Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Isip To The Extent That It Affirmed With Modifications Petitioner Manuel
Isip To The Extent That It Affirmed With Modifications Petitioner Manuel
of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision [1] of the The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the
Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 date when the offense was committed, the number and amount of the
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. check. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:
Isip to the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel
Crim. Case Date of No. of Check Amount of
S. Isips conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional
No. Commission Check
Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended 518644
147-84 17 March 1984 518645 P50,000.00
Decision[2] dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for 148-84 30 March 1984 030086[5] P50,000.00
Reconsideration. 149-84 12 March 1984 518674 P150,000.00
155-84 25 March 1984 518646 P95,000.00
156-84 29 March 1984 518669 P90,000.00
157-84 1 April 1984 P25,000.00
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136- The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court
84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following with five (5) counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal
information: Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again
to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1)
the Court of Appeals in the parties respective briefs, are the following: Dome shaped ring with matching earring with
diamonds valued at P120,000.00. As with their
previous agreement, the item was to be returned
i) Prosecution Version. or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March
21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal
Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant Atty. checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated
Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by March 29, 1984 for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00,
complainants father, Nemesio, business associate respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring
of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and
unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitus This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for
(pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993). Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal Case
Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP
Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing 22 against Marietta Isip.
operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be
their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went
acceded to (p. 14, ibid). back to the residence of complainant and got from
him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one
Thus, the operation went smoothly that was before (1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn,
February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid). ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt
with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds
On February 3, 1984, at complainants residence in thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27,
Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses received 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip
from complainant a 6 carat mens ring valued issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27,
at P200,000.00 with the condition that they are 1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5,
going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis tsn, October 22, 1993).
for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the
same, they have to return the ring if sold on or The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of
before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993). Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the Isip
couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip
issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the
30, 1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as Isips went to complainant informing him that
partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in
jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most
Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid). opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of
jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a
This particular mens ring is the subject of Criminal receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit O)
Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos. 518644 acknowledging the value thereof to the tune
and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17 ofP562,000.00.
and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal
Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84. Exhibit O contained the promise that the jewelry or
proceeds thereof will be delivered on March 27,
In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple 1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit O,
went again to complainants residence in Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No.
Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered 51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces
pearls with diamond worth P150,000.00. The of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).
condition was that the proceeds be turned over to
complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27- This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-
29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of 84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal Case
turning over the proceeds or return the Choker No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP
Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984 22.
for P150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as
payment (p. 34, ibid).
2
All of the checks covered by the above transactions misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution
were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid), before the Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr.,
but all of them bounced for being drawn against Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to
insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the maintain good relations with complainant,
couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid). appellant Marietta signed the document
acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting,
ii) Defense Version. which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-
22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the
During all the times material to these cases, transactions were entered into in Manila,
complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence complainant filed the cases herein before the
at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).[7]
on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but
claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos
Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the
Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr., On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the
6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants dispositive portion thereof reading:
Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M.
Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at
3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
(Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P.
City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-
10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel, in the brokerage 84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby
and trucking business; while appellant Marietta, in sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1)
that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of
goods, real estate and cars, which she started when Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84
she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95, where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City, of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
losing or financially-strapped players which she temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
repledged as security for financing she obtained complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant of P120,000.00 for the value of the articles
Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she
14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
short of capital, he referred appellants to his son, Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17- Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim.
19). Beginning early 1983, at complainants Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila, imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1)
appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen
who participated only as a witness, started having (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
transactions with complainant who, on different to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose
dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84
various amounts to her for which appellant where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
agreed between her and complainant to be sold on reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16- indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
18). In the course of the transactions, appellant amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84
Marietta had issued several checks to complainant where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
which have either been paid or redeemed, had reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
had conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
some personal properties, like brass and antics, and amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat,
Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim.
be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is
6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby
of appellants to complainant have already been sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34- Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
appellant Marietta issued which were initially reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the
dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95, complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount
25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry
the dismissal of some cases he filed against misappropriated, and to pay the costs.[8]
appellants. Complainant however failed to return
some of the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to
him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in
did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as
appellant Marietta incurred some default in these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant
payment and complainant suspected that she
would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for Atty. Leonardo Joses ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was
the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that
on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was
appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
3
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR
connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
the same had already been made and the alleged set-offs were for
Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip
other cases which were settled amicably and subsequently dismissed
died thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.
upon motion of the City Prosecutors Office at the instance of the
complainant.
In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals
misappropriated the pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII)
Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal 1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed on
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-
accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2)
84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No. years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted maximum, and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was
ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear
as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases,
interest at the legal rate from filing of the
but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a information until fully paid;
7-carat diamond mens ring which he secured from the complainant. 2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-
84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals the crimes charged; and
- II -
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING venue was properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the two
THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY accused and/or that the transactions transpired at complainants
APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses
OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID
CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR charged took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court
- III - acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the ground that since the
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor
LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN
thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry
INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES,
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
4
Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 136-84. He raises the following issues:
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the
First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED
dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED;
defenses claim of redemption/dacion en pago that real and personal
Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY
properties were conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of
SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT
desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases to be OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN
CAVITE CITY; and
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL
novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise
LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic)
of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.
information in court.In these five cases, it ruled that there was novation
because complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction
payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases.Consequently, over the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure
the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,[11] but held speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly
them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry involved. absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements of the Estafa
charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is
petitioner, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling of the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non
conviction. It found petitioners claims that he did not receive the sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral
jewelry worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the
receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those documents which transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual
were forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and residents of Manila.Mere convenience suggests that their transaction
that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant, to was entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to
be not persuasive. finance the transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where
the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner and/or where
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in it was to be accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any,
representation of his deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not
for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the
No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered into
Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no
378-84.[12] competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed
in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the subject
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period from February to
account the death of Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in
portion: civil cases, is jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take transaction took place in Cavite City.
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of
trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court Appeals holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[16] delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues
that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship
are convinced that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite with complainant, the fact remains that there is no showing that the
City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no
covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence[17] from the was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.
Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly
laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court
the transaction involved was entered into inManila. The age-old but of Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No.
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.[18] 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient the ring in question. Petitioners claim that he did not receive any ring
and competent evidence that the transaction happened and merely executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship
in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually with the complainant deserves scant consideration.
transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the
that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that significance, import and obligation of what he executed and signed. The
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner,
prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c)
at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to That private transactions have been fair and regular; and (d) That the
have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the ordinary course of business has been followed [22] Thus, it is presumed
number of times they received pieces of jewelry from that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its
complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners contents and consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully
late wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It
accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the devolves upon him then to overcome these presumptions. We,
conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City. however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving
It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said
courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having in Cavite City.
manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the Petitioners argument that he did not receive the subject
appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[19] It is to be ring[23] is further belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter
pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been testified that said ring was borrowed by him on7 March 1984. [24] In all,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same occurred
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are in Cavite City.
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. [20] In the case at bar, Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia
we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was
more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of that could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new
the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No.
rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 136-84, it is clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article
because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa
he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money,
prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
Court should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
said case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or
but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
application of the novation rule in said case. prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the
offender return the money or property.[28] All these are present in this
We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation[25] cannot case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond
be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the (mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same
personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted
remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the
the properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the latter same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed
would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage
cases against petitioner and his late wife.This, complainant did not do and prejudice to complainant in the amount of P200,000.00.
for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him were not
enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on
deceased wife.Complainant testified that the properties he received petitioner, we find the same to be in order.
herein.[26] In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the
eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26
properties as payment.[27] It follows then that the obligations incurred October 2005, respectively, areAFFIRMED.
by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal
SO ORDERED.
cases herein tried were filed.
2. LBP v. Belista (2009)
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the
rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did PERALTA, J.:
not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner),
that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision[1] and the July
place, four essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous 28, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth
of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as
element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No. follows:
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals
applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks issued as It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and
payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8)
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter,
involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.
7
The court a quo motu propio dismissed the
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by case when it issued the herein first assailed Order
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) dated 12 November 2003 for failure to exhaust
under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections
Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private
Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for
respondent claimed payment of just compensation
Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, that the DARAB
over said agricultural lands.
2003 Rules of Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its
precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation
dismissal of the case is not among the instances when
of the subject farms was only P227,582.58,
a court may dismiss a case on its motion.
while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP,
for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
As the court a quo denied its Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November
Believing that her lots were grossly
2003, petitioner LBP elevated the case before the
underestimated, private respondent, on 11
Tribunal through the present Petition for Review,
November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and
theorizing:
Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A
bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for
QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING
Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-
THE CASE MOTU PROPIO ON
005.
THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE TO EXHAUST
On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the
fallo of which reads: II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5,
6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE
Wherefore, just DARAB 2003 RULES OF
compensation for the subject PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES
areas is hereby preliminarily FILED AND PENDING BEFORE
fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT THE DARAB OR ITS
HUNDRED NINETY-SIX ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS
THOUSAND and FOUR EFFECTIVITY AND TO CASES
HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 FILED AND PENDING WITH THE
(P2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.[3]
Bank of
the Philippines, Legaspi City, is
hereby ordered to pay herein
petitioner said amount On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision
pursuant to existing rules and
guidelines, minus the sum dismissing
already remitted per Order
the petition.
dated January 2, 2003.
SO ORDERED.
The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
As both parties interposed their respective
Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution shall be filed
motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually
issued an Order dated 8 October 2003, the decretal before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the
portion of which reads:
case before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB
Wherefore, the is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
Decision dated July 7, 2003 is
MODIFIED, fixing the valuation remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of
claim of petitioner herein with
respect to her due share in the just compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the
above lots to the tune of Two 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February
Million Five Hundred Forty
Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven 8, 2003, and under its transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003
and 58/100 (P2,540,211.58)
Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an
Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is
hereby ordered to pay herein appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the
petitioner said amount
pursuant to existing rules and DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in
guidelines, minus the sum
dismissing petitioner's petition.
already paid per Order
dated January 2, 2003. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
8
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURTA Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The
QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB. determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN matters involving the implementation of agrarian
DECLARING THAT THE APPLICABLE RULE IS reform, except those falling under the exclusive
THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE and the Department of Environment and Natural
PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT Resources (DENR) x x x
OF JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED
BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special
2002.[4] Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the
Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just prosecution of all criminal offenses under this
Act. x x x
compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all
Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case
the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory provision of the for decision.
2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to
adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of
governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of
the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and
filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is
exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just
the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not
compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal
the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules
offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the
prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just
RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator
compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested
on land valuation and preliminary determination of just
in the courts.
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board,
In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive
The court rules in the negative. jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions for
9
determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that
Section 57 of RA No. 6657. there is nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[7] the Court upheld the RTC's
implementation of agrarian reform, which includes
jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for determination of just the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive
compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation. The
was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the
first refers to administrative proceedings, while the
determination of land valuation. The Court held: second refers to judicial proceedings.
It is clear from Sec. 57 Thus, the trial court did not err in taking
that the RTC, sitting as a Special cognizance of the case as the determination of just
Agrarian Court, has original and compensation is a function addressed to the courts
exclusive jurisdiction over all of justice.[10]
petitions for the determination
of just compensation to
landowners. This original and In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[11] where the issue was
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's
DAR would vest in petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency
administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated
cases and make the RTC an
that:
appellate court for the review
of administrative decisions.
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of
Thus, although the new rules
property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the
speak of directly appealing the
power of eminent domain by the State. The
decision of adjudicators to the
valuation of property or determination of just
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57
essentially a judicial function which is vested with
that the original and exclusive
the courts and not with administrative agencies.
jurisdiction to determine such
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance
cases is in the RTCs. Any effort
of respondent's petition for determination of just
to transfer such jurisdiction to
compensation.[12]
the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the
RTCs into an appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary
to Sec. 57 and, therefore, The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just
would be void. Thus, direct compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003
resort to the SAC [Special
Agrarian Court] by private DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:
respondent is valid.
Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring
properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos the matter to the Board by filing with the
complaint for determination of just compensation. It Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal
must be stressed that although no summary withinfifteen (15) days from receipt of the
administrative proceeding was held before the resolution. The filing of a Motion for
DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt
initially determining the value of Wycoco's land the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of aggrieved party may file the appeal within the
1990.[8] x x x remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than
five (5) days.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[9] wherein Land Bank Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure
on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the
questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited
reglementary period provided shall be deemed a
reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, butinstead filed a petition to fix concurrence by such party with the land valuation,
just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:
10
hence said valuation shall become final and that respondent judge issued a hold departure order against her on
executory. October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97
which provides that hold departure orders shall be issued only in
Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an
who disagrees with the decision of the Board may opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order.
contest the same by filing an original action with
the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge
over the subject property within fifteen (15) days admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the
from his receipt of the Board's decision. Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished
a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he
instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of
Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997,
he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order
Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process,
provides: respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly
notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge
Determination and Payment of Just erred in issuing the assailed hold departure order, recommended that
Compensation The decision of the Adjudicator on he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of
land valuation and preliminary determination and the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.
to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
only one motion for reconsideration. courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that
hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is a power vested in the
within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of
courts.[13] Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges
to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. The
adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has
not been remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due
change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original
diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and
and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was
circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt
Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore,
petitions for the determination of just compensation.[14] In accordance cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in
their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge
with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.
the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction In recent cases,[1] involving similar violations, this Court imposed
the penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same penalty
over the subject matter is conferred by law.[15] Only a statute can confer should be imposed on respondent judge.
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED
procedure cannot.[16] with the warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
SO ORDERED.
on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago,
Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP JJ., concur.
4. Foz v. People (2009)
No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court,
3. Mondejar v. Buban (2001) Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant
Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious
irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07- of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying
CR-133 entitled People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Arlette Mondejar for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged
11
The second operation, done by Dr.
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the Portigo's recommendee, was
RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were devastating to the family and the
patient herself who woke to find
charged with the crime of libel committed as follows: out her anus and vagina closed and
a hole with a catheter punched on
her right side.
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
This was followed by a bad news
this court, both the accused as columnist and
that she had cancer.
Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a
daily publication with a considerable circulation in
Dr. Portigo recommended another
the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did
operation, this time to bore
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
another hole on the left side of
with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar
made the referral frankly turned it
Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in
down because it would only be a
Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring
waste of money since the disease
and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
was already on the terminal state.
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in
the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5,
The company and the family spent
1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO,
some P150,000.00 to pay for the
COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder,
wrong diagnosis of the company
to wit:
physician.
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
My sympathy for Lita and her
COMPANY PHYSICIAN
family. May the good Lord, Healer
of all healers, be on your side, May
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to
the Healer of all healers likewise
help to do all their best to promote
touch the conscience of physicians
the health of their patients.
to remind them that their
Especially if they are employed by a
profession is no license for self-
company to serve its employees.
enrichment at the expense of the
poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed
However, the opposite appears to
away, July 2, 1994.
be happening in the Local San
Miguel Corporation office, SMC
Lita is not alone. Society is replete
employees are fuming mad about
with similar experience where
their company physician, Dr.
physicians treat their patients for
Portigo, because the latter is not
profits. Where physicians prefer to
doing well in his sworn obligation in
act like agents of multinational
looking after the health problems
corporations prescribing expensive
of employees, reports reaching
drugs seen if there are equivalent
Aim.. Fire say.
drugs sold at the counter for much
lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of
hospitals, owned by a so-called
employee Wilfredo Payunan, and
charitable religious institutions and
residing in Burgos,
so-called civic groups, too greedy
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to
for profits. Instead of promoting
say about Dr. Portigo. Her story
baby-and mother-friendly
began September 19 last year
practices which are cheaper and
when she felt ill and had to go to
more effective, they still prefer the
Dr. Portigo for consultation. The
expensive yet unhealthy practices.
doctor put her under observation,
taking seven months to conclude
The (sic) shun breast feeding and
that she had rectum myoma and
promote infant milk formula
must undergo an operation.
although mother's milk is many
times cheaper and more nutrious
Subsequently, the family sought
(sic) than the brands they peddle.
the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr.
These hospitals separate newly
de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital.
born from their moms for days,
Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also
conditioning the former to milk
maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got
formula while at the same time
angry, sources said, after knowing
stunting the mother's mammalia
that the family chose a surgeon (Dr.
from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
Celis) on their own without his nod
death!
as he had one to recommend.
My deepest sympathy to the
Lita was operated by Dr. de los
bereaved family of Mrs. Lita
Reyes last March and was released
Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her
from the hospital two weeks after.
body lies at the Payunan residence
Later, however, she again
located at 236-G Burgos St.,
complained of difficulty in urinating
Lapaz, Iloilo City.May you rest in
and defecating[. On] June 24, she
peace, Inday Lita.
was readmitted to the hospital.
12
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting
in high sense of professional integrity, trust and Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of
responsibility expected of him as a physician, which defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as
imputation and insinuation as both accused knew
were entirely false and malicious and without columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an
foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous,
opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the
offensive and derogatory to the good name,
character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion
Portigo.
columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and article was an opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive
the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay
rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and
Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE News, did not have to share those views and should not be held
DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353
and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised responsible for the crime of libel.
Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1)
Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not
Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was
fine of P1,000.00 each.[7]
established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing
anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an
that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded
Order[8] dated February 20, 1998.
finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result
affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
of the case − a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in
denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following
court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed
grounds:
whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN information charging them with libel did not contain allegations
THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of
AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their
FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER
OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not
ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
precluded from doing so.
COLUMNISTS.[9]
13
It is noted that it was only in his petition the offense: Provided, however, That where one of
with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the the offended parties is a public officer whose office
trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. is in the City of Manila at the time of the
Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection commission of the offense, the action shall be filed
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or
over the offense charged may be raised or of the city or province where the libelous article is
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage printed and first published, and in case such public
of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
case cannot be conferred upon the court by the the province or city where he held office at the time
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such of the commission of the offense or where the
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority libelous article is printed and first published and in
which organized the court, and is given only by law case one of the offended parties is a private
in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of
exception to this rule was recognized by this Court First Instance of the province or city where he
beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. actually resides at the time of the commission of
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed
jurisdiction by the court which rendered the and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
questioned ruling was considered to be barred by
laches, we find that the factual circumstances In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360
involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the were restated as follows:
departure from the general rule are not present in
the instant criminal case.[11]
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a
private person, the criminal action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city
The Court finds merit in the petition. where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that: 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense Instance of the province where he actually resided at
should have been committed or any one of its the time of the commission of the offense.
essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the First Instance of Manila.
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding
committed outside of that limited territory. office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the the Court of First Instance of the province or city
criminal case is determined by the allegations in where he held office at the time of the commission
the complaint or information. And once it is so of the offense.[15]
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense was committed
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous
supplied.)[13]
article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where
the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written offense.
defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this
shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:
means, shall be responsible for the same. That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994
in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
for the defamations contained therein to the same region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
extent as if he were the author thereof. feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the
virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner
cases of written defamations, as provided for in this in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to
with the court of first instance of theprovince or public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and
city where the libelous article is printed and first publish in the regular issue of said daily publication
published or where any of the offended parties on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR.
actually resides at the time of the commission of PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN....
14
a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire
The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication Philippines, the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to
with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first
region only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in publication of the alleged libelous article.
considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a
was printed and first published in Iloilo City. private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence
of which reads: of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not
That on or about March 1995, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing
and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with
in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible
others whose true names, real identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.
one another, with malicious intent of impeaching
the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of
one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel
General of the Philippines, and with the evident
purpose of injuring and exposing him to public alleged that the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the
ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the
published in Smart File, a magazine of general community, the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish
circulation in Manila, and in their respective
capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court
....[17]
explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest of abode provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency; no particular length of
jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance time of residence is required. However, the
with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition: residence must be more than temporary. The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one
reveals that the word published is utilized in the must abide in a place where he had a house therein.
precise context of noting that the defendants To create a residence in a particular place, two
cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine fundamental elements are essential: The actual
of general circulation in Manila. The Information bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely
states that the libelous articles were published exercised intention of remaining there
in Smart File, and not that they were published permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to possible that as the Acting General Manager of the
situate where Smart File was in general circulation, Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been
and not where the libel was published or first actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations
printed. The fact that Smart File was in general did not state that he was actually residing therein
circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish when the alleged crimes were committed. It is
that it was published and first printed in Manila, in entirely possible that the private complainant may
the same way that while leading national dailies have been actually residing in another place. One
such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or who transacts business in a place and spends
the Philippine Star are in general circulation in considerable time thereat does not render such
Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are person a resident therein. Where one may have or
published and first printed in Cebu. own a business does not of itself constitute
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand residence within the meaning of the statute.
sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
the publication is in general circulation in Manila, residence there for purposes of venue.[21]
there would be no impediment to the filing of the
libel action in other locations where Smart File is in Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
general circulation. Using the example of
the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information,
would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case
for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
because these newspapers are in general circulation ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act
No. 4363 sought to avoid.[18] court.[22] Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a
RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision
private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want
Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged
that the libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
15
That on or about December 19, 1995, and
of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
jurisdiction. City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-
ranking public officer, being a member of the
24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of committing the offense in relation to office, having
obtained cash advances from the City Government
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE
THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00),
23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without
Philippine Currency, which she received by reason
prejudice. of her office, for which she is duty-bound to
liquidate the same within the period required by
SO ORDERED. law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
5. People v. Sandiganbayan (2009) fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00,
Philippine Currency, despite demands to the
PERALTA, J.: damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Before this Court is a petition[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) datedFebruary 28, 2005 dismissing The case was raffled to the Third Division of the
Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION
Amante for lack of jurisdiction. TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR
Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further The OSP filed its Opposition[5] dated December 8,
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be
as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent
Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of
OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante. those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the
OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information[3] with the not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. officials/heads.
No. 1445, which reads as follows:
16
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution[6] dated February 28, position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section
2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves
which reads: a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary
prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper
grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
court.
jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by
the movant is hereby considered moot and cite a decision[9] of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over
academic.
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it
In its Reply[10] dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office
THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF
RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES ofEsteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[11] wherein this Court ruled that an
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE. offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this The petition is meritorious.
Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.[7] According to
petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[12] thus:
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds
that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E.
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, required of public officers and employees, based on
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
committed in relation to public office. integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at
all times accountable to the people.[13]
Respondent Amante, in her Comment[8] dated January 16, P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by
P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[14]
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D.
Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases
where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher;
and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his
17
Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether officials occupying the following positions in the
or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the offense:
the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
(1) Officials of the
executive branch occupying the
This Court rules in the affirmative. positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as
grade 27 and higher, of the
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
(Republic Act No. 6758),
1995, which was again amended onFebruary 5, 1997 by R.A. No. specifically including:
(c)
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other Officials of
the
offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in diplomatic
relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no service
occupying
exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court the position
of consul and
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution higher;
of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies
(d)
in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, Philippine
army and air
2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.Verily, the pertinent
force
provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the colonels,
naval
following: captains, and
all officers of
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan higher rank;
shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving: (e)
PNP chief
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as superintend
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and ent and PNP
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and officers of
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal higher rank;
18
(f) jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
City and among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
provincial
prosecutors regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
and their
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
assistants,
and officials 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
and
prosecutors classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
in the Office
the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
of the
Ombudsman enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated
and Special
Prosecutor; are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
(4) Chairmen and Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in
members of Constitutional
relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Sandiganbayan.
Constitution; and
19
belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No.
proper regional or municipal trial court.
1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
In the case at bar, the accused is a
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies
enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to
(g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad
No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of
in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to
Section 89 of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines which is not a case falling under the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long
Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended. This being the case, the principle as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with
declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused
because as stated, the charge must involve a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had
position of the accused is one of those enumerated the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,
public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since
she is being prosecuted of an offense not the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in
mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general
relation to his office.[17] Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive
qualification that accused must be a public official
occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a Secretary,[18] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held
requirement before this Court could exercise
jurisdiction over her. And since the accused that:
occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then
she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the The phrase other offenses or felonies is
Sandiganbayan. too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the
accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he
Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan[16] where this Court ruled that the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[19] where the
amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner,
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine contained allegations that the accused, petitioner
herein, took advantage of his official functions as
the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense committed the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal
councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and
in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech
public official involved was a member of theSangguniang critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based
on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A.
connected with the discharge of petitioners official
No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein
said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the it held that the accused was performing his official
provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing and that accuseds violent act was
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on precipitated by complainants criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of
Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in the municipality, during the latters privilege
relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as speech. It was his response to private complainants
attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
amended, provides that: would not have been irritated or angered by
whatever private complainant might have said
during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the
b. Other offenses or felonies committed
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
by public officials and employees mentioned in
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[22] The
under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the
exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is
assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section Division) dated February 28, 2005 isNULLIFIED and SET
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the
offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an 6. Serana v. Sandiganbayan (2008)
element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and
REYES, R.T., J.:
felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at
(1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term offense committed in relation to ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
[an accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid
down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and bayan?
to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613
(1960)]. The principle set out inMontilla v. Hilario is The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition
that an offense may be considered as committed in
for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot
exist without the office such that the office [is] a Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her
constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice motion for reconsideration.
Concepcion, said that although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,
the facts in a particular case may show that The Antecedents
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and
Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]
officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
enumerated.It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that Annex.[4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
21
source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. [5] The which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8]It has no jurisdiction over
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers),
alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X,
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise reconsideration.[17] The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of dated February 4, 2004.[18]
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx Issue
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19]
the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely:
provision of law?
(a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board
of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her
exclusively exercises the general powers of
office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to Estrada, not from the government.
the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2)
To prescribe rules for its own government and to
Our Ruling
enact for the government of the university such
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to
law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation The petition cannot be granted.
of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
University; to fix their compensation, hours of quash is not correctible by certiorari.
service, and such other duties and conditions as it
may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
23
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition dismiss the case.
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668),
rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial,
for certiorari and dismissed the amended
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their complaint.
motion to quash.[20]Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this
Court granted the petition for certiorari after the
such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of denied by respondent judge and ordered him to
desist from further action in the criminal case
appeals in a single action.[22] except to dismiss the same.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge remain at all times accountable to the people.[29]
from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon
the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]
24
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to
simple or complexed with other crimes committed
P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their
No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of office.
the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant
jurisdiction over the following: to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall In cases where none of the accused are occupying
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
involving: higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
Code, where one or more of the accused are their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
officials occupying the following positions in the Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
the offense: appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city over petitions of similar nature, including quo
department heads; warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or
which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
assessors, engineers, and other city department exclusive of the Supreme Court.
heads;
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
occupying the position of consul and higher; Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
captains, and all officers of higher rank; Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
occupying the position of provincial director and Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
those holding the rank of senior superintended or the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
higher; shall represent the People of the Philippines, except
in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the In case private individuals are charged as co-
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of employed in government-owned or controlled
government-owned or controlled corporations, corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
state universities or educational institutions or public officers and employees in the proper courts
foundations. which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade 27 and up under the Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
1989; the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
the provisions of the Constitution; proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
the Constitution; and such civil action separately from the criminal action
25
shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where
the civil action had heretofore been filed separately isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
but judgment therein has not yet been regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
said civil action shall be transferred to the
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
case may be, for consolidation and joint should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an
determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est,
abandoned.
ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases
is to be taken into view.[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A.
lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted
No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction
as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is
of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We
the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
quote:
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for
their penalties. In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the
26
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a
was later designated as the National Parks public office under our political system is therefore
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only
1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda because and by virtue of some law expressly or
R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid.,
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest
3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right
of Forest Development, Department of Natural to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices
Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of which provide for special immunity as regards
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur.
remained under the Office of the President (E.O. 881).
No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of
appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the a public office:
President and allotments for its maintenance and
operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
A public office is the right, authority and
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated invested with some portion of the sovereign
with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
the Courts ruling in Bondoc read: invested is a public officer.[42]
Petitioner UP student regent the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44]
is a public officer.
office.[47]
A public office is the right, authority, and
duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him
27
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas
the public makes one a public officer.[48] private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists
with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner
training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00),
declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50] Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
(P15,000,000.00).
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office. source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then
President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela
body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
capacity and not in relation to public office.
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to
quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of
information.[51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction
Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty.
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., while in the
which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
performance of her official functions,committing the offense in relation
warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
honesty before the courts.[58]
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this
ground.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
RESOLUTION
28
QUISUMBING, J.: companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint
counter-affidavit,[10] petitioners and their companions denied the
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a
mandamus[1] with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for
restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2
resolution[2] dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against herein Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
petitioners, and (2) the order[3] denying petitioners motion for On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the
reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental petition,[4] petitioners impugned resolution[11] recommending that both Mayor Esquivel
assail the Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without or and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel be indicted for the
beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and the People of the crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for
Philippines as additional parties in this case. grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows: dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
both residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned the aforesaid resolution.
with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No.
Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their 24777[12] for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and
respective complaint-affidavits,[5] filed before the Philippine National Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778[13] for grave
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and
Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the
Esquivel,[6] municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As
Eboy Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for
illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, reconsideration/reinvestigation[14] with the Office of the Special
and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the
Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2 assailed order[15] dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the
Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C. Ombudsman approved the OSPs order of denial.
Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police
Force of dereliction of duty. On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases,
and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that
at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings
lunch at his parents house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen, previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for
Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda, reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging
LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied them. grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering
Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45 the resolution and the order.
service pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners
COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board motion[16] reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO directing
petitioners vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall. public respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the 24777 and 24778.[17]
town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:
threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo
and said, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit 1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN
mo ako kinakalaban! (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING
accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE
municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel shoved WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN HE WAS
PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1 RELEASED FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN,
Espiritu to kill him, saying Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at NUEVA ECIJA;
report. (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a report.)
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING
what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHEN
likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE ARREST
Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against PO2 OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE
Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
with a handgun, while Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel was holding the COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE
latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT
his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his PROPERTY; and
release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police
blotter that he was in good physical condition. 3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most PETITIONERS.
likely maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He
said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided Petitioners formulation of the issues may be reduced to the
a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor following:
disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with
connections to the mayor.[7] (1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing
the filing of the informations against petitioners?
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a
medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
documentary evidence.[8]
assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office
forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.[9] of discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in
their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a
physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva
preliminary investigation and required petitioners and their
29
Ecija.[18] With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from Sandiganbayan,[34] we already held that municipal mayors fall under
claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor
and need not be proven in any other proceeding.[19] can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not
a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A.
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,[35] provides that it is only in cases
through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is where none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying
not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate that positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher [36] that exclusive
this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners in the charges original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
against them and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
threshed out in a full-blown trial.[20] court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
We find the present petition without merit. provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.[37] Note that under
the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there 27.[38] Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[21] Settled in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal
is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers cannot issue in petitioners favor.
without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. [22] Said
exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate[23] and the For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ of prohibition
courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon must also be denied.
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it
well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of has no legal claim.[39] As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much law.
the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be
decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are
complainant.[24] Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,[25] we held adequate and available.[40] Prohibition is granted only where no other
that: remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners
have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non- otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the issuance
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the of the writ.[41] In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash the
exercise of such discretion. informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only
themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown
any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the informations,
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
during their much delayed arraignment,[42] but its denial is not a proper
disputed resolution and order.
subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, interlocutory order. [43]
much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that he
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior
was in good physical condition when he was released from the police
court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are sought
headquarters.[26] Such admission was never brought up during the
to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of
preliminary investigation. The records show that no such averment was
jurisdiction.[44] The foundation of this rule is the respect and
made in petitioners counter-affidavit[27] nor was there any document
consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing
purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an
unnecessary litigation;[45] it cannot be presumed that the lower court
annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly
reconsideration.[28] In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did
presented to it.[46] The records show that petitioners only raised the
admit signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this
condition when he left the police station. However, the admission
Court.
merely applied to the execution of said document and not to the
truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the admission that Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
addressed to the public respondents appreciation. It is evidentiary in a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary
nature and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full- duty.[47] The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
blown trial on the merits. requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.[48] Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper
control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is
remedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing:
his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or
examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to correct it, however erroneous it may be. [49] Moreover, as earlier
the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary
decision, resolution or order.[29] course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of
law, mandamus will not lie.[50]
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners
merit. Costs against petitioners.
theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they
hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975.[30] As the positions of SO ORDERED.
municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein,
they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[31] Sr., JJ., concur.
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs. 8. DOJ v. Liwag (2005)
Sandiganbayan,[32] Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,[33] and Layus vs.
30
AZCUNA, J.: Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor
are they related to respondents discharge of their official duties;
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of Investigation It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office
(NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to
late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and
of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934. prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall
rule thereon with finality;[6]
The facts are as follows:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order,
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that
PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on
other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They
Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was
offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were violating the Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and
docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01- exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the
00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster
complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and their claim.
thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed
the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their
prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary
counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be
investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
dismissed.
Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses of the Order reads as follows:
executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and
circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is
the Ombudsman.[1] NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, individually and
and private individuals for the following alleged crimes: collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No.
2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time
Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong; that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction
over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it, or
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being
committed by the petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.[2]
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue
without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of
In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the
recommendation was made after taking the sworn statements of Mary issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule
Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and 58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses were
attached to the letter.[3]
SO ORDERED. [7]
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a
subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named in the Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ,
witnesses sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director
on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit their counter- Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ
affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the petition, they raise the following issues:
DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their
counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel I
of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary
Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents. DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ
Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Courts ruling in Uy v. AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
Sandiganbayan,[4] the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08,
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4
this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as
II
private respondents.[5]
The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER
Order that stated the following as basis of the denial: THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE
FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A
which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;] PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition
of 1989, provides:
puts forth one central question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ
has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman
accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being
principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
substantially the same set of facts alleged. by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such
First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case, take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and agency of Government, the investigation of such
the crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention. cases; .[10]
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect
stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and
taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the
limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of
exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting
the respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations
the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following
of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as
rationale:
ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice.
The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application
would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in
existence.[9] the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling
of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a
Now, to the merits. preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a
shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary
based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other
I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states: investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to
add an input into the Ombudsmans investigation. Only in matters
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the
provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies
both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being
and administration of the correctional system; . . . investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane
than the source of their powers with respect to such cases. This is, of
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
Department shall have the following powers and functions: ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not
ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making
recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the
...
Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such
recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.
administer the probation and correction system;
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman
... may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the
Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials,
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is the
April 11, 1978, provides: feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that
provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
32
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,[19] the settled rule is
becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint
respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.[20] Thus,
by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and
are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is
the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case
absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is
principle of agency must be recalled.[11] the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence,
it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the
exclusion of the DOJ.
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the
Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a
malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or factual situation similar to that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v.
employees.[12] To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),[21] the Court
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies. investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No.
First and foremost, it extended independence to the Ombudsman and 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court
insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to
Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but
selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut
natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the with the Office of the Ombudsman.Moreover, a close scrutiny of said
immediately preceding election.[13] The Ombudsman and his deputies case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared,
were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth
Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a cases.[22]In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the
prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to
office.[14] They were given a fixed term of seven years, without conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of
reappointment.[15] Upon their cessation from office, they are sequestration orders against petitioners assets.
prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately
succeeding election.[16]Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the In Sanchez v. Demetriou,[23] the Presidential Anti-Crime
Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner Mayor
autonomy.[17] Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a
warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were
The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only
Constitution to serve as the principal and primary complaints and the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases
action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling
maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public
usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared
investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary
initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.[18] It can investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.
inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on
reports in the media and those which come to his attention through In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[24] a letter-complaint charging
sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the Provincial
the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of
may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The
the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can
has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to file the said Information without previous authority from the
minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling
Office of the Ombudsman. Vis--vis other prosecutors, the exercise by regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again,
the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is it should be noted thatthe complaint in that case was addressed solely
given preference over other bodies. to the provincial prosecutor.
As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v.
role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act Felix[25] and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary DOJ[26] where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed
from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power
bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or
cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan is not co-equal with other orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the
the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power. Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records,
conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI
Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish and the DOJ.
the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to Not only this.
investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the
In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice.
33
Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair
either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF
trial.[27] When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific
into cash.
charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary
investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family to A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the
anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be
filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
Resolution[2] dated May 29, 2000recommending the filing against
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend
his position before every agency or body where the same complaint herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of
was filed.This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense. Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said
There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight
distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114
same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the
guilt of the respondents. were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed
expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, in a duplication of proceedings already their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
started with the Ombudsman. which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-
any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge. evaluate the cases against petitioners.
Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
evidence.
Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario andGarcia, JJ., concur.
On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.
34
Sec.13. The Office of the
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only Ombudsman shall have
with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of the following powers,
functions, and duties:
proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the
xxxx
power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), Promulgate its rules and
procedure and exercise
which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct such other functions or
duties as may be
entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude
provided by law.
that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and
Expounding on this power of Congress to
distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and prescribe other powers, functions, and
authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. duties to the Ombudsman, we quote
Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:
xxxx
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be
MR. COLAYCO:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Yes.
MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is
stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 xxxx
placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional MR. RODRIGO:
Madam
infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 President. Section 5
reads: The Tanodbayan
violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as shall continue to
1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.[6] function and exercise its
powers as provided by
law.
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the
the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld
xxxx
Pursuing the present line of reasoning,
MR. MONSOD: (reacting when one considers that by express
to statements of mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article
Commissioner Blas XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may
Ople): exercise such other powers or perform
functions or duties as may be provided by
xxxx law, it is indubitable then that Congress has
With respect the power to place the Office of the Special
to the argument that Prosecutor under the Office of the
he is a toothless animal, Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress
we would like to say may remove some of the powers granted to
that we are promoting the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and
the concept in its form transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant
at the present, but we the Office of the Special Prosecutor such
are also saying that he other powers and functions and duties as
can exercise such Congress may deem fit and wise. This
powers and functions Congress did through the passage of R.A.
as may be provided by No. 6770.[8]
law in accordance with
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag
the direction of the
thinking of v. Guerrero.[9] More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Commissioner
Rodrigo. We do not Valera,[10] the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling
think that at this time
in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a
we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
to Congress at some
future time if it feels under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
that it may need to Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
designate what powers
the Ombudsman need preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
in order that he be
more effective. This is Deputy Ombudsman.[11] The Court's ruling in Acop that the
not foreclosed. authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770
36
not what is
was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation settled. Stare
for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held decisis simply means
that for the sake of
that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case
the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to
should be applied to
the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, those that follow if the
facts are substantially
Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional the same, even though
the parties may be
powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of
different. It proceeds
the Ombudsman. from the first principle
of justice that, absent
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the any powerful
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be countervailing
considerations, like
revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this cases ought to be
decided alike.Thus,
contention deserves scant consideration. where the same
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to questions relating to
the same event have
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is been put forward by
the parties similarly
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines which
situated as in a
provides, thus: previous case litigated
and decided by a
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying competent court, the
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution rule of stare decisis is a
shall form a part of the legal system of bar to any attempt to
the Philippines. relitigate the same
issue.[16]
why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
and stability of judicial decisions, thus: over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the
latter.
Time and again, the
court has held that it is
a very desirable and
necessary judicial
practice that when a The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's
court has laid down a disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases
principle of law as
applicable to a certain is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly
and apply it to all future ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable
cases in which the facts
are substantially the cause.That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
same. Stare decisis et
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to
non quieta
movere. Stand by the correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been
decisions and disturb
37
emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of
Appeals,[18] to wit: probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
of facts and evidence is not the province of the Desierto,[22] the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse,
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem - beyond the ambit of to wit:
appeal. Incertiorari proceedings, judicial review
does not go as far as to examine and assess the Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
evidence of the parties and to weigh the and whimsical exercise of judgment
probative value thereof. It does not include an tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of Ombudsman's exercise of power must have
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
of evidence is merely an error of judgment that which must be so patent and gross as to
cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
judgment is one which the court may commit in virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of or to act at all in contemplation of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of law. x x x[23]
was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, or its conclusions power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact
of the court a quo.[19] It should also be noted that the petition does not question any
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.
evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
independence, stating thus: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to annul and set aside the Order[1] of the Ombudsman dated July 6,
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as OMB-
Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to 0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its
investigate and prosecute any act or omission
of a public officer or employee when such act or Order[2] of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper reconsideration.
or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling
of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are
supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
as the champion of the people and preserver of follows:
the integrity of public service, he has wide
latitude in exercising his powers and is free
from intervention from the three branches of
government. This is to ensure that his Office is
insulated from any outside pressure and On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
improper influence.[21] Administrative Order No. 13, which created herein petitioner
(Committee).
38
repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the loan
Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts referred by the
The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who
Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report and
instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the
recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia
Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges against
and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden
the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former
River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and
PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the
Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
respective stockholders/officers of the three corporations.
1982 for the amount of P5,551,000.00; and refinancing loan obtained The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio,
on December 1, 1982 for the amount of P7,118,656.52. Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco, stockholders of Golden River;
and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr.,
collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to the loans
Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were
obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged that
consolidated by the Office of the Ombudsman.
the above-mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to
ensure not only the viability of their operations but also their ability to
39
In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is not barred by
was ten years. Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. Applying the
Ombudsman denied it in its Order dated August 31, 1998. Constitution and the law to the present case, the Ombudsman argues
that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by
Golden River in 1982, all the other alleged criminal acts of herein private
Hence, herein petition.
respondents in connection with the loan transactions they entered into
in the years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995. Hence,
investigation.
40
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin
Resolution[6] issued by this Court dated February 22, 2006, to run from the day of the
respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be
Lorenzo Salcedo and Antonio Mendoza were dropped as respondents known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the
for an earlier resolution of the case after all efforts of petitioner to
institution of judicial
ascertain their correct and present addresses proved to be in vain. proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their The prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings
respective comments, the Court dispenses with the comments in order
are instituted against the guilty
that the present petition may be resolved. person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this The above provisions are clear and need no
interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee vs.
was the main basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner's
Hon. Desierto*, we held:
complaints. x x x it was well-nigh impossible
for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: the time the questioned
transactions were made
The right of the State to recover properties
because, as alleged, the public
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
officials concerned connived or
from them or from their nominees or transferees,
conspired with the
shall not be barred by prescription,laches,
beneficiaries of the loans. Thus,
or estoppel.
we agree with the COMMITTEE
that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto[7], the were charged should be
computed from
Court held that the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover the discovery of the
ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten commission thereof and not
from the day of such
wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other words, the prosecution of commission.
offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten The assertion by the
Ombudsman that the phrase if
wealth contemplated in the above-mentioned provision of the the same not be known in
Constitution may be barred by prescription.[8] Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does
not mean lack of knowledge but
that the crime is not reasonably
knowable is unacceptable, as it
provides an interpretation that
Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended defeats or negates the intent of
by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, the law, which is written in a
clear and unambiguous
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said Act language and thus provides no
room for interpretation but
was increased from ten to fifteen years.
only application.
We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans
As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against vs. Desierto** thus:
In cases involving violations of
herein respondents had already prescribed, the Court's disquisition on
R.A. No. 3019 committed prior
an identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto[9]is instructive, to wit: to the February
1986 Edsa Revolution that
ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the
The applicable laws on prescription of government as the aggrieved
criminal offenses defined and penalized under the party could not have known of
Revised Penal Code are found in Articles 90 and 91 the violations at the time the
of the same Code. For those penalized by special questioned transactions were
laws, Act No. 3326, as amended, applies. Here, since made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R.
R.A. 3019, the law alleged to have been violated, is No. 140232, January 19, 2001,
a special law, the applicable law in the computation 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. vs.Sandiganbayan, supra, Note
3326, as amended, which provides: 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact
Finding Committee on Behest
Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note
16). Moreover, no person
41
would have dared to question
the legality of those that the presumption of regularity of the Ombudsman's performance of
transactions. Thus, the his official duties must yield to the evidence presented by petitioner. As
counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the such, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
date of discovery of the offense
Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be considered as timely filed.
in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31,
As to when the period of
prescription was interrupted, 1998 of the Ombudsman shows that there are grounds other than late
the second paragraph of
Section 2, Act No. 3326, as filing upon which the Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion for
amended, provides Reconsideration, to wit:
that prescription is interrupted
when proceedings are xxxx
instituted against the guilty
person.[10]
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and
bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of this
case, particularly the fact that the subject loans are
now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans,
The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the
the same remains to be bare allegations with no new
exact dates when the alleged offenses were discovered. However, it is evidence tendered to thwart the Order in question.
not disputed that it was the Committee that discovered the same. As
such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than October 13, The complaints herein are plain and
simple. There is no allegation even that the
1992, the date when the Committee was created. It is clear, therefore, questioned loans were granted at the behest of
respondent officials in these cases x x x.
that the alleged criminal offenses against herein respondents had not
x x x x[12]
yet prescribed when the complaints were filed in 1996. Thus, the
complaints was not merely the prescription of the complaints, but also
the lack of any allegation therein that the questioned loans are behest
As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the
loans.
Ombudsman to deny petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the
in Manila stating therein that Registered Letter No. 74220 was sent by
the PCGG on July 29, 1998, addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman (a) It is under-collateralized;
in Manila, and that said letter was duly delivered to and received on
(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
August 5, 1998 by an authorized representative of the Office of the
(c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman failed to controvert petitioner's
officials, like the presence of marginal notes;
submission in any of the pleadings filed in the present petition. A simple
referral to the date that appears on the front page of the Motion for (d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower
Reconsideration, indicating the date when the Office of the corporation are identified as cronies;
that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case should
Hon. Desierto,[14] the Ombudsman adopted the position that to qualify A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman shows
as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria enumerated in that there is no express finding that the complaints filed by petitioner
Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present. were manifestly without merit. There is no explanation or discussion,
case that the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon were bereft of any
allegations that their questioned loans are behest, considering that said Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS
complaints explicitly alleged the presence of two of the criteria: that the and Filcarbon, the Court finds it necessary to refer them back to the
subject loans are under-collateralized and that the borrower Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on their merits.
Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the complaint against it with respect to its loan transactions obtained
Ombudsman, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982. The Court finds no cogent
of the Ombudsman, provides: reason to deviate from the findings of the Ombudsman, to wit:
Discussing these two loans, we find that in
1980, Golden River Corporation was granted a
SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint,
refinance in the amount of P14,724,430 pesos. Such
the investigating officer shall recommend whether it
grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less than 50% of
may be:
the said P14,724,430 pesos, hence, this cannot be
said to be granted with insufficient collateral, taking
the same as reference point alone without the
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; previous collaterals and assets which were
b) referred to respondent for comment; admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in
paragraph b, p. 2 of the Sworn Statement of Orlando
c) indorsed to the proper government L. Salvador (p. 10, Records, OMB-0-96-2644)
office or agency which has jurisdiction over
the case; xxx
demands that the Ombudsman must set forth in a Resolution the In other words, collaterals were sufficient
in accordance with Sec. 78, R.A. 337, as amended
reasons for such dismissal.
(General Banking Act) x x x[17]
form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with the
Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the
inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the
complaints without requiring respondents to file their counter-
complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite relevant is
affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further require petitioner to
the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman[18] and
clarify its evidence or adduce additional evidence.
reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding
Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act
otherwise.[21] The basis for this rule was provided in the case of consolidating the three complaints and of issuing a single order for
of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman[22] where the Court held as follows: their dismissal considering that, with the exception of the complaint
regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River which was
While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Except with
discretion of the Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion,[24] the
respect to the complaints relative to the loan accounts of Golden River
Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in dismissing the
obtained on March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982, the assailed
complaint against Golden River insofar as the two 1982 loan
Orders of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 and August 31, 1998 in
transactions are concerned.
OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645 are SET ASIDE.
However, the complaint against Golden River had not been completely
The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an
disposed of by the Ombudsman as it failed to discuss the refinancing
evaluation on the respective merits of the complaints against herein
loan obtained by the said corporation in 1980 for the amount
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule II of its Rules
of P14,724,430.00. Hence, the complaint against Golden River should
of Procedure.
also be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary
to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules under the Information.[8]
of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which the
69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution[2] which denied the RTC denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.[10]
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[11] with the CA, but the
The facts are of record. latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation Petitioners motion for reconsideration[12] was also denied.
of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and
for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of following:
Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court, 1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the 31, 2000, when the Information for
Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted
Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in against the Petitioner, had the authority to file
the custody and possession of public funds in the the same in light of this Supreme Courts ruling
amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, in the First Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case, which
representing the value of her collections and other declared that the prosecutorial powers of the
accountabilities, for which she is accountable by Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by
reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity the Sandiganbayan.
and committing the offense in relation to office,
taking advantage of her public position, with 2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then issued by the Supreme Court dated February
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously 22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can
appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused,
convert to her own personal use and benefit said without violating the constitutional provision
amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and on ex-post facto laws and denial of the
demands made upon her account for said public accused to due process.[13]
funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of
issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001. case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no
prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the
of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision
conduct the preliminary investigation and file the in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence,
salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that
the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[4] petitioner further argued that as time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers
she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against over the case.
her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted
only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose The petition lacks merit.
prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.[5] The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v.
on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the
charged.[7] Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:
Ombudsman in the case, pointing outthat in Uy, upon motion for
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation
clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9,
invoking the very same resolution promulgated
45
on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan employees. Indeed, it must be
reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory stressed that the powers
power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases granted by the legislature to
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. the Ombudsman are very broad
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the and encompass all kinds of
said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has malfeasance, misfeasance and
powers to prosecute not only graft cases within non-feasance committed by
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also public officers and employees
those cognizable by the regular courts. It held: during their tenure of office.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution
of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati
in Uy, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases
cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South
pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative Cotabato which includes General Santos City (city), assailing that
ruling on the issue. portion of the Resolution[2] dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of the
(Judge Adre), former City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan),
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,
Register of Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management
constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such
Officer III of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing
one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent (PENRO) of South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional Technical
of that law.[18] Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga)
in Uyinterpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of (respondents).
the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and
interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective reserve for recreational and health resort site
application.[19] But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, purposes, under the administration of the
municipality of General Santos, subject to private
a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the
the moment of its legislation.[20] public domain situated in the said municipality and
more particularly described as follows:
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation
in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it
The Municipal Government
vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the
of General Santos Magsaysay Park
public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the
Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D)
situated in the barrio of
same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back Dadiangas, Municipality of General
to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner. area of 52,678 square meters.
On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar
applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent over Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the
portions of Lot X, to be divided as follows (refer to Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the
affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75): sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the
private sale of the subject lots to the above-named
Applicants Area applied applicants-respondents, without public auction
(refer to sample letter-report of recommendation
1. Mad Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent
CENR Officer, Renato Rivera, also issued
2. Oliver Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; recommendation letters for each of the sixteen
applicants addressed to the PENR Officer for the
3. Jonathan Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and of
the private sale (please refer to sample
4. Alex Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o],
Record, p. 78).
5. Jack Guiwan - 999 sq. m.;
A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz
6. Nicolas Ynot - 999 sq. m.; also on the same date stating therein that
on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold
7. Carlito Flaviano III - 999 sq. m.; (Record, p. 79).
8. Jolito Poralan - 999 sq. m.; On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates
of Titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
9. Miguela Cabi-ao - 999 sq. m.; General Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra,
which titles were also signed by respondent
10. Jose Rommel Saludar - 999 sq. m.; Augustus Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive
Director, to wit:
11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.;
Name of Owner OCT No. Lot Record
12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.; No. Page No.
13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.; 1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;
14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.; 2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;
15. Arsenio delos Reyes, - 510 sq. m.; and, 3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
Jr.
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent
Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land Management 6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
Inspector, recommended for the approval of the
survey authority requested by the above-named 7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-
private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418). 100;
Within the same day, the Survey Authority was 8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-
issued to private respondents by public respondent 103;
CENR Officer Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a
result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots 9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-
(refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32). 106;
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita 10. Jose Rommel P-6388 X-10 107-
T. Nuez, assisted by respondent City Legal Officer Saludar 109;
Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to
application documents, Record, pp. 421-500) 11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-
addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X 112;
applied by private respondents and stated therein
that this office interposes no objection to whatever 12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-
legal proceedings your office may pursue on 115;
application covering portions thereof after the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-
excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the 117;
49
14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-
120; have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the
charges against the respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was
15. Arsenio delos P-6395-A X-15 121-
Reyes 123; disposed in this wise:
with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver 5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN
GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO
Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL
SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each as
Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio conspirator in the falsification of public document
relative to the corresponding unilateral Deed of
de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;
Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty.
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and
Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of
section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the
(g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[5] as amended, and government inn the correct amount of taxes due
for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and
for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of
Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor Nuez Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUEZ,
AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE,
and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO
DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby
the Ombudsman opined that the validity of the Compromise
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of
Agreement had been settled when the Office of the Solicitor General criminal cases against private respondents, for
offenses committed not in conspiracy with the
(OSG) and the RTC found it to be in order. The Ombudsman also ruled herein public respondents, by the proper parties-
in-interest.
that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of
the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to SO RESOLVED.[6]
50
existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city.
On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration Likewise, in their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997,
which was, however, denied by the Ombudsman in his instead of opposing the applications of Mad Guaybar and his
Order[7] dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that since the companions, Mayor Nuez and Nalangan endorsed the same
criminal Informations were already filed against the aforementioned and interposed no objection thereto. Said Indorsement was
indicted and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan part of the grand conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the
and the regular courts ofGeneral Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost resale of the said property to AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the
jurisdiction over the said case. city. Petitioner submits that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan also
Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that: 1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo
Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence 4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the
pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and Motion for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before Judge
those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the assailed
X of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of a grand conspiracy, RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the
petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and RTC that upon verification, they did not find in the records
involvement of each respondent, as follows: any deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop.
for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of Mad 5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is
Guaybar and his companions. The same Order was likewise not disposable and alienable and is, therefore, not a proper
used by Mayor Nuez and Nalangan as the reason for subject of a sales patent application. Despite such knowledge
interposing no objection to the said applications. The assailed and based on the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera,
RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years after Momongan allowed Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad
his Judgment based on the Compromise Agreement had long Guaybar and his companions by approving their
become final; thus, it was issued with grave abuse of miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original
discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre, Certificates of Title (OCTs) covering the subdivided lots of Lot
therefore, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false reports,
the properties of the city, that Lot X of theMagsaysay Park is 6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of
owned by the city and reserved as health and recreation site. documents and titles may be considered as ministerial, the
Yet, Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the circumstances under which the titles were issued in the
assailed RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was no names of Mad Guaybar and his companions and eventually,
51
in the name of AFP-RSBS, indicate that Cruzabra was aware have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for the
and was part of the grand conspiracy to defraud the city. Each Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.[12]
Flaviano claimed and received the owners' copies of the 2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy
OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint exists between her and other respondents charged before
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to
be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of selling their Cruzabra refer to recorded transactions which are legal acts.
respective lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said Such allegations did not discuss how the alleged conspiracy
SPA in their respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty. was committed; they are merely conjectures and bare
Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and
Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of there is no convincing evidence to support such allegations,
Internal Revenue (BIR) on the same day the capital gains tax the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
and documentary stamp tax due thereon. On the same day, Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain
Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in lieu thereof, any restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As
twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of such, Cruzabra submits that it would be most unfair if she
AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were transferred and would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply
registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by because she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of
virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the registered Deeds.[13]
owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that
Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions; 3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional
instead, she allowed the transfer and registration of the said Executive Director of the DENR, he is duly authorized to sign
lots to AFP-RSBS so swiftly, that it could only be interpreted patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard
as part of the scheme to defraud the city.[9] procedure and processes were complied with, Momongan
disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park. 4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution[15] of the
applications, and he may rely on the data submitted by the (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been
CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.[17] Moreover, Borinaga committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be
argues that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided,
That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of entertained.
time.[18] The Certification[19] dated October 1, 2003, issued by
reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect
Our Ruling
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
53
the issue on the participation of each respondent in
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, the titling of Lot X, whether the same would
which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other
illegal acts.
courts, in much the same way that courts would be swamped by a
1. Respondent Abednego Adre His participation
deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the
extends only to his issuance of an Order excluding
part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information Lot-X from the coverage of the Compromise
Agreement.
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[24]
A review of the terms and conditions of the subject
Compromise Agreement confirms the Order of the
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The
Order of respondent judge was made in accordance
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the with the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy
finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that respondent judge assisted in preserving the
claim of the government
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in of General Santos City over Lot X by enjoining the
donation of said property by the private
this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,[25] where respondents.
we laid down the following exceptions to the rule:
2. Respondents Nuez and Nalangan Said
respondents participation in the titling of Lot-X was
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection when they issued or caused the issuance of
to the constitutional rights of the accused; Indorsements stating therein that this office (Office
of the Mayor) interposes no objection to whatever
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of legal proceedings your (CENRO) office may pursue
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of on the application covering portions thereof (Lot-X).
actions;
The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub above, cannot be construed as a waiver on the part
judice; of General Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On
the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the
excess of authority; titling of the property. Moreover, it should be
taken into account that DENR has the
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, responsibility, authority and the power to grant
ordinance or regulation; alienable and disposable lands to deserving
claimants.
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the to prove that respondents Nuez and Nalangan gave
offense; unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing
said Indorsements. In fact, they protected the
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than interest of the government over Lot-X by
prosecution; immediately filing a case for nullification of titles
upon knowing of the issuances thereof.
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; xxxx
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case [5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito
against the accused and a motion to quash on that Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan, Asteria E.
ground has been denied. Cruzabra Based on the evidences on record, these
respondents were in the regular performance of
their official functions. Their participation in the
titling of Lot-X was due to the fact that the
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an
documents for titling were submitted to their
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of respective offices as a matter of course, and there
is nothing that they can do but to follow the
passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to established procedure upon finding that all the
documents for titling were submitted.[27]
evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by,
or in contemplation of law.[26]
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner
found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant
from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar- the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect,
54
All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
(1) The accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former; dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents.
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest Peter L. Sesbreo filed a Verified Complaint[1] dated March 2, 2004
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable against respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter
neglect.[29] with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to Criminal Case
No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.
Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints
against Enrique Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuez (Nuez), Edna
the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have been done
Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the
with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. Bad Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave
Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned
faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law; bad to respondent judges branch and subsequently consolidated for
faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral disposition.
judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued
a Consolidated Resolution[2] dated May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting
for arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority. Except for
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the Marcelino who failed to appear during the arraignment, all of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating accused were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a warrant for
Marcelinos arrest.
with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior
Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants Urgent
purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by the Manifestation[3] dated February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused were
also charged with violation of Republic Act No. 10[4] (R.A. 10) and
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or
praying that warrants of arrest be likewise issued against all of the
intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to accused.
consequences as far as other persons may be affected.[30] Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued
an Order[5] dated February 12, 2004 stating that a charge for violation
of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for Usurpation of
Authority but was not resolved due to oversight. However, since the
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no
statute only applies to members of seditious organizations engaged in
showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective subversive activities pursuant toPeople v. Lidres,[6] and considering that
the complaint failed to allege this element, respondent judge found no
acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is good faith, not bad probable cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10.
faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied complainants prayer for
Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the
records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for
springs from the fountain of good conscience.[31] review.
commission of the crime charged indicative of a common Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b),
Rule 112 of the Rules when she refused to issue warrants of arrest
design.[33] This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish. against the accused. Complainant also faults respondent judge for
55
allegedly motu proprio reconsidering her Consolidated discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private
Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.
Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.
In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who,
Complaint[7] dated March 26, 2004, respondent judge counters that the with or without pretense of official position, shall perform any act
issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge. Since pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority or public
she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she found it officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be punished with
unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10)
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has years. Violation thereof is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court but
been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO subject to preliminary investigation.
can take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus,
she acted in accordance with law when she forwarded the records of Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she
the case to the PPO for review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman conducted the preliminary examination of the complaints.
as complainant insists. Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found no
probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case. Therefore,
Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreo when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
of falsification, and the latter of violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of case for lack of probable cause, she was acting in accordance with the
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, the affidavit which procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of
was attached to the instant verified complaint was not notarized by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Atty. Raul Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty. Sesbreo was
allegedly convicted of Homicide and may have been suspended from
Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be
the practice of law.
forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office on review. Sec. 5 of
Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainants Reply Rule 112 provides that the resolution of the Investigating Judge is
To Respondents Comment Dated March 26, 2004[8] dated May 11, 2004. subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor, or the
He further contends that there is no provision in the Ombudsman Act Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.
of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be the Deputized
Ombudsman Prosecutor as respondent judge contends. He adds that It is respondent Judges contention that the resolution shall be
respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 8 reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant to
since she has yet to forward her resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman. the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of R.A. No. 10.
Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to
his complaint was notarized by Atty. Corro as certified by a member of
the latters staff. Complainant also disproves respondent judges However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989
allegation that Atty. Sesbreo is in the habit of filing administrative provides that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the Ombudsman to
complaints against judges, explaining that the latter merely acted as act as special investigator or prosecutor only on certain cases. Such
counsel for litigants who filed administrative complaints against certain provision is not applicable to the issue at hand. Therefore, respondent
judges. Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to the Provincial
Prosecutors Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that
In another Verified Complaint[9] filed on March 18, 2004, respondent Judge was motivated by bad faith when she issued the
complainant further charges respondent with violating Sec. 9(b), Rule assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error for which she
112 of the Rules. could not be held administratively accountable absent any proof of
fraud or other evil motive.[14]
Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss
Administrative Complaint[10] dated May 7, 2004 clarifying that contrary
to complainants allegation, she did not conduct a preliminary A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a
investigation in the case for Usurpation of Authority. What was complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge for violation of by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without
R.A. 10. It was her resolution dismissing the charge for violation of R.A. regard to the fine.[15] Thus, a preliminary investigation is not required
10 which was transmitted to the PPO for appropriate action. However, nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the
since the charges for violation of R.A. 10 and Usurpation of Authority Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision correccional in its
were contained in a single complaint, respondent judge deemed it minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day
proper to forward the entire records to the PPO. to four (4) years and two (2) months.[16]
Complainant filed a Complainants Reply To Respondents This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said
Comment Dated May 7, 2004[11] dated May 20, 2004 substantially section provides:
reiterating his allegations.
Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by
The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a the Rule on Summary Procedure.
supplemental complaint per the notation in the Memorandum[12] dated
June 25, 2004.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court.If the complaint or
In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit
conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation of Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in
Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after
appear during trial; in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004 the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable
dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally
records of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman. examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of
instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit but that respondent additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine
judge should be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no
of her duties.[13] It made the following findings: probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten
(10) days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the
A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
reveals that there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and
requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no
the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
56
Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed Deputy Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of
directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in Sec. the Ombudsman.
3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge finds no
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, in accordance with law when she forwarded the case for violation of
or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the
hold the latter for trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the
merely issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he does not find Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite
it necessary to place the accused under custody. another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have taken the
necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the disposition of the case.
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused even
after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
the form of searching questions for the determination of whether order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official
probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly,
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judges it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or
sound judgment.[17] some other like motive. Respondent judges actuations are hardly
indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay the case which
Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law.[22]
case to the prosecutor for review.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED
In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure, for lack of merit. Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED
found probable cause to hold the accused for trial for the charge of to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.
Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set their arraignment and the
pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the course of action taken by SO ORDERED.
respondent judge. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Neither is there merit in complainants contention that Nazario, JJ., concur.
respondent judge should have issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused for their failure to appear during the initial presentation of 14. Punzalan v. Dela Pea (2004)
evidence for the prosecution for the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
during trial is discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, there is nothing in
the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for non-
appearance of the accused during trial. Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the June 6, 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and
Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners motion for
failed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her Consolidated reconsideration.
Resolution dated May 6, 2003. Nonetheless, she asserts in
her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss,
Complaint[18] dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio
investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near
charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan,
presented. Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin, and several others
preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge.[19] Thus, when arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili
respondent judge dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she and sumbrero mo?[2] Dela Pea replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay
merely did so to correct an oversight. pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.[3] Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio
slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group
Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody
was the dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated shouted, Yariin na yan![4] Thereafter, Alex Toto Ofrin kicked Dela Pea
to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able
to transmit the entire records of the case to the PPO knowing that the to run. The group chased him.
charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the records of the
case. Respondent judge should have ensured that at least one complete While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas
set of the records remained in her sala so that the prosecution for family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara
Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael
actuation was, we do not agree with complainant that respondent Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away
judge was motivated by an evil intent to delay the case. from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan
on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran towards the
This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have latters house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and
transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge when they got to the Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan,
of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo![5] Dela Pea, Cagara, and Plata
PPO. Complainant asserts that since the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the station to seek assistance.
primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.
As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide[6] and against
8[20] entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara
Ombudsman, which provides that all prosecutors are now deputized and Dela Pea filed several counter-charges[7] for grave oral defamation,
Ombudsman prosecutors. Moreover, [R]esolutions in Ombudsman grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries
cases[21] against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by
assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S.
Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Pea against Alex
Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the Toto Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).
approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take
appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in In their counter-affidavit,[8] the Punzalans argued that the
the proper regular court or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them from
charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm
more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the
57
Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against
Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan, Alex Toto Ofrin.[16]
mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as
hearing distance of other people, told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong follows:
ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the
pa kita ng trabaho.[9] In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered questioned Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and
the alleged defamatory statements. 11 October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and
City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander Toto Ofrin,
Rosalinda Punzalan,[10] holding that Cagara failed to show that the Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz,
alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.
actionable.[11] The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby
and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because affirmed insofar as it directed the withdrawal of information for two (2)
complainant Dela Peas claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms counts of other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin.
part of the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case
SO ORDERED.[17]
previously filed by Rainier against the latter.[12]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[18] Hence, the
Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of
instant petition raising the following assignment of errors:
Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero
issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the I
Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others (1) that the charge
of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND
Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex Toto OCTOBER 11, 2000.
Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive portion of
II
the Resolution reads:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY
of Mandaluyong City is directed to file information for three (3) counts
THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND
of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for
WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.
two (2) counts [of] other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin;
information for attempted homicide against Alexander Toto Ofrin, III
Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES,
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE INTENT
for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap, TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN
Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander Toto Ofrin, Herson MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.[19]
Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino Bobby Serrano, and
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is
John Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against
hereof.
petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against
SO ORDERED.[13] petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide.
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together The petition is impressed with merit.
with their co-respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the the Rules of Court, which provides:
movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger. excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier, amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
the Secretary held that the allegations in support thereof should first appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Pea failed to prove the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
dispositive portion thereof reads: tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is justice may require.
REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal,
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
separate informations for slight oral defamation, other light threats, without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor
respondents and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in
receipt hereof. the judges findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of
SO ORDERED.[14] law and fact, appeal is the remedy.[20]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished
Resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 11, thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the
2000.[15] legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority
On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his
with the Court of Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of jurisdiction.[21] In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v.
Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation Sandiganbayan,[22] it was held that grave abuse of discretion implies a
against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier,
58
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not
of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case ofSamson, et al. v.
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty Guingona[27] that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise
must be grave.[23] of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown
grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and to have been made with grave abuse.[28]
October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. of Appeals dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003
Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly whenever denying petitioners motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, directing the
direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
and decision of subordinate officials or units.[24] attempted homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.
In the case of People v. Peralta,[25] we reiterated the rule that the No pronouncement as to costs.
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion
the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of SO ORDERED.
which depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna,
prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,[26] we JJ., concur.
declared that:
A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion 15. People v. Duca (2009)
to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been
shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
presented by the petitioner.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during
a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the
executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is Decision[1] dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals
not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to
prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are
convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be The CA decision reversed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-
discretion in the discharge of this function.
D[3] which affirmed an earlier decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is
within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent
that of the Secretary of Justice.
Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City
Penal Code.
Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the
other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion. The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:
and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held: the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the
to be heard.[18]
And in Labaro v. Panay,[13] the Court held:
RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of
General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET
respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of ASIDE and the case isREMANDED to the CA for further
Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party,
proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.
in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent
failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a
SO ORDERED.
copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.[21] The service
appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondents failure
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition
no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead
assailed decision.
On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant
reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies
only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against
civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
63