Godinez vs Fong Pak Luen

FACTS:

Jose Godinez married to Martina Alvarez Godinez has acquired a parcel of land in Jolo
Townsite during their marriage. Martina died in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving
heirs. In November 1941 Jose Godinez sold the said land to Fong Pak Luen a chinese citizen
without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. On January 11, 1963, defendant Fong Pak Luen
executed a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who
conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata.

The plaintiffs filed this case to seek the recovery of said land on the ground that the sale was
null and void ab initio since it violates the Constitution and the Civil Code because respondent is
an alien not allowed to acquire property and since Gidonez could not have legally conveyed the
entire property being a conjugal property. Thus, the alleged attorney-in-fact, defendant Kwan
Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said property and defendant Navata.

Defendant Navata responded that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it
appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that
as his sole property he may dispose of the same and that the cause of action has been barred
by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on
November 27, 1941 and the action was brought only on on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10
year period provided for by law

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a
constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to
a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.

DECISION:

The heirs cannot recover the property sold to an alien if it had been conveyed to a Filipino
citizen qualified to own and possess it.

There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese
citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of the Constitution which provides that aliens may
not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential lands." Consequently, prescription
may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. It does not necessarily
follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien as the
disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen
qualified to acquire real property. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized
Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. There would be no more public policy to
be served in allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified
person. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner.

Felipe vs Aldon
G.R. No. 60174, Feb. 16, 1983
FACTS:

Spouses Maximo Aldon and Gimena Almosara owned several parcels of land during the
marriage. In 1951 Gimena sold the 3 parcels of these lots to spouses Eduardo Felipe and
Hermogena Felipe. The said sale was without the consent of her husband, Maximo.

On April 26, 1976 the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their children Sofia
and Salvador, filed a complaint in the CFI of Masbate against the spouses Felipe. They alleged
that they were the owners of the three lots in question. That they had orally mortgaged the same
to the defendants, and an offer to redeem the mortgage has been refused so they filed the
complaint in order to recover the three parcels.

The defendant asserted that they had acquired the property from the plaintiffs by purchase and
subsequent delivery to them. The trial court sustained the claim of the defendants. Upon appeal,
the CA set aside and reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale made by Gimena is a defective contract

DECISION:

The sale made by Gimena is a defective contract. It is a voidable contract.

According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are “Those where one of
the parties are incapable of giving consent to the contract.” In the instant case – Gimena had no
capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even
to the husband alone but to both spouses. Art. 173 of the Civil Code provided that contracts
entered by the husband without the consent of the wife when such consent is required, are
annullable at her instance during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
questioned.

The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the
marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the
party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. The case of their children is
different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract
insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The
father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third
(1/3) pertaining to the widow.

The children's cause of action accrued from the death of their father in 1959 and they had thirty
(30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within the
period.

Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals was modified. Sofia and Salvador Aldon were
awarded of their shares of the lands.
Vallido vs Pono
April 15, 2003

Facts:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA on a case involving a
double sale of a parcel of land.

It appears that Martino Dandan was the registered owner of a parcel of land but he then sold
that land to Purificacion Cerna and gave to the latter the owner's copy of OCT No. P-429. Cerna
then sold a portion of the land to Martino Pono, the husband, and delivered the above
mentioned owner's copy to the latter. Pono, herein respondent, registered the portion he bought
for taxation purposes and later allowed his son, herein respondent, to build a house thereon.

On June 14, 1990, Dandan sold the whole subject property to his grandson Esmeraldo Vallido
but can no longer deliver any certificate of title since he had delivered the said OCT No. P-429
to Cerna in1960. On Sept. 17, 1999, Vallido registered the deed that was granted by the RTC to
Pono when he filed for the same and the Registry of Deeds issued a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed a complaint for quieting of title, recovery of possession of
real property and damages against the respondents.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners and held that there was a double sale but the CA ruled in
favor of the defendant stating that petitioners were neither buyers or registrants in good faith.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are buyers or registrants in good faith.

Ruling:

The petitioners are not buyers or registrants in good faith.

It is undisputed that there was a double sale and that the respondents are the first buyers while
the petitioners are the second buyers. The burden of proving good faith lies with the second
buyer (petitioners herein) which is not discharged by simply invoking the ordinary presumption
of good faith.

There are several indicia that should have placed the petitioners on guard and prompted them
to investigate or inspect the property being sold to them. First, Martino, as seller, did not have
possession of the subject property. Second, during the sale on July 4, 1990, Martino did not
have the owner’s duplicate copy of the title. Third, there were existing permanent improvements
on the land. Fourth, the respondents were in actual possession of the land. These
circumstances are too glaring to be overlooked and should have prompted the petitioners, as
prospective buyers, to investigate or inspect the land. Where the vendor is not in possession of
the property, the prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in
possession.

As the petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith, they cannot lean on the
indefeasibility of their TCT in view of the doctrine that the defense of indefeasibility of a torrens
title does not extend to transferees who take the certificate of title in bad faith. 13 The Court
cannot ascribe good faith to those who have not shown any diligence in protecting their rights.
Fabillo vs IAC
G.R. 68838, Mar. 11, 1991

FACTS:

Florencio Fabillo contracted the services of Atty. Murillo to revive a lost case over his
inheritance from his deceased sister Justinia. He sought to acquire the San Salvador and
Pugahay Properties that his sister left behind, against the latter’s husband. They entered into a
contract where a contingent fee in favour of Atty. Murillo in case the case was won was agreed
upon. The fee was for 40% of the value what whatever benefit Florencio may derive from the
suit – such as if the properties were sold, rented or mortgaged. It was vague however, regarding
the fee in case Florencio or his heirs decide to occupy the house – allowing Atty. Murillo to
option to occupy or lease 40% of the said house and lot. A compromise agreement was entered
into where Florencio acquired both the San Salvador and Pugahanay Properties. Atty. Murillo
installed a tenant in the Pugahanay Property. Later on Florencio claimed exclusive rights over
the properties invoking Art. 1491 of the Civil Code. Both Florencio and Atty. Murillo died and
were succeeded by their respective heirs.

ISSUE
Whether or not the contingent fees agreed upon was valid.

DECISION:

The contingent fee agreed upon was valid.

Contingent fees are not contemplated by the prohibition in Art. 1491 disallowing lawyers to
purchase the properties of their clients under litigation. The said prohibition applies only during
the pendency of the litigation. Payment of the contingent fee is made after the litigation and is
thus not covered by the prohibition. Fo as long as there is no fraud or undue influence, or as
long as the fees are not exorbitant, the same is valid and enforceable. It is even recognized by
the Cannons of Professional Ethics.

However, considering that the contract is vague on the matter of division of the shares if
Florencio occupies the property, the ambiguity is to be construed against Atty. Murillo being the
one who drafted the contract and being a lawyer more knowledgeable about the law. The Court,
thus invoking the time-honoured principle that a lawyer shall uphold the dignity of the legal
profession, ordered only a contingent fee of P3,000.00 as a reasonable attorney’s fees.