NATIONAL ECONOMY and PATRIMONY

REPUBLIC V. VILLANUEVA
Facts:
Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters and an
assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by INC on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot with an
area of 247 square meters owned by the said church.
The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are not included in any military reservation. They are
inside an area which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted
to santol and mango trees and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land had been declared for realty
tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid therefor.
On September 13, 1977, INC filed with the CFI Bulacan an application for the registration of the two lots. It alleged that
it and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than thirty years.

The trial court ordered the registration of the two lots.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the registration of two lots.

Held:
Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution stated that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area".

INC, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public domain,
like the two lots in question, because of the constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said church
is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section 48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A
corporation sole has no nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission,
102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land Law).

The contention in the comments of the INC that the two lots are private lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs.
Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private land in the Susi case was a
parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial, as in Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S.
449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that
category. They are still public lands. A land registration proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is
public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

As held in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been
in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession would
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest."

In Uy Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a
confirmation of his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo" and that before
the issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State.

The lower court's judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of INC is dismissed with costs
against said applicant.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from
the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3 rd of July
1947, the original owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation of title on Dec. 1,
1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the
following contentions:
1. The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years
had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional
prohibition banning a private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable.
2. It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses who, as Filipino
citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their imperfect title to the land
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect/incomplete title.
2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.
3. Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is contingent on the judicial
confirmation of title.

RULING:
1. NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified from
applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14
of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and citizens of the Philippines are
allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA.
2. NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is contingent upon (1) fulfilling the
necessary condition of possession by the predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2)
the judicial confirmation of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with the decision,
but accepted that a conversion indeed took place.
3. HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J. Abad Santos and J. De Castro,
concurred accordingly. J. Teehankee dissented and traced the line of jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to
Herico which maintained that the conversion or acquisition effectively happens by the operation of law, ipso
jure, as soon as it can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for the confirmation of
the grant have been met. According to his reasoning, upon the fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions,
the confirmation of an imperfect title is only a formality.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC (1986)

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)
FACTS:
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
 possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
 land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with
the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
 Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
 ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
 donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
 IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
 already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient
 it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
 The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
 The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
 If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
 The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands
in excess of 1,024 hectares

GODINEZ VS FONG PAK LUEN

FACTS:

Jose Godinez married to Martina Alvarez Godinez has acquired a parcel of land in Jolo Townsite during their marriage.
Martina died in 1938 leaving the plaintiffs as their sole surviving heirs. In November 1941 Jose Godinez sold the said
land to Fong Pak Luen a chinese citizen without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. On January 11, 1963, defendant Fong
Pak Luen executed a power of attorney in favor of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien, who conveyed and
sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata.

The plaintiffs filed this case to seek the recovery of said land on the ground that the sale was null and void ab initio since
it violates the Constitution and the Civil Code because respondent is an alien not allowed to acquire property and since
Gidonez could not have legally conveyed the entire property being a conjugal property. Thus, the alleged attorney-in-
fact, defendant Kwan Pun Ming had not conveyed any title or interest over said property and defendant Navata.

Defendant Navata responded that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation
that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same
and that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by
Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941 and the action was brought only on on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10 year
period provided for by law

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation of a constitutional prohibition may
recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it.
DECISION:

The heirs cannot recover the property sold to an alien if it had been conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and
possess it.

There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen residing in
Hongkong, was violative of the Constitution which provides that aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands,
including residential lands." Consequently, prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution
prohibits. It does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to recover the property sold to an alien as
the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire
real property. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is already in
the hands of a qualified person. Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner.

THE SECRETARY OF DENR V. MAYOR JOSE YAP et. Al

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose
Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and
marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which
was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these
lands alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of
the inalienable public domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CA

FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and issued an original
certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered
within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato
had encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject land is submerged in water during high tide and low tide,
filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed
the complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year
period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from and
after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute
an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts impair the use of the
property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea
moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm
of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided the registration
decree of a trial court and held that said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or
entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. THE GOVERNMENT

FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya which resulted to the
crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects:
a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which
led to the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum
was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain
and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the
freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.
The MOA-AD further provides for the extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space
above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance, on the other hand, a
shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization
of the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order
No. 3, and right to information. They further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the
petition.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to
information 2) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the
right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern
found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public
disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with
the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the
broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State
to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents
cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential
element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government
and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights
to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a
species of the right to information, is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to
disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided
by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution
of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the three
underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the
sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by
the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes ―continuing
consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization
and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of
a plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than
sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is
to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant
information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the
comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the
Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace
partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace
agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center
on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed
those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn
first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international
law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties
actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11
on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-
AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of
transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central
Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more
precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association
in international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term
―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events
in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or
between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the
Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions
of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the
amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to
the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides
that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous
region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on
TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities
of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the
above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. That constitutional provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development. An associative arrangement does not uphold
national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework
will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in
the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation
of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace
panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution
and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to
make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers
vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for
the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or
interference with that process

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES

G.R. No. 161881 July 31, 2008

FACTS:
In 1993, petitioner was granted the lease of 923 hectares of public forest land in Sitio Lanton, General Santos
City through Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) for 25 years. Before the lease was
granted, private respondent Paglangan along with Sabel Esmael and Lasid Acop filed a letter of complaint with
COSLAP to cancel FLGLA No. 542. Petitioner questioned COSLAP’s jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public
lands. COSLAP went on with the hearing and petitioner alleged that he was not given the opportunity to be present
and participate in the field investigations conducted. On August 3, 1998 COSLAP cancelled FLGLA No. 542 and
petitioner appealed to CA for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Based on the records, the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs Legal Research
Alcantara v COSLAP, DENR and Paglangan 2001 to the B’laan indigenous cultural community since they have
been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a fact has not been
disputed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON COSLAP has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
COSLAP has jurisdiction to resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature, for
instance, between occupants and lease agreement holders. Active participation of a respondent in the case pending
against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to recognizing its jurisdiction and therefore cannot
question it later after the decision.
 It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542 granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 410 which states that all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain
are declared part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are
further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural
group concerned.

OROPORT CARGOHANDLING SERVICES, INC., represented by its President FRANKLIN U. SIAO, vs. PHIVIDEC
INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 166785 July 28, 2008

FACTS:
In 2003, Oroport bid for the management and operation of MCT, a P3.24 billion government infrastructure
project. As no bidder won in the two public biddings, PIA took over MCT operations. On April 19, 2004, Oroport sued
PIA and Phividec in the RTC for injunction and damages. It accused PIA of illegally operating MCT without a license
from PPA or a franchise from Congress. It also alleged unfair competition since PIA handled cargoes of the general
public. It further invoked unlawful deprivation of property as it stands to incur investment losses with PIA’s take over of
MCT operations It prayed that PIA be stopped from handling cargoes not owned or consigned to its industrial estate
locators.

ISSUE:
WON PIA can temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement with PPA sans a franchise or
a license?

RULING:
Yes. PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a franchise or license as it was necessary, temporary and
beneficial to the public. Franchises from Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate
because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the
operation of certain public utilities. Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution does not necessarily imply that only
Congress can grant such authorization. The determination of whether the winning bidder is qualified to undertake the
contracted service should be left to the sound judgment of PPA or PIA as these agencies are in the best position to
evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with the project’s
development plans. Neither the Court nor Congress has the time and the technical know-how to look into this matter.
Furthermore, Section 4(e) of Presidential Decree No. 538, gives PIA the legal authority to construct, operate and
maintain port facilities including stevedoring and port terminal services even without PPA’s authority. The MOA granting
PIA the exclusive control and supervision of all ports, wharves, piers and services within the industrial area, recognizing
its power to collect port fees, dues and charges, makes PIA’s authority over MCT operations more secure.