According to
petitioner, she had spent approximately
P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the
fishpond operations commenced in August
1995. A month later, petitioner learned from
newspaper reports of the impending demolition
of her fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and
blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus,
petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to
dissuade respondents from destroying her
property.
Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents
ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond.
The property was demolished on 10 October
1995 by dynamite blasting. Petitioner alleged
that the demolition was purposely carried out in
the presence of media representatives and other
government officials to gain media mileage.
Petitioner imputed evident bad faith on
respondents Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor
Cabrera in allowing the destruction of the
fishpond despite their prior knowledge of the
existence of the lease agreement. She also
charged respondents Governor Lapid and
Senior Superintendent Ventura with gross
inexcusable negligence for ordering the
destruction of the fishpond without first
verifying its legality.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is
vested in the municipalities. Petitioner also
questioned the certification by the Municipal
Health Officer, alleging that the same was
issued before the ocular inspection of the
property which took place only on the day of the
demolition. Petitioner also contended that a
judicial proceeding was necessary to determine
whether the property indeed had caused the
flooding. Respondents filed separate oppositions
to petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition and
respondent Governor Lapid filed a rejoinder to
the reply.
ISSUE:
WON the issuances of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 is valid.
RULING:
Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27 of R.A. No.
6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act
of 1989. The provision allowed direct appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office
of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The
right to appeal is granted only in respect to
orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. The provision does not
cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases.
However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions
is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction taints the findings of the
Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause,
the aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from
resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary
investigations of criminal cases is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
But in this case, petitioner has taken the position
that the Ombudsman has decided questions of
substance contrary to law and the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a
ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a
reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear
that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the
assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she
merely questions his findings and conclusions.
As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme
Court via a petition for review on certiorari is
not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By
availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should
be dismissed outright.
Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its
dismissal is nevertheless warranted because
petitioner failed to present, much more
substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Ombudsman.
A careful reading of the questioned Resolution
reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed
petitioner's criminal complaint because
1

respondents had validly resorted to the police
power of the State when they effected the
demolition of the illegal fishpond in question
following the declaration thereof as a nuisance
per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion
that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code was committed by
respondents. In the words of the Ombudsman,
"those who participated in the blasting of the
subject fishpond were only impelled by their
desire to serve the best interest of the general
public; for the good and the highest good."
The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to
the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of
probable cause to indict respondents. These are
purported errors in judgment which can be
corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct
appeal to this Court. Direct resort to this Court
may be had only through the extraordinary writ
of certiorari and upon showing that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion, which petitioner failed to
demonstrate.
The instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED.
CARLOS SUPERDUG CORP VS DSWD
GR No. 166494 June 29, 2007
FACTS:
 Petitioners, belonging to domestic
corporations and proprietors operating
drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for
preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the
“Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” On
February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A.
No. 7432, was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became
effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of the
Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. –
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%)
discount from all establishments relative
to the utilization of services in hotels and
similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
funeral and burial services for the death
of senior citizens;
 The establishment may claim the discounts
granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost
of the discount shall be allowed as deduction
from gross income for the same taxable year that
the discount is granted. Provided, further, That
the total amount of the claimed tax deduction
net of value added tax if applicable, shall be
included in their gross sales receipts for tax
purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
 The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and
adopted the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8
which contains the proviso that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be
subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued
by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the
new law, the Drug Stores Association of the
Philippines wanted a clarification of the
meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified
that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax
deduction on discounts was subtracted from
Net Sales together with other deductions which
are considered as operating expenses before the
Tax Due was computed based on the Net
Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax
credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is
the tax credit item, was deducted directly from
the tax due amount.
 The DOH issued an Administrative Order
that the twenty percent discount shall include
both prescription and non-prescription
medicines, whether branded or generic. It
stated that such discount would be provided in
the purchase of medicines from all
establishments supplying medicines for the
exclusive use of the senior citizens.
 Drug store owners assail the law with the
contention that granting the discount would
result to loss of profit and capital especially that
such law failed to provide a scheme to justly
compensate the discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded
Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not
violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the
Constitution which provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation and the equal
protection clause of Article 3 Section 1.
HELD:
2

 The permanent reduction in their total
revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to
the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for
which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just
is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
 The law grants a twenty percent discount to
senior citizens for medical and dental services,
and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission
fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals, and other similar places of culture,
leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land,
air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels
and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers; and purchases of
medicines for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the
law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior
citizens may claim the discount as a tax
deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is
not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as
“the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all
the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested
in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
of the subjects of the same.”
CITY OF MANILA VS HON. PERFECTO
LAGUIO
GR No. 118127 August 12, 2005
FACTS:
 Private respondent Malate Tourist
Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses.
 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition
with the lower court praying that the Ordinance
of the City of Manila be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
 MTDC argued that the Ordinance
erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments,
motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court
considering that these were not establishments
for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they
were not "services or facilities for
entertainment," nor did they use women as
"tools for entertainment," and neither did they
"disturb the community," "annoy the
inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community."
 The Ordinance ordered the removal of
motels, inns, massage parlors, beer houses,
nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area.
 MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance
was invalid and unconstitutional for the
following reasons:
1. The City Council has no power to
prohibit the operation of motels as
Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the Code)
grants to the City Council only the
power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments
2. The Ordinance is void as it is
violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 49913 which specifically declared
portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a
commercial zone with certain
restrictions
3. The Ordinance does not constitute a
proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel
business has no reasonable relation to
the legitimate municipal interests
sought to be protected
4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post
facto law by punishing the operation of
Victoria Court which was a legitimate
business prior to its enactment
5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's
constitutional rights in that: (a) it is
confiscatory and constitutes an invasion
of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City
Council has no power to find as a fact
that a particular thing is a nuisance per
se nor does it have the power to
extrajudicially destroy it; and
6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of
equal protection under the law as no
3
 Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon

reasonable basis exists for prohibiting  The Ordinance invades fundamental

the operation of motels and inns, but not personal and property rights and impairs
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses personal privileges.
or other similar establishments, and for  It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
prohibiting said business in the Ermita- operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
Malate area but not outside of this area. explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement
 Petitioners City of Manila and Lim of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
maintained that the City Council had the power Council under the Code had no power to enact
to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null
order to protect the social and moral welfare of and void.
the community" as provided for in Section 458  Police power legislation of such character
(a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code. deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
 Petitioners likewise asserted that the we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its
Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance
Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of has no statutory or constitutional authority to
the community in conjunction with its police stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case,
power. the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation
 Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private of the enumerated establishments under Section
respondents and declared the Ordinance null 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion
and void. without infringing the constitutional guarantees
 Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower of due process and equal protection of laws not
court alleging that the following errors were even under the guise of police power.
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It
erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is
ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable
and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It
erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance
contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of
all kinds of commercial establishments, except
those specified therein; and (3) It erred in
declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.
 Petitioners contend that the assailed
Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the
inherent and plenary power of the State and the
general welfare clause exercised by local
government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18
(kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and
conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power; it does not contravene
P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of
validity.

ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of

Manila shows a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring

the operation of motels and inns within the
Ermita-Malate area.
 The exercise of police power by the local
government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy,
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common
right.

4

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD VS
COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 93891 March 11, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation
is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
textiles with untreated wastewater which were
being discharged directly into a canal leading to
the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On
September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution
Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order
based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile
Finishing Corportion’s plant, directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing
its wastewater pollution source installations as
they were clearly in violation of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control
Law) and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules
and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent
Regulations.
Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration
which was granted by the Pollution
Adjudication Board for a temporary operation.
However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari
and preliminary injunction against the Board
but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the CA
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984,
Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex
parte orders to suspend the operations of an
establishment when there is prima facie evidence
that such establishment is discharging effluents
or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set
by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the
other hand, contends that under the Board's
own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may
issue only if the effluents discharged pose an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued
that there were no findings that Solar's
wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution
Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue
the Order and Writ of Execution against Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation. YES.
RULING:
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized
petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist
orders under the following circumstances:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided,
That whenever the Commission finds prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
are of immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or
exceeds the allowable standards set by the
Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-
parte order directing the discontinuance of the
same or the temporary suspension or cessation of
operation of the establishment or person
generating such sewage or wastes without
the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said
ex-parte order shall be immediately
executory and shall remain in force until said
establishment or person prevents or abates
the said pollution within the allowable
standards or modified or nullified by a
competent court.
The Court found that the Order and Writ of
Execution issued by petitioner Board were
entirely within its lawful authority Ex parte
cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like in this case.
The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health,
and general welfare and comfort of the public,
as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public interests
like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. Hence, the trial court did not err
when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari.
It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal
from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as
Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave due
course on the Petition for Review and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution were set aside. The Order of
petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as
well as the decision of the trial court were
reinstated, without prejudice to the right of
Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public
hearing before the Board.
MMDA VS DANTE O. GARIN
GR No. 130230 April 15, 2005
FACTS:
 Respondent Garin was issued a traffic
violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license
was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin
wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his license and
expressed his preference for his case to be file in
Court. Without an immediate reply from the
chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary
5

injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f)
of RA 7924 violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and
impose unspecified and unlimited fines and
penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing
MMDA to return his license and for the
authority to desist from confiscating driver’s
license without first giving the driver the
opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which
authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or
revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of
traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
HELD:
 The MMDA is not vested with police power.
It was concluded that MMDA is not a local
government unit of a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.
 Police power, as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty is the power vested in the
legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances either with penalties of without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for good and welfare of the
commonwealth and for subjects of the same.
 There is no provision in RA 7924 that
empowers MMDA or its council to “enact
ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of Metro Manila.” It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national
government agencies, People’s Organizations,
NGOs and private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of services. All its functions
are administrative in nature.
ORTIGAS & CO., LTD VS COURT OF
APPEALS
GR No. 126102 December 4, 2000
FACTS:
 On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas &
Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of
land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759, with
an area of 1,508 square meters, located in
Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro
Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided
that the lot: be used exclusively…for residential
purposes only, and not more than one single-
family residential building will be constructed
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
thereon,… The BUYER shall not erect…any sign
or billboard on the roof…for advertising
purposes… restrictions shall run with the land
and shall be construed as real covenants until
December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and
terminate…These and the other conditions were
duly annotated on the certificate of title issued
to Emilia.
 In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (now Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority) enacted MMC
Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the
Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National
Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a
commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue
from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills
Subdivision where the lot is located.
 On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael
Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso
and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The lease
contract did not specify the purposes of the
lease. Thereupon, private respondent
constructed a single story commercial building
for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the restrictions must prevail
over the ordinance, specially since these
restrictions were agreed upon before the
passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01?
2. Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a
mere lessee of the lot in question, is a total
stranger to the deed of sale and is thus barred
from questioning the conditions of said deed
HELD:
 The legal system upholds the sanctity of
contract so that a contract is deemed law
between the contracting parties, nonetheless,
stipulations in a contract cannot contravene
“law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Non impairment of contracts or
vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legitimate exercise by the State of
police power to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people.# Moreover,
statutes in exercise of valid police power must
be read into every contract.
 A real party in interest is defined as “the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.” It is noted that the lessee who built
the commercial structure, it is he and he alone
who stands to be either benefited or injured by
the results of the judgment in Civil Case No.
64931. He avers he is the party with real interest
6

in the subject matter of the action, as it would be
his business, not the Hermosos.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS
COMELEC
GR No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
FACTS:
 Respondent Comelec promulgated
Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to
provide free Comelec space of not less than one-
half page for the common use of political parties
and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates to enable them to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public
Issue and their platforms of government. The
Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.
 Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc.
(PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper
and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme
Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the
taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power
of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No.
2772 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
 The Supreme Court declared the Resolution
as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print
media companies to donate “Comelec space”
amounts to “taking” of private personal
property without payment of the just
compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the
taking has not been established by respondent
Comelec, considering that the newspapers were
not unwilling to sell advertising space. The
taking of private property for public use is
authorized by the constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a
national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
PRC VS ARLENE DE GUZMAN
GR No. 144681 June 21, 2004
FACTS:
79 successful examinees of the Physician
Licensure Examination from Fatima College
obtained unusual and exceptionally high scores
in the two most difficult subjects of the exam,
which aroused the suspicion of the Board of
Medicine. They had the results surveyed by a
statistician and investigated by the NBI.
Subsequently, they adopted a Resolution which
withheld the registration as physicians of the
Fatima examinees. After the results of the
investigation of the NBI and the survey of Fr.
Nebres, the Board issued another Resolution
charging the said examinees with immorality,
dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit.
The Fatima examinees, on the other hand, filed
the special civil action of mandamus against the
PRC so that they would be allowed to take their
physician’s oath.
ISSUE:
W/N the Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic
oath and the issuance of the certificates to
successful board examinees.
RULING:
YES. The practice of medicine is a privilege,
subject to qualifications and disqualifications. It
must appear that the applicant has fully
complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by the law and the
licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar
the compliance as being less than satisfactory,
then the privilege will not issue. Until the moral
and mental fitness of de Guzman, et al. could be
ascertained, the Board has discretion to hold in
abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic
oath and the issuance of the certificates to them.
The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel
performance of an act which is not duly
authorized.
The power to regulate the exercise of a
profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an
arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED
which ordering petitioners to administer the
physician’s oath to herein respondents as well as
the resolution of the appellate court, denying the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are
7

REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of
mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
JMM PROMOTION & MANAGEMENT, INC
VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 120095 August 5, 1996
FACTS:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991,
Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which
later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and
train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In
pursuant to the proposal POEA and the
secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize
the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book
which a performing artist must acquire prior to
being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent
Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity
of the said regulation as it violated the right to
travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and
deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The
lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC
is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court.
The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote
the general welfare or the common good. As the
assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon
petitioners to demonstrate that the said
order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does
not enhance the public welfare or was exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of
Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of
Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and
absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the
very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
EMINENT DOMAIN
PLDT VS NTC
190 SCRA 717
FACTS:
a. Petitioner assails two (2) orders of public
respondent National Telecommunications
Commission granting private respondent
Express Telecommunications (ETCI)
provisional authority to install, operate and
maintain a Cellular Mobile Telephone
System in Metro Manila now ETCI in
accordance with specific conditions on the
following grounds;
1. ETCI is not capacitated or qualified
under its legislative franchise to
operate a system-wide telephone or
network of telephone service such as
the one proposed in its application;
2. ETCI lacks the facilities needed and
indispensable to the successful
operation of the proposed cellular
mobile telephone system;
3. PLDT has its pending application
with NTC Case No 86-86, to install
and operate a Cellular Mobile
Telephone System for domestic and
international service not only in
Manila but also in the provinces and
that under the “prior operator” or
“protection of investment” doctrine,
PLDT has the priority preference in
the operation of such service; and
4. the provisional authority, if granted,
will result in needless, uneconomical,
and harmful duplication, among
others.
b. After evaluating the consideration sought
by the PLDT, the NTC, maintained its ruling
that liberally construed, applicant’s
franchise carries with it the privilege to
operate and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone service. Subsequently, PLDT
alleged essentially that the interconnection
ordered was in violation of due process and
that the grant of provisional authority was
jurisdictionally and procedurally infirm.
However, NTC denied the reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether or not the contention of PLDT
is tenable.
RULING:
a. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
8

b. There can be no question that the NTC
is the regulatory agency of the national
government with jurisdiction over all
telecommunications entities. It is legally
clothed with authority and given ample
discretion to grant a provisional permit
or authority. In fact, NTC may, on its
own initiative, grant such relief even in
the absence of a motion from an
applicant.
c. Rep. Act No. 2090 grants ETCI (formerly
FACI) "the right and privilege of
constructing, installing, establishing and
operating in the entire Philippines radio
stations for reception and transmission of
messages on radio stations in the foreign
and domestic public fixed point-to-point
and public base, aeronautical and land
mobile stations, ... with the corresponding
relay stations for the reception and
transmission of wireless messages on
radiotelegraphy and/or radiotelephony
d. A franchise is a property right and
cannot be revoked or forfeited without
due process of law. The determination
of the right to the exercise of a franchise,
or whether the right to enjoy such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user,
is more properly the subject of the
prerogative writ of quo warranto, the
right to assert which, as a rule, belongs
to the State "upon complaint or
otherwise" (Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66,
Rules of Court), 2 the reason being that
the abuse of a franchise is a public
wrong and not a private injury. A
forfeiture of a franchise will have to be
declared in a direct proceeding for the
purpose brought by the State because a
franchise is granted by law and its
unlawful exercise is primarily a concern
of Government.
e. Transfers of shares of a public utility
corporation need only NTC approval,
not Congressional authorization. What
transpired in ETCI were a series of
transfers of shares starting in 1964 until
1987. The approval of the NTC may be
deemed to have been met when it
authorized the issuance of the
provisional authority to ETCI.
f. PLDT cannot justifiably refuse to
interconnect. Rep. Act No. 6849, or the
Municipal Telephone Act of 1989,
approved on 8 February 1990, mandates
interconnection providing as it does that
"all domestic telecommunications
carriers or utilities ... shall be
interconnected to the public switch
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
telephone network." Such regulation of
the use and ownership of
telecommunications systems is in the
exercise of the plenary police power of
the State for the promotion of the
general welfare. The 1987 Constitution
recognizes the existence of that power
when it provides.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS
POBRE
GR No. 106804 August 12, 2004
FACTS:
 Petitioner NPC is a public corporation
created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric,
nuclear and other power and to transmit electric
power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to
exercise the right of eminent domain.
 Private respondent Pobre is the owner of
property located in Tiwi, Albay.
 In 1963, Pobre began developing the
Property as a resort-subdivision, which he
named as “Tiwi Hot Springs Resort
Subdivision.”
 On August 1965, the Commission on
Volcanology certified that thermal mineral
water and steam were present beneath the
Property. The commission found it suitable for
domestic use and potentially for commercial or
industrial use.
 NPC then became involved with Pobre’s
Property in three instances.
 First was on February 1972 when Pobre
leased to NPC for one year eleven lots frof the
subdivision. Second was sometime in 1977, the
first time that NPC filed its expropriation case
against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion
of the Property. On 1979, the trial court ordered
the expropriation of the lots upon NPC’s
payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling
operations and construction of steam
wells. While the first case was pending, NPC
dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed
upon by NPC with Pobre. It altered the
topography o the Property. No action was done
on Pobre’s complaints, dumping continued.
Third was on September 1979, when NPC filed
its second expropriation case. NPC needed
more lots for the construction and maintenance
of a Well Site. NPC immediately deposited
P5,546.36 with the Philippine National
Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total
market value of the lots covered by the second
expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot
upon the trial court’s issuance of a writ of
possession to NPC.
 Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second
complaint and claimed that NPC damaged his
9

Property. He prayed for just compensation of all
the lots affected.
 On April 1987, the trial court decided in
favor of Pobre, ordered the whole property to be
paid off by NPC.
 NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of
the decision, which was denied by the trial
courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the
trial court’s decision and denied NPC’s motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUES: WON, CA erred:
1. In holding that NPC had “taken” the entire
Property of Pobre;
2. In not excluding from the Property portions
of which NPC had previously expropriated and
paid for;
3. In holding that the amount of just
compensation fixed by the trial court at
P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 1979
until fully paid, is just and fair;
4. In not holding that the just compensation
should be fixed at P25/sqm only as what had
been previously agreed upon;
HELD:
 Even before the first case, Pobre had
established his property as a resort-subdivision.
NPC had wrought so much damage to the
property that it made it uninhabitable as a
resort-subdivision. Questions of facts are
beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for
review may only raise questions of law. NPC
points out that it did not take Pobre’s 68,969 sqm
property. NPC argues that assuming that it is
liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that
it had successfully expropriated and fully paid
for should have been excluded from the 68,969
sqm property that Pobre claims NPC had
damaged.
 It was clearly established that the property
originally had a total area of 141,300 sqm. Pobre
identified the lots forming the 68,969 sqm
property that comprised the undeveloped area.
NPC had the opportunity to object to the
identification of the lots, but failed to do
so. Thus, the trial and appellate courts’ finding
on the total land area NPC had damaged cannot
be disturbed.
 When possession of the land cannot be
turned over to the landowner because it is not
anymore convenient or feasible to do so, the
only remedy available to the aggrieved
landowner is to demand payment of just
compensation.
 In this case, the property is no longer
habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property
is worthless is now only useful to NPC. NPC
moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
second expropriation on the ground that it had
found an alternative site and there was stiff
opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the
second expropriation case five years after it had
already deprived the Property virtually of all its
value. NPC has demonstrated its utter
disregard for Pobre’s property rights.
 Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC
to institute expropriation proceedings to
determine the just compensation for Pobre’s
68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be
spared any further delay in his pursuit to
receive just compensation from NPC. Just
compensation is the fair and full equivalent of
the loss.
 The lesson in this case must not be lost on
entities with eminent domain authority. Such
entities cannot trifle with a citizen’s property
rights. The power of eminent domain is an
extraordinary power they must wield with
circumspection and utmost regard for
procedural requirements.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for
lack of merit.
LAGCAO VS LABRA
GR No. 155746 October 13, 2004
FACTS:
 In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210
lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was
Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City,
with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965,
petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late
1965, the 210 lots, reverted to the Province of
Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul
the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the
petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the
province for specific performance and damages
in the then CFI.
 On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in
favor of petitioners and on June 11, 1992, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the
appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed a
deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of
petitioners.
 After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take
possession of the lot only to discover that
squatters already occupied it. Thus, petitioners
instituted ejectment proceedings against the
squatters. The MTCC, rendered a decision on
April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate
the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution
and order of demolition.
 However, when the demolition order was
about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor
Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to the MTCC,
10

requesting the deferment of the demolition on
the ground that the City was still looking for a
relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders
suspending the demolition for a period of 120
days from February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for
petitioners, during the suspension period, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City
passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot
1029 among the identified sites for socialized
housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843
was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing
the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029
which was registered in the name of petitioners.
The intended acquisition was to be used for the
benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and
sale to the actual occupants thereof. For this
purpose, the ordinance appropriated the
amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the
subject lot. This ordinance was approved by
Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.
 On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with
the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of
Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional.
The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon
was also denied.
 In this appeal, petitioners argue that
Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it
sanctions the expropriation of their property for
the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an
endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use"
contemplated in the Constitution. They allege
that it will benefit only a handful of people. The
ordinance, according to petitioners, was
obviously passed for politicking, the squatters
undeniably being a big source of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intended
expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-
square-meter parcel of land owned by
petitioners contravenes the Constitution and
applicable laws.
HELD:
 Local government units have no inherent
power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the
legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress
conferred upon local government units the
power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was
enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. － A local
government unit may, through its chief
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics
supplied).
 Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the
expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by
the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized
housing for the homeless and low-income
residents of the City.
 There are two legal provisions which limit
the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by
local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute.
 The foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing
at all why petitioners’ property was singled out
for expropriation by the city ordinance or what
necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason
for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site
of a socialized housing project.
 RA 7279 is the law that governs the local
expropriation of property for purposes of urban
land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10
thereof provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. －
Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority
Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more
practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this
section shall not apply. The local government
11

units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands. (Emphasis
supplied).
 SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. － The
modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this
Act shall include, among others, community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be
resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted: Provided
further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
parcels of land owned by small property owners
shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx.
(Emphasis supplied).
 In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late
Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila,
we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are
strict limitations on the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by local government units,
especially with respect to (1) the order of
priority in acquiring land for socialized housing
and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank
last in the order of priority for purposes of
socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings may be resorted to
only after the other modes of acquisition are
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is
mandatory because these are the only
safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of
private property against what may be a
tyrannical violation of due process when their
property is forcibly taken from them allegedly
for public use.
 We have found nothing in the records
indicating that the City of Cebu complied
strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate
petitioners’ property without any attempt to
first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed
to establish that the other modes of acquisition
in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted.
Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No.
1843, there was no evidence of a valid and
definite offer to buy petitioners’ property as
required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We therefore
find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally
infirm for being violative of the petitioners’ right
to due process.
 It should also be noted that, as early as 1998,
petitioners had already obtained a favorable
judgment of eviction against the illegal
occupants of their property. The judgment in
this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
finality, with a writ of execution and an order of
demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial
court to suspend the demolition on the pretext
that the City was still searching for a relocation
site for the squatters. However, instead of
looking for a relocation site during the
suspension period, the city council suddenly
enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners’ lot. The
unconscionable manner in which the questioned
ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
respondent City transgressed the Constitution,
RA 7160 and RA 7279.
 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the city
or municipality to enact but must also be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law. It
must be in accordance with certain well-
established basic principles of a substantive
nature. These principles require that an
ordinance (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
 Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with
the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear
case of constitutional infirmity having been thus
established, this Court is constrained to nullify
the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to
the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA
7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate manner in which it was
enacted was plain oppression masquerading as
a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners’ small property
was singled out for expropriation for the
purpose of awarding it to no more than a few
squatters indicated manifest partiality against
petitioners, and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there
was a reasonable relation between the end
sought and the means adopted. While the
objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it
employed in pursuit of such objective fell short
of what was legal, sensible and called for by the
circumstances.
REPUBLIC VS CATELVI
58 SCRA 336
FACTS:
 The Castellvi property had been occupied
by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a
contract of lease. It was stipulated by the parties,
12

that "the foregoing contract of lease is 'similar in
terms and conditions, including the date', with
the annual contracts entered into from year to
year between defendant Castellvi and the
Republic of the Philippines. It is undisputed,
therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's
land from July 1, 1947, by virtue of the above-
mentioned contract, on a year to year basis
(from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the
succeeding year). Before the expiration of the
contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused.
When the AFP refused to vacate the leased
premises after the termination of the contract, on
July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of
Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of
the property had decided not to continue leasing
the property in question because they had
decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public, demanding that the property be
vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter,
and that the premises be returned in
substantially the same condition as before
occupancy .On January 30, 1957, Lieutenant
General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff,
answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it
was difficult for the army to vacate the premises
in view of the permanent installations and other
facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were
erected and already established on the property,
and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of
expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President. Defendant
Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga to eject the Philippine Air
Force from the land. While this ejectment case
was pending, the Republic instituted these
expropriation proceedings.
 The Republic argues that the "taking" should
be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue
of a special lease agreement between the
Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was
granted the "right and privilege" to buy the
property should the lessor wish to terminate the
lease.
 Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that
the "taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain requires two essential
elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by
condemn or upon the private property for more
than a momentary or limited period, and (2)
devoting it to a public use in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues
that in the instant case the first element is
wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon
provides for a lease from year to year; that the
second element is also wanting, that the contract
Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon
of lease does not grant the Republic the "right
and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value
at the time of occupancy."
ISSUE: WON the “Taking” of properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of the
action. (What are the requisites of “Taking” of
property of eminent domain?)
HELD:
 It is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's
property for purposes of eminent domain
cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947
when the Republic commenced to occupy the
property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the
contention of Castellvi that two essential
elements in the "taking" of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the
entrance and occupation by the condemnor
must be for a permanent, or indefinite period,
and (2) that in devoting the property to public
use the owner was ousted from the property
and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
 Untenable also is the Republic's contention
that although the contract between the parties
was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was
"in reality a more or less permanent right to
occupy the premises under the guise of lease
with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property
should the lessor wish to terminate the lease,"
and "the right to buy the property is merged as
an integral part of the lease relationship ... so
much so that the fair market value has been
agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but
as of the time of occupancy". We cannot accept
the Republic's contention that a lease on a year
to year basis can give rise to a permanent right
to occupy, since by express legal provision a
lease made for a determinate time, as was the
lease of Castellvi's land in the instant case,
ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can
it be said that the right of eminent domain may
be exercised by simply leasing the premises to
be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of
Court).
 To sustain the contention of the Republic is
to sanction a practice whereby in order to secure
a low price for a land which the government
intends to expropriate (or would eventually
expropriate) it would first negotiate with the
owner of the land to lease the land (for say ten
or twenty years) then expropriate the same
when the lease is about to terminate, then claim
that the "taking" of the property for the purposes
of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date
when the Government started to occupy the
13
 Constitutional Law II | Atty. Renato Galeon

property under the lease, and then assert that

the value of the property being expropriated be
reckoned as of the start of the lease, in spite of
the fact that the value of the property, for many
good reasons, had in the meantime increased
during the period of the lease.
 The lower court did not commit an error
when it held that the "taking" of the property
under expropriation commenced with the filing
of the complaint in this case.
 In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
Republic was placed in possession of the
Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on
August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi
property for the purposes of determining the
just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be
reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint
for eminent domain was filed.

14