G.R. No.

L-35574 September 28, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio Sugay for defendant-appellant.

CUEVAS, J.:

In an amended Information 1 filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, VALENTINA
MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of March, 1965, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Hon. Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, that is, having conceived and deliberated to kill her husband, Elias Day y Pablo,
with whom she was united in lawful wedlock, enter (sic) the NAWASA building situated at Pasay City,
where said Elias Day y Pablo was working as a security guard; and the said accused, having in her
possession a bottle containing gasoline suddenly and without warning, poured the contents on the
person of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, ignited the gasoline, as a result of which, said Elias Day y Pablo
suffered burns and injuries which subsequently caused his death.

Contrary to law 2

Tried after pleading "NOT GUILTY" upon arraignment, accused was convicted and thereafter sentenced
to reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00; and to pay
costs.

From the aforesaid judgment, she ventilated an appeal to the then Court of Appeals (which referred the
appeal to us considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, assailing her aforesaid
conviction and contending that the trial court erred: 1) in convicting her solely on the basis of the
alleged extrajudicial confession; 2) in finding that Pneumonia was a complication of the burns sustained
by the victim; 3) in not finding her not to have cause the death of the deceased; and 4) in not acquitting
her at least on ground of reasonable doubt.

The prosecution's version of the incident as summarized in the People's Brief is as follows:

On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at
Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10)
centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee
bottle (t.s.n., p. 13, January 13, 1969). She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the
latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their
house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was
opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW
GALIGAON" (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline
and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id). Then, she got a matchbox
and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. (Exhs. "A" and "A-1", p. 197, Rec.)

The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written
statement (Exh. "A", p. 197, Rec.) where she admitted having burned the victim.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity
General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. (Exh. "C", p. 208, rec.) due to
pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. 3

Appellant's story on the other hand runs, thus:

It was before 10:00 o'clock p.m. when appellant returned from Olongapo City. She fed her grandson and
put him to bed. After filing the tank with water, she remembered that the next day was a Sunday and
she had to go to church. Her shoes were dirty but there was no gasoline with which to clean them.
Taking with her an empty bottle of Hemo, she left for a nearby gasoline station and bought ten centavos
worth of gasoline. Then she remembered that her husband needed gasoline for his lighter so she
dropped by his place of work. (p. 13, Ibid.)

Appellant saw her husband inside a bonding of the NAWASA standing by the window. As the iron grille
was open, she entered and knocked at the wooden door. Elias opened the door, but when he saw his
wife he shouted at her. Appellant said that she had brought the gasoline which he needed for his lighter,
but Elias, who was under the influence of liquor, cursed her thus: "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON".
Elias continued shouting and cursing even as appellant told him that she had come just to bring the
gasoline that he wanted. Appellant trembled and became dizzy. She was beside herself and did not
know that she was sprinkling the gasoline on her husband's face. She was tired and dizzy and had to sit
down for a while. Then she remembered her grandson who was alone in the house so she went home
leaving her husband who was walking to and fro and not paying attention to her. (pp. 13-14, Ibid., p. 2,
March 20, 1969)

She went to bed but could not sleep. She went back to the NAWASA compound to apologize to her
husband. Upon reaching the NAWASA, however, she found that police officers were present. Her
husband was walking all around still fuming mad, and when he saw her he chased her. A policeman
pulled appellant aside and asked if she was the wife of Elias. When she replied in the affirmative, the
police officer accused her of burning her husband. She denied the accusation. But the police took her to
the headquarters, and prepared a written statement, Exhibits A, A-1. Appellant was made to sign said
statement upon a promise that she would be released if she signed it. Although she did not know the
contents, she signed it because of the promise. (pp. 14-16. Id.; p. 5, March 20,1969) 4

Appellant's assigned errors boil down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial
confession was voluntarily given; and (2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed
to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.

Right after the burning incident, appellant was picked up by the police operatives of Pasay City. She was
thereafter investigated by Sgt. Leopoldo Garcia of the Pasay City Police who took her statement in
Tagalog and in Question and Answer form which was reduced into writing. 5 After Sgt. Garcia was
through taking her statement, she was brought to Fiscal Paredes who asked her questions regarding the
said statement and its execution and before whom said statement was subscribed and sworn to by her.
In that investigation, appellant categorically admitted having thrown gasoline at her husband and
thereafter set him aflame as evidenced by this pertinent portion of her statement-

T Ano ang nangyari at iyong binuksan ng gasolina ang iyong asawa na si Elias Day?

S Dahil may sala siya, at sinunog niya ang aking mga damit, at may babae pa, at saka lahat ng aming
pagkain sa bahay ay hinahakot.

T Ng dahil dito sa mga binanggit mong ito ay ano ang ginawa mo sa iyong asawa?

S Ako po ay nagdilim ang aking isipan at ang ginawa ko ay naisip kong buhusan ng gasolina, kaya ang
aking ginawa ay bumili ako ng halagang 10 sentimos sa Esso Gasoline Station sa Tall Avenue at inilagay
ko sa isang boti.

T Pagkatapos na ikaw ay makabili ng gasolina sa station ng Esso sa Taft Avenue dito sa Pasay City, ay ano
ang ginawa mo?

S Ako po ay nagpunta sa kanya na pinaggoguardiahan sa Nawasa at pagdating ko nuon ay kumatok ako

sa pintuan ng Nawasa, at nang marinig niya ang aking katok sa pinto ay binuksan niya ang pintuan, at
pagkabukas ng pintuan ay nakita niya ako, at nagalit siya at ako ay minura ng puta putan Ina mo, lalakad
ka ng gabi, at namumuta raw ako, at pagkatapos na ako ay mamura ay hinahabol pa ako ng
suntok, kayat ang ginawa ko po kinuha ko ang aking dalang bote na may gasolina at aking ibinuhos sa
kanyang katawan at aking kinuha ang posporo at aking sinindihang at hangang magliyab ang suot
niyang polo shirt, na may guhit na itim at puti.

T Alam mo ba na kung ano ang iyong ginawa sa iyong asawa kanginang humigit kumulang na mag-iika
alas 11:00 ng gabi Marzo 6, 1965?

S Opo, aking sinunog ang aking asawa. (Exhs. A & A-1 Emphasis supplied)

She would now like her aforesaid extrajudicial confession discredited by asserting that she did not
understand its contents because she is not a Tagala aside from having reached only the primary grades;
and furthermore, that said statement was signed by her merely upon the promise of the policemen that
she will later be released.

We find appellant's aforesaid assertions a mere pretense too flimsy to be accepted as true. For the truth
is that appellant knew and understood Tagalog despite her not being a Tagala, having stayed in Manila
since 1951, continuously up to the time of the burning incident in question for which she was
investigated. During this period of almost fourteen years, she was in daily association with Tagalogs
communicating with them in Pilipino. This is clear from her admission on cross-examination which runs
thus-

Q But you can understand Tagalog because of the length of time that you litem been living here in
Manila?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, when you buy something from the store, you speak Tagalog?

A Yes.
Q And when you ride in a jeep or bus, you speak Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q And you were well understood by these Tagalog people?

A Yes.

Q And as a matter of fact, you can understand Tagalog?

A Yes,

Q And you can also read Tagalog?

A Yes.

Q You can read?

A Yes, but I do not litem interest to read. TSN, March 29, 1969, pp. 11-12).

All through shout the entire investigation and even at the time appellant A as before Fiscal Paredes,
before whom she subscribed and swore to the truth of an what appeared in her statement, 6 no
denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was
there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of
the promise by the police that she will be released later. We therefore find her aforesaid claim highly
incredible and a mere concoction. For why will the police still resort to such trickery when the very
sworn statement given by her proved by its contents that appellant was indeed very cooperative. In fact,
almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her
on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein.
Moreover, We find said statement replete with details which could not litem been possibly supplied by
the police investigators who litem no previous knowledge of, nor acquaintance with her and the victim,
especially with respect to the circumstances and incidents which preceded the fatal incident that
brought about the death of the latter. We therefore find no error in the trial court's pronouncement
that appellant's sworn statement was voluntarily given by her; that she fully understood its contents;
and that she willingly affixed her signatures thereto.

Well settled is the rule that extrajudicial confession may be regarded as conclusive proof of guilt when
taken without maltreatment or intimidation 7 and may serve as a basis of the declarant's conviction. 8 It
is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proven. The burden of proof is upon the person who
gave the confession. 9 That presumption has not been overcome in the instant case.

Indeed the trial court could not be faulted for relying heavily on accused-appellant's sworn statement in
assessing her guhit since it was given shortly after the incident took place. By then, she had yet no time
to concoct any fabrication favorable to her. Shock by the aftermath consequences of her criminal design
she must litem been motivated by no other purpose except to admit the undeniable. On the other hand,
when she took the witness stand, disclaiming any responsibility for the burning of her husband, it was
already January 13, 1969 . . . more than five years after the incident and decidedly after she had the
benefit of too many consultations.
That appellant has murder in her heart and meant to do harm to her husband when she went to the
latter's place of work on that fatal night and intended an the consequences of her nefarious act finds
clearer manifestation and added support in her total indifference and seemingly unperturbed concern
over the fate that had befallen the victim . . . her husband . . . especially at times when he needed her
most. Being the wife, she must be the closest to him and the hardest hit by the mishap if she has not
authored the same nor voluntarily participated therein. She was then reasonably expected to come to
his succor and alleviate him from his sufferings. And yet, the records do not show her having seen her
husband even once while the latter lay seriously ill at the hospital hovering between life and death.
Neither did she attend his funeral nor was she ever present during the wake while the victim's remains
lay in state. That she was under detention does not excuse nor justify those glaring and significant
omissions. For she could litem asked the court's permission for any of the enumerated undertakings
which we believe would not litem been denied. But she did not even attempt.

Indeed, the more we scrutinize appellant's alibi and explanation, we become more convinced of the
falsity and incredibility of her assertions. For instance, her claim that her purpose in buying gasoline at
so an unholy hour of the night, past ten o clock in the evening, solely for the purpose of cleaning her
shoes which she would wear in going to church the following Sunday, hardly recommend acceptance.
That she dropped at her husband's place of work also at the middle of the night for no other purpose
except to deliver to him gasoline for his cigarette lighter, is likewise too taxing upon one's credulity . . .
more so if we litem to consider the previous spat she had with the deceased in the morning of that fatal
day.

In her vain attempt to exculpate herself, appellant would like Us to believe that her husband died of
pneumonia because the latter drank liquor as shown by the toxicology report indicating presence of
alcohol in the victim's body. Hence, assuming she set her husband on fire, she is not criminally liable for
her husband's death.

We are not persuaded by appellant's aforesaid ratiocination

The claim that the victim drank liquor while confined in the hospital would not suffice to exculpate the
appellant. For as testified by Dr. Reyes, pneumonia could not be caused by taking alcohol. In fact,
alcohol, according to him, unless taken in excessive dosage so as to produce an almost comatose
condition would not cause suffocation nor effect a diminution of the oxygen content of the body. 10 In
fine, as correctly pointed out by the Hon. Solicitor General, the victim's taking of liquor was not an
efficient supervening cause of his death which took place on March 10, 1965, just four days after the
burning.

The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary.
There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings
immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere
complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the
court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second
degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as
to the cause of death, merely contributory. We agree.

Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4. Criminal Liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred.

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

the essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
committed by the offender. 11

The reason for the rule as spelled out in the earlier cases of PP vs. Moldes, 61 Phil. 1, 3 & 4; and PP vs.
Quianzon, 62 Phil. 162, citing 13 RCL 748, 751 is as follows —

One who inflicts injury on another is deemed guilty of homicide if the injury contributes immediately or
immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not
relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the deceased might litem recovered if
he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper
treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death was men." caused by a
surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is
founded is one of universal application. It lies at the foundation of criminal jurisprudence. It is that every
person is held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a
person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows
as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality
to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result. Neglect of the wound or its unskilled
and improper treatment which are themselves consequences of the criminal act, must in law be deemed
to litem been among those which are in contemplation of the guilty party and for which he must be
responsible The rule has its foundation on a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to
give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amidst the
conflicting theories of medical men and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily
ailments and injuries it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate
cause of death, and thereby open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime might escape
conviction and punishment.

In convicting the accused, the trial court imposed upon her the obligation to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased only in the amount of P12,000.00. That should now be increased to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, except as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs
against appellant.

It appearing however that appellant Valentina Mananquil is now 71 years of age, this Court
recommends her for executive clemency. For the purpose, let His Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, be furnished with a copy of this decision thru the Hon. Minister of Justice.
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in
Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent appellate
Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.

The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been clearly
illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the public
respondent, thus:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and that
while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra Sources International
Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient
funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor
was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit equivalent
to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased, amounting to
P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a
personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the warranty
deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in question,
on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)

The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:

1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee shall deposit
with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the faithful
performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire period of
Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the
option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to
petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through
Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject
of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon
Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These checks were a)
Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated
September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the
amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the one
who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to
pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited they were
returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was
convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:

. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of B.P. Blg.
22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-
35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid.,
pp. 25, 27)

Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is
intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties, the
petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the officers of
Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing
scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at
the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out"
made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would
have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the termination
of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of the warranty
deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a
purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out
by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic
constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not
his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say
the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation
officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were
turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her
instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence,
she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".

It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful
legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the
name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the
same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as this one.
This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need
protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they
also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme
designed to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction of
the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the special
law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with
materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.

This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of
said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue that
after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs.
Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to
stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage users of
the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness
transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who
are the pillars of society.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function
of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished
in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in
time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that
moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation
is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the
moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral
disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P.
11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca
and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the
objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value"
as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose
operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the
open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty
deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:

Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to complainant had been
extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement — by the terms of which the warranty deposit
advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused as lessee — and that as the lessor L.S. Finance
neither made any liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed
that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not
change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the four checks were
originally issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be a
conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of said
offense that the check should have been made and issued on account or for value — it is sufficient, all
the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must have been drawn and issued in
payment of an obligation.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks, of the
obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have resulted in placing the case at
bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that
there was such an extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the
warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the same
court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the
crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has already been
taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides
being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the
value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her
possession the checks that "bounced".

That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty
deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:

And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, which is a
special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that in cases
ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent
not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public
policy and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for
said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)

The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty"
and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the alleged crime
could not have been committed by petitioner:

a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as they
are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p.
1423)

A cross-reference to the following term shows:

Fitness for Particular Purpose: —

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)

b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance of some
contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment
and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the estate.

To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to
intrust to the care of another.

The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be withdrawn
at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or
the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and generally
understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on demand and for
which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain
notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner
never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a
matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom
petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not
communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was
covered by L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to
the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol"
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding
the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by
the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court
to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court viaa petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were
filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner
is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is
only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and
in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to
due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of
the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper
time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the dropping of the charges.2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in
"official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it
must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws
do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It
appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the
stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part
of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that
preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required
in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation
does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective.9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such intent, the
felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and
external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location
and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27,
2006,1whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed
against Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.2

Antecedents

The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o�clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter
�Alexander�) was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter �Alfredo�), the brother of his land
lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter �Lucila�), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what
Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, �Pasensya ka na Mang Alex� and told
the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours.
Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While
pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his
left face and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and
begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded
Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander.
Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was
brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter,
Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further
medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and
about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal
space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound
penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic
cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to Dr.
Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the
second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander�s death without timely medical
intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25, 1997
at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he
accidentally hit Alexander�s back, causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt
insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander
on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter�s face.3

The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De
Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., �JUNIOR,� guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any
modifying circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months
and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION
MAYOR as MAXIMUM .

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant compensatory damages in the amount of
P14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that
intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained
by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during the fistfight between them; that
he did not inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another person could have inflicted such wounds; and
that he had caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found
guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner�s conviction, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA denied the petitioner�s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6

Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?

Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code , as amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate
courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we
immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him and
Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of
them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he
appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because
the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently
established. He avers that such intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical
injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is
competently shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that
the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony
by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent
to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of
the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the
words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them.
Contrary to the petitioner�s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks
inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and
used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained
two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The
petitioner�s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying
his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the
wound on Alexander�s chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical
intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that
should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found
guilty of frustrated homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and appellate courts
on the credibility of Alexander�s testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible
and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more
compelling application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural
tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant
and to recall the manner in which the latter committed the crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the
petitioner�s mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical
evidence corroborating Alexander�s statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm the
petitioner�s conviction for frustrated homicide.

The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty of �Six (6)
Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of
PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM �12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite the CA concurring with the trial
court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is
imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term.13 The maximum term is
the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code after considering any attending modifying
circumstances; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of
the Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower
to reclusion temporal, the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayor in its medium period �
from eight years and one day to 10 years � is proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one
day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not within the medium period
of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years of prision correccional, as
the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as compensatory
damages �representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly
proven.�15 We need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and
relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we emphatically declared to be �imperative that the
courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be
imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a
waiver of its recovery.� We explained why in the following manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: �(1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by
a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.� Their disregard compels us to act as we now do
lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time
a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy
of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be
otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be true to the
judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their
rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is
what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex
delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them.
The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.17

Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender committed
violence that nearly took away the victim�s life. �Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.�18 Indeed,
Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in
physical injuries.19 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that
P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil
indemnity of P30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per
annumreckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding petitioner
Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE,
and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay
to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory
damages of P14,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this
decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 193169, April 06, 2015

ROGELIO ROQUE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an
Information that reads as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2001, in the municipality of Pandi, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot with a gun
complain[an]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the latter on his right ear and nape, and kick[ing] him on the
face and back, causing serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said
Reynaldo Marquez, thus, performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, that is[,] by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which
prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded �not guilty.�� During the pre-trial
conference, the defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that he is
a Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of the incident, November 22, 2001
was the Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay.� Trial thereafter ensued where the parties presented
their respective versions of the incident.

The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and
Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan,�
Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them.� At that instant,
petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle.� Believing that Rodolfo�s shout was
directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former.� Reynaldo apologized for the
misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding.� Before leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers
that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him.

Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in
settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by
dela Cruz and brought to the house of Tayao.� But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo
just proceeded to petitioner�s house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead.�
Upon arriving at petitioner�s residence, Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner but the latter did not
reply.� Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came out, he was already holding a gun
which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear.� Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who
fell to the ground after being hit in the nape.� Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on the face and
back.� Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those around not to get
involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo�s parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency
medical treatment.� He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was
operated on and confined for three weeks.� Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and issued a
medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo�s skull and exited at the back of
his right ear.

Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on November 22, 2001, petitioner went
to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to fetch his child.� While driving, he was cursed by brothers
Reynaldo and Rodolfo who were visibly intoxicated.� Petitioner ignored the two and just went home.�
Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives against him.�
Petitioner�s brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed to leave but not without
threatening that they would return to kill him.� Petitioner thus asked someone to call Tayao.� Not
long after, the brothers came back, entered petitioner�s yard, and challenged him to a gun duel.�
Petitioner requested Tayao to stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead
fired his gun.� Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.

On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84, rendered its
Decision2finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision
correccional,� as minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as maximum.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4 dated August 16, 2007.

Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision5 dated February 27, 2009,
the CA affirmed in full the RTC�s Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in
its entirety.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner�s Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a Resolution8 dated July 30,
2010.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner
imputes upon the CA the following errors:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE
ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION WAS NOT
 SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY SHOWN
THAT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS INDEED ARMED WITH A GUN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE
ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT THAT THERE
WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION, PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT
THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE
ON RECORD WHEN IT RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF PETITIONER WAS PRESENT
CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT
WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGAY OFFICIALS FROM INTERVENING
AND HELPING OUT THE WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.10

Our Ruling

The Petition must be denied.

The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to �appreciation of evidence� or factual errors
which are not within the province of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.� The Court had
already explained in Batistis v. People11 that:

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a
decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other thandeath, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari.

A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law.� Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of
Court, explicitly so provides, viz:

Section 1.� Filing of petition with Supreme Court. � A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.� The petition may include an application for
a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth.� The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified
motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.

Petitioner�s assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and re-examination of the

evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.12� The Petition must therefore be denied on this basis
because �one, the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal
questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA,
unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or
contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,�13 which was not shown to be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are accorded high
respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA,14 as in this case.� After all, the RTC �had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling the truth.�15� �To
[thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court�s findings of
fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by
the CA�16 as petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which
merits a departure from the said doctrine.17

In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC�s ruling that petitioner is guilty
of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious physical injuries as the latter insists.� As aptly
stated by the CA:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim.� If there is no
intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries only.� Vice-versa, regardless of
whether the victim only suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is
sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266).

Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts of the
victim�s body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted.� Hence, when a
deadly weapon, like a bolo, is used to stab the victim in the latter�s abdomen, the intent to kill can be
presumed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).

It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in the head.� Indeed the location
of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications that the accused-appellant�s
objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.� Verily, had the accused-
appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would have killed him
outright.� Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant even
prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x the bleeding victim.� Indeed, the fact
that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum
injuries does not mean that the crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious
physical injuries.� After all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not
the gravity of the resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the
trigger.18

The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is also proper, there is a need
to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of damages must be made in favor of the victim
Reynaldo.

The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded to Reynaldo due to the
absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he incurred from the incident. �Nonetheless, absent
competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate
damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary
loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.�19� Since it was undisputed that Reynaldo was hospitalized due to the gunshot
wounds inflicted by petitioner, albeit as observed by the RTC there was no evidence offered as to the
expenses he incurred by reason thereof, Reynaldo is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P25,000.00.� Aside from this, he is also entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00.� These awards of
damages are in accordance with settled jurisprudence.20� An interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum must also be imposed on the awarded damages to commence from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.21

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.� The Decision dated February 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002 convicting petitioner Rogelio Roque of
the crime of frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to
pay the victim Reynaldo Marquez moral damages and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00
each, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until
fully paid.
G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CORNELIO BAYONA, defendant-appellant.

Gervasio Diaz for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, finding
the defendant guilty of a violation of section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:

A eso de las once de la mañana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras se celebrahan las elecciones
generales en el precinto electoral numero 4, situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio de Pilar,
Provincia de Capiz, el aqui acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio, que era entonces el
representante del Departamento del Interior para inspecionar las elecciones generales en la Provincia
de Capiz, y por el comandante de la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que iba en aquella ocasion con el citado
Jose E. Desiderio, portando en su cinto el revolver Colt de calibre 32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, dentro del
cerco que rodeaba el edificio destinado para el citado colegio electoral numero 4 y a una distancia de 22
metros del referido colegio electoral. Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del revolver en
cuestion.

La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro Buenvenida, trato de establecer
que el aqui acusado paro en la calle que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a invitacion de dicho
Jose D. Benliro y con el objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado para llevar a su casa a los electores
del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya habian terminado de votar, y que cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y
el comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba en la calle. Desde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio
en que, segun dichos testigos, estaba el acusado cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una
distancia de 27 metros.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido con su revolver dentro del cerco de
la casa escuela del Barrio de Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como colegio electoral.

2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la infraccion de la Ley Electoral querrellada y,
por consiguiente, al condenarle a prision y multa.

As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is sufficient to say that the record
shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major
Agdamag of the Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the elections in the
Province of Capiz, testified positively that the defendant was within the fence surrounding the polling
place when Desiderio took possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also disposes of
that part of the argument under the second assignment of error based on the theory that the defendant
was in a public road, where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the argument
under the second assignment of error is that if it be conceded that the defendant went inside of the
fence, he is nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he was called by a friend
and merely approached him to find out what he wanted and had no interest in the election; that there
were many people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant could not leave his
revolver in his automobile, which he himself was driving, without running the risk of losing it and
thereby incurring in a violation of the law.

As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in his automobile without the risk
of losing it because he was alone, it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary
for the defendant to leave his automobile merely because somebody standing near the polling place had
called him, nor does the record show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that
occasion.

The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not especially construct buildings for
electoral precincts but merely utilizes whatever building there may be available, and all election
precincts are within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would be absurd,
because members of the police force or Constabulary in pursuit of a criminal would be included in that
prohibition and could not use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people living in
the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from cleaning or handling their firearms within
their own residences on registration and election days;

That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of firearms with intention to
influence in any way the free and voluntary exercise of suffrage;

That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise of suffrage, the prohibition in
question should only be applied when the facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for
the purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice of the electors (citing the
decision of this court in the case of People vs. Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20,
1929, not reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to preserve order on the
request of the chairman of the board of election inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there
is no evidence that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work for the
candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows that the defendant had no intention to
go to the electoral precinct; that he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the
election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in the strict, narrow interpretation of
the law the defendant is guilty, it would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict him.

We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for the acquittal of the defendant. The
law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate
the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the
fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully.
The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to
interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense. Unless such an
offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that he intended to intimidate the voters.
The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala prohibita it is
sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the
difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..." (U.S. vs. Go
Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)

While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men are not and should not be held
criminally responsible for acts committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least evil
intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have always recognized the power of the
legislature, on grounds of public policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master of things", to
forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal
without regard to the intent of the doer. (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil.,
488.) In such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such
knowledge or motive to be shown. (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)

The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the
enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day,
within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he
had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in
pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling
place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they
would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the decision in the case
of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p.
169, ante), that a policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of election
inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized by law to carry his arms.

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be acquitted because it was not
proved that he tried to influence or intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell
intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day with impunity.

As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a violation of the provision in question,
that is a matter for the Chief Executive or the Legislature.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 4963 September 15, 1909

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GO CHICO, defendant-appellant.

Gibbs and Gale for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant is charged with the violation of section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission,
which reads as follows:

Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises, or
who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any
flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate
or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device
used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine Island for the
purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in
the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is
commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that five hundred pesos for more than
five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than five years, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

The defendant was tried in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the 8th day of September,
1908. After hearing the evidence adduced the court adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime charged
and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine currency, and to pay the costs
of the action, and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place
prescribed by law until said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence the defendant
appealed to this court.

A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the following facts:

That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the appellant Go Chico displayed in
one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of
medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the
picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the
Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. On
the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said
store, of which the medallions formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the
city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the appellant was arranging his stock
of goods for the purpose of displaying them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in
one of the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was ignorant of the existence of
a law against the display of the medallions in question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The
facts above stated are admitted.

The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:

First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal intent upon the part of the
accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners, devices, or
emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United
States.

In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal
intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits
the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence
would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained
of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the
pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the
person performing the act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The display of a
flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to
incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as
effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself,
without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of
crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public
depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and
kills B, the interest which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the intention with
which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged intentionally, with the purpose of
accomplishing the death of B, then society has been injured and its security violated; but if the gun was
discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking, has no concern in the matter,
even though the death of B results. The reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society
and institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere discharge of the gun and the
death of B do not of themselves make him so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In
the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of
mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public
mind. In the one case the public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act itself.

It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that —

The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without
regard to the intent of the doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it effect although
the intention may have been innocent. Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed
is to be determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of the prohibition as well as the
language of the statute, and thus ascertaining the intention of the legislature.

In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was charged with the sale of
adulterated milk under a statute reading as follows:

No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any impure, unhealthy,
adulterated, of unwholesome milk.

It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the defendant's store 1 pint of milk which
was shown to contain a very small percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There
was no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was that he was not allowed,
upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it
existed, but was condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally immaterial
and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not and however
carefully he may have sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.

The opinion of the court in that case says:

As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of the offense. The act alone, irrespective
of its motive, constitutes the crime.

xxx xxx xxx

It is notorious that the adulteration of food products has grown to proportions so enormous as to
menace the health and safety of the people. Ingenuity keeps pace with greed, and the careless and
heedless consumers are exposed to increasing perils. To redress such evils is a plain duty but a difficult
task. Experience has taught the lesson that repressive measures which depend for their efficiency upon
proof of the dealer's knowledge or of his intent to deceive and defraud are of title use and rarely
accomplish their purpose. Such an emergency may justify legislation which throws upon the seller the
entire responsibility of the purity and soundness of what he sells and compels him to know and certain.

In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose under a statute which provided
that an inspector of elections of the city of New York should not be removed from office except "after
notice in writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth clearly and distinctly
the reasons for his removal," and further provided that any person who removed such an officer
without such notice should be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by
Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and convicted of a misdemeanor under
the statute. He appealed from the judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following
quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief Justice Church, writing the
opinion of the court, says in relation to criminal intent:

In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law under legal device. The court ruled out
the evidence offered, and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the offense. It is
quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation
of a corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute. The defendants made a mistake
of law. Such mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the subject appears
to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated?

xxx xxx xxx

The authorities seem to establish that sustain and indictment for doing a prohibited act, it is sufficient to
prove that the act was knowingly and intentionally done.

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, if the defendants could have shown that they believed that in fact notice had been given to
the inspector, although it had not, they would not have been guilty of the offense, because the intention
to do the act would have been wanting. Their plea is: True, we intended to remove the inspector
without notice, but we thought the law permitted it. This was a mistake of law, and is not strictly a
defense.

xxx xxx xxx

If the offense is merely technical, the punishment can be made correspondingly nominal; while a rule
requiring proof of a criminal intent to violate the statute, independent of an intent to do the act which
the statute declares shall constitute the offense, would, in many cases, prevent the restraining influence
which the statute was designed to secure.

In the case of Fiedler vs. Darrin (50 N.Y., 437) the court says:

But when an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

In the case of The Commonwealth vs. Murphy (165 Mass., 66) the court says:

In general, it may be said that there must be malus animus, or a criminal intent. But there is a large class
of cases in which, on grounds of public policy, certain acts are made punishable without proof that the
defendant understands the facts that give character to his act.

In such cases it is deemed best to require everybody at his peril to ascertain whether his act comes
within the legislative prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished, the practical methods available
for the enforcement of the law, and such other matters as throw light upon the meaning of the
language, the question in interpreting a criminal statute is whether the intention of the legislature was
to make knowledge of the facts an essential element of the offense, or to put upon everyone the burden
of finding out whether his contemplated act is prohibited, and of refraining from it if it is.

In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247), the question of a criminal intent
arose under a statute, under which the defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any
township committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in
excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a
crime. The defendant was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of the
appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from which the quotation is taken was
written upon a decision of that appeal. That court says:

When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that the defendant, in aiding in the passage
and effectuation of the resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under the advice of
counsel and in good faith, and from pure and honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and
caution.

xxx xxx xxx

As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the
knowledge or motive of the doer of such act, there can be of necessity, no judicial authority having the
power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such
instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce
the law in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it
will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide.

In the case of Rex vs. Ogden (6 C. & P., 631; 25 E. C. L., 611), the prisoner was indicted for unlawfully
transposing from one piece of wrought plate to another the lion-poisson contrary to the statutes. It was
conceded that the act was done without any fraudulent intention. The court said:

There are no words in the act of Parliament referring to any fraudulent intention. The words of it are,
'Shall transpose or remove, or cause of procure to be transposed or removed, from one piece of
wrought plate to another.

In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:

It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the criminal law is an essential ingredient in
every criminal offense, and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense; this is especially
true as to statutory offenses. When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some
person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to
the meaning of the law he violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the offense is not made
to depend upon the positive, willful intent and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.

In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the question arose on an appeal by the
defendant from a judgment requiring him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State
which provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall manufacture, sell, or offer or
expose for sale, or have in his possession with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the
defendant requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the
defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of
his customers any oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then the verdict
must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the charge as requested and that is the only point
upon which the defendant appealed.

The court says:

The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be expressed in terms more explicit and
comprehensive. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying that the forbidden
act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically
defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons engaged in the traffic so engage in it at
their peril and that they can not set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the commodities
they sell, as a defense.

The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia., 374); Commonwealth vs. Farren
(9 Allen, 489); Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton (2 Allen, 160);
Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442; Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence,
section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456); Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The
People vs. Roby (52 Mich., 577).

It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration the legislature did not intend
that a criminal intent should be a necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense
embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully. The wording is
plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation.

Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to commit the crime and the
intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did
intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself — intent and all.
The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The
accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.

We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely, that the law is applicable only to
the identical banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners,
can be sustained.

It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the display of the flag or flags
actually used in the insurrection, and, at the same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving,
perhaps, size) to be displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the display of a
certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules
governing the interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not destruction. To give the
interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this particular provision, nullify the statute
altogether.

The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identity those in
armed rebellion against the United States" mean not only the identical flags actually used in the
insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but to a
type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and is no other way of describing that type of flag.
While different words might be employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method of
description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word known by which that flag could be
aptly or properly described. There was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to
describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart from its use in the insurrection, by
which it could, in such enactment, be identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had upon
the which the Commission could seize as a means of description and identification was the fact that it
was used in the insurrection. There was, therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in
the Act, describe the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must not be forgotten that
the Commission, by the words and phrases used, was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a
type of flag. They were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain battle, but a type
of flag used by an army — a flag under which many persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments
and feelings wherever seen or in whatever form it appeared. It is a mere incident of description that the
flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle. They were describing the flag not a flag. It
has a quality and significance and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense, and
the literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the real intent of
the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the
letter, so that a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were
within the letter, and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it be
within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be construed as to advance the remedy and
suppress the mischief contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487; State Bolden, 107 La.,
116, 118; U.S. vs.Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R.
Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y., 524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)

The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial
construction, are to control the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and language
capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in that sense which will harmonize with such intention
and object, and effect the purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law., 602.)

Literally hundreds of cases might be cited to sustain this proposition.

The preamble is no part of the statute, but as setting out the object and intention of the legislature, it is
considered in the construction of an act. Therefore, whenever there is ambiguity, or wherever the words
of the act have more than one meaning, and there is no doubt as to the subject-matter to which they
are to be applied, the preamble may be used." (U. S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72;
Platt vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 99 U. S., 48; Myer vs. Western Car Co., 102 U. S., 1; Holy Trinity
Church vs. U. S., 143 U. S., 457; Coosaw Mining Co. vs. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 550; Cohn vs. Barrett, 5
Cal., 195; Barnes vs. Jones, 51 Cal., 303; Field vs. Gooding, 106 Mass., 310; People vs. Molineaux, 40 N.
Y., 113; Smith vs. The People, 47 N. Y., 330; The People vs. Davenport, 91 N.Y., 547; The
People vs. O'Brien, 111 N.Y., 1)

The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the
rights of the defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the
language be plain, it will be construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning;
if ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute
were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect substantial justice." (Bolles vs. Outing Co., 175 U.
S., 262, 265; U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76, 95; U. S. vs. Reese, 92 U. S., 214)

It is said that notwithstanding this rule (the penal statutes must be construde strictly) the intention of
the lawmakers must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes. This is true, but this is
not a new, independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the known maxim and
amounts to this -- that though penal statutes are to be construed strictly, they are not be construed so
strictly as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat., 76;
Taylor vs. Goodwin, L. R. 4, Q. B. Civ., 228.)

In the latter case it was held that under a statute which imposed a penalty for "furiously driving any sort
of carriage" a person could be convicted for immoderately driving a bicycle.

It is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render
then operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Accordingly, in
case of any doubt or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out these objects. (Black,
Interpretation of Laws, p. 106.)

In The People vs. Supervisors (43 N. Y., 130) the court said:

The occasion of the enactment of a law always be referred to in interpreting and giving effect to it. The
court should place itself in the situation of the legislature and ascertain the necessity and probable
object of the statute, and then give such construction to the language used as to carry the intention of
the legislature into effect so far as it can be ascertained from the terms of the statute itself. (U.
S. vs. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S., 72, 79.)

We do not believe that in construing the statute in question there is necessity requiring that clauses
should be taken from the position given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give
the whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they now are in the statute, a
reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that
the Act should be held applicable to the case at bar.

The judgment of the court below and the sentence imposed thereunder are hereby affirmed. So
ordered.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. November 29, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3,
convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion
of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and
legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-
MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO
P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before
Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4]He met
the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in
Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer
Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo
succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her
that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on
April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch
61.[5] It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they
were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and
whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo
took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-
certified copy of the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that
Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.[8]

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to
seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to
commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He
visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing
that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20
years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina
Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.[9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate
him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further
ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the
latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest
belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to
have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the
New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on
the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the
Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for
a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry.
Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the
private complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous
and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to
the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel
could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado
v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE
WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF
PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa
had been absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as
a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who
has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of
death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon
the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he
was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of
her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the
Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of
bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code,
the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the
Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on
presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor
of the private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew
that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He
also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners
conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim,
the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser
castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
because the drafters of the law were of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which
provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy.[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she
has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage
having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered
into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy:
(1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second
marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have
juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the Philippines, the
judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that
there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3)
fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:

This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong
evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who
contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of
his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.[29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the
act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.[30] Although the words with malice
do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is
proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.[34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant
in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his
first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would
negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he
could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered on the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty
or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its
severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists.
To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be
dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.[39] Only with
such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal
belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent
for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article
390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance
of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger
of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present
to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision
was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the
confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage
law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he
or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse
of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable
and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary,
superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable
time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.[50] The Court also took note that a
petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion
with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words proper proceedings in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that,
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a
person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349 or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper
proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision
presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not
been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous.
He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second marriage is bigamous only when the
circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith
will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should
not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the
case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse
present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is
absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present
spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with
bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present
spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be
guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for
bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second marriage is
already established.[58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that
things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for
purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will
suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp
of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article 83,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law,
in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his
estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even
if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling
in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to have been set
to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner
maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced
evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against
the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del
Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No
existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG,
likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the
following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in
Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved
party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise,
there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous
cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)[68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The
standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set
forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its
violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand, Article 21 provides that any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to
prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He
assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant
where he and his parents made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She
lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he
was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and
support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being
bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.[72]

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed,
in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser,
supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the
wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27
N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct
was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became
entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co.,
supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous
marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but
couldnt sleep but couldnt eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears
for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first
count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert
the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from
recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in
fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained
by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him,
gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had
unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no
bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the
plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to
one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false
and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102
Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of
the law by herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which
damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819;
Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v.
Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery
where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal
action was induced solely by the defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a
contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act
upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A.
L. R. 958.[76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for
moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, G.R. No. 152644

STEVEN PAUL REID and

PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,

Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and

TINGA, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. February 10, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14
March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John
Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez (petitioners). The 14 March 2002 Resolution
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief
Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the
base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or
near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the
Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of
Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree
No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or
the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11]

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were
duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners
John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of
the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse
or justification.

The Ruling of the MTC

In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling on petitioners
motion for lack of indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x. The MTC scheduled
petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners motion, the MTC issued a
Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 (Consolidated Order), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint
Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to mine tailings which were
precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and condition required to be
undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.

The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the single fact
of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of
evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements constituting
violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the
terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other
words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after taking into
consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be
maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act
(RA 7942).

Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code; and
Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine
Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.

The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained and
heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to
[sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the negligent act of
polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to
the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.[13]

The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May 1997. In the
hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to
appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making
of record petitioners manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of
not guilty pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque,
assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942.
Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal
with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public
respondents motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners
petition in Branch 94.

The Ruling of Branch 94

In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but denied
petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations
for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the
Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:

After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no absorption
by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and
distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the same with each
other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the pollution of the
Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each charging
a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that

A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x.

xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from
one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not although they stemmed from a single act.[15]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 acted with
grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and
the Article 365 of the RPC proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations
contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that since the acts
complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts
complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence,
petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The appellate court
held:

The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x

xxxx

[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].

xxxx

We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with respect to the variances in
the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in
the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x

xxxx

[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since the
Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are
national in character.

xxxx

This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which the petitioners
have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x

xxxx

[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise to any
suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for
violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial courts denial of the
petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its Resolution of 14
March 2002.

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING
THAT:

A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL
LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC
AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.

B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT
BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE
ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF
TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK
OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER
ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]

The Issues

The petition raises these issues:

(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and

(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v. Relova.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as
Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.[21]

Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners
erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from and are based on a
single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2)
the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element of lack of
necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them.

The contention has no merit.

As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.[25] In People v.
Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not the same

x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x
x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of
the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.[28] However, for the
limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense only,
we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365
of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential
element not required of the others, thus:

In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping of mine
tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to dump
said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-
Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be
validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has
complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the
necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual
pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be
exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation
and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and
silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that
the accused satisfactorilyproved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the
run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of
the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.

On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the
part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous
laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution
to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law
are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or
negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

People v. Relova not in Point

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution contravenes this
Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the
law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though
different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements.

This contention is also without merit.

The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one Manuel
Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of
violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated
Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by
those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an
ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for
the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section
21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of
electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information.

The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from the express
terms of the constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act. x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that it must be
examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the
general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x
x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a single act not
only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of
Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four national statutes
and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence
of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as
in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
THIRD DIVISION

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, G.R. No. 157171

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES, and

TINGA, JJ.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE Promulgated:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
March 14, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24547[1] that
affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court[2] of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch
54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.[3]

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections,
an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with
violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8, 1995
elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia,
Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the
votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-
eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159)
precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417, 008418,
008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes
as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of Canvass
with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence,
except petitioner who was convicted as follows:

xxx

5. And finally, on the person of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes
of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this finding is a
violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree
lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused ARSENIA B. GARCIA is not entitled to probation;
further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her
right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered to
commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further
orders from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision,
thus,

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal assigning the
following as errors of the appellate court:

ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL
SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO
BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.

II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL
BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.

III

ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE
REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. 7, WHEN THE DUTY WAS THAT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.

IV

THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR
INTENTIONAL.[7]

Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election
law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala
prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a
special law.[8] Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.[9] Criminal intent is
not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.[10]

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646[11] provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in
Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:

xxx

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses,
after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
xxx

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.[12] For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted
and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it
could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is
done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.[13] Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.

Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers of the
Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:

1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof
were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;

2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the
Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the
results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board, entering the
number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to
reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of the Municipality of Alaminos,
Pangasinan.

3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by accused
Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the
use of electrical adding machines.

4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were
handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the precincts listed in
each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column in the
Statement of Votes.

5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de Vera
added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.

6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was reflected
was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in
the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.[14]

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for each
precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV
Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to arrive at the
grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.[15] The grand
total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or
5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received.This error is also
evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.[16]

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the figure of
1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as secretary of the
board.[17] Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though
it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to
perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.[18]

Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no idea how the
SOV (Exhibit 6) and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921
votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate,
correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her
trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility
pursuant to the dictates of the law.[19]

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant,
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a
candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.[20]

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court. The Court
has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.[21]

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of
canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting
statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents
whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.[22]

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.[23]

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921
votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy
may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from
one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six
months is AFFIRMED.