The

Eye of the Beholder: Ideological Lensing, Information Effects, and the Vote

Ernesto Calvo Timothy Hellwig Keyoung Chang

ecalvo@umd.edu thellwig@indiana.edu kiyoung.chang@gmail.com
University of Maryland Indiana University University of Maryland

First Draft

April 2012

Abstract: An extensive literature shows that voters have biased perceptions of policy outcomes, bi‐
ased perceptions of elites’ policy proposals, and biased perceptions of the ideological placement of
political parties. An equally extensive literature has sought to explain how responsible parties max‐
imize vote support, cultivating ideological brands that cater to poorly informed voters. While schol‐
arship in the former tradition distrusts the information reported by voters, the later approach takes
the preferences reported by voters as given when modeling vote choice and the equilibrium loca‐
tion of parties. In this paper we provide a general approach to unify these distinct traditions. We
make three important contributions. First, we provide a general strategy to incorporate infor‐
mation effects in equilibrium models of voting. Second, we provide a solution to common attenua‐
tion biases observed in most equilibrium models of vote choice. Finally, we provide a feasible pro‐
jection of the parties’ ideological placement when groups of voters differ in where they perceive the
party to be located. We describe our model as a heteroscedastic proximity model, which solves ideo‐
logical lensing problems in the estimation of vote choice models.

Paper prepared for the conference “Contemporary Applications of the Spatial Model,” Instituto Juan
March, 27 April 2012.

 
 
 In physics, gravitational lensing describes the effect that matter exerts on a beam of light

from a background source as it travels across the space towards an observer. The curving of a beam

of light through lensing alters the perceived location of the background source while revealing in‐

formation about the distribution of matter in space. Such altered perceptions apply to politics as

well. When it comes to elite‐mass communications, the perceived policy position of a political rep‐

resentative is shaped by the location of the observer—the observer here being the voter. Drawing

from an extensive literature on information bias, we begin this article describing similar lensing

effects in the perceived location of parties in the ideological space. As in physics, our ultimate goal is

both to draw inferences about the location of objects (parties) in (ideological) space while gather‐

ing information about the social phenomena that induces lensing on the part of the voter. Our work‐

ing expectation is that information about the social traits bias the revealed position of policies and

political actors among the public.

We know from previous research that “voters may misestimate the policy platforms of can‐

didates or parties either out of ignorance or in a fashion which reflects systematic bias” (Adams,

Merrill, and Grofman 2001). In particular, respondents tend to overstate the reported proximity to

parties which they intent to vote for as well as how distant they are from parties which they will not

vote for. In the aggregate, these biases produce non‐trivial effects in terms of voter support and

election outcomes (Bartels 1998; see also Bartels 1996). Indeed, a great many scholars both of

American and comparative politics have systematically documented such biases in public opinion,

biases which are then accounted for by a host of attitudinal and contextual variables (Converse

1964, Dahlberg 2012; Iyengar and Kinder, Zaller 1992, Adams et.al., Page, Althaus 2003).

These systematic biases in the reported locations of parties give rise to theoretical problems

when trying to ascertain the “true” location of parties and when testing spatial models of voting un‐

der misreported proximity. In effect, because vote choice alters the reported ideological proximity

of voters to parties, tests of the spatial proximity model tend to return attenuated estimates of the

1 
 
distance between voters and parties. In turn, attenuated estimates of ideological distance result in

equilibrium models of voting that magnify the effects of issue proximity vis‐à‐vis non‐proximal fac‐

tors, thereby producing centripetal biases.

These biases have been duly noted and attempts have been made to address the problem.

Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005), for example, propose a “discount” model in which a weight is

assigned to recalibrate the effect of proximity. Others moderate the centripetal biases through the

consideration of the distribution of power across party actors (Kedar 2005) or, more fundamental‐

ly, but positing alternative models for how party locations enter the vote calculus (Macdonald, Rab‐

inowitz and Listhaug 2001). Still others identify electoral rules as a source of voter misperception

(Dahlberg 2012). The solution we propose also fixes the centripetal bias in equilibrium models of

voting but from a very different set of assumptions. A central contribution of our strategy is that it

allows the analyst to model how information biases changes the equilibrium location of parties.

Borrowing from lens models in optics, we begin by assuming that individuals observe the

image of a party located in the ideological space, rather than the actual location of a party, using a

poorly constructed lens that induces optical aberration. As in optical systems, we show that the an‐

gular view of individuals with different ideological preferences is shifted in the space (magnifica‐

tion), leading to different reported ideological locations of the party. To address this problem, we

place “corrective lenses” on respondents. First, we (i) calculate the shape of an ideological lens that

would “correct” optical aberration for party j while providing a projection of the “true” location of

the party. We then (ii) calculate the degree of magnification of the lens at different points of the

ideological space and (iii) estimate a statistical model that explicitly incorporates ideological

lensing in spatial proximity model. Finally, we (iv) discuss a heteroscedastic proximity model of

voting which measures the effect of information biases on the parties reported equilibrium.

The proposed model can be used to obtain proper estimates of the effect of ideological prox‐

imity or, more important yet, to understand the effect of information biases in proximity models of

2 
 
voting. Finally, given that voters have different perceptions regarding the “true” location of the par‐

ty, we show that a party that changes its policies (selects a new location in the policy space), will

move at different rates for different groups of voters. This embedded “stickiness” of the perceived

ideological location will tie parties fast on their tracks to their initial locations, reducing the costs

(and benefits) of changing policies.

The organization of this paper is as follows: first we describe lensing effects in the reported

location of the parties. We estimate the degree of magnification of voters in different ideological

locations and solve for the projected “true” location of the Party in the policy space. We then de‐

scribe how to correct for the angular magnification in the voters’ perceived ideological distance. In

section three we estimate the effect of ideological proximity on vote choice once we correct for

magnification. In section four we describe a statistical model that explains the sources of ideological

lensing among voters. We define our model as a heteroscedastic proximity model, which contrib‐

utes to both the fields of spatial models and information effects. Finally, we describe the effect of

ideological lensing on the equilibrium location of parties (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005). The

conclusion discusses implications of our approach for research on perceptual biases, on infor‐

mation effects, and on spatial models of party competition.

1. An optical model of ideological lensing

Evidence in existing survey data is overwhelming: respondents differ in predictable ways when

reporting the location of parties in the ideological space. Respondents with very different political

leanings consistently overestimate their distance to parties with which they do not identify as well

as the ideological distance to parties they do not expect to vote for (Bartels, 1986; Adams, Merrill,

and Grofman, 2005; Tesler, 2011). To provide an example of this phenomenon, consider voter

choice in the 2004 US presidential election. Based on evidence from a post‐election survey, we find

that when asked in a post‐election survey to place the Republican Party on the left‐right scale, a

3 
 
self‐reported conservative voter (scored 10 in our scale) will perceive the Republicans as very con‐

servative, locating the party at approximately 9 on the 0‐10 point scale if she voted for one of its

candidates. A similarly conservative voter (again, located at 10 on the scale) will perceive the Re‐

publican Party as very liberal (just above 2 on the 10 point scale) if she voted against the party.1

Similar biases come from the 2005 election in Great Britain. When asked to place the Conservative

Party on the left‐right scale, a voter located on the far‐right of the left‐right scale identify the Party

as very conservative, at approximately 9 (8.9) 0‐10 point scale if she voted for one of its candidates.

A similarly conservative voter (again, located at 10 on the scale) will perceive the Tories as very

liberal—at 2.2—if she voted against the party.2 As we examine 81 parties in 14 democratic coun‐

tries, such biases repeat irrespective of individual, partisan, or country traits.

How are we to make sense of these differences? Let us provide some structure to the ob‐

served differences by assuming that all voters see the location of a party through a convex lens.

While we expect all voters to observe the party in a single location on the ideological space, spheri‐

cal aberration3 shifts the view of the observers so that the image of the party appears closer or fur‐

ther away from its true location. When voting for a party, the reported locations do not converge

on a single point on the line, with the focus falling behind the object, which appears closer than it

should. When voting against the party, the focal point appears ahead of the object, which is pro‐

jected further away than it should. We might think of the first of these cases as one where the voter

is farsighted (unable to focus at a distance); in the second case the voter is nearsighted.

Just as individuals correct their eyesight with lenses, we can speculate that there is a lense

that explains the degree of optical aberration in ideological distances. The curvature of this lens can

                                                            
1 These data are from the US component of Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)

project and are described in greater detail below. The perceived locations of the Republican Party among
those self‐identifying at 10 on the scale are 9.14 for those voting for the party and 2.13 for those voting
against it.
2 Data are from the 2005 British Election Study, CSES sample.
3 A convex lens suffers from spherical aberration when light transmitted through the lens fails to converge to

a single point. This is known in optics as hyperopia or, more commonly, as farsightedness.

4 
 
be feasibly approximated using a quadratic approximation, as routinely used when estimating the

convexity of lenses or the projection of a ray of light on a parabolic mirror. We thus employ such an

approximation to initially describe the curvature of our ideological lens. For ease of communica‐

tion, we keep with the case of the Republican Party in the U.S., describing the reported location of

the Republican Party by respondent i while given the self‐reported ideological position of the

same respondent .

(1)

We center the convex lens of the Republican Party at its projected axis; where there is an

individual ∗ that observes the “true” ∗

location from a position perpendicular to its own position:

∗ ∗ √
. (2)

Figure 1 displays the magnitude of ideological lensing using data for the United States in
∗
2004. In the figure in Figure 1 the axis of the party is depicted using a large solid circle. Mean‐

∗
while, when voting for the party, all respondents observe images that are either closer or
∗ ∗
further removed from for every e.g. magnification. We can describe the angular

magnification (AM) of our mirror:

∗ (3)

or the absolute magnification in the ideological scale,

∗ . (4)

<<Insert Figure 1>>

Note that while moderate voters appear to be less affected by lensing in absolute terms (M),

Figure 1 shows that angular magnification is as important among moderate voters as it is among
∗
more extreme voters. Provided that we consider a feasible approximation to the true location of

the party, , we may substitute the reported ideological distance in our models so that

5 
 
 ∗
. This adjustment can be then used as information when estimating proximity

models of voting.

2. The effect of Ideological Proximity on Voting

This section describes attenuation biases in the estimation of ideological proximity models

and reports results from our correction in fourteen OECD Countries. Proximity models of voting

assume that the utility derived from voting for Party R declines with ideological distance,
∗
U V α , where α describes the weight voters attach to their proximity preference.
∗
Given that we observe instead of the actual distance , estimates of the im‐

portance that voters attach to ideological proximity will be biased downward. Provided that we

know the level of magnification M, we can estimate an adjusted model

U V α (5)

to correct for this bias. The logic is that M corrects the lensing as to the degree required for i to re‐

ceive the “correct”—or, better, unbiased—image of R is adjusted such that when 1, then
∗
. Put differently, when the absolute magnification is large, then the ob‐

served distance is less than the actual distance. The reverse is also true: when the absolute magni‐

fication is small (less than 1), then the observed distance between the voter and the party’s location

must be more than the actual distance. The intuition behind this adjustment is that the ideological

space is not fixed, but instead it stretches with information.

In order to demonstrate the magnitude of the attenuation biases, we employ data from the

Comparative Study for Electoral Systems (CSES) project to estimate a series of vote choice models.4

For each post‐election survey, we estimate the effect of issue distance on voter choice using a pair

                                                            
4 Data are from Module 2 of the CSES project. We use all surveys from established party systems for which

we have data on vote choice and issue positions. These include post‐election surveys for Australia, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.

6 
 
of specifications. The first specification uses an unadjusted proximity model using the voters’ ob‐

served positions for the parties. In this specification = 1 such that equation (5) reduces to

U V α (Enelow and Hinich 1984). We then re‐estimate the model with the parabol‐

ic approximation to the level of magnification , as described in equation (5).

Table 1 displays the results. The first set of results show results of the restricted specifica‐

tion without the correction. As we would expect, across all 14 cases, coefficients on the choice‐

specific distance measure are negatively signed and precisely estimated. The greater the distance

between the voter and her image of where the party is located, the less likely the voter is to select

the party. The second set of results in Table 1—shown in the grey shaded cells—estimates the

model with our estimate of the known degree of magnification. The coefficient on the now‐adjusted

distance term, , is negative. More importantly, in every case the estimate is greater in abso‐

lute magnitude compared to the unadjusted models. And model AIC consistently indicate that the

improved fit implies that the models provide a better account of the voter’s utility than the

unadjusted models common in the literature.

3. An Heteroscedastic Proximity Voting Model

In equation (4) we assumed that the degree of magnification at different points of the ideo‐

logical space could be well approximated using a quadratic specification (parabola). Given that

magnification is different for respondents voting for or against the party, we are in fact incorporat‐

ing information about vote preference on our ideological distance estimate. This may seem unfair,

as the convexity of the lens is in fact a function of our dependent variable. However, the previous

example already shows that information can be used to streach the ideological space in proximity

models of voting. Consequently, we could just as easily assume that magnification is more generally

the result of political, social, and information processes that can be explicitly modeled with other

covariates. As it is commonly done when estimating heteroscedastic models in which the variance

7 
 
was normalized to 1 (quasipoisson, quasibinomial, negative binomial, etc), we can assume the level

of magnification in ideological proximity can be itself a function of other covariates. We therefore

use a placeholder parameter which will be used to incorporate other types of variables that in‐

duce magnification:

U V α (6)

In equation (6) we have substituted the angular magnification estimate with the parameter the ex‐

ponentiated parameter , so that ~ , . As a heteroscedastic choice model (Alvarez and

Brehm 1995), the expression in (6) has the desirable feature of allowing us to model the variance as

a linear function of a set of covariates. Different from an heteroscedastic model, the variance is only

rescaling the ideological proximity measure.

By explicitly modeling the magnification in the ideological scale, equation (6) provides a

means for testing arguments about which factors, both individual and systemic, shape the voter’s

capacity to “see clearly.” In particular, this representation provides a novel way of incorporating

information processes into the proximity model. It offers a more realistic model of voter utility

where non‐proximity, or valence, assessments, are modeled as working through the proximity

model rather than being incorporated additively as is commonly the case (see discussion below).

Recent work on spatial models with non‐proximity components have called attention to

parties’ non‐positional related reputations with respect to competence, integrity, charisma, and the

like (Adams et al. 2005; Schofield and Sened 2006). This work demonstrates the inclusion of non‐

proximity components into random utility model yields more complete models for understanding

election outcomes and how party strategies respond to voter preferences. We build on this insight.

However, rather than incorporating party valence advantages additively, we explore whether va‐

lence evaluations bias voter’s perceptions of where the party is positioned in ideological space. We

know from previous work that valence advantages allow parties attain larger shares of the vote

8 
 
than they would as predicted solely by spatial considerations.5 But voters’ assessment of a party’s

location in policy space, on the one hand, and its valence (dis)advantage, on the other, typically are

assumed to be unrelated to one another.6

We relax this assumption. We model the degree of bias in voter assessments of party posi‐

tions as a function of the voter’s perception of the party’s valence appeals. We maintain that if a

voter i views the image of the party j as proximally closer to him than j’s actual location, then the

degree of magnification, M, should increase. In the context of equation (4) above, this makes it likely
∗
that . To the extent that reputational considerations are built on familiarity,

this claim finds support in work on voter choice out of the behavioral tradition which shows that

voters dislike uncertainty and resist supporting parties they know little about (even if they share

the party’s policy preferences).7 Parties who voters view as being more competent, trustworthy,

charismatic, and the like, should receive a biased evaluation by the voter in positional terms (that is,

the distance between and is small).

To test the plausibility of this argument, we use the CSES data to model M as a function of

respondent’s valence assessments. To do so, we use as our dependent variable the natural log of the

angular magnification (AM) of our mirror (see equation (3)).8 Valence perceptions are measured

using a 10 point like‐dislike thermometer questions for each political party. We also consider indi‐

vidual attributes other than their party‐specific valence evaluations. Some respondents may be

more likely than others to link policy locations to non‐policy characteristics. One source of hetero‐

geneity is social class. Upper income voters may be more likely to adjust their perceptions of a par‐

ty’s location in terms of its overall competency to, say, manage the economy in a predictable and

                                                            
5 See especially Adams et al.’s (2005) unified model; also see Wittman (1983), Groseclose (2001), Calvo and

Hellwig (2011).
6 Further, the spatial modeling literature generally assumes that parties’ valence advantages are identical

across voters.
7 See, among others, Alvarez (1997); Bartels (1986; 1988). Enelow and Hinich’s (1981) formal model yields

consistent predictions.
8 Recall that moderate voters are as subject to angular magnification as are voters who place themselves

more at the extremes (recall Figure 1, right‐hand side).

9 
 
stable way. Lower class individuals, on the other hand, may be less swayed by the party’s overall

performance relative to its penchant for proposing policies to change the status quo (e.g., redistrib‐

ute income). In addition to being influenced by class‐based issues, valence considerations may also

exert an effect via individual sophistication about politics. As Downs (1957, 10) noted some time

ago, information—or the lack thereof—“can lead rational men to make systematic errors” in how

they perceive reality. Much empirical assessments of issue voting have indeed found that the more

sophisticated individuals are better able to use information about the location of parties when cast‐

ing their vote (Macdonald et al. 1995; Kedar 2005; Zaller 2004).

Table 2 reports the OLS estimates. The most notable result is that across countries, coeffi‐

cients on Valence are positive and precisely estimated: the voter’s bias in the image of the party’s

location is greater (smaller) if the party is perceived by the voter as valence (dis)advantaged. What

about sources of heterogeneity affecting such bias? Here, findings are less unified across cases. To

assess whether class matters, we interact dummy variables for high, medium, and low‐income re‐

spondents and interact them with valence. For eight of the 14 countries, as well as for the pooled

model, the positive effect of valence on bias is greater for medium and, especially, high income indi‐

viduals.9 And in no case do we find that the relationship between valence and magnification to be

less among higher‐income respondents. We find only weak and occasional evidence that valence’s

effect varies across levels of political sophistication—in four cases we observe the expected positive

effect; in none do we see a negative effect.10

<<Table 2 about here>>

                                                            
9 “Low income” respondents are set as the baseline, omitted category in Table 2. The income measure is from

the income quintiles as provided by the CSES. Low Income is quintiles 1 and 2, Medium Income is quintile 3,
and High Income is quintile 3.
10 Interestingly, valence’s effect on magnification is conditional on political information for three of the Scan‐

dinavian parliamentary democracies: Denmark, Finland, and Sweden (though not in Norway). The only other
country in which information has a statistically significant effect on valence effects is the UK. The CSES mod‐
ule deposited for Germany did not include the three‐item objective knowledge scale used to measure political
information (for more information on the measure, see Hellwig 2011).

10 
 
 4. Directional and Proximity Effects Under the Heteroscedastic Proximity Model

Table 2 results demonstrate that individual biases can be understood systematically in terms of

parties’ valence perceptions. These results provide insights into what shapes ideological lensing.

Let’s return to the basic spatial voting model whereby i’s utility for voting for party R is specified as

the squared difference between the voter’s position and her perception (image) of R’s location. Ac‐

cording to the heteroscedastic choice model described in equation (6), the precision of this proximi‐

ty effect varies as function of a set of exogenously determined covariates. OLS models of magnifica‐

tion reported in Table 2 suggest two factors which influence magnification: valence evaluations and

social class. We use these as substitutes for M in equation 6. Also included in the variance compo‐

nent is a measure for voter extremity. This measure gauges the extent to which i prefers extreme

positions relative the center of the distribution of issue preferences.11 With this information, the

heteroskedastic proximity model is as shown in equation (6) with desirable feature of allowing us

to model the variance, , specified as a linear function of valence, class, and extremity, expressed

as

∗ ∗ ∗ , (7)

where is the valence assessment (specifically, i’s assessment of R’s non‐positional quality), ,

, and are indicators for i’s social class (low, medium, or high), measures i’s perception of

the extremity of R's policy preferences, and , , , and are parameters to be estimated.

We estimate heteroskedastic proximity models—one per country—using the Markov Chain

Monte Carlo (MCMC) engine in WinBUGS (Spiegelthaler et al. 2003). Table 3 reports results in two

equations – one for the choice model and the other for the variance component. As in Table 1, the

choice model includes the estimated effect of ideological distance on the likelihood the respondent

selects the party. The choice‐specific coefficients are negatively signed and precisely estimated in

each of the 14 surveys.

                                                            
11 We measure policy extremity by taking the absolute value of the difference between the party’s self‐

placement on the left‐right dimension and the neutral position (5 on the 0‐10 left‐right scale).

11 
 
 <Table 3 about here>

The remaining covariates are specified not to explain voter choice but to account for varia‐

tions about the voter’s decision. In modeling valence and extremity in the variance equation, this is

a very different way of conceiving of non‐policy, and non‐proximal components in a model or vote

choice (discuss more below). First consider valence effects. The coefficients reported on the va‐

lence parameters are, in every case, positively signed. In terms of the heteroskedastic model, this

means that the when the voter perceives a party as valence advantaged, this increases the error

variance. Put differently, it is more difficult for the standard proximity model – e.g., the conditional

logit model – to produce unbiased estimates when individuals give a party high marks for non‐

policy characteristics. This is just as we would expect, given the extent that valence informs the

mirroring effect (Table 2).

Valence has a biasing effect party’s image of the party’s location – increasing the degree of

magnification where it would otherwise be. This effect, however, may not be identical for all indi‐

viduals. Table 2 results provided a moderately strong indication that the magnifying effects of va‐

lence are greater for upper‐class individuals. The specification in equation (7) enables us to exam‐

ine the conditional effects of class in the context of the heteroskedastic proximity model. By using

indicators for low‐, middle‐, and upper‐class voters, we can determine whether the effect of class on

valence is linear, non‐linear, or non‐existent.12 On these grounds, results reported in Table 3 vary

considerably by country. In some cases, valence effects are largest for low‐income respondents and

lowest for high‐income respondents (Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland); in

some, the effect is non‐linear, affecting middle income respondents more (Netherlands, Spain, UK)

or less (Australia, Germany, USA); and for others class appears to have no conditioning effect (Ire‐

land, Israel, Sweden).

                                                            
12 A linear effect would mean that the magnitude of the coefficient on “valence‐mid income” lies between that

of the “valence low income” and “valence high income.” A non‐linear effect implies that the coefficient on “va‐
lence mid income” is either higher or lower than the other two. A non‐existent effect suggests the coeffi‐
cients on the three valence parameters are roughly equal in magnitude.

12 
 
 Lastly, consider the influence of directional effects. Directional effects are present when it is

shown that voter utility rises when parties take more extreme placements on their preferred side of

issue neutrality. Beginning with early work on the directional model, analysts have sought to de‐

termine whether spatial or directional effects carry the day (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989).

Empirical findings, however, have been mixed to say the least. Results often hinge on whether the

dependent variable, voter utility, is gauged in terms of vote choice or feeling thermometer) or on

decisions about which modeling assumptions to relax.13 In nearly every case, however, directional

and proximity effects are pitted against one another, typically in additive fashion, within the context

of a mean model. In doing so, tests between models are on the order of a horse race between varia‐

bles as analysts discern whether proximity of directional components carry greater weight. By

placing the directional component in the variance component, our approach provides a way to

think about directional tendencies as shaping the angle of the mirror.

In the heteroskedastic models positively signed coefficients on the directional term

indicate that the utility of voters declines more rapidly for parties as they move to the center of the

ideological space. In other words, a positive directional term indicates that voters are biased to‐

ward more extreme parties. Similarly, a negative coefficient indicates that the utility of voters

declines more rapidly for parties as they move to the extremes of the ideological space. That is

negative coefficients indicate that as parties move away from a voter preference the perceived dis‐

tance is smaller for parties taking more moderate positions.

<<Figure 2 about here>>

The expected effect of the directional parameters is exemplified in Figure 2, showing single‐

peaked preferences that are not symmetric. Instead, under our specification of the directional mod‐

                                                            
13 Lewis and King (1999) and Merrill and Grofman (1999) and provide useful discussions.

13 
 
el the ideological space is stretched so that parties distance to voters differs as they move to the ex‐

treme or to the center of the ideological space.

Results reported in Table 3 convey a mixed picture when it comes to directional effects in

the hetersocedastic proximity models. The effects of directional tendencies are estimated with pre‐

cision in all but two of the 14 cases, New Zealand and Spain. In eight cases, the directional effect is

negative, implying a extremist‐induced bias. In the remaining four, the directional effect is positive,

such that it produces a moderate‐induced bias.

To better illustrate the influence of directional tendencies in the heteroskedastic proximity

model, we use the parameter estimates in Table 3 to describe the joint effects of directional relative

to proximity effects. Figure 2A does so for a country with a extreme‐biased parties, the United

Kingdom. We set the voter’s image of the parties equally spaced on the 1‐10 scale at 7 for the Con‐

servative Party (Party 1), 5 for the Liberal Democrats (Party 2), and 3 for the Labour Party (Party

3). Valence and class considerations are held constant across the three major British parties. With

these values, Figure 2A depicts the probability that a voter selects each party as she moves from

more leftist to more rightist positions on the horizontal axis without consideration of the direction‐

al parameter ( 0 . These baseline proximity probabilities are presented solid lines. To observe

the influence of a directional effect, we evaluate the model with equal to 0.28, or the estimate pro‐

vided by the heteroskedastic proximity estimates. These probabilities are presented for each of the

parties by dashed lines. Comparing the dashed to the solid lines, we see that a directional effects

shift the voter onto more extreme positions. Put differently, inclusion of the directional effect re‐

veals that without it, the British voter tends to possess an extremist bias.

<<Figure 3a and 3b about here>>

14 
 
 Take, for example, a center‐right voter in Britain located at 8 on the left‐right scale. Without

considering directional impulses, he selects the Conservatives with probability 0.64, the Liberal

Democrats with probability 0.30, and Labour with probability 0.06. The inclusion of directional

effects shows these estimates to be biased in a centrifugal direction. With the inclusion of the direc‐

tional parameter in the variance model, the voter becomes more likely to choose the Tories (0.74)

and less likely to select the Liberal Democrats (0.24) and Labour (0.02). In the US, we find the op‐

posite (see Figure 2B). Rather than biases towards more extreme parties, voters the utility of voters

is biased towards moderation.

Put differently, the results shown in Table 3 and Figure 2 tell us something about the rela‐

tive effects of party shifts on their electoral success. According to model of party competition with

vote‐seeking parties, parties have incentives to adjust their positions in policy space—shifting to

the left or to the right—until they have maximized their vote share and system is in (Nash) equilib‐

rium (e.g., Wittman 1983).14 Proximity models, however, make no distinction about the relative

gains of shifting one way or another—the direction of the shift is dictated by the distribution of vot‐

ers and by the placement of its party competitors (Downs 1957; Adams and Somer‐Topcu 2009).

Directional models do, of course—indeed, the directional set‐up implies that party shifts in one di‐

rection are more beneficial to its vote‐maximizing objectives than shifts in the other. Our het‐

eroskedastic proximity model with a directional component shows how the directional expectation

can be squared with the proximity model’s prescription of minimizing the distance to the voters.

Consider a voter i located to the right of center at a position of, say, 7 on the 0‐10 scale. If the “cor‐

rect” location of party R is at 7, then we would assume i selects R with a high probability on the or‐

der of, say, 0.8. But what if, in an attempt to maximize vote share, party R shifts positions? The

proximity model assumes that a centrist (leftward) shift produces the same effect on i’s probability

of choosing R as an equal shift to the outside (rightward). In our heteroskedastic proximity model
                                                            
14 Parties cease making policy adjustments once the system’s Nash equilibrium has been reached and they

have no incentive to deviate.

15 
 
this depends on the directional effect on model variance. In systems with a centrist bias like the UK,

an outward shift by the party is preferred by i to an inward shift. In systems with an extreme bias

like the US, an inward shift by the party is preferred by i to an outward shift (see Figure 3).

5. Conclusion

Our goal in this paper has been to employ insights from physics to shed new light on the prob‐

lems of—and offer solutions to—ideological lensing by voters in competitive elections. Borrowing

from lens models in optics, we began by assuming that individuals observe the image of a party lo‐

cated in the ideological space rather than the actual location of a party. The degree of bias in this

image is a function of the voters lens—a lens that induces optical aberration. While we have not

been the first to acknowledge this perceptual bias in how voters perceive party positions, our work

ranges beyond previous studies in offering a more cogent, theoretically informed means for a)

measuring ideological lensing and b) for correcting for it.

We make three important contributions. First, we provide a general strategy to incorporate in‐

formation effects in equilibrium models of voting. Second, we provide a solution to common atten‐

uation biases observed in most equilibrium models of vote choice. Finally, we provide a feasible

projection of the parties’ ideological placement when groups of voters differ in where they perceive

the party to be located. Results of estimating the heteroskedastic proximity model find that lensing

is shaped by valence and directional factors—exactly the two features the large literature on spatial

voting has identified as in some way altering or improving on the predictions of the simple proximi‐

ty model. Thus, while the initial impetus for this study was to identify and correct for ideological

biases in the location of parties, our findings lay the groundwork for engaging with in more sus‐

tained fashion with current debates in the study of spatial voting more generally.

16 
 
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18 
 
 Table 1: Estimates of Ideological and on Vote Choice, 14 Countries

   Australia  Australia  Denmark  Denmark  Finland  Finland  Germany  Germany  Ireland  Ireland 
   Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M 
Ideological  ‐0.0981  ‐0.1775  ‐0.1564  ‐0.2241  ‐0.1218  ‐0.2135  ‐0.0729  ‐0.1166  ‐0.0700  ‐0.1082 
Distance  (0.006)***  (0.010)***  (0.006)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.014)***  (0.004)***  (0.006)***  (0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
LogLik  ‐1698.7  ‐1486.6  ‐2815.1  ‐2591.9  ‐1297.7  ‐1172.4  ‐2294.9  ‐2112.1  ‐1899.6  ‐1806.8 
AIC  3399.4  2975.1  5632.2  5185.8  2597.4  2346.8  4591.7  4226.1  3801.1  3615.6 
N  6856  6856  13698  13698  5416  5416  8099  8099  6861  6861 
                                
New  New Zea‐
Israel  Israel  Netherlands  Netherlands  Norway  Norway  Spain  Spain 
   Zealand  land 
   Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M 
Ideological  ‐0.0823  ‐0.1049  ‐0.1869  ‐0.2845  ‐0.0970  ‐0.1610  ‐0.1225  ‐0.1919  ‐0.1437  ‐0.1982 
Distance  (0.006)***  (0.007)***  (0.009)***  (0.013)***  (0.006)***  (0.010)***  (0.006)***  (0.009)***  (0.010)***  (0.015)*** 
LogLik  ‐941.3  ‐891.0  ‐2456.6  ‐2253.7  ‐1476.5  ‐1328.6  ‐2459.9  ‐2259.2  ‐527.3  ‐462.3 
AIC  1884.5  1784.0  4915.2  4509.3  2955.0  2659.2  4921.8  4520.4  1056.6  926.5 
N  3986  3986  12669  12669  6672  6672  10460  10460  2331  2331 
                                
   Sweden  Sweden  Switzerland  Switzerland  UK  UK  USA  USA       
   Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M  Dist  Dist/M       
Ideological  ‐0.1750  ‐0.2485  ‐0.0932  ‐0.1208  ‐0.1003  ‐0.1505  0.0585  0.0764       
Distance  (0.011)***  (0.015)***  (0.006)***  (0.008)***  (0.011)***  (0.016)***  (0.006)***  (0.007)***       
LogLik  ‐1010.8  ‐924.5  ‐1054.6  ‐992.7  ‐355.9  ‐311.6  ‐299.4  ‐260.2       
AIC  2023.6  1851.0  2111.2  1987.5  713.7  625.2  600.7  522.3       
N  4720  4720  4103  4103  1228  1228  1236  1236       

19 
 
 Figure 1. The Magnitude of Ideological Lensing, 2004 U.S. Election

0 2 4 6 8 10

Reported Location of Party j by Voters of the Other Parties

1.2
Magnification
Thin Lense

f-focal

1.0
lenghtf 5.99 f 5.67 f 5.4 f 5.19 f 5.05 f 5 f 5.05 f 5.2 f 5.44 f 5.76

Voted f or Party

0.8
Did Not Vote f or Party

0 2 4 6 8 10 2 4 6 8 10

Self Placement, Ideology Self Placement, Ideology

0 2 4 6 8 10

Reported Location of Party j by Voters of Party j

2.0
Angle Magnification

1.5
Thin Lense

1.0
f-focal
lenghtf 5.83 f 5.57 f 5.37 f 5.21 f 5.11 f 5.04 f 5 f 5 f 5.03 f 5.08 0.5

Voted f or Party
0.0

Did Not Vote f or Party

0 2 4 6 8 10 2 4 6 8 10

Self Placement, Ideology Self Placement, Ideology

20 
 
 Table 2. Modeling Magnification
  pooled  Australia  Denmark Finland Germany Ireland  Israel  Neth.
Valence  0.035**  0.048**  0.021** 0.030** 0.032** 0.045**  0.041*  0.067**
(0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.023)  (0.009) 
valence x      0.003**  0.001  0.004** 0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 0.004  ‐0.001
med income  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
valence x  0.004**  ‐0.002  0.006** 0.006** 0.001 0.004 0.006**  0.005
high income  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
medium  ‐0.019**  ‐0.016  ‐0.024** ‐0.005 0.002 0.005 ‐0.033  ‐0.009
income  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.046) 
high income  ‐0.017**  ‐0.005  ‐0.023** ‐0.019** ‐0.006 ‐0.011  ‐0.032**  ‐0.035
(0.004)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.035) 
valence x  0.001  ‐0.002  0.006** 0.006** ‐0.001  ‐0.002  0.006
med info  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.023)  (0.009) 
valence x  0.001  ‐0.003  0.012** 0.016** ‐0.002  ‐0.003  ‐0.004
high info  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.023)  (0.010) 
medium info  ‐0.001  0.024  ‐0.033* ‐0.015 0.003 0.096  ‐0.058
(0.008)  (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.141)  (0.054) 
high info  0.001  0.035  ‐0.046** ‐0.047** ‐0.009  0.092  ‐0.014
(0.012)  (0.027)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.141)  (0.059) 
Constant  ‐0.084**  ‐0.147**  0.004 ‐0.117** ‐0.066 ‐0.137**  ‐0.145  ‐0.205**
(0.010)  (0.026)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.141)  (0.051) 
R^2  0.243  0.361  0.376 0.315 0.312 0.529 0.250  0.376
N  72522  6836  3911 8121 13480 2322 5385  1226
       
  NZ  Norway  Spain Sweden Switz. UK USA 
Valence  0.015**  0.031**  0.034** 0.039** 0.033** 0.044**  0.049** 
(0.007)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
valence x  0.001  0.002  0.000 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.014** 
med income  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
valence x  0.004**  ‐0.002  0.003** 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.012** 
high income  (0.001  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
medium  ‐0.004  ‐0.002  0.001 ‐0.022* ‐0.010 ‐0.016  ‐0.105** 
income  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.047) 
high income  ‐0.014  0.005  ‐0.013 ‐0.010 ‐0.005 ‐0.010  ‐0.077** 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.036) 
valence x  0.007  ‐0.006  ‐0.001 0.008** ‐0.001 0.006**  0.001 
med info  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.009) 
valence x  0.009  ‐0.004  0.000 0.009** ‐0.003 0.006 0.000 
high info  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
medium info  ‐0.040  ‐0.002  0.003 ‐0.025* 0.016 ‐0.022  ‐0.037 
(0.042)  (0.028)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.063) 
high info  ‐0.047  ‐0.011  ‐0.002 ‐0.029* 0.027 ‐0.021  ‐0.021 
(0.042)  (0.028)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.065) 
Constant  ‐0.008  ‐0.057**  ‐0.091** ‐0.112** ‐0.083** ‐0.087**  ‐0.347** 
(0.042)  (0.028)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.061) 
R^2  0.385  0.378  0.256 0.299 0.350 0.431 0.304 
N  6609  3954  12459 10465 6552 4682 1236 
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of angular magnification (AM).  Cells report OLS estimates with robust 
standard errors in parentheses (clustered by country in the case of the pooled model).  All models include party 
specific fixed effects.  Source: CSES Module 2.

21 
 
 Table 3. Heteroskedastic Proximity models

  Australia Denmark Finland Germany  Ireland Israel Netherlands

Choice Model     
Ideological distance  ‐1.493 ‐1.851 ‐1.549 ‐2.344  ‐1.125 ‐1.407 ‐4.914
[‐1.968,‐1.093]  [‐2.273, ‐1.488]  [‐2.134, ‐1.070]  [‐3.257, ‐1.599]  [‐1.474, ‐0.828]  [‐2.051, ‐0.904]  [‐5.608, ‐4.114] 
Ideological Variance Model     
Valence ‐ low income  0.562 0.433 0.561 0.601  0.309 0.347 0.538
[0.482,0.649]  [0.390. 0.479]  [0.480, 0.649]  [0.499, 0.721]  [0.256, 0.367]  [0.270, 0.437]  [0.498, 0.581] 
Valence ‐ mid income  0.493 0.395 0.530 0.523  0.328 0.353 0.593
[0.422,0.572]  [0.394, 0.444]  [0.458, 0.609]  [0.426, 0.631]  [0.268, 0.395]  [0.294, 0.419]  [0.533, 0.657] 
Valence ‐ high income  0.611 0.361 0.498 0.673  0.322 0.334 0.493
[0.523,0.707]  [0.360, 0.402]  [0.421, 0.583]  [0.556, 0.808]  [0.268, 0.381]  [0.265, 0.413]  [0.456, 0.531] 
Directional effect  ‐0.242 ‐0.018 ‐0.334 ‐0.143  0.302 0.312 ‐0.205
[‐0.348, ‐ [‐0.085, 0.051]  [‐0.493, ‐0.176]  [‐0.286, ‐0.001]  [0.199, 0.407]  [0.180, 0.444]  [‐0.283, ‐0.127] 
0.136] 
‐2*loglik  2428.410 3792.320 1965.820 1136.350  2477.000 1298.600 3130.490
     
  New Zealand Norway Spain Sweden  Switzerland UK US
Choice Model     
Ideological distance  ‐2.423 ‐1.802 ‐1.831 ‐5.026  ‐1.078 ‐0.634 ‐0.235
[‐3.375, ‐ [‐2.095, ‐1.491]  [‐2.551, ‐1.260]  [‐6.031, ‐3.854]  [‐1.501, ‐0.678]  [‐0.897, ‐0.398]  [‐0.366, ‐0.138] 
1.629] 
Ideological Variance Model     
Valence ‐ low income  0.668 0.562 0.368 0.581  0.411 0.490 0.283
[0.541, 0.827]  [0.507, 0.622]  [0.284, 0.457]  [0.514, 0.650]  [0.326, 0.508]  [0.349, 0.666]  [0.156, 0.443] 
Valence ‐ mid income  0.480 0.454 0.499 0.590  0.333 0.719 0.106
[0.403, 0.569]  [0.417, 0.494]  [0.408, 0.598]  [0.521, 0.665]  [0.265, 0.403]  [0.509, 0.991]  [0.008, 0.230] 
Valence ‐ high income  0.429 0.432 0.389 0.582  0.327 0.433 0.251
[0.358, 0.507]  [0.395, 0.469]  [0.276, 0.524]  [0.516, 0.651]  [0.264, 0.391]   [0.326, 0.562]  [0.138, 0.382] 
Directional effect  0.097 ‐0.227 0.043 ‐0.374  0.224 ‐0.443 0.284
[‐0.004, 0.200]  [‐0.299, ‐0.158]  [‐0.138, 0.216]  [‐0.502, ‐0.247]  [0.117, 0.323]  [‐0.715, ‐0.198]  [0.134, 0.425] 
‐2*loglik  1467.440 3946.360 740.085 1366.970  1550.550 528.784 562.904

22 
 


Figure 2. Hypothetical Illustration of Hypothetical Effects of Shift by Party R on Vote Proba‐

bilities under Centrist Bias (Positive Estimate of , dotted line) and Extremist Bias (Nega‐
tive Estimate of , dotted line) Party Systems

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6
←R R→
V 0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Left‐Right Scale

Note: voter i's preferred position is 7; the neutral point is at 5.

23 
 


Figure 3: Directional and Proximity Effects in the Heteroskedastic Proximity Model

A. United Kingdom: Extremist Bias B. United States: Centrist Bias

Note: simulations produced using estimates reported in Table 3 in models for the United Kingdom and the United States.

24