Professional Documents
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Background
A UEFA review in 2009 showed that more than half of 655 European clubs made a loss over the previous year, and
although a small proportion were able to sustain heavy losses year-on-year as a result of the wealth of their owners,
at least 20% of clubs surveyed were believed to be in actual financial peril. The reasons for this are well summarised
in the 2010–12 House of Commons report on Football Governance:
Club owners are generally over optimistic about their management abilities and vision for a club. With
ample academic evidence that there is a clear correlation between squad wages and points won[5] -
something which is obvious to owners - there is a natural tendency to borrow in the pursuit of success,
although not all teams can be successful. There are many examples of clubs where the directors (true
fans) have "chased the dream" - gambling short-term investment (or borrowing) in the hope of long-term
success. The pressure on the directors of a club to invest, to sign a star player…is often immense from
ordinary supporters.
Even among Europe's elite sides, continued excessive spending has often been justified by club executives as being
"necessary to keep the club competitive". As Christian Müller, CFO of the Bundesliga told the European
Commission: "...we learn by experience all over the world [that] most club executives tend to operate riskily, tend to
overestimate their chances in the Championship. This may result in disproportionate spending relative to the income
some clubs generate... club executives have somehow to be protected from themselves."[]
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 2
The vast majority of the overall European football debt is owed by only three of the biggest leagues: the English
Premier League, the Italian Serie A and the Spanish Primera División, commonly known as La Liga.
Premier League
A report by the accountants Deloitte indicated that total debt among the 20 Premier League clubs for the year
2008-09 was around £3.1 billion.[6]
At the time of the introduction FFP, several Premier League clubs were known to be spending considerably above
their income. For example, between 2005 and 2010 West Ham United recorded an aggregate net loss of £90.2
million, with equity of £13.063 million on 31 May 2010 following a re-capitalization,[7] while Everton, whose
former manager David Moyes had long received praise for his continued ability to keep the club among the top
Premiership sides despite an extremely tight transfer budget, had a negative equity (in group accounts) of £29.774
million on 31 May 2010, making a net loss of £3.093 million in consolidated accounts.[8]
Worst of all though were the finances of Portsmouth, who had a shortfall of £59,458,603 to the creditor in February
2010 (after deducting the book value of the asset)[9] Having invested heavily on players over previous seasons, (the
previous year's net loss was covered by Alexandre Gaydamak), Portsmouth were runners-up of the 2009–10 FA Cup
in 2010, but as the season wore on the financial situation deteriorated, leaving players unpaid and the club with an
outstanding bill for income tax which in turn led to a winding-up petition from HM Revenue & Customs.[10] There
then followed administration to avoid the club being liquidated, a nine-point deduction from the Premier League, and
finally relegation into the lower division. A similar train of events had affected another English club, Leeds United,
some years previously.[11]
The problem of debt was not confined to the top division, with a number of clubs in the second tier of English
football, the Football League Championship seemingly gambling their futures in an effort to gain promotion into the
Premiership. The 2010 - 2012 parliamentary report into English football noted that; "much of the overspending (by
non Premier league clubs) is as a result of the desire to get into the ‘promised land’ of the Premier League or indeed
to simply stay there... the prevailing reasoning amongst Football League sides seems to be that excessive levels of
spending can be sustained for a few years within which time promotion must be achieved. After that, Premier
League revenues can be used to pay off all the debts accrued"
Serie A
In the Italian Serie A most clubs also reported a net loss over the previous season: A.C. Milan (group) €69.751
million on 31 December 2010;[12] Genoa C.F.C. €16,964,706 on 31 December 2010; ACF Fiorentina €9,604,353 on
31 December 2010; Bologna F.C. 1909 €4,166,419 on 30 June 2011; Chievo €527,661 on 30 June 2011, etc. Only a
few Italian clubs made a net profit, these included Udinese Calcio, Calcio Catania, S.S.C. Napoli (€4,197,829 on 30
June 2011) and S.S. Lazio (€9,982,408 on the group account on 30 June 2011[13]).
Some of the Italian clubs had been losing money for a number of years; for example Internazionale have
accumulated losses of around €1.3 billion over the last 16 years,[14] while on 20 May 2005 S.S. Lazio agreed a
23-year repayment plan to pay back a €140 million overdue tax bill.[15] The club recovered however, showing a net
asset/equity of €10,500,666 in its consolidated accounts on 30 June 2011, while net financial debt of the group
(Italian: Posizione finanziaria netta) was €9.01 million. Its city rival A.S. Roma SpA, from its ultimate holding
company Italpetroli, intermediate holding company "Roma 2000" (the holding company or the head of Roma larger
group of companies, holding company of "ASR Real Estate S.r.l." and "Brand Management S.r.l.") to AS Roma SpA
(or AS Roma [smaller] group), owed considerable money to banks, including UniCredit. On 30 June 2010, AS Roma
SpA had a negative equity (total liability greater than total asset) of €13.2 million on the consolidated balance
sheet,[16] which ultimately led to the group ("Roma 2000") being sold to group of investor lead by American
billionaire Thomas R. DiBenedetto (25%). Before the formal handover on 30 June 2011, the club had a net financial
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 3
La Liga
Despite the most recent report showing 8% growth in the Spanish La Liga’s revenues, the highest of any European
league, the overwhelming majority of the extra money went to the two dominant clubs, Real Madrid and Barcelona,
primarily due to their ability to negotiate separate TV deals.[18] During the summer of 2009, Real Madrid paid a
world record transfer fee of £80 million for Cristiano Ronaldo. Despite being the world’s second richest club
according to the Forbes' List, heavy spending on two other players, Kaká, and Karim Benzema with their associated
high wages trebled Real’s net financial debt from €130M on 30 June 2008 to €326.7M on 30 June 2009, as the
signing Albiol, Benzema, Kaká, Ronaldo and some minor players to 2009–10 squad were included in the 2008–09
financial year.[19] Madrid signed one more big name, Xabi Alonso in August 2009, made the net financial debt only
dropped from €326.7 million to €244.6 million on 30 June 2010, still higher than previous 8 seasons (2000–2008).
However, the net asset/equity was increased from €195.9M to €219.7M.[20][21] Their main rivals Barcelona also
continued to spend heavily on transfers and players wages, although in recent years, the level had been slightly
reduced. On 30 June 2009 Barcelona's net asset/equity was just €20.844 million.[22][23]
Total debt in La Liga was estimated at £2.5 billion, leaving many of the owners, as so often in the past, having to put
more of their own money into the club. In the summer of 2010, Villarreal failed to pay their players because the
ceramics industry from which their owner, Fernando Roig made his money was hit hard by the European credit
crisis. At the end of the year, Deportivo de La Coruña were more than €120 million in debt, Atlético Madrid owed
more than €300 million, while the total for Valencia at one point in 2009 was reported to be as high as €547m.[24] In
2007, during a property boom, Valencia's management decided to build a new 70,000 capacity stadium, despite
doubts that it could attract enough fans to regularly fill it. Construction of the 'Nou Mestalla' was to be funded by the
sale of the existing ground, however two years into the project work ground to a halt when following the Spanish
property crash the club could not find a buyer.[25] Despite an impressive display on the field, Valencia was forced to
temporarily halt work on a new stadium and delay players wages when its bank Bancaja denied it more credit,
forcing management to sell some of their best players, including David Silva and David Villa.
In the lower Spanish leagues, at least six clubs, including second-tier sides Real Sociedad, Celta de Vigo, and
Levante were in administration with more threatened as the recession worsened. In July 2008, the Spanish
Government revealed that the clubs had a combined debt of £507 million to the tax authorities alone, with substantial
amounts owed to a number of other state bodies, such as the social security system.[26]
Ligue 1
In France, The Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion (DNCG) is responsible for administering, monitoring,
and overseeing the accounts of all professional clubs to ensure that owners are being financially prudent. Sanctions
for non-compliance include transfer embargoes, reduced playing squads, demotion, or even expulsion from the
league. Despite lower incomes, French clubs do not carry the enormous multi-million euro debt of the English,
Italian and Spanish leagues. A number of French clubs have produced small profits over a number of years,
concentrating on developing young players in modern academies who then generate good profits when sold. For
example, in the four years up to 2009 player trading by Lille, one of the leading clubs exceeded €164 million in
profit.[27]
OL Group, the holding company of the same name (Olympique Lyonnais), had a net profit of €5.1 million in
2008–09 season.[28]
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 4
Bundesliga
At the end of each season, clubs in the Bundesliga must apply to the German Football Federation (DFB) for a licence
to participate again the following year; only when the DFB, who have access to all transfer documents and accounts,
are satisfied that there is no threat of insolvency do they give approval.[29] The DFB have a system of fines and
points deductions for clubs who flout rules and those who go into the red can only buy a player after selling one for
at least the same amount. In addition, no individual is allowed to own more than 49 percent of any Bundesliga club.
Despite the good economic governance in the German league, there have still been some instances of clubs getting
into difficulties. In 2004, Borussia Dortmund reported a debt of €118.8 million (£83 million).[30] Having won the
Champions League in 1997 and a number of Bundesliga titles, Dortmund had gambled to maintain their success with
an expensive group of largely foreign players but failed, narrowly escaping liquidation in 2006. In subsequent years,
the club went through extensive restructuring to return to financial health, largely with young home-grown players.
In 2004 Hertha BSC reported debts of £24.7 million and were able to continue in the Bundesliga only after proving
they had long term credit with their bank.
The leading German club FC Bayern Munich made a net profit of just €2.5 million in 2008–09 season (group
accounts), while Schalke 04 made a net loss of €30.4 million in 2009 financial year. Borussia Dortmund GmbH &
Co. KGaA, made a net loss of just €2.9 million in 2008–09 season.[31]
Other leagues
Other European leagues include the Portuguese Primeira Liga, the Dutch Eredivisie and the Scottish Premier League.
Mainly as a result of their lower populations and smaller economies, these and other leagues such as the Belgian,
Danish and Scandinavian leagues generate less revenue than those of the bigger nations and there are currently no
clubs in the Deloitte Top 20 from outside the big five leagues, although these are home to a number of extremely
well run and successful clubs.
Despite earning only 1/6th of Real Madrid’s revenue for example, Portuguese club FC Porto regularly reach the last
16 of the Champions League and have been European champions twice - in 1986–87 and as recently as 2003–04.
Porto make use of third party deals and an extremely effective scouting network, particularly in South America, to
buy promising young players to develop and play in the first team for a few years before selling them on for a big
profit. Since 2004 Porto has covered its large operating losses with a €190 million net profit in player sales.[32]
Another big Portuguese club, S.L. Benfica also regularly competes at the highest level, being crowned European
champions twice and being beaten finalists another five times.
The three main Dutch clubs, Ajax, PSV Eindhoven and Feyenoord have each been crowned European champions at
least once, however, in recent years, their dominance has been challenged by the emergence of other clubs such as
FC Twente, meaning they can no longer always rely on annual infusions of Champions League cash. As in other
countries, the Global Recession greatly diminished sponsorship and TV income in the Netherlands, turning an
Eredivisie profit of €64m in 2007/08 into a €90m loss for 2009/10.[33] PSV Eindhoven recorded a €17.5 million
loss as their annual revenue dropped back 40% from €85 million to €50 million, while major rival Ajax - the only
Dutch club listed on the stock exchange - lost €22.8 million.[34] After enjoying 11 consecutive years of CL
qualification and reaching the CL semi-final in 2005, PSV found its regular profits turning into losses and began
selling top players, including Heurelho Gomes (Tottenham Hotspur), Mark van Bommel (Barcelona), Park Ji-Sung
(Manchester United), Johann Vogel (Milan), Alex (Chelsea), and Jan Vennegoor of Hesselink (Celtic). Able to count
only on the much lower revenues of the Europa League (less than €4m in 2010[35]), the club took on a €10m loan
from its long-standing benefactor, the electronic giant Phillips and in April 2012 was forced to sell its ground and
training complex to the local council for €49 million, leasing it back for €2.3 million per year. A leading councillor
said that the move was necessary because of ‘the idiocy of big money and the game played between millionaires and
football agents’[36]
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 5
Recognising the unique social and cultural important of its clubs, Dutch local authorities invested over €300 million
in football between 2006 and 2011, mainly through indirect subsidies and loans to clubs such as FC Utrecht, FC
Groningen, FC Twente, Vitesse Arnhem and ADO Den Haag, though it is possible that such aid may fall foul of EU
rules which govern the use of unfair subsidies.
A 2011 report from accountants PriceWaterhouseCoopers expressed deep concern at the fragile financial state of
Scottish football. Despite a modest profit in five of the previous six seasons, net indebtedness of SPL clubs had
grown over the previous year to £109m, with half of clubs reporting a worsening position and only two clubs,
Hamilton Academical and St. Johnstone debt free.[37] Despite providing the first British team (Celtic in 1967) to
become European champions, since the advent of pay-per-view TV Scottish football had failed to keep up with its
English counterpart; in stark contrast to the Premier League's vast TV earnings, following the collapse of the Irish
satellite broadcaster Setanta in June 2009 the joint Sky-ESPN TV rights to be shared among all SPL clubs now
amounted to only £13m per year, a figure little changed from the £12m it had received under the Sky deal as long
ago as 1998.[38]
Following the global downturn, job insecurity and rising unemployment meant that a number of Scottish fans did not
renew season tickets, leading to a 10% (or 100,000) fall in attendances over one year. The entire turnover of SPL
champions Glasgow Rangers for the 2008 09 season dropped 38% to only £39.7m, a tiny fraction that of the English
champions Manchester United’s earnings of €327m.[39] As with other leagues, participation in the UEFA Champions
League continued to make the crucial difference between profit and loss for the two ‘Old Firm’ clubs, however
because of mediocre performances in recent years the SPL champions no longer qualify automatically for the CL
group stages and are now largely confined to the much less lucrative Europa League.
Leveraged buyouts
There was also concern at the heavy debt being loaded onto some clubs as a result of new owners borrowing heavily
to acquire the club and then using future earnings to pay the interest, a practice known as a leveraged buyout.[40][41]
The world’s richest club, Manchester United, was bought in this way by the Glazer family in 2005 after which the
club, previously very profitable, remains several hundred millions of pounds in debt. Since 2005, more than £300m
which might otherwise have been spent on players, improving facilities or simply kept as a contingency has been
taken out of Manchester United and spent on interest, bank fees and derivative losses.[42] (While Manchester United
FC Limited was almost debt free, its ultimate holding company "Red Football Shareholder Limited" had a negative
equity of £64.866 million in its consolidated balance sheet on 30 June 2010.)
Liverpool found itself in a similar position after being purchased by Americans Tom Hicks and George Gillett in
February 2007. Although subjected to less leveraged debt than Manchester United, by 31 July 2010 the club was
suffering a negative equity of £5.896 million while its holding company, KOP Football Limited - the entity which
carried the debt - had a negative equity of £111.88 million, leaving the club tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, and
had to be put up for sale. Hicks and Gillett placed what was widely believed to be an unrealistic value on the club in
the hope of making a vast profit however, for which they were severely criticised in the House of Commons as "asset
strippers draining the club with their greed."[43] Eventually Liverpool was bought by a new American consortium,
but because leveraged buyouts are permitted under normal stock market rules they will not be addressed by the FFP
rules.[44]
The Leveraged Buyout model is common for normal business ventures where - apart from the actual employees - the
overall national impact of a firm (e.g. a chain of shoe shops) collapsing is not particularly significant since other
companies will fill the gap in the market. LBO’s have sometimes been defended by those using them as mechanisms
to bring greater efficiency and financial discipline to target companies, although there are also examples (e.g. The
Readers Digest & EMI) where they have actually added to an existing problem of debt. To ordinary football fans
who find themselves paying significantly higher ticket prices (around 50% at Manchester United in the first five
years of the Glazer takeover) merely for the privilege of having a new owner, LBO’s are anathema, perhaps
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 6
representing the complete opposite of the wealthy benefactor model, taking money out of the club and providing few
or no positive changes to their club since no new players are purchased and no facilities or stadia (as in the case of
Liverpool) are built or improved. As with debt taken on in an attempt to improve the team, unexpected failure (such
as not qualifying for the Champions League) can cause significant financial problems for clubs loaded with LBO
debt.
For these ‘emotional stakeholders’, their club is not a ‘normal business’, but an intrinsic part of their lives and often of
great social and cultural importance to their local community. LBOs are also believed to have played at least a part
role in takeovers at Portsmouth, Hull City, Chesterfield, Notts County and Derby County, and perhaps
unsurprisingly, the main supporters groups of Manchester United and Liverpool, MUST and Spirit of Shankly called
on the British government to legislate against future leveraged buyouts of football clubs, calling for an outright ban
or a limit on the amount which can be borrowed against acquisition – perhaps along the German model where no
individual can own more than 49% of the club. There have also been calls to restrict levels of dividend withdrawal
and improvements in ‘proper person tests’ introduced after the earlier takeover of Manchester City by Thaksin
Shinawatra. After being ousted as prime minister of Thailand in a military coup, Shinawatra was accused of human
rights abuses, charged with three counts of corruption and had his financial assets in Thailand frozen, but eventually
made a significant profit when selling the club to Sheik Mansour.[45]
Wealthy benefactors
A number of clubs across Europe are able to spend substantially more than they earn as a result of the benevolence
of their owners who make substantial financial gifts to the club, either by paying off existing debt, providing direct
injections of cash, issuing extra shares, or giving loans which are later written off. This adversely affects the market
by creating wage and transfer inflation as well encouraging other clubs to spend more than they can afford in an
effort to remain competitive. For example, Internazionale's enormous losses since the mid-1990s have been largely
underwritten by their president, energy company owner Massimo Moratti. Its archrival, A.C. Milan was also
financially supported by Silvio Berlusconi (over €120 million between 2007 and 2010, prior to 2006 unknown, 2011
result not yet released) The Della Valle brothers also contributed €84.7 million to ACF Fiorentina from 2006 to
2009 (prior to 2005 unknown). Juventus had re-capitalized two times in recent years, by about €104.8 million after
the 2006 Italian football scandal and in 2011 by €120 million. In Ligue 1, Paris Saint-Germain became the richest
club in France and one of the richest clubs in the world after Qatar Investment Authority became the majority
shareholder of PSG after buying a controlling 70% of the shares in 2011 by buying the club in a deal worth €50m,
which covered an estimated €15-20m in debt and losses of €19m from the 2010–11 season. PSG splashed a French
record €108m and were the biggest spenders in the world for the 2011–12 season. In the English Premier League,
Chelsea's massive transfer spending since 2003 has been paid for by their owner, the Russian oil and gas billionaire
Roman Abramovich, while Manchester City is owned by one of the world's richest men, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed
bin Sultan Al Nahyan. Since 2008 the owner has spent in excess of £600 million on players and infrastructure at the
club, though this has drawn considerable criticism from other clubs and football figures. Arsenal manager Arsène
Wenger, a major proponent of the FFP legislation, has referred to "transparent owner equity investment" as
"financial doping."[46][47]
Referring to the intention to reduce the plutocratic influence of the "Sugar Daddies," UEFA President Platini said, "If
you buy a house, you have a debt but that doesn't mean someone is going to stop you from working. If you depend
only on a rich benefactor however, then the financial model is too volatile."
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 7
Criticism of FFP
almost complete dominance of the three major domestic English competitions by just four clubs (Arsenal, Chelsea,
Liverpool and Manchester United), often referred to as the 'Big 4'. During this period the lack of competition for
lucrative Champions League football in England from outside of those four clubs was frequently criticised.
However, more recently the grip on the four top places in the Premier League (that enable automatic entry into the
UEFA Champions League competition) by the incumbent 'Big 4' clubs has been eroded somewhat in more recent
seasons due to the rise in competitive performance of both Tottenham Hotspur and Manchester City and the relative
demise of Liverpool, and in the most recent season, Manchester United.
Potential loopholes
Other commentators pointed to actual and possible loopholes in the legislation itself; for example, up until the end of
the 2014–15 season, clubs will be allowed to exclude from the FFP calculation the wages of players signed before
June 2010 as long as they can show an improved trend in their accounts. There is also the potential for legal action to
overturn the legislation and for larger clubs to artificially raise their income from massive sponsorship deals or
stadium naming rights via companies with a vested interest in the club’s success, or from the sales of "overseas
rights" to consortiums without clearly identified investors.[49]
There are claims that this has already started in the case of Manchester City,[50] where four of the club's eight main
sponsors - Etihad Airways, Abu Dhabi Tourism Authority, telecoms giant Etisalat and Aabar, a global investment
company dealing in oil are ultimately owned by the United Arab Emirates government, of which Manchester City
owner Sheikh Mansour is one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.[51]
2010–11 season
Transfer spending across Europe’s top five leagues during the 2010 summer transfer window was nearly 40 percent
down on the summer of 2009, though this was seen more as a result of the worsening global financial situation than
the introduction of FFP, and was also partly due to the 2010 World Cup, with players being more concerned with the
success of their country in the tournament than in moving clubs.
Although all of the traditional big English clubs spent more than £50 million on players,[56] overall spending in the
English Premier League was significantly down on the previous season, totalling a relatively modest £395 million. In
Spain, Barcelona's finances up to 30 June 2010 revealed that the club’s shareholder equity was dropped to negative
€59.109 million, from a positive of €20.844 million, despite awareness of the FFP rules.[57] Around the same time,
however, Real Madrid President Florentino Pérez told the club's general assembly that the net debt was reduced to
€244.6 million by 30 June 2010 as a result of an increase in revenue over the previous season, while the net
asset/equity was slightly increased to €219.7 million.
In Italy, where for some time there had been concern at the slow growth in football income and the lack of
competitiveness among clubs - partly due to the inequality in TV income - pressure by a number of clubs finally led
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 10
to the three biggest, Internazionale, Milan, and Juventus agreeing to end the long-standing system whereby clubs
negotiated their own TV rights. During the 2009/10 season, each had earned at least €100 million from major
broadcaster Mediaset,[58] and the introduction of the "collective sale" model of distributing TV income immediately
strengthened the smaller clubs by up to €10 million each more per season, leaving the big clubs much worse off; in
the case of Juventus, by around €43 million per year.[59] But the change, which left the Spanish league as the only
major league where clubs still negotiated separate deals, led to a much more entertaining and competitive season
with a number of clubs being in with a chance of winning the Scudetto. Despite the effect the change had by
reducing the spending power of his own club, Inter President Massimo Moratti indicated that he was actually looking
forward to the changes, saying, "Some thought that FFP was against owners like me, but I say that at last it means
that I can stop putting money into football every day. Inter are so expensive that I wouldn’t recommend it to anyone.
I hope that FFP allows us to experience football in a different way."
UEFA reminder
In all, English clubs spent £225 million during the January 2011 transfer window, prompting UEFA to issue a
reminder that the activity counted towards the 2012 to 2015 period over which they were only allowed to lose £39
million in total, and that it would affect the amount they could spend in later years. This was due to the principle of
amortisation - whereby a players transfer fee must be divided out between the number of years in his contract (i.e. a
player bought for £20m with a four-year contract must be represented on the club balance sheet as a £5m net
payment - or loss - over each of the four years of his contract) A UEFA statement said,
UEFA is aware of the recent transfer activity across Europe and is confident that clubs are increasingly
aware of the nature of its financial fair play regulations which require them to balance their books. It
must be noted, however, that the financial fair play rules do not prevent clubs from spending money on
transfers themselves but rather require them to balance their books at the end of the season. It is
therefore difficult to comment on any individual situation without knowing the long-term strategy of
each club. The clubs know the rules and also know that UEFA is fully committed to implementing them
with rigour.
Barnsley director Don Rowling said "There are people that want to put money into their clubs to chase the dream but
they will have to face the nightmare at a later date. This will bring people into the game for the right reasons… now
we have a model that is about being sustainable and being clever rather than how big your wallet is at a particular
time" Acknowledging that some clubs would not abide by the rules, Rowling continued; "There is so much hype
now from people including supporters who want you to chase this dream of getting into the Premiership. You look at
the support base of some clubs and it is very, very difficult to realise their ambitions, that is why there are people
who want to buy a club and push it forward."
Tom Glick, CEO of Derby County, whose wage bill was expected to land the club with a £7m loss that season,
commented; "It is an indictment of the industry that we need to go to the length of regulations to try and tell us to be
sensible in the way we spend. This is transformational for our business, it allows all of our clubs to work towards a
business model that is sustainable. We are currently in a model that is not sustainable so we have clubs that go out of
business or teeter on the edge.
Leagues One and Two of English football also made efforts to curb the spending of clubs by introducing salary
capping.
2011–12 season
During the summer, Arsenal reluctantly sold two players, Gaël Clichy and Samir Nasri, to Manchester City to avoid
losing them for nothing the following year when their contracts ended.[74] Both players refused to sign new
contracts, preferring to go to Manchester City where they could win considerably more cups. Following the
publication of Manchester City’s end of season financial results which showed Premier League record losses of £197
million, with players wages of £174 million, £21 million more than turnover (Chelsea's previous record in 2005 was
£141 million), Arsène Wenger questioned whether UEFA would go through with their threat to take action against
clubs who broke the rules, believing that Europe’s wealthy clubs would use legal means to fight any attempt to ban
them from European competition or from buying players. Wenger said,
We live in a world where any decision made is challenged. Europe (the European Union legal system)
has created that and we see how far Europe has gone. The authority of the legal affairs is challengeable
everywhere. UEFA want to create a situation where clubs with deficits cannot play in the Champions
League but I question whether they will be able to force it through. Will they have the legal power to
force that through today? I question that because you have as well Paris Saint-Germain and Málaga
[other high spending clubs] in other countries. Once they represent a force together, it will be difficult to
fight against.[75]
At the time, the Swiss club Sion were fighting a UEFA decision to ban them from the Europa League for fielding
ineligible players. Supporting Sion, Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, the ECA chairman, who is highly critical of English
clubs’ spending stated: "FIFA and UEFA need the clubs for a World Cup or European Championship but the clubs
don't need them."[76]
in 2004 is Hamed bin Zayed Al Nahyanthe, the half brother of Manchester City owner Sheik Mansour.
Despite the size of the figures, a Manchester City official pointed out that the sponsorship deal was not just for the
football stadium but for the whole 210 acre campus being developed around the ground. When complete, this will
comprise an expanded football academy and training ground, sports science centre, office and retail space and a
7,000-seat stadium for youth games.
As infrastructure, the cost of building the Etihad Campus does not count towards the FFP financial calculation
because it is not considered to be football-related, however any income generated will, and therefore will greatly
assist Manchester City in meeting the UEFA requirements and providing a vital new revenue stream which could
create millions a year for the club. Manchester City are in the unique position of having acres of vacant land adjacent
to their stadium and this potential was quickly recognised by Sheikh Mansour and Khaldoon Al Mubarak just weeks
after taking over City in September 2008. Some have speculated that City will maximise regeneration; football
finance expert Tom Cannon has stated that the plans are "probably the most exciting of any ground in Europe."
In August 2011, UEFA confirmed their intention to examine the deal to ensure it was not an attempt to unfairly
circumvent the FFP regulations.[80] The head of UEFA’s Financial Control Panel, Jean-Luc Dehaene, said they
would benchmark all deals to make sure they represented fair value. He said,
If we see clubs that are looking for loopholes we will act. It is not enough to say 'we've got a
sponsorship contract and that's OK' if the contract is out of line. You know where the problems are and
you know you will have to confirm them. But on the other hand they are all members of the ECA
(European Club Association) and if they don't follow the rules they won't have the support of the other
clubs.
Arsene Wenger immediately demanded that UEFA should block the deal, believing that it was an attempt to
circumvent FFP; "It raises the real question about the credibility of Financial Fair Play. They give us the message
that they can get around it by doing what they want. The sponsorship cannot be doubled, tripled or quadrupled
because that means it is better if we leave everybody free. He (Michel Platini) is not stupid, he knows as well that
some clubs will try to get around that and at the moment I believe they are studying, behind closed doors, how they
can really check it. That is where Financial Fair Play is at stake".[81][82]
A number of other English clubs had already negotiated naming rights for when they had redeveloped their grounds,
including Bolton Wanderers (Reebok Stadium), Stoke City (Britannia Stadium), and Swansea City (Liberty
Stadium), however commentators expressed their surprise that Manchester City had been able to generate such a
large sum to re-brand an existing ground which they themselves did not even own. Liverpool's managing director,
Ian Ayre said that although naming rights were common for new stadiums, there was no precedent for the lucrative
re-branding of existing grounds; "It hasn't happened in Europe that a football club has renamed an existing stadium
and it's had real value. It was the City of Manchester Stadium or Eastlands for the last nine years and now it's going
to be called something different and someone has attached a huge amount of value to that. I find that odd because it
has never been done before. There is no benchmark that says you can rename your stadium and generate that
amount of value. Mike Ashley tried it at Newcastle but nobody called it Sports Direct@St James' Park and it
certainly didn't have that kind of value"[83] (In fact, the Newcastle deal had not involved the exchange of any money,
merely being a device to showcase existing sponsors)[84]
At the Global Sports Forum in Barcelona in early March 2012 it was revealed that UEFA had banned its senior
executives from talking about the Manchester City situation, for fear of prejudicing any future legal action against
the club. When asked to comment on the Manchester City losses of £197million over 2010-11, Philippe Rasmussen,
UEFA FFP manager stated; I am not authorised to talk about this. I am not allowed to talk about it.[85]
In March 2012, the Council of Europe produced a report which described the deal as an "improper transaction",[86]
recommending that; "UEFA should prohibit clubs from sponsoring themselves or using associated bodies to do
so…UEFA will have to take care to ensure their financial fair play rules are not circumvented, and that clubs should
not overpay for the rights they acquire. Clubs will no doubt try to supplement their income if possible. They could
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 14
for example call on sponsors to invest more so as to reduce or eliminate their deficits…care will have to be taken to
prevent any circumvention of the financial fair play rules in this way" Criticism in the report of Manchester United's
debt-financed model was ignored by the British press, as was the proposal that executives of clubs should not be
members of the game's governing bodies, which would have disqualified United's David Gill from his then role at
the Football Association.
Elsewhere at high spending Internazionale, who during the previous five years had lost a massive €665 million, the
club's management were now seriously considering how they were going to meet the new rules. Again, 20 years
previously Inter's revenues had actually exceeded that of Real Madrid but now totalled only around half that of their
huge Spanish rival. Having estimated losses of €60 million for the previous season the club actually went on to
record an €87 million loss, raising concerns that management were unable to control expenditure, at least in the short
term. Even during their "best" recent year, 2010, when they won the Champions League and sold players worth €72
million, Inter still made a €69 million loss.) One club official compared the state of football’s finances to the
sub-prime banking crisis but vowed, "We will be ready to meet all the standards set by UEFA and we are working on
various fronts. That means cutting costs and increasing revenues." Inter had already made a number of changes,
including a salary cap of €3 million for most first team players, a lower basic salary (with higher bonuses for
success), lower contracts for older players extending their contracts and the sale of expensive fringe players. Inter’s
sporting director Marco Branca admitted that the club could no longer afford the fees paid in the past, declaring, "We
have to organise our finances for the financial fair play rules in the next two years. We are looking for younger
players now with great talent who we can develop."
Despite their efforts to improve finances in the future, the ‘Big Three’ of Italian football accounted for 89% (€252
million) of the total Serie A loss of €285 million in 2010/11, and Massimo Moratti warned, "We are not yet able to
balance the books. I don’t know how Italian clubs will play in the Champions League in future, if UEFA’s fair play is
confirmed."
Milan vice-president Adriano Galliani also admitted; "FFP hurts Italy. There will no longer be patrons that can
intervene. Until now people like Berlusconi and Moratti would be able to support us, but with the fair play it will no
longer be possible."[105]
2012–13 season
During the summer, Spanish side Malaga, bought by a wealthy benefactor in 2010, unexpectedly went into financial
meltdown with players wages left unpaid and several sold cheaply in order to keep the club afloat.[109] Since buying
Malaga, Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser Al-Thani had invested almost €80 million in players, infrastructure and
developing a youth academy as part of a five-year plan to fast-track them to domestic and European glory. Despite
the team finishing fourth in La Liga ahead of schedule, earning a place in the Champions League, Al-Thani, a
member of Qatar’s royal family, abruptly announced that he’d had enough of the uneven distribution of TV revenue
in Spain and of criticism by the media, and was now no longer willing to bank-roll the club.[110]
In July, AC Milan sold their two star players, Thiago Silva and Zlatan Ibrahimovic, to free-spending Paris
Saint-Germain for a combined €65 million (£51.4 m) in order to meet FFP.[111] Club owner Silvio Berlusconi
commented; "We did not want to sell Thiago Silva or Ibrahimovic and turned down the first offer. We then thought
about the Financial Fair Play…so we had to accept it with weeping hearts. It was impossible for us to turn down the
offer. It has saved us a lot of money in transfers and wages, meaning our finances are secure for many years to come.
We will save 150 million euros in two years."[112]
In July, there were renewed concerns that wealthy clubs might try to bypass FFP when Chelsea signed a
‘commercially confidential’ three-year deal under which Russian oil and gas giant Gazprom would become Chelsea's
‘global energy partner’. Some commentators pointed to Chelsea owner Roman Abramovich’s 2005 sale of his
controlling stake in oil company Sibneft to Gazprom as possibly infringing UEFA rules defining ‘related-party
transactions’ as including those where clubs could potentially exert ‘significant influence’ over clubs' sponsors.
Earlier Paris St Germain, the French club owned by the Qatar government (who had recently been, and continued to
be the biggest spenders in world football), signed a similarly confidential sponsorship deal with the 50% state-owned
Qatar National Bank. Having earned almost €60 million after winning the previous season’s Champions League,
Chelsea had also signed new sponsorship deals with Audi, Sauber F1 and Delta Airlines, and it was felt that the deal
was unlikely to be scrutinised in the same way that the Manchester City – Etihad sponsorship after the Chelsea club
website also announced that Gazprom has signed an almost simultaneous agreement to also become an official
partner of the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Super Cup.
With Premier League spending on players continuing unabated during the summer transfer window, Liverpool FC
principal owner John Henry, who had previously joined Arsene Wenger in criticising Manchester City's deal with
Etihad Airlines as a means of circumnavigating FFP, proposed that the only way of preventing clubs from effectively
ignoring the rules would be for the Premier League to follow the example of the French and German football
authorities by incorporating the FFP legislation into the Premier League’s own rules. Such a move would allow
domestic sanctions to be taken over and above any measures taken by UEFA to curb excessive spending by clubs.
Henry said;
"The mandate of financial fair play in Europe is for clubs to live within their means... half of the clubs in the top
divisions within Europe are losing money and 20% are in straits of varying degrees... There are a lot of clubs within
the league that support financial fair play. We believe the league itself may have to adopt its own rules given that
clubs seem to be ignoring UEFA’s rules, which may be porous enough to enable clubs to say that the trend of huge
losses is positive and therefore be exempt from any meaningful sanctions."
At the Premier League Annual General Meeting, delegates from Manchester United and Arsenal spoke in favour of
the Liverpool proposal, as did West Ham United’s joint chairman David Gold, who commented; "I was involved in
bringing in the FFP rules in the Championship and at the time I thought should I get to the Premier League, I’ll lobby
for it. Even the big clubs now are saying we have to get to grips with costs." The proposal was not unanimously
agreed. Manchester City said that they would prefer to manage their business as they saw fit, while Fulham, who had
in the past enjoyed significant financial support from their owner Mohamed Al-Fayed, said that such a plan might
‘kill the dreams’ of others.
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 18
It was decided that various possible changes would be discussed over the coming months, with one possibility being
the full adoption of the FFP rules in to the Premier League’s own rules. Such a change would require a 14–6 majority
by club chairmen.
Beşiktaş–Bursaspor ban
On 30 May 2012, UEFA refused to issue a licence for the 2012–13 European season for Beşiktaş J.K. and
Bursaspor, and probationally suspended Beşiktaş for one more season if the club had qualified between 2013–14 to
2017–18 (five years). They were the first two clubs to be banned since UEFA renewed its UEFA Club Licensing
regulation in 2010. As FFP is only fully in force in 2013, both clubs violated UEFA Club Licensing instead of FFP.
However, UEFA did not specify which article(s) they failed. Article 49 stated that there should be no overdue
payables towards football clubs and article 50 stated that there should be no overdue payables towards employee and
social/tax authorities. Beşiktaş have been sued by numbers of clubs for overdue solidarity contribution and the club
used misunderstanding the rule as an excuse. However the club were also sued by Matteo Ferrari for overdue wages,
and news reports claimed that Manuel Fernandes had submitted a transfer request after the club failed to pay his
wages.
Moreover, according to the statutory filing in Turkish Public Disclosure System (Turkish: Kamuyu Aydınlatma
Platformu), Beşiktaş Futbol Yatırımları Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş (BİST: BJKAS [113]), the list portion of the club, had
a negative equity on 29 February 2012 for negative TL 286,256,446[114] The listed company also recorded a
successive net loss in consolidated accounts: TL 12,050,502 (2006–07), TL 1,345,510 (2007–08),[115] TL
29,417,643 (2008–09)[116] TL 48,442,389 (2009–10)[117] TL 120,079,175 (2010–11)[118] and most recently TL
84,932,418 in the first nine months of 2011–12 season. It was uncertain whether Beşiktaş lied on the acceptable
deficit of €45 million or not (after deducting irreverent income and cost). However, Beşiktaş certainly covered the
net loss by increasing debt, as well as breaking one or more financial indicators such as negative equity, thus
Beşiktaş would be banned if FFP was already in force.
It was reported that Bursaspor had overdue debt to Portsmouth F.C. (Collins Mbesuma).[119] Last but not the least,
the last Turkish Big-Three, Galatasaray, champion of 2011–12 Turkish Super League, had a negative equity and
aggregate net loss in 2010–11 and 2011–12 season (first 9 months). The club had to either cover the net loss by
equity contribution (instead of increasing debt) and/or reducing relevant break-even result to €5 million in the near
future in order to avoid sanction due to FFP. However, the incident of Beşiktaş also reflected the fragility of Turkish
football, as Beşiktaş were already the one of the leading clubs of the league and had qualified for European
competitions successively from 2002 to 2012. Galatasaray returned to UEFA Champions League in 2012–13 season
and this may put the club back on the right track.
Meanwhile another Turkish Super Lig club, Trabzonspor announced plans to greatly boost their annual income in
order to both meet FFP and to provide a guaranteed revenue stream to allow then to expand onto the European stage
when they received approval to build a 28 megawatt hydroelectric power plant in the hills above their Black Sea
home of Trabzon. The Financial Times estimated that following after an initial investment of between US$30–50
million, Trabzonspor would be able to count on an additional $10 million per year from the domestic sale of
electricity, before taking account running costs, financing and tax.[120]
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 19
After Rangers received a conditional licence to play in the fourth tier of Scottish football, (Scottish Third Division)
on 27 July 2012, Rangers manager Ally McCoist bitterly accused the other chairmen of adopting "as hostile an
agenda as possible"[130] towards his club, though many others – including some of their own fans - maintained that
Rangers' downfall had been due entirely to their own financial recklessness.
Malaga avoided a two season ban as they met the 31 March 2013 deadline[135]
The case against Lech Poznan and Sporting was dropped by UEFA, who also released the prize money they withheld
from all clubs that were punished or avoided punishment.
Legal Challenge
In early May 2013 Jean Louis-Dupont, the lawyer who in 1995 won the ground-breaking Bosman ruling against the
EU and UEFA, launched a legal challenge against the FFP rules on that grounds that it might restrict the income of
his client, a Belgian registered football agent named Daniel Striani.[145] The earlier case had been brought by a
Belgian player, Jean-Marc Bosman on the basis that the refusal of his former club to allow him to move to a new
club when his playing contract expired amounted to an unlawful restriction on his freedom of movement,
subsequently making it much easier for players in similar situations to move between clubs. A later statement by
Striani, who has represented a number of Premier League players claimed that: "The rules will lead to restrictions in
terms of investment, will diminish the number of player transfers that take place and will also bring down the
revenues of player agents…This rule also impacts upon the right to free movement of capital, to free movement of
workers and to the free availability of services. Financial fair play will further increase the gap between big clubs
and smaller teams. I mainly work with the latter, hence my concerns. I don't know whether other agents share my
opinion or whether clubs will follow my example, but I'm confident about the outcome."[146]
UEFA General Secretary Gianni Infantino dismissed Dupont's claim, saying; "We are not worried about it. First,
because we have the best lawyers working for us but also because FFP has been agreed by all of the clubs,
associations and the European Commission. These haven't been imposed."
It is believed that any final judgement may be as long as five years, however Daniel Geey, a competition and football
law specialist at Field Fisher Waterhouse, commented: "This is significant. The EC has always said in the
background that it supports the objectives of FFP. Now it must undertake an objective assessment of whether, among
other things, FFP is anti-competitive. The complaint will either be upheld, leading the Commission into negotiations
with UEFA and possible formal proceedings or be rejected, which could lead to a further court challenge. Either way
this won't be a quick process and in the meantime UEFA will make licensing decisions based on the FFP break-even
regulations."
On Tuesday 20 May 2014 it was announced that the EC had rejected the complaint and did not intend to investigate
it any further. The EC argued that the financial fair play rules apply to clubs, not to players’ agents, and therefore
Striani had no legitimate interest in complaining about them.[147]
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 23
2013–14 season
Early in the close season French club AS Monaco, recently bought by Russian billionaire Dmitry Rybolovlev, spent
£51m on Radamel Falcao in addition to Joao Moutinho and James Rodriguez for a further £60m. Manchester City
meanwhile also spent close to 50m in June 2013 on two players: Fernandinho and Jesus Navas, and despite their
elevation to the position of the world's highest paid sport team - with an average first-team squad member wage of
£100,764 per week, more than £7,000 higher than that of the second-placed team, American baseball side LA
Dodgers[148] - Manchester City Chief Executive Ferran Soriano said that they were "not worried" by FFP and were
catching up "very fast" with their rivals in terms of revenue. He said that the club were implementing a new playing
structure under director of football Txiki Begiristain and pointed to the club's recent rise to number 7 in the Deloitte
Rich List.[149]
On 17 June it was announced that former Manchester United chief executive David Gill had been appointed
Chairman of UEFA’s influential Club Licensing Committee (CLC), the body which decides which clubs are entitled
to licenses to play in Europe, (on 25 June the committee banned leading Turkish sides Fenerbahce and Besiktas, who
had been due to play Champions League and Europa League football for involvement in match fixing) and which
will be responsible for recommending sanctions against any clubs who fail to comply with FFP.[150] Although the
CLC has no involvement in assessing club accounts, the appointment was queried by some[151] because Gill, a strong
advocate of FFP was due to remain a Manchester United Director, leading to concerns about a lack of impartiality in
the event of any English clubs exceeding the £38m allowable losses at the end of the first accounting period.
On 20 September it was announced that UEFA had withheld the prize money of six clubs for outstanding payments
that hadn't been paid. Astra Ploiesti (Romania), Hajduk Split (Croatia), Metalurg Donetsk (Ukraine), Skonto
(Latvia), Trabzonspor (Turkey) and Zrinjski (Bosnia) were all deemed guilty. The action was taken based on
information supplied on 30 June to UEFA[152] It was announced on 21 November 2013 that Metalurg Donetsk and
Skonto had been referred to the UEFA Club Financial Control Body as well as Pandurii Targu Jiu (Romania),
Petrolul Ploiesti (Romania), Slask Wroclaw (Poland) and Vitoria (Portugal). UEFA also released the prize money to
the six clubs that had their prize money initially withheld.[153] Five of the six clubs referred to the UEFA Club
Financial Control Body received punishment on 20 December 2013. Metalurg Donetsk, Petrolul Ploiesti and Skonto
will be banned for the next season that they qualify for Europe between the 2014-15 and 2016-17 season unless they
can prove that they have paid the money they owe by 31 January 2014. Five of the six clubs were fined including
Metalurg Donetsk (€80,000), Petrolul Ploiesti (€50,000), Pandurii Targu Jiu (€40,000), Skonto (€40,000) and Slask
Wroclaw (€20,000). Vitoria of Portugal avoided punishment[154]
Across all of the 'big five' top divisions of Europe, gross spending by clubs was again significantly higher that during
the previous year. Partly as a result of the new TV deal, Premier League clubs spent a record £630m – a 29%
increase on the equivalent figure of £490m in 2012, and £130m more than the previous record set in 2008. The next
highest spenders were Spain's La Liga and Italy's Serie A, each with a gross spend of £335m, although both leagues
actually generated net surpluses as a result of player trading. They were followed by France's Ligue 1 with £315m
and the German Bundesliga with £230m.
financial plan such as Chelsea, who are generally looking more to young talent and Manchester City, who are
looking to have a training complex for youth (as well as senior) players opened by the start of the 2014-15 season
despite spending nearly £100m on four players during the summer of 2013.
City FC[162][163]).The sale of player image rights to an external company has never been attempted by a football club
before, since they are normally considered as an integral part of their own income, part of which is retained by the
player and separated from his salary for tax reasons. For example, when the club tried unsuccessfully to buy Kaka
from Milan in January 2009, lucrative image rights were offered to the player as a major incentive in agreeing to
sign. In addition, the club will have to prove that whichever organisation bought its intellectual property rights
received fair value for their investment, and that the figure has not been merely agreed with a related party as a
device to help overcome the break even principle.
Other payments between separate parts of the club – i.e. the sale of ‘intangible assets’ totaling £11.5m to City
Football Marketing, and another totaling £10.87m with another subsidiary, City Football Services – were also
thought likely to be considered examples of the club simply moving money between different parts of the clubs
constituent parts, since Manchester City's six main board members – Khaldoon al-Mubarak, Mohamed al-Mazrouei,
Simon Pearce, Martin Edelman, John Macbeath and Alberto Galassi – also sit on the boards of the two subsidiaries
involved. Chelsea Manager José Mourinho questioned the validity of the Manchester city accounts, claiming that;
"Some clubs are feeling financial fair play as 'fair' financial fair play and others are feeling it as 'dodgy' financial fair
play,"[164]
Liverpool’s financial results up to the end of May 2013 showed losses of £49.8m and a further £40.5m over the
previous 10 months. Between 2011 and 2013 the club had lost over £90m, however it was believed that a large
proportion was related to debt arising from the aborted attempts to build a new stadium. It was hoped that the club
would be able to write off an interest free loan it received from their owners, Fenway Sports Group, to repay a £38m
loan from former owners, Tom Hicks and George Gillett, as infrastructure costs.[165]
Rule changes
In 2012 a new potential sanction was introduced allowing a club to be retrospectively stripped of a European title if
they were later found to have overspent in the process of winning it. The 2014 UEFA FFP rulebook, published in
late January also included two significant rule changes. One allows clubs to ‘plea bargain’ sanctions imposed to
punish them overspending. The second change provides clubs with the right to challenge plea bargains if they feel
they have been negatively affected by the outcome.[166] One possible scenario would be that a club finishing just
outside their league’s European competition places could claim that a club finishing above them who had overspent
had unfairly deprived them of the opportunity of playing in lucrative European competition.
In early March it was also announced that only clubs taking part in European competition during the 2013-14 season
will be initially assessed for compliance with the break even rule; the remaining clubs would not be assessed until
the following autumn.
Sanctions
In late February 2014 UEFA announced that of the 237 clubs whose accounts were being assessed for compliance
with the break even rule over the two year monitoring period, 76 were being investigated and might later face
sanctions.[167] Though not identifying any clubs involved, UEFA revealed that the total deficit among the clubs, who
had all played in European competition during the 2013-14 season, amounted to €600 ($828 million). UEFA also
revealed that while overall wages in European football had risen by 59% over the past five years, the overall income
generated by the clubs had increased by only 42%.
The 76 clubs had been asked to provide the CFCB with updated financial information, and those involved in the
more serious cases would be identified in April when the second, judging chamber of the CFCB would decide on
and announce the first sanctions. It was believed that many of the infringements would be found to be quite minor
and action would eventually be dropped.
All verdicts would be published by June ahead of the qualifying round draws for the 2014–15 Champions League
and Europa League competitions, though several clubs were expected to challenge their sanctions at the Court of
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 26
Arbitration for Sport before the group stage draws in late August. UEFA legal director Alasdair Bell said; "July and
August could be a busy time. We are not afraid of them being contested." UEFA Secretary General Gianni Infantino
commented; "UEFA is taking the lead in order to protect European football from greed, from reckless spending,
from financial insanity".[168]
On Monday 28 April 2014 it was revealed that the initial list of clubs thought to be in danger of failing the
break-even rule had been whittled down to less than 20 clubs and that Manchester City and Paris Saint-Germain
were among them. It was also disclosed that UEFA had rejected both club's arguments that the sponsorship deals and
other declared income streams were legitimate, and that talks were ongoing around potential plea bargains on
sanctions.[169][170]
On 16 May 2014, UEFA announced that they agreed to settlements with nine clubs after Financial Fair Play
investigations, with sanctions ranging from break-even targets (e.g., limit of wage bill), sporting measures (e.g., limit
of squad size in UEFA club competitions), and financial contribution (e.g., fines). The nine clubs were:
• Anzhi Makhachkala
• Bursaspor
• Galatasaray
• Levski Sofia
• Manchester City
• Paris Saint-Germain
• Rubin Kazan
• Trabzonspor
• Zenit Saint Petersburg
References
Overall
• http://www.rdes.it/UEFA%20Procedural%20rules%20governing%20214.pdf
Specific
[1] BBC News Website 15 September 2009
[2] BBC News Website 2 March 2010
[3] http:/ / www. uefa. com/ MultimediaFiles/ Download/ EuroExperience/ uefaorg/ Publications/ 01/ 59/ 87/ 45/ 1598745_DOWNLOAD. pdf
[4] http:/ / www. financialfairplay. com
[5] The House of commons report was citing research done on behalf of the Wall Street Journal
[6] The Guardian - 3 June 2009
[7] http:/ / www. whufc. com/ staticFiles/ a7/ 6d/ 0,,12562~159143,00. pdf
[8] http:/ / www. evertonfc. com/ assets/ _files/ documents/ feb_11/ efc__1297183974_Annual_Report_and_Accounts_201. pdf
[9] http:/ / www. uhy-uk. com/ assets/ medi/ new/ PFC%20-%20Report%20to%20creditors%20Adobe%207. pdf
[10] Sky.com Sports News - 26 February 2010
[11] BBC News - 10 September 2006
[12] http:/ / www. acmilan. com/ uploads/ club/ bilancio2010/ pdf/ Bilancio_Gruppo_Milan_10. pdf
[13] http:/ / www. sslazio. it/ images/ stories/ documenti/ pdf/ investor_relator/ Bilancio%20S. S. %20Lazio%2030-06-2011. pdf
[14] The Swiss Ramble 7 December 2011
[15] SS Lazio financial report and accounts on 30 June 2009 (http:/ / www. sslazio. it/ images/ stories/ documenti/ pdf/ investor_relator/
PROGETTO BILANCIO 30-06-09. pdf)
[16] http:/ / www. asroma. it/ pdf/ 2010_-10-13_relazione_finanziaria_annuale_al_30_giugno_2010. pdf
[17] http:/ / www. asroma. it/ pdf/ 2011_-_10_-_06_progetto_di_bilancio_consolidato_al_30_giugno_2011. pdf
[18] Elcentrocampista.com 27 December 2011
[19] http:/ / www. realmadrid. com/ StaticFiles/ RealMadrid/ img/ pdf/ InformeRm08_09. pdf
[20] http:/ / www. realmadrid. com/ StaticFiles/ RealMadrid/ img/ pdf/ InformeRm09_10. pdf
[21] BBC News Website - 20 September 2009
[22] http:/ / arxiu. fcbarcelona. cat/ web/ downloads/ sala_premsa/ memoria/ 2009/ memoria_barca_economica_eng. pdf
[23] However, the net asset value may under-valued or over-valued as the intangible asset, may be over or under valued. For example, youth
product does not have an asset value as there is no formation cost of that capital, such as a transfer fee; the asset value would also be amortized
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 27
which the residual value of the contract in accounting did not reflect the true market value; lastly, there is a lack of protocol to make
impairment on flops. The residual contract value may be greater than the market value as the transfer market always had fluctuation
[24] The Guardian
[25] Yahoo news 12 April 2012
[26] Daily Telegraph 19 November 2008
[27] The Swiss Ramble 10 May 2011
[28] http:/ / www. actusnews. com/ documents/ ACTUS-0-3288-OL-DDR-0809-GB. pdf
[29] Daily Mail 9 October 2008
[30] Daily Telegraph 17 November 2004
[31] http:/ / eng. borussia-aktie. de/ pdf/ gb/ BVB-AR-2009. pdf
[32] Swiss Ramble - 8 December 2010
[33] NL Planet
[34] Reuters - 14 October 2010
[35] The Swiss Ramble - 28 July 11
[36] DutchNews.nl - 5 April 2012
[37] PricewaterhouseCoopers 21st Annual Financial Review of Scottish Football (August 2010)
[38] The Guardian 19 August 2010
[39] Deloitte Football Money League February 2009
[40] Daily Telegraph 27 January 2010
[41] The Guardian - 3 November November 2010
[42] http:/ / www. parliament. uk - 'Football Governance
[43] BBC News Website 17 June 2010
[44] http:/ / www. parliament. uk - 'Football Governance'
[45] Daily Mail - 19 May 2012
[46] Daily Telegraph 7 August 2009
[47] Metro 26 August 2011
[48] Footballfancast.com – 7 June 2012
[49] Daily Mail - 26/09/11
[50] Thefootballfront - 29 July 2011
[51] Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
[52] BBC News - 27 October 2011
[53] BBC News - 7 December 2011
[54] Guardian 5 February 2013
[55] BBC News Website 26/09/11
[56] BBC News Business 1 September 2010
[57] http:/ / arxiu. fcbarcelona. cat/ web/ downloads/ pdf/ 2010-11/ Memoria_Club_09-10_CASTE_BAIXA. pdf
[58] Anversred
[59] Swiss Ramble 6 October 2011
[60] The Independent - 31 January 2005
[61] BBC News Website 11 January 2011
[62] BBC News Website 11 February 2011
[63] BBC News Website 1 February 2011
[64] Daily Telegraph 1 February 2011
[65] BBC News Website 17 January 2011
[66] http:/ / www. uefa. org/ protecting-the-game/ club-licensing-and-financial-fair-play/ news/ newsid=1744182. html
[67] http:/ / www. uefa. com/ MultimediaFiles/ Download/ Tech/ uefaorg/ General/ 01/ 74/ 41/ 25/ 1744125_DOWNLOAD. pdf
[68] The Independent - 25 January 2012
[69] Insideworld football - 26 Jan 2012
[70] BBC News Website - 25 January 2012
[71] BBC News Website 16 August 2011
[72] Sky News 4 June 2011
[73] Daily Mail - 24 April 2012
[74] http:/ / www. caughtoffside. com 17 August 2011
[75] News 24 - 23rd November 2011
[76] WorldSoccer.com - 26 August 2011
[77] Daily Mail 8 July 2011
[78] SportingIntelligence.com)
[79] The Guardian – 19 May 2012
[80] BBC News Website 16 August 2010
UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations 28
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