The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology by Hans Jonas

Review by: Philip Hefner

The Journal of Religion, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), pp. 61-64
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 CRITICAL
REVIEWS 61

center, emphasize the multifarious aspects of ic and so reclaim for the psycho-physical unity
Paul's Greco-Roman-oriental Jewish complex of life that place ... it had lost through the
as necessary for understanding the "apostle to divorce of the material and mental since Des-
all nations of men." Muilenburg'sintense study cartes" (p. ix). As I shall indicate later, the
of the relation of the Deuteronomic theology book hardly lives up to such a Preface.
of prophetism to the prophetic movement, or The book is a collection of Jonas' essays
office, is well complemented by Frost's appre- from the years 1950 to 1965, and for these we
ciation of the non-historical character of apoc- can admire it and be grateful for it, inasmuch
alyptic. Freedman's paper is a catalogue of the as it brings before us once again the impressive
immense strides made in the last decades in range of interests that Jonas has attended to in
understanding the biblical languages through recent years and the brilliant insights he has
comparative philology. Conzelmann and Cohen brought to bear upon them. Those interests are
in their review of the present knowledge of the so broad that no review can cover them all.
first Christian century both rightly stress the Here is Jonas' celebrated admonition to theo-
importance of polemical syncretism in both logians who have drunk too deeply at Martin
Judaism and Christianity. Quispel insists that Heidegger's fountain ("Heidegger and Theol-
what we call Gnosticism in the New Testament ogy"), delivered at Drew University in 1964,
is fringe-Jewish heterodox influence, while as well as the Ingersoll lecture for 1961 on
Jonas reiterates his long-standing position that "Immortality and the Modern Temper," to-
there was no Jewish Gnosticism, by definition. gether with a discussion of "Gnosticism,
All these papers, along with those of the Existentialism, and Nihilism," and an essay on
New Testament Textual Criticism Seminar, philosophical method ("The Practical Uses of
which are also included, make their several Theory"). Leaving these aside, however, this
valuable contributions to this significant mile- review will focus on those half-dozen essays
stone of scholarly achievement. The society that do in some way engage in philosophical
should be pleased and the world of scholarship reflection upon biological fact. We can only
grateful. list a few noteworthy points in Jonas' discus-
J. A. SANDERS sion.
Union Theological Seminary 1. Throughout the essays, one notes a po-
lemic against the tendencies in the physical
and natural sciences to reduce reality to its
The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philo- smallest, inanimate units. Jonas considers such
a procedure to be ironically inappropriate to
sophical Biology. By HANS JONAS. New
York: Harper & Row, 1966. 303 pages. $6.00. the study of the phenomenon of life, since it
ultimately leads to the attempt to reduce life
Professor Jonas' new book calls forth two to non-life. The study of life, however, must
reactions from me: irritation at what the book proceed upon the
assumption that life is a
is not, admiration for what it is. I cannot resist reality in and of itself,
apart from which the
commenting on what the book is not, because individual units of any organism cannot be un-
it is not what the publisher advertises it to be, derstood
properly. This argument seems to be
and it is only barely what Jonas himself says it an attack
upon what is called physical or mo-
is in his Preface. Harper and Row advertises lecular
biology, although it suffers from
the book as a critical challenge to the thought Jonas'
unwillingness to name his opponent out-
of Teilhard de Chardin and as a "new vision
right and clarify precisely what the force of his
of man based on the latest discoveries in the
disagreementis. As a consequence, even though
biological sciences." It is neither of these: Teil- his argument may be correct, and even rele-
hard is referred to only once (in a footnote), vant, it is so
general that it cannot be much
and his ideas are scarcely probed at all, just as assistance to one who wishes to work with
the "latest" discoveries in biology actually (rather than
polemicize against) the data of
postdate some of the chapters in this book by physical biology so that they can inform our
several years. For his part, Jonas writes that
attempts today to construct a general view of
his book is "an 'existential' interpretation of life that
incorporates the knowledge of many
biological facts. ... A new reading of the bio- disciplines. Furthermore, in a rather drastic
logical record may recover the inner dimen- omission, he neglects to mention the so-called
sion ... for the understandingof things organ- dry biologists, that is, those who work with

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62 THEJOURNALOF RELIGION

large statisticalgroupsand employ evolution- indeed,he does not even take us very far to-
ary and genetic theories.Jonas does not ac- wardthe resolution.But he does recognizethe
knowledgetheir polemicagainstphysicalbiol- problem,he helpsus to see its significance,and
ogy (cf. Loren Eiseley), and his strictures most of all he has developedsome helpful
certainlyare not aimedat the "dry"school of terminologyupon which we can build. In at
biology. least two sections (pp. 17 ff. and 86-91), he
2. To accompanythis polemic against the tracescertainhistoricalproblemsthat illumine
attempts to reducelife to non-life, Jonas in- the question,and he establishesthe finalunity
cludes at least two (see essays one and two) of inwardand outwardin the bodyitself. Jonas
very helpful historicalsketches of the intel- is himself, of course,a phenomenologist, and
lectual developmentfrom the pre-Cartesian this meansthat his own suggestionsfor resolv-
monismthroughthe Cartesiandualismand its ing the questiontend to emphasizethe inward
consequentsplitbetweenmaterialismandideal- pole to the exclusionof the outwardpole (as
ism which led to a current realizationthat his Preface,indeed,indicatedthey would). He
materialism without idealism is bankrupt. posits, for example,the awarenessof the self's
Jonas recognizesthat, even thoughDarwinism oppositionto his worldas a fundamentalchar-
seemed to be materialistic(since it reduced acteristicof life (p. 102)-as any phenomeno-
man to the level of his animal descent), it logicalstudy wouldbear out; but he does not
actually struck materialism'sdeathblow,be- considerhow this can be, in light of the bio-
cause it assertedthat the realm of life as a logicaltestimonyto life's unity and continuity
wholeis kin to man and his spirit."So it hap- with its world.How does it happenthat life
penedthat in the hour of the final triumphof whichis bornof its worldis characterizedby
materialism,the very instrumentof it, 'evolu- oppositionto that sameworld?Onemightalso
tion,' implicitlytranscendedthe terms of ma- askwhetherJonashas seen that the one pole of
terialism and posed the ontologicalquestion his attemptedsynthesis(the physical-outward)
anew-when it just seemedsettled. And Dar- is inseparablyrelatedto the scientificeffortto
winism,more than any other doctrinerespon- reduce life to non-life, which he elsewhere
sible for the now dormantevolutionaryvision polemicizesagainst.
of all reality, turns out to have been a thor- 4. Jonas' second essay, "PhilosophicalAs-
oughly dialecticalevent" (p. 58). The upshot pects of Darwinism,"summarizessome of the
is, accordingto Jonas, that the history of philosophical implications of evolutionary
modern thought demonstratesthat the phe- theory.He discussesthis theory'shandlingof
nomenonof life itself can neverbe suppressed, the problemof origins;its possibleimplemen-
no matter how intensely men seek to trans- tation of a new dualismto replaceCartesian-
mute it into non-lifefor the purposesof study ism; its mixtureof fact, hypothesis,and de-
andschematicunderstanding. duction;and its hypothesisof the chancechar-
3. One of the most importantproblemsin acter of change or mutationin living organ-
any contemporary philosophicalbiologyis that isms. He objects stronglyto the chance hy-
of reconcilingwhat Jonas calls the "physical- pothesis,becauseit makesbiological"progress"
outward"dimensionof life with the "vitalistic- a matter of whimsyand even pathology.One
inward"dimension.The formeris the dimen- wonderswhetherJonas really understandsthe
sion that is immediatelyperceived by the mathematicalmeaningof randomnessas refer-
physical and natural sciences, as they study ring to the undirected,unpredictableappear-
the composition,action,and interactionof liv- ance that mutationsmust assumefor the em-
ing things and their components.The latter, pirical observerfrom the "physical-outward"
which Jonas also designatessimply as "in- point of view.
wardness," grows out of phenomenological 5. The third ("Is God a Mathematician?")
studieswhichattend to the consciousnessthat and fifth ("Cyberneticsand Purpose:A Cri-
men have of the same events whichthe physi- tique") essays are highly polemical,develop-
cal and natural sciences study. One of the ing the themewe mentionedearlieragainstat-
great intellectualquestionsof our time is that tempts to reducelife to non-life.The critique
of how these two dimensionsare to be han- in the third essay is very insightful.Jonas'
dled, what methodologycan be constructedto argumentationis not always as helpful as it
correlateand synthesize them in our under- might be in constructinga positivephilosophi-
standing.Jonas does not resolvethis question; cal biology,however,becauseit does not indi-

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 CRITICAL
REVIEWS
cate how (in light of his critique) one can
utilize the data of mathematics and cybernetics
to inform his view of life in general and man
in particular. In other words, Jonas has chosen
the easier task of critique over the more diffi-
cult one of construction. His discussion of
cybernetics is, furthermore, open to dispute.
His premise is that cybernetic theory neces-
sarily entails a concept of purpose. The point
of his essay is that cyberneticists do not under-
stand what purpose is: they assign purpose to
mechanisms and then, in a reverse anthropo-
morphism, ascribe mechanism to man. Jonas
challenges this dialectic. A self-guiding torpedo,
for example, is not really pursuing a purpose,
but only performing a series of operations that
fulfil the purpose of its human inventor or
operator. Only living beings possess purpose, in
Jonas' opinion. Whether cybernetics as such
really does presuppose the view of purpose that
Jonas criticizes is a matter of interpretation.
Furthermore, his exaggerated insistence (pp.
117-19) that human purpose is to be sharply
distinguished from the machines that imple-
ment it, that man and machine cannot be
united into a whole, is really unbelievable.
Only an imprisonment within phenomenological
methodology could lead a twentieth-century
man to assert that his purposes are uninflu-
enced by and absolutely distinguishable from
the machines that implement them. Would
man have framed the purpose to explore space
if he had not possessed a telescope? It is much
more important to me to recognize cybernetics
as a science that throws light on the mechanism
by which behavior (whether in living organ-
isms or machines) can be controlled by refer-
ence to information that has previously been
established as normative. What is interesting
about the self-guiding torpedo is that its func-
tioning is constantly checked by the informa-
tion that its operator has determined should
govern its movement. This basic insight into
the way servomechanisms control functions is
very important for our understanding of life.
Jonas' criticisms notwithstanding, a philosophi-
cal biology will have to utilize cybernetic
theory. The conclusion is forced upon us that
Jonas' critique is perhaps not so much wrong
as it is problematic and even beside the point.
Even if his critique were to the point, we could
not ignore the light that cybernetics throws
upon the how of control. Finally, it seems
strange that he would charge Norbert Wiener
with being blind to humanistic concerns in
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63
light of the man's book, God and Golem, Inc.,
which is a moving discussion of the dangers of
cybernetics.
A similar misplaced polemic may be noted
in the discussion of psychological determinism
appended to the fifth essay, where Jonas inter-
prets this determinism as meaning that ante-
cedents can be traced precisely as causes of
specific actions in the present: Given motives
A, B, C at time tl, a person will make decision
X at time t2. Jonas indicates how preposterous
this scheme is. Is this the point of psychologi-
cal determinism, however? Is it not, rather,
that, given a certain genetic-psychologicalback-
ground over which a person has no control, the
predisposition toward certain behavior is pre-
determined? Psychological determinism is de-
moralizing because one has no control over the
factors that shaped his upbringing and hence
his future. Jonas has assumed that indetermin-
ism (which he demonstrates impressively) is
the answer to determinism. But it is not. The
answer to determinism is freedom and auton-
omy, and despite his argument psychological
determinism does rather thoroughly undercut
freedom and autonomy.
6. Essays four ("To Move and Feel: On the
Animal Soul"), six ("The Nobility of Sight:
A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses"),
and seven ("Image-making and the Freedom
of Man") show Jonas' phenomenologicalanaly-
sis at its best, and these chapters are certainly
very useful helps "towards a philosophical
biology." His suggestion that man's uniqueness
lies in his being Homo pictor, an animal that
can conceive of images, make them, and use
them, is provocative. It opens the way for an
appreciation of the fulness of human life and
the role of myth, symbol, and cultus in that
life, which is an important "secular" testimony
to offset much of the worldly and secular holi-
ness that is propounded these days.
Jonas' book is a difficult one, but it is worth
wrestling with. Its weakness is the weakness of
the essay: an essay can focus on one issue and
ignore others that may in themselves be very
important. A more serious attempt to construct
a philosophical biology would not have been
able to avoid the issues that Jonas has left un-
touched here. It would, for example, deal more
searchingly with the physical-outward/vital-
istic-inward tension; it would have to probe the
freedom/determinism question (which, as-
toundingly, Jonas scarcely touches) and the
spirit/matter dualism. Finally, it would have
64 THEJOURNALOF RELIGION
to tackle head on the theories of Father Teil-
hard.
PHILIP HEFNER
Lutheran Theological Seminary
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
The Three Pillars of Zen. Compiled and edited,
with translations, introductions, and notes,
by PHILIP KAPLEAU. New York: Harper &
Row, 1966. 363 pages. $6.95.
One is never altogether certain how to re-
view a book on Zen, especially when it is pre-
sented as an affirmationof faith. Mr. Kapleau,
who is the editor as well as the translator, in
discussing the difficulties involved in the trans-
lation of Zen teachings stresses that such a task
requires nothing less than Zen training and the
experience of enlightenment, "lacking which
the translator is almost certain to distort the
clarity and emasculate the vigor of the original
in important respects." Such a view leads us to
wonder whether an outsider, who has not had
Zen training and the experience of enlighten-
ment, can really criticize this type of a book.
We are somewhat comforted by the fact that
there are three pillars in Zen-teaching, prac-
tice, and enlightenment. On the authenticity of
the satori ("self-realization") experience, we
simply have to take the words of those who
claim that they had such experiences. How-
ever, on teaching and practice we may have
something to say.
In his Preface, the editor rightly states that
there is no Zen apart from practices. He goes
on to say that "the attempt in the West to
isolate Zen in a vacuum of the intellect, cut
off from the very disciplines which are its
raison d'etre, has nourished a pseudo-Zen which
is little more than a mind-tickling diversion of
highbrows and a plaything of beatniks." In
order to correct this distortion, the editor de-
cided to compile this book addressed to the
general reader rather than to scholars or spe-
cialists in Zen Buddhism. He claims, with a
bit of exaggeration, that "both the Soto and
Rinzai disciplines are presented here-for the
first time in a European language, we believe
-as one integrated body of Zen teaching, and
this not academically but as living experience."
Considering the practical character of Zen
Buddhism, such a strong emphasis on living ex-
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perience is admirable. However, because of the
editor's anti-intellectual bias and his eagerness
to emphasize the living aspect of Zen, this
book is not securely anchored on one of the
three pillars, namely, the intellectual dimen-
sion. The book does not have even a sketchy
account of the historic development of Zen or
a cursory presentation of its philosophical
foundation. For instance, while the sermon and
letters by a fourteenth-century Rinzai master,
Bassui (pp. 155-86), are included, a scholarly
writing, and undoubtedly the most important
literature of Japanese Zen Buddhism, by the
thirteenth-century Soto master, D6gen, is given
only a little over two pages (pp. 297-99).
Rather, in the present volume "teaching"refers
to "teaching on practice," as exemplified by
the introductory lecture on Zen practice by a
contemporary Soto master, Yasutani-rbshi, as
well as by his lecture on the koan and his pri-
vate instructions to students. Although we
have profound respect for Yasutani-rbshi's
spiritual insights and for his saintly character,
we have never thought that he is an intellectual
heavyweight. Other influential Zen thinkers of
our time, even such notables as the late D. T.
Suzuki or Dr. Shinichi Hisamatsu, are com-
pletely ignored. (We can understand Kapleau's
unhappiness over the fact that only two ref-
erences to zazen practice are found in a recent
anthology of Suzuki's works. We are neverthe-
less mystified by the fact that Suzuki's name
is rarely mentioned, and only incidentally, in
this book.)
The entire Part II (pp. 189-291) of the
book is devoted to the testimony of eight
contemporary enlightenment experiences by
four Japanese (an executive, a garden designer,
a retired government worker, and an insur-
ance adjuster), three Americans (an ex-busi-
nessman, a schoolteacher, and an artist), and
one Canadian (a housewife) and the transla-
tion of "enlightenment letters" by a young
lady, Yaeko Iwasaki, written in 1935 shortly
before her death. One, of course, finds personal
experiences of any sort very interesting, and
some of these accounts of enlightenment ex-
perience have touching, if not naive, aspects.
But this type of "how-I-have-found-the-
Truth" presentation has never been my cup of
tea, even though it may speak to the seekers.
JOSEPH M. KITAGAWA
University of Chicago