#1

G.R. No. 155849 August 31, 2011

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, vs.

DISTRIBUTION ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution advising Distribution

Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required
freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially
considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular
No. 153 (MC 153).

For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213)
entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates.

In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution

dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary
restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463).

However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the
constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001. It also
denied DMAP’s Motion for Reconsideration.

DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, 2002, the Court
denied DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to: (a) take the appeal
within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee
and clerk's commission in the total amount of P202.00. The Court with finality denied DMAP’s
Motion for Reconsideration.

In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion
of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora
Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update.

Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the
respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect
contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were
privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme
Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo"9 to the effect that
the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the
respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." They averred that the respondents’ purpose was to "defy
the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!"

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sea Transport Udpate constitute Indirect Contempt of Court?

RULING: NO

The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAP’s members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to
MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.1avvphi1

The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court
because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court
allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the
respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued
in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months,"54 was insufficient, without
more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
1
Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea Transport Update
stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on
technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented",55 or the phrase in the Sea
Transport Update reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime
is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary to the petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered
as "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court
allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners"57 or that "the point that respondents
wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities,
and the Supreme Court was influenced!’",58 we find the phrases as not critical of the Court
and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members
to defy the resolutions.

NOTES:

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public

authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings
or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase
contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different
acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically
granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there
ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to
impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful
mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the
power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the
presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and
constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful
process or order of the court.

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or
evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of
courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further
proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is
essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling
into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law.
There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt
punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of
the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the
courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if
admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct
contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear
and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal
knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or
by testimony under oath of other persons.

In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The
proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process
of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such
charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.
2
#2

G.R. No. 155849 August 31, 2011

FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, [Deceased], JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS,
Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 117, Pasay City

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS
Ferdinand Cruz filed a Civil Case against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr. (Mina), for
abatement of nuisance. In the said case, petitioner sought redress from the court to declare
as a nuisance the "basketball goal" which was permanently attached to the second floor of
Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s only right of way.
Mina was declared in default hence petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.
After trial, Judge Gingoyon, declared the basketball goal as a public nuisance but
dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked "locus standi." Citing Article 701 of
the Civil Code, Judge Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be
commenced by the city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the
petitioner.
In the same Decision, Judge Gingoyon also opined that:
Plaintiffs must learn to accept the sad reality of the kind of place they live in. Their
place is bursting with people most of whom live in cramped tenements with no place to
spare for recreation, to laze around or doing their daily household chores.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he
took exception to the advice given by Judge Gingoyon as off-tangent and even espouses
illegality - Since when did living in cramped tenements become a license for people to
invade the alleys and use the said alley for doing all sorts of things, i.e., as wash area or
cooking food? In effect, this court is making his own legislations and providing for exceptions
in law when there are none, as far as nuisance is concerned;
The court might not be aware that in so doing, he is giving a wrong signal to the
defendants and to the public at large that land grabbing, squatting, illegal occupation of
property is all right and justified when violators are those people who live in cramped
tenements or the underprivileged poor, as the court in a sweeping statement proclaimed
that "residents are forced by circumstance to invade the alleys;"
For the enlightenment of the court, and as was proven during the ex-parte
presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, Edang estate comprises properties which are
subdivided and titled (plaintiffs and defendants have their own titled properties and even
the right of way or alley has a separate title) and not the kind the court wrongfully perceives
the place to be;
Nonetheless, what remains bugling is the fact that the court in his unsolicited advice
knows exactly the description of the alley where the complained nuisance is located and
the specific activities that the defendants do in relation to the alley. The court should be
reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else
can the court gather this information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that
the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter
has already been in default.
Petitioner requested the respondent court to hear his motion for reconsideration on
November 18, 2005.
In an Order dated November 11, 2005, Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on
November 18, 2005, a date chosen by petitioner, and directed him to substantiate his
serious charge or show cause on even date why he should not be punished for contempt.
Judge Gingoyon also opined that:
On November 18, 2005, petitioner, however, did not appear. Judge Gingoyon then
3
motu proprio issued an Order in open court to give petitioner another 10 days to show
cause.
In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, petitioner maintained that the alleged
contumacious remarks he made have a leg to stand on for the same were based on the
circumstances of the instant case. He even reiterated his insinuation that Judge Gingoyon
communicated with Mina by posing the query: "…where then did this court gather an exact
description of the alley and the myriad of [sic] activities that the inhabitants of interior Edang
do in relation to the alley, when the defendant was held in default and absent plaintiff’s
evidence so exacting as the description made by this court in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his
Decision dated October 21, 2005."
On November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon issued an Order, finding petitioner guilty of direct
contempt of court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of
court
RULING
YES.
A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the
court or judge wherein proceedings are pending is considered direct contempt.
"Contemptuous statements made in pleadings filed with the court constitute direct
contempt." "A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted
to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending has been held to be equivalent
to ‘misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same’ within the meaning of Rule 71, § 1 of the Rules of Court and,
therefore, constitutes direct contempt.”
Based on the abovementioned facts and consistent with the foregoing principles set
forth, we agree with the finding of respondent court that petitioner is guilty of direct
contempt of court.
The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with the
defendant off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute. The
accusation in the Motion for Reconsideration and the Compliance submitted by the
petitioner to the respondent court is derogatory, offensive and malicious. The accusation
taints the credibility and the dignity of the court and questions its impartiality. It is a direct
affront to the integrity and authority of the court, subjecting it to loss of public respect and
confidence, which ultimately affects the administration of justice.
Furthermore, assuming that the conclusion of petitioner is justified by the facts, it is still
not a valid defense in cases of contempt. "Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence
that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for
the judicial office should always be observed and enforced.

#3

Siy vs. NLRC

Facts:

 For resolution is private respondent Elena Embangs motion to cite Atty. Frederico P.
Quevedo, counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt of court for delaying this
case and impeding the execution of the judgment rendered herein, in violation of
Canon and Code of Responsibility.

 This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday
pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and Philippine Agri
Trading Center. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Embang.

4
  The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) denied petitioners appeal and
affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter with modification.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for
certiorari. Finding the petition to be without merit, the appellate court dismissed the
same.
 Atty. Quevedo (counsel of the petitioner) refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal
with the NLRC on August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave
abuse of discretion in failing to specify in his order that the backwages should be
computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no backwages should accrue
thereafter because of Embangs refusal to be reinstated.
 Embangs counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the appeal was
not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center did not post the
required cash or surety bond. Pending the resolution of the appeal, Embang filed the
instant motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
 By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the execution of
the decision but only sought the consideration of Embangs refusal to be reinstated in
any writ of execution that may be issued. He claims that such refusal on Embangs part
constituted a supervening event that justified the filing of an appeal ―
notwithstanding the finality of the decision. He also asserts that an appeal was the
proper remedy to question the July 30, 2004 order of the labor arbiter.
 Despite the denial of the appeal, however, Atty. Quevedo filed a motion for
clarification/partial reconsideration of the NLRCs February 28, 2005 resolution.

Court Ruling:

 For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment, we hold Atty.
Quevedo in contempt of court.
 Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts
orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either
direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same.
Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court. It is an act done
at a distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and
justice.

 Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is

committed by a person who commits the following acts, among others: disobedience
or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court; any abuse of or
any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt; and any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.

 We denied with finality the petitioners petition for review on certiorari almost two years
ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification by the NLRC and
upheld by the CA and this Court) remains unsatisfied up to now because of Atty.
Quevedos sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.

 Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to
rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party
is obliged to respect the courts verdict and to comply with it.

 Atty. Quevedos client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of the modified
decision of the labor arbiter. He should not have tried, under the guise of a flimsy

5
 appeal to the NLRC, to reopen a case already decided with finality. Nor should he
have raised anew matters previously considered and issues already laid to rest.

 Atty. Quevedos act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was obviously intended
to defeat the implementation of a final and executory decision.

 While a lawyers violation of his duties as an officer of the court may also constitute
contempt, the grounds for holding a person in contempt and for holding him
administratively liable for the violation of his lawyers oath are distinct and separate
from each other. They are specified in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. A finding of
contempt on the part of a lawyer does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions against him for his contravention of the ethics of the legal profession.

 x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate and
distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the other. A
contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority
of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with
the fitness of the courts officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the
court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold
such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is
to safeguard the functions of the court [while that] of the exercise of disciplinary
authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by
attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of
justice.

 Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a contempt
proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional
conduct. In the same manner, an attorneys conviction for contempt was not
collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the
court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has
likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct
objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court
is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.

 Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for contempt and
to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and are equally incidents
of the courts basic power to oversee the proper administration of justice and the
orderly discharge of judicial functions.

 There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like
that before us here: the Courts inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader [than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently,
where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Courts disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which
the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court
over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but
corollary to the Courts exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely
a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any
act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the

6
 exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.

 Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a
FINE of P30,000 is imposed upon him, payable in full within five days from receipt of this
resolution.

#4

Barredo-Fuentes vs. Albarracin

Facts:

 Pilar Barredo-Fuentes, Lourdes J. Estrellado, Clarita Estrellado-Mainar and Florenda

Estrellado-Diaz (complainants) charged Judge Romeo C. Albarracin (respondent judge)
of MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and/or Procedure and
Grave Abuse of Discretion.
 The charges refer to respondent judges acting on an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion without
hearing and without the motion served on the complainants.
 The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion sought the issuance of an order specifically directing Sheriff
Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the writ of execution and special writ of demolition,
including the demolition of defendants buildings and other improvements filed by
plaintiffs.
 Respondent judge asserts that a hearing is not necessary because the special writ of
demolition had already been granted after several hearings and the ex-parte motion
was merely for the enforcement or implementation of said writ.
 After a perusal of the evidence on record, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
ruled that complainants have no basis for their charges.
 It noted that the wheels of justice would run smoothly if the members of the judiciary who
perform their functions conscientiously are not hampered by groundless and vexatious
charges.
 Further, the decisions in the subject cases had already become final and executory.
However, due to the numerous delaying tactics employed by complainants the same
remained unexecuted.
 Thus, the OCA recommended that the administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit
and that complainants be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each
for filing this baseless harassment administrative case.

Issue: Whether or not OCA is correct.

Court Ruling:

 We sustain the findings of the OCA except as to the imposition of fine on complainants.

Ruling in relation to Rule 71

 Assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as delaying tactics,
remedial action may be enforced against them through contempt of court proceedings.
A brief review of the rules governing contempt proceedings is useful.
 Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court, such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
 There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect
contempt.
 Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence of
or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn
or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required
to do so.
 Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the
presence of the court.
 Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt.
7
 The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under
this latter category.
 Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following requisites
prior to conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court; and (c) to be heard by himself or counsel.
 With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual
presence of the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner
permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense to the charges before punishment is
imposed.

 The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. The
modes of procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are
similar in nature to those used in criminal prosecutions.
 Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt may
be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed
by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate
indirect contempt proceedings against complainants for the injury was not
committed against this tribunal, but against respondent judge.
 There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or condemn the
complainants to suffer the penalty for contempt, considering that the contemptuous
act was not directed against the Court itself. The penalty as recommended by the
OCA cannot be sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be
penalized for filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate proceeding, if
warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
#5

RULE 71 N0.5
October 12, 2010
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Five (5) administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) against Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, for violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, for
making untruthful statements in his certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the law
and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and
discretion, and for serious irregularity.
In a memorandum1 dated September 24, 2007, embodying the report and
recommendation of the OCA, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court
Administrator Lock) referred to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) the
five administrative cases filed against respondent judge.
Thereafter, the cases were referred to an Investigating Justice3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation and recommendation.
In one of the cases ( A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078) , the facts are as follows:
Jose Mari L. Duarte (complainant) is one of the defendants in a civil case entitled
"Eugene T. Mateo v. The Board of Governors of Ayala Alabang Village Association" for
Declaration of the General Membership Meeting and Election of the Ayala Alabang Village
Association (AAVA) as void ab initio, with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
and/or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Status Quo Order.
On November 25, 2003, respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff,
declaring the AAVA’s general membership meeting held on June 15, 2003 void ab initio,
and ordering that the status quo of the board’s composition prior to the proceedings of
June 15, 2003 be maintained. The respondent judge also enjoined defendants from further
exercising the functions of the office they respectively hold.
8
 The aggrieved complainant, together with all the other defendants, appealed to the
CA from the above-cited decision.
On December 10, 2003, plaintiff filed with the RTC a petition to direct defendants to
show cause why they should not be cited and thereafter punished for indirect contempt of
court (petition for indirect contempt) for their alleged defiance of respondent judge’s
decision dated November 25, 2003, as shown by their continued performance of duties as
governors of Ayala Alabang Village, despite receipt of a copy of the said decision.
On July 1, 2004, respondent judge issued an order declaring complainant, Arceo and
Romualdez, guilty of indirect contempt, and ordering each of them to pay a fine in the
amount of P30,000.00.
Unperturbed, complainant and his co-defendants Arceo and Romualdez moved for
reconsideration of the July 1, 2004 order. On September 24, 2004, respondent judge granted
their motion for reconsideration, and reversed and set aside his order dated July 1, 2004.
On June 29, 2007, the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA issued a resolution, ruling
that the lower court should have dismissed the plaintiff-appellee’s Complaint for Declaration
of the General Membership Meeting and Election of the AAVA as void ab initio with prayer
for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO and Status Quo Order because it is
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that has jurisdiction over the dispute.
On August 23, 2007, Mateo filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, contending
that respondent judge did not have the judicial authority to hear and decide the issues
involved in Civil Case No. 2003-433 for want of jurisdiction.
In his comment, respondent judge argued that the error he allegedly committed
could be corrected by an available judicial remedy
The Investigating Justice recommended that the instant administrative case against
respondent judge be dismissed. However, the Court takes the opposite view.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendants held guilty for indirect contempt of court.

HELD:
On the matter of the order finding complainant guilty of indirect contempt, the court
finds the action of respondent judge sadly wanting. Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules
provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order
or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or
are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege
that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for
joint hearing and decision.31
The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in
two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon
compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. The procedural requirements are
mandatory considering that contempt proceedings against a person are treated as criminal
in nature.32 Conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings.33
The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an opportunity to rebut
the charges against him. Respondent judge should have conducted a hearing in order to
provide complainant the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or
testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing also allows the court a more thorough
evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the case, including the chance to observe the
accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the
complainants or from the court itself.34
It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt should be used
sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions

9
of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual.35 In this respect, respondent judge
failed to measure up to the standards demanded of member of the judiciary.

#6

G.R. No. 162299 March 26, 2014

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., DEAN ELIZABETH FE-DACANAY, ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, DR.
ROBERTO LEGASPI, DR. ANASTACIO AQUINO, LOURDES JACINTO, DR. JOHN ANTHONY
DOMANTA Y, and NORA PO NOC, Petitioners,
vs.
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, SHIERYL A. REBUCAL, JENNY RIZA A. BANTA, BRANDO B. BADECAO,
and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 174758

BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, SHI ERYL A. REBUCAL, JENNY RIZA A. BANTA, and BRANDO B.
BADECAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., DEAN ELIZABETH FE-DACANA Y, ATTY. ARNULFO SORIANO, DR.
ROBERTO LEGASPI, DR. ANASTACIO AQUINO, LOURDES JACINTO, DR. JOHN ANTHONY
DOMANTAY, and NORA PONOC, Respondents.N
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:

SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City.

Olairez group were fourth-year graduating students of SLU’s College of Medicine who filed
their Complaint for Mandatory Injunction with Damages and Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC against Dean Dacanay and other unidentified
individuals, challenging the implementation of the revised version of the Comprehensive
Oral and Written Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for graduation from SLU’s medicine
course.

Accordingly, Olairez alleged that the then newly designated Dean Dacanay, suddenly
devised and revised the COWE by further subjecting the graduating students to additional
requirements such as completing Orals 1 and Orals 2, along with added months of medical
clerkship (Revised COWE). Contending that the implementation of the Revised COWE was
contrary to SLU’s Student Handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation, they
sought injunctive relief from the trial court which the latter granted.

On July 16, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Olairez group as graduates of
the College of Medicine, SLU.

The next day or, on July 17, 2003, the Olairez group trooped to SLU and insisted on its
immediate compliance with the RTC ruling. Unable to get a favorable reply from SLU, the
Olairez group filed, on the same day, a "Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in
Contempt" setting the hearing of the motion for July 18, 2003.

In its Order, dated July 18, 2003, the RTC reset the hearing on the motion to cite SLU in
contempt of court to July 22, 2003 to allow compliance with a technical defect in the
motion.

Thereafter, the hearing of the motion to cite SLU in contempt proceeded on the said date
without any participation of SLU and its officials.

On the next day, or on July 23, 2003, the RTC found SLU guilty of indirect contempt.

SLU then appealed the order of the RTC finding it guilty of indirect contempt before the CA.
The CA, finding merits on the appeal for contempt, reversed the July 23, 2003 Order of the
RTC.

10
Citing Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the CA opined that to comply with the procedural
requirements of indirect contempt, there must be: (1) a complaint in writing which may
either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a
person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for the person charged
to appear and explain his conduct.

The CA observed that the second element was lacking as there was haste in the conduct of
the proceedings and in issuing orders which deprived SLU of the opportunity to explain the
reason for not complying with the mandatory injunction.

Unperturbed, the Olairez group moved for a reconsideration of the said ruling but the CA
denied. The Olairez group then filed a petition review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Issue: Whether or not THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEREIN ALLEGEDLY
THEY "WERE FOUND NOT TO HAVE BEEN AFFORDED REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE
APPELLANTS TO APPEAR AND EXPLAIN THEIR CONDUCT"

Ruling:

The group’s petition is bereft of merit.

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
which provides: (See the provision)

In contempt, the intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith or lack of
it, of the alleged contemnor is considered. To constitute contempt, the act must be done
wilfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

In the case at bar, the supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group
visited the school on July 17, 2003 to demand their compliance with the decision was not
borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to hinder the
implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad
faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here.

Records reveal that the Olairez group violated the three-day notice rule on hearing of
motions as provided in Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when they scheduled the
hearing on their "Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants In Contempt" on July 18, 2003 or just
one day after they filed the said pleading on July 17, 2003. As a rule, any motion that does
not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be received for filing and, if filed, is
not entitled to judicial cognizance, subject only to some exceptions, such as where a rigid
application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice59 or if there was
substantial compliance.

Under the attendant circumstances, there was no substantial compliance with procedural
due process because although the hearing on the said motion was reset to July 22, 2003,
the disputed writ of execution was actually issued on July 18, 2003 and served on SLU and its
officials on July 19, 2003 before the rescheduled hearing date. In due process, the
parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be heard, as well as the time to
study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is
based.

This was not properly afforded to SLU.

The power to declare a person in contempt of court is an inherent power lodged in courts of
justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the
solemnity of the proceedings therein and the administration of justice from callous
misbehavior, offensive personalities and contumacious refusal to comply with court orders.
This contempt power, plenary it may seem, however, must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly with highest self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retribution or vindication. It should not be
availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice.

11
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 162299, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions, dated
November 18, 2003 and February 10, 2004, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. SP 78127,
are AFFIRMED.

In G.R. No. 174758, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the April 7, 2006 Decision and the
September 11, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 27861, are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

#7

G.R. No. 186589 July 18, 2014

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and LORNA CILLAN-SILVERIO, Petitioners,

vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A hearing is required in order to resolve a charge of indirect contempt; the respondent to

the charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone.

Factual Antecedents

In an October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order3 issued by Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati in Spec. Proc. M-2629 entitled "In re: Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz S. Silverio,
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Petitioner, versus Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Heir-Administrator
Designate,Edmundo S. Silverio, Heir-Movant, and Ligaya S. Silverio, represented by her Legal
Guardian Nestor Dela Merced II, Heir-Intervenor,"

Petitioner Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (Ricardo Sr.) is the surviving spouse of the decedent Beatriz
S. Silverio, with whomhe has children: herein respondent Ricardo Jr. (Ricardo Jr.); Edmundo;
Ligaya; and Nelia Silverio-Dee (Nelia). Lorna Cillan-Silverio (Lorna) is Ricardo Sr.’s second
wife. The subject matter of Spec. Proc. M-2629 is the decedent’s intestate estate (the
estate), which includes, among others, shares of stock in Pilipinas Development Corporation
(PDC) and a residential house in Urdaneta Village (house atUrdaneta Village).

Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA – docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 971965 –
questioning the trial court’s October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, particularly Ricardo Jr.’s
appointment as the new administrator. The CA later issued two Resolutions, which granted
Nelia’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

On September 3, 2007, Ricardo Jr. filed with this Court an "Appeal under Rule 45 and/or
Certiorariunder Sec. 1, Rule 65" with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 178676,10 seeking among
others a reversal of the CA’s July 4, 2007 Resolution and the issuance of injunctive relief.
Respondentcontended therein that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion inissuing
the July 4, 2007 Resolution and in granting injunctive relief against him.

On June 13, 2008, Ricardo Jr. wrote and sent two letters, one each to petitioners. Ricardo Jr.
demanded in the first letter that Ricardo Sr. cease and desist from 1) exercising the rights of
a stockholder in PDC; 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting withthird
persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records. In the second
letter, Ricardo Jr. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate the house at Urdaneta
Village.11

On June 25, 2008, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Indirect Contempt, 12 docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, seeking that herein respondent Ricardo Jr. be declared in indirect
contempt of court and punished accordingly. They charged that respondent’s June 13,
2008 demand letters violate and defy the CA’s July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008
Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196, which enjoined respondent’s appointment as
administrator pursuant to the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order; allowed petitioner Ricardo
12
Sr. to continue as administrator of the estate; and enjoinedRicardo Jr. and his co-
respondents in Spec. Proc. M-2629 from executing, enforcing or implementing any writ of
execution, order, or resolution for the enforcement of the Omnibus Order

Petitioners argued further that PDC and the house at Urdaneta Village are assets of the
estate placed under Ricardo Sr.’s charge as administrator through the July 4, 2007 and
February 29, 2008 Resolutions, which characterize respondent’s acts as undue
interferencewith Ricardo Sr.’s administratorship; moreover, respondent’s acts contravene
Philippine customs and traditions. Thus, respondent’s acts constitute indirect contempt as
defined and punished under Rule 71, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 14 (1997
Rules).

On February 25, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision, which held thus –

After a careful evaluation of the evidentiary records, this Court finds it inappropriate to
make a ruling on whether or not the Respondent has committed certain acts, supra.,
violative of Revised Rule 71 of the Rules.

Accordingly, in the light of the foregoing development, this Court is compelled to restrain
itself from resolving the issuesin the instant petition.

Otherwise put, it is imperative that We instantly pull the plug and let the High Tribunal settle
the controversy surrounding the propriety in the issuance of CA Resolution dated 4 July 2007,
supra., from which order the Respondent has allegedly committed acts indefiance thereof.

On this account, petitioners filed the present Petition.

Issue:

In the Petition, it issubmitted that –

THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL BEFORE THE [SUPREME COURT] ON THE VALIDITY OF AN

INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE [LATTER] FROM
ADJUDICATING THE QUESTION OFWHETHER X X X SUPERVENING ACTS COMMITTED BY ONE OF
THE PARTIES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE CONSTITUTE INDIRECT CONTEMPT BASED ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY OF COURTS. THUS, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT INVOKED THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR HIERARCHY OF COURTS IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT.16

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners, in praying that the assailed Decision be set aside and that the Court declare
respondent guilty of indirectcontempt, maintain that the July 4, 2007 and February 29, 2008
CAResolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 are valid and standing orders that must be obeyed
unless and until they are reversed or set aside, and despite the pendency of the petition in
G.R.No. 178676; respondent is bound by what is decreed in the July 4, 2007 Resolution, and
without injunctive relief from this Court, any act performed incontravention thereof
constitutes indirect contempt. Petitionersthus conclude that in refusing to take cognizance
of their petition for indirect contempt, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104060 committed error.

Finally, petitioners urge this Court to take the initiative in finding respondent guilty of indirect
contempt for issuing the June 13, 2008 letters and for attempting to evict them from their
Urdaneta Village home on June 20, 2008, which acts they believe amount to a defiance
and disobedience of the CA’s dispositions in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196.

Respondent’s Arguments

Arguing for the denial of the Petition, respondent in his Comment17 submits that the mere
act of writing and sending the June 13, 2008 letters to petitioners does not make him liable
for indirect contempt of court, as they "do not deal directly or indirectly with any of the
13
enjoined acts enumeratedin the 31 October 2006" Omnibus Order. Respondent adds that
petitioners have not shown that petitioner Ricardo Sr. has filed an administrator’s bond and
has taken his administrator’s oath; because ifhe has not, then it may notbe said that
respondent acted in defiance of the appellate court’s Resolutions since he continued to
act as the administrator on the strength of the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order in Spec.
Proc. M-2629. Finally, respondent submits that he may not be found guilty of indirect
contempt in the absence of proof that he physically carried out the demands contained in
his June 13, 2008 letters; though he admits that he wrote the letters, he nonetheless claims
that hedid nothing more beyond sending them.

Our Ruling

The Petition is granted in part.

The pendency of a special civil action for certiorariinstituted in relation to a pending case
does not staythe proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order. Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this.

Petitioners are thus correct in arguing that the pendency of G.R. No. 178676 did not interrupt
the course of CA-G.R. SP No. 97196, in the absence of a temporary restraining order orwrit of
preliminary injunction issued in the former case. This is because "an original action for
certiorariis an independent action and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial
resulting in the judgment complained of."18The CA therefore committed error in dismissing
CA-G.R. SP No. 104060, or petitioners’ indirect contempt petition, on the ground of
pendency of G.R. No. 178676.1âwphi1 It need not wait for this Court to resolve G.R. No.
178676 before the petitioners’ contempt charge may be heard.

However, at this point, this Court cannot grant petitioners’ plea to resolve the merits of their
petition for indirect contempt; it is the CA that should properly try the same. Aside from the
fact that the CA is the court against which the alleged contempt was committed, a hearing
is required in resolving a charge for indirect contempt.1âwphi1 The respondent in an indirect
contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis ofwritten pleadings alone.19

Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically [outline] the procedural requisites
before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there must be an order
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Second,
the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
Third, there must be a hearingand the court must investigate the charge and consider
respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.
The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in court, and an opportunity
given to the person charged tobe heard by himself or counsel. What is most essential is that
the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to
be heard in his defenses. This is due process, which must be observed at all times.

xxxx

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. To be sure, since an

indirectcontempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction cannot be
had merely on the basis of written pleadings. A respondent in a contempt charge must be
served with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the Court does not issue
summons on the respondent. While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer
similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set the contempt charge for hearing
on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must make his appearance to answer
the charge. x x x20 (Emphasis supplied)

To be sure, there are more pressing matters that require the attention of this Court;
petitioners' complaint for indirect contempt could very well be resolved by the appellate
court. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The February 25, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104060 is SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to
take cognizance of petitioners' June 25, 2008 Petition for Indirect Contempt.
14
SO ORDERED.

15