Slgean2016 PDF

Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century
East Central and Eastern Europe

in the Middle Ages, 450–1450
General Editor
Florin Curta
Volume 37
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ecee

Transylvania in the Second Half
of the Thirteenth Century
The Rise of the Congregational System
By
Tudor Sălăgean
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Cover illustration: Bologa (Sebesvár) castle, Cluj county, Romania. ©Photograph by Ştefan Socaciu.
Translation: Radu Valentin Băzăvan. Text revision: Andrei Gandila, Crina Gandila. Maps: Vlad Andrei
Lăzărescu.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Sălăgean, Tudor.

Title: Transylvania in the second half of the thirteenth century : the rise of the congregational system /
by Tudor Sălăgean.
Description: Leiden : Brill, 2016. | Series: East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle ages, 450–1450,
ISSN 1872–8103 ; volume 37 | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016001753 (print) | LCCN 2016006763 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004243620 (hardback : acid-free
paper) | ISBN 9789004311343 (e-book) | ISBN 9789004311343 (E-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Transylvania (Romania)—Politics and government. | Transylvania (Romania)—Kings and
rulers—History. | Nobility—Romania—Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Transylvania (Romania)—
History, Church. | Church and state—Romania—Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Congregationalism—
Political aspects—Romania—Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Social change—Romania—
Transylvania—History—To 1500. | Romania—Politics and government—To 1711. | Romania—History,
Church.
Classification: LCC DR280.2 .S26 2016 (print) | LCC DR280.2 (ebook) | DDC 949.8/4—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016001753
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issn 1872-8103
isbn 978-90-04-24362-0 (hardback)
isbn 978-90-04-31134-3 (e-book)
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Contents
List of Maps vii
Introduction 1
1 The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath 4

1.1 Prerequisites 4
1.2 The Organization of Transylvania’s Defense 16
1.3 The Campaign 25
1.4 The Tartar Retreat: The Second Devastation of Transylvania 30
1.5 The Aftermath of the Invasion 34
2 From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian Duchy (1243–1257) 49

2.1 Transylvania and the Council of Lyon 49
2.2 The Years of Recovery (1243–1248) 53
2.3 The Decade with No History (1248–1257) 58
3 The Duchy of Transylvania 63

3.1 Reinstating the Duchy of Transylvania 63
3.2 The Banate of Transylvania (1258–1261) 68
3.3 Civil Wars 71
3.4 Political and Social Change 90
4 Political Crisis in the First Years of Ladislas the Cuman’s Reign:

Attempts to Restore the Duchy of Transylvania 108
4.1 The Voivode Nicholas Geregye (1272–1274) 108
4.2 Transylvania under the Rule of the Csák Kindred (1274–1277) 112
4.3 The Saxon Rebellion (1277–1279) 119
4.4 The Aristocratic Triumvirate of 1278: The Domination of the Aba
Kindred in Transylvania (1279–1282) 124
5 Regnum Transilvanum: The Rise of the Congregational Regime 130

5.1 The Voivode Roland Borsa 130
5.2 The Mongol Invasion of 1285 135
5.3 Ladislas the Cuman and Transylvania 138
5.4 The Rise of the Congregational Regime 143
5.5 Ladislas iv and the Romanians of Transylvania 148
5.6 The End of Ladislas iv’s Reign 151
vi contents
5.7 The “Constitutional” Reform of King Andrew iii 153

5.8 The End of Roland Borsa’s Rule (1294) 156
5.9 Regnum Transylvanum 157
6 Ladislas Kán (1294–1315): The Transylvanian Nobles and the

Congregational Regime 166
6.1 The Beginnings of Ladislas Kán’s Power 166
6.2 A Nearly Sovereign Transylvania (1301–1310) 175
6.3 The Major Coordinates of Kan’s Internal Policy 185
6.4 External Policy: Transylvania’s Involvement in the Competition
for the Hungarian Crown 202
6.5 The Compromise of 1310 and Its Consequences 214
7 Charles Robert and Transylvania 229

7.1 Civil War (1316–1322) 229
7.2 The Political Regime of the Restoration 237
Conclusions 244
Annexes 249
1 General Congregations and Noble Congregations of Transylvania
(1288–1322) 249
2 Dukes of Transylvania 251
3 Voivodes and vicevoivodes of Transylvania 251
4 Counts of the Transylvanian Counties 252
5 Counts of the Szeklers 254
6 Bishops of Transylvania 255
7 Provosts of the Chapter of Transylvanian Church 255
8 Archdeans of the Transylvanian Church 256
9 Provosts of Sibiu 257
Bibliography 258
Index 274
List of Maps
1 The Mongol Invasion (1241–1242) 5

2 The duchy of Transylvania 64
3 Transylvania under Ladislas Kán 109
Introduction
In the late 13th century, a number of sources refer to Transylvania as a regnum,

apparently different from the regnum Hungariae, but nonetheless part of its
political system. The historical approach we propose hereby comes from the
necessity to explain the real meaning of this concept, hitherto regarded either
as a territorial, state-like entity (primarily by Romanian historians) or as an
“oligarchic” regime introduced by the voivodes Roland Borsa and Ladislas Kán
in the late 13th and early 14th century (an interpretation favored by Hungarian
historians). While Romanian and Hungarian historians agree on the actual
meaning of the word regnum, they disagree on its interpretation. Romanian
historians have long insisted on the continuity of the voivodal institution and
the ensuing state traditions, the origin of which is believed to go back to the
“dark ages” of the 9th and 10th centuries. By contrast, Hungarian historians
approach this issue as the result of the circumstances surrounding the crisis
of royal authority in the late 13th century, when the Arpadian dynasty came
to an end. In their views, Ladislas Kán was no different from Matthew Csák,
Henrik Kőszegi or Amadé Aba, all “oligarchs” or “kinglets” emerging one by one
as as ephemeral political actors, who disappeared as soon as Charles Robert of
Anjou managed to secure his power over the kingdom of Hungary.
Once nationalist pre- or misconceptions are removed, however, and the his-
torical sources are examined in their own right, one is faced with fewer diffi-
culties in the interpretation of the meaning regnum Transilvanum had for the
people at that time. To be sure, regnum nostrum Transsilvanum, as mentioned
in a document of duke Stephen (1266), obviously refers to a distinct politi-
cal unit subordinated to the Transylvanian voivode. Anticipating one of the
conclusions of this book, it is worth pointing out that, for reasons spelled out
in one of the following chapters, all other refereces to regnum Transilvanum
which could be dated firmly between 1288 and 1291 have certainly nothing to
do with the voivode Roland Borsa and his territorial authority. The documents
containing those references were issued not by the voivodal chancery, but by
the Transylvanian noblemen’s congregation, an institution that came into
being at that same time. Even the king used that phrase in reference to the
ownership of the noble title and its associated benefices or privileges (1291).
As a consequence, it appears that the Transylvanian nobility ascribed a new
meaning to the term regnum: namely that of a “legal country”, legal community
with its own privileges and autonomy. The remarkable development of the
Transylvanian nobility beginning with the second half of the 13th century and
its rise to the status of a provincial political group, the study of which is one of
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_002

2 Introduction
the topics of this book, entailed the bold assertion of a separate, Transylvanian
identity. The recognition of such claims led to a distinction most people at that
time, including the kings of Hungary, drew between Hungary and Transylvania.
There are several examples of how in the late 13th and early 14th century, the
Transylvanian nobility opposed any unwanted interference in local affairs
of court aristocrats or landlords from outside Transylvania. It is therefore no
surprise that the local nobility’s concern with maintaining control over land
resources in the province resulted in a specifically Transylvanian way to deal
with such issues, which were apparently different from the procedural customs
in the kingdom (consuetudo regni). Claims over local land resources are unde-
niably linked to the political vocation of the provincial elite, which manifested
itself in constant efforts to assume decision-making positions. Such aspira-
tions came into being less than a decade after the imposition in Transylvania
of the congregational regime. In fact, the policies introduced after 1301 by
Ladislas Kán were largely due to the fulfillment of those aspirations. The cor-
porate identity of the Transylvanian nobility, which finds its illustration in the
status of “legal country”, was associated to the specific laws, which were differ-
ent from those applying to the rest of the kingdom of Hungary, exceptions to
which were consistently linked to Transylvania. Those were in fact fundamen-
tal features of the congregational system, which emerged shortly before and
after 1300.
The chronological span of this historical reconstruction goes to a certain
extent beyond the limits announced in the title. The Mongol invasion of 1241 is
commonly viewed as the watershed for the fundamental changes taking place
in the Kingdom of Hungary during the second half of the 13th century, and
this is definitely true for the history of the province and of its nobility. Ladislas
Kán’s term as voivode of Transylvania, in itself the climax of the congregational
regime, needs to be examined in its entirety, namely until 1315, long after the
consolidation of the Angevine power.
One can hardly study the rise of a social elite in its pursuit of full politi-
cal control without understanding the political context in which such devel-
opments took place. A considerable part of this book is thus dedicated to an
event-by-event reconstruction of political history, important for the under-
standing of the circumstances in which the Transylvanian nobility assumed a
corporate identity. In paying attention to such details, I strove to offer a com-
prehensive view of several developments taking place at the same time and
therefore shaping in different ways the historical process. For that, I have relied
on the meritorious work of a few historians, who have meticulously studied
the period and contributed greatly to the reconstruction of historical events.
Introduction 3
The relative historiographic obscurity of the topic is in fact due primarily to the
difficult task of disentangling the complicated web of political developments.
My own attempt to do that is based on the idea of integrating the historical
phenomenon under study within the general history of Transylvania and of
the kingdom of Hungary in the second half of the 13th century.
CHAPTER 1
The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath
For a number of good reasons, the great Mongol invasion of 1241–1242 rep-
resented an exceptional event in the history of medieval Transylvania. The
invasion sounded the death knell for the previous military and administrative
structures of the kingdom of Hungary, which were based on royal fortresses
operating as county centers. During the second half of the 13th century, the
Transylvanian institutions underwent profound changes. The responsibili-
ties of royal officials, who lived off the exploitation of royal domains, were
now largely taken over by the provincial nobility, which, from this moment
onwards, became the main military force of the kingdom. In Transylvania, the
institutional changes were accompanied by a drastic social reconfiguration,
the key feature of which was the growing importance of the lesser nobility.
Equally significant was the redefinition of ethnic relations within the province,
as Romanians began working together with official institutions and providing
military participation in the royal army. At the same time, the great Mongol
invasion radically changed the external position of Transylvania, as it cut
short the crusading movement in Southeastern Europe, for which throughout
the first half of the 13th century Hungary had relied on the cooperation with
Latin Empire of Constantinople. The place of Transylvania in this expansion
of Latin Christendom into the southeastern region of the European continent
is yet insufficiently studied, but from what we know so far it appears that the
province was targeted by the Mongols precisely because it was perceived as
an advanced bastion of the Hungarian kingdom. Conversely, the 1241 invasion
effectively stopped the eastward advance of Western Christianity beyond the
Carpathian Mountains. In other words, the Mongols put an end to a century of
colonization and crusading.
1.1 Prerequisites
1.1.1
One of the most trustworthy sources depicting the obstacles the Mongols had
to overcome to conquer Transylvania, emanating from within the Mongolian
world, is Djami ot-Tevarikh (“The Sum” or “The Complete Collection of Histories”),

The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath 5
1 Adrian 18 Făgăraș 35 Ocna Dejului 52 Sebeș

2 Arieșul de Câmpie 19 Feldioara 36 Ocna Sibiului 53 Sibiel
3 Avrig 20 Frata 37 Ocnele Turzii 54 Șprenghi
4 Baraolt 21 Gârbova 38 Odorhei 55 Tămașda
5 Bâtca Doamnei 22 Geled 39 Orăștie 56 Tășnad
6 Bileag 23 Gilău 40 Orlat 57 Tâmpa
7 Birtin 24 Hălchiu 41 Piatra Șoimului 58 Teliu
8 Bulci 25 Hălmeag 42 Pintic 59 Tilișca
9 Câlnic 26 Hărman 43 Prejmer 60 Ungra
10 Cârța 27 Herina 44 Racoșul de Jos 61 Ungurei
11 Chelmac 28 Igriș 45 Rășinari 62 Vărșag
12 Cisnădie 29 Keve 46 Râșnov 63 Vărșand
13 Cisnădioara 30 Lomb 47 Rucăr 64 Vurpăr
14 Codlea 31 Lotru 48 Săcădate 65 Zalău
15 Comana de Jos 32 Luncani 49 Săsciori 66 Zalnoc
16 Crihalma 33 Micloșoara 50 Sâncel
17 Dej 34 Miercurea Sibiului 51 Sânpetru
MAP 1 The Mongol Invasion (1241–1242).
6 CHAPTER 1
the monumental work of the Persian scholar Rashid od-Din.1 Although written
half-a-century after the events, namely around 1307, this work is invaluable for
having relied for the period prior to the reign of Möngke (1251–1259) not only
on Juvaini,2 but also on several other sources, which have meanwhile been lost.
One of those sources appears to have supplied him with detailed information
about the military operations of the Mongols in Transylvania and the neigh-
boring territories outside the Carpathian Mountains. What is the remarkable
about this account3 is that, according to Rashid od-Din, the Mongol corps
led by Kadan, Büri and Böček, which operated on the southern flank of the
great invading army, engaged in no less than five battles, three against the
“Sasans,”4 one against the “Ulaghs,”5 and another against Mišelav.6 By contrast,
1 A Jew converted to Islam, Rashid od-Din was born in Hamadan (Persia) in 1247. He started
his career as the personal doctor of the Ilkhan Abaqa (1265–1281), and eventually became the
financial advisor of his grandson Ghazan (1295–1304), who commissioned to him the writing
of a complete history of the Mongols and of their conquest. Unfortunately, a major part of
his monumental work was lost. See J. A. Boyle, “Juvaini and Rashid al-Din as sources on the
history of the Mongols,” in Historians of the Middle East, edited by Bernard Lewis (New York,
1962), 133–137.
2 The History of the World-Conqueror by ‘Ala-ad-Din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini, translated by J. A. Boyle
(Manchester, 1958). A Persian by birth, ‘Ala ad-Din ‘Ata-Malik Juvaini (ca. 1226–1283), the son
of minister of finance of the Great Khan Ögödei, held important offices in the political sys-
tem of the Mongol Empire. See Boyle, “Juvaini and Rashid al-Din,” 134.
3 “And Kadan and Büri heading towards the Sasan people have defeated this people after
three clashes. And Böček walked down the Kara Ulaghi road through the mountains there
defeated that brave Ulagh people. And from there he entered the forests and the Yaprak
Tak Mountains at the Mišelav border and defeated the enemies who were there ready to
fight.” See Aurel Decei, “L’invasion des Tatars de 1241/1242 dans nos régions selon la Djam
ot-Tevarikh de Fäzl ol-lah Räshid od-Din,” Revue Roumaine d’Histoire 12 (1973), no. 1, 101–121
(available in Romanian translation in Aurel Decei, Relaţii româno-orientale. Culegere de studii
(Bucharest, 1978), here 194).
4 Most likely the Saxons of Transylvania. For the analysis of the text, see Decei, Relaţii, 193–208.
5 Most likely the Romanians in the lands outside the Carpathian Mountains. See Şerban
Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire. The Romanians in the 13th Century
(Cluj-Napoca, 1998), 100–101.
6 For Mišelav, see Dimitrie Onciul, Originile principatelor române (Bucharest, 1899), 95 and
155–158, who advanced the idea that Mišelav is the same as Seneslav known from the charter
granted to the Hospitallers in 1247 by King Béla IV. This identification has been, accepted
by Decei, Relaţii, 205–206; Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie tătară şi sud-estul euro-
pean (Bucharest, 1933), 45; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 102, but
questioned by Victor Spinei, Moldavia in the 11th–14th centuries (Bucharest: Ed. Academiei,
1986), 113–114; The Great Migrations in the East and South East of Europe from the Ninth to the
Thirteenth Century (Cluj-Napoca, 2003), 431–432; and Dmitrii E. Mishin, “Information on the
the northern corps under Baydar and Ordu engaged in only one battle, namely
that against the German and Polish armies led by duke Henry II of Silesia,
which took place on April 9, 1241 at Legnica. Judging by Rashid od-Din’s testi-
mony, the borders of Transylvania were better defended than those of Silesia.
There are few reasons to suspect Rashid od-Din for bias or distortion. He may
not have had complete information on the defensive system of Transylvania,
and thus may have collapsed a series of otherwise disjointed events. Be as it
may, the information in his work is still remarkable, for it confirms the fact that
the Mongols approached Transylvania with greater difficulty than the south-
ern regions of Poland.
The sheer numbers of troops on the southern flank of the invading
army bespeak the Mongol awareness of the defense system in and around
Transylvania. There is no doubt that out of seven armies deployed for the cam-
paign of 1241, the Mongols reserved no less than three armies to operate on
their western flank.7 The invasion forces may have thus consisted of between
120,000 and 140,000 men,8 including the auxiliary forces recruited from the
Vlachs in Medieval Islamic Literature (Arabic and Persian),” Romanian Civilization 6 (1997),
no. 2, 41–47.
7 Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 33, proposes four armies, as he regards Bochetor and Böček as
two distinct characters. Similarly, Victor Spinei writes of several Mongol armies roaming in
the lands just outside the Carpathian Mountains. To be sure, according to Rogerius, several
other “kings crossed the river named Seret” in the company of Bochetor (“Bochetor autem
cum aliis regibus, fluvium, qui Zerech dicitur, transeuntes”). See Master Roger, Epistle to the
Sorrowful Lament upon the Destruction of the Kingdom of Hungary by the Tatars / Magistri
Rogerii Epistola in miserabile carmen super destruction Regni Hungarie per tartaros facta,
translated and annotated by János M. Bak and Martyn Rady, in Anonymus and Master Roger
(Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 2010), 166 (Latin) and 167 (English). “Kings,” in this context,
may refer however to Kadan and Büri. According to Spinei, The Great Migrations, 430, Master
Roger’s Bochetor either Böček, son of Tului, or Bärkäčar, son of Jochi. In addition, the name
may be a derivative of the term ba’atur (“hero”, “brave”). Lacking more conclusive evidence,
of all three commanders mentioned by Rashid od-Din, Böček seems the most plausible iden-
tification for Bochetor.
8 The 50,000 men indicated by René Grousset, L’empire des steppes (Attila, Gengis-Khan,
Tamerlan) (Paris, 1965), 328, represent a general estimate of the armies that set off in 1236
in Batu and Subutai’s European campaign. A similar figure is advanced by See K. Koščev,
“Ešče raz o čislennosti mongol’skogo vojska v 1237 goda,” Voprosy istorii (1993), no. 10, 131–
135: 130,000–150,000 men, of whom only 50,000–60,000 Mongols. According to Denis Sinor,
“Horse and pasture in Inner Asian history,” Oriens Extremus 19 (1972), no. 1–2, 171–183, under
normal grazing conditions, the Hungarian puszta could have sustained, anything between
68,600 and 107,300 Mongol horsemen. Sinor believes that the Mongols withdrew in 1242
because of difficulties they faced in feeding their horses and livestock, which would imply
8 CHAPTER 1
conquered territories.9 How were these forces organized? Given the Mongols’
use of a military structure based on the decimal system,10 each of the noyons
in the Genghis-Khan’s family may have relied on up to 10,000 warriors. Of some
ten tümens, one for each of the commanders mentioned in the written sources11
the greatest was led directly by Batu and Subutai, the core force of the Mongol
invasion. This army was estimated at over 50,000 men.12 The army operating in
southern Poland under the command of Baydar, Ordu, and Kaidu must have
had between 30,000 and 40,000 men. After joining the other armies just in time,
these troops managed to defeat at Legnica the army of duke Henry II of Silesia,
which is estimated at some 30,000 warriors (before the arrival of the support
troops sent by the king of Bohemia). Thus, the three commanders operating
on the southern flank may have had some 30,000 warriors on horseback, of
which 10,000 followed the Danube upstreams (seemingly under the command
of Böček), and 20,000 moved against Transylvania.13 No matter how cautiously
one may need to treat those figures,14 it seems hard to question that the forces
on the southern flank represented about a quarter of the invading army, or
three eighths of the total forces that engaged in the battle against Hungary. At
any rate, the military force on the southern flank appears disproportionately
large, given that on the other two directions, where the Mongol armies were
expected to encounter military forces larger than theirs.
Moreover, the commanders of the three armies on the southern flank
enjoyed a well-consolidated military prestige and at the same time held impor-
tant positions in the empire’s political hierarchy. Kadan, one of the sons of the
Great Khan Ögödei, had earned his excellent military reputation as the com-
mander of one of the three armies which had invaded the Song Empire in
that their numbers were larger than the given estimate. The estimate of the contemporary
authors (500,000 in Master Roger and Simon of Kéza) are exaggerated.
9 See Koščev, “Ešče raz.” According to Master Roger, 40,000 Rus’ troops opened the way for
Batu’s army through the Carpathian passes, while 600 captives taken from Rodna guided
Kadan on his westward advance: Master Roger, Epistle, 166–167.
10 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 410.
11 Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 28.
12 This figure is indirectly confirmed by the analysis of the forces engaged in the battle at
Mohi on April 11, 1241, The Hungarian army led by King Béla had between 40,000 and
50,000 men. See Bálint Homan and Gyula Szekfű, Magyar Törtenet, vol. 1 (Budapest, 1935),
406.
13 A similar opinion on the distribution of the Mongol forces in A. T. Komjathy, A Thousand
Years of the Hungarian Art of War (Toronto, 1982), 20.
14 For a warning against taking figures given in Oriental sources at face value, see Spinei, The
Great Migrations, 410–411.
1235–1236.15 He had also participated in the great European campaign of Batu

and Subutai, particularly in the conquest of Riazan’ in 123716 and the decisive
battle at Chernigov.17 He then joined Möngke in the expedition against the
Circassians on the Kuban River (1238).18 Together with Berke, Kadan may have
also participated on the annihilation, in 1239–1240, of the Cuman resistance in
Dešt-i Kipčak, while Batu was busy besieging Kiev. This might explain Batu and
Subutai’s decision to entrust him with the command of the western flank dur-
ing the attack on Hungary, the goal of which was to eliminate any resistance
Transylvania and to plunder the areas settled by Cumans in Hungary. The
Cuman settlements were mainly on the western side of the lands between the
Danube and the Tisza rivers, as well as along the rivers Criş, lower Mureş and
Timiş.19 During the winter of 1241/1242, Kadan broke the defensive line set up
along the Danube by Paul Geregye, the count of Alba, thus opening the way for
the second Mongol attack, which stretched all the way to the Austrian border
and the Dalmatian coast. In addition, during the Mongol withdrawal of 1242,
Kadan did not miss the chance of forcing Serbia and Bulgaria into submission.
Büri was also part of the great family of Genghis Khan, for he was the son of
Chagatai. Becoming one of Batu’s main adversaries, together with Güyük, he
had a key role in the inner strife for power within the imperial family, and he
was eventually killed in the process. He earned his military reputation during
the campaign against Rus’, largely because of tight cooperation with Kadan.
In almost every major occasion, the two warlords appear together.20 Finally,
Böček, Tului’s seventh son, had distinguished himself in the campaigns against
Volga Bulgaria, the Alans, the Rus’ and especially the Cumans.21 The mission
assigned to him during the 1241 campaign was of strategical importance:
namely to move around the Carpathian Arc and to enter from the southeast
via the Banat region, thus cutting off any possibility for the Cumans of Kuthen
to withdraw into the Balkans.
Despite such an impressive display of force, the Mongols manage to break
through the fortified frontier of Transylvania at a date later than their vic-
tories on other fronts. The northern corps had begun the attack on Poland
15 Grousset, L’empire, 323.

16 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 412–413.
19 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 309. See the royal diploma of 1279, in HD 427; DIR, II. 219.
21 Decei, Relaţii, 204.
10 CHAPTER 1
in February 1241,22 when the towns of Lublin and Sandomierz were taken
(February, 13).23 On March 18, Baydar won the battle of Chmielnik,24 followed
ten days later by that of Krakow.25 In late March and early April, Baydar and
Kaidu’s troops joined in at Wrocław and wiped out duke Henry II’s army at
Legnica on April 9.26 Meanwhile, on the central front, the army commanded
by Batu had forced its way through the Veretsky Pass on March 10, and two
days later smashed the troops led by the Count Palatine Dionysius Tomaj, who
had attemped to block their entry into the plains.27 On March 15, Batu’s scouts
were already spotted near the town of Pest,28 while two days later the army
corps under the command of Šaiban reached the Danube near the town of
Vác.29 Over the next few days, Mongol troops pillaged a number of settlements
on the left bank of the Danube, with records of the clashes with Ugrinus Csák,
the Archbishop of Kalocsa, duke Frederick of Austria, and Bishop Benedict
of Oradea.30 Eventually, in early April, after confrontations around Pest, Batu
started his simulated retreat to the east, orchestrating the huge diversion that
lured the royal army into the ambush at Mohi (April 11, 1241).31
Throughout all this time, the attackers on the southern flank have not
accomplished much. The breach through the Carpathian passes was only
accomplished on March 31,32 at a time when major victories had been already
won on other fronts. By the time Batu made his appearance before the city of
Buda and Baydar set Krakow on fire, no Mongol horseman had yet entered
Transylvania. On the day of the decisive defeat of the Hungarian army at Mohi,
Kadan and Büri’s troops had only reached Cluj and Sibiu. Most historians seem
to have been oblivious to the implications of that delay. Why were the Mongols
so slow on the southern front? With nothing to suggest that Kadan, Büri and
Böcek have started their campaign at a later date, the key to finding a solution
lies in the above-quoted account of Rashid od-Din. The only possible explana-
tion for which the Mongols were able to cross the Carpathian Mountains only

26 For Legnica, see Spinei, The Great Migrations, 420–421 with n. 262.
27 Master Roger, Epistle, 160–161; Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the Thirteenth Century (Boulder/
New York, 1996), 139.
28 Master Roger, Epistle, 168–169; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 151.
29 Master Roger, Epistle, 170–171; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 152.
30 Master Roger, Epistle, 168–173.
31 On the battle at Mohi, see Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 154–160.
32 Annales Frisacenses, MGH. SS. 24: 65–67; Gombos, Catalogus, 315; Jakó 191.
on March 31 is that they had encountered stiff resistance in the lands outside
those mountains, and were bogged in mopping operations before entering
Transylvania. At the same time, the southern troops seem to have been far-
ther away from Hungary proper than the armies on the northern and central
flanks. There is therefore sufficient evidence to suggest that Transylvania was
one of the main targets of the great invasion of 1241, and that the resistance the
invaders encountered on their way justified the careful planning of the cam-
paign, the purpose of which was the annihilation of the military potential of
Transylvania.
1.1.2
After the battle at Kalka (1223),33 the vast, albeit unstable “empire” of the
Cumans underwent a rapid disintegration. That military confrontation shed
light both on the winners’ military superiority and on the serious crisis under-
mining the Cuman political system. In addition, the solution adopted by
Kuthen, one of the most important Cuman chieftains—an alliance with the
Rus’ princes—had proved ineffectual. Not only did the Rus’ alliance, despite
its consistency,34 fail to save the day; later developments, marked by increas-
ing Rus’-Cuman disparities, clearly proved that a permanent alliance was
impossible. Under such circumstances, only one power with interests in the
region could lend a helping hand to both Cumans and Rus’, and that power
was Hungary. The interest of the Hungarian kings in the Cuman steppe was
of a rather recent date, and represented one aspect of papal policy of spread-
ing Western Christianity to the East, especially after the creation of the Latin
Empire of Constantinople in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. That is
why the efforts of the Hungarian kings in that direction were supported by
two orders, the Teutonic Knights, who were settled by King Andrew II in the
Bârsa region of southeastern Transylvania (1211),35 and a missionary order,
the order of the Preaching Brothers, established by St. Dominic of Guzman,
33 See Spinei, The Great Migrations, 402–403, with a discussion of sources; Grousset, L’empire,
308.
34 Grousset, L’empire, 308, believes the Rus’ army to have been as large as 80,000 men, which
is most likely an over-estimate.
35 For the role of the Teutonic Knights in the Bârsa (Burzenland) within the broader political
context of the crusade in Eastern Europe, see Harald Zimmermann, Der Deutsche Orden
in Burzenland. Eine diplomatische Unterschung (Weimar/Vienna, 2000); Şerban Turcuş,
Sfântul Scaun şi românii în secolul al XIII-lea (Cluj-Napoca, 2001), 205–233; Şerban Turcuş,
“Christianitas şi românii: note privind locul românilor în realitatea creştină occidentală la
începutul secolului al XIII-lea,” ActaMN, 34 (1997), no. 2, 23–27; Papacostea, Between the
Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 40–46.
12 CHAPTER 1
who were engaged in converting the Cumans to Christianity.36 The Teutonic

Knights began by building an impressive system of fortifications in eastern
Transylvania, making it impenetrable to the then seemingly powerful Cuman
attacks. Despite unfavorable, if not altogether hostile conditions, the knights
started their offensive by expanding their authority over territories outside the
Carpathian Arc, to an extent yet difficult to assess.37 Shortly after Kalka, how-
ever, the Grand Master Hermann von Salza put under the direct jurisdiction of
the pope the Teutonic domain in the Bârsa and the adjacent lands on the other
side of the mountains.38 He thus effectively cancelled all allegiance to the king
of Hungary, while opening the gate for further expansion eastward. This led to
King Andrew’s swift reaction of 1225, when the Teutonic Knights were forced
to leave the country. They left behind a legally complicated, yet militarily solid
legacy, which enabled the Hungarian king to contemplate for the first time the
possibility of expansion outside the Carpathian Mountains to the east, deep
into the Cuman steppe.
After 1225, Prince Béla (future King Béla IV) became a key player in this
borderland, as he was appointed by his father “young king” and duke of
Transylvania,39 a title seemingly created for the occasion. Sharing power
with King Andrew II,40 Béla had control not only over the military system in
Transylvania, which until then had had no unified command, but also over the
kingdom’s entire eastern policy. That control became exclusive when, follow-
ing the conflict between Pope Gregory IX and King Andrew II, Béla became
one of the pope’s most trusted collaborators, for Gregory wanted to make him
what Béla’s father, in the pope’s eyes, had never been: a true crusader, at least
in relation to the Balkan and eastern parts of the European continent. Indeed,
soon after that, Prince Béla’s political initiatives in the east were secured with
36 On St. Dominic’s plans to convert the Cumans, see Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum
Predicatorum Historica, edited by [give the name of the editor], volume 16, part 2 (Rome,
1935), 34–35, 162, 217, 294, 378. See also R. F. Bennet, The Early Dominicans. Studies in
Thirteenth-century Dominican History (Cambridge, 1937), 108, according to whom St.
Dominic allegedly grew a beard in preparation for his mission to the Cumans.
37 For the most competent discussion of this problem, see Victor Spinei, “Contribuţii la isto-
ria spaţiului est-carpatic din secolul al XI-lea până la invazia mongolă din 1241,” Memoria
antiquitatis 6–8 (1974–1976): 109–111; Spinei, Moldavia 49–51.
38 The transfer was approved by Pope Honorius III on April 3o, 1224, See Potthast 7232;
DIR I. 204–205, 381–382; HD 85–86; ZW 29–30.
39 The exact date of the appointment is unknown. He was definitely in office on August 1,
1226, when his brother Coloman was already duke of Slavonia, see CD III/2. 90. See also
Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 96.
40 Crowned in 1214, for which see Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 49.
the papal protection, as well as with the cooperation of the Preaching Brothers,
shortly after the Dominicans became one of the most important instruments
of papal policies in Eastern Europe.
Given the disarray in the Cuman world in the aftermath of Kalka, the results
of the fruitful combination of Hungarian (Transylvanian) military pressure
and Dominican missionary propaganda did not take too long to appear. In
1227, Bortz or Burch, the chieftain of a Cuman tribe most likely located in the
western lands of the Cuman steppe, next to Transylvania, decided to convert
to Christianity under the spiritual guidance of the pope and the military pro-
tection of Hungary. In order to maximize the opportunities thus offered for
the conversion of the region to Christianity, a Cuman bishopric was estab-
lished as the foundation of a very ambitious political program.41 Entrusted
to the Dominicans, the bishop of the new diocese became the administrator
of a territory which, following the 1224 charter for the Teutonic Knights was
a part of the lands they had placed under the jurisdiction of the pope (terra
Sancti Petri). As the papal jurists did not regard as closed the conflict between
Hungary and Teutonic Knights, Prince Béla could neither assume the title of
King of Cumania, nor appoint Hungarian officials in the lands of the Cuman
bishopric, even though he was its military protector.
That the conversion of Bortz and his tribe had serious repercussions in the
Cuman world results from Khan Kuthen’s reaction. He refused Béla’s offer of
alliance and preferred to remain on the side of the Rus’ princes until the eve of
the great Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe. In 1230, when Béla campaigned
against Daniil of Halych-Volhynia and his ally Kuthen, he relied on assis-
tance from another Cuman warlord, Begovars,42 an indication of the growing
Hungarian influence in the steppe lands. Daniil and Kuthen remained close
allies throughout the entire period between 1227 and 1233.43 After 1235, how-
ever, as the Mongols resumed their offensive, they completely changed their
strategy. Since 1229, the Mongols had been a common presence on the left bank
of the Volga River, and two Cuman tribes (of Durut and Toksoba) had accepted
41 As for the activity of the Dominicans in the lands outside the Carpathian Mountains and
the establishment of the Cuman Bishopric, see I. Ferenţ, Cumanii and episcopiile lor (Blaj,
1931); Spinei, Moldavia, 51–54; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire,
104–107; Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun, 284–302; Turcuş,, “Christianitas şi românii,” 19–21; Victor
Spinei, “The Cuman bishopric—genesis and evolution,” in The Other Europe in the Middle
Ages. Avars, Bulgars, Khazars, and Cumans, edited by Florin Curta (Leiden/Boston, 2008),
413–456.
14 CHAPTER 1
their hegemony.44 In an attempt to keep the Mongols as far away as possible

from their own borders, the Hungarians had established contact with the lands
known as Magna Hungaria on the Volga, by means of a Dominican mission.
However, such contacts proved inconsequential. Friar Ricardus learned in 1236
in Suzdal, that Magna Hungaria had already submitted to the Mongols. The
great invasion of Europe had started.
1.1.3
The effort of the Hungarian kings to expand their influence in the Cuman
steppe and beyond, culminating with Dominican mission to the Volga, could
not have escaped the attention of the Mongol warlords. The great kuriltai of
1235, at which the decision was taken to attack the Cuman steppe, had explic-
itly defined Hungary as one of the potential opponents.45 The account of Friar
Julian, one of the Dominicans Béla sent to Magna Hungaria, is evidence of the
Mongols’ preoccupation with the realm of the Arpadian kings.46 The same is
true for Batu’s attempt to establish diplomatic contacts with the King Béla at
the beginning of the military operations on the Volga.47 Batu’s contacts with
Béla are also mentioned in the chronicle of Matthew of Paris.48 Batu’s insis-
tence undoubtedly concealed a more menacing approach, but also shows
that the Mongols were open to negotiations,49 their primary objective being
to eliminate (by diplomatic means, if possible) any Hungarian competition in
the Cuman steppe.
King Béla’s refusal can only be interpreted as accepting the challenge. In
reality, the great Mongol offensive had itself opened the gates of the East, for
even Kuthen, Béla’s old enemy, as well as some of the Rus’ princes asked for the
king’s help and accepted his alliance and protection.50 This newly-acquired

45 Juvaini, apud Spinei, The Great Migrations, 409.
46 László Bendeffy, “Fontes authentici itinera (1235–1238) fr. Iuliani illustrantes,” Archivium
Europae Centro-Orientalis 3 (1937), nos. 1–4, 38 and 42.
47 A letter addressed by Batu to the Hungarian king, which has been entrusted to the
Dominican missionary by the prince of Suzdal’, reproached Béla for not answering to the
30 (!) envoys that had already been sent to him. Two versions of the letter in Wenzel, VII,
549–550 and 554–555.
48 Matthee of Paris IV, 274. Batu’s envoy was a former Templar, who was captured and inter-
rogated by duke Frederick of Babenberg in the spring of 1242, while the Mongols reached
Austria.
49 Similar messages had been sent by the Mongols to the Rus’ princes before the battle at
Kalka. See John Fennel, The Crisis of Medieval Russia (1200–1304) (New York, 1989), 65.
influence, after almost two decades of unfruitful attempts, could not be pre-
served however only by means of political and missionary activities. Béla’s
new eastern allies were all awaiting for his serious involvement in fighting the
invaders.
In this context, under the year 1239 the chronicle of the Cistercian monk
Alberic of Trois-Fontaines mentions a Hungarian attack against the Mongols
run by a certain “count of Transylvania” (comes Ultrasilvanus). After some
initial success, in a battle “near the Meotid marshes” (the name given since
Antiquity to the Sea of Azov),51 the commander of the Hungarian expedition
into the steppe lands was killed.52 This bit of information is corroborated by the
Dominican chronicler Nicholas Trivet, who wrote in the early 14th century and
who mentions an attack on the Mongols led by “one of the Polish or Hungarian
princes.” Apparently, the attack caused great distress among the Mongols in
regards to their relations to the realm of the Arpadian kings, but their “idols”
shared the internal contradictions which also divided the Hungarian society.53
Nicholas Trivet’s “prince” is most likely the “count of Transylvania” in Alberic’s
account. Who was this character? A count (comes) of Transylvania, also appears
in a papal letter of 1238,54 and he may have been a deputy of the voivode’s in

52 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronica, ed. Paul Scheffer-Boichorst, MGH SS 23: 946: “Contra
Tartaros vero misit comitem Ultrasilvanum, qui in quodam angusto transito paludum
Meotidarum ita confregit primum cornum illorum, quod ceteris retro respicientibus, iam
in illis partibus perisse putabatur memoria eorum cum sonitu.”
53 Gombos, Catalogus, 4017, 1707: “Tartari subactis Georgia, India, Armenia maiore ac Turkia,
per unum de principibus Poloniam et Hungariam sunt aggressi. Cum vero timerent
intrare Hungariam, consulentes idola, dum hostias immolarent, tale accepisse feruntur
responsum: Ite securi, quia spiritus infidelitates et discordiae vos praecedent, quibus
inter se turbati Hungari vobis minime praevalebunt.” Since the chronicler highlights the
fact that the Mongols were afraid to attack Hungary, but not Poland, one could draw the
conclusion that the attack came from Hungary.
54 A certain count of Transylvania named Ladislas is mentioned in Pope Gregory IX’s letter
of February 11, 1238: “nobilis vir Ladislaus . . . comes eiusdem diocesis /Ultrasilvane/” (DIR,
C, XI–XIII, 316–317, 414; Theiner, I, 161–162; Jáko, EO, 187). Ladislas appears to have been
in conflict with bishop of Transylvania, who appealed against him to the pope. He was
most certainly not the voivode of Transylvania, Pousa, who is specifically mentioned in a
separate letter of the same pope dated to January 29, 1238 (RA 637). He may however have
been Ladislas Aba, a veteran of the Galician campaigns, in which brother Myke (Miko),
former count of Bihor (1212–1222) had lost his life. In 1234, as a reward for his military
merits, Ladislas Aba received from King Andrew II a land grant in Bihor (RA 527 with text;
DIR I. 276–280).
16 CHAPTER 1
charge with the troops on the frontier or even beyond it, within the lands out-
side the Carpathian Arc and within the Cuman bishopric.
The Transylvanian expedition of 1239 must have undoubtedly been asso-
ciated with the clashes between the Mongols and Kuthen, the latter on the
verge of giving up on the resistance that looked initially so promising.55 His
decisive defeat in that same year sealed the fate of the entire steppe corridor
north of the Black Sea. Kuthen was forced to flee to Hungary together with
his Cumans.56 After that, King Béla’s efforts concentrated exclusively on the
defense of his own kingdom. He therefore refused to provide assistance to the
Kievans besieged by Batu, despite the request of the Grand Prince Mikhail
Vsevolodovich.57 Nonetheless, Béla did not hesitate to offer asylum to both
Mikhail and, later, Daniil Romanovich, the only Rus’ prince known to have sent
troops to Kiev.
The reasons for the Mongol attack on Hungary are thus obvious, and so are
those that made them hesitate to do so earlier. The asylum Béla offered to any-
one asking for it and the enlisting of Cuman refugees turned Hungary into a
potential contender to recent Mongol conquests. At the same time, the mili-
tary campaign of the Transylvanian “count” was not just an intolerable offense,
but also a proof that Hungary had the means to put its expansionist plans
into the steppe lands in practice. This irrefutable evidence warned Batu and
Subutai that, unless the Hungarian menace was removed, the conquest of the
Cuman steppe could never be complete. Tackling the Hungarian issue made it
necessary to deal a most severe blow on Transylvania, at that time Hungary’s
advanced bastion to the east.
1.2 The Organization of Transylvania’s Defense
1.2.1
Prompted by the settlement of the Saxon colonists (hospites), the military net-
work of Transylvania has been revived in the second half of the 12th century.
55 According to Master Roger, Kuthen had initially succeeded in inflicting two defeats on
the Mongols. During a third confrontation, however, he he was taken by surprise and was
forced to admit defeat. Master Roger, Epistle, 136–137.
56 According to Roger, there were 40,000 Cumans together, with their families, (circa
quadraginta milia dicebantur: Master Roger, Epistle, 140–141. András Pálóczi-Horváth,
Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians. Steppe People in Medieval Hungary (Budapest, 1989), 60–61
has raised doubts about that figure, pointing out that the area in which the Cumans were
settled by Béla IV in 1246 could support only between 17,000 and 20,000 families.
During the first decade of the 13th century, given Hungary’s contribution to the
crusade in Southeastern Europe, which resulted in the creation of the Latin
Empire of Constantinople, the defense network in Transylvania was reorga-
nized into an even more remarkable offensive structure. This was most likely
the period when it was separated from the military organization at the county
level and was placed under the command of the count of Sibiu. In addition to
an elite force recruited from among German settlers, and the Szeklers troops,
the new military organization now harnessed the military abilities of two fron-
tier populations, namely the Romanians and the Pechenegs. An army with
exactly that composition is said to have intervened in Bulgaria in 1210, under
the leadership of count Joachim (Iwachinus) Türje of Sibiu, in order to provide
military assistance to the pro-Hungarian emperor Boril.58 The Pechenegs had
already in the 12th century joined the Szeklers in the defense of the eastern
frontier of the kingdom, which was at that time placed under the command
of the count of Alba. In the early 13th century, they seem to have been in the
process of being assimilated.59 Their role was now taken by the older inhab-
itants of the province, the Romanians, with whom the Pechenegs appear to
have cooperated in the past. That Romanians were now included in the mili-
tary organization of Transylvania suggests that neither the Saxons (German
settlers), nor the Szeklers were numerous.60 It was under those circumstances
that a royal charter of 122261 acknowledged the existence of a “country of the
Romanians” (terra Blachorum), which apparently enjoyed a certain degree of
autonomy in sharp contrast to the encroachments of the previous decades.62
Another new element appearing in the border area of southern Transylvania,
probably again in response to the lack of manpower, was the introduction of
the royal servientes.63 The charter King Andrew II granted to Johannes Latinus
in 1204 is in fact the first piece of firm evidence pertaining to the institution of
servientes in the kingdom of Hungary.64
58 DIR I. 338–339; Wenzel VII. 310–311; Jáko 37: Saxonibus, Olacis, Siculis et Bissenis.
59 N. A. Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului în secolul al XIII-lea. Mănăstirea
cisterciană Cârţa, vol. 1 (Cluj-Napoca, 2000), 151–152 offers examples of noble families
from the Făgăraş who were probably of Pecheneg origin. See also 171–338, for place names
and other names of Turkic origin from the Făgăraş area.
60 The Saxons were expected to contribute 500 soldiers to the defense of the kingdom
(Andreanum, ZW 32–35, DIR I. 208–210).
61 DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20.
62 Antal Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului în Evul mediu (Bucharest, 1999), 149–171.
63 On the category of royal servientes see Martyn Rady, Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval
Hungary (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000), 35–38.
64 DIR I. 28–29; ZW 7–8; HD 50–51; Jáko 30.
18 CHAPTER 1
The influence and authority of the count of Sibiu, which initially seem to
have covered the whole of Transylvania, was soon diminished by the settle-
ment of the Teutonic Knights in the Bârsa region in 1211, and the creation of
the Banate of Severin in 1232/1233. That various elements in the military orga-
nization were supposed to work together results from the right granted in 1224
to the Saxons to use “the forest of the Romanians and the Pechenegs” (silva
Blacorum et Bissenorum),65 as well as from the exemption in 1222 of the Teutonic
Knights from paying customs duties when crossing terra Blachorum and terra
Siculorum.66 The three entities—the Bârsa now in the hands of the Teutonic
Knights, “the country of the Blachs/Romanians” and “the country of the
Szeklers”—were obviously components of one and the same military system.
The fragmentation of the frontier defense, as well as the coordination between
the royal troops and the Saxons of the “province” of Sibiu,67 may explain why,
shortly after expelling the Teutonic Knights from the Bârsa (1225), King Andrew
II established the new title of “duke of Transylvania.” The incumbent—no other
than the heir apparent, Béla—had authority over all military structures, which
considerably increased their efficiency. As its influence expanded in the Lower
Danube in the aftermath of the war with Bulgaria, the military organization of
Transylvania came to include also a number of Romanian polities on the other
side of the Carpathian Mountains (Transylvanian Alps) along the valleys of
the rivers Jiu and Argeş valleys. Béla, on the other hand, promptly placed the
Cuman bishopric—including a number of smaller Romanian polities—under
his military authority, thus effectively extending the “Duchy of Transylvania”
to the southeast across the Carpathian Mountains as well.68 His subsequent
coronation as king in 1235 put an end to the “Duchy of Transylvania,” which
triggered a conflict between the voivode and the count of Sibiu over authority
in the lands from which the Teutonic Knights had been expelled. Along with
the efforts the voivode initiated in 1235 to establish his authority in the Bârsa
and the eastern area of the Country of Făgăraş, the bishop of Alba Iulia also
strove to include those lands in his diocese. The conflict appears to have been
65 For the location of that forest, see Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului, 254–272;
Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 157–158.
66 DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20.
67 This results, among other things from the restrictive provisions of the Andreanum of 1224:
the Saxons were obliged to accomodate the voivode of Transylvania twice a year, provided
that he acted, as specifically mentioned, ad regalem utilitatem. Otherwise, no distinction
is made between voivode and any other royal “serf” (dignitary), whom the Saxons were
to provide only 50 soldiers, and only at the specific request of the king. DIR I. 208–210,
383–384; ZW 32–35.
68 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 97–103.
still going on at the time of the Mongol invasion of 1241, which no doubt had
serious consequences for the organization of the frontier defense.
1.2.2
Many new fortifications were built in the early 13th century, and old ones
were repaired and extended. On the eastern border of Latin Christendom,
Transylvania probably had the most fortified frontier. The lance head of this
defensive system was the heavily fortified Bârsa region, in which the Teutonic
Knights erected five fortresses between 1211 and 1225. After their departure,
additional fortifications were erected at the order of the Hungarian crown.
The royal donation diploma of 1211 granted the Knights the right to build only
timber (-and-earth) fortifications.69 However, eleven years later, when renew-
ing his initial grant, the king had to allow the Knights the right to build stone
fortifications, a right, however, which they seem to have already assumed.70
According to Pope Gregory IX’s bulls issued between 1231 and 1234 to endorse
the knights’ demands for restitution, there were no less than five fortifica-
tions. Moroever, another fortress, built ultra montes nivium, have been erected
at a later date.71 The identification of those fortresses (the number given in
the papal bulls may be treated with suspicion, given that the purpose of those
documents was to obtain restitution) has been one of the greatest challenges
of historians dealing with the medieval history of Transylvania. Without get-
ting into the details of that controversial issue, suffice to say that, with the
exception of Marienburg—the location of which in Feldioara seems to be
accepted by everyone—no other fortress said to have been erected by the
Knights has so far been identified on the ground. According to recent opin-
ions, possible candidates are Codlea,72 one of the fortifications in the environs
69 DIR I. 150–151, 369–370; ZW 11–12.

70 DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20.
71 DIR I. 245–246, ZW 51 (1231); DIR I. 256–258, ZW 55–57 (1232); DIR I. 272–273, ZW 58–60
(1234).
72 Kurt Horedt, “Zur siebenbürgischen Burgenforschung,” Südost-Forschungen 6 (1941),
588–589;. See also Virgil Vătăşianu, Istoria artei feudale în Ţările Române, IInd ed., Cluj
Napoca, 2001, 11; Alfred Prox, “Die Burgen des Burzenlandes,” Siebenburgisches Archiv 1
(1962), 61; Géza Bakó, and Gernot Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften und Gerichtsstühle,”
Neuer Weg 8565 (November, 27, 1976), 4, cited in Thomas Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor în
Transilvania (Bucharest, 1992), 190–191; Benkő, KMTL, 216; Grigore Ionescu, Arhitectura pe
teritoriul României de-a lungul veacurilor (Bucharest, 1982), 132; Paul Binder, “Antecedente
şi consecinţe sud-transilvănene ale formării voievodatului Munteniei (sec. XIII–XIV), II,”
Acta Hargitensia 2 (1997), 33.
20 CHAPTER 1
of Braşov (Tâmpa, Şprenghi or another, yet unidentified location),73 Hălchiu

(Heldenburg),74 Râşnov,75 Rucăr,76 Teliu (Cruceburg, Cetatea Crucii),77 Racoşul
de Jos (“Mihályvára”, in the Várpatak valley),78 and Comana de Jos.79 Besides
strongholds in the Bârsa area, the Teutonic Knights are known to have built
another strong fortification (castrum munitissimum) somewhere beyond the
mountains, but it is not clear whether or not that fortification is Cruceburg.80
That particular fortress seems to have been bone of contention in the dispute
between the Knights and King Andrew II, who had not given his approval for
its erection. The fortress was eventually taken by force by the royal troops even
before the Knights were expelled from Bârsa in the summer of 1225.81
Pending further archaeological information on the Teutonic fortresses, one
document can however assist our approach. In two charters issued on March
17 and March 21, 1240,82 King Béla IV granted to the Cistercian monks a num-
ber of four churches in Bârsa, which had been persistently claimed also by the
bishop of Transylvania. For reasons that remain unknown, the monks did not
immediately obtain the grant, and the king saw it fit to compensate them for
the delay. The four churches donated in 1238–124083 were located in Feldioara
(Castrum Sactae Marye), Sânpetru (Mons Sancti Petri), Hărman (Mons Mellis)
and Prejmer (Tartilleu/Tartilleri),84—all located within the lands granted
to the Teutonic Knights in 1211. Judging by the situation in Feldioara, which
appears on the list, those churches may have all been located within fortresses.
By means of this compromise, King Béla may have attempted to placate the
73 Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4; Benkő, KMTL, 126.

74 Prox, “Die Burgen,” 61.
75 Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4.
76 Prox, “Die Burgen,” 61; Ionescu, Arhitectura, 132; Binder, “Antecedente,” 33.
77 Prox, “Die Burgen,” 61; Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4.
78 Binder, “Antecedente,” 33.
79 Binder, “Antecedente,” 33.
80 The text of the the 1222 donation suggests that Cruceburg, which the king granted to the
knights, was located inside the Bârsa area—DIR I. 182–184; ZW 18–20. The fortress beyond
the mountains seems to have been erected between 1222 and 1224 with no permission
from the king. That in fact was the spark that ignited the conflict of 1224–1225.
81 DIR I. 214–216; ZW 36–38.
82 Michel Tănase, “Avatarurile unui act de donaţie. Donaţia făcută Cistercienilor, în Ţara
Bârsei, de către Bela IV, la 17 martie 1240,” Revista Istorică 4 (1993), no. 1–2, 55–80, review-
ing previous editions (DIR I. 319–320, ZW 68–69, HD 184–185 and others).
83 Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 69–70 believes that the donation to the Cistercians was probably
made in 1238, the documents of 1240 being only the solemn confirmation of the previous
transaction.
84 Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 63.
pope, who has aggressively campaigned in favor of the Knights in the previ-
ous years. Even if the churches in question were not in fact restituted to the
Knights, they were given now to another monastic order with outstanding con-
tributions to the crusading cause. The papacy seems to have been pleased with
the arrangement, which effectively put an end to complaints from Hermann
von Salza and his successors. That the king was in a position to transfer imme-
diately the churches in question to the Cistercians may have been the result
of his conflict with the Knights.85 The delay must have been caused by the
preparations the voivode Pousa made to prevent the Mongol invasion, which
in turn would imply that the churches granted to the Cistercians were inside,
or at least next to strongholds.86
Despite the fact that the exact location of the five Teutonic fortresses remains
unknown, there can be no doubt that the defensive potential of fortresses in
the Bârsa area grew considerably during the decade separating the departure
of the Knights from Transylvania from the Mongol invasion. According to
Thomas Nägler, the Teutonic Knights started out with the building of more
than five fortresses, but did not have the time to finish the job.87 Their efforts,
though, were brought to fruition by duke Béla (1225–1235) and, after his corona-
tion, by voivode Pousa. Shortly before the 1241 invasion, Transylvania received
a significant number of fortifications, which are also mentioned in Alberic’s
chronicle.88
Inside Transylvania, and behind the line fortified by the Knights, there were
several royal fortresses that had been erected well before 1211. Two of these
85 Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 69–71. It is however less likely that fifteen years after being driven
out of Transylvania, the Teutonic Knights continued to cash in revenues from the Bârsa
area.
86 Native settlements were discovered in Hărman, Sânpetru, and Prejmer, which could be
dated to the 8th–12th centuries. The area must have been populated before the arrival of
the Knights. See Alexandrina D. Alexandrescu, Ion Pop, and Maryna Marcu, “Raport asu-
pra săpăturilor de la Hărman, jud. Braşov (Report on the Hărman, Braşov county, digging)
(1961–1970),” MCA 10 (1973), 231. As for the settlements of the German “guests” Michel
Tănase has demonstrated that they had the same dependant position in relation to the
Knights as the Cistercians (Tănase, “Avatarurile,” 71).
87 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 192.
88 Albericus, in MGH SS 23: 946: Given that the two fortresses that King Béla “fortified” ultra
silvas et nemora were of importance, since news about them were sent to the other side of
Europe, they could be identified with Codlea and Feldioara. The former must have been
built on this particular occasion, the other simply rebuilt, possibly in a different location.
See Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4, cited in Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 191.
22 CHAPTER 1
fortresses were Ungra89 and Hălmeag,90 both mentioned together with

“indagines Nicolai” from the Micloşoara area, in the royal donation of 1211.91
Also, some of the other fortresses listed by Schullerus as border fortresses (for
instance, Crihalma or Săcădate)92 might have undergone some remodeling.
On the other hand, most of the fortresses located on the western slopes
of the Eastern Carpathians were either reinforced with earthen palisades
and wooden poles, or border fence lines (indagines)93 which, according to
Albericus, blocked the mountain paths.94 Moreover, there is the possibility
that at least two stone fortresses predate the Mongolian assault: Odorhei and
Vărşag.95 On the eastern side of the Carpathians the Hungarian crown com-
manded the border fortress of Bâtca Doamnei (Piatra Neamţ),96 which con-
trolled the access to the Bistriţa valley, in Moldavia.
Even though there is no recent evaluation available regarding the state of
the fortifications located around 1241 on the Olt Gorge, it is well known that
the strategic importance of this region had increased considerably in the
first decades of the 13th century.97 In order to secure this mountain pass,
the Hungarian crown imposed its direct authority on the western most part
of the Country of Făgăraş.98 Besides having the Saxons colonize the region,99
they erected the earthen fortress of Avrig.100 In addition, the fortresses of
89 Stone fortress (70/40 m) researched by archeologists, dating back to the first decades of
the 13th century—Radu Popa, Radu Ştefănescu, Şantierul arheologic Ungra, jud. Braşov),
MCA, XIV, (1980), 496–503.
90 Lukács, Ţara Fagăraşului, 154.
91 Prima vero meta huius terre incipit de indaginibus castri Almage et procedit usque ad indag-
ines castri Noilgiant, et inde progreditur unsque ad indagines Nicolai—DIR I. 150–151, 369–
370; ZW 11–12.
92 Schullerus, “Die Grenzburgen der Altlinie”, Korrespondenzblatt, XLI, no. 5–8, (1918): 17–21.
Same opinion at Horedt, Zur siebenbürgischen, 122.
94 Albericus, in Gombos, Catalogus, 33.
95 Adrian A. Rusu, “Arheologia, cronologia and interpretarea istorică a unor cetăţi medievale
timpurii din Transilvania de est. Note critice”, Crisia XXIV (1994): 43–54. Mircea Rusu,
Castrum, urbs, civitas (cetăţi şi “oraşe” transilvănene din sec. IX–XIII), ActaMN VII (1971):
201.
96 Spinei, “Contribuţii la istoria”, 145–148; Moldavia in the 11th–14th centuries, 65–66.
97 Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 161.
98 Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 161.
99 Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului, 232.
100
Horedt, “Südsiebenbürgische Grenzburgen”, in Siebenbürgische Vierteljahrschrift
64 (Hermannstadt, 1941) 17–19. For a more reserved opinion see also Lukács, Ţara
Făgăraşului, 148.
Orlat101 and perhaps Lotru102 may have been constructed within the same time
span. Also, during the reign of Andrew II, Sibiu, the county seat of Sibiu, was
expanded and received a stone wall.103
1.2.3 Flaws in the System

In spite of the strongholds and the natural advantages that made Transylvania’s
military frontier an impenetrable barrier to less persistant invaders, such as
the Cumans, certain weakness left it vulnerable to a massive invasion.
First and foremost, Transylvania’s defensive capabilities were restricted to
the border itself.104 For the Hungarian crown, the consolidation of the military
frontier eliminated any threat to the hinterland and no longer required the
military reformation of the counties. Such a measure would have inherently
entailed a complete overhaul of the administrative system, for which King Bela
was anything but ready. Starting with the end of the 12th century, the state’s
resources were channeled mainly towards the frontier areas, neglecting almost
completely the bigger inland fortresses.105 Thus, should an invader succeed in
breaching the frontier, almost no resistance would oppose its advance towards
the center of the kingdom.
Secondly, the army defending the frontier was not prepared to deal with
a massive onslaught; they could only hold back the invaders until the royal
army’s arrival. Thus, it is no wonder that in 1241, when the royal army was busy
fighting with an invasion in central Hungary, the stiff resistance mounted by
the Transylvanians proved to be insufficient. Moreover, the general assembly
ordered by king Bela IV in early March deprived the Transylvanian frontier of a
great number of potential defenders. It is also known that the king called for all
high ecclesiastic officials to spare none of their material resources and to hire
101 Thomas Nägler, “Cetăţile feudale de la Orlat şi continuitatea românilor în sudul

Transilvaniei”, Muzeul Brukenthal. Studii and comunicări. Arheologie-istorie, no. 20 (1977):
27–49; Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 157.
102 Horedt, “Zur siebenbürgischen”, 594; See Vătăşianu, Istoria artei, 131; Busuioc-von
Hasselbach, Ţara Făgăraşului, 266.
103 Petre Munteanu Beşliu, “Sibiu”, Cronica cercetărilor arheologice 1983–1992. A XXXI–a
Sesiune Naţională de rapoarte arheologice (Bucharest, 1997), 96–98.
104 Adrian A. Rusu, Forteresses du Haut Moyen-Âge de Transylvanie. État des recherches,
in Frühmittelalterliche Burgen Mitteleuropas bis zum Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts. 4.
Castrumbene-Konferenz (Visegrád, 1994), 59.
105 Rusu, Forteresses, 59. Some of these fortresses (Alba Iulia, Cluj-Mănăştur, Arad, Cenad),
also incorporated buildings with religious function, and their importance increased
above the initial military functions of the fortresses.
24 CHAPTER 1
and equip new military units to serve under his command.106 Among those
who responded to the king’ summon were Bishops Benedict of Oradea, Bulchu
of Cenad, the Provost of Arad and Bishop Raynaldus of Transylvania. The latter
became one of the martyrs of the battle of Mohi, which also claimed the life
of Provost Nicholas of Sibiu.107 The Bishop of Oradea, succeded in gathering
“a great army”,108 that was subsequently defeated under his command in the
attempt to liberate the town of Agria (Eger), shortly after it was occupied by
the Mongols.109 On its way to Buda, the army led by the Bishop of Cenad was
engaged in a series of clashes with the Cumans who were plundering their
way out of Hungary.110 Not just the church officials unanimously honored the
king’s request, but also the leaders of the counties neighboring Transylvania.
Rogerius recounts that count Boch (Both) of Bihor led his men to fight along-
side Bishop Benedict in the battle of Agria, but he fails to inform his reader
whether he survived it or not.111 On the other hand, the Solnoc county troops,
placed under the command of the Count Palatine Dionysius Tomaj, might
have been crushed, together with the palatine army, by the Mongols shortly
after crossing the Verecke Pass (March 10th, 1241). In one way or another, all
these forces, that at least in teory could have pulled a good oar to the defense
of Transylvania or at least raise a new defensive line at its western border, were
used to defend the core of the kingdom itself. In this context, the forces gath-
ered by voivode Pousa against the Mongols in Burzenland were hardly a match
for the invaders.
In conclusion, even though Transylvania had a considerable number
of strong fortifications they were unevenly distributed along the frontier.
Although a great number of them were located in the Carpathian area, a
number of potential passes were insufficiently defended. One of these—near
Rodna—was in fact the route taken by Kadan’s army. The defensive system
set up in the years prior to the invasion failed to make up for the gaps, which
allowed the Mongols to succeed in outflanking it.

108 Master Roger, Epistle, 178–179: pro se de mandato regis magno exercitu congregato . . .
1.3 The Campaign
1.3.1
Despite the lack of sufficient evidence, most historians assumed that the entire
Mongol forces employed in the offensive against Central Europe were camped
during the winter of 1240–1241 in an area confined around Halych. This hypoth-
esis is not confirmed by any known source. On the contrary, Rogerius accounts
that the troops marching through the Gate of Russia under Batu’s leadership
were merely a part of the invading army.112 Furthermore, this assumption goes
against existing evidence placing the entire Mongol army in the Hungarian
plain during the winter of 1241–1242. This placed a huge burden on the area’s
food resources which eventually forced the Mongols out of the Arpadian
kingdom.113 Even though the geographical conditions of Halych were a lot less
favorable for camping an army of nomadic riders compared to those of the
Hungarian plain, there are no mentions of a similar food shortage. In addi-
tion, the strategic assembly of all Mongol effectives in the Hungarian plain was
only the result of the military necessities of 1241–1242. Such a strategy is not
recorded in any other episode of the massive European military campaigns
started in 1236.
Considering the aspects mentioned above, it is more likely that the exten-
sive effectives of the invading army were spread over a vast area alongside the
frontiers of the states targeted by these campaigns. The troops led by Baydar
and Ordu, the initiators of the attack against Poland (February 1241), were con-
centrated somewhere around Vladimir, that is, more than one hundred kilo-
meters away from the area where Batu’s troops camped for the winter. The fact
that the northern flank of the Mongol offensive was the first to start the mili-
tary operations was undoubtedly due to the absence of any natural obstacles
to hinder their advance.
Considering the significant time gap between Batu’s breach of the Verecke
pass (March 10th) and the time Kadan and Büri’s troops entered Transylvania
(March 31st), the southern flank could not have joined the offensive from the
Halych area. If we are to believe that the southern flank did start the campaign
from Halych, then Kadan’s delay to join in remains unaccountable. Starting
112 Master Roger, Epistle, 164–165: Bathu maior dominus, dimissa tota familia, solus cum suis
militibus et non multis ad dictam portam Ruscie, que propior erat ad locum in quo rex con-
gregabat exercitum, recto tramite properauit, et expugnando exercitu comitis Palatini ean-
dem porta obtinuit et intrauit.
113 See infra, 1.4.
26 CHAPTER 1
from the Halych area around the same date as Batu’s offensive, Kadan should
have reached the mountains around March 10th and, should have been able
to cross them in three days, as indicates Rogerius,114 they should have reached
Rodna around March 15th at the latest, which surely did not happen. Hence,
we must consider the existence of an additional concentration area on the
southern Mongol flank, which was likely located somewhere on the Lower or
Middle Dniester. This hypothesis is also supported by the analysis of the attack
directions of the Mongol troops on Transylvania. Thus, the conquest and sub-
sequent destruction of the fortress at Bâtca Doamnei (Piatra Neamţ) provides
a valuable clues regarding the route taken by Kadan’s army.115 The march took
him up the Moldavian Bistriţa Valley until he reached the Dorna Valley. He then
must have followed down the Ilva River, making a surprise appearance in front
of Rodna on March 30th, 1241. According to Epternach’s account, Büri made
his entrance into Burzenland around the same date (March 31st)116 which indi-
cates not only a perfect coordination of these military operations, but also the
fact that the two armies seem to have divided themselves shortly before the
crossing of the Carpathians, probably somewhere near the junction of Bistriţa
and Siret Rivers. The mission of the troops led by Bochetor/Böček, as opposed
to that of Kadan–Büri’s army, was to keep under surveillance the movements
of the Cuman refugees located in the Balkan Peninsula and to forestall any
regrouping attempt on their part. Consequently, this army might have win-
tered somewhere close to the Danube River, most likely in the Budjak Steppe.
1.3.2
In the winter of 1240–1241, the Mongol troops camped in these regions car-
ried out preliminary military operations similar to those performed by Batu’s
troops in the Halych area. In fact, they were familiar with the Cuman steppe
from previous years. Back then, Böček managed to stand out against the
Cuman leader Bačman,117 and afterwards to participate, alongside Büri in the
conquest of Crimea.118 The Cumans’ last centers of resistance were most likely

115 Mircea Dogaru, Istoria militară a poporului român, vol. I, (Bucharest, 1984), 317–318.
Spinei, Moldavia 112, considers this action was made by an army corps subordinated to
Kadan. Also Spinei, The Great Migrations, 430.
116 Eodem die (Resurrectionis dominice) alter exercitus eorundem Tartarorum ingrediens pro-
vinciam que Burza dicitur—Annales Frisacenses, MGH, SS, XXIV, 65–67; Jakó 191.
117 Decei, Relaţii, 204
118 Spinei, Moldavia, 113.
annihilated shortly before the offensive in Hungary.119 The fact that the Cuman
bishop managed to raise a local army, composed mostly of Wallachians—
Rashid od-Din’s Ulaghs—ready to engage in an open combat with the invad-
ing Mongol forces is a strong evidence of the political and military structures
already existing in the region. While Böček’s victorious troops headed towards
a new confrontation with the Wallachians (kara-ulagh) led by Mišelav, and
then set foot into Hungary via Severin,120 Kadan and Büri attacked the forti-
fied line of the Carpathians. We can not know for sure whether the division of
Kadan and Büri’s forces was part of the initial offensive plan, or it was only the
result of the first and least successful confrontation with the defenders of the
Carpathian passes.
While the route followed by Kadan to reach Rodna seems rather clear, there
is still doubt regarding the mountain pass chosen by Büri in order to reach
Burzenland, most of the historians favoring the Oituz pass.121 Once they left
behind the mountain passes fortified by the locals with palisades,122 the two
invading armies were faced with even more difficulties. Kadan succeeded in
conquering Rodna—a mining town with no fortifications—after two attacks,
and a faked retreat to weaken the town’s defenses.123 After the conquest of
Rodna, guided by the newly acquired 600 hostages, among which the Saxon
judge Aristaldus, Kadan headed towards Bistriţa, which he conquered on
April 2nd.124 The conquest of Bistriţa marked the end of the resistance in the
Saxon colonized northeastern Transylvania. The path towards the heart of the
province appeared now to be secured. Still, Kadan’s advance went a lot slower
than anticipated. He undoubtedly destroyed the salt mines located around Dej
and conquered the royal fortress from Dăbâca.125 He then attacked the royal
castle of Cluj, which he conquered126 on April 11th and massacred the popu-
lation. Next, Kadan continued his westward advance and reached Oradea on
119 Byzantine historian Nicephor Gregoras records, around the year 1241, the refuge to the
south of Danube of 10,000 Cumans from the North-Black Sea steppe, FHDR III, 500–501.
120 For a different opinion, see: Maria Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare în secolele
XI–XIV, (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1981) 70–73.
121 Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 35–36; Spinei, Moldavia 113.
124 Notitia Epternach: Feria III eiusdem hebdomande in opido quod Nosa dicitur ceciderunt ex
Christianis VI milia XIII.
125 Ştefan Pascu et al., “Cetatea Dăbâca”, ActaMN V (1968): 166, 182–183.
126 Notitia Epternach: item in quodam castro quod dicitur Cluse ceciderunt infinite multitudo
Hungarorum.
28 CHAPTER 1
April 16th or April 17th—which he conquered after a siege of several days dur-
ing which he made use of seven war machines.127
On March 31, 1241, after crossing the mountains, the troops led by Büri
crushed the army of voivode Pousa. The defeated voivode perished on the
battlefield.128 The town of Kumelburch, which Büri conquered on April 4th,
could not have been Cetatea de Baltă due to the considerable distance between
the fortress and the eastern Transylvanian frontier (impossible to be covered
by the invaders in such a short time span). Even though the identification
suggested by Aurelian Sacerdoţeanu129 is uncertain, the position of this town
must be searched in the same area of the military frontier, mostly somewhere
between Burzenland and Transylvania.
Once Büri’s troops went beyond the heavily fortified Burzenland they seem
to have divided into two groups. One of them continued advancing towards
the center of Transylvania, conquering Cetatea de Baltă,130 Alba Iulia131 and
presumably Turda. The other army, operating close to the military frontier,
went downstream the Olt River Valley, towards Sibiu. This second army was
responsible for devastating the Catholic settlements located between the Olt
River and the Perşani Mountains,132 and following their way to Făgăraş,133 for
destroying the Cistercian monastery of Cârţa.134 The Mongols then laid siege
on Sibiu, conquered on April 11 at the end of a fierce resistance.135 The two

128 Eodem die alter exhercitus eorundem Tartarorum ingrediens provinciam que Burza dicitur,
ducem exhercitus transilvane terre cum omnibus suis interficit.
129 Rupea/ Cohalm/ Köhalom—Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 3
130 The site of the royal fortress destroyed by theMongols was identified by Gheorghe Anghel,
Fortificaţii medievale de piatră din secolele XIII–XVI (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1986), 89.
131 Annales Frisacenses, Jakó 191; Master Roger, Epistle, 224–225.
132 Binder, Antecedente, 35.
133 See: Lukács, Tara Făgăraşului, 66–70, for discussions regarding the existence, in Făgăraş,
of a fortress previous to the Mongol invasion. However, a settlement did exist in that spot.
According to a more recent analysis, the Făgăraş thesaurus was buried during the inva-
sion of 1241, see Ernest Oberländer-Târnoveanu, “Din nou despre datarea teazurului de
monede bizantine de la Făgăraş (jud. Braşov)”, Studii şi comunicări. Arheologie-Istorie 21
(1981): 287–289. The same dating is suggested in the case of the Sreza-Cârţişoara thesau-
rus by Lukács, Tara Făgăraşului, 152.
134 D IR II. 55–56, ZW 93–94, HD 322.
135 Notitia Epternach: item feria V ante dominicam misericordia ceciderunt in civitate que villa
Hermanni dicitur, plus quam centum miliam. Annales Erphordenses: Tartari . . . civitatem
dictam Hermanni villam in Aprili expugnantes, usque ad centum /milia/ ibi peremerunt,
predicatorum cenobium ibidem incendentes, Jakó 190.
army groups reunited devastated Miercurea, Sebeş and Orăştie.136 They con-
tinued by marching down the Mureş Valley, conquering Hunedoara137 and
the settlements located on the lower Mureş River, and finally reached Cenad
sometime around April 25th, several days after Kadan took Oradea.
As for Böček, he entered Hungary via Severin and continued the offensive
along the Danube line, conquering and destroying the Hungarian border
fortresses of Keve and Horom.138 Afterwards, he crossed the Tisza River and
camped in the southern part of Pannonia, but did not engage in any other mili-
tary operations in Banat (present-day southwestern Romania). The conquest
and devastation of the Cistercian abbey of Igriş—after an all-out siege in which
the Mongols used war machines139—as well as of other monasteries on the
lower Mureş River, many of them (Bulci,140 Kenezmonostor, Geled, Chelmac/
Eperjes, Rohonczamonostor etc.141)—severely damaged or even destroyed
beyond reconstruction, were all attributed to Büri, who led his troops into the
lower Mureş River area during his Transylvanian campaign.
Kadan and Büri’s advance through Transylvania was much slower compared
to that of the Mongol armies operating in Hungary and Poland. Even though
the fortresses failed to stop the Mongol offensive, they at least delayed it. Thus,
while Batu’s army crossed the distance between the Verecke pass and Pest
at an astounding speed of over 50 km/day, Kadan and Büri’s troops crossed
Transylvania, starting from Rodna and Burzenland all the way to the Cluj-Sibiu
line, at a speed of only 20 km/day. Also, they most likely did not manage to
travel any faster over during their subsequent advance.
Thus, neither Kadan nor Büri arrived in time to participate in the decisive
battle of Mohi, which gave king Bela the chance to fight an evenly numeri-
cal battle. In the end he was not able to capitalize on this chance. Also, it
seems to had been the battle of Mohi that brought Batu and Büri in conflict,
as accounted in the Secret History of the Mongols.142 During the kurultai initi-
ated after the first stage of the campaign against Hungary, Batu seems to have
136 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 198.

137 The earth and wood fortress on the Sâm Peter hill, abandoned in mid-13th century—
Alexandru Bogdan, “Contribuţii arheologice la cunoaşterea castelului Corvineştilor de la
Hunedoara”, BMI 2 (1970): 20–21.
138 Petru Iambor, Aşezări fortificate din Transilvania (secolele IX–XIII), Cluj-Napoca, 2005,
67–69.
140 Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 97–98.
141 Dicţionarul mănăstirilor din Transilvania, Banat, Crişana and Maramureş. Edited by
Adrian A. Rusu. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2000: 101, 142, 157–158, 217–218.
142 Decei, Relaţii, 203.
30 CHAPTER 1
claimed additional distinctions and behaved accordingly. In fact, it was he

who had defeated king Bela, while Büri reached his final target, the by now
deserted area colonized by the Cumans, more than a month after Batu’s arrival
in front of Buda. The Mongols seem to have failed in assessing the difficulties
they would face in the process of invading Transylvania. Thus, they left behind
them a considerable number of unconquered fortresses143 and were not able
to establish a permanent occupation in the area due to their insufficient troops
and because of the fierce local opposition.
1.4 The Tartar Retreat: The Second Devastation of Transylvania
Mongols’ retreat from Hungary, in the spring of 1242, must have come as a sur-
prise to contemporaries, at least as much as their devastating invasion. As a
matter of fact, the reasons behind the retreat continued to intrigue histori-
ans from much later periods. The attempts to clarify these issues have engen-
dered until now at least four different theories:144 1) the “political” theory—still
the most widely accepted145—links the Mongols’ retreat to the death of the
great khan Ögödei and the beginning of the struggle for succession; 2) the
“geographical” theory146 considers the cause of the retreat to be the incapacity of
the Pannonian plain’s to provide enough grazing space for the Mongol horses;
3) the theory of the “military weakness”,147 argues that the Mongols relinquished
their invading plans due to the heavy losses suffered on the Russian, Polish
and Hungarian battlefronts; 4) last, those favouring the “gradual conquest”
theory148 consider the 1241 expedition a first stage of the assault on Europe,

144 Greg S. Rogers, “An Examination of Historians’ Explanations for the Mongol Withdrawal
from East Central Europe”, East European Quarterly 30 (1/1996), 3–26.
145 See the examples provided by Rogers, “An Examination”, 8–9. Some of the Romanian
historians who adopted this point of view—endorsed, also by the testimony of Plano
Carpini—are Sacerdoţeanu, (Marea invazie, 62–63) and Papacostea (Between the Crusade
and the Mongol Empire, 157–159.
146 Based on Sinor’s remarkable article, “Horse and pasture”, 171–183.
147 Favoured by the Soviet historiography in the attempted to make the peoples located
on the Volga and the Russian knezes the saviors of Europe; according to Rogers, “An
Examination”, 12–14. This explanation, present, in the respective period, in other Central
and Eastern European historiographies, is also found, for instance, in Istoria României,
vol. 2, Bucharest: Editura Academiei: 122.
148 Laszlo Makkai, A History of Hungary (London: 1975), 59–60; Magyarország Története, 1st
ed. part2. Budapest, [give publisher], 1984: 1439; Ödön Schütz, “A mongol hóditás nehány
problémájáról”, Századok 24 (1959): 230.
during which the Mongols only intended to prepare the ground for a decisive
campaign—which in the end never happened. In spite of their shortcomings
and proven lack of persistance,149 each of these theories sheds light on some of
the aspects of the Mongol retreat. Furthermore, we must ask whether combin-
ing the information offered by these theories, could not in fact bring us closer
to a better understanding Batu’s long-disputed decision.150 In this context, one
must mention Victor Spinei’s thesis, which succeeds in combining the essen-
tial parts of the first three theories151 (given its inconsistent argumentation, the
fourth is rather hard to take into consideration).
In his remarkable work on the Black Sea policy of the Mongol Empire, Virgil
Ciocâltan provides the basics of yet another hypothesis worth considering.
His rigorous analysis of the political and economic tendencies of the Golden
Horde maintains that Batu had very little interest in the Black Sea and the rest
of Europe, as his main interests focused on the Trans-Caucasus and Asia Minor,
on the Silk Road and the Fertile Crescent and, last but not least, on the politi-
cal developments at the Great Khan’s court.152 Under these circumstances, we
should ask ourselves whether Batu ever intended to settle in Central Europe.
Even though various literary works written by frightened Europeans ascribed
the Mongols the desire to conquer various regions of Christendom or even
the whole world, we must not forget that according to the Mongol sources the
main objective of the military campaign started in 1236 was the conquest of
the Cuman Steppe. The Mongol plan to dominate the surrounding territories
starting from the Cuman Steppe must not be interpreted as a will to settle in
Central Europe. In fact, due to the Mongol way of life settling in Europe would
not have appealed to them.
Under these circumstances, the 1241 invasion seems to have been justified
by the need to protect the Cuman steppe from Hungarian intervention in the
region. Thus; the objective of the campaign was to annihilate the offensive
capabilities of the Arpadian kingdom and to force its withdrawal from the
race to dominate Eastern Europe. The Hungarian nobility seems to have antic-
ipated their intentions and this much can be deduced from their refusal to
allow Kuthen’s Cumans to settle in Hungary, lest they antagonize the Mongols.
Similar reasons might have led to a decrease in the influence exerted by the
pontifical political instruments in this part of the world, in the years that fol-
lowed the invasion. Both the Dominican order, very active in Eastern Europe
149 For a different opinion see G. Rogers, 15–20.

150 Rogers, “An Examination”, 21.
152 Virgil Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea trade in the thirteenth and fourteenth cen-
turies, trans. Samuel Willcocks (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 42–55.
32 CHAPTER 1
and, quite surprisingly, the Templars, despite their dedication and sacrifice
in the battle of Mohi, lost their popularity on the territory of Hungary. The
destruction of the Hungarian strongholds located outside the Carpathians, the
weakening of the Transylvanian military power and driving the Cumans and
of Russian princes (strong opponents of the Mongol domination in Eastern
Europe) out of Hungary, were actions taken by the Mongol in order to ensure
their success. Once these objectives were achieved, the Mongol presence in
Hungary was no longer necessary. More so, a permanent stay would have been
implied a high cost for the Mongols. The Hungarian plain could not have sus-
tained the large number of Mongol riders. An army of approximately 120,000–
140,000 soldiers occupying its territory for a year would have led to a complete
depletion of its resources. In despite of the impressive shock of the invasion
and the decisive victories in open field, the losses had been considerably high
and the conquest of Hungary was far from being complete. The unexpected
resistance faced by the Mongols during their raids in Bohemia and Austria
pointed to the necessity of reassessing a prospective invasion further west.
During these raids, the Mongols were met only by the local forces, but to fight
the imperial army of Frederick II, or a crusading army prepared against them,
would have brought upon them a completely different scale of warfare. Under
the circumstances, the Mongols realized that it was not possible to maintain
their hold on Hungary with an army of only 6,000 soldiers (as they would do in
Kiev).153 In fact, communication would have been difficult given the huge dis-
tance between the Arpadian kingdom and the political centers of the Empire.
Therefore, an occupation army needed considerable numbers in order to
ensure a complete operational autonomy in case of confrontations with the
European kingdoms. Thus, in order to settle a considerable army in Hungary,
Batu would have been forced to remain on the Danube banks, unable to par-
ticipate in the political developments within the Empire and to take advantage
of the profitable commercial routes of Central Asia. It is likely that the Mongol
commanders were satisfied with attaining their initial strategical objective in
Central Europe: of discouraging Hungary from venturing beyond the line of
the Eastern Carpathians for the entire century that followed the 1241 invasion.
153 Under the command of khan Corenza—identified by the experts as Qurumsi, son of
Ordu—this army, led by Batu, expanded its authority over Western Russia and, presum-
ably the Outer Romanian Carpathians. Iohannes de Plano Carpini, ‘Ystoria Mongalorum”.
In Sinica Franciscana, I, Itinera et relations fratrum minorum saeculi XIII et XIV, edited
by P.A.v.d. Wyngaert (Firenze: Quaracchi, 1929): 106, 108. According to Spinei, The Great
Migrations, 459.
The fact that during their retreat, in the spring-summer of 1242, the Mongols
devastated Transylvania in a much more systematic manner compared to
the previous year might also indicate that the Mongols intent was mainly to
secure their conquests in Dešt-i Kipčak. Transylvania put up a fierce resistance
in March–April 1241, and crossing its territory turned out to be an arduous
enterprise. Taking advantage of the fact that the Mongols did not leave behind
an army, the Transylvanians erected new fortresses and regrouped in case of
another invasion.154 Given the fact that Transylvania was, among the territories
of the Arpadian kingdom, the closest province to the Cuman steppe, where
the 1239 offensive had started, the fighting abilities of the locals were surely
known by the Mongols. On the other hand, we must take into account the fact
that the troops retreating through Transylvania155 were not part of the two
armies led by Kadan that continued their offensive west of the Danube at the
beginning of 1242, and returned to the Steppe North of the Black Sea through
Serbia and Bulgaria. The soldiers crossing Transylvania had spent the previ-
ous months in the Hungarian plain. They were low on provisions and plun-
dering Transylvania was their last chance to increase their booty. Thus, taking
full advantage of the opportunity, the withdrawing Mongol troops devastated
Transylvania systematically, causing, according to Rogerius and Thomas of
Spalato, a severe depopulation of the region.156 Rogerius crossed the region as
a Mongol prisoner, which makes him an eye witness of the events. He managed
to escape after crossing the mountains, somewhere on Cuman territory, and he
returned by foot to Alba Iulia. His testimony is impressive. He recounts cross-
ing deserted villages, feeding on roots and vegetables from deserted gardens,
and finding his way back guided by the burnt church steeples. During eight
days of walking from the Cuman border to Alba Iulia, Rogerius did not meet
one living soul.157

155 Sacerdoţeanu, Marea invazie, 63–64 and note 3—believes that Batu himself, together
with Subutai, followed this way back and challenging those arguing that they went back
through Bulgaria. However, he failed to take into consideration a possible retreat on the
same route initial invasion: Halych—Kiev.
156 Thomas Spalatensis archidiaconus, Historia Salonitarum, in Gombos, Catalogus, 2238:
Interea Tartarorum exercitus, depopulata omni regione Transilvana etc.; Master Roger,
Epistle, 220–221: Et sic retrocedendo paulatim pervenimus Ultra Silvas, ubi remanserat
populi multitudo, et erant post eorum transitum castra plurima preparata. Et quid ultra?
Exceptis castris quibusdam terram totaliter occuparunt et eam procedentes desolatam et
vacuam reliquerunt. . . .
34 CHAPTER 1
1.5 The Aftermath of the Invasion
1.5.1 Immediate Consequences

1.5.1.1 Starvation, Depopulation, and Destruction
The immediate consequences of the Mongol invasion impacted mostly the
territories that were formerly under their direct control. Due to the military
operations and the thorough plundering, the entire agricultural production of
1241 and 1242 was compromised.158 The massive depopulation and the pres-
ence of invading troops slowed down production, and the small crops resulted
in these circumstances together with the rest of provisions were consumed
by the marauders. They also showed a particular interest in collecting the
local livestock, which constituted valuable war spoil for a nomadic people.
The result was a great hunger that took its toll on the contemporaries. The
Lvov anonymous chronicle describes the 1242 famine that struck Hungary as
“horrible and never before heard of”. According to the same chronicle starva-
tion brought more death than the invasion itself159 and this information was
reproduced in the 14th century Hungarian chronicles.160 The survivors had
no choice but to feed on dogs and cats, while human flesh was sold in local
markets.161 The settlements were under constant menace from hungry wolves,
for fear of which no person left their house unarmed.162 On top of everything
else, a dreadful locust invasion destroyed all crops in the summer of 1242,163
making the upcoming Christmas in the kingdom of Hungary the scene of
“the greatest misfortune and misery ever seen”.164 No human being could be
found “within a 15 days’ walk in any direction from a spot”.165 This vast and
158 S RH, I, 468: et seminare illis temporis non potuerunt Hungari,.

159 Anonymi Leobiensis (Gombos, Catalogus, 271): Interea fames horribilis et inaudita invasit
terram Hungariae, et plures perierunt fame, quam antea a paganis.
160 S RH, I, 468: Molto plures post exitum illorum fame perierunt quam illi qui in captivitate
ducti sunt et gladio ceciderunt.
161 Anonymi Leobiensis: Canes edebant et cattos, et hominibus humana caro publice vendebatur
in nundinis. Spinei, The Great Migrations, 443, finds similar information given by Rashid
od-Din: in Hungary and Poland “there was [. . .] such hunger and misery that people ate
children meat”.
162 Anonymi Leobiensis: lupi rapaces et infesti, nemini parcentes, praevalerunt in terra, ita quod
vix aliquis de domo sua auderent inermis procedere (Anonymi Leobiensis).
163 Anonymi Leobiensis: deinde locusta id, quod seminatum errat, corrosit.
164 Anonymi Leobiensis: A nativitate Christi non est tanta plaga et miseria vista et audita in
aliquo regno sicut in Hungaria, prropter peccata eorum.
165 Anonymi Leobiensis: In quindecim diaetis in longitudine et latitudine homo non invenieba-
tur in regno illo.
scorched land is the territory lying between the Danube and the Tisza plain,
were the Mongols settled in the 1241–1242 winter, devoured its food resources,
destroyed a great number of existing settlements and turned their wheat fields
into grazing grounds. In the first months of 1243, count Paul Geregye, “before
any other noblemen of the kingdom”, dared to cross the Danube and venture
inland, and he could only find wilderness, a place where law and order were a
distant memory. His deed was considered an extreme act of courage.166 While
the Danube was the western limit of the empoverished area, the eastern bor-
der was very close to the frontiers of Transylvania. As an eye witness, Rogerius
wrote that the Mongols carried out systematic operations in the area, attempt-
ing to destroy even the shelters located in the mountains, as testified by the
great number of settlements abandoned after the 1241–1242 invasion.
On the other hand, Transylvania’s situation was completely different than
that of Hungary. Even though the two successive invasions (March 1241 and
the spring of 1242) left severe marks on Transylvania, it was never fully and
permanently subdued. The amplitude of the devastation was significant but
it did not come close to the proportions reached in Pannonia and the Tisza
plain. Even though after his escape from the Mongols, in the spring of 1242,
Rogerius described the province as completely depopulated, he also recounted
that he was saved from starvation by locals who had taken refuge in the moun-
tains. The great number of refugees that Rogerius encountered at Frata were
well organized and supplied. Rogerius also indicated that numerous fortifica-
tions were erected in Transylvania during the interval between the two inva-
sions, and some were left unconquered by invaders even after the 1242 attack.167
Moreover, the number of communities hidden in the mountains, forests or
improvised fortifications, such as Frata or Tămaşda,168 the latter destroyed by
the Mongols, was without any doubt greater.
The written sources provide a great deal of information regarding the
consequences of the Mongol invasion. On May 6th, 1246, bishop Gallus of
Transylvania was granted the privilege to colonize six bishopric estates (Alba
Iulia, Herina, Bileag, Gilău, Zalău, Tăşnad) that were very low on population.169
Similar references are made to the Sâncel estate (Zonchel)—“which included
166 D IR I 335–337, 427–428, HD 245–247.

167 Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221: Et sic retrocedendo paulatim pervenimus Ultra Silvas, ubi
remanserat populi multitudo, et erant post eorum transito castra plurima preparata. Et quid
ultra? Exceptis castris quibusdam terram totaliter occuparunt et eam procedentes desola-
tam et vacua reliquerunt. . . .
168 Master Roger, Epistle, 200–201: Pontes Thome (Tamashida, Thomasbrücke).
169 D IR I. 327–328,417; ZW 72–73.
36 CHAPTER 1
and fed three villages in happier times” (1252)170—and Zek estate (1252).171
Also, a document by “young king” Stephen V, dated 1263, contains a list of four
settlements, located in the Târnava area, which were “deprived of their right-
ful inhabitants”.172 Furthermore, the act given by the aforementioned king to
the Cistercian abbey of Cârţa (1264) describes its state as “completely deserted
after the fury of the Mongol plunder”.173 The scarcity of documents makes a
purely quantitative evaluation of the destructions impossible. However, they
do shed light on the discrepancy between the northern and the southern part
of Transylvania. While some localities on the Someş valley were mentioned
as depopulated as late as 1246, the references for southern Transylvania go as
late as 1263–1264.174 The same area must be the territory Rogerius crossed in
1242 it was the scene of the most important battles175 and the bloodiest mas-
sacres. Furthermore, scholars agree that these areas were the most severely
depopulated.176
If indeed southern Transylvania suffered more destruction than the north-
ern part, the explanation must be sought in the different impact of the mili-
tary confrontations taking place in these regions during the 1241 campaign. In
regards to the 1242 retreat, we can only assume that the Mongols hesitated to
use the path through Rodna, less frequented at that time, and poured through
the mountain passes into southern Transylvania, which would explain the
massive devastation therein.
170 D IR II. 5, ZW 79, Jáko 217.

171 D IR II. 5–6, ZW 78–79, Jáko 216.
172 D IR II. 51–52, ZW 89–90, Jáko 241: terras udvarnicarum nostrarum in Transsilvanis partibus
existentes legitimis suis incolis carentes Wiz, Munora, Hassach, Nogrech et alias . . . (Veza,
Mănărade, Târnăveni, Nocrich).
173 D IR II. 55–56, ZW 93–94.
174 In the counties located in the Tisza Plain (Arad, Bihor, Sătmar and others), mentioned at
least until the Mongol invasion of 1285, after which tracing them in documents becomes
impossible.
175 Annales Frisacenses, MGH SS. XXIV 65–67, Jáko, 191; Annales Erphordenses, MGH.
SS. XVI. 34, Jáko 192.
176 Thomas Nägler considers that the most deserted areas, after the great Mongol invasion,
in the province of Sibiu were in the county seats of Miercurea, Sebeş and Orăştie (Nägler,
Aşezarea saşilor, 198). According to Paul Binder the other localities severely hit by the
invasion were those with a Catholic population from the Perşani Mountains area: Debran,
Veneţia, Dopca, Hoghiz, Racoşul de Sus (Paul “Antecedente”, 35). Despite suggestions in
this respect, setting up a list of settlements no longer attested in documents after 1241–
1242 can not lead to a clear conclusion in the case of Transylvania.
1.5.1.2 Migration
As suggested above, the real depopulation of Transylvania was due to the
massacres or the enslaving of its inhabitants as well as to the food shortage,
a consequence of the systematic Mongol plunders. But there was also a sec-
ond type of depopulation that was only apparent since it was the result of a
massive migration from areas exposed to Mongol attacks to safer areas, usually
natural shelters. These migrations mostly affected incipient urban centers (like
the bishopric of Alba Iulia, all the other county centers, and the salt exploita-
tion settlements), causing a slowdown or even a halt in their development.
The archeological data gathered in Alba Iulia indicate that the city reached
the demographic level of 1241 only in the 15th century.177 The city of Cluj was
only revitalized in the time of Stephen V,178 while Dăbâca, which had been
an important center, faced an irreversible decline. Among the first measures
taken by count Paul Geregye after the royal administration was reinstated in
Transylvania was against the effects of depopulation, “gathering the popula-
tion scattered anywhere”, helping them to reestablish their households to a
state that permitted economic growth.179 These measures ensured the resum-
ing of some important economic objectives (salt mines, royal estates or those
pertaining to the bishopric of Transylvania180) by new relocations meant to fill
in the population gaps resulted from the invasion. Same actions were taken by
local nobility eager to repopulate their estates.
As for the economic centers in the Saxon colonized areas, despite being a
frequent target for the invaders, the information we have indicates that the
locals overcame the post-invasion crisis faster compared to other regions.
The revival was not due to a new inflow of colonists, but to the regrouping of the
survivors inside the emerging urban centers. Thus, settlements like Rodna,
Bistriţa and Sibiu could resume their development, while settlements located
close to the periphery of the province were temporarily deserted.181 In this
177 The archaeological research conducted at the Apor Palace revealed the existence of a gap
between surface dwellings from the 12th–early 13th century and the level of inhabitation
of the early 15th century, when a repopulation precess can be noted, see Rusu, “Cetatea
Alba-Iulia în secolele XI–XIV” (Ephemeris Napocensis 4 (1994): 340–351).
178 D IR III. 251–253, 413–415; ZW 319–320: cum Stephanus illustris rex Hungariae . . . volens olim
fundare et congregare predictam civitatem Kuluswar multa prerogativa libertatum ipsos
decorasset . . .
179 D IR I. 335–337, 427–428: dispersos undique populus recollegit, collectosque et inventos man-
tunendo fideliter et conservando . . .
180 D IR I. 327–328, ZW 72–73.
181 Zek (DIR II. 5–6, ZW 78–79), Wiz, Munora, Hassach, Nogrech et alias (DIR II. 51–52, ZW
89–90) etc.
38 CHAPTER 1
case, the Saxon deep sense of community seems to have boosted urban devel-
opment in the aftermath of the 1241 invasion.
The population also headed towards safer regions in western Hungary.
These migrations continued after 1242 at a slower pace, and consisted mostly
in representatives of the high social strata.182
1.5.1.3 Banditry and Insecurity. Institutional Crisis

These phenomena were amplified by the Mongol occupation (wherever direct
occupation took place), the famine ravages and the massive relocations.
The delay in the return of the royal clerks to Transylvania and neighboring
regions—as late as the spring of 1243—amplified the crisis and brought even
more havoc. Thus, according to the information received from Hungary in the
summer of 1243 by Pope Innocent IV: “during the Mongol occupation and even
after their withdrawal, some rushed in great enmity against the kingdom itself,
setting fire to the goods of many, laying waste and destruction, in overt unlaw-
fulness against the Crucified One”.183 The information was most certainly
related to the situation in the eastern regions of the kingdom as the Roman
pontiff received it through the envoy sent by bishop Benedict of Oradea solicit-
ing his transfer to the Győr bishopric.184 Other testimonies mention: “the time
of the Mongol invasion, when people could no longer guard themselves the
way they would have wanted”.185 Also: the “rights of the fortresses . . . alienated
and mingled during the Mongols”,186 somewhat adding to the image of calami-
tous times. There were also those who stood against this crisis like count Paul
Geregye of Solnoc: “as he came on the other side of the Danube before other
noblemen of the kingdom, to destroy the plunderers and the marauders thriv-
ing in these parts as well as in Transylvania, putting them to fair judgment . . .”;187
and all the other dignitaries assigned by king Bela IV to reestablish order.
182 As suggested by existing examples: DIR I. 325, HD 218 (the widow of nobleman Andreas
Ekly); DIR I. 324, CD IV/1. 280–281 (Benedict, the Bishop of Oradea); DIR I. 325, Theiner
I. 188–189 (Rogerius, the Archdean of Oradea); DIR I. 326–327, Theiner I. 229 (Artulf, the
Bishop of Transylvania’).
183 D IR I. 324, Theiner I. 188, HD 217 (22 July 1243).
184 Transfer approved by Pope Innocent IV on July 11th, 1243—DIR I. 324.
185 D IR I. 337–338.
186 D IR I. 338–341.
187 D IR I. 335–337, 427–428: prius pre ceteris nobilibus regni ultra Danubium veniens, tam in
eiusdem, quam in Transsilvanis partibus fures et latrones, qui tunc in eiusdem locis plures
solito surrexerant, extirpando, et justo mediante judicio condemnando.
1.5.2 Long-term Consequences

The great invasion of 1241–1242 had numerous consequences which gave a dif-
ferent direction to Transylvania’s development, fundamentally changing its
social and administrative structure.
1.5.2.1
The royal fortresses were strategically important for the invaders. As a conse-
quence, the amplitude of the destruction was considerable. With no excep-
tion, the county seats of Transylvania (Alba-Iulia, Dăbâca, Cluj, Turda, Cetatea
de Baltă, and Hunedoara) were conquered and burned down while their flee-
ing population was massacred. The same fate was shared by Sibiu, the county
seat of the Saxon colony located in southern Transylvania, and many other
royal fortresses from neighboring regions. Furthermore, Cetatea de Baltă was
completely destroyed and later rebuilt on a different site. The key element
of this fortress was a dungeon made of stone and brick and surrounded by
a moat enclosing a surface of merely 100 sqm around it. To the exterior, this
rather modest fortification also had an earthen palisade probably reinforced
with wood.188 The old fortress of Hunedoara (the fortification located on the
Sâmpetru Hill) shared the fate of Cetatea de Baltă and some of its functions
were taken over by a small stone fortress built in the vicinity.189 Due to the
abandonment of the royal fortress, Hunedoara lost its status of county seat
to the new royal fortress of Deva. No less severe was the devastation of Cluj,
rehabilitated after a few decades by King Stephen V who colonized the area
with German settlers.190 The fortress could not be rebuilt on its previous loca-
tion, which was now in the possession of the Benedictine monastery of Cluj-
Mănăştur.191 After the invasion, the strong fortress of Dăbâca entered a phase
of fast decline, but with some mending and consolidation the fortress still kept
its military function.192 In this case the Mongol invasion seems to have primar-
ily affected the civilian settlement and but the scale of the destruction was
too large for the fortress to preserve its former position. Thus, only decades
after the invasion, Dăbâca lost its function of royal fortress and county seat,
188 Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 92–94; Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 125–126.

189 Bogdan, “Contribuţii arheologice”, 20–21.
190 D IR III 251–253, 413–415; ZW 319–320.
191 Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 152–154; Petru Iambor and Ştefan Matei, “Cetatea feudal-
timpurie de la Cluj-Mănăştur”, AIIACluj 18 (1975): 299–300; Petru Iambor, Ştefan Matei
and A. Halasu, “Consideraţii privind raportul cronologic dintre aşezarea şi cimitirul de la
Cluj-Mănăştur”, ActaMN 18 (1981), 150.
192 Pascu, et al. “Cetatea Dăbâca”, 193.
40 CHAPTER 1
becoming a simple stronghold owned by one of the branches of the Kökényes-

Radnót193 kindred. The royalty also gave the same kindred the old fortress of
Turda, located in the vicinity of the former locality Sânmiclăuş, on the banks
of Arieş River.194 Due to its status, the bishopric of Alba-Iulia alone was the
exception to this general rule. The reconstruction of Alba-Iulia started shortly
after the Mongol invasion, most likely when bishop Gallus took office (1246),
and benefited from direct support from the royal and the voivodal institutions.
Nonetheless, its reconstruction took place at a slow pace. For almost a century,
the former fortified wall of the fortress could not be used.195 Also, archaeologi-
cal research has shown that a part of the old town was in ruins for a long time,
and the repopulation of the settlement to its 1241 level did not occur until the
15thc.196 At the same time, the inclusion of the town of Alba Iulia within the
direct possessions of the Diocese of Transylvania197 marks the disappearance
of its former military and administrative functions.
The decay of the former royal fortresses was the direct consequence of the
destruction caused by the Mongols, but also that of the crown’s failure to pro-
vide the means for reconstruction. The Mongol invasion made the contem-
porary face the bitter truth that such fortifications had grown obsolete, and
the large scale of devastation hindered the reconstruction of an efficient for-
tification system within a reasonable amount of time. Their main vulnerabil-
ity before the Mongols cannot be explained only by the materials used in the
building process, although there is no doubt that earthen and wooden fortifi-
cations were already considered outdated at the time. However, it is notewor-
thy that some fortresses like Alba-Iulia, Dăbâca, and Sibiu were surrounded by
fortified stone walls, which yet failed to boost their resistance capacity.
Even so, the more serious deficiencies were related to the function and size
of these royal fortifications, as well as to the human factor in charge with their
protection. Their size was undoubtedly exaggerated compared to the number
and military potential of the defenders. Thus, the Hunedoara fortress was 220 ×
70 meters and had a surface of almost two hectares,198 only a little smaller than
193 D IR II. 213–215, ZW 137, Jakó 294.

194 Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 132–134. For the identification of the Turda fortress see: Petru
Iambor, “In legătură cu localizarea cetăţii Sânmiclăuş (Turda)”, ActaMN 14 (1977): 309–314.
195 Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 72.
196 Rusu, Cetatea Alba-Iulia, 340–351.
197 D IR I. 327–328. The part of the city that remained under the royal property and was colo-
nized with Germans was also conceded to the Diocese of Transylvania after the dramatic
events of 1277—DIR II. 190–191; ZW 132–133.
198 Bogdan, “Contribuţii arheologice”, 20–21.
the significantly better populated royal fortification of Cluj-Mănăştur (220 × 98

meters). As for the royal castle Dăbâca, the fortified wall was over 250 meters
in length, and due to the triangular shape of the terrace on top of which it was
built, its width ranged between 50 and 250 meters.199 The medieval fortress of
Alba Iulia maintained the initial shape of the former Roman fortress, in this
case a rectangle of 430 × 415 meters.200 Even though we lack this kind of data
regarding the fortresses from Turda and Cetatea de Baltă, existing analogies
enable us to assume that the fortifications bore the same features.
At the same time, the former royal fortresses were inhabited, housing both
the administrative headquarters of the counties, as well as those of the main
ecclesiastical institutions (in most cases arch-dioceses, but also the Bishopric
of Alba-Iulia, and the Benedictine monastery from Cluj-Mănăştur). In addi-
tion, these were also economic centers, concentrating the main economic
activity of the county—manufacturing, exchange and consumption of goods.201
Besides the permanent population, these fortifications also sheltered the pop-
ulation from the neighboring areas, retreating in panic from the Mongol threat.
As centers of administrative power wealth, the royal fortresses represented
extremely attractive targets for potential invaders. Through their conquest, the
invaders could wipe out with a single blow the entire political, administrative,
religious, and economic structure—which indeed happened during the dra-
matic events of 1241.
Consequently, the reformation of the defensive system of the Hungarian
Kingdom had to include first of all a clear separation between the military
headquarters and the civilian settlements, and also an efficient decentraliza-
tion of the counties’ defensive system. The conditions of the time compelled
the crown to abandon its obligations towards providing immediate protection
to religious institutions and civilian population to church authorities, land-
lords and the community. The new royal fortresses, erected in the second half
of the 13th century had an exclusive military function, benefited from better
defensive systems, and were attended by garrisons made of professional sol-
diers. In times of need, they could shelter a handful of officials and a small
number of noblemen and their families, but not the local civilians. Cetatea de
Baltă represents and example of the first stage of transition towards this new
system. As additions to the renovated and reconsolidated fortresses from the
frontier, the following decades would witness the rise of stronger fortresses,
199 Pascu, et al. “Cetatea Dăbâca”, 157.

200 Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 81. Different measurement, 440 × 440 m at: Mircea Rusu,
“Castrul roman Apulum şi cetatea Alba Iulia”, AIIACluj 22 (1979): 47–70.
201 Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 247–264.
42 CHAPTER 1
well equipped to defend themselves against long lasting sieges (Deva, Ciceu,
and Hunedoara etc.). As a reaction to a papal directive requiring local church
leaders to build adequate refuges for Christians202 and the same suggestions
accompanied by donations from the state authorities, the ecclesiastical insti-
tutions would make their responsibility to fend for themselves. Thus, the town
Alba Iulia became a possession of the Diocese of Transylvania203 which, being
reluctant to engage in projects that demanded more than the resources in
hand afforded restrain the inhabited area to the southwestern corner of the
former royal fortification, enclosing it with an earthen wall and a palisade.204
On the other hand, the Benedictine monastery from Cluj-Mănăştur remained
the sole owner of the former precinct of the royal fortress devastated in 1241
and tightened its own defense with a stone precinct in the second half of the
13th century.205 This category of fortified ecclesiastical institutions also
includes the Cârţa Monastery and the St. Michael Church from Cisnădioara,
both erected in the second half of the 13th century.206
As a part of the new defensive structure, an important function was bestowed
by the royalty on the fortresses held by noblemen. In the aftermath of the
invasion, Bela IV was obliged to reconsider his defenses and therefore made
extensive donations of estates to noblemen in his trust, who were bound to
use some of their revenues to consolidate the kingdom’s fortification system.207
The importance of building a defensive system was clearly stated in a series of
royal diplomas. One of them referred to the donation of “estates suitable for
erecting fortifications to those of our subjects who know how and are capable
of building them”.208 This policy seems to have become more popular between
1246 and 1248 when, confronted with the imminence of a second Mongol
invasion, king Bela found himself with insufficient fortifications. It was prob-
ably within this time span that the count of Solnoc, Paul Geregye, started
the construction of the two fortresses: Adrian (Adorján) and Piatra Şoimului
(Sólyomkő). Arieşul de Câmpie fortress (Aranyos, Cheud commune), attested
202 R A 769, Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 187.

203 Anghel, Fortificaţii medieval, 72.
204 Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 161.
205 Iambor and Matei, “Cetatea feudal-timpurie”, 299–300; Iambor, Matei, and Halasu,
“Consideraţii privind raportul”, 150.
206 Radu Heitel, “În legătură cu unele probleme ale arheologiei cetăţilor de piatră medievale
din Transilvania”, BMI XXXIX 2 (1970): 27.
207 Erik Fügedi, Castle and Society in Medieval Hungary (1000–1437) (Budapest: Akadémiai
Kiadó, 1986), 50.
208 C D IV/2, 49; RA 904: loca quaedam munitionibus apta communi baronum nostrorum
consilio fidelibus nostris nosse et posse aedificandis habentibus regia auctoritate duximus
conferenda.
in 1246 as part of Paul Gutkeled’s estate in the Solnoc county, was constructed
around the same time period.209 During the following decades, fortresses
owned by the nobility multiplied significantly in Transylvania. In 1268, a count
Rotho sold a property in Bistriţa, with a “stone tower and a wooden house near
the tower, and a fortified yard all around”.210 An unknown number of private
fortresses located on the Someş Valley, were conquered and destroyed by the
army of the bishop of Transylvania around 1282.211 These fortifications, which
belonged to a rather turbulent and anarchic nobility, known for hijacking trav-
elers and salesmen who crossed their lands, have yet to be identified. Even
though the location of some of the fortresses has been identified, further
research did not offer any conclusive information regarding their chronology.
The Câlnic fortress is one of the very few fortresses of this type for which there
is a remarkably precise chronology established (between 1270 and 1272212).
A significant number of the fortresses owned by noblemen in Transylvania
seem to have been erected within this time period.
According to Rogerius, local communities were the first to participate in this
construction effort, which started in the interval between the 1241 invasion and
the 1242 withdrawal. Refuge fortifications constructed in the surrounding areas
were probably consolidated in the subsequent period, all depending on local
resources. In most cases, their very nature makes proper identification impos-
sible. Comana de Jos is one such fortress, dating back to the second half of the
13th century, unable to hold an active military duty due to its modest size and
rudimentary defenses.213 This category might also include the fortresses from
Sibiel,214 Săsciori, Vurpăr,215 Tilişca,216 Orlat,217 Răşinari, Cisnădie, and Avrig218
209 H O I. 24. Pál Engel, Magyarország világi Archontológiája 1301–1457, (Budapest: História-
MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 1996), 1: 268.
210 Turris lapidea et domus lignea apud turrim et curiam circummunitam cum fundo: DIR II
115, 498–499; ZW 99–100.
211 D IR II 239–240; ZW 142–143.
212 Radu Heitel, “În legătură cu unele probleme”, 26.
213 Victor Eskenazy, “O nouă fortificaţie românească din Ţara Făgăraşului. Cetatea Comanei
(secolele XIII–XIV)”, RMM.MIA 1 (1981): 34–44; Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 146–148.
214 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 157; Aurel Decei, “Cetatea Salgo de la Sibiel (jud. Sibiu)”, Anuarul
Institutului de Istorie Naţională 8 1939/1942 (Sibiu, 1942): 299–342.
215 Gheorghe Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, Apulum 12 (1974): 295.
216 Thomas Nägler, “Die mittelalterliche Burg Tilişca nach ihrer archäologischen Erforschung”,
Forschungen zur Volks- und Landeskunde 10/1 (Bucharest; Editura Academiei, 1967),
77–85.
217 Nägler, Cetăţile feudale, 27–49; Nägler Aşezarea saşilor, 157.
218 Lukács, Ţara Făgăraşului, 148, draws the attention on the possible similes with the
Comana fortification.
44 CHAPTER 1
all built, maintained and ruled by the members of the community.219 A special,
but not unique case was that of the settlement from Gârbova (Alba county),
where two fortifications were erected during the same period: a fortress in the
center of the settlement, and a fortified refuge for the village community, in the
neighboring mountains.220
The new system of fortifications was flexible and dispersed. Each one of its
components was able to put up with long sieges from potential invaders while
not being in itself an attractive target to justify the time and human losses to
conquer it. Largely reinforced over the next decades, the system would hold
back the Mongol’s second attempt of invading Transylvania in 1285.
1.5.2.2
The disappearance of royal military bases also marked the end of the mili-
tary system based on the services of fortress serfs (iobagiones castri). In time
this system became obsolete and contemporaries were aware of its limita-
tions. This explains why the new system of military frontier, established in the
early 13th century, renounced the use of fortress serfs, in favor of the newly
established royal serfs and the military services offered by the free communi-
ties. The military service of the serfs, hereditarily bonded to county centers,
became unsatisfactory in time. Undoubtedly, at the origins of the family his-
tory of all royal serfs appeared an ancestor with certain military skills. Their
offspring inherited the status of royal serfs assuming both the obligations and
the privileges conferred by this status. In times of need the royal authorities
were compelled to appealt to their services even though we can assume that
some of them lacked the military skills of their ancestors. In addition, since the
status applied to their entire lifespan, we can assume a good number of them
were unfit for military service due to old age. Such an army did not hold much
military value and made the presence of serfs within the armed forces of the
13th century an exception rather than a rule.
Like any state-based system, employing royal serfs to perform military
duties presented numerous disadvantages. The maintenance of royal for-
tresses, one of the main attributions of castrensi, was oriented towards con-
servation rather than improvement. Thus, in the first half of the 13th century,
the county seats of Transylvania presented outdated defensive systems. At the
same time, despite royal reluctance, a new and much stronger type of fortifica-
tion was developing in the area of the military frontier. King Andrew II’s own
doubts expressed through an act of donation from 1211 in which he tried to
219 Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, 123.

220 Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, 119–124.
impose on the Teutonic Knights a reconstruction plan with an old-fashioned

fortification system,221 were founded on the state of the royal fortresses from
inner Transylvania.
In addition, royal serfs, together with other county officials, represented an
excessive, cumbersome administrative apparatus, with almost exclusive con-
trol over the royal estate. Being in charge with maintaining order on the royal
estates, the fortress serfs saw to the preservation of the patrimony—which
empowered them to commit abuses against free land owners.222 Tax collec-
tion also enabled them to get rich quickly through illegal actions.223 Their judi-
ciary attributes, as well as their power over any estate transactions throughout
the county were no less important.224 Such privileges soon turned them into
a parasitic social class, numerically exceeding their useful purpose and con-
suming most of the revenues gathered from the royal estates they adminis-
tered. By mid-13th century, their distinct legal status, which allowed them to
possess personal properties (hereditary), acquire lands and amass fortunes
became the guaranty of a wealthy life rather than the expression of military
servitude. Their income, largely acquired by participating in county affairs,
must have been generous enough since their financial position was similar
with that of provincial middle nobility. For example, in 1268, a Turda castle serf
sold the inherited estate of Luncani (Gerend);225 in 1275, the former estates of
two Solnoc castle serfs who perished without heirs, were given by the king to
the Kata kindred;226 in 1291, a serf of Cluj castle sold the Lomb estate for 20
silver marks;227 in the same year, the estate of an Alba castle serf was legally
recorded;228 in 1292, Ladislas Borsa bought the Pintic estate from the joint
ownership of a Solnoc castle serf and two noblemen.229 Hence, dropping the
services of the royal serfs, useless in the new military system, was the expected
thing to do. Bela IV remained rather reticent in renouncing the costly services
221 et ad munimen regni contra Cumanos castra lignea et urbes ligneas construere eos per-
misimus, DIR I. 150–151, 369–370; ZW 11–12; HD 56–58. The Teutonic Knights could not
agreewith this stipulation becausetheir numeric inferiority needed to be compensated by
technical superiority, including the fortifications.
222 D IR I. 67 (RO 103); DIR I. 140 (RO 369).
223 In 1219, the centurion Voiavoda cashed an additional hefty amount of six silver marks for
assimilating the three serfs of the Dăbâca fortress with the castrensii, DIR I. 95 (RO 212).
224 Mentioned in DIR II. 33–34, ZW 26; DIR II. 244, ZW 146.
225 D IR II. 99, HO VII. 111–112, Jakó 270.
226 D IR II. 176, Wenzel IX. 123.
227 D IR II. 350, Teutsch-Firnhaber I. 177–178.
228 D IR II. 348–349, ZW 187–189.
229 D IR II. 383–385, Wenzel X. 84–85.
46 CHAPTER 1
of the serfs, considering them a warranty for the well-functioning of the cen-
tralized system. In the end it was King Stephen V who decisively encouraged
the process. The aforementioned examples, indicating serfs as estate sellers
and never buyers, stand as evidence that the office of royal serfs was already
collapsing in the last three decades of the 13th century. In addition, the admin-
istrative attributions of royal serfs, the support of their social status, decreased
considerably in importance and eventually disappeared completely. The Royal
Decree of 1261, annulling the judicial duties of serfs over the town of Dej, was
the last written source in Transylvania in which their judicial attributions were
explicitly mentioned.230 Also for the last time, in 1265, five serfs from Dăbâca
castle were called to confirm the legitimacy of a property sale.231 Furthermore,
a document from 1266 mentions the last Transylvanian castle serf who, as the
king’s man, assisted together with a nobleman to the taking into possession of
an estate.232 Starting with the second half of the 13th century, castle serfs would
look for ways to rid themselves of their duties and to gain the statute of nobles.
This status change was possible at the time only as a consequence of military
service.233 Those who failed to adapt would come across increasing difficulties
in preserving their hybrid status, semi-dependent and semi-privileged. After
the middle of the 14th century, the new royal castle serfs represented a new
category, assimilated into the dependent, unprivileged social layer. The differ-
ences in position and responsibilities, compared to those of their ancestors
from 1200, were considerable.
1.5.2.3
Given the almost total disappearance of the former administrative and judicial
system, the crisis of the property system affected primarily the property of the
free people. If royal domains, and to a lesser extent church estates, enjoyed
protection from the central authority, the private estate was left at the mercy
of local officials. Their activity added to the general unlawful seizure of estates
and rights, which was favored by the disappearance or refuge of a large num-
ber of land owners, and by the destruction or loss of property documents dur-
ing the Mongol onslaught. Paul Geregye remains the most notorious case. On
January 21st, 1249, the king confirmed his possession of no less than 16 estates
230 D IR II 33–34, ZW 26.

231 D IR II 71–72; HO VI. 134–135.
232 D IR II 79–80, ZW 97–98.
233 Erik Fügedi, The Elefánthy. The Hungarian Nobleman and his Kindred, ed. Damir Karbić
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 37–38.
in the counties of Bihor, Solnoc and Crasna,234 some of them listed as royal
property.235 These estates, accumulated within the five years span (1243–1248)
in which Paul Geregye held official duties in the region, were only the part
that came into sight of a much larger estate system, which included a series
of possessions seized from aristocratic families and noblemen: Chanad—who
recovered their Birtin customs service and other estates from Bihor only after
appealing the king in 1256;236 Gutkeled—who retook possession of their sev-
eral estates within the same county, “estranged during the Mongols” and seized
by the Geregye kindred only in 1278;237 and Borşa, whose estates, appropri-
ated by one of the Geregye kindred’s friends, were only retrieved through the
decision of the 1279 regional congregation.238 This later repossessions were not
encountered only in Bihor county. In Transylvania, a certain Nicholas, son of
Tywan of Vărşand recovered in 1304 his property of Ungurei (Gregorfalva in
Alba county), lost “in the times of the ancient Mongols”. He was able to do
so only after tiresome juridical endeavors and after spending 50 silver marks,239
which, if real, could not amount to much less than the market value of the
estate itself.
There is enough information available in sources to conclude that at least
in certain geographical areas old structures and ownership rights were liter-
ally obliterated. This also accounts for the changes suffered by the social elite.
These forced takeovers were reversed by the use of the same methods, when
it was possible (the Gutkeled and Borşa cases), or by costly and time-consum-
ing judicial efforts. We must also assume that families lacking military force,
influence at the king’s court or at least the financial resources needed for the
expenses of the intricate judicial system of the time could never recover their
estates.
All these changes ultimately brought about a radical transformation in the

social structure of the province. Within this structure, the nobility, with its
military capabilities substantially improved after the “natural selection” dur-
ing the invasion and the ensuing years, became the kingdom’s most important
military power. They also took over the control of the administrative func-
tions of the county. On this basis and soon to become a vector for economic
234 D IR I 335–337, 427–428; HD 245–247.

235 Including lands of royal guests: terram Zonuk hospitum castri Zonwk.
236 D IR II 15–16, 16–18; Wenzel VII 458, 474–476.
237 D IR II 195–196; HD 413–414.
238 D IR II 201–203; Wenzel XII 250–253.
239 D IR III 36–37; ZW 228–229.
48 CHAPTER 1
development, the Transylvanian nobility defined its own identity in compari-

son with the non-indigenous aristocracy which would continue to keep almost
exclusive grasp over decisional functions. Therefore, once this basis took
shape, claiming a more important role within the political system was just a
matter of time.
CHAPTER 2
From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian

Duchy (1243–1257)
The threat of a new Mongol invasion influenced the entire evolution of

Transylvania in the two decades following the 1241–1242 onslaught. Taking
into account the political, military and organizational efforts of the Arpadian
Kingdom to prevent a new invasion and to mobilize all due resources to fight
it off, one can split the evolution of Transylvania into two distinct stages:
1) approximately 1243–1247, mainly featuring sustained efforts to offset the
impact of the recent invasion and to restore the economic and military poten-
tial of the province; 2) 1248–1257, a period marked by the decision adopted by
King Bela IV and his military counselors to engage in a more prudent strat-
egy in the case of a new Mongol invasion. If the Mongols were to attack again
then all the forces available in the kingdom would be concentrated along the
Danube line, which consequently adjourned Transylvania’s recovery and the
province entered a long period of stagnation.
2.1 Transylvania and the Council of Lyon
2.1.1 The Council of Lyon. Defining the Response of Christianity to the

Mongol Problem
The Council of Lyon (June 28th–July 17th, 1245) was a major step for Christianity
in setting a coherent anti-Mongol policy.1 Faced with the violent devastation of
Hungary and Poland, Pope Innocent IV was compelled to include the Mongol
threat among the five plagues which, just like the crucifixion wounds, scourged
1 Alberto Melloni, “I fondamenti del regime di cristianità a Lionese I (13 luglio 1245)”,
Cristianesimo nella storia XVIII (1/1997); Giuseppe Alberigo ed., Storia dei concili ecumenici,
(Brescia: Queriniana, 1990), 204–207. Pentru evoluţia poziţiei papalităţii faţă de mongoli see
Giovanni Soranzo, Il papato, l’Europa cristiana e i Tartari: un secolo di penetrazione occidentale
in Asia (Milano: Societa Editrice, 1930), 71–166; Davide Bigalli, I Tartari e l’Apocalisse (Firenze:
La nuova Italia Editrice), 1971, 50–63; Jean Richard, La papauté et les missions d’Orient au
Moyen Âge (XIIIe–XVe siècles) (Roma: École Francaise de Rome), 1977, 65–86; Papacostea,
Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 169–172.

50 CHAPTER 2
the Church of Christ.2 However, he delayed taking any action until his inform-
ing mission returned from the east.3 The evidence gathered on the great inva-
sion of Europe forced the pope to no longer associate the Mongol Empire to
the legendary kingdom of Prester John.4 Even so the Roman pontiff had not
completely lost hope of Christianizing these fierce warriors, or at least making
of them a strong ally against the Muslims (who had reconquered Jerusalem in
1244). Under the circumstances, the Mongol issue was rather left aside in the
conciliar debates.5 The main issues discussed focused on more pressing issues
like the relationship with Frederick II, the general reform of the Church, the
freeing of the Holy Land, and endorsing the Latin Empire.6 Consequently,
the 16th Canon of the Concilium, De Tartaris, does nothing more than incrimi-
nate the violent devastation of “Poland, Russia, Hungary and other Christian
countries” and to recommend Christian princes to reinforce their frontiers
with the Mongols, in order to be able to ward off a new invasion.7 It was only a
few years later, with the great Mongol alarm of 1248, that Innocent IV allowed
crusaders (crucesignati) assigned for the Holy Land to be used against the
Mongols, and empowered the Teutons to grant plenary indulgence (the most
important spiritual instrument used by the pope) to all who took arms against
these new foe of the Christian faith.8
2 Melloni, “I fondamenti del regime”, 67.

3 Run by Franciscan Iohannes de Plano Carpini, the pontifical mission in the Mongol Empire
was registered between 1245–1247, and its results were recorded in a vast and detailed report
sent to the Roman Pontif—see de Plano Carpini, “Ystoria Mongalorum”, 27–130. For the
answer given by the great Khan Güyük to the message sent by Pope Innocent IV see Paul
Pelliot, “Les Mongols et la Papauté”, in Revue de l’Orient Chrétien 23 vol. 3–4 (1922–1923): 21.
4 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 164–167.
5 Which in fact, were not assistedby any prelate in Hungary, see Melloni, “I fondamenti del
regime”, 65–66.
6 See Giulio Battelli, “I transunti di Lione del 1245”, in Scritti scelti. Codici, documenti, archive
(Roma: Multigrafica Editrice, 1975), 171–201; for the Frederick II’s problem see David Abulafia,
Federico II. Un imperatore medievale (Turin: Einaudi, 1993), 305–311; J. A. Watt, “Medieval
Deposition Theory. A Neglected Canonist ‘Consultatio’ from the First Council of Lyons”, in
Studies in Church History, ed. G. J. Cuming, vol. 2 (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1962),
197–214. A just appreciation of the importance given to the Mongol issue by Council, see
Spinei, The Great Migrations, 452.
7 Giovanni Domenico Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, vol. 23
(Venice, 1779), coll. 627–628.
8 Maureen Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy. The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and
Crusade to the Holy Land from the final loss of Jerusalem to the fall of Acre (1244–1291) (Leiden:
Brill, 1975), 67–69.
From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian Duchy 51
At the same time, Pope Innocent IV initiated a defensive system against

the Mongols in which, thanks to the great diplomatic skills of knez Daniil
Romanovich, the kingdom of Halych was granted a key role. Not long after
the Mongols’ retreat (1244–1245), King Bela resumed his old policy of attempt-
ing to subordinate Halych to the Hungarian crown, and endorsed his son-in-
law, Rostislav Mihailovich, in his attempt to overthrown Daniil Romanovich.9
Rostislav was defeated at Yaroslav by the reunited armies of knezes Daniil
and Vasilko, thus putting an end to any attempt of solving the issue by means
of arms.10 At the same time, Daniil Romanovich invaded Poland, devastated
the towns of Lukow and Seczechov and took over Lublin, where he built a
new fortress (1244).11 In order to improve his relationships with Hungary and
Poland and to gain freedom of action to negotiate with Batu directly, Daniil
Romanovich turned to Pope Innocent IV for protection. That was undoubtedly
the primary goal of the Lyon mission led by the Archbishop Peter of Halych,
who stirred the spirits in the Concilium with his tales about the origins and
habits of the Mongols.12 Daniil Romanovich’s dream to make Halych a buf-
fer state between Europe and the Mongol Empire came to life in the same
year (1245), through his trip to Batu’s court and the acceptance of the Golden
Horde’s suzerainty.13 Given these remarkable diplomatic achievements, Daniil
Romanovich not only secured his throne, but also assumed the role of media-
tor between the two worlds. Consequently, Hungary refrained from interfering
in the affairs of a state under the double protection of the Roman pontiff and
the Great Khan of Saray.
9 Around the year 1243, Rostislav Mihailovich, the son of the great Knez Mikhail Vsevolodici
of Kiev and one of Roman Msistlavich’s daughters, married Anna, the 4th daughter of
King Bela and Mary Laskaris. KMTL 581.
10 Nicholas L. Chirovsky, An Introduction to Ukrainian History, I, (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1981, 168; Michael Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine (New Haven: Archon Books,
1941), 108; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 200.
11 MPH III. 72, 167, 307. Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 170.
12 Annales Burtonienses, Gombos, Catalogus, 113–115; MGH, SS. 27: 474–475.
13 For Daniil Romanovich’s international policy and his relations with the Golden Horde,
Hungary and the Holy See George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, (London-New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1953–1959), 143–147; Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian
History, 169–172; Kosztolnyik, Thirteenth Century, 200–207; Boleslaw Szcsesinak, “The
Mission of Giovanni de Plano Carpini and Benedict the Pole of Vratislava”, Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 7 (1957): 12–15; Spinei, The Great Migrations, 454; Spinei, Moldavia,
117; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 171–173.
52 CHAPTER 2
2.1.2 Consequences for Transylvania

Justly assessing the role of Hungary in the new anti-Mongol defensive sys-
tem, Pope Innocent IV understood he had to make political sacrifices to
restore King Bela’s full freedom of action at home. As far as Transylvania
was concerned—also represented in the pontifical Curia in February 1245 by
a certain Theodoric, parish priest in Sebeş and council member in the Alba
bishopric14—these concessions legitimated the loss of all positions gained in the
province during the time of popes Celestine III, Innocent III and Honorius III.
Such was the case with the government of the free church chapters, towards
which Pope Honorius III and Pope Gregorius IX showed an increased inter-
est much to the displeasure of the Hungarian crown during the reign of
Andrew II.15 Pope Innocent IV also refrained from interfering with the inter-
nal problems of the Hungarian church throughout his entire term. As a conse-
quence, the provost of Arad was forced to swear allegiance to the Esztergom
Archbishop16 on March, 31st, 1246. Previously he declined to acknowledge his
authority due to a special interpretation of the statute of his chapter, which
dated back to Pope Honorius III.17 The chapter of German colonists from Sibiu
found itself in a very similar position. Built during the reign of King Bela III18
in a territory previously subordinated to the Bishopric of Alba Iulia and left
without any pontifical support, the chapter was now exposed to the pressures
exerted by the Bishopric of Transylvania. At the same time, the pope did not
support any more the Benedictine Monastery of Cluj-Mănăştur in the conflict
with the Bishopric of Transylvania19 and (as proven by the privilege granted
to the canonic Theodoric in 124520) showed flexibility in imposing ecclesias-
tical norms, otherwise enforced in other parts of the Christian world. These
exemptions were meant to encourage the devastated church of Transylvania,
left without a bishop until 1246. It was only then that Gallus became the new
bishop of Alba Iulia, undoubtedly due to these encouraging measures.
14 DIR I 326; ZW 71–72.

15 Tudor Sălăgean, “Honorius III, Transylvania and the Papacy’s Eastern Policy”, TR 4 (1998):
81–84.
16 DIR I 327, Nándor Knauz, ed., Crescens Lajos Dedek, Gabriel Dreska, Monumenta Ecclesiae
Strigoniensis Vol. I. (Esztergom, 1874–1924), 362–363.
17 DIR I 219–220; Theiner Augustinus, ed., Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram
illustrantia, vol. I. (Roma-Zagreb: 1863–1875), 62.
18 DIR I 11; ZW 1–2.
19 See: DIR I 220–221; ZW 42.
20 Who, due to the destruction of his revenues by the Mongols’ wrath, was allowed to cumu-
late the revenues of a not mentioned number of parishes: DIR I 326; ZW 71–72.
2.2 The Years of Recovery (1243–1248)
2.2.1 Reestablishing Royal Authority in the Regions East of the Danube

Due to the mayhem in the territories deserted by the Mongols, bringing them
under royal authority represented a difficult and dire process. Although Kadan’s
retreat before Trogir had started before mid-March,21 King Bela himself did not
leave his Croat refuge to return to Hungary before May 1242.22 Going round
the Hungarian moor, now a wilderness, he initially headed to the highland
counties in the north, where he spent the winter of 1242–124323 together with
a few loyal companions. He returned to Buda on Easter (April, 12th, 1243),24 a
holiday which he and his propaganda machine turned into a celebration of
the resurrection of the Hungarian Kingdom. The king’s long-lasting journeys,
almost as long as his refuge in the Dalmatian Kingdom, were at the root of the
scholarly tradition according to which the king, driven away by the Mongol
invasion, spent no less than three years away from his kingdom. In fact, King
Bela’s whereabouts were recorded not only in the Hungarian chronicles of the
14th century,25 but also in a much earlier royal document (1271).26
Under the circumstances, the recovery of the territories beyond the Danube
could not have taken place before early 1243. Due to the turmoil in these terri-
tories, such actions required people trusted by King Bela, who were also skillful
and motivated enough to assume such a complex mission. It is not surprising
therefore, that one of these protagonists was count Paul Geregye, risen to the
status of war hero for defending the Danube line against the attacks of Kadan.
2.2.2 Paul Geregye’s Transylvanian Mission

In his position of count of the royal county of Alba (Fehérvár) at the out-
break of the great invasion (March 1241),27 young Paul Geregye had plenty of
21 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 174. Also see Marynna D. Birnbaum, The Mantle of Bela IV, in The
Man of Many Devices, Who Wandered Full Many Ways. Festschrift in Honor of János M. Bak
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 499–502.
22 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 185.
23 Mórichida—2 Oct. 1242, RA 722; Verőce—16–21 Nov., RA 723–724; Nitra—24 Jan. 1243, RA
732; Túróc—29 Jan., RA 734.
24 The first documents issued by King Bela IV after his return to Buda on April 16th, 1243, the
Thursday after Easter—RA 736, 737.
25 SRH I. 212, 468.
26 DIR II. 143–144; CD V/1. 153–159.
27 RA 674.
54 CHAPTER 2
opportunities to display his military qualities.28 His most heroic feat was the
fierce defense of the Danube line in the aftermath of the Mohi disaster, when
Paul Geregye showed exceptional organizational and military skills. Despite
insufficient means and desperate conditions, the young count (who became
the judge of the royal court29 by the summer of 1241) succeeded in transform-
ing the Danube into an impenetrable line of defense until late 124130 or early
next year.31 A noteworthy exploit which not only covered the retreat of other
refugees32 but also offered the defense to the West of the Danube the time
required to regroup and to diminish the effects of the second Mongol offensive
in the first months of 1242. After the break of the Danube resistance,33 Paul
Geregye joined King Bela’s retinue, and remained judge of the royal court
throughout the king’s Dalmatian retreat.34 After the king’s return to Hungary
in mid-1242, he handed over this office to Demetrius Csák, the representative
of a major aristocratic kindred, whose benevolence King Bela was striving to
gain. Nonetheless, he retained his former position as count of Székesfehérvár
until November 1242,35 which indicates that at this time his Transylvanian mis-
sion had not yet begun.
Taking into consideration the general situation in the kingdom, the cis-
Danubian mission of Paul Geregye could not have started before early 1243.
However, it could have started a few months before the official return of King
Bela to Buda.36 Furthermore, according to the royal charter of 1249, Paul
Geregye proceeded in his mission to the East of the Danube River before all
the other royal officials who acted in those regions.37 In this situation he might
have assumed a series of cumulative functions, not very clearly stated, which
28 DIR I. 335–337, 427–428: the campaigns against Halych, and various clashes in Dalmatia
and at the German frontiers.
29 The first mention of September 23rd, 1241, RA 709. The former holder of this office,
Andreas, son of Szerafin (1239–1241), disappeared in the Mohi battle.
30 CD IV/2, 222.
31 MGH, SS, XXIX. 592.
32 Distinction highlighted in the royal diploma of 1249, DIR I. 336.
33 The Mongol commander who succeeded in forcing the Danube line, with the help of the
tactics of deceitful retreat, was Kadan: simulating the retreat and the abandonment of
the camp he drew Paul Geregye’s men into a trap, being caught by the returning Mongols
upon the cross of the river. SRH II. 53, 30 and 584, 5.
34 Last reference made on May 10th, 1242, RA 718.
35 RA 723, November 16th, 1242.
36 The list of royal dignitaries from January 29th does not mention any other counts of
Székesfehérvár, RA 734.
37 . . . prius pre ceteris nobilibus regni ultra Danubium veniens . . ., DIR I. 428.
placed in his hands full power over all military, economic and social aspects.38
Initially, the region over which Paul exerted his rule seems to have been limited
only by his military capacity. Once the situation in the region to the East of the
Tisza River was stabilized, he was confined to the counties of Bihor, Crasna
and Solnoc, which were at the time outside the administrative jurisdiction of
Transylvania. However, the sole official rank bestowed on Paul Geregye during
this time (1242/1243–1248) was that of count of Solnoc.39
In this quality, according to the royal charter of January 1249, he mainly
focused in righting the wrongs done by the outlaws who had infested these
regions, gathering the dispersed population and reopening salt exploitations.40
He also paid special attention to the royal properties. After 1248, impressed by
the way he handled the situation in the eastern counties, King Bela entrusted
him with the mission of reconstituting the domains of the royal fortresses
throughout the entire kingdom.41 At the same time, taking advantage of his vir-
tually unlimited powers in the region, Paul Geregye seized the opportunity to
build a vast personal estate which, according to the royal donation of January
21st, 1249, included no less than 16 domains: Jadani, Ocani, Felcheriu, Beliu,
Borşea, Sărand, Haieu, Bical, Fild and Almăjd—in Bihor county; Cuzdrioara,
Someştelec and Solnoc—in Solnoc county; Zăuan (Zwan), Nuşfalău and
Valcău—in Crasna county.42 The victims of his abusive confiscations were
not only free men or members of various social strata more or less privileged
(Saxon colonists referred to as hospites, as well as fortress serfs), but also church
representatives and important noblemen (members of Chanad,43 Gutkeled44
and Borsa45 kindreds). The latter, despite their prestige, could not recover their
properties until many decades later. At royal request, Paul Geregye erected a
series of strong fortresses on these estates: Adrian (Adorján),46 presumably
Valcău (Valkó), and Piatra Şoimului (Solyomkő—Falcon Rock).47 Despite the
38 . . et cuncta perficere studuit, que et reformacioni regni sciebat, et usui regio expedire, DIR I.
428; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 185, mentions Paul Geregye as royal court judge, position he
had stopped exerting for some time.
39 RA 823 (December 12th, 1245); RA 853, DIR I. 329–333, HD 249–253 (June 2nd, 1247).
40 DIR I. 335–337; 427–428. For the Ocna Dejului (Deszakna) exploitations see: DIR I. 334, ZW
76 (February 23rd, 1248).
41 DIR I. 338–341; CD IV/2. 521–522; RA 926.
42 DIR I. 335–337; 427–428; Jakó 209.
43 DIR II. 15–16, 16–18; Wenzel VII. 458, 474–476.
44 DIR II. 195–196; HD 413–414.
45 DIR II. 201–203; Wenzel XII. 250–253.
46 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 265; Győrffy, I. 591–592.
47 KMTL 30, 605, 708.
56 CHAPTER 2
scarcity of written sources, we can still assess Paul Geregye’s method of govern-
ing as equally discretionary and abusive as it was dynamic and efficient.
2.2.3 Transylvania: the voivode Lawrence48 (c. 1242–c. 1252)

Next to Paul Geregye, Lawrence was one of the main artisans of reestablishing
royal authority in the inner Carpathian territories. As a member of one of the
oldest and strongest aristocratic kindreds, he was among those who followed
King Bela into his Dalmatian exile. During this period of time, in a document
issued in Klissa, in March–April 1242,49 he was mentioned for the first time
as the voivode of Transylvania. Thus, his appointment had been pronounced
long before he was literally able to exert this office. On January, 29th, 1243,
Voivode Lawrence was still—next to Stephanus (Stephen) Csák, the new ban
of Severin—on the list of witnesses of a royal document issued near the Túróc
fortress (apud castrum Turuz);50 on June, 5th, he was again mentioned as wit-
ness, in a document issued “iuxta Budam in insula que dicitur Leporum”.51 It
was only afterwards that Lawrence could have honored his responsibilities in
Transylvania, and by then count Paul Geregye had already exerted his power
for some time.
Lawrence most likely took office no earlier than the summer of 1243.
Initially, his activity must have resembled that of Paul Geregye in Solnoc and
the counties down the Someş Valley. The objective was to reinstate order and a
minimal degree of security in a havoc stricken province, and it claimed a great
deal of sustained effort for at least the next two years. In fact, the difficulties he
had to overcome in Transylvania are highlighted by the state of the church in
the province. By mid-1244, the king failed to find a prelate willing to take over
the Bishopric of Alba Iulia,52 and the appointment of Artulf in the summer
48 Engel—Archontológia I. 331, II. 122: mentions him as a member of a presumed Ilidia
branch of the Kán family. This identification is doubtful since such a branch of the Kán
family never existed. The 1248 document, issued by the voivode at Ilidia (Yliad, DIR I.
334–335, Jakó 208), cannot be considered as evidence of ownership over the fortress. In
fact, all other previous (DIR I. 197, HD 81, 1223: possessio regalis Elyad) or later (DIR II.
335) references regarding the fortress confirm its statute of royal property. At the same
time, the genealogic filiations suggested by Paul Engel cannot be proven. Identifying
this voivode as Lawrence Aba, based on the document from May, 11th, 1279 (ZW 136–137;
DIR II. 204; Jakó 366), despite its evasiveness, remains to this date the most plausible.
49 RA 719; CD IV/1. 91.
50 RA 734.
51 RA 744.
52 On June 5th, 1243 (RA 744) and April 21st, 1244 (RA 762) the Bishopric of Alba Iulia was still.
of 124453 appears to have been more formal than factual.54 The prolonged
vacancy of office at the Bishopry of Alba Iulia ended in 1246, with Bishop Gallus
accepting this position. Consequently, throughout this interval Lawrence
lacked the support of some of the most important pillars in reestablishing
order. At the same time the exemption granted by the king to Gallus upon his
appointment as Bishop (1246)55 indicates that by that time the church’s prop-
erties in Transylvania had unnaturally been under the control of the voivode.
A more obvious revival of the province became apparent in 1246. The proper
investment of a bishop in Alba Iulia was a success in reinstating a state of nor-
mality. Also, by this date, Lawrence had already achieved most of his accom-
plishments: mending some of the royal fortresses (Cetatea de Baltă, Cluj,
Hunedoara—all of them rebuilt on new locations, etc.); reconstituting the
royal estate, including the annexation of estates left with no owners after the
1241–124256 events; reopening the salt mines and organizing the salt transport
down the Mureş River. Precious information regarding the salt exploitation
and trade is provided by a 1248 diploma granted by the voivode to his guests
from Vinţ and Vurpăr.57 This document, first through which a Transylvanian
voivode granted such a privilege to royal hospites, offers relevant clues on the
new sort of voivodal power. The royal prerogatives bestowed on the voivode
were much like those boasted by the duke of Transylvania, two decades
earlier. Contemporaries and the king himself must have seen the situation as
a provisional exertion of power, due to the need of reestablishing order in the
inner Carpathian region. However, historical conditions in the second half of
the 13th century made this situation permanent. Thus, contrary to the ephem-
eral reinforcement of royal power, voivodal attributions would only grow more
until the time of Ladislas Kán.
Just like Paul Geregye, Lawrence took advantage of his position, and become
the owner of a vast personal estate in Transylvania. Based on the available data,
his properties consisted of several localities in the northwestern part of the
province, on the Şieu Valley: Sărata (Sofalua), Chintelnic (Kendtelek), Sărăţel
53 There is little evidence available documenting his presence in the Diocese. First reference
was made on June, 15th, 1244, RA 769.
54 In the fall of 1245, with support from the king, he would manage to get transferred to the
episcopal see of Győr, DIR I. 326–327, CD IV/1. 378–379. On December 12th, 1245, the epis-
copal see of Alba Iulia was again vacant, RA 823, CD IV/1. 384.
55 DIR I. 327–328, ZW 72–73.
56 See DIR II. 51–52; ZW 89–90.
57 DIR I. 334–335, 426–427 (1248); ZW 77. Seealso DIR I. 330, 423 (June 2nd, 1247, Diploma
Ioaniţilor): ad hec de salibus . . . de quacumque salifodina Ultrasilvana. . . .
58 CHAPTER 2
(Zereth), Şieu-Măgheruş (Monyoros), Arcalia (Arukalia), Săsarm (Zeyzorma)

and Chiuza (Kuzepfolua).58 Nonetheless, he may have owned estates in
other parts of Transylvania as well, but there is no information available to
confirm that.
2.3 The Decade with No History (1248–1257)
2.3.1 The Mongol Threat of 1247–1248 and the New Defensive Strategies of
King Bela
The benevolent attitude manifested by Pope Innocent IV towards Daniil
Romanovich was grounded in the intention to speculate on the dissen-
sions confirmed by Plano Carpini between Güyük and Batu. Thus, the pon-
tiff intended to offer the latter the opportunity of a tranquil western border,
provided he refrained from pillaging Europe. Only by sealing such an agree-
ment with Batu, could King Bela divert his attention from his eastern frontier
and engage in the 1246 war against Austria. He was joined in this enterprise
by both count Paul Geregye (later taken prisoner, together with seven other
members of his kindred59) and the Cumans who returned to Hungary at King
Bela’s request.60 Moreover, according to Russian sources, he also received mili-
tary support from Daniil Romanovich, the great Knez of Halych.61 The general
mobilization towards the Western frontier, which required the services of the
troops used to defend the Eastern part of the kingdom, is convincing evidence
that throughout 1246 the Mongol threat was no longer deemed imminent.62
The apparent calm came to an end in early 1247, when Güyük was elected
Great Khan of the Mongol Empire, and the threat of another invasion of Europe
became apparent. In January 1247, alarmed by the information he received
presumably from the Russian lands, King Bela wrote to the pope, warning him
about the perils from the East. In his reply dated February 4, Pope Innocent IV
addressed the king with his usual encouragements, asking for all the details the
monarch could provide.63 In the summer of 1247, the distressing news about
the imminence of a civil war between Batu, the Khan of the Golden Horde,
58 Jakó 194, 319, 366; DIR II. 204; DRH X. 312–313.
59 DIR I. 335–337; 427–428.
60 Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians, 68–70.
61 See indication of sources at Kosztolyik, Hungary, 202.
62 On November, 15th, 1246, Bela IV interceded with the pope for the throne of Austria,
vacant after the demise of the Babenberg dynasty, RA 839.
63 Augustus Potthast, ed., Regesta Pontificium Romanorum, vol. II (Berlin: 1875), 12414.
and the Great Khan Güyük was confirmed by Giovanni de Plano Carpini upon
his return from the Mongols. According to the estimates of the Franciscan
missionary, Güyük’s victory over Butu was very likely after which the Great
Khan would plan another all-in attack over Hungary and Poland within the
next three years.64 After the return of the Franciscan missionaries, Bela IV sent
his own informers to the East and received a similar report.65 The threat was
so serious that in the summer of 1247 the Russian knezes Daniil and Vasilko
accepted to acknowledge Rome’s patronage in exchange for the right to “win
back” territories and goods they could prove to be their property and to remain
of East Christian faith.66 Several months later, in the attempt to set up an effi-
cient resistance in Eastern Europe, Innocent IV negotiated an alliance with the
Knezes of Halych Vladimir and Suzdal, and also with the Teutons. The latter
were bestowed with the privilege of running the Anti-Mongol front and ple-
nary indulgence.67
The imminence of a new Mongol invasion stirred up spirits in the entire
Christian world, while Hungary in particular was governed by generalized
panic.68 A new invasion similar to the one from 1241–1242 would have undoubt-
edly turned the Kingdom of Hungary into ruin. Under the circumstances, King
Bela IV hastened the kingdom’s fortification project. This included the erec-
tion of the fortress of Buda in order to receive the German colonists from Pest,
the settlement of colonists in the Esztergom and Székesfehérvár fortresses, the
construction of strongholds in the counties of Szepes, Baranya, Borsod, on the
Szigliget isle of Lake Balaton and in Slavonia.69 Also in order to further rein-
force the defensive system of the kingdom, Bela IV signed on June 2nd, 1247,
a contract with the Hospitallers.70 These defensive measures were exclusively
concentrated on the kingdom’s central and Western (trans-Danubian) regions.
The disastrous experience from the spring of 1241 drove the king to a rather
cautious approach, aimed at avoiding a direct confrontation with the invaders
64 De Plano Carpini “Ystoria Mongalorum”, 93–95, 121.

65 G. Itsványi, “XIII századi feljegyzés IV Bélánok a tatárokhoz küldött követségéről”,
Századok 72 (1938): 270.
66 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 171–172; Kosztolnyik, Hungary,
211–212.
67 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 172. In January 1249, Innocent IV
requested Daniil Romanovich to send the Teutons of Prussia all the information he could
muster on the Mongols, see Wenzel, VII, 267.
68 György Székely, “Egy elfelejtett rettegés: a második tatárdúlós hagyományban és egy-
etemes összefüggésekben”, Századok 122 1988): 52.
69 Fügedi, Castle and Society, 50–53.
70 DIR I. 329–333, 418–426.
60 CHAPTER 2
which meant interposing a natural, easier to defend obstacle between them

and his troops. This was also his intention back in March–April 1241, but he was
urged to engage in the direct confrontation with the Mongols by the Hungarian
nobility, who was dissatisfied with the king’s political reform and was trying to
conservate of its military role (due to the arrival of the Cumans). The pressures
exerted in favor of an open war in April 1241, with disastrous consequences,
gave King Bela the authority to decide the strategy in 1247.
The letter addressed by King Bela IV to Pope Innocent IV, in November 11th,
1247,71 unveiled the pillar of the new Magyar defensive strategy. The letter was
a cry for help, and admonished the Pope and Christian sovereigns for their
indifference to the destiny of Hungary. Also, the letter was hinting to a poten-
tial alliance with excommunicated Frederick II and even to a covenant with
the Great Mongol Khan. King Bela wrote:
for this we have resolved after countless considerations, that it be more

worthwhile to us and to the entire Europe that the Danube be reinforced
with fortresses. For this is the water of our resistance, where Eraclio the
defender of the Roman Empire battled with Cosrode, and where not with
standing surprise or fierce attacks we fought the Mongols for ten months,
our kingdom almost bereft by fortresses and defenders. . . .72
Danube, the aqua contradictionis, became, in King Bela’s vision, the foremost
obstacle before the Mongols’ invasion of Europe.
At any rate, this defensive strategy came to life in the second half of 1247.
The Diploma of the Hospitallers, June 1247, stipulated an even distribution of
knights from the Western frontier (which duke Frederick of Babenberg tried
to conquer in the events of 1241) and the Severin county which, at the date,
71 DIR I. 344–347; HD 259–262; RA 933a. Since one of the most important dating elements—
the marriage of princess Costanza to Lev Danilovici—seems to have taken place, accord-
ing to the arguments brought by Z. J. Kosztolnyik (Hungary, 201–204), in 1246–1247, dating
the letter as from 1247 becomes fully plausible. This is the only date matching with the
international status: by November 11th, 1248, six months passed since Güyük’s death and
the threat of a new invasion of Europe was no longer imminent. In this context any other
previous date can not sustained with evidence. The desperate tone of King Bela could
only be explained by the circumstances of the year 1247, when alarming news threatened
with another huge Mongol invasion. For a recent analysis of this important document
see: Toru Senga, “IV Bela külpolitikaja és IV Ince pápáhaz intézett ‘Tatár’ levele”, Századok
121 (1987): 583–612.
72 HD 259–262: quod esset salubrius nobis et toti Europae, ut Danubis fortaliter munirentur.
Hec enim east aqua contradictionis. . . .
was engulfed in a broader defensive system based on the high peaks of the
Carpathians. A few months later, in November 11th, 1247, in his letter to Pope
Innocent IV, King Bela already referred to settling some of the Hospitallers
in medio regni nostri . . . ad defensionem castrorum que circa danubium edi-
ficari facimus, and the rest to be massed (according to the interpretation of
Maria Holban73) in a vast Danubian segment located at the convergence
with the Tisza River, which was the area that the Mongols pierced through
the Hungarian defenses in the winter of 1241/1242.74 Thus, despite his initial
intentions, the king had organized the knights into a new, Danube-bound line
of defense. Half of them protected the Southern flank, to deter any attempt
to close the circle. Although it was closer to the frontier with the Bulgarian
Kingdom, the Hospitallers’ front probably did not include the Severin county,
at least at the beginning.75
The military grounds of King Bela’s defensive strategy of concentrating all
his available forces along the Danube line are unquestionable. In fact, as we
are about to see, the Mongols’ half-failed invasion of 1285 was largely due to a
similar defense strategy organized by Ladislas IV. However, this strategy left the
rest of Transylvania and other vast territories in the east in a state of abandon-
ment, which the king acknowledged of being unable to defend.
2.3.2 Consequences on Transylvania

In a time when the shock of the 1241 invasion was not completely overcome,
the impact of the new defensive strategy on the development of Transylvania
was almost dramatic. Even though, the assassination of Güyük, in April 1248,
removed an immediate threat, the decade that followed the Mongol dread of
1247–1248 and the vast efforts to put up a defense slowed down the economic
and administrative revival of Transylvania, and consequently the province was
thrown into a cone of shadow.
Changes were immediately showing in the administrative hierarchy. One of
the first effects was the withdrawal from Transylvania of the officials who had
actively started its reconstruction. Paul Geregye was the first to leave, for the
position of judge of the royal court.76 He was recommended by his expertise
in organizing the Danube defense and the restoration of the estranged royal
73 Maria Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 73–85.

74 . . . in confinio cumanorum ultra Danubium et bulgarorum, per quem etiam locum tempore
invasionis regni nostri ad nos aditum habuit exercitus Thartarorum.
75 For opinions according to which the Ioanites were not effectively settled in Severin see:
Istoria României, II, 145; Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun, 241–242.
76 KMTL 512; DIR I. 427–428.
62 CHAPTER 2
estates. Furthermore, in 1247–1248, voivode Lawrence was appointed count of

Valkó. This new position brought new organizational and military responsi-
bilities related to the defense of the Danube line that could not be honored
together with his voivodal attributions. At the same time, the voivode’s pres-
ence in Ilidia (Yliad) in 1248,77 seems to indicate his active involvement along-
side the Hospitallers in the defense of the Southern flank of King Bela’s defense
system and in the process of consolidating the fortresses in these regions.
After 125278 any references regarding the voivodal position disappear for a
couple of years, which makes it impossible to speculate on the identity of its
holders. However, a certain Herbord presumably held voivodal attributions
(mentioned in 1252 together with his brother Lawrence, as buyer of the Sâncel
estate79) and confirmed as one of the owners of this estate according to a later
source naming him among others.80
The scarce data available from this period is suggestive of Transylvania’s
internal turmoil. In 1252, the barren land of a Saxon who disappeared in the
1241 turmoil was conceded by the king to a Székely called Akadas.81 In the same
year, half of the Sâncel estate, located at the fertile junction of the two Târnava
Rivers, was sold by its owners for a trifling five silver marks.82 In 1256 (May 1st,
in mid spring) the Călata road was closed, pending an uncertain reopening.83
In 1257, Transylvanian churchmen were in dire material need, and according
to information sent to Pope Alexander IV, they no longer held church service
and could not sustain themselves financially.84 Under the circumstances, the
Székelys and the Romanians, enclosed in their traditionalist cultures, charac-
terized by autarchy and a subsistence economy, seem to be the main survivors
of the period. The social and economic development of these populations,
confirmed by the insistent pleas for the payment of animal tax duties to the
Archbishopric of Esztergom in 1256 and 1262, was to become more evident in
the decades to come.
77 DIR I. 426–427.

78 DIR II. 5–6; ZW 78–79.
79 DIR II. 5; ZW 79.
80 DIR II. 135–136; ZW 110–111 (1271).
81 DIR II. 5–6; ZW 78–79.
82 DIR II. 5; ZW 79.
83 DIR II. 16–18; Wenzel VII. 474–476.
84 DIR II. 14; Wenzel II. 285.
CHAPTER 3
The Duchy of Transylvania
The delay in the reconstruction of Transylvania convinced King Bela IV in the

late 1260s to abandon the strategic defense he had planned against the Mongol
threat in 1247–1248. He also intended to reorganize the administrative system
in order to give an impetus to the eastern regions of the Arpadian Kingdom.
In this context, he turned to an administrative innovation first implemented
by Andrew II, after the banishment of the Teutons, which he himself experi-
mented with as heir to the throne: reinstating the Duchy of Transylvania. The
new title was bestowed in 1257 upon Prince Stephen, next in line to the crown
of Hungary, who initially left the province after a brief amount of time (c. 1258),
in exchange for the title of duke of Styria. For the next three years until his
return, similar attributions were exerted in Transylvania by the holder of an
improvised office: that of Ban of Transylvania.
3.1 Reinstating the Duchy of Transylvania
The birth, in 1239, of the first son of Bela IV and queen Mary Lascaris, brought
great joy in the entire Kingdom of Hungary. The hopes for a boy were very
low, not only because of the king’s age (33 years old) but also because the
royal couple had already seven daughters. Seen as a token of divine grace, this
event triggered a grandiose thanksgiving on the day of St. Luke the Evangelist
(September 18th), when even the economically wise King Bela displayed
memorable generosity. On this occasion, the venerable Archbishop Robert of
Esztergom lived his last great joy, that of baptizing the little prince with the
name of the holy King Stephen, the initiator of Christianity in Hungary. Several
weeks later (November, 2nd, 1239), the Valon cleric who dedicated most of his
life to the church of Hungary passed away.1
Considering the hopes invested in him, the little prince enjoyed the full con-
sideration worthy of a future king. In 1246, on the celebration of his 7th birthday,
Stephen was crowned as associated king of Hungary, and received the formal
title of duke of Slavonia.2 Also during these years, a future royal court, including
1 Albericus, in Gombos, Catalogus, 33–34; MGH, SS, XXIII, 811.

2 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190; Kristó Gyula, KMTL, 294. The administration of this province
would be effectively exerted by Bans Ladislas Kán (1245–1247), Rostislav Mihailovich (1247–
1248) and Stephen Gutkeled (1248–1259).

64 CHAPTER 3
1 Abrud AB 17 Copand AB 33 Mănărade AB 50 Sebeș AB

2 Adrian BH 18 Crăciunelul de 34 Mediaș SB 51 Sfărașu CJ
3 Arcalia BN Jos AB 35 Meșcreac AB 52 Stremț AB
4 Arieșul de Câmpie 19 Cricău AB 36 Micăsasa SB 53 Stupini BN
(com. Cheud, SJ) 20 Dăbâca 37 Mintiul Gherlei CJ 54 Sumurduc CJ
5 Binținți (Aurel 21 Dej CJ 38 Ocna Dejului CJ 55 Suplac SJ
Vlaicu) AB 22 Dupusul SB 39 Ocnele Turzii CJ 56 Șieu-Măgheruș BN
6 Apold MS 23 Fundătura CJ 40 Odverem AB 57 Șieu-Odorhei BN
7 Bazna SB 24 Gârbova AB 41 Pețelca AB 58 Kezdi (Târgu
8 Bonțida CJ 25 Geoagiul de 42 Piatra Șoimului Secuiesc) CV
9 Căpud AB Sus AB BH 59 Teiuș AB
10 Câlnic AB 26 Hașag AB 43 Rodna BN 60 Teremia MS
11 Cârța SB 27 Hădăreni MS 44 Ruși AB 61 Unguraș CJ
12 Chintelnic BN 28 Ighiu AB 45 Sălacea BH 62 Valcău SJ
13 Chiuza BN 29 Igrițiu CJ 46 Sărata BN 63 Veza AB
14 Cloașter SB 30 Ip SJ 47 Sărățel BN 64 Vințu de Jos AB
15 Cluj-Mănăștur 31 Lujerdiu CJ 48 Sângătin SB 65 Vurpăr SB
16 Cojocna CJ 32 Măceu HD 49 Sântimbru AB 66 Zalnoc SJ
MAP 2 The duchy of Transylvania.
The Duchy of Transylvania 65
officials such as count Nicholas of Dubicha (treasurer of the young king),

Andrew, son of Ivancha and count Herbord, son of Osl, was organized around
him.3 The young king also owned territories under his direct administration in
various locations throughout the kingdom. In 1254, the young King Stephen, age
15, married a Cuman princess who was also baptized on this occasion with the
name of the holy Hungarian Saint Elisabeth.4 Most likely, this political move
enabled King Bela to answer one of the demands of Cuman leaders who agreed,
back in 1246, to return and help repopulate the Hungarian Kingdom. By giving
Hungary a queen, they had more reasons to consider Hungary as their new
home. Henceforth, Stephen could already be considered fit to exert some of
his royal attributes. Furthemore, as Stephen Gutkeled became the governor
of Styria, Prince Stephen seems to have assumed his responsibilities as
duke of Slavonia.
In 1257, at the age of 18, Stephen became the duke of Transylvania, an office
revived by his father especially for him. The Duchy of Slavonia was attributed
to the second son of King Bela IV, Prince Bela, born in 1243. King Bela him-
self had undergone a similar course in his youth. He was crowned as a young
king in 1214, and then he consecutively became duke of Slavonia (1220) and
later duke of Transylvania (c. 1225). More than assuring succession and rees-
tablishing the tradition started in the very first centuries of the Hungarian
conquest,5 the decision to rebuild the Duchy of Transylvania was an attempt
to revive the reconstruction of some regions subject to major social and eco-
nomic difficulties due to prolonged neglect. Hence appointing the very suc-
cessor to the Hungarian throne as duke of Transylvania was meant to restore
the Transylvanians’ confidence in the Hungarian crown. Also, through this
move, King Bela renounced the previous strategy of deliberately neglecting the
Eastern regions and concentrating his forces along the Danube.
King Bela IV adopted a series of measures meant to reinstate the rule of
law in the matter of property ownerships. In the decade that followed the
great invasion, the royal power prioritized the recovery of the strongholds and
that of the church properties that had significantly upheld the defense effort.
However, the success of this action was rather moderate. Around 1254, more
than a decade after the invasion, the king decided to resume activities related
3 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190–191.

4 Daughter to Zeyhanus (Szejhán) dux, the main leader of the Cumans returned to Hungary
on 1246; she was christened in 1254 at the Dominican Monastery of Buda—Pálóczi-Horváth,
Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians, 78. Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190; Kristó, KMTL, 294.
5 For the evolution of Duchy in the Arpadian era see Makk, KMTL, 261; Gyula Kristó, A XI.
századi hercegség története Magyarországon, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974).
66 CHAPTER 3
to estate property,6 the beneficiaries of which included, for the first time, free
owners. As far as Transylvania and the neighboring regions are concerned,
one of the most noteworthy moments of this policy occurred right before the
revival of the institution of duchy.
In April 1256, the noblemen Ladislas and Thomas from the Chanad kindred
petitioned the king regarding the occupation of some of their Bihor proper-
ties by Paul Geregye in the years after the Mongol invasion. Compelled by this
context, King Bela IV decided, for the first time, against Geregye,7 who had
played such a tremendously important role in bringing the Eastern regions
under royal control. Moreover, in November the same year, the St. Benedict
Monastery, located near the Gran River officially appealed the king for the
restitution of properties and rights that had been estranged from them after
the Mongol invasion, including the salt customs near Arieşul de Câmpie.8
Eventually, on December 16th, 1256, King Bela reconfirmed a series of previous
donations to the Esztergom Archbishop made at the time of its establishment
by his royal ancestors. He also paid particular attention to certain revenues
and rights in Transylvania, including the right over cashing in “in the name
of the king the quitrents from Székelys and Romanians, consisting of big or
small livestock and any other animals”, as well as the regular fees paid by the
Romanians in the Kingdom of Hungary.9
All these decrees shared a common denominator: they were all meant to put
an end to the abuses made by high officials and clerks. Such was the case with
the Chanad kindred property, seized by Paul Geregye, or the Arieşul de Câmpie
customs post, taken over by the palatine Stephen Gutkeled, owner of numer-
ous estates and a fortress in the vicinity.10 Furthermore, a few years later, one
of the palatine’s offsprings, Paul Gutkeled, was granted by young king Stephen
legal confirmation of his “right” to cash in revenues related to those properties.11
On the other hand, the revenues claimed by the Archbishopric of Esztergom,
6 István Rákos, “IV Béla birtokrestaurációs politikája”, in Acta Historica Szegedinensis,

(Szeged: József Attila Tudományegyetem, 1974), 3 (with document samples).
7 The complaints of Ladislas and Thomas were filed on the March 29th, 1256—DIR II. 15–16,
Wenzel VII. 458. On May 1st, 1256, following the royal sentence, the invaded lands and a
half of the Birtin custom post were effectively returned to their lawful owners—DIR II.
16–18, 491–493; Wenzel VII. 474–476.
8 CD IV/2. 405–407, DIR II. 48 (summary): in parte Transsilvana tributum salium circa
Aranyos habitum.
9 DIR II. 18–20, 493–494; HD 276–277; ZW 80–81.
10 Jakó 202–203.
11 DIR II. 390–391; Wenzel V 66–68.
were abusively snatched by a plethora of royal intendants.12 Removing all the

abuses required the existence of a royal institution with direct control over
the entire administrative apparatus. The Duchy of Transylvania seemed to
be the best option for such a goal.
At the same time, the institution of the duchy was also supposed to assist with
more pressing military demands, such as the Hungarian expanding interests in
the Balkans and the political crisis experienced by the Golden Horde after the
death of Batu Golden Horde (1255). After an uneventful decade, the disappear-
ance of the Great Khan at the age of 48 set the entire Eastern world in motion
with threats and optimism alternating at a blinding speed. The rise of Sartaq,
a Nestorian Christian (according to Armenian sources), as the new leader of
the Golden Horde (1255–1256), brought hope for Christians everywhere,13 and
judging by all appearances, broke king Daniil Romanovich’s ties with Rome.14
The consequent death of Sartaq, in conditions that remain unclear and the rise
of his son, Oulaqtchi to power did not bring any essential changes to the gen-
eral context. The new khan engaged to pursue his father’s efforts to integrate
the Russian principalities in the Mongol political and military system. To this
end, he summoned a meeting with Russian princes, in which he engaged in a
lenient policy and granted all their demands.15 Furthermore, respecting the
general draft imposed by Sartaq, Oulaqtchi moved on enforcing Russia’s reorga-
nization into military districts, according to the Mongol model.16 Even though
these measures fully integrated Russia into the Golden Horde,17 the Mongol
dominance relied on the cooperation of the Russian princes and the stimula-
tion they received in order to join the political system of the Golden Horde.
The attractive Mongol political offer seemingly caused Daniil Romanovich
to turn a deaf ear to the calls and threats of Pope Alexander IV (1256–1257),18
who intended to reconnect Halych to the Roman religious establishment. The
the new Russian-Mongol cooperation seemed ready to cast an entirely new
12 Nunc autem quidam judices regni nostri et collectores censuum nostrorum et exactores
urbararum, necnon comites camerarum nostrarum sibi et ecclesie sue fraudem facere
conarentur, occupando, iurisdictionem prorogando, solutionem quandoque diminuendo,
DIR II. 493–494.
13 Grousset, L’empire, 473–474; Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea, 62.
14 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 115.
15 Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 150.
16 Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 150.
17 Grekov, Iakubovski, Hoarda de Aur și decăderea ei, (Bucharest: Editura de Stat pentru
Literatură Ştiinţifică, 1953), 206.
18 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 181; Chirovsky, Introduction to
Ukrainian History, 173.
68 CHAPTER 3
light onto the threat from the East, augmenting the feeling of insecurity at the
Hungarian Eastern frontier. Due to this colaboration, the Mongols reached in
1257 the boundaries of the Teuton-owned Prussia.19 In these circumstances,
which called for the revival of Transylvania’s military potential, King Bela’s
solution was that which he himself had experimented in his youth: the reinsti-
tution of the duchy and the ensuing unique military command.
However, such a complex endeavor was too great a burden for the still frail
18-year-old prince. Stephen would play more of a symbolic role in this remote
region than that of a full-fledged administrator. His presence at the head of the
duchy would be brief. In 1258, given the imminent war with Bohemia, Stephen
was appointed duke of Styria. At the same time, in order to ensure the continu-
ity of Transylvania’s recovery and the revival of its military potential, King Bela
turned to a new administrative innovation: the Banate of Transylvania.
3.2 The Banate of Transylvania (1258–1261)
3.2.1
The ban of Transylvania worked as a substitute for the duke. Similar to the case
of Slavonia—which probably served as the example for this model of admin-
istration—the king planned to keep the centralized administrative structure
of the “duchy” also during the periods when none of the royal family mem-
bers who owned the duke title was able to lead. In essence, the role of the lord
was to exert, in the name of the king, his authority over all the constituencies
of Transylvania’s administrative hodgepodge, to control royal servants and to
centralize the rule over the province’s military structures.
The person appointed by the king, Ernye Ákos, was one of the few who had
accompanied Bela IV in his Dalmatian retreat (1241–1243). A few years later he
made a name for himself during the war against Austria.20 In 1250 he was the
official holder of the office of magister agasonum, and he was granted estates in
Sătmar county,21 as a reward for his services. One year later (1251), Ernye Ákos
became count of Varasd and in 1254 he was mentioned as count of Borsod,22 a
position he probably held until 1256–1258, when his successor was mentioned
20 RA 928.
21 RA 928.
22 RA 1021 (cu text).
for the first time.23 There is no evidence to suggest that Ernye Ákos was the
leader of Transylvania as of 1252, even though it is believed to have been so in
older and also more recent scholarship.24 He must have made his appearance
in Transylvania most likely along with Stephen (around 1257), and the later
evolution of his ties with the heir point out to the fact that he had previously
been assigned by the king to exert some sort of tutelage over the royal son.
The reconstitution of the duchy institution and its subsequent replacement
with that of the lordship came hand in hand with administrative reforms, the
most important being the integration in its administrative system of Solnoc25
county. Up to that point, Solnoc county had not been integrated into the
administrative and military structure of Transylvania. On the contrary, the
owners of this vast county of foremost economic importance, with its juris-
diction over the Dej salt mine and Transylvanian salt transport and the great
storage facility of Sălacea, were high officials of the kingdom. In the first half of
the 13th century, this position was reunited with that of curial count, magister
tavernicorum or palatine,26 and in the years after the Mongol invasion tenured
for this position was no other than Paul Geregye. The subordination of this
county to the Duke/Lord of Transylvania was undoubtedly an attempt to chan-
nel much of the region’s resources into its own consolidation. Furthermore,
whether this had been King Bela’s intention or not, under the administration
of duke Stephen V the subordination of Solnoc county to the entire political
system ruled by the Duke/Lord of Transylvania would soon turn into subordi-
nation to the voivode of Transylvania.
Considering other internal objectives after the installation of Ernye Ákos as
Transylvania’s ruler, their success was probably just partial. Certain progress
had been achieved in better controlling royal servants,27 but the abuses com-
mitted by the local lords could not be eliminated completely while they still
played a major role in the defensive system of the province after the Mongol
invasion. At the same time, the diploma that reconfirmed the privileges of the
23 Corrardus, RA 1133. The dating of the document is uncertain: around 1256 at Szentpétery,
and 1258 in HO VI. 96.
24 KMTL 193, 197; Erdelyi Törtenete, I, Budapest, 1987, 312.
25 DIR II. 33–34, 497; ZW 85–86. In 1261, duke Stephen renewed the privileges granted to the
Dej colonists, who had received them from Ban Ernye Ákos.
26 On one occasion, in 1214, this office was held by a Transylvanian voivode (Gyula Kán),
RA 290; Wenzel VI. 367–368; DIR I. 158.
27 The renewal, in 1262, of the privileges granted to the church of Esztergom eliminates the
references to the abuses of royal clerks presented in a similar document from 1256, thus,
we can assume that this issue was partially resolved.
70 CHAPTER 3
Archbishopric of Esztergom in 126228 and also reasserted his rights over 10%
livestock tax imposed on Romanians and Székelys might indicate that at least
in Transylvania a series of issues had been left unsolved. This should not come
as a surprise since in 1259–1260 dealing with the Mongol threat was undoubt-
edly the main priority of Lord Ernye Ákos.
3.2.2 The Mongol Invasion of 1260

The rise to the throne of the Golden Horde of Berke, a Muslim, in the aftermath
of the assassination of young Oulaqtchi, resumed the Mongol expansion policy
towards Central Europe. The entire Christian world looked at the event in awe.
As a result, Daniil Romanovich changed his policy and allied with the Catholic
world, which triggered an anti-Mongol uprising culminating with his failed
attempt to impose his authority over Kiev.29 The lightning retaliation of the
new Khan of Saray proved that the military power of the Golden Horde in the
area was still impressive. The powerful intervention of the Mongol Commander
Burundai from 1258 brought Halych under heel and forced Daniil Romanovich
to demolish his fortifications.30 Under these circumstances, the call to arms in
a regional crusade against the Mongols addressed by Pope Alexander IV (July
1258)31 was rather late and disappointing. Not only did the support that Daniil
expected fail to come once again, but the vengeful Berke decided to respond
to the faint challenge with new raids against Poland and Hungary. These raids
were an attempt to subdue by means of force any future actions of interfer-
ence of these powers in the sphere of dominance of the Horde. Thus, in 1259
and 1260 Poland, Lithuania and Prussia were repeatedly raided. The invasion of
Poland was particularly violent, sometimes causing population displacements.
Among the victims was Boleslaus Pudicus,32 duke of Krakow, who was forced
to seek refuge in Hungary.
The retaliation against Transylvania must have taken place in the second
half of 1260, during or immediately after the end of the Hungarian-Bohemian
war, corroborated, with a Bulgarian attack on Severin33 launched at the same
time. This raid, which appears to have been rather small in scale, was a total
disaster for the Mongols. According to a fragment from the chronicle of Kemāl
28 DIR II. 41–43, HD 307–309.

29 Grousset, L’Empire, 476; Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 172–173.
30 Chirovsky, Introduction to Ukrainian History, 173; Grousset, L’Empire, 476; Vernadsky, The
Mongols and Russia, 157–158.
32 Grousset, L’Empire, 474, Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 116.
33 DIR II. 62–65.
Pasha-Zāde: “At that time, a party from Bereket-Khan’s army /. . ./ crossing the
Balkan Mountains [= the Carpathians], raided the ill omen Hungarian country.
The evil foe victorious in that battle for faith took the survivors of the clash /. . ./
Such as in a game of backgammon one can be outrun, and other times one can
be the outrunner, so are the brave-hearted riders, who roam the hunting ground
sometimes apprehended, and other times become apprehenders themselves.”34
Despite the lack of conclusive evidence in this respect, we can assume that
the Mongol action of 1260 occurred in Southern Transylvania and that on this
occasion the Cistercian church of Cârţa probably suffered more devastation.35
The leadership of the military operations and the victory laurel were attrib-
uted to Lord Ernye, who coordinated on the battlefield both the border defense
troops as well and some of the Transylvanian noble representatives.36 None of
Stephen V’s documents otherwise detailed records of his own deeds of arms,
mention this campaign which might indicate that it took place before he
returned as duke of Transylvania. At the same time it was the future Palatine
Lawrence (son of Kemyn), who answered King Bela’s request and ahead of an
army recruited by himself, recaptured the Severin county from the Bulgarians.37
Shortly after his success, overlooked by the chronicles due to the rather murky
circumstances, Prince Stephen returned to lead the Duchy of Transylvania,
after the loss of Styria to King Ottokar II. Due to the fall out with his father,
probably dating back to the war against Bohemia, one of Stephen’s first actions
as “duke” was to remove Lord Ernye Ákos and to abolish the Banate institution,
obsolete after his return.
3.3 Civil Wars
After the Kroissenbrunn defeat, the Hungarian rule in Styria came to an end,
and it was officially sanctioned by the peace of April 1261. Prince Stephen
returned to Transylvania, and inaugurated one of the most prolific periods
in the history of the province. Through a dynamic and innovation-oriented
34 Aurel Decei, “Problema colonizării turcilor selgiucizi în Dobrogea secolului al XIII-lea”, in
Relaţii româno-orientale. Culegere de studii, (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1978), 176–177.
35 DIR II. 55–56. In 1264, the monastery is described by duke Stephen as “totally deserted
after the wrath of the Mongol scourge”; we do not know whether he was referring to the
great invasion of 1241, or of a more recent raid.
36 Some of these special responsibilities were held by count Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus,
guerdoned for his merits in the battles with the Mongols—DIR II. 54–55, HD 323, Jakó 252.
37 DIR II. 64–65.
72 CHAPTER 3
strategy, duke Stephen was able to reform the social, military and administra-
tive system of Transylvania. Thus, his reforms ended the two decades of reces-
sion in the aftermath of the 1241–1242 invasions. The Duchy of Transylvania
during Prince Stephen’s time was marked by the conflict with his father King
Bela IV, which degenerated in two bloody civil wars.
3.3.1 Origins of the Conflict

On Stephen’s return to Transylvania, the conflict with his father king Bela IV
was already brewing. The main cause seems to have been the Kroissenbrunn
defeat, due to differences of opinion over tactics. From a military perspec-
tive, the differences between King Bela and Prince Stephen’s approach were
evident. While the King was cautious in politics, but hesitant on the battle-
field and far from the ideal of a warrior-king38 (all the great battles he per-
sonally led concluded either in defeat or in genuine catastrophes), the young
prince possessed all the qualities needed to become an exceptional military
commander. Endowed with extreme ambition, strong will, and determina-
tion the prince won victories even in what seemed totally compromised cir-
cumstances. He also benefitted—unlike his father—from the major ability of
being wise in selecting his companions from the best men of arms, noblemen
animated by the same ideals of late medieval chivalry that the young prince
himself had inherited from his grandfather, Andrew II. He could also be gener-
ous to extravagance,39 and he never hesitated in advancing his devotees (often
members of smaller, and lesser noble families), to the highest political ranks
in the kingdom, granting them generous estates, and making them the core
of a new aristocratic stratum in competition with the old aristocratic families
grouped around his father. These different traits of personality also influenced
his internal policy. Given his complete lack of reverence to the centralist tradi-
tion which dominated the Arpadian Kingdom, Stephen was, just like his grand-
father Andrew II, adept of the Western feudal system. He never hesitated in
ridding himself of the royal fortresses, which he donated to his barons and
knights or sold to the people who funded him. Bela IV, on the other hand, was
a partisan of the older traditions, of preserving the centralized structure of
the state and the royal estate. Ever since he was young, King Bela IV consis-
tently promoted this policy as a form of protest against his father Andrew II,
38 See SRH I. 469 (Chronicon Budense, Chronicon Dubnicense): Erat rex Bela vir pacificus, sed
in exercitibus et preliis minime fortunatus.
39 In 1269, he paid Ban Mykud the hefty sum of 100 silver marks for a horse, DIR II. 119–120;
HO, 174–175; Jáko 278.
and attracted the enmity of the aristocracy.40 When the military network of
royal fortresses was proven obsolete, King Bela refused to implement the more
radical solution of the great scale feudal conscript system (more efficient, but
also potentially anarchic and dangerous), and by that to sacrifice much of the
royal estate. On his attempt to exert his royal authority onto the aristocracy, he
turned to an unusual solution never used to such an extent in the history of
Hungary: bringing in warmongering settlers from Eastern Europe and calling
to arms various populations within the influence of the Arpadian Kingdom.
Consequently, his army, in the battle of Kroissenbrunn, consisted of an odd
mix of Ruthenians, Mongols and Poles, external allies of King Bela, joined
by Cumans, Slavs, Székelys, Romanians, Pechenegs, Ishmaelites, Greeks and
Bulgarians, Serbs and Bosnian heretics.41 Almost naturally, this odd, hetero-
geneous throng of warriors stood little chance before a Western army run by
one of the most brilliant military commanders of the time, King Ottokar II
Přemysl. Thus, the 1260 failure only confirmed the policy adopted by Prince
Stephen and the distance he took from his father’s obsolete conceptions. At
the same time, King Bela’s shift of external political alliances (immediately
after Kroissenbrunn, the king had approached Bohemia) obviously attracted
the disapproval of duke Stephen. Also, both the Hungarian-Bohemian peace of
April 1261 and the marriage of Ottokar II to Kunigunda (Rostislav Mihailovich’s
daughter and King Bela’s kin), concluded in the autumn of the same year,42
posed serious threats to Stephen’s succession to the throne. Under these cir-
cumstances, the dismissal of count Ernye Ákos, King Bela’s representative in
Transylvania, was a true declaration of independence from his father.
40 The vast action of repossessing estranged royal domains had started immediately after his
coronation (1235) and involved an impressive administrative and judicial apparatus, see:
DIR I. 300–301, 305–310 etc. In the Duchy of Transylvanian these measures were enforced
much earlier—DIR II. 254–255, 394–395; ZW 54; HD 120–121. For the noble discontent
against this policy see: Master Roger, Epistle, 144–145.
41 adversus regem Russiae et filios eius et ceteros Ruthenos ac Thartaros, qui eidem in auxilium
venerant at Boleslaum dux Cracoviensem et Loczkonem juvenem Lausaciae duces et innu-
meram multitudinem inhumanorum hominum, Cumanorum, Ungarorum et diversorum
Sclavorum, Siculorum, quoque et Valachorum, Beszeninorum et Izmahelitarum scismati-
corum, etiam utpote Grecorum, Bulgarorum, Rassiensium et Bosniensium hereticorum . . .,
HD 287–288. See: Mihail P. Dan, Cehi, slovaci and români în veacurile XIII–XIV, (Sibiu:
Publisher, 1944), 17–22.
42 Annales Pragenses, in Gombos, Catalogus, 185: Eodem anno /1261/ 8. Kal. Novembris prin-
ceps regni Bohemorum duxit in uxorem Cunegundem, filiam Hostislai ducis Bulgarorum.
74 CHAPTER 3
3.3.2 Relations with the Golden Horde

Due to the increasingly tensed relations with the pro-Bohemian party behind
the Hungarian throne, Stephen had to look for a viable solution to avoid the
escalation of the conflict with the Golden Horde and to secure peace at the
Eastern frontiers. Circumstances were in fact in favor for initiating negotia-
tions with the Mongols and finding the best compromising solution. At the
same time, the failure of 1260 had shown the Mongols that Hungary was far
from being an easy prey.
Under the circumstances, the negotiations initiated by Stephen with the
help of count Ponyth Miskolc,43 a savvy negotiator, resulted in a remarkable
diplomatic success. The Hungarian (Transylvanian)—Mongol agreement,
most likely signed in 1261, was more than just a simple non-aggression pact.
It was on this occasion that the two parties also agreed on their areas of inter-
est in Bulgaria and Cumania. The influence of duke Stephen in Bulgaria was
confined to the Iskar Valley, a line that his armies never crossed too far.44
The Mongols most likely agreed not to interfere on behalf of the Bulgarian
Kingdom of Vidin, while Hungary consented not to interfere with the Lower
Danube. This was undoubtedly the explanation why the Mongols did not offer
support against Stephen to the Tarnovo Czar Constantin Tich, their ally in the
campaigns against Byzantium.
The 1261 agreement was a first remarkable diplomatic success for duke
Stephen. Despite the critical moments of 1265, this agreement lasted until the
end of his reign, and provided the peace necessary to achieve the major objec-
tives of his policy.
3.3.3 The First Civil War (1262)

The immediate cause of the 1262 conflict was Stephen’s wish to be acknowl-
edged as king and to govern the state together with his father. This push was not
necessarily the expression of vain ambitions shown by the young prince. It was
more of a measure of precaution against the increasingly obvious intentions
of King Bela and Queen Mary to provide prince Bela, their second born, with
a sizeable chunk from the royal heritage. To prevent future unpleasant events,
Stephen arranged to have his succession rights45 acknowledged by Bela IV and
43 DIR II. 133–135, HD 347–348, Jakó 290.

44 The farthermost point reached by the Hungarians in their campaigns in Bulgaria was the
Pleven fortress, besieged by count Ponyth Miskolc in 1266 DIR II. 133–135, HD 347–348,
Jakó 290.
45 Stephen’s royal title in the documents issued in 1261–1262, a consequence of his coro-
nation in 1246, is a formal one, always accompanied by the “first born of the King of
to further extend his authority. Even though the only title he possessed at the
time, “duke of Transylvania”, implied that Stephen’s authority was restricted
to the boundaries of this province, we know for a fact that he controlled the
entire area to the East of the Tisza River. Using his royal prerogatives,46 he
renewed the privileges of the colonists (hospites) located in Dej (Deeswar),
Sălacea (Zoloch) and Sătmar (Zotmar), enforcing them “to join our army and
fight alongside”.47 Also by virtue of the same prerogatives, he judged the cases
of properties in the counties of Bihor, Sătmar and Bereg.48 His solid position
in these regions is confirmed by the unprecedented fact that the Bishopric of
Oradea was obliged to ask Stephen to confirme (on September 3rd, 126249), a
document issued by the chancellorship of King Bela IV on March 23rd, 1261.50
In addition, after offering support to the “Czar” Rostislav Mihailovich and
his successor Iakov Sventislav, through his campaigns in Bulgaria (1261, 1262)
Stephen secured their future cooperation and undoubtedly the control over
the Banate of Severin. Prior to this initiative, as we have already seen, Stephen
carried out negotiations with the Mongols, through the course of which the
prince used his self-assumed sovereign prerogatives to negotiate the spheres of
influence of Hungary and the Golden Horde at the Lower Danube.
Under the circumstances, even though according to a document from
December 5th, 1262, the armed conflict between the king and his heir was
accidental, one might argue that a direct confrontation was inevitable. Duke
Stephen’s decision to extend his authority over the territory between the Tisza
and the Danube triggered an argument over the Fylek fortress,51 which cap-
tains Henrik Preussel and Franco refused to hand over to the young king. This
Hungary” syntagm. At that time Stephen’s royal authority was not acknowledged, and he
remained just an heir prince. Until the Peace Treaty from Bratislava, which acknowledged
him as the “young King of Hungary”, and stipulated his relations to the father king and
was, also, attributed a territory to govern, he would remain, from this juridical point of
view, a king without a kingdom.
46 See also the justification of the privilege given to the Dej colonists (1261): ad regiam perti-
net maiestatem precibus condescendere subditorum ut numerus fidelium augeatur et rega-
lis potentia latius extendatur, cum regis sit proprium in multitudine populi gloriari, DIR II.
497.
47 Ibidem: ad exercitum nostrum venire et nobiscum exercituare teneantur.
48 DIR II. 35, 498 (July 4th, 1261).
49 DIR II. 35, 498, 41.
50 DIR II. 35, 498, 34.
51 Fülek (today’s Filakovo, Slovakia), located in the Neugrad county (KMTL, 227–228) was
one of the fortresses that resisted the Mongol siege of 1241–1242 (Fügedi, Castle and
Society, 45).
76 CHAPTER 3
incident resulted in a clash between the two sides, sometime in October 1262,
most probably close to the aforementioned fortress. Although concluded with
the victory of Stephen, the fortress did not surrender. With the prompt inter-
vention of the Bohemian troops sent by Ottokar II52 to support King Bela,
which threatened to transform this conflict into a civil war, a truce was secured
with the intervention of count Herrandus of Trenčin and magister Ladislas,
Archdean of Hont. The treaty, duly signed by the negotiators of the two par-
ties (Bishop Philip de Vác, and Provosts John of Arad and Benedict of Sibiu)
under the patronage of Archbishops Philip of Esztergom and Smaragdus
of Kalocsa, were concluded in late November 1262 with the peace agree-
ment from Bratislava. The requests made by Prince Stephen were satisfied
almost entirely.
3.3.4 The Peace Treaty of Bratislava

The Bratislava peace agreement marks the military superiority of the heir to
the throne, proven by the rather peaceful approach adopted by King Bela.
More than the complete satisfaction in the matter of the Fylek fortress,53
Stephen was acknowledged the official title of “young King of Hungary, Duke of
Transylvania and Lord of the Cumans”. In addition, his authority was extended
over all the territories of Hungary to the East of the Danube. Without further
dwelling on the details of the complicated juridical system through which they
attempted to manage the relations between the two distinct state formations
created on the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary as a consequence of this
treaty, we will show that in the territory administered by “the young king” the
administrative and juridical structures were similar to the those subordinated
to King Bela and that his court was a copy of his father’s. Also, the Cumans
were placed under his control, and King Bela explicitly assumed the obliga-
tion to never attempt, through any means, to attract them under his command.
On the other hand, Stephen engaged to do the same in regards to the Slavs
in Slavonia and the “Teutons” in the counties of Western Hungary, as well as
the numerous “Bohemians”, largely mercenaries, in the service of King Bela.
The two parties also agreed to never undertake reprisals against the noblemen
and royal servants in the service of the other side and to never prejudice their
52 Annales Pragenses, Gombos, Catalogus, 185; MGH, SS, IX, 178: . . . exercitu transeunte in
Ungariam. . . .
53 In the first document issued at Poroszlo, in December 5th, 1262, Stephen renewed the
provisions of the Peace Treaty of Bratislava as a consequence of receiving into possession
the Fylek fortress.
properties. The salt exploitation and commerce in Transylvania was placed

under the common administration of the two sovereigns.54
Overall, the peace agreement from November 1262 was undoubtedly an
exceptional success for Stephen. His prerogatives became practically similar
to those exerted by the king himself, and the “young king” title was just a for-
mality which did not entail any real subordination. Through his jurisdiction
over the Cumans he became the owner of the greatest army in Hungary, which
granted him a crucial role in the external policy of the country. He also con-
trolled one of the most important economic resources of the kingdom, salt,
since the activity of Bella’s representatives in Transylvania was conditioned by
his good will.
3.3.5 Armed Peace (1263–1264)

The Peace Treaty of Bratislava was deemed inacceptable by King Bela, Queen
Mary and the aristocratic party supporting them, whose undisputed leader
was Palatine Henrik Kőszegi from the Heder kindred. After a year (1263) of
apparent peace, marked by an endemic food crisis that was ravaging through
Central Europe,55 this aristocratic party started a vast diplomatic and propa-
ganda campaign meant to undermine the positions held by Stephen and to
prepare a military retaliation. The aims of the future clash were not limited at
rebuking Stephen and regulating on a new basis the relations between the king
in power and his first born. With the consolidation of the influence exerted by
the Bohemian King Ottokar II Přemysl (a true military and diplomatic tutelage
over the royal court of Buda), King Bela and Queen Mary stated their intention
to disinherit Stephen and leave everything to their second born, Prince Bela.56
Confronted with this new perspective, an important number of Stephen’s fol-
lowers, including the voivode of Transylvania, Ladislas Kán,57 radically recon-
sidered their attitude towards him. They were joined by most of the “loyalist”
social categories, who followed Stephen until then only because he was heir
54 The importance of to salt mines and the ensuing revenues is marked by the fact that one
tenth of the text of the treaty dwells on this issue.
55 Anonymi Leobiensis (Gombos, Catalogus, 273): Hoc anno /1263/ fuit maxima fames per
totam Austriam et Hungariam et Bohemiam et Moraviam, qualis ante raro visa fuit . . .
56 Bornaround 1243, he became duke of Slavonia in 1261. Regarding the intentions of King
Bela see: d. ex. DIR II. 158–162; HD, I/1, 388–391.
57 Ladislas Kán changed his allegiance to King Bela, accompanied by his brother Gyula—
DIR II. 94–95; HD 331–332; DIR II. 101–103; HD 388–391. For more a more comprehensive
list of noblemen rennouncing Stephen’s cause or attempts led by King Bela in order to
attract more supporters from his son’s camp, see: DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332; DIR II. 94–95,
HD 331–332; DIR II. 108–110, HO VIII. 110–113; DIR II. 121–123, HD 344–345 etc.
78 CHAPTER 3
to the throne and the crowned “young king”: the Saxons of Transylvania,58
the Cumans,59 the middle nobility60 and also the members of the Balkan
Commonwealth under his command (including duke Bela of Mačva,61 Czar of
Vidin, Iakov Sventislav62 and the Romanian voivode Litovoi).
Furthermore, King Bela IV exerted his external influence and was offered
more support from his Polish sons-in-law, dukes Boleslav Pudicus of Krakow
and Boleslav the Pious of Gnyezno, and also from Prince Leszek the Black, the
son of Casimir I, duke of Kujawia.63 At the same time, the diplomatic offensive
started by King Bela’s against his son changed the attitude of the Papacy. Before
the 1262 war, Stephen managed to attract the good will of Pope Urban IV.64
After the agreement signed at Bratislava, the Roman Pontiff tried not to take
sides but rather to assume the role of peace guarantor for Kingdom of Hungary.
Thus, after the request of the Pope, King Bela confirmed on August 3rd, 1263
the Peace Treaty of Bratislava, and engaged to never take actions against his son
Stephen and his wife Elisabeth.65 A few months later, on February 2nd, 1264,
Pope Urban IV addressed identical letters to both kings, father and son, asking
them to avoid a civil war at all costs and use their “riches and fortunes” to more
noble purposes, such as helping the Holy Land or reconstructing the churches
destroyed by the Mongols.66 The privilege granted in the same year by Stephen
to the Cistercian Monastery of Cârţa,67 destroyed during the Mongol invasion,
might have been an immediate response to this request in the attempt to win
58 DIR II. 158–162, HD 388–391.

59 DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332.
60 DIR II. 94–95, HD 331–332: “deserting many of our barons and knights, as well as many of
our kingdom’s noblemen.”
61 His brother, Michael, was Stephen’s ally in 1262: DIR, 44–49, HD, 300–303. However, duke
Bela, who pleaded allegiance to the king in office, played an important military role in the
battle of Isaszég, DIR 213–215.
62 For his previous unfaithful acts, which caused the royal campaign of 1266, see: DIR II.
133–135, Jáko 290.
63 DIR II. 82–85, Theiner, I, 284–286. Boleslav V of Krakow (1227–1279) was married (1239)
with Bela’s first born, Kunigunda (born 1224), while Boleslav of Gnyezno was married to
the 7th daughter, Yolanda (1256).
64 Considering he was liable of persecution from his father, Pope Urban IV granted him the
privilege of immunity from excommunication or any other interdict placed on him by
any of the prelates from the Kingdom of Hungary. Renouncing this privilege was one of
the causes of the Bratislava agreement: DIR II. 44–49, HD 300–303.
65 Wenzel VIII 34–35, Theiner I 459; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 208.
66 DIR II. 59–60, Theiner, I 265–266; HD 314–315.
67 DIR II. 55–56, ZW 93–94.
papal favor.68 However, in the summer of the same year, after a new round
of negotiations with King Bela, Pope Urban IV issued two documents endors-
ing his cause. In the first document (July 14, 1264) he berated the Cumans, at
the time still supporting the young king, and threatened them with expulsion
from Hungary if they did not respect the Catholic religious precepts.69 The
second document (July 16, 1264),70 much more significant, was incriminat-
ing Stephen, addressed not as the “young king” or heir to the throne but as
the “King Bela’s firstborn”, for having appropriated a number of Transylvanian
properties belonging to Queen Mary,71 and asked for immediate restitution,
under church penalties. These assets, according to the text of the papal bull,
entered in the possession of Stephen after the Peace Treaty of Bratislava. His
request was based on the shaky argument that the agreement was never signed
by Queen Mary72 and therefore was null and void. Moreover, the church penal-
ties that Stephen was to be subjected were to be decided by Archbishop Philip
of Esztergom and Bishop Omodeus of Györ, both close supporters and promot-
ers of King Bela’s interests. Thus, starting with the summer of 1264, Stephen’s
legitimate rights and the peace agreement from 1262 were no longer endorsed
by the Papacy. Furthermore, Pope Urban IV tacitly approved new armed regu-
lations between the “young king” and his father, and even to a potential debate
regarding the succession to the throne of Hungary.
The diplomatic campaign waged against Stephen reached its climax in
the fall of 1264, with the extravagant marriage of Prince Bela, his brother, to
Kunigunda, daughter of Markgraf Otto III of Brandenburg.73 Organized at
Pottenburg, on October, 7th, 1264, under the generous patronage of the King of
Bohemia, Ottokar II Přemysl, the pomp of the ceremony lasted in the memory
of the contemporaries as a first rank political manifestation.74 According to
68 In this period two ambassadors of Stephen to the Holy See were attested: Joanche,
Archdean of Orăştie, present before the pope in Orvieto, in March, 1264 (DIR II. 60–61,
ZW 90) and priest Stephen of Transylvania, mentioned in the same place the next month
(DIR II. 64, Theiner, I, 267).
69 DIR II. 67–69, HD 317–319.
70 DIR II. 69–70, ZW 92–93, HD 319–320. Jáko 248.
71 Bistriţa (Bistiche), Rodna (Rodona), Jelna (Zolosim), Crainimăt (Querali).
72 “. . . you, under a pact which, without the queen’s consent, was made between you and
the said King /Bela/, your father, you transgressed against justice and own, to the loss and
damage of the said queen, certain villages and landscalled . . . (see supra).”
73 And of Bojena-Beatrix of Boemia, Ottokar II Přemysl’s sister.
74 Anonymi Leobiensis (Gombos, Catalogus, 273): Eodem anno juvenis rex Hungariae Bela
contraxit cum domina filia marchionis Brandenburgensis matrimonium, ob cuius hon-
orem rex Bohemiae Otakerus avunculus suus maximum festum in campo qui Vizze dicitur
80 CHAPTER 3
the Dominican Annals of Vienna, the feast organized on this occasion reunited
no less than 14 princes, all seated on an equal number of especially erected
princely thrones.75 They also must have oferred their allegiance to Prince
Bela. Furthermore, through this marriage Prince Bela overcome his brother by
becoming the protégé of king Ottokar II, whilst Elisabeth of Cuman origin,
Stephen’s wife, did not facilitate any family bonds to the crowned European
families. After these festivities and with all the internal conspiracy against
him, Stephen’s external isolation was nearly complete. The second civil war
was now imminent.
3.3.6 The Second Civil War (1264–1266)

At the time of Prince Bela’s marriage, the general offensive against Stephen was
probably under way. Unlike the previous conflict, this time King Bela IV had
the upper hand, as he relied not only on his obvious military superiority but
also on the edge given by the fact that it was an unexpected move. Aware of his
weaker position and of the fact that he could not gather all his dispersed sup-
porters in due time, Stephen was forced to assume a defensive stance at this
time. Thus, he retreated to Transylvania, hoping he would manage to resist in
this natural fortress until the regrouping of his loyal troops.
His position deteriorated with the problems inside the province (the
Saxon rebellion and the uninvolvement of the local nobility in the first stage
of the conflict) and the insufficient forces to tackle the massive invasion of
royal troops which attacked almost simultaneously from two different direc-
tions. The Cumans, who were now fighting for King Bela, were the first to take
action and established their headquarters on the lower Mureş River, near the
Transylvanian border. Despite the efforts of Ban Alexander of Severin to regain
these territories on behalf of Stephen,76 the Cumans continued their advance
on the Mureş Valley under the command of voivode Ladislas Kán and his
celebravit, vocatis ad hoc multis principibus de partibus diversis, cum quibus expensas fecit
infinitas; Annales Predicatorum Vindobonensium (Gombos, Catalogus, 182, MGH, SS, IX,
728): Bela filius regis Bele de Ungaria duxit filiam marchionis de Brandenburch, quibus rex
Ottakarus fecit maximam sollempnitatem nuptiarum in Vizza, in octava die Mychahelis.
Prince Bela received as gift from his parents the fortresses Moson, Bratislava, Nitra and
Sopron, together with the Vas, Zala, Somogy and Baranya counties (Wenzel, III, 94–98;
Fügedi, Castle and Society, 59; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 208–209), donation confirmed by
the pope (Theiner, I 254–255).
75 Ibidem 14 sedilia structa fuerunt, in quibus tantummodo principibus comederunt, Theiner,
I 254–255.
76 DIR II. 101–103, HD 339–340.
brother Gyula.77 They were met by Stephen himself at Deva,78 but his forces had
already engaged in a series of other confrontations at the time of the Cumans’
entry in Transylvania, with the main royal army corps led by Lawrence, son of
Kemyn, coming from the northwest. Faced with the threat of being encircled,
Stephen was forced to divide his forces and leave the defense of Deva against
the Cuman offensive to the young and brave Peter Csák,79 while Stephen him-
self set off, with part of his men,80 to meet the other invading army. The results
of the confrontations on the two fronts were radically different. While at Deva,
Peter Csák displayed for the first time his brilliant military capabilities, and
managed to win the first conclusive victory of this civil war,81 Stephen failed
to match the more numerous and tenacious army of Lawrence, son of Kemyn.
Consequently, he retreated in the border fortress of Codlea and prepared for
a long siege.
Thus, in the winter 1264/1265, young King Stephen and his followers were
in a critical situation, under tremendous pressure from King Bela and his
allies. While Lawrence, the son of Kemyn, practically controlled the entire
Transylvania, a third royal army led by Princess Anna, Rostislav Mihailovich’s
widow, and her son Bela conquered the Patak fortress and captured Stephen’s
entire family (his wife, Queen Elisabeth, together with the young Prince
Ladislas and his sisters).82 Furthermore, they succeeded in conquering one of
the residences that Stephen inhabited before the war: the Borynka fortress,83
located in the Bereg county. Also, other fortresses defended by the partisans of
the young king, including Fyzer84 in the Abauj county and Temethyn85 in the
Nitra county, were under heavy siege. At the same time, the Vidin Czar Iakov
Sventislav attacked and seemingly conquered Severin86 and voivode Litovoi,
the latter’s associate, raided the territories controlled by the young king.
77 DIR II. 94–95, 101–103; HD 331–333.

78 DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105. KMTL 167.
79 DIR II. 158–162, Jakó 325.
80 Including the Chyl of Câlnic (DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105) and Andrew, the son of Ivancha (DIR
II. 94–95, HD 331–333).
81 DIR II. 158–162, Jáko 325: idem magister Peters ex missione patris nostri sub castro Dewa con-
tra Cumanorum exercitum viriliter dimicavit, quosdam ex eis captivando, quosdam autem
perimendo, triumphalem reportavit victoriam, negotium patris nostri ibi feliciter inchoando.
82 DIR II. 158–162, Jáko 325.
83 Baranka, Ucraina (Ukraine). DIR II. 158–162, Jáko 325.
84 Füzer, cmt. Abauj, Hungary, DIR II. 121–123, ZW 106–107; fortress owned by the Aba: Fügedi,
Castle and Society, 48.
85 Temetvény, cmt. Nitra, Slovakia. Loc. cit.
86 DIR II. 133–135, Jáko 290.
82 CHAPTER 3
Moreover, King Bela’s Polish allies (Boleslaus Pudicus, the duke of Krakow, and
Prince Leszek the Back) started an aggressive offensive against Knez Daniil of
Halych and against his nephew, Swarno, the Knez of Vladimir, two of the few
outside supporters of the young king.87 The only exception to this general may-
hem was Peter Csák, the winner at Deva. Still, he lacked the means to timely
jump to the rescue of the young king besieged in Codlea, which proves that the
royal army led by Lawrence was truly considerable in numbers.
Under the circumstances, the fate of the entire war depended on the Codlea
siege. A capitulation would lead to a general surrender, while a victory would
enable Stephen to change the course of war to his favor. For Stephen, the Codlea
siege—which he called, a few years later, a “place of death and misery”88—was
a true turning point and a real test. Also, it was a very severe test of loyalty
for all the barons, knights and soldiers. Stephen would never forget those who
remained faithful to him in those critical moments.
All odds were against the young king when the siege started. Deserted by
many of his barons and knights, with no support from the local nobility,89
Stephen seemed to have completely lost faith in his own strength and in
victory.90 According to his later testimony (1268), “outside of God, I barely had
faith in people”.91 Among those who remained close to him from the begin-
ning of the siege were Alexander, an nobleman with vast properties around
Buda, and leader of his own army corps (involved in the Bulgarian cam-
paigns92), count Ponyth Miskolc, remarkable warlord and diplomat, member
87 Initiated in 1265, through Boleslav of Krakow’s campaign in the territories owned by
Swarno, the Polish-Halych confrontations continued throughout the next year. In the
decisive battle of Zawychost (June, 2nd, 1266), Leszek the Black defeated and killed
Roman (Vasilko), the brother of Knez Daniil—Rocznyk Małopolski (MPH, III, 171), Rocznik
Franciszkański Krakowski (MPH, III, 48), Boguphali . . . Chronicon Poloniae (MPH, III, 592),
Rocznik Świçtokrzyski (MPH, III, 75), MPH, III, 308. The Polish protagonists of this conflict
are mentioned as allies of King Bela in the text of the Agreement from the Rabbits Island
(March, 23rd, 1266). At the same time, Stephen’s preference for the Bereg county, where
he had his winter residence in 1263–1264, explains his ties to Halych.
88 DIR II. 108–110, HO VIII. 110–113 (locu mortis et miseriae).
89 “deserting us and hunting many of our barons and knights, as well as all the noblemen
of our kingdom” (DIR II. 94–95; HD 331–332: dereliquentibus et deserentibus pluribus bar-
onibus nostris et militibus et omnibus nobilibus regni nostri); see also DIR II. 146, CD V/1.
238–241.
90 DIR II. 91–92, RA 1873: “he believed he would not resist in against his enemies and the
troops of his father who chased him” (Ladislas IV).
91 DIR II. 108–110.
92 DIR II. 101–103.
of one of the oldest aristocratic families in Hungary,93 Cosma, son of count

Cosma of the Gutkeled kindred;94 count Mykud and his two sons, Mykud
and Emerich of the Kökényes-Radnót kindred,95 John and Stephen, the sons
of count Gwd, Slavonian noblemen,96 Dominic and Thomas brothers, of the
Csák kindred,97 the four sons of Mykud, nobleman of Kachuz,98 Jacob, the
son of count Emerich99 and Andrew, the son of Ivancha,100 one of the bravest
knights ever to serve the young king. Stephen was also joined by the nobles
from the territories East of Tisza, which he controlled starting from 1260:
magister Thomas, the son of magister Gabriel, with properties in the Ugocsa
county,101 and Alexander, the son of Durugh,102 brothers Peter and Jacob,
Bihor castle servants.103 Furthermore, some of the noblemen of Transylvania
offered their support: count Chyl of Câlnic,104 Teel, son of Ebl of Braşov,105
count Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus106 and his suite, courtiers and other men
of inferior rank: count Demetrius, son of Andrew, and the personal servant of
Stephen,107 Thomas, later the count of the royal beaters,108 Dominic, the son
of Andronikos, of modest origin (de populi castri Zaladiensis), and servant in
the young king’s treasury109 and Marcel, the son of Jacob, Vasvár fortress serf
and veteran of the Bulgarian campaigns.110 Shortly after Stephen’s refuge to
Codlea with his few followers, the fortress was attacked by an army vanguard
led by Conrad, brother of Lawrence, son of Kemyn. Determined to take advan-
tage of the general confusion among Stephen’s men and to end their resistance
with a decisive blow, Conrad tried to storm the fortress but was stopped at
93 DIR II. 108–110, 133–135.

94 DIR II. 112, HD 326.
95 DIR II. 213–215, Jáko 368.
96 DIR II. 148, HD 368–369.
97 DIR II. 146.
98 DIR II. 147, Zichy I. 28–32.
99 DIR II. 127, HD 345–346.
100 D IR II. 94–95.
101 D IR II. 166–167, Zichy I. 34–35.
102 D IR II. 91–92.
103 D IR II. 105–106, Csáki 1/1. 10.
104 D IR II. 118–119, ZW 105, Jakó 276.
105 D IR II. 135–136, ZW 110–111.
106 D IR II. 117–118. Gyog, Gyogh superior, today Stremţ, Alba county, acc. to Jáko, 391.
107 D IR II. 121–123, HD 344–345.
108 D IR II. 136; Wenzel VIII. 341–343 (comes liscianorum nostrorum).
109 in officiis tavarnicorum, DIR II. 126–127, Wenzel VIII, 306–308.
110 D IR II. 107–108, CD IV/3. 468–469.
84 CHAPTER 3
the gates by the men of Alexander, the Ban of Severin.111 Consequently, the
royal army started the siege, despite the unfavorable conditions characteristic
for the upcoming cold season, which, at least at the beginning, put additional
stress on the defenders.
The defenders’s ranks were growing thin by the day.112 According to later
documents issued by Stephen to credit his men, the night and day watches
were very hard to bear.113 Due to physical exhaustion, wounds and difficulty in
obtaining supplies, the besieged were at least once very close to capitulating.
The fact that they did not surrender was due to chance as the young king asked
to negotiate his surrender directly with his father, and the emissary he sent
with the message of repentance, Dominic, son of Andrew, was captured by
Lawrence, the son of Kemyn, who “tortured him bitterly”.114 This episode seems
to have been the only attempt to initiate negotiations. On the other hand, it is
hard to believe that the negotiations with Lawrence, the son of Kemyn, whom
Stephen would long regard as one of his greatest enemies,115 would have ended
up well. Stephen’s thoughts of a potential capitulation eventually diminished
as news arrived of partisans from everywhere coming to the rescue.
One of the first to offer help was magister Pous and his brother Dominic,
who broke the encirclement and managed to enter the fortress accompanied
by several supporters of the young king.116 The most consistent support came
from Peter Csák who, after his victory in Deva, ran a real tour de force to provide
his sovereign with priceless services. While heading towards the Bereg county,
home to many of Stephen’s loyalists, he managed to reconquer (at the end of
a bloody siege) the Borynka fortress.117 From these positions, in parallel with
recruiting soldiers, he negotiated with barons who were unhappy with King
111 D IR II. 101–103.

112 We know, for instance, that Paul of Kachyz was killed during the siege, and that his
brother Gaal received a hand wound, DIR II. 147. Also, the sons of count Gwd, John and
Stephen were injured, DIR 148. Additional numerous losses of ordinary troops remained
unrecorded in the sources.
113 “the night and day guards (nocturnis et diurnis vigiliis)”, DIR II. 94–95; HD 331–332. See
also: DIR II. 91–92, 105–106.
114 D IR II. 121–123, HD 334–335 (graviter fuit tormentatus ab eodem).
115 D IR II. 121–123, HD 334–335 (Laurentius filius Kemyn, qui /. . ./ vitam nostram extinguere
cupiebat); DIR II. 94–95, Jakó 262 (persecutorem et maiorem inimicum nostrum et nostro-
rum); DIR II. 103–105, Jakó 267 (maiore persecutore nostro et inimico).
116 D IR II. 96–97, HD 335–336.
117 D IR II. 158–162.
Bela’s party, and managed to obtain the release of Stephen’s wife and children.118
Also, upon his return to Transylvania, accompanied by his brother Matthew, at
the head of an allegedly numerous army, he brought the Saxon territories back
to order. Lastly, he reached the Codlea fortress and started a series of harassing
operations targeting the assailants.119 Thus, probably around the early winter
of 1264–1265, the military balance started tilting in Stephen’s favor once again.
Even though his forces were inferior to those of Lawrence, as time went by
the assailant became the besieged in an increasingly hostile province. At this
moment, Stephen decided it was time for decisive action.
According to Stephen’s later testimony, in the battle waged at the foot of the
Codlea fortress, the decisive role was played by the artful diversion created by
count Ponyth Miskolc,120 who seemingly simulating a desertion, came down
to the enemy’s camp together with some of his loyal followers and, “searching
their will and minds, handed them to us / King Stephen, n. n. / for sentencing
and death penalty”.121 Thus, he “won through both strength and sharpness of
mind against the army of infidel barons”.122 Most likely, inside the assailing
camp, count Ponyth gave the signal for the start of the battle, at which time
Stephen’s knights made their impetuous charge spreading panic among the
royal troops. Andrew, the son of Ivancha, was in the first line and lanced the ban-
ner bearer and other two knights, and then, he speared Lawrence and took him
prisoner.123 Furthermore, Alexander, son of Durugh, speared a knight and
took eighteen more prisoners whom he brought before the king “like cattle or
calves”,124 and Ban Alexander of Severin speared and stabbed numerous ene-
mies, many others “brought defeated and tied up”.125 Thus, the entire Codlea
battle seems to have been a mere cavalry charge.126 The intervention of the
118 D IR II. 158–162. However, it was possible that this episode occurred after the Codlea vic-
tory, perhaps in the spring of 1265, see also: DIR II. 133–135; Jakó 290.
119 D IR II. 133–135; Jakó 290.
120 D IR II. 108–110, 133–135.
121 D IR II. 108–110.
122 D IR II. 133–135 (tam per potentiam, quam per astutiam suam devicit exercitum baronum
infidelium).
123 D IR II. 94–95.
124 D IR II. 91–92, 103–105; ZW 100–102: quemadmodum boves seu vitulos.
125 D IR II. 101–103.
126 The presence of serfs or other ordinary soldiers was not recorded in any of the royal diplo-
mas (unlike other battles during the same civil war). The merit of victory seems to go to
the knights only. Also see: DIR II. 96–97, 118–119, 121–123, 146, 213–215.
86 CHAPTER 3
troops led by brothers Peter and Matthew Csák,127 which cut the assailants’
retreat, completed the victory and secured an unusual number of prisoners.
Through the Codlea victory and the prior endeavors of magister Peter Csák,
King Stephen regained control over the entire Transylvania and the counties
to its Northwest (Sătmar, Bereg, Ung, Maramureş), which had always been his
strongest possessions.128 Nonetheless, the other counties to the East of Tisza,
including Bihor and Arad, were still under King Bela’s authority.129 This victory
led to a significant growth of supporters, including some noblemen who cau-
tiously waited for the outcome of the battle before taking action.130 At any rate,
after the exhausting campaign of 1264, most of the following year was calm,
with the exception of a weak attack from the Cumans of King Bela. They were
led in battle by a certain Menk, but they did not pose any real threat to Emerich
Kökényes-Radnót and the Mykud brothers who fought back their attack with-
out difficulty.131 It is still unknown whether the undeclared armistice between
the two parties occurred after the alarming news coming from the Lower
Danube, where the Mongols of Nogai mounted a new threat. According to
another possible scenario King Bela was expecting the Mongol aggression to
seize the opportunity to launch, with the help of his Western allies, a massive
offensive against Transylvania and to disguise it as an honorable crusade. In
favor of the second theory seems to plead the desertion of Nicholas Sceuke, the
son of count Thomas. He betrayed Stephen and stole 300 silver marks desig-
nated by the young king to finance an embassy to the Mongols.132 On the other
hand, King Bela obtained from the new Pope Clement IV, on June 25th 1265,
the proclamation of an anti-Mongol Crusade in Hungary, Bohemia, Poland and
the Brandenburg margraviate, all the countries whose sovereigns had joined
127 D IR II. 158–162.

128 In October, 31st, 1265, Stephen would issue a document at Beltiug (Beltuk), in the Sătmar
county—DIR II. 78, CD IV/3 296–297.
129 D IR II. 74–75, HO VI 130–132 (April, 16th, 1265), donated by King Bela to the two servants
of the Provost of Arad, for their military services; DIR II. 76–77, CD IV/3 263–265 (October,
17th, 1265) confirmation by Bela of a donation of Bishop Zosyma of Oradea October, 12th,
the same year.
130 Among others a count Peter, owner of a fortress in the Gömör county, with his servients
(DIR II. 111–112) and the Transylvanians Peter and Iacob of Gerend (DIR II. 124–125, HO VI
166–167), members of the Gutkeled and Monoszló kindreds, see infra.
131 D IR II. 213–215, ZW 137–139, Jáko 294. Probably during the spring of 1265.
132 D IR II. 108–110, HO VIII. 110–113: Stephen himself accuses him of betrayal and of the intent
to make his negotiations with the Mongols impossible.
forces against the young king in 1264.133 Irrespective of King Bela’s intent, the
specter of the Mongol threat was warded off by Stephen via the diplomatic ser-
vices of the same Count Ponyth Miskolc, who, once again, displayed wonderful
negotiating skills.134
Stephen’s new diplomatic success in his relations with the Golden Horde
left Bela with no other alternative but to continue the civil war. The army sent
in the fall of 1265 against his son was this time commanded by the former
ban of Transylvania, Ernye Akos, who was very familiar with the terrain and
also an experimented military commander. This time Stephen was not caught
unprepared. The troops of the young king, led by Count Ponyth Miskolc135 and
brothers Peter and Matthew Csák136 (Stephen did not participate in the battle)
surprised Ban Ernye somewhere in the vicinity of Tisza and gained a conclu-
sive victory. The heroes of this battle were Egidius Monoszló, Andrew, the son
of Ivancha,137 Peter Csák, who was badly injured,138 and Mykud Kökényes-
Radnót, who captured the commander of the royal army.139
The victory against Ernye Akos was probably the decisive factor that drove
Stephen to take the initiative and prepare the final assault on the capital. After
the preparation and general mobilization of the two sides, Stephen advanced
towards Buda, with all the armed men he could gather.140 The decisive bat-
tle, one of the most significant for the knighthood of this time, was waged
in Isaszeg, not far from the capital of the kingdom. Initially, the numerically
superior army of King Bela, under the nominal command of “young Duke
Bela”141 but led in the field by Henrik Kőszegi, seconded by Henrik Preussel,
133 Not mentioned in the text of the papal bull, which also raises some questions—DIR II.
75–76, HD 324.
134 He also paid for the mission, which points to the financial difficulties that Stephen was
facing (DIR II. 108–110, 133–135).
135 D IR II. 108–110, 133–135.
136 D IR II. 158–162.
137 D IR II. 94–95.
138 “Lanced and cut with the sword”, DIR 158–162.
139 D IR II. 119–120.
140 Even though 1265, is the date generally admitted for the battle of Isaszég, it remains highly
unlikely to be the correct one considering the incredible amount of major operations
occuring between October 1264–March 1265. Moreover, Wenzel VIII 200–201 (DIR II.
111–112) makes it obvious that the war consisted of two stages, separated by an apparent
peace.
141 Generally identified with duke Bela of Mačva—son of Knez Rostislav Mihailovich and
Dutchess Anna, the daughter of King Bela IV—based on the information contained in a
document issued by Ladislas IV in 1279, ZW 137–139, DIR II. 213–215.
88 CHAPTER 3
commander of the Buda fortress, managed to gain the upper hand. The royal
cavalry142 charged and pierced the light cavalry and the pedestrian army of
Stephen (led by Transylvanian voivode Nicholas Gutkeled143 and the new
magister tavernicorum, Egidius Monoszló144) and headed towards Stephen
himself, in an attempt to capture or kill him. One of the attackers broke his
lance against the young king’s saddle fender and was then killed by Stephen’s
lance.145 With the intervention of the knights in Stephen’s immediate entou-
rage, notably Alexander, son of Durugh146 and Mykud Kökényes-Radnót,147 the
attack was pushed back. A devastating counterattack ensued (led by Ponyth
Miskolc,148 Peter Csák,149 Ban Alexander of Severin,150 count Chyl de Câlnic,151
magister Pous,152 the sons of count Gwd153 and obviously Andrew, the son of
Ivancha154) which eventually brought the young king the victory. As a result,
Palatine Henrik Kőszegi was taken prisoner together with his two sons,155 the
famous Austrian captain Henrik Preussel lost his life,156 and young duke Bela
fled from the battlefield.157 This time, for old King Bela IV the defeat was
complete.
142 D IR II. 124–125, HO VI 166–167, speaks about the “violent power of the attack”.
143 D IR II. 108–109, CD IV/3 468–469. On this occasion, the following were injured: Marcel,
son of Jacob, Vasvár fortress serf, Peter and Jacob, Bihor fortress serfs (DIR II. 105–106) and
brothers Peter and Jacob of Gerend (DIR II. 124–125, HO VI. 166–167).
144 R A 1901 a (with text).
145 D IR II. 103–105, ZW 100–102: Et cum quidam miles insignis cum lancea vexillata irruisset in
nos et lanceam suam in par[ura] selle nostre fregisset, qui tamen per hastam nostram suc-
cubuit in momento . . .
146 D IR II. 103–105, ZW 100–102.
147 D IR II. 119–120.
148 D IR II. 108–110, 133–135.
149 D IR II. 158–162; despite the wounds he received in the battle with Ban Ernye, indicating
the relative close succession of the two confruntation.
150 D IR II. 101–103.
151 D IR II. 118–119.
152 D IR II. 96–97.
153 D IR II. 148.
154 D IR II. 94–95, Jakó 262: ipse non ultmis sed primus et etiam prima et prior lancea sua fuit . . .
155 D IR II. 94–95, 103–105. One of them, John, was apprehended by magister Pous (DIR II.
96–97).
156 D IR II. 158–162, 213–215.
157 D IR II. 158–162.
3.3.7 The Treaty of 1266

Despite the Isaszég victory, the peace agreement from March 23, 1266 was far
from being a dictate given by the young king. Both sides were moderate in their
claims partly due to the exhaustion installed after a long and bloody civil war,
but also because the treaty did not take into account the personal animosities
inside the royal family, and was just a regulation of the relations between the
two aristocratic parties that financed and waged the war. The text of the treaty158
was promulgated by the two parties under the warranty of Archbishop Philip
of Esztergom and confirmed by Pope Clement IV on June 22, 1266.159 Mainly
the agreement regulated the juridical relations between the two Hungarian
dominia and especially between the two kings and the barons and noblemen
who had opted for the other’s party. The political relations between regnum
Belae and regimen Stephani, the only terminological distinction suggesting
Stephen’s formal subordination,160 and the territorial delimitation of the two
kingdoms (mainly confined to the borders agreed in 1262) were the object of
later negotiations. Learning from his previous experience, Stephen took all the
necessary precautions this time around: the old King Bela undertook the obli-
gation to have the treaty ratified by Queen Mary, Duke Bela and Princess Ana,
thus eliminating all possible future challenges. Also, the document confirmed
the new administrative powers of Queen Elisabeth over the territories East
of Danube which she seized during the civil war as an “heir’s right” from her
mother-in-law, Queen Mary.161 Furthermore, the barons and noblemen who
owned properties located in the part of the kingdom owned by the opposing
side were granted a special status. As part of the pact, they received not only
a formal ownership warranty, as stipulated by the 1262 treaty, but also com-
plete immunity. Their domains were exempt from any dues and obligations
and were no longer subject to the royal obligation of accommodation. These
exemptions were enacted by the sovereign who ruled over the respective part
of the kingdom, but as the administrations of the two kings could only exert
their attributions in the counties subordinated to them, these domains gained,
in fact, complete autonomy. These provisions lay at the basis of the excep-
tional status of the properties owned by the Csák and Gutkeled kindreds in the
Western part of the kingdom and those owned by the Geregye kindred in the
Eeastern side. Moreover, to a certain extent, the barons and noblemen from
the two camps were encouraged to seek new allegiances while the two kings
158 D IR II. 82–85, Theiner I 284–287.

159 D IR II. 88–90, Theiner I 284–287.
160 No such distinction was made in the text of the Peace Treaty of Bratislava.
161 D IR II. 72–73, HD 327.
90 CHAPTER 3
showed a more tolerant attitude towards the aristocracy. Even though enforc-
ing these provisions raised a series of issues, (King Stephen only enforced them
on inherited domains, and seized from the “infidels” the properties he himself
had granted162) they survived the juridical system of the kingdom, and were
reiterated in the “Constitution of the noblemen” from 1267.
Overall, from Stephen’s point of view, the 1266 victory reconfirmed his status
of associate sovereign and heir to the crown of Hungary and also deterred his
brother Bela from being designated as such. Nonetheless, the vast properties
owned by the latter (which enabled full control over the Transdanubian part of
the kingdom since 1264)—as well as his princely statute and the internal and
external support he enjoyed were serious threats for Stephen at the time of the
succession.
3.4 Political and Social Change
3.4.1 Duke Stephen and Transylvania

During 1260–1270, the young king of Hungary did not have a permanent resi-
dence. Until 1266 (the year when the second civil war ended and also when
Stephen’s only outside supporter, Knez Daniil of Halych, passed away) he seems
to have favored the counties in Northeastern Hungary, near the Ruthenian bor-
der. Thus, on July 4th, 1261, the young king was in Sălacea (Zoloch),163 a locality
colonized by Germans who enjoyed special privileges granted by him,164 in
February 1263 he was in Oradea,165 and in the months of April and May in
Patak166 and the Szakolyi (Zokol) Monastery, in the Nógrád county.167 Stephen
and his court, including Bishop Zosyma of Oradea,168 spent the Christmas of
1263, somewhere in the Bereg county (probably at Baranka). In the summer
of 1264169 he retreated to Transylvania in order to prepare the war against his
father. Eventually, on October 31st, 1265, after overcoming the critical stage
of the second civil war, Stephen issued a document in Beltiug (Beltuk),170 in
162 D IR II. 96–97, HD 335–336; DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105.

163 D IR II 35; Zichy I 11–12.
164 D IR II 33–34; ZW 26; HD 296–297.
165 R A 1798.
166 R A 1800.
167 R A 1801.
168 D IR II 58–59; Zichy I 12–13.
169 After June 22nd, when his presence is recorded in Sáros, RA 1833 a.
170 D IR II 78; CD IV/3 296–297.
the Sătmar county. Even though during the second civil war Queen Elisabeth,
accompanied by her children,171 sought refuge inside the walls of the Patak
fortress, a number of clues indicate that Satu Mare was in fact her permanent
residence. The royal estates in this county were her property,172 and the par-
ish priest of Satu Mare, Egidius, was also the chaplain of the young queen.173
Following Sălacea and Dej, Satu Mare entered under Stephen’s protection, and
the young king encouraged the Germans to colonize it. The new colonists were
granted broader administrative and judicial autonomy. In exchange, they had
the obligation to participate in wars and fight in his army.174
After his victory in the second civil war, Stephen covered a greater area, but
he continued to dwell mainly in the Northwestern counties.175 These regions,
and mostly the hunting grounds of Maramureş, remained among his favorites
even after his crowning in 1270. It was here that King Stephen V spent the last
winter holiday (1271–1272).176
Stephen’s presence in Transylvania was rather sporadic, except for the criti-
cal period of the second civil war. The references he made during the Codlea
siege seem to indicate that he considered Transylvania a rather unattractive
and remote province, located too far from Hungary. It is still possible that he
may have inspected his “Duchy” in 1261 and occasionally in the next two years.
As for the period that followed the second civil war, there is no evidence regard-
ing his presence in this province. His temporary residences must have included
mainly the localities that benefited from a status similar to Sătmar and Sălacea,
such as Dej, and Cluj, a royal property colonized with German settlers around
1261.177 The same category of “safe” havens also included, for instance, Bonţida,
which Stephen donated to one of his close men who initiated a similar
171 D IR II 158–162; HD 388–391.

172 D IR II 72–73; HD 327.
173 D IR II 70–71; CD VI/2 388–389.
174 D IR II 33–34, 497; ZW 26 (cca. 1261). In 1271, after the coronation of Stephen, the Satmar
colonists would become the beneficiaries of more new privileges, DIR II 137–139; CD IV/3
206–208.
175 Sáros, July 1267 (RA 1865); Ugocsa, August 1267 (RA 1866); Patak, December 1267 (RA 1874)
and 1268 (RA 1886).
176 D IR II 145, HD 360–361 (December, 31st, 1271); DIR II 147, CD V/1 210–211 (in Maramorisio,
January, 6th, 1272). February, 9th–10th, the king was in Sáros (RA 2154–55).
177 The only information regarding this colonization appears in assume that the colonists
from Cluj received privileges similar to the ones in Salacea, Sătmar and Dej, but at a later
date.
92 CHAPTER 3
colonization program in 1263,178 and Dăbâca, the fortress permanently under

the control of the dignitaries most trusted by the king.
3.4.2 Royal Court

If in the years that followed the installation of Stephen in Transylvania the
political and administrative structures under his command largely included
people loyal to King Bela, after 1266 the young king would only tolerate bar-
ons and noblemen whose loyalty he verified during the confrontations with
his father. Thus, many of the officials mentioned in this age were outstanding
veterans from the civil war: Ponyth Miskolc (Ban of Severin until around 1266,
would later become count of Dăbâca179), Mykud Kökényes-Radnót, count of
Dăbâca, and his son (who became the Ban of Severin), Andrew, Ivancha’s son
(of unquestionable loyalty to Stephen, with whom he served since the great
Mongol invasion180), received the position of “gatekeeper” (ianitor) of his
court,181 Alexander, the son of Durugh (would become the permanent count
of Szabolcs), and the other Alexander (who would also exert, in various inter-
vals, the position of Ban of Severin). The great number of Severin bans men-
tioned during Stephen’s reign (Lawrence, son of Kemyn, Alexander, Ponyth
Myskolc, Mykud Kökényes-Radnót, Jula, and Ugrinus Csák) might indicate a
limited interest shown by the aristocracy for this function in the province. On
the other hand, the palatines were selected from the young king’s very small
inner circle. Even though in 1266 the function of palatine (associated to that
of counts of Bács and Sibiu) was exerted by Dominic (from the Csák kindred),182
in 1268 it was given to Benedict, who was at the same time the royal court judge
and the count of Sibiu.183 In fact, this was not the only time when the palatine
and royal court judge offices were held by the same person (the same happen
in 1262, unfortunately the name remains unknown). In 1264–1266, Baas, count
of Gömör, was the royal court judge, position he might have held until the year
1270.184 In 1265 we find Lawrence, the former voivode of Transylvania185 as
the treasurer of King Stephen but later that year the royal finances would be
entrusted to Egidius Monoszló.
178 D IR II 52; HO V 40.

179 D IR II 108–110 (1267).
180 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 191; CD IV/2. 54.
181 D IR II 94–95.
182 D IR II 90; Wenzel VIII 147–148.
183 D IR II 113.
184 D IR II 70–71, CD VI/2 388–389; DIR II 91, CD IV/3 322–330.
185 D IR II 73.
The members of the Monoszló kindred were in fact Stephen’s great favorites
and were entrusted responsibilities of foremost importance at his court. Their
unique rise became more obvious in the years that followed the second civil
war, and it was all the more outstanding because the Monoszló kindred, origi-
nally from Baranya county, was not a part of the high aristocracy. If the name of
the family had a certain resonance in 13th century Hungary, it was undoubtedly
due to the merits of Ban Thomas Monoszló, who participated in the crusade
led by King Andrew II (1217–1218) and to the expeditions against Halych. The
son of Ban Thoma, Gregory (II) Monoszló, was married to a Bő kindred noble
woman and held the position of count of Caraş in 1255,186 which must have
included him among the protagonists of the Balkan campaigns for the sup-
port of Rostislav Mihailovich. Count Gregory and his sons’ military merits were
again highlighted during the second stage of the 1264–1266 civil war, during
which time the members of the Monoszló kindred contributed to the victory
of the young king.187 Not surprisingly, after 1267, the leader of the family would
be entrusted the position of Judge of the Cumans,188 a very important office
from the perspective of the balance of forces between the two belligerents.
Even though later this position lost all importance and was merged with
that of palatine, during the time of internal division, its holder was in charge
with the difficult mission to keep the Cumans under control and to prevent
them from making an alliance with the aristocracy loyal to King Bela. We have
already seen how the authority gained by the young king through the Peace
Treaty of Bratislava over the Cumans was growing unstable and in 1264–1265
they not only deserted him in his crucial confrontation with his father, but
even fought against him. The peace signed on the Rabbits Island failed to
automatically bring the Cumans under the rule of the young king,189 despite
his efforts to bring them back to order with the help of Egidius Monoszló.190
Stephen tried to infiltrate his trustees among the Cumans,191 but the return of
186 János Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek a XIV század közepéig, (Budapest, 1900),
834–835.
188 Attested in 1269: Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 834–835; HO VII 115.
189 From the second part of 1266 to the start of 1268 the dominus Cumanorum office was not
included in Stephen’s title, see Imre Szentpétery, “István ifjabbkirálysága”, in Századok, LV
1–5 (1921): 82.
191 In 1266, Stephen granted his trustee count Parabuch, with the consent of Khan Keyran,
their leader, the ownership of Cuman domains in the Borchol family—DIR II 81–82;
Ortvay 3–4; RA 1856, 1876. Those properties were initially given to the Cumans by King
Bela.
94 CHAPTER 3
the Cumans under his authority, probably one of the political consequences
of the great congregation of 1267, needed to be guaranteed by the creation of a
royal office that would scrutinize them closely.
While the appointment of count Gregory (II) Monoszló as Cuman judge
seems to have occurred sometime before the end of 1267, the rise of his three
sons (of ages close to that of King Stephen) started soon after the second civil
war. Thus, the appointment of Egidius Monoszló as Stephen’s treasurer was
already a fact at the time of the Isaszég battle (1266),192 and Gregory (III)
Monoszló’s instatement as the treasurer of Queen Elisabeth (although attested
only a few years later193) might have occurred on the same occassion. Thus,
the two brothers would hold the responsibility for the royal finances until
the death of their protector. Furthermore, the youngest son of the family,
Peter Monoszló, whom his father destined to an ecclesiastic career, became
Stephen’s chancellor from 1266,194 and in 1270 he was invested, through royal
decree, as Bishop of Transylvania.
3.4.3
The other three predecessors of Peter Monoszló at the head of the young king’s
chancellery (people with sound ecclesiastic education, belonging to some of
the most important families), learned all there was to know about the royal
court and royal politics from their positions as vice-chancellor, and afterwards
took on ecclesiastic careers at the head of the Archbishopric of Esztergom. The
fact that they would successively lead the most important Archbishopric of
Hungary for a quarter of a century (1274–1298), underlines the remarkable influ-
ence exerted by the generation crystallized around Stephen V on the futures of
the kingdom during the late Arpadian period. Stephen’s first vice-chancellor,
in his service since the time he was the duke of Styria,195 was a certain Benedict
from the county of Zala (where he and his family ruled over a number of prop-
erties and servants196). Between 1260 and 1263, Benedict exerted, in parallel,
the position of Provost of Sibiu. In 1263, after receiving the approval of the
Archbishop of Esztergom, Benedict became the Provost of Arad. His new posi-
tion was subordinated to the Archbishop of Esztergom (who also held the
192 R A 1901 a.
193 In 1272: DIR II 149–150, ZW 116–117. There is no prior reference to this position.
194 Vicecancellarius, the title of chancellor formally belonged to Archbishop Kalocsa.
195 He was attested as notary of the throne’s heir since 1258 but he might have held the office
for a longer period of time: Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 191; Wenzel VII. 486: . . . fratres magistri
Benedicti, Notarii aulae karissimi filii nostri regis Stephani.
196 D IR II. 74–75; HO VI. 130–132.
honorary title of chancellor of King Bela). Furthermore, being the vice-chancel-

lor of the young king subordinated him to the Archbishop of Kalocsa, the offi-
cial holder of the chancellery. His allegiance to the Archbishop of Esztergom,
taken once he became the head of the Arad provost, clearly reflected Benedict’s
limited freedom.197 At the outbreak of the second civil war, he was forced to
choose between the loyalty to his senior and his duty to the Church, since Pope
Urban IV openly expressed his support to King Bela. It is not surprising that
under the circumstances Benedict abandoned Stephen in 1264,198 forcing him
to find another vice-chancellor. This time around, the young king selected from
a pool of young candidates who, although belonging to the ecclesiastic order,
would not hold any other functions that could interfere with his authority.
Under the circumstances, Lodomerius became the new vice-chancellor, and
later one of the most prominent Archbishops of Esztergom (1279–1298). The
issue of his origin constitutes yet another controversy. His alleged kinship to
the Monoszló kindred199 seems difficult to prove. Furthermore, his tight rela-
tions with the Borsa kindred, to whom he owed his rise to higher aristocracy,
seem to be due to family ties. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that this
family of local importance, and of a modest condition around the year 1260,
had the means to support him to become the Canon of the Veszprém church
(1257–1260), and to finance his studies in Bologna (circa 1260–1263). Thus the
origins of Lodomerius should be investigated among the aristocratic families
related through an alliance with the Borsa kindred, whose representatives
were on the young king’s side, after 1265. Lodomerius exerted the attributions
of prime chancellor for no more than two years (1264–1266), but this proved to
be the most critical period of Stephen’s reign. Under the circumstances, it was
natural for the young king to reward him for his service. In 1266, Lodomerius
was instated as Bishop of Oradea, position that remained vacant after the
death of Bishop Zosymas (1265), but he received the confirmation for his posi-
tion (most probably due to King Bela’s opposition) only in 1268.
197 He was fully subordinated to the Archbishop of Strigoniu, except for his potential actions
against his own order, most likely the Dominican: DIR II 50; CD IV/3: 164–165.
198 Benedict’s decision was undoubtedly imposed by the circumstances. Stephen was able to
understand the situation and after his coronation in 1270, he appointed again the Provost
of Arad as vice-chancellor of the royal court.
199 János Karácsonyi, “A merges vipera és az antimonialis. Korkép Kun László király idejéböl,
in Századok 44 (1910): 1–24.
96 CHAPTER 3
Eventually, Peter Monoszló’s immediate predecessor as the chancellor of

the young king was Nicholas Kán, Provost of Alba Iulia,200 who honored his
loyalty to the young king, as opposed to the rest of his family. Making good use
of his reputation before Stephen, in 1267 he managed to regain some of the
Transylvanian properties which belonged to his great-grandfather, Ban Gyula
Kán.201 Nonetheless, his term as chancellor was short,202 indicating most likely
a provisional solution.
3.4.4 The voivodes of Transylvania

Sources are rather scarce regarding the first voivode of Transylvania at the
time of Stephen’s Duchy, Ladislas (I) Kán (1261–1264/65). It is known that at
the time he played a military role in the Bulgarian campaigns, supporting
Iakov Sventislav.203 In 1264, together with his brother Gyula, he convinced
the Cumans to swap sides to King Bela and as their leader, initiated the first
military action against the young king during the second civil war. After being
defeated at Deva by Peter Csák’s army, the brothers Ladislas and Gyula Kán
seem to no longer have any contribution to the history of the conflict. It is how-
ever beyond any doubt that the Kán brothers owned considerable property in
Transylvania, some recovered in 1267, as pointed out earlier, by Nicholas Kán,
Gyula’s son. The origin of these domains went as far as the early 13th century,
when their grandfather, Ban Gyula, was also voivode.204 More estates were
obtained by the Kán brothers during their presence in Transylvania: in 1263,
Gyula was granted by King Stephen a massive number of properties in Alba
county and near the border with the Sibiu province205 and we can assume that
Ladislas, as voivode, must have benefited from royal munificence. Even though
many of these properties were undoubtedly confiscated by Stephen after the
‘treason’ (1264), Nicholas Kán’s presence in his entourage and also the fact that
he was the Provost of the Alba Iulia chapter enabled him to safeguard some of
the Transylvanian properties of his family.
200 The first mention 1265: DIR II 71–72; HO VI 134–135. He came to Transylvania and assumed
this position probably during Ladislas Kán (1260–1264).
201 D IR II 97–98; ZW 528. Nicholas is the son of Jula (Gyula) Kán, the brother of voivode
Ladislas.
202 Mentioned only once, in 1266: DIR II 90; Wenzel VIII 147–148. He was named cancellarius.
203 D IR II 124–125; Jakó 284.
204 In the years 1201, 1214: KMTL 193. His properties included terra Obruth—DIR II 139;
ZW 111–112.
205 D IR II 51–52; ZW I 89–90.
In addition, Ladislas’ successor, Nicholas Gutkeled (1265–1270), belonged

to a powerful aristocratic kindred. Stephen Gutkeled’s son, Nicholas, former
palatine, Ban of Slavonia and Governor of Styria, had been a petty Kalnik
count (Croatia, 1262–1264), before changing allegiance in favor of Stephen dur-
ing the second civil war. In addition to commanding the Transylvanian army
in the Isaszég battle, he also held, just like his predecessor, major responsi-
bilities in organizing the Bulgarian campaigns.206 Nicholas Gutkeled was not
the only member of his kindred to enter the service of King Stephen after
1264. His brother Joachim Gutkeled, King Bela’s former wine keeper in 1263,207
manifested the same political option, being granted by the young king208 the
possession of Mehadia and Haţeg (the latter snatched from Litovoi, as a conse-
quence of his position during the civil war). Joachim Gutkeled built around the
same time two fortresses on these lands, with donjons of similar planimetrics
that must have been the work of constructors coming from the Western part
of the province.209 The construction of these fortifications indicates that the
area was prone to conflict, and explains why Joachim Gutkeled must have held
military attributions for the defence of the frontier. During the same period of
time, Paul Gutkeled, Nicholas’s brother, received the recognition (through the
benevolence of King Stephen210) of the right to cash in the salt taxes in Arieşul
de Câmpie (Oronos), a right granted to by the members of his family in the
immediate aftermath of the Mongol invasion.211
Nicholas Gutkeled’s double office, that of Transylvanian voivode and Solnoc
county chief,212 required at that time, the advent of the office of Transylvanian
vice-voivode, which replaced the older one of viceiudex wayuode (voivode’s
vice-judge).213 The restrictions imposed on the activity of the voivodal
206 D IR II 124–125; Jakó 284.

207 K MTL 304.
208 C D V/2 447–449; Jakó 359.
209 See Adrian A. Rusu’s opinion on the matter: “Cetatea Haţegului. Monografie istorică
şi arheologică”, in Sargetia XVI–XVII (1982–1983): 341. As for the Mehadia dungeon see
Ştefan. Matei, “Aspecte ale arhitecturii de fortificaţii în Banat în perioada feudalismului
timpuriu”), in Studii de istorie a artei, ed. Mircea Țoca (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1982): 110–113.
210 D IR II 390–391; Wenzel V 66–68.
211 In the year 1246 (Jakó 202–203), the members of the Gutkeled kindred, including Palatine
Stephen, owned numerous properties in the area. The revenues of the Arieşul de Câmpie
customs were cashed in before the great invasion by the St. Benedict Monastery located
near the River Gran, which later complained about losing these rights, with no success, in
November, 8th, 1256 (Jakó 220).
212 D IR II 97–98, 107–108; ZW 528; CD IV/3 468–469.
213 D IR I 310311, 410–411; ZW 66–68 (1238). DIR II 79–80; ZW 97–98 (1266).
98 CHAPTER 3
vice-judge, as a result of the privileges acquired by various communities,214

required an extension of its attributes and also the adoption of a new title
that would eliminate the previous limitations. The voivode’s main attributions
were judiciary, but he also assumed the obligations that the voivode held as
count of Alba. One of the early holders of this office was, most likely, the per-
son who represented the young king, on November, 20th, 1266, at the common
judicial assembly of barons from the two halves of the kingdom, instituted
according to the provisions of the Bratislava Treaty. This character, referred to
as “voivode”, was recorded only with the initial L., by the only document that
offers information on this event.215 The fact that he participated in the Holy
Virgin’s Island Assembly was undoubtedly due to his juridical background. The
other representative sent by Stephen to this assembly was magister Baas, the
judge of the royal court.
Except for the already mentioned cases of Haţeg and Mehadia and the older
possessions in the Solnoc county, there is no other clue that the Gutkeled
kindred received any further properties in Transylvania. Their presence in
this province was, chronologically speaking, strictly limited to the “exile” of
the throne’s heir to the Eastern parts of the kingdom. After the coronation
of Stephen V as sole King of Hungary (1270) the interest of the main branch of
the Gutkeled kindred focused on exerting major offices at the royal court or
in their traditional province, Slavonia.216
3.4.5 Administrative Reforms and Social Consequences

The policy of reforming the older administrative structures, implemented
by Stephen in certain counties in early 1260s, accelerated during the second
civil war. This was the direct consequence of the long decades of agony of the
military system based on fortresses. Even though the military changes started
under the administration of voivode Lawrence, the administrative roles of the
fortress serfs and those of the servants subordinated to the curial counts were
eliminated in period of time that Stephen was duke of Transylvania. Thus,
214 Including the Ighiu and Cricău colonists—see previous footnote. After replacing the vice-
judge with the vice-voivode, its exemption was no longer mentioned in the renewal of the
privileges of the two communities.
215 D IR II 91; CD IV/3 322–330. The term might indicate Laurencio barbato, which was used
referring to Stephen at a similar assembly in Besenyö (October 1268), but there was no
reference regarding his title of voivode: DIR II 113–114.
216 Nicholas Gutkeled, royal court judge and count of Gecske (1270–1274, with interruptions),
Ban of Croatia and Dalmatia (1275), Ban of Slavonia (1278–1279): KMTL 457; Joachim
Gutkeled, Ban of Slavonia (1270–1277, with interruptions): KMTL 304.
while the latest mentions of royal udvornici in the province were recorded in
1263,217 the latest record about a castle servant exerting his obligation of wit-
nessing change of property ownership as king’s representative was dated to
1266.218 The last mention of an approval given by the serfs’ community regard-
ing the donation of a property of the Alba fortress (1274)219 slightly exceeds
the reign of Stephen V, which might indicate an ephemeral and eventually
futile reaction against his reforms. On the other hand, in the Solnoc county,
which was placed under the authority of the voivode around this time, the
resistance of the old structures was much stronger. The latest mention of a
maioris exercitus was recorded in 1275,220 while the serfs of the city still func-
tioned as warrants of property transactions until late that century. The persis-
tence in this county of administrative structures on their way to extinction in
Transylvania raises a number of questions regarding the level of integration of
Solnoc under the administrative system subordinated to the Voivode’s author-
ity. The large size of the county was the reason why only the region located
East of Meseş was eventually integrated in the political and economic system
of the kingdom,221 while the Western regions maintained their strong ties to
the Bishopric of Oradea and to the Western counties. In the second half of the
14th century, this situation required the division of Solnoc county into two dif-
ferent counties of reasonable size: The Middle Solnoc and the Lower Solnoc.
Even though the voivode of Transylvania acted as count of the Middle Solnoc
county until the 15th century, it was the Lower Solnoc County that was fully
integrated in the administrative system of the seven counties.
Through such a policy, the young king intended to replace the older admin-
istrative structures with newer ones, which would strengthen his position and
also deal a severe blow to one of the strongest pillars of the aristocratic group
gathered around his father. The castle servants, a conservative social category
which benefited from the traditionalist political program of King Bela, had
shown hostility towards Stephen, who could no longer trust them. Under the
circumstances, the young king turned to the radical solution of giving away
the greatest part of the royal domain to his supporters, in exchange for their
217 D IR II 51–52; ZW 89–90. A series of properties owned by them were donated, on this occa-
sion, to Gyula Kán.
218 Lewe, Alba fortress serf: DIR II 79–80; ZW 96–98.
219 D IR II 171; ZW 126.
220 D IR II 176, Wenzel IX 123.
221 In 1269, the noblemen from the Solnoc county turned to the Chapter of Alba Iulia
in order to confirm a property transaction in the Dej area: DIR II 116–117; Teutsch-
Firnhaber I 94.
100 CHAPTER 3
military services. This measure was both politically tenable and financially
viable. On the short run, since most of these giveaways were in fact been
sales,222 through this measure Stephen covered the considerable expenses
caused by his lengthy military enterprises and was also a profitable way of
rewarding the noblemen who participated in those campaigns at their own
expense. These donations did not exempt the residents from paying their royal
dues, unless in truly exceptional cases. Consequently, this measure did not
diminish the royal revenues. Even more, by laying off the administrative func-
tionaries of these properties, the fiscal and administrative system of the king-
dom was significantly simplified. Even though it undoubtedly led to a surge
in taxation, this new measure was also an incentive in raising the monetiza-
tion of the economy. At the same time, it pushed the search for better solu-
tions to raise the profitability of royal, ecclesiastical and aristocratic estates. In
this context, the royal example of colonizing craftsmen into these regions and
offering them special privileges was followed by clerics and nobles alike.
Most of Stephen’s donations, as recorded in the available sources were
properties within Alba county, which encompassed numerous royal domains:
in 1263—Wiz, Hassach, Nogrech (Veza, Haşag, Ruşi);223 in 1264—Germand,
Polcholca, Cupud (Mescreac, Petelca, Capud);224 in 1268–1270—Gywmurd
(Sântimbru)225—1266, Kend (Rădeşti);226 in 1269—Coppan (Copand),
Iwankateleke (disappeared),227 two unknown properties belonging to the
Alba fortress,228 Ratka (Teiuş);229 in 1272—Zwkmand (Odverem),230 Aruszegh
(Crăciunelul de Jos);231 sometime between 1261–1272—Sothelik (Binţinţi, today
Aurel Vlaicu),232 terra Obruth (Abrud),233 Enyed (Sângătin).234 These properties
were followed by a significant number of properties from the Turda county: in
222 D IR II 108–110, HO VIII 110–113; DIR II 119–120, HO VI 173–175; DIR II 155–157: cases in which
the donations represented, entirely or partially, a compensation for the failure to pay cer-
tain debts.
223 D IR II 51–52, ZW 89–90, Jakó 241.
224 D IR II 54–55, HD 323, Jakó 252.
225 D IR II 79–80, ZW 96–98, Jakó 260.
226 D IR II 53, 228, 503–504, Jakó 274 (dating).
227 D IR II 270–271, CD IV/3 310–311, Jakó 281, 418.
228 D IR II 118–119, ZW 105, Jakó 276.
229 D IR II 117–118, HD 343, Jakó 277.
230 D IR II 145–146, 419, Jakó 317.
231 D IR II 149, 499–500, Jakó 314.
232 D IR II 348–349, ZW 185–186, Jakó 293.
233 D IR II 139, ZW 111, Jakó 287, 310.
234 D IR II 389–390, ZW 191, Jakó 297.
1270—Hodryv, Lona (Hădăreni, Luna);235 in 1261–1272—the vast land of Arieş

(Oronos), located between the Arieş River and Mureş River,236 Scenthmyklous
(Sânmiclăuş/Turda),237 Igruchteluk, Kerekyghaz (disappeared).238 Also, prop-
erties from Dăbâca county: in 1263—Bonchhyda (Bonţida)239 and around
1261–1269—Dobokavarfalva, Lusad (Dăbâca, Lujerdiu),240 Geneu, Bucteluk,
Stephantelke, Schobolotelky (Fundătura and Boc, both disappeared).241 Another
county recorded for donations was Târnava: in 1263—Munora (Mănărade);242
in 1267—Mediesy, Mykazaza, predium Nicolai, Thobiasfalva (Mediaş, Micăsasa,
Cloaşter, Dupusul);243 and in 1261–1272—Bozna (Bazna).244 Furthemore,
Solnoc was also mentioned: in 1263—Drauchvduarhel (Şieu-Odorhei);245 in
1269—Balwanus, villa Nemty (Unguraş, Mintiul Gherlii);246 around 1271—
Orrothlonheda (disappeared);247 and in 1261–1272—Zanuk (Zalnoc), Chalanus
(disappeared).248 In Cluj county, where the land was largely owned by the
church and local noble men, Stephen donated the properties that he initially
confiscated: Zomordogi (Sumurduc), confiscated from Mejhedey (around
1262–1266)249 and Teremy (Teremia), land belonging to the Cluj church (1264).250
A similar situation was that of the two properties in the Călata area (Bihor
county), Fornos (Sfăraşu) and Stylyteluk (disappeared),251 located near the
Western limit of the county and confiscated by Stephen from Dionysius’ sons.
On the other hand, the terra Solmus (Stupini),252 located to the easternmost
part of the county, near the Saxon district of Bistriţa, might represent an excep-
tion from this policy. Moreover, the verbal donation of the town of Cluj (villa
235 D IR II 124–125, HO VI. 166–167, Jakó 284.

236 D IR II 312–314, Sz. Okl. I. 21–23, Jakó 304.
237 D IR II 294–296, HD 470–472, Jakó 434.
238 D IR II 213–215, ZW 137–139, Jakó 368.
239 D IR II 52, HO V 40, Jakó 240.
240 D IR II 213–215, ZW 137–139, Jakó 368.
241 D IR II 119–120, Jakó 278.
242 D IR II 51–52, ZW 89–90, Jakó 241.
243 D IR II 97–98, ZW 528, Jakó 261.
244 D IR III 15–16; ZW 2221–222, Jakó 301.
245 Jakó 242.
246 Jakó 269, with text.
247 Wenzel IX 555, Jakó 312.
248 D RH XI 328–330, Jakó 300.
249 D IR II 49–50, Jakó 278.
250 D IR II 57–58, Sz. Okl. IV 1–2, Jakó 251.
251 D IR II 49–50, Jakó 278.
252 Jakó 560 (with text).
102 CHAPTER 3
Kulusvar) to the Bishop of Transylvania,253 presumably made by Stephen, and

its confirmation required to King Ladislas IV, remains questionable. Quite
likely, this donation was never made. It was invented in 1275, by Peter Monoszló
and the Csák party as argument to justify the invasion of Cluj by the bishop. In
the case of the Hunedoara county, the uncertain status of much of its territory,
reduced to a strip of land following the Mureş River Valley, did not encourage
the expansion of the nobiliary estates. The development of the administrative
structures in this county occurred during Stephen’s Duchy, and it was stimu-
lated by the construction of the Deva royal castle and by the increasing flow of
Transylvanian troops passing towards Severin and Bulgaria. Thus, even though
Stephen’s donations only covered a limited area (Fenes (disappeared), Gurbeu
(disappeared), Machou (Maceu)254 in 1263 and Haţeg (Hatzok),255 donated to
Joachim Gutkeled in 1265), it represented the start of a new stage of aristo-
cratic insertion in Southwestern Transylvania. The administrative status of the
Haţeg region seems to remain uncertain, a document from 1276 mentioning it
as a distinct county. The intensification of the Hungarian presence in the area
required the appearance of the ecclesiastical institution of the Archdeanship of
Hunedoara, first attested in 1265.256
The main beneficiaries of these donations were the members of the main aris-
tocratic and noble families, who joined the young king’s army. While the inter-
ests in Transylvania of some (Miskolc, Gutkeled) remained superficial, in other
cases, such as the Csák or Kán kindreds, the properties received or confirmed
in this period (more than eight known, in the case of Kán) were just a part of a
long presence in Transylvania, which was continued during the next decades.
The massive donations received by count Mykud of the Kökényes-Radnót
kindred and his two sons, Mykud and Emerich, (no less than 13 known
properties257 in four counties, including two former royal fortresses) from
Stephen V, were the cause of their relocation to Transylvania and the raise
of a new noble family, Dobokai, separated from the aforementioned kin-
dred. At the same time, Stephen’s donations were also bestowed on many
representatives of the Transylvanian middle aristocracy (the Gyogh/Geoagiu
noblemen, received five properties;258 Peter and Jacob, sons of Samson of
253 D IR II 174–175, HD 404–405, Jakó 339.

254 Jakó 242; Györffy III 292, 293, 297.
255 Please provide footnote text.
256 D IR II 71–72, HO VI 134–135.
257 D IR II 119–120, 213–215, 270–271, 294–296, Jakó 275, 278, 281, 368, 434.
258 D IR II 54–55, 117–118, 145–146/499, 228/503–504, Jakó 240, 274, 277, 317.
Gerend/Luncani;259 Bozouch, son of Inouk;260 Mykola, son of Philip, nobleman

from Călata;261 Meggyes and Fyoch, from Cluj county;262 the Ip and Suplac
noblemen;263 Abraham, son of Ponyth of the Kata kindred264). Furthermore,
some members of the Székely family (Stephanus and Dominic, sons of the
Székely Benchench,265 who gave the name of Binţinţi village; Peter, son of count
Peter the Székely266) and also some Saxon grafs (counts) (Chyl of Câlnic;267
Teel of Braşov;268 Arnold of Apold;269 Hermann of Fatha270) received proper-
ties. Among the beneficiaries of such donations, were also included some local
communities (the colonists of Ighiu and Cricău;271 the Székelys of Kezdi272)
and, also, the Chapter of the Transylvanian church273 (whose provost was in
fact a Kán kindred member).
These massive donations, which radically reformed the royal domain in
Transylvania and its administrative structures, enjoyed undisturbed economic
success, reflected both in the apparent growth in the price of property sold
and bought, and in the increased number of churches and fortresses owned
by nobles.274 This was the case not only with the fortifications of the Gutkeled
or Kökényes-Radnót kindreds, but also with a number of fortresses built at
the initiative of the most important Transylvanian noblemen: Stremţ, owned
259 D IR II 124–125, Jakó 284; The Gerend/Luncani estate, from which the family name origi-
nated, was purchased by them in 1268 from a Turda fortress serf: DIR II 99, Jakó 270.
260 D IR III 15–16, Jakó 301.
261 D IR II 49–50, Jakó 238.
262 D IR II 57–58, Jakó 251.
263 D RH XI 328–330, Jakó 300.
264 Jakó 312.
265 D IR II 348–349, Jakó 293.
266 D IR II 149/ 499–500, Jakó 314.
267 D IR II 118–119, Jakó 276.
268 D IR II 135–136, Jakó 311.
269 D IR II 389–390, Jakó 297.
270 Jakó 302, 560.
271 D IR II 79–80, Jakó 260.
272 D IR II 312–314, Jakó 304.
273 D IR II 139, Jakó 287, 310.
274 Such churches made of stone attested in this period: Fundătura/Geneu (patroned by St.
Martyr Thomas): DIR II 119–120; Mureni (Holy Mary), Crit (St. Cross): DIR II 129, ZW 107–
108; Mirăslău (St. Peter): DIR 170–171, Teutsch-Firnhaber I 102–103. The only such church
previously attested is the one in Sâncel (St. Martin), 1252: DIR II 5, ZW I 79.
104 CHAPTER 3
by the Geoagiul de Sus nobles;275 Câlnic, owned by the count of Chyl;276 and
Gârbova, owned by a local Saxon noble family.277 All these were just some of
the few new additions in this period of building frenzy, which marked the cli-
max of the “intra-Carpathian castellation”.278 Due to their contribution to the
consolidation of the defensive system of the kingdom, the owners of a fortress
were granted certain material advantages, as well as the right to bear the title of
count. From this time on, this title referred not only to the dignitary in charge
of administering a county, but was also a noble rank strictly reserved (at least
in the counties) to fortress owners or commanders.279
Stephen V’s donations were good incentives for the middle aristocracy of
Transylvania, who took over the attributes previously exerted by fortress serfs.
In addition, the changes also stimulated the administrative centralization,
considerably consolidating the voivode’s authority over the counties directly
subordinated to him. The management of royal domains, previously the task
of counts and fortress serfs and collecting royal revenues were from now on
the voivode’s responsibilities, enforced with the help of his own administra-
tive system. This new form of centralized provincial administration was an
important part of redefining and consolidating Transylvania’s specific identity
within the kingdom of Hungary, focusing on a series of particularities exerted
more or less since the Arpadian conquest.
3.4.6 External Policy

Similar to the Transylvanian Duchy under Bela IV (1225–1235), Stephen’s
rule revitalized the Eastern policy of the Arpadian Kingdom. The Hungarian
expansion, this time conditioned by the domination of the Mongol Empire
over Eastern Europe was, this time, limited to the Northern Balkans. After a
brief power vacuum during the second civil war, followed by the defeat of
Czar Iakov Sventislav of Vidin in the 1266 summer campaign, the positions
275 Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 170–173.

276 Radu Heitel, Cetatea de la Câlnic (Bucharest: Editura Meridiane, 1968); Anghel, Fortificaţii
medievale, 98–102.
277 Regarding the fortress see: Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 119–121. A count Daniel of Wrbou,
mentioned in 1291, might be the builder: DIR II 372–374, ZW 179–180.
278 Adrian A. Rusu, “Cetăţi din voievodatul Transilvaniei (sec. XI–XIV)” (PhD diss., Cluj-
Napoca, 1987), 73–75.
279 The term castellanus, which would later designate the commanders of royal, episcopal
or noblemen fortresses, only appeared in Transylvania in the last decades of the 13th
century, and the first bearers would only be mentioned in the first part of the next cen-
tury, see Adrian A. Rusu, “Castelani din Traniylvania in secolele XIII–XIV”, in AIIACluj XII
(1979): 72.
held by Hungary in the area were rapidly reinstated.280 Based on a rather

consistent Transylvanian participation,281 the five Hungarian campaigns in
Bulgaria282 contributed decisively to the consolidation of Sventislav’s rule over
the Czardom of Vidin and also at weakening the positions held by the Czar
of Târnovo, Constantine Tich. Even though the sources report the temporary
conquest of Pleven by Ban Ponyth Miskolc, during the 1266 campaign,283 it is
nonetheless certain that the Hungarians refrained from any action that could
be interpreted as a threat to the buffer zone established by the Mongols on
Lower Danube.284 Consequently, Hungary’s only solid gain after this sustained
military effort was the creation of a buffer state in the Northwestern Balkans,
which they could use as the base for a future expansion that would never actu-
ally take place. As proven one century later by Louis the Great’s similar attempt
to engage Hungary beyond the frontiers of a different and hostile civilization
was an experiment with little odds of success.
Stephen’s main external policy goal during 1265–1270 was to break the inter-
national isolation he was forced into during the second civil war, by his father’s
alliance with the king of Bohemia, Ottokar II Přemysl. Despite Stephen’s vic-
tory in 1266, the influence of the Bohemian king in Hungary’s internal affairs
remained strong. By directly supporting the aristocratic party run by Palatine
Henrik Kőszegi, Ottokar II continued to pursue his older goal of preventing
Stephen’s succession to the crown of Hungary. To deter the plans of his power-
ful opponent, duke Stephen initiated in 1268 a successful diplomatic offensive.
In August 1268, he visited Krakow and signed a peace and perpetual alliance
with duke Boleslaus Pudicus, husband of his sister Kunigunda.285 This diplo-
matic success marked the first serious breach in the political system devised
by Ottokar II, whose aspirations to the imperial crown and domination of
Central Europe did not go unnoticed. His Krakow trip was also a pilgrimage to
St. Stanislaw’s relics,286 a religiously important enterprise, where Stephen
280 For Stephen’s Balkan policy see: John V. A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans. A Critical
Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Michigan: The University
of Michigan Press, 1987), 170–183.
281 D IR II 124–125, HO VI 166–167; DIR II 149, 499–500.
282 H D 349–350, DIR II 128.
283 D IR II 133–135, HD 347–348.
284 The Mongols were already settled near the Danube in 1264: Papacostea, Between the
Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 120–121. Nogai was appointed as their leader during the
reign of Berke (before 1267), see: Ciocâltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea, 248–250.
285 Annales Franciscanum Cracoviensium, MPH III. 49.
286 Annales Franciscanum Cracoviensium, MPH III. 49.
106 CHAPTER 3
probably prayed for support and vowed his allegiance.287 By chance or not,
after this date the chances were altogether on his side. In November 1268, the
death of Pope Clement IV represented the end of the upper ground held by
his opponents in the pontifical curia. Furthermore, in 1269, the young prince
Bela, duke of Slavonia, Stephen’s rival to the royal crown, met his sudden
death, and 1270 marked the consecutive disappearance of both his parents,
King Bela IV and Queen Mary. Stephen was thus crowned king in June 1270,
his political opponents taking refuge at the Bohemian court of Ottokar II. At
the same time, the year 1269 was marked by the prestigious alliance Stephen
signed with Charles of Anjou, which later resulted in a double matrimony with
most important consequences for the Hungarian kingdom: the marriage of the
future king of Naples, Charles II, with Stephen’s daughter Mary, and the engage-
ment of Ladislas, heir to St. Stephen’s crown, with Isabella, daughter of Charles
of Anjou.288 Moreover, in 1270, probably as a continuation of the oath taken
in 1268, King Stephen V made another pilgrimage to the relics of St. Stanislaw.
Ironically, one of his very few followers, who on this occasion pledged his loy-
alty to the new sovereign, was King Bela’s former Palatine Lawrence, son of
Kemyn, his relentless enemy during the second civil war.289
3.4.7 The Crowning of Stephen V

As sole king of Hungary caused, just like Bela IV’s coronation in 1235, the dis-
mantling of the institutions of the Duchy of Transylvania. Just like his father,
the new king ran an uncompromising centralization policy, also required by
the necessity to control the opposition which enjoyed significant material
resources and external support. In 1271, in the Pressburg (Bratislava) peace,
Ottokar II vowed to no longer support the opposition against Stephen and in
his turn, the king would not retaliate against his political opponents among
the aristocracy.290 Despite the new king’s efforts to soothe his former adver-
saries and even have them join him, Stephen’s enemies were always on guard,
actively increasing their pool of supporters and when the time came, seized
287 D IR II 140–141, HD 351–352.

288 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 245–248; Oskar Halecki, Jadwiga of Anjou and the Rise of East
Central Europe (New Jersey: Columbia University Press, 1991), 20; Steven Runciman,
The Sicilian Vesper: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 159. Ladislas IV’s marriage to Elisabeth of
Sicily was celebrated after Stephen’s death, in September, 5th, 1272.
289 D IR II 140–141, HD 351–352.
290 Pál Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary. 895–1526 (London, New
York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), 107.
power. In the spring of 1272, this powerful coalition was joined by the Slavonian
Ban Joachim Gutkeled, who managed to take Ladislas, heir to the throne, hos-
tage and used him as warranty against any hostilities from his father. The rather
sudden and suspicious death of Stephen V in august 1272, threw Hungary into
a whirlwind of tragedies that only ended, almost four decades later, with the
triumphant instauration of a new dynasty.
CHAPTER 4
Political Crisis in the First Years of Ladislas the

Cuman’s Reign: Attempts to Restore the Duchy
of Transylvania
In the first years of reign of Ladislas IV the Cuman, controlling Transylvania

was the crucial factor (in some cases even decisive, as was the case with the
Saxon rebellion of 1277) in establishing the balance of forces among the nobili-
ary parties engaged in internal clashes and, ultimately, in dominating the inter-
nal political scene. This period of time saw the transition from Stephen V’s
Transylvanian duchy to the congregational system of regnum Transylvanianum,
instituted by the provincial nobility of the late ‘80s. Evidence points out the fact
that the duchy administrative model was not an exterior episode in the history
of Transylvania, as if this province had proved itself incapable of managing
a political and institutional autonomy. On the contrary, its revitalization was
repeatedly tested with the direct participation of internal forces that favored
this evolution.
4.1 The Voivode Nicholas Geregye (1272–1274)
The coup of August 1272, prompted by the death of King Stephen V, brought
an aristocratic restoration party to power, consisting of Bela IV’s former sup-
porters in the civil wars of the ’60s who had taken to exile in 1270 upon the
death of their protector.1 Returning to Hungary in the mayhem after the death
of King Stephen, the exiled noblemen led by Henrik Kőszegi of the Heder kin-
dred took control of the capital after a violent clash with the former supporters
of the late King Stephen, lead by Ban Bela Rostislavich, whose allies included
Egidius and Gregorius Monoszló, the brothers of Bishop Peter of Transylvania.
Afterwards, they shared the government of the kingdom with the main
1 On the general framework of the time and the main events see, more recently, Kosztolnyik,
Hungary, 255–271; Szücs Jenö, Az utolsó Árpádok (Budapest: [give publisher], 1993), 279–291;
Zsoldos Attila, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik: Magyarorszag története 1301-ig (Budapest: Csokonai
K., 1997), 143–147.

1 Abrud 23 Cisnădie SB 45 Hălchiu BV 68 Palatca CJ 91 Șeica SB

2 Agriș SJ 24 Cisnădioara SB 46 Hălmeag BV 69 Palota BH 92 Sibiel SB
3 Aiud AB 25 Cojocna CJ 47 Herina BN 70 Panad / Horia AR 93 Sic CJ
4 Aiudu de Sus AB 26 Crasna SJ 48 Iara CJ 71 Pâncota AR 94 Șieu-Măgheruș BN
5 Albești MS 27 Cricău AB 49 Ighiu AB 72 Peșteana HD 95 Șieu-Odorhei BN
6 Almaș SB 28 Cristiș-Oprișani 50 Ilia HD 73 Petrești AB 96 Sighișoara MS
7 Așchileu CJ 29 Cuzdrioara CJ 51 Izvoru Crișului CJ 74 Rediu CJ 97 Șpring AB
8 Baraolt CV 30 Dăbâca 52 Jimbor BN 75 Rodna 98 Stana CJ
9 Biertan SB 31 Densuș HD 53 Jucu CJ 76 Românași SJ 99 Streisângiorgiu HD
10 Binținți / Aurel 32 Deuș CJ 54 Lăpuș MM 77 Romos HD 100 Stremț AB
Vlaicu HD 33 Dezmir CJ 55 Legii CJ 78 Rupea BV 101 Sumurduc CJ
11 Bonțida 34 Dezna AR 56 Luncani CJ 79 Sălacea BH 102 Tălmaciu SB
12 Borșa CJ 35 Domnești BN 57 Mediaș SB 80 Sâmbăta BV 103 Țapu SB
13 Borșea BH 36 Fărău AB 58 Miercurea Sibiului 81 Sâncel AB 104 Târnăveni MS
14 Brașov 37 Finiș BH 59 Mirăslău AB 82 Sâncraiu AB 105 Teaca BN
15 Brethonia HD 38 Gâmbaș AB 60 Moruț BN 83 Sând / Săndulești CJ 106 Topa CJ
16 Călata CJ 39 Gârbova AB 61 Niraj MS 84 Sânnicolau de Beiuș 107 Valcău SJ
17 Câlnic AB 40 Geoagiul de Sus AB 62 Nochrich SB 85 Sântejude CJ 108 Vințu de Jos AB
18 Câmpulung AG 41 Gilău CJ 63 Ocna Dejului CJ 86 Sântimbru AB 109 Vița BH
19 Căpuș CJ 42 Glogoveț AB 64 Ocna Sibiului CJ 87 Sărata BN 110 Vurpăr SB
20 Caransebeș CS 43 Grebenișul de 65 Ocnele Turzii CJ 88 Sărățel BN
21 Cârța SB Câmpie MS 66 Ozd MS 89 Șard AB
22 Ceaba CJ 44 Gurasada HD 67 Pâglișa CJ 90 Saschiz MS
MAP 3 Transylvania under Ladislas Kán.
110 CHAPTER 4
aristocratic group of opposition from the inside, constituted around the Ban of
Slavonia, Joachim Gutkeled.2
Under the circumstances, the office of voivode of Transylvania, cumulated
since Stephen’s duchy with that of count of Solnoc, was assumed by one of the
most ardent supporters of the aristocratic restoration regime, and at the same
time a fierce opponent of the Csák kindred: Nicholas, son of Paul Geregye.
Furthermore, the father of the new voivode, Paul Geregye, was one of the first
royal officials that ventured in a devastated Transylvania to reopen the salt
mines and to reinstate peace. He also managed, during this unsettled period
of time to create a major estate in the counties of Bihor, Solnoc and Crasna,
through what even then considered illegal and violent methods. Consequently,
the Geregye kindred acquired plenty of enemies in these regions, and its posi-
tions became increasingly tenuous as former owners or their descendants
started claiming their rights and joined forces against them in order to recover
their lost properties. As adversaries of King Stephen back in the days of the
civil war, the members of the Geregye kindred were one of the numerous aris-
tocratic groups that sought refuge in Bohemia at the time of his rise to the
throne of Hungary. Upon their return after the peace of Bratislava (1271), they
withdrew to their vast properties near Transylvania, nonetheless keeping con-
tact with the aristocratic opposition that was preparing to regain power. It is
the only explanation to Nicholas Geregye, the son of Paul, being mentioned as
holder of the voivodal office ever since the first list of dignitaries of the new
regime (September 1272).3 Nicholas Geregye undoubtedly went through major
difficulties to control a province profoundly attached to King Stephen, with
hard core of loyal followers (due to voivode Matthew Csák’s and Bishop Peter
Monoszló’s activity), who owed their privileges and wealth to the Duchy of
Stephen V. Throughout the ‘70s, this part of the nobility would become fiercely
hostile against the aristocratic party of Stephen’s former enemies, who had
taken control in 1272.
It is extremely likely that Nicholas Geregye was unable to take con-
trol over Transylvania before the second half of November. His success was
2 This character may have been involved in the death of King Stephen, which occurred
in circumstances unclear to this day (Simonis de Keza, “Chronicon Hungaricum”, in IIR,
ed. Gheorghe Popa-Lisseanu, IV. Bucharest: Bucovina, 1935, 56; Annales Praedicatorum
Vindobonensium, in MGH, SS, IX, 729). The king spent the entire summer of 1272 in Slavonia
(RA, 2191–2218), trying to negociate the release of his son Ladislas, taken hostage by Ban
Joachim. The king returned from Slavonia in mid July, shortly after he died (August, 6th,
1272).
3 R A 3737, 2314.
probably due to the compromise between the representatives of the new

power of Buda with Matthew Csák, who received the position of Slavonian
ban,4 an office similar to the one he was forced to surrender. Nonetheless, while
Matthew Csák successfully imposed himself as the newly appointed ban of the
entire Slavonia, and the sources record his military clashes at the Carinthian
borders,5 the authority exerted by Nicholas Geregye in Transylvania seems to
have remained problematic. It is more than obvious that he failed in creat-
ing support for himself among the provincial nobility,6 and his relations with
Bishop Peter Monoszló, until 1274 caught in a rather reserved attitude towards
the new regime, were never to be cordial. His authority was strictly confined
to the territory of the voivodal counties, while Sibiu or Rodna “counties” were
ruled by high officials or various other men from the royal entourage.7 In addi-
tion, the dynamics and broken alliances which featured Hungary’s political life
for most of the year 1273 brought, at a certain moment, new surprises even
for Nicholas Geregye. In May 1273, the alliance between the Csák, Monoszló
and Kőszegi families, in the dissadvantage of the Gutkeled group, including
the Geregye kindred, led to the rise of John ( Johannes, Johann) Kőszegi of the
Heder kindred as a contender to the voivodal position.8 Most likely the peace
that followed, already recorded at the end of May,9 was enforced by the inter-
ventions in Buda of the Gutkeled kindred and their partisans.
The end of year 1273 ended this feverish repositioning process initiated in
November 1272. In October 1273 there were already two opposing sides, after
the mergers and alliances concluded among various groups which had until
4 Mentioned as such between November, 27th, 1272, and April, 1273 (RA 2329–2355).
5 For instance: RA 3063: . . . cum Matheum tunc banum totius Sclauonie, quem subtus castrum
Lastruch ad confinia Karintie miseramus . . .
6 The only Transylvanian nobleman known to have asked and received confirmation for his
privileges this time was Nicholas, the son of Chyl of Câlnic (Kalnuk) (ZW 120; DIR 151). The
character was a Saxon noble, thus, explaining the support given by the Saxons, right from the
beginning, to the enemies of the Csaks.
7 In March 1273, the count of Sibiu was Ladislas Kán, also the royal court judge (RA 2355–
2357). A certain magister Paulus, count of Rodna and Bistriţa, relative or friend to magister
Paulus, High Steward of the royal court, is mentioned in May, 7th, 1274 (ZW, 1, 124; DIR 169; RA
2499). In the same year 1274 (RA 2492, 2543), count of Sibiu and Dăbâca was the former Ban
Alexander of Severin.
8 Johanne wayuoda Transsiluano count of Zonuk was, probably, John Kőszegi (member of the
Heder family, son of Henrik Kőszegi), count of Zala until March/April 1273, and then count of
Sopron from July, the same year. He was mentioned as voivode between May, 12th and 29th,
1273, which have him no time to exert the office (RA 2362, 2364–8, 2370–2, 2375).
9 R A 2374 (May, 28th, 1273).
112 CHAPTER 4
then acted rather chaotically. Their confrontation would turn court intrigues
and the petty local conflicts, that predominanted until then, into a civil war.
Moreover, some of the members of the two sides changed their alliances since
August 1272. As a consequence, the party that held the political power and con-
trolled the royal court had much less support, consisting mainly of the mem-
bers of the Kőszegi—Gutkeled kindreds and a limited number of supporters,
including voivode Nicholas Geregye. The opposition, led by Matthew Csák
and the members of his kindred, consisted of a greater number of aristocratic
families (Aba, Rátót, Monoszló, Kán) and, in addition, an impressive number
of noble families discontent with the turn of events in the kingdom after 1272.
The attempts to find a compromise, through the mediation of Queen
Elisabeth, failed in the first months of 1274.10 Consequently, from spring of
the same year, the tensions between the two sides broke into an all-out war.
The first action was made by the opposition who took over the Northern and
Eastern counties, where the local nobility was obviously favorable to the Csák
kindred and hostile to the aristocratic restoration. It was under such circum-
stances, sometime before the beginning of summer, that Nicholas Geregye lost
control over Transylvania, although he would formally continue to hold the
office as witness in royal documents until late September.11
4.2 Transylvania under the Rule of the Csák Kindred (1274–1277)
Matthew (Mattheus, Máté) Csák’s control over Transylvania preceded by a few

months the victory over the adverse party throughout the entire kingdom.
In June, 25th, 1274,12 Matthew Csák was already voivode, issuing sentences in
ongoing trials. Furthermore, he cooperated with Bishop Peter and the Chapter
of Alba Iulia and also with the Geoagiul de Sus noblemen, who were older
partisans of King Stephen. His authority over Transylvania was undoubtedly
acknowledged at that time after taking control over the capital and winning
a decisive victory against his rivals. These later stages of the civil war took
10 A royal decree from January, 23rd, 1274, mentions that the king, the queen mother, and the
great barons of the kingdom came to peace (CD VII/5, 391; RA 2446). It is rather a sample
of exaggerated optimism of this mediation attempt, whose failure became obvious a few
months later.
11 Even though, in June, 25th, 1274, Matthew Csák issued a decree as voivode of Transylvania,
Nicholas Geregye continues to appear as the holder of this position on the lists of digni-
taries until September, 25th, 1274, in the eve of the effective takeover of Buda by the Csáks
and their allies (RA 2512, 2514–5, 2517–8, 2521–2, 2524, 2531–7, 2542, 2553–5).
12 ZW 124–125; DIR 170–171; Jakó 328.
place successively in September, respectively October–November 1274. The

control over the royal court was secured sometime between September 25th
and September 30, 1274.13 The chaos that ensued seems to have created the
perfect opportunity for incipient conflicts inside the opposing coalition with
regards to the control over Transylvania. In a document issued at that time, the
voivodal office was attributed to Egidius Monoszló,14 brother of Bishop Peter,
expressing this kindred’s ambition to change Transylvania into its own pos-
session. However, in the days to come, with the arrival of the Csák kindred
in Buda, the situation was taken entirely under their control. In fact, the cir-
cumstances were rather unfavorable for starting internal conflicts in the coali-
tion, since Henrik Kőszegi, a refugee on his vast estates in Western Hungary,
was gathering his men in preparation for an assault against Buda. The deci-
sive battle, the last episode of the civil war, took place at Fövény, not far from
Székesfehérvár, in September 127415 and it was concluded with the complete
victory of the Csák kindred. Henrik Kőszegi died on the battlefield, and his
sons were forced to go into exile.
The first list of the royal dignitaries after the Fövény victory, in November 27,
1274,16 is a list of the members of the winning party. On this list, Roland Rátót
appears as the Palatine and Dionysius Péc as the Ban of Slavonia, also Egidius
Monoszló17 was the already confirmed kingdom treasurer, Peter Aba was the
Marshal (magister agasonum), Ernye Akos the judge of the royal court,18 and
Nicholas Pok was the Great Steward (magister dapiferorum). Moreover, there
13 The last document issued under the testimony of the dignitaries belonging to the
Kőszegi—Gutkeled group was issued in September, 25th (RA 2555). In September, 30th,
1274, the dignitaries of the kingdom are already from the winning party (RA 2559).
14 RA 2556 (with text); Egidius is also mentioned in the text of the document as one of the
foremost barons from whom the king takes advice. This entire document, in which the
Csáks are not yet present, seems to be Henrik Kőszegi’s attempt to reach a compromise
with the more approachable wing of the opposing party.
15 Dating this battle in September, 26th–29th, 1274 (Szücs, Az utolsó Árpádok, 286–287;
Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 227) remains questionable.
16 RA 2562, (with text).
17 Egidius Monoszló held the same office during King Stephen, and was probably consid-
ered an expert in the field. Durign the regrouping of May 1273 (RA 2362–2556), Gregorius,
brother of Egidius and Bishop Peter, became count of Vasvár (comite Castriferrei, a posi-
tion he also held during Stephen V) and remained loyal to the Kőszegi—Gutkeled party.
After September 1274 he would no longer hold any public office. The overturn of June 1275
brought him the temporary and minor position of count of Baranya (RA 2609, 2615, 2650),
but he withdrew from politics, in December, after Csáks return to power.
18 Holder of this position until December, 31st, 1274 (RA 2569), after which he disappeared
from the lists of dignitaries. Starting from January 1275, the royal court judge was Dionysius
Péc (RA 2590).
114 CHAPTER 4
were no less than three Csák kindred members with an obvious natural incli-
nation to positions that required direct control over territories: Peter, count of
Sopron and Somogyi,19 Ugrinus, Ban of Severin,20 while Matthew, the leader
of the kindred and of the entire coalition, kept the office of Transylvania’s
voivode and count of Solnoc for himself. It was under this structure that the
coalition governed Hungary until early June 1275,21 when retaliation from the
regrouped opposing party regained the power for the Kőszegi—Gutkeled
kindreds.
The decision of Matthew Csák, the undisputed leader of the kindred and
of its party, after the Fövény victory, to not take the title of palatine but that of
voivode of Transylvania, indicates both tactical reasons as well as a trend within
the Hungarian aristocracy, of constituting their own territorial domains, under
their direct control, with greater autonomy and lesser interventions from the
central power. During the civil war, such domains also offered the human
and material resources required for a successful involvement in the battle
for power, and also offered a safe refuge, independent from the turmoil and
fast-changing politics of the capital. Transylvania was the main component
of the political system of the Csák kindred, located at the core of a vast ter-
ritorial organization which included the Banate of Severin, which was at that
time openly subordinated to the Transylvanian voivodes. Even though while
Matthew Csák was the voivode, Ugrinus Csák22 was the Ban of Severin, alterna-
tions to power among the members of the kindred temporarily pushed in this
19 Between November, 1274 and June, 4th, 1275 (RA 2562–2602). Péter Csák, the younger
brother of Matthew, was the father of future Palatine Matthew Csák (the famous oppo-
nent of Charles Robert in the first decades of his reign).
20 September, 1274–June, 4th, 1275 (RA 2556–2602). The documents dated September, 7th,
1274, which mention him in this position, are fake (RA 2550–2552). In the document from
September, 1274 (RA 2556), Ugrinus Csák was mentioned as Ban of Severin, while voivode
was Egidius Monoszló. Even though Ugrinus was a remote relative of Matthew Csák, he
was initially allied to the opposing party, and he held from 1272 the office of High Count
(magister agasonum) and also count of Sirmium (RA 2314–2414). After joining the Csáks
in the spring-summer of 1273, he lost these offices. In the following years, Ugrinus Csák
became one of Matthew’s closest allies, and remained by his side even during the most
critical periods.
21 After June, 4th, 1275, RA 2602, the last document mentioning the Csáks party as still hold-
ing their offices.
22 RA 2556–2602: he held this office during the Csáks’ rule (September, 25th, 1274–June,
4th, 1275). After the return to power of the Csáks, in December 1275, he became the new
voivode of Transylvania and royal court judge. Also, he was the Ban of Severin between
July 1276 and February 1277 (one reference in this period, probably from the end of the
year: RA 2752–1276).
position a former holder of the office, Mykud of Kökényes-Radnót,23 in-law to

the Monoszló kindred24 and, obviously, loyal to the Csák kindred.25 Moreover,
Matthew Csák had taken over Transylvania months before the assault on the
capital, and there is sufficient evidence to assert that this action had ensured
the final success of 1274. As long as the Csák’s controlled Transylvania, their
positions remained firm despite the blows received constantly from their
opponents. Furthermore, in the summer-fall of 1275 this stategy proved its
superiority when, despite the fact that the Csáks lost control over the capi-
tal city and also probably much of the country, his position in Transylvania
remained unchallenged.26
Using the firm ground that Transylvania represented for the Csák party, they
managed to regain the power in December 1275. In order to prevent the events
of June from happening again, in the following months, the members of the
Csák kindred temporarily renounced the voivodal position27 (the only time
during their dominance), and engaged all their resources in controlling the
kingdom’s central institutions. Consequently, no less than four members of
the kindred held the most important offices of the state: Matthew became the
treasurer;28 Peter, who still held the counties of Sopron and Somogyi, assumed
the positions of Palatine and Judge of the Cumans,29 Ugrinus was the royal
court judge,30 and Stephen (Stephanus), son of Matthew, became the Great
Steward, while he was also count of Trenčin. The Csák kindred maintained
their control over the counties near the capital city, and they also replaced
23 Between December 1275 and July 1276, while Ugrinus Csák had other assignments.
Mentioned in February, 10th, 1275 under unclear circumstances (HD 405; DIR 175).
24 His sister Kata was married to Egidius Monoszló, see: Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek,
835.
25 On July, 8th, 1279, during the last comeback to power of the Csáks, Ban Mykud was repaid,
in the name of King Ladislas IV, for his deeds (“. . . during the turmoil in our kingdom . . . he
never inflicted any damage . . .”): DIR 213–215; ZW 137–139; Jakó 368.
26 The lists of dignitaries of the new regime led by his adversarie, acknowledge Matthew Csák
as the voivode of Transylvania (RA 2604–2652). Between June and October–November
1275, the former voivode, Nicholas Geregye, held the offices of royal court judge and count
of Bana (RA 2604–2652).
27 In the first documents issued after the Csáks’ rise to power, Ugrinus is mentioned as the
voivode of Transylvania (December, 4th–10th, 1275): RA 2659–2661. On December, 10th, he
renounced this position to become royal court judge.
28 December, 4th, 1275–July 1276: RA 2659–2711.
29 December, 4th, 1275–1277: RA 2659–2823. Mentioned again in the summer of 1278: RA
2870.
30 Between December 1275 and February–March 1276. He then becomes voivode until the
summer of 1276, when he is mentioned once again as Ban of Severin: RA 2662–2691.
116 CHAPTER 4
Ugrinus as Ban of Severin, with the trustworthy Mykud Kökényes-Radnót.

On the other hand in Transylvania they were forced to turn to a provisional
arrangement employing another member of a high aristocratic kindred. In this
context, Ladislas Kán was voivode of Transylvania for a short period (December
1275–February 1276),31 not against the Csák kindred, as previously believed, but
with their obvious blessing and during the climax of their reign. Furthermore,
in February 1276, Ugrinus Csák renounced the office of royal court judge in
favor of its former holder, Moyus (who was in the queen’s trust), and the
voivode until the early summer of 1276, when herecered to Matthew Csák.32
Thus, the Csáks kept constant control over Transylvania between 1274 and 1277.
This interval was a period of stability for Transylvania, soon to be followed
by a period of violent confrontations in 1277–79. As reflected in documentary
sources, during the Csák reign justice started functioning again, property trans-
actions were again mentioned, and ecclesiastic institutions resumed their nor-
mal activity. In contrast with the troubled politics of the other members of
the Monoszló kindred, the cooperation between voivode Matthew and Bishop
Peter was successful. The fact that Matthew Csák’s documents, as voivode of
Transylvania, were issued in Alba Iulia33 indicates the importance of the city
that headquartered the Bishopric, which also became the political capital and
symbolic center of the realm. Consequently, for his internal support and the
contribution to the stability of power, Bishop Peter Monoszló (1270–1307) was
able to initiate his great campaign to expand the domains of the bishopric,
which represents the blooming period of this ecclesiatic institution in the
entire medieval history. The most important acquisition was possible through
the generosity of the Csáks and was recorded in rather questionable circum-
stances. Based on an alleged verbal donation made by Stephen V, the royal
diploma from December 1275,34 which was mostly signed by members of the
31 Ladislas Kán was only mentioned between December, 10th, 1275 and January, 9th, 1276:
RA 2662–2687. On the other hand Ladislas’s successor, Ugrinus Csák, was still a royal court
judge in February, 2nd, 1276: RA 2691.
32 Probably in June–July: RA 2710–2711.
33 June, 25th, 1274: DIR 170–171; Georg Daniel Teutsch and Friedrich Firnhaber, “Urkunden
buch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, in FRA: Österreichische Geschichtsquellen, vol. 15, 2,
(Viena: Druck und Verlag der Kaiserl. Königl. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1857), 102–103;
Jakó 328. September, 14th, 1276: DIR 183–184; Teutsch and Firnhaber, “Urkundenbuch zur
Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, 1, 110; Jakó 346.
34 ZW 127 (1275); DIR 174–175 (1275); based on the list of witness, Jakó 339 argues for “1275,
after December 10th”. The text of the document indicates that Cluj (colonized by German
settlers) was considered of importance by King Stephen, who attempted to raise its pros-
perity to the same scale as before the invasion. This might raise some questions regarding
Csák kindred as witnesses, conceded the town of Cluj (villa Clwsvar) to the
Bishopric of Alba Iulia. In November, 25th, 1276, a new acquisition just as con-
troversial as the first one and located in the same territory, Izvorul Crişului
property (in Bihor county) was acquired as an exchange with the Chapter of
Alba Iulia.35 In May 8, 1276, again with the help of the Chapter of Alba-Iulia,36
an institution obedient to the Bishopric, Peter Monoszló received as a loan a
hill in the Fyless forest, near Alba Iulia, in order to build a fortification.37
In addition to the support received from the church, the political regime
instituted by the Csáks needed the support of the provincial nobility, which,
at the time, was trying to consolidate its positions in Transylvania. The politi-
cal, military and juridical systems continued to function in the same terms as
before, through the cooperation with an aristocratic elite insufficiently tied
to the province. The execution of the sentence pronounced in November, 1st,
1274, regarding the destruction of a village, was a landmark feature of this reign.
The case was chaired by four judges: Matthew Csák, voivode of Transylvania,
Peter Monoszló, Bishop of Transylvania, Ban Mykud, count of Dăbâca, and
Alexander, count of Sibiu.38 The verdict ruled by the voivode split the respon-
sibility of the sentence with representatives of higher aristocracy, without
any reference to the other members of his own kindred. Even though this was
probably an extraordinary case, and the goal was to make more powerful the
sentence against people as important as Abraham, son of Ponyth of the Kata
kindred (the defendant of the case), it also indicates that the Csák kindred rule
was far from authoritarian. The character of the regime was probably aristo-
cratic in nature, with oligarchic tendencies.
the reasons for which he later donated Cluj, which he failed to mention in the document.
Furthermore, the donation was apparently made shortly before his death, which might
explain the missing information from the donation document. On the other hand, since
the king died unexpectedly, this verbal donation might have been only a fabrication.
35 CD 5/2. 371–372; HD 1/1, 409; Jakó 348.
36 In 1276 he received the confirmation of the Turda salt mine donation (made by Stephen V):
Teutsch and Firnhaber, “Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, 1, 109–110; DIR
182–183; Jakó 346; the confirmation of voivode Matthew Csák on the 14th of September
the same year—Teutsch-Firnhaber 110, DIR 183–184, Jakó 346. The Transylvanian estates
donated by the king to the Bishopric of Esztergom (August, 9th, 1276) were also confirmed:
Teutsch and Firnhaber, “Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte Siebenbürgens”, 1, 108–109; DIR
181–182; Jakó 344.
37 CD 5/2. 370–371; DIR 180; Jakó 341.
38 Jakó 332: Nos M. wayuoda Transsilvanus et comes de Zonuk, P. episcopus Transsilvanus,
Alexander comes Zebeniensis et Mykud banus comes de Doboka damus pro memoria.
118 CHAPTER 4
The difficulties in controlling the confusing situation in the kingdom forced

the Csák kindred to regroup their forces in Transylvania in 1276, and to take
advantage, again, of the safe base offered by the province. As of 1274, Matthew
Csák turned Transylvania into the center of a vaster political system, which
must have included at least the Banate of Severin, and was undoubtedly
inspired by Stephen V’s duchy. An explicit and formal reconstruction of the
Duchy of Transylvania, the boundaries of which were not clearly determined
(followed the lines of Stephen’s variable authority during the division of the
kingdom), represented the way for the Csák kindred to secure an undisputed
supremacy over the counties they already controlled. Thus, reenacting the
political model of the Duchy of Transylvania, which meant controlling a terri-
tory larger than that of the duchy itself, was the only way to ensure the role of
arbiter of the political scene.
Indeed, the years 1276–1277 marked the reappearance in the documents of
the terms “duke” and “Duchy” of Transylvania. In August, 6th, 1276, while invited
to the hearings regarding the canonization of Saint Margaret of Hungary, the
mother to Matthew Csák, a nun in the Dominican monastery located on the
Danube Island, was presented as domina Margaretha, mater domini Matthei,
ducis Transylvani.39 This reference was confirmed, in May 30, 1277, by refer-
ences to a “Duchy of Transylvania” (ducatu . . . Transsilvano), made both by
Bishop Stephen (Stepanus) of Kalocsa, in a letter to Pope Nicholas III,40 and by
a document issued on the same date by the high church officials gathered for
their “general assembly”. The document was signed by Archbishop Stephen of
Kalocsa, Bishop Phillip of Vác, Bishop Lodomerius of Oradea, Bishop Timotheus
of Zagreb, Bishop Dionysius of Györ, Bishop Peter of Transylvania and Bishop
Pouka of Syrmium.41 The second document, addressed to the church officials
of the “Duchy of Transylvania, belonging either to the Transylvanian diocese or
to the holy church of Esztergom”, offers additional details on one of the most
important concrete significations of the term “duchy”, namely the fact that it
included the Transylvanian diocese and the territory ecclesiastically subordi-
nated to the Archbishopric of Esztergom.
Getting the Saxons of the “province of Sibiu” under the control of
Transylvanian voivodes and that of Alba Iulia bishops was an older desideratum
in the pursuit of which the interests of noble and ecclesiastic elites converged.
However, after 1274, since Transylvania was no longer run by a royal family
member to whom the Saxons towed obedience, the inclusion of Sibiu county
39 Monumenta Romana Episcopatus Vesprimiensis, I (1103–1276), Budapest, 1896, 163.

40 Jakó 351.
41 DIR 193–195; Jakó 352.
in the political system created by Matthew Csák could not be accomplished

simply by assuming the title of duchy. Firstly, an adequate political solution
was needed to legitimate, in case of necessity, a potential turn to force. In order
to solve his dilemma, Matthew Csák transferred Ban Alexander of Severin42
from the royal court entourage (close companion of Queen Elisabeth, after
September 1247) to the voivode’s entourage. Thus, in November, 1st, 1274,43 this
Alexander comes Zebeniensis (who, from September the same year, was no lon-
ger included on the royal lists of dignitaries) was one of the three most impor-
tant provincial officials, next to Bishop Peter and to Mykud, count of Dăbâca,
who assisted voivode Matthew in the trial against Abraham Kata. One year
later, in 1275, the promotion of Mykud as Ban of Severin entitled Alexander as
count of Dăbâca, which added to the title of count of Sibiu, accentuated his
“Transylvanization”.44 Thus, the new position of count of Sibiu, whose author-
ity over the Saxons was legitimate, became a member of the voivode’s admin-
istrative apparatus and enabled the king to exert his authority over the Saxons
of Sibiu.
4.3 The Saxon Rebellion (1277–1279)
The danger of permanently subordinating the Sibiu county to the Transyl

vanian voivode, a consequence of the pressure exerted over the county for
more than a quarter of a century, explains the tense circumstances that trig-
gered the Saxon rebellion of February 1277, the event that put a decisive end
to the Csák’s domination over Transylvania. The immediate causes of the
Saxons’ involvement in a new violent stage of the internal conflict in the king-
dom (1277–1279) were correlated to the disputes around the succession to the
Archbishopric of Esztergom, vacant in 1276. This event helped Nicholas Kán,
then the provost of the Chapter of Alba Iulia to reappear at in the foreground
of the Hungarian political scene.
42 He was Ban of Severin in 1268 (DIR 101–103; Jakó 268), and he was rewarded by Stephen
V with properties in the county of Sătmar for his impressive military skills. Most of his
estates were probably located around Buda (see: DIR 173). Also, for the “Greece” campaing
he was able to arm his own troops, indicating that he possessed important revenues. He
was first mentioned as count of Sibiu in April, 26th, 1274 mentioned again in the same
office in August and September, same year: (ZW 124, 126, 127).
43 Jakó 332 (with text).
44 DIR 173 (1275).
120 CHAPTER 4
Nicholas Kán, who was the royal vice-chancellor (and provost of the
Transylvanian church) between September 1272 and February 1273,45 became
a favorite of the still young Queen Elisabeth,46 and got actively involved in
the political intrigues of the royal court. Ambitious by nature, he managed to
become, as of March 1273,47 the Archbishop of Esztergom (vacant after the
death of Archbishop Fillip in December 1272), against the will of the canons
and despite the fact that he lacked the experience and education required
for this position.48 The scandal that emerged (despite his connections to the
queen, Nicholas was also accused of threatenning and pressuring the canons
who opposed him)49 was too great to allow the former Provost of Alba Iulia
to receive the papal consent. Furthermore, he wasn’t popular with any of the
nobiliary parties. Thus, in May 1273 Nicholas Kán lost all the positions he held
(elected Archbishop and perpetual count of Esztergom, Chancellor of the
kingdom and count of Pilis)50 and reentered a phase of utter anonymity for the
following few years. The new Archbishop of Esztergom was Benedict, a former
Provost of Arad, and affiliate of the Kőszegi-Gutkeled party.
Upon the death of Benedict, in 1276, the issue of electing a new archbishop
triggered a major internal political crisis, which was one of the main causes
that led to another civil war. In this context, Nicholas Kán reasserted his can-
didature with the support from the Csák party, who had already named him
provost of the church of Transylvania.51 Nicholas Kán’s opponent was Peter
Kőszegi, Bishop of Veszprem, obviously endorsed by the aristocratic party that
gravitated around his kindred. Thus the duel between Nicholas of Transylvania
and Péter of Veszprem was the ecclesiastical mirror of the ongoing political
conflict between the Csák and Kőszegi kindreds. The Holy See failure to reach a
decision caused this conflict to escalate into violence. Furthermore, one of the
most outrageous events in face of the contemporaries occurred in the summer
45 RA 2314–2350.

47 RA 2355 (March, 29th, 1273): venerabili viro Nycolao sancte Strigoniensis ecclesie electo, per-
petuo comite loci eiusdem, aule nostre cancellario.
48 After the scandals at the elections for archbishop, in the years ‘70, the chapter 40 of the
“constitution” signed by the Synod of Buda (1279) conditioned the access to the upper
layers of the ecclesiastic hierarchy, starting with archdean, by a three year canonical
education; see: Şerban. Turcuş, Sinodul general de la Buda (1279) (Cluj-Napoca: Presa
Universitară Clujeană, 2001), 56–57, 176–177, 230–231.
50 Last mentioned in office, in May, 26th, 1273: RA 2367.
51 RA 2718, 2750.
of 1276, when, in the attempt to prevent Peter Kőszegi’s candidature, Palatine

Peter Csák attacked and devastated the Bishopric of Veszprem.52
The events from fall 1276 were the immediate cause of the violent actions
taken by the Saxons during the following winter. Given the fact that the
Provost of Sibiu was subordinated to the Archbishopric of Esztergom, invest-
ing Nicholas in this position would have led to the request of independence
from the Bishopric of Transylvania. Thus, the Saxons’ quasi-administrative
subordination to the voivode, which Matthew Csák resolved by converting the
count of Sibiu into a member of his own entourage, would have been consoli-
dated by subordinating the Provost of Sibiu to the Alba Iulia Bishopric. Faced
with such pressure, the Saxons in Transylvania rebelled.
On February 21, 1277, in the Reminiscere Sunday, the Saxons in the province
of Sibiu, under the leadership of the count of Ocna Sibiului Gaan/Gyan/, son
of Alard, attacked the Bishopric of Alba Iulia, which was undefended at the
time. On the other hand, the count of Ocna Sibiului was running his own per-
sonal vendetta against Bishop Peter Monoszló, whom he held responsible for
the assassination of his father.53—The city residents sought refuge inside the
cathedral, but the assailants did not hesitate to attack it, rob it and then set
it on fire. According to the contemporary sources, the number of Hungarians
who were burned alive inside the cathedral, after the Mongol custom (usus
tartarica), was nearly 2,000. Among the victims of the Saxon fury were four
archdeans of Transylvania (including Agabitus of Alba, Michaelis of Ozd and
Bartholomeus of Kukullu/Târnava), eight canons (including the chapter’s ple-
banian, Racha) and numerous other priests and clerics. The cult objects of
the cathedral, together with numerous other valuables (plateis, calices, libros,
cruces, vasa, sigilla capituli, indumenta sacerdotalia et omnia ornamenta ipsius
ecclesiae) were desecrated and robbed. The Saxon offensive did not stop with
the attack against the city of Alba Iulia. Shortly after, the rebellion engulfed
entire Transylvania and resulted into much crime, destruction and rob-
bery for the episcopal property and the estates of the canons who survived
the Reminiscere massacre.54 The list of episcopal properties destroyed or
52 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 260–262; Remig Békefi, A káptalani iskolák története

Magyarországon 1540-ig (Budapest: MTA, 1910), 160. Scholars haven’t reached an agree-
ment regarding the date of this event. Gyula Krisztó, Csák Máté (Budapest: Gondolat,
1986), 48: places the even in the summer of 1276. Szücs, Az utolsó Árpádok, 288: mentiones
the event in the year 1275. Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 227: considers that the event
took place in March 1276.
53 DIR III. 114–115; ZW 255–256; Acta Gentilis, 208–210.
54 Jakó 351.
122 CHAPTER 4
depopulated (not part of the trial iniated by the voivode due to the interven-
tion of Peter Monoszló in 1282)55 included estates in the counties of Alba (Sard/
Sard) and Turda (Sancraiu/villa Sancti Regis), but also numerous estates in Cluj
county (Cluj/Clus,56 Gilău/Gylo, Capus/Kopus and Izvorul Crişului/Keresfev).
The list included, also, two estates in Northeast Transylvania, Herina/Herena
and Domneşti/Bylok, indicating that the Saxons in the Bistriţa area joined the
Sibiu rioters. The destruction affected both royal, the part of Alba Iulia that
was still under royal rule, and noble properties belonging to the ruling kindred.
The atrocities inflicted upon the Alba Iulia cathedral were the counterac-
tion to the devastation of the Veszprém cathedral, which had occurred a few
months before. At the same time, their campaign was rejecting the Csáks’ pol-
icy of restraining the Saxon liberties and their candidate to the Archbishopric
of Esztergom, Nicholas Kán. Thus, the Saxon rebellion was not the spontane-
ous reaction of an angry mob against episcopal abuse. Moreover, the actions
taken by the Saxons were coordinated by the enemies of the Csáks from the
counties from the eastern and northern regions of the kingdom. The other pro-
tagonists of these events were Roland, son of Mark, who led the rebellion in
the Zips county, and the former voivode of Transylvania, Nicholas Geregye.
From the time of Stephen V after the 1272 turmoil, the nobleman Roland,
son of Mark, ruled over vast properties and exerted a remarkable influence
over the Zips county.57 Even though he was associated to the Kőszegi group
and a witness in the royal documents from 1274, the victory of the Csáks, in
1274, did not affect his position initially.58 On the contrary, the Csáks appar-
ently tried to win him over. In April 1275, his kindred received several dona-
tions, and the ones given to Roland personally were located in the town of
Zips.59 Despite the Csáks’ attempts to befriend him, Roland became one of the
main supporters of the Kőszegs’ return to power in June 1275. Consequently,
he was rewarded with the office of count of Vasvár,60 which did not affect the
positions of his kindred in the Zips county.61 In this case, Roland became one of
the political victims of the Csák’s restoration (December 1275). The reference
made in January 9, 1276, regarding a certain magister Gregorius, Scepus count,62
55 DIR II. 239–240, ZW 142–143, Jakó 391.

56 See also Ştefan Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, vol. I (Cluj: Dacia, 1972), 177.
57 RA 2333, 2510, 2518, 2599, 2650.
58 Comite Scepusiensis in May 21st, 1275; doesn’t appear on ther list of witnesses: RA 2599.
59 RA 2596, CD V/2. 238.
60 RA 2604–2623.
61 September, 27th, 1275, he is mentioned as count of Zips: RA 2650.
62 RA 2687. Pressumably Roland’s future ally in the 1277 rebellion.
indicates the Csák’s immediate replacement of a man who was beyond any
doubt hostile to them. No surprise then that in 1277, more than a year since
his falling into disgrace, Roland was one of the protagonists of the rebellion
that brought the Kőszegi kindred to power. He initiated this action in coopera-
tion with the Geregye kindred,63 whose leader, former voivode Nicholas, had
also held, between June and December 1275, the position of royal court judge.
After the Csáks’ victory, he retreated to his vast estates in Bihor, which were
protected by a defense system that included fortresses like Adrian, Solyomkő
or Palota.64 In this region, the Geregye kindred could rely on the services of a
number of affiliate noblemen families, including Kata, Mykula and Kany.
The upheaval of Csáks’ opponents in northeastern counties included,
according to the royal diploma of 1285, “our estate Zips together with
Gylnuchbana and the land of Nyr, beyond Tisza all the way to Transylvania”,65
and culminated with the bloody rebellion of the Saxons, a severe blow to the
Csáks’ domination over the kingdom.
The Csák kindred’s temporary lack of reaction was primarily due to the insuf-
ficient forces which made it impossibility to deal with the complex challenges
they were facing. Indeed, the Eastern insurrection was just a part of a greater
plan. The context favored a new rise of the Kőszegs and their main supporter,
Ottokar II of Bohemia. It was also correlated with a rebellion in the Maritime
Provinces, which expressed their support to the grandson of King Andrew II
(also favored by the Venetians), as successor at the Hungarian crown. In 1277,
the Csáks engaged their forces against the Western objectives, deemed a pri-
ority. Due to the fierce resistance they encountered at the Moravian border,
where the Csáks benefited from strong positions, the conflict with Bohemia
was limited to small raids and ended in minor skirmishes.66 On the other
hand, the Slavonian campaign in support of future king Andrew III required
the presence of Palatine Peter Csák, who managed to crush the enemy and
reinstate control.67 Regardless of these minor successes, the Csáks’ party was
met with serious difficulties in keeping the situation under control. Their main
advantage was the fact that they managed to maintain the control of the capi-
tal and the royal court. In the attempt to convince the noblemen to support
him, King Ladislas IV, at an age which enabled him to legitimately take over
63 RA 2785, 2900; CD V/2. 248.

64 Györffy I 591, 661–662, 650.
65 terram nostram Scepusiensem, unacum Gylnuchbana et terram Nyr ultra partem de Tyzael
usque ad partem Transsilvanam: DIR II. 271–273; Jakó 406.
66 RA 2813.
67 RA 2785, 2803.
124 CHAPTER 4
the prerogatives of sovereignty, presided, in May 23–30, 1277, a general assem-

bly on the Rákos plain. In this context, Peter Csák gave the office of palatine to
Dionysius Péc and invested Nicholas Pok as voivode of Transylvania,68 a func-
tion he would not be able to exert. In spite of their attempt to associate with
certain powerful families, the crisis committee still dominated by the Csák and
Kán families could not issue claims to the domination of the kingdom’s politi-
cal life. In fact, in the summer of 1278, following pressure from the pope, the
Csáks were again abandoned by their temporary allies and were having a hard
time finding new ones.
4.4 The Aristocratic Triumvirate of 1278: The Domination of the Aba

Kindred in Transylvania (1279–1282)
Chased away from Transylvania by the Saxon rebellion in February 1277 and at
the same time faced with the serious external threat posed by the Bohemian
King Ottokar II Přemysl, the Csáks were forced to give up on some of their
political ambitions and expressed willingness to share the government of the
kingdom with the new leader of the Gutkeleds and renegotiate their older alli-
ance with the Aba kindreds.
The alliance between the Csáks and Ban Stephen Gutkeled, leader of his
kindred after the death of his brother (1277), was concluded in June 19, 1278.
Fortunately enough, the information regarding this alliance is available in
contemporary documents. Issued under the warranty of King Ladislas, Queen
Elisabeth and the bishops close to the Csák party, the document stipulated the
restitution to Stephen Gutkeled of all the properties formerly belonging to Ban
Joachim (including Haţeg and Mehadia) and also his promotion to royal court
judge and count, with an annual stipend (stipendio) of 1,000 silver marks.69
Pressumably in this interval the Csák kindred renewed the alliance with the
Aba kindred, whose new military leader, the future Palatine Fyntha, already
won his first victory against the Zips county rebels.70 Aware of their own inca-
pacity to resolve the situation in Transylvania, the Csáks ceded the province
to their allies, which assumed the hard task of bringing it under control. The
primary emergency faced by this aristocratic triumvirate was at that time the
Bohemian campaign run by King Ladislas in the service of Rudolf of Habsburg.
This campaign was meant to eliminate one of the most important external
68 RA 2823, 2825.

69 CD V/2, 447–449; RA 2870; Jakó 359.
70 DIR II 271–273; HD 452–459.
supporters of the political intrigues that upset the political life of Hungary,
during the 8th decade. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian Army victorious at
Dürnkrut (Marchfeld) against Ottokar II consisted of three distinct forces: the
king’s Cumans, the private armies of the Csáks and Gutkeleds,71 and the men
in the service of the Aba kindred.
Even though the sole benefit for Hungary was the elimination of a danger-
ous opponent,72 the great victory of Marchfeld (August 26, 1278) was a turning
point in the evolution of the internal conflict. Lacking support from Bohemia,
the Kőszegi kindred was forced to abandon the battle for power. Under these
circumstances, the defeat of the eastern strongholds was just a matter of time.
The most important role in their annihilation was played by the Aba kindred,
which also received support from local elements trying to make a name for
themselves. Thus, while the forces of the Aba kindred were engaged in crush-
ing the rebellion in the Northeastern counties during the Moravian campaign,
most likely acting in the Nyr region and near Transylvania, the operations
in the Bihor area, against the Geregyes, gathered a vast local coalition prob-
ably run by Bishop Lodomerius. Still, the most important role was played by
his close allies, noblemen members of the Borsa kindred. Due to the fierce
resistance of Nicholas Geregye and his allies, the operations in this region
lasted longer than planned, until late in the fall of the year 1278.73 Also, some
of the strongholds of the rebels were defended until well into the next year.74
In the end the Geregye kindred was completely annihilated and its estates
were divided among the winners: the Borşa and Gutkeled kindreds and the
Bishopric of Oradea. Immediately after, in the winter of 1278–1279, the reunited
forces of the winners from various battle fronts in the northeast, reinforced
with local Transylvanian elements and led by the Aba kindred, started the
assault against the Saxons in the Sibiu province, led by the nobleman Gaan
71 A. Küsternig, “Probleme um die Kämpfe zwischen Rudolf und Ottokar und die Schlacht
bei Dürnkrut am 26. August 1278,” in Jahrbuch des Vereins für Landeskunde 44–45 (1978–
1979): 226–311; A. Pálóczi-Horváth, Pechenegs, Cumans, Iasians, 70–73.
72 Simonis de Keza considers this victory to be the solution found by young King Ladislas
to the older enmity between Ottokar II and his father: Chronicon Hungaricum, in IIR IV,
57–58.
73 On September, 1st, 1278, the hostilities in Bihor were in full swing. Also, according to a
document from June, 19th, among the newest enemies of the Geregye kindred was Péter,
son of Durugh from the Gutkeled kindred: DIR 195–196.
74 By January, 30th, 1279, Nicholas Geregye and his brother Gregen were already defeated,
but their vassal Thoma de Kány continued resisting in the Palota fortress: DIR 201–203;
Wenzel XII. 250–253.
126 CHAPTER 4
(Gyan), son of Alard.75 Even though the bloody reprisals led by Fyntha, Peter
and Amadé Aba ended probably in the late winter of 1279, the Aba kindred
members had already assumed Transylvania’s most important offices making
it their new realm as early as January 1279. Thus, Fyntha Aba, son of David,
was the new voivode of Transylvania and count of Solnoc, Peter Aba became
magister agasonum and count of Sibiu and Lawrence Aba, the son of former
voivode Lawrence was the new Ban of Severin.76
Unlike the Csák regime, the Aba domination of Transylvania became a fam-
ily business. After the 1278 agreement, the Aba kindred felt entitled to admin-
ister the province through its political clientele and with whatever methods
they deemed fit. At the same time, Fyntha Aba never intended to become a
perpetual voivode. Furthermore, he never expressed any intent to reinstate
the duchy, even though the members of his kindred already controlled all the
important institutions: the province itself, the Sibiu province, and the Banate
of Severin. On the contrary, in the brief period as voivode (1279–1280),77 Fyntha
Aba, together with the other prominent members of his kindred,78 did not
seem to seek to exploit the province to the maximum in order to gain the nec-
essary resources to eliminate the Csák and Gutkeled kindreds, who were still
their main political rivals. In May 1279, Lawrence Aba sold the Transylvanian
possession of Chintelnic79 to count Hench of Rodna for a staggering 150 sil-
ver marks. Other possessions that voivode Lawrence had obtained in unclear
circumstances in the counties of Dăbâca and Solnoc shared the same fate.80
75 It is of utmost certainty that this campaign against the Saxons only started after the end
of the one in Bihor. A certain count Nicholas, Nyr nobleman, who had coordinated the
Adrian fortress siege, owned by Nicholas Geregye and his brothers, died in the war of
Transylvania against Gyan, the son of Alard (CD V/3. 258–261; DIR II 254–255). Regarding
the participation in this campaign of certain Borsod fortress serfs, see: Wenzel, IX 330–
331, and DIR II 242. The event is mentioned after the Bohemian campaign. One of the
Transylvanian nobles who perished in this expedition was count Andreas of Gyogh
(Geoagiul de Sus / Stremţ): DIR II 228.
76 Wenzel, XII, 250; RA 2942; DIR II 201.
77 Documentary evidence between January, 30th, 1279 (RA 2942) and July, 19th, 1280 (RA
3056).
78 Lawrence Aba, was Ban of Severin between January and August 1279: RA 2942–2985. Peter
Aba, was count of Sibiu from January to March, 1279: RA 2942, 2946. In 1279 the office
received by voivode Fyntha’s younger brother, Amadé (Omodeus) Aba, who held still in
office in 1280: RA 3019, DIR II 227.
79 Kendteluk: ZW 136–137; CD V/2, 547–548; DIR II 204; Jakó 366.
80 Sofalua, Zereth, Monyoros, Arukalia (Dăbâca county), Kuzepfolua (Solnoc county),
see: Jakó 194.
This liquidation of the kindred’s businesses in Transylvania indicated that the

leaders only wanted to throw the financial resources obtained in Transylvania
in the battle for political power. According to the sources, the expedition orga-
nized by magister Georgius Baksa, another prominent member of the Abas’
political suite, against the Wallachian voivode Litovoi, shared a similar pur-
pose. Organized in the first months of the year 1279, in parallel with the war
against the Saxons in Transylvania, the expedition against Litovoi set off from
the Banate of Severin, where Georgius Baksa was the locum tenens of Lawrence
Aba. The military campaign was an undisputed success and it ended with the
death of the Wallachian voivode and the capturing of his brother and succes-
sor, Barbat. Still, this victory was insufficiently exploited by the winners, who
only looted of a great amount of money from the defeated.81 On the other
hand, this large sum of money was what the Aba kindred and their treasury
needed most.
A major step in gaining additional political power was made at the end of
the summer of 1279, when the considerable wealth accumulated by Lawrence
Aba smoothened his way to becoming the treasurer of the kingdom (magis-
ter tavernicorum).82 It was the first political victory in the competition with
the most important rival kindred, with the previous holder of the office being
Ugrinus Csák. This change also marked the end of the costly political alli-
ance with Stephen Gutkeled, who on this occasion was relieved from being
a royal court judge and cashing in his generous stipend.83 At the same time,
Lodomerius, the Bishop of Oradea, and allied of the Aba kindred in the con-
frontation with Nicholas Geregye and also a last minute opponent of the Csáks
who had prevented him from occupying the archbishop see for a whole year
became the Archbishop of Esztergom.84 These two moves could only have
occurred with the support of the papal legate Philip de Fermo, whose inter-
ference in Hungary’s political life played a major role in changing the force
81 super quem nos non modicam quantitatem pecunie fecimus extorquere, et sic per eius-
dem magistri Georgii servitium tributum nostrum in partibus eisdem nobis fuit restaura-
tum: Jakó 406.
82 RA 3019: the second half of 1279.
83 In July–August, 1279, was last mentioned as royal court judge: RA 2985. In 1280, after a long
vacancy, the position was taken by Peter Aba: RA 3056.
84 In January–March, 1279, the episcopal see was vacant: RA 2942, 2946. During this period
of time the crisis between the king and the papal legate deepens. Also the candidature of
Nicholas Kán, Queen Elisabeth’s favorite and a Csák sympathiser adds to the crisis. In the
summer of 1279, after the death of his opponent, Lodomerius receives the interim of the
archbishopric (RA 2981), that was finally confirmed the next year (RA 3056).
128 CHAPTER 4
ratio among the internal groups and undoubtedly in triggering the great crises
1279–1282.85
The complete takeover of power by the Aba party only occurred in the last
months of 1280, at the end of a new stage of the civil war. The opponents of
the Abas were Stephen Gutkeled, Akon Geregye and most likely Peter and
Matthew Csák. After the victory, Fyntha Aba (now a palatine) and Lawrence
became the most powerful men of 1281, the sole holders of a political power
they were all too reluctant to share.86 To keep direct control over Transylvania,
they entrusted the voivode position to trustworthy allies. Thus, in 1280, the
position was held by Stephen, the son of count Tekus of Mera,87 originating
from the Abaújvár county.88 Furthermore, he had a vast experience gained as:
maior plaustrorum and Count of Patak (1273–1275),89 count of Torna (1277)90
and, in 1279, Ban of Kulchou (Kulcsó).91 His rise was strictly conditioned by
the services he brought to the Aba kindred and his authority was exerted only
in the area where the Abas prevailed. Despite owning, in 1273, a number of
properties in Borsod county,92 Stephen of Mera did not enjoy the political, eco-
nomic or social power of a voivode, which he received solely for being close the
ruling kindred. Later that year (1280), the voivodal position was handed over to
a certain Peter (Peters/Péter), son to Dominic,93 a hardly identifiable character,
most certainly a member of the same kindred.
The complete domination of the Aba kindred, which, besides opposing all
other political groups, had brought along severe restrictions to royal preroga-
tives, reached an end in 1281–1282, when King Ladislas, at the head of a large
coalition made of the main aristocratic families, laid siege to former Palatine
85 For the most recent analysis of Philip de Fermo’s activity, run from the perspective of the
papal policy towards the central-European space, see Turcuş, Sfântul Scaun, 121–127; idem,
Sinodul general de la Buda (1279) (The general synod of Buda—1279), Cluj-Napoca, 2001,
41–46.
86 In a document in 1281, Fyntha and Lawrence Aba are the only ones to appear in the list of
royal dignitaries—RA 3113, with text. (Laurentio magistro tawarnicorum nostrorum, Phinta
palatino et aliis quampluribus comitatus regni tenentibus et honores).
87 Stephanus/Stephen: DIR II 224–225; Antal Szataráy, Grof Sztáray család oklevéltára,
ed. Gyula Nagy, vol. 1 (Budapest: [give publisher], 1887), 24.
88 Györffy, I 78, 109, 118.
89 maior plaustrorum domini regis (in charge with the royal carts): RA 2415, 2676.
90 RA 2798–2800.
91 RA 3019: December 1279.
92 RA 2415.
93 RA 3059–3060.
Fyntha’s fortresses of Zelench (Slanec) and Patak.94 The campaign eliminated

Fyntha Aba from Hungary’s political life. What followed was the instauration,
for a brief period (approximately 1282–1287), of a system of governance ruled
by the king and based on a balance among the aristocratic parties.
Despite the fact that other members of the kindred distanced themselves
from Palatine Fyntha’s rebellion, the Aba kindred was distrusted by the king for
a while. The only one who would succeed in receiving the royal grace during
King Ladislas IV’s reign was Lawrence Aba.95
94 To date this campaign see: Atilla Zsoldos, “Téténytõl a Hód-tóig (Az 1279 és 1282 közötti
politikatörténetének vázlata)”, in TSzl 1 (1997): 69–98.
95 Magister tavernicorum and count of Saros from January to September, 1285:
RA 3348–3385.
CHAPTER 5
Regnum Transilvanum: The Rise of the

Congregational Regime
5.1 The Voivode Roland Borsa
The noblemen of the Borsa kindred, after defeating the sons of Nicholas
Geregye, became the true rulers of the counties between Tisza, Mureş and
the Transylvanian borders. Still, they were not members of the old Hungarian
aristocracy.1 Until around 1280, none of the members of the kindred held any
significant political office. Furthermore, after being defeated in the rebellion
against Charles Robert, in 1320, the Borsas were almost completely eliminated
from the foreground of medieval Hungary’s political life. This might be due to
the fact that the roots of the Borsa kindred were not of Hungarian origin. The
family probably belonged to the ruling elite who controlled the area prior to
the Hungarian conquest or they may have been connected to the companions
of Magyar conquerors, who came here around 900.2 Still, the older of the two
most important branches of the Borsa kindred was the one in Transylvania,
whose properties developed from the nucleus located in the Valleys of the
Borsa and Lona, in Dăbâca county. The dispersion and fragmentation of these
1 Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 144. See also Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 226–233,
290–293.
2 The attempts to clarify the ethnic origins of this family had been steril. For Slavo-Romanian
origins see: Nicolae Drăganu, Românii din secolele IX–XIV pe baza toponimiei and onomasti-
cei (Bucharest: Imprimeria Naţională, 1933), 390, 510; Ioan Pătrut, Onomastica românească
(Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1980), 25. For Cuman origins see: Nicolae
Iorga, Histoire des Roumains, III (Bucharest: Imprimeria Naţională, 1937), 241; Ioan Lupaş,
“Voievodatul Transilvaniei în sec. XII şi XIII,” Studii, conferinţe şi comunicări istorice II (1930):
19. For the Kabar or Khazar origins see: György Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország történeti
földrajza, (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1963), 1: 496, 573. For Hungarian origins see: István
Kniezsa, Keletmagyarország helynevei I (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1943), 227, 235; László
Makkai and András Mócsy, ed., Erdély története I (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1987), 262–
263; questioned by Radu Popa and Nicolae Chidioşan and Antal Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală
din secolele XI–XII la Sânnicolau de Beiuş. Contribuţii la istoria Bihorului medieval” in RMM.
MIA 2 (1984): 23. Radu Popa, Țara Maramureşului în veacul al XIV-lea (Bucharest: Editura
Academiei, 1970), 24: argues that the origin of the Borşa name might be the pre-Roman.

The Rise of the Congregational Regime 131
estates3 indicates the repetitive successions throughout several generations.

In 1306, during a confrontation with the members of the Kökényes-Radnót
kindred over the ownership of Pâglişa (Puklustheluky), located in the imme-
diate vicinity of the Dăbâca fortress, Ladislas Borsa claimed his ab antiquo
rights, despite his recent failure to produce any written document as proof.4
Nonetheless, the nobiliary congregation of Transylvania considered his claims
to be as rightful as those made by the sons of Ban Mykud. The dispute was won
in a judicial duel by Ladislas Borsa’s representatives.5 As for the Bihor branch
of the kindred, they gained, at an unspecified date, ownership of the property
compactly populated by Romanians ethnics on the upper Crişul Negru River.
Its nucleus lay, after all probabilities, in Sânnicolau de Beiuş, where archaeo-
logical research of 1971–1982 identified the remains of a nobleman’s residence
dating back to the 11th century.6 Under the circumstances, the unusually rapid
rise of the Bihor branch of the Borsa kindred to the highest political positions
can only be explained by the favorable situation of the 1280s, due to the sup-
port the kindred of count Thomas benefited from two key characters of the
time: Archbishop Lodomerius and King Ladislas IV. The indestructible alliance
between the Borsa kindred and the Bishop of Oradea, Lodomerius, was the
keystone in the victory against the Geregye kindred. Noteworthy is the fact that
the nucleus of the Bihor properties owned by the Borsa kindred was located in
the “land of Beiuş”, a region populated by Romanians. In the middle of the 13th
century, the Bishopric of Oradea received, in these regions, major donations
from the Magyar crown.7 After becoming Bishop of Oradea (1266), Lodomerius,
one of Stephen V’s close allies, might have turned to the sons of count
Thomas Borsa for support against Paul Geregye and his successors at the head
of the opposing party. Borsa. After 1272, the Borsa brothers constructed the
Şoimi fortress which, together with the Finiş episcopal fortress, were two of the
most important strongholds against the domination of the Geregye kindred
and their allies in Bihor. The victory over the Geregye kindred turned the sons of
count Thomas into the main inheritors of the estates previously owned by the
defeated. On the long run, these estates provided them with enough material
resources to fuel their spectacular rise in the decades that followed. Together
with the fortresses of Valcău and Piatra Şoimului, obtained on this occasion,
3 Makkai and Mócsy, Erdély története, 262–263; Karácsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek, 290–293.
4 József Pataki, Anjou királyaink és a két román vajdaság (Cluj: Kolozsvár: Nagy Jeno, 1944),
15–17.
5 Pataki, Anjou királyaink, 15–17.
6 Popa, Chidiosan, and Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală”, 26–34.
7 Popa, Chidioşan, and Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală”, 25.
132 CHAPTER 5
the Borsa brothers must have also gained possession of the royal fortress from
Adrian.8 By extending their control over all these fortresses and estates, the
Borsa kindred found itself in the possession of a vast, massive and compact
domain. In addition, their military and economic resources made them one of
the most powerful aristocratic families in the Kingdom of Hungary. Thus, it was
an even more appealing target for the ambitious Lodomerius who, with sup-
port from Cardinal Philip of Fermo, managed to obtain, in 1279, the most impor-
tant position in the ecclesiastic hierarchy, that of Archbishop of Esztergom.
As a consequence, King Ladislas IV appreciated the support the Borsa kindred
could provide in his attempt to overthrow the domination of the Aba kindred
and to establish the much wanted calm amongst the aristocratic parties (1281–
1282). Even though, until 1278–1279 the Cumans offered the king the military
support nedeed to preserve a certain independence from the aristocratic fac-
tions, after the measures taken against them (after pressures from the papal
legate) they no longer stood by the king’s side. Consequently, all major political
offices were seized by the Aba kindred. In order to defeat the Abas, Ladislas
turned to the services of the Borsa kindred, which he provided with estates and
privileges, and turned it from a petty noble kindred into a strong ally. Under the
circumstances, Roland Borsa, the oldest son of count Thomas, was appointed
voivode of Transylvania. The details of the campaign against the Aba kindred
were probably decided in the winter of 1281–1282, when King Ladislas visited
Oradea for Christmas.9 Roland was probably appointed shortly before the first
official mentioning with the title of voivode (May 19, 1282). Under the circum-
stances, his appointment could not have coincided with his effective installa-
tion in a province still under the rule of the Aba kindred. Furthermore, his first
assignment as voivode was to retake the province from the hands of the Abas.
It is unclear whether Roland Borsa had the time to impose his authority over
all the Transylvanian counties. Nevertheless, the only time when this could
have happened was April and June 1282. During the same period of time, the
Borsa brothers played a major role in the armed clashes against Akon Geregye
in Bihor, the most important local ally of the Aba kindred.10 The dramatic
events in the summer and fall of the same year left Roland Borsa little time
to launch an expedition in Transylvania. In July–August 1282,11 the king set off
on his great campaign against the fortresses of Szalánc and Patak, which must
8 Regarding the fortresses mentioned and the evolution of their status, see: Popa, Chidioşan,
Lukács, “O reşedinţă feudală”, 22, 24; Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország, 593, 660–662.
9 Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 93.
10 DIR II 254–255; HD 447–448; Jakó 405.
11 For the chronology of the events see: Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 69–98.
have required the presence of the army that the Borsa brothers held in Bihor.
Unexpectedly, in the context of the raid against Fyntha Aba which seemed to
reach its final stages, the Cumans started their great rebellion. To answer this
new challenge King Ladislas headed southwards, engaging in the great bat-
tle of the Lake Hód.12 The subsequent victory was also due to Roland Borsa’
intervention.13
Despite the role played in the royal conspiracy against Fyntha Aba and
his contribution to the victory against the Cumans, Roland Borsa could not
be maintained voivode for long. In the light of the dramatic events of 1282,
King Ladislas made another political choice for the voivode office. The lake
Hód victory had been obtained by the king with help of all Hungarian aris-
tocratic and noble factions. During the general congregation that followed,
at Szeged, between October 24th and 16,14 the king tried to balance the influ-
ence of the parties, by making a series of concessions to the high aristoc-
racy. Consequently, Matthew Csák was reinstated great palatine, Petér Aba
became treasurer, and Petér Tétény the Ban of Slavonia.15 These concessions
represented a postponing of King Ladislas’ intentions to impose a governing
regime based exclusively on his supporters. In this governing system, the Borsa
brothers would have pressumably occupied important positions. However, at
Szeged, Roland Borsa was not able to overcome his low origins and the alliance
with the royal faction. Subsequently he was rejected by the old aristocracy and
sacrificed in the name of the governing system. Furthermore, Apor (Opour) of
the Peć kindred, representative of the old aristocracy, was appointed voivode.
Even though his estates were located mainly in western Hungary, Apor Peć was
also one of the protagonists of the military confrontations of his time. Also, his
brother Gregory was one of the participants to the Balkan expeditions led by
Stephen V.16
Apor Peć was voivode throughout 1283 and the first part of 1284. Still, there
is little information available regarding his activity.17 Most likely he exerted
his office mostly from outside the province. Also, he merely instituted an
12 According to Zsoldos, Az Árpádok és alattvalóik, 93–96: sometime between September, 17th
and the October, 21st, 1282.
13 Chronicon pictum, 97–98: “Lorandus filius Thome, miles strenuus contra Cumanos lancea-
vit cum impetu virtutis sue, et laudabiliter percussit plurimos et prostravit”.
14 congregatio regni nostri: Szücs, Az utolsó Arpádok, 312.
15 KMTL 475, 650, 662.
16 CD V/3 157–158.
17 The confirmation, in 1283, of the privilege granted by Ladislas IV to the Dej colonists is the
only internal document known from his reign, see: DIR II 244; Jakó 401.
134 CHAPTER 5
exploitation regime to the benefit of the Hungarian aristocracy. With no prop-

erties in Transylvania, the Peć kindred never demonstrated any interest in this
province. On the other hand, his allies, the Rátót kindred, took advantage of
the political anarchy and managed to extend their control (for a short period
of time) over the vast royal estates of Ciceu (Chycho) and Reteag (Rethteg), in
Solnoc county.18
The political alliance that imposed Apor Peć as voivode broke apart after the
death of Matthew Csák (1284). Thus the governing system was challenged by the
Heder kindred, against whom King Ladislas led a military expedition in early
1284.19 The subsequent failure of the campaign, the political crisis in the king-
dom and the rising political influence of Archbishop Lodomerius determined
the king to institute a new form of government with the the Heder (Nicholas
Kőszegi—palatine, Ivan Kőszegi—ban of Slavonia20) and Aba kindreds
(Amadé—royal court judge, Lawrence—treasurer21) holding the main offices
(summer of 1284). Also, two of the Borsa kindred members were finally granted
important positions. Thus, while Roland Borsa was reinstated voivode of
Transylvania and count of Solnoc, his brother Jacob (Kopasz) became Great
Count (magister agasonum) and count of Borsod.22
It was in this formula, which lasted until 1286, that Roland Borsa’s control
over Transylvania was truly effective. Still, on August 1, 1284, despite becoming
voivode, Roland Borsa presided, next to the Bishop of Oradea, a congregation
of noblemen in the Bihor county with the purpose of reforming the customs
system.23 He was mentioned in Transylvania in December 21, 1284, when while
in Dej, he acknowledged the rights given to the colonists in this locality in
the royal privilege of 1279.24 This document had also been confirmed a year
before, by voivode Apor Peć. However, less than a month later, Roland Borsa
was forced to suspend his political and administrative activities and deal with
the military threat possed by the Mongol invasion led by Nogai and Tula Buga.
18 DIR II 245–246; HD 446. The document is a historic fake, but must also present some
acurate information, see: Jakó 402.
19 During January–February: Kosztolnyik, Thirteenth Century, 290.
20 KMTL 475, 650.
21 KMTL 512, 662.
22 DIR II 254–255; RA 3348.
23 DIR II 261–262.
24 DIR II 267–268; ZW 146–147.
5.2 The Mongol Invasion of 1285
The Mongol invasion of 1285 was most likely a direct consequence of the
Cuman rebellion of 1282.25 Chased away from Hungary by King Ladislas
“beyond the mountains, to the Tartar borders, where none of his predecessors
trespassed”,26 the Cumans offered their services to Nogai, the Mongol khan of
the Lower Danube. With the new military force under his command, Nogai
decided to start a vast campaign against an apparently weak kingdom.27 As
his grandfather (Bela IV) before him, Ladislas the Cuman was considered
responsible by some noblemen for provoking the invasion, due to his connec-
tions to the Cumans. Furthermore, in the years to come, some even accused
Ladislas of having invited the invaders himself.28 The invasion of 1285 seems to
have followed the routes taken by Batu and Kadan, four decades earlier. Thus,
while Tula Buga, accompanied by the Russian knezes and Lithuanian troops,
stormed into Hungary most likely through the Verecke Pass,29 a second Mongol
army commanded by Nogai crossed the Carpathians in the Braşov area and
entered Transylvania.30 Most likely, there was a third army following the route
taken by Kadan in 1241 to the center of the kingdom. This would explain the
Mongol damage inflicted on Bistriţa and Northern Transylvania.
In order to ensure the element of surprise, the invasion started in the dead
of winter, in the middle of January.31 This explains the Mongols’ cumbersome
25 Petru Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare asupra Transilvaniei în a doua jumătate a sec-
olului al XIII-lea,” AIIACluj XVII (1974): 212–223; V. Spinei, Moldavia, 170–171; Papacostea,
Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 123–124, 161.
26 de finibus et terminis Tartarorum quos nemo praedecessorum nostrorum peragraverat,
ultra Alpes—CD V/3. 410; DIR II 292–293.
27 A significant number of reliable sources blame the Cumans for the invasion: Chronicon
Pictum Vindobonense, Chronicon Posoniense, Chronicon Varadinense, Anonymi Leobiensis,
Chronicon Austriacum, Miechovius—Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis. See also: Iambor,
“Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 214, n. 13.
28 Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 109.
29 Spinei, Moldavia, 122; Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 215.
30 Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 219; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol
Empire, 191. The reconstitution of Nogai’s route is based on the information gathered in
the Chronicle of Ipatiev. See also: Antal Hodinka, Az orosz évkönyvek magyar vonatkozásai
(Budapest: A. M. Tud. Akadémia kiadása, 1916) 450.
31 According to Matthias Miechovius, the Mongols devastated Hungary: ab octavo epipha-
niarum [January, 13th] usque ad festum Paschae [March, 25th]. Gombos, Catalogus, 1610.
136 CHAPTER 5
crossing of the Carpathians and the unfavorable weather they had to face dur-
ing their operations in Transylvania.32
The invasion made it impossible for King Ladislas to summon enough forces
to engage in a decisive confrontation with the invaders. Much needed help
came from the noblemens’ powerful armed forces. Due to the anarchy in the
kingdom and the barons’ custom of solving their differences through violence,
the local armies were remarkably swift and also well trained. The army corps
led by Roland Borsa, Amadé Aba, Georgius Baksa, Peter of Sáros, and other
noblemen in the East managed to disperse a great number of their troops and
to release most prisoners taken by the Mongols.33 Thus, even though the invad-
ers arrived in Pest in the first part of their campaign,34 the destruction they
caused in central and Northern Hungary was not irreparable.
In Transylvania, the areas most affected were in the North, which indicates
that one of the invading army used this route leading to the center of Hungary.
Thus, the invasion of 1285 affected Bistriţa,35 Ocna Dejului,36 Cluj-Mănăştur,37
Turda and Ocnele Turzii,38 Rimetea Trascăului.39 Despite the relatively signifi-
cant number of references, the Mongols’ devastation was not catastrophic, and
the resistance they faced must have been particularly fierce. The new types of
fortifications constructed in the second half of the 13th century, which had
proven their resistance during the numerous civil wars and local conflicts after
1262, stood strong before the Mongols. Thus, the Trascău fortress, defended by
the Székelys in the Arieş region, resisted all assaults.40 Moreover, by organiz-
ing an ambush against the Mongols, the Székelys managed to free more than
one thousand men from captivity.41 The only fortress which we are certain
the Mongols conquered and destroyed was that of Ban Mykud, in the Arieş
Valley. Still, this fortress was the former royal stronghold of Turda42 and the
improvements made by the new landlord proved insufficient. On the other
33 Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 216–217.
34 SRH I 213; SRH II 44, 472.
35 DIR II 279; ZW 149–150.
36 DIR II 354–355; ZW 169–170.
37 Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare,” 218.
38 DIR II 376–377; ZW 181–182.
39 DIR II 377–379; ZW 182–184.
40 DIR II 312–314; CD V/3 452–454: “castro Thuruczkou se viriliter obiecerunt, et contra eos-
dem Tartaros laudabiliter dimicarunt”.
41 DIR II 312–314; CD V/3 452–454.
42 Iambor, “În legătură cu localizarea cetaţii Sânmiclăuş (Turda),” ActaMN XIV (1977):
309–313.
hand, according to direct or indirect data available, none of the new genera-
tion fortress was conquered by the Mongols. Furthermore, in the Southern and
Eastern areas of Transylvania, the Székelys, the Romanians and the Saxons suc-
cessfully blocked the invasion in its initial phase.43 During the Mongol retreat,
taking advantage of the whimsical spring, the local armies inflicted a series
of hard blows to the Mongol army.44 Thus, with the advantage of the nobil-
ity’s excellent mobilization and the Transylvanians’ remarkable reactivity, the
Mongol retreat turned into a disaster for the invaders.
In comparison with the disaster caused in the Hungarian kingdom by the
great invasion of 1241–1242, the long term consequences of the 1285 invasion
were minor. There are no records of deserted or devastated localities in 1285,
temporary cease of activity of major economic centers, famine, or depopula-
tion. The state institutions, secular or ecclesiastic, were able to function nor-
mally in this period of time. There were no disappearances recorded among the
royal dignitaries or clerks, the members of major aristocratic or the aristocratic
families. Also, the Mongols were not as successful at conquering fortresses
or piercing through fortifications. Furthermore, during the invasion of 1285,
they were not the ambushers, but very frequently the ambushed. Constantly
harassed by the local forces, the Mongols hastly retreated before the army that
King Ladislas amassed on the Western bank of the Danube.
Under the circumstances, the theory that this retreat was for Nogai a politi-
cal success45 Nogai can be disputable. In reality, the invasion of 1285 was for
the Mongols mostly a failure that could have easily turned into a catastrophe.46
Even though according to Salimbene, Nogai retreated after signing a “peace”
with King Ladislas,47 the invasion of January-March 1285 was the Mongols’ last
great invasion of Hungary and the last threat possed to Hungary’s integrity.
The indecisive result of this confrontation, together with King Ladislas’ inabil-
ity to speculate Nogai’s retreat in his external policy, enabled the Mongols to
43 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 261; Knauz, Monumenta
Ecclesiae Strigoniensis, 419: “Siculi, Olahi et Saxones omnes vias ipsorum cum indaginibus
stipaverunt sive giraverunt”.
44 Iambor, “Atacurile cumano-tătare”, 219 (indicating the sources); Papacostea, Between the
Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 191.
45 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 191; V. Ciocîltan, The Mongols
and the Black Sea, 256—for whom, after the 1285 invasion, King Ladislas the Cuman had
become “Noghai puppet king of Hungary” is undoubtedly far fetched.
46 According to Spinei, Moldavia, 122: “a demi-failure for the Mongols / . . . / who no longer
ventured to organize such vast campaigns against Transylvania and Hungary and con-
fined themselves to mere raids and pillaging along the frontier lines.”
138 CHAPTER 5
consolidate their domination in the Balkans and the Outer Carpathian territo-
ries. After this date, however, both sides showed extreme caution in trespass-
ing each other’s territories, in order to avoid any large scale attack.
The 1285 invasion was undoubtedly a personal failure for King Ladislas, who
did not succeed in playing a decisive role in a moment of major importance
for his kingdom. He did not manage to turn Nogai’s havoc into a personal vic-
tory, and failed to amass all the armed forced of the barons and the noblemen
under the royal banner, as he did at Marchfeld and Lake Hód. The king’s pas-
siveness before Nogai’s invasion shadowed the positive spirit he initiated with
the Tétény assembly and the battle of Marchfeld. Moreover, it was during his
time that the Arpadian dynasty started its decline.
At the same time, the event of 1285 was a major success for the local political
forces and the promoters of regional particularity. After proving their military
skills, the efficiency of their fortifications and their armed forces, their capabil-
ity to ensure the security of their subjects (to a greater extent than the king or
his dignitaries did), various local elites expanded their net of supporters and
deemed themselves entitled to rule large regions of the kingdom. Thus, the
events in the winter-spring of the year 1285 constituted a powerful momentum
in consolidating the aristocratic “principalities”, and stimulating the accumu-
lation of the regional political power in the hands of those who held the actual
military power.
5.3 Ladislas the Cuman and Transylvania
The invasion of 1285 brought to light the king’s lack of significant military
resources and his incapacity to compensate for those shortcomings through
political skills. The Mongol threat was removed with the intervention of the
aristocracy and armed communities supported by the fortresses of the nobil-
ity and with almost no help from the king. Consequently, what was left of the
prestige of the king was rapidly dimishing, and eventually was lowered to the
level of the resources he possessed.
Under the circumstances, in parallel with appeals to the Cumans to return
under his command, the king saw himself forced to identify a sufficiently sta-
ble base that would provide him with an alternative to the eternal dichotomy
between the various noblemen factions that he was unable to control. This
base could not come from the counties in Northern Hungary or from those
across the Danube, which were now under the control of aristocratic families
like the Aba, Csák or Heder. Also he could not rely on Slavonia or the Maritime
Provinces (Croatia and Dalmatia), where the nobility, influenced by the papal
propaganda and the peninsular policy, were already in favor of the Naples
branch of the Anjou family as successors.48
Therefore, the only option for Ladislas was the nobility from the East of
the Tisza River, where no kindred strong enough to join the “oligarchy” had
emerged until the 1280s. In the decades after the great Mongol invasion, these
regions were forced to accept the domination of aristocratic families from the
center and the Western part of the kingdom. The king could only benefit from
these loyal keepers of the old Arpadian regulations. Also, this nobility was rela-
tively homogenous, with few social and economic inequalities, and reluctant
to the domination of elites from other parts of the kingdom. Moreover, after
the political events of 1272–1280, Transylvania, with its outstanding human
and material resources, showed potential in becoming a decisive factor in the
competition for the domination of the internal political arena, which King
Ladislas could not avoid.
Thus, Transylvania’s importance in court politics increased, as the king
was faced with more difficulties in controlling the internal political develop-
ment. Moreover, within two months after the Mongol retreat from Hungary,
Transylvania was the first province to receive a royal visit. According to the
available information, this was also Ladislas’ first visit to Transylvania as a king.
The king’s trip to Transylvania was incredibly fast. Even though on May 8,
1285, Ladislas was still on the Csepel Island (Magna insula),49 by May 27, he
was already in Alba Iulia.50 After approximately two weeks the king was back
in Hortobagy (June, 13th),51 heading towards Zips, which he reached in the sec-
ond half of July.52 Thus, the effective time spent by the king in Transylvania
amounted to no more than two weeks, including the time spent visiting the
inner province. The most important goal of this trip (which he made accom-
panied by voivode Roland Borsa)53 was the assessment of the Mongol destruc-
tion and the rewarding of the warriors who fought in the conflict.54 Moreover,
this trip was the king’s attempt to wash away his passive approach to the inva-
sion and to take some credit for the victory. This was a remarkable initiative,
considering that we have no evidence that King Bela IV, his grandfather, set
foot in Transylvania after the events of 1241–1242.

49 RA 3358.
50 RA 3361–3363.
51 Hurtubag, RA 3364.
52 RA 3372.
53 Jakó 410.
54 DIR II 273–274; Jakó 408.
140 CHAPTER 5
In the following years, the king’s presence to the East of Tisza started resem-
bling a real exile. The formal reconciliation between Ladislas and Queen
Isabella, a warranty of his return to Christian values, was put to the test with
the deaths of Isabella’s father, Charles of Anjou, and Pope Martin IV (1285).
The king reconnected with the Cumans, resumed the liaisons with his concu-
bines and returned to the Cuman lifestyle, which determined the aristocracy
of the kingdom to desert him for good. Consequently, Archbishop Lodomerius
became the main decision maker in the kingdom. Having to choose between
their two protectors, the Borsa kindred did not hesitate in manifesting their
favors to Lodomerius, thus becoming adversaries of the king. Despite the
royal attempt to reach a compromise at the Rákos congregation (June, 1286),55
peace could no longer be reinstated. In 1286–1287, the Heder kindred openly
defied the king, joining Albert of Habsburg, whom his father, King Rudolf I of
Germany, wanted to instate as king of Hungary. Giving the request for support
from Pope Honorius IV and Archbishop Lodomerius56 to his personal advan-
tage, Rudolf of Habsburg invaded the counties at the border with Austria.57 In
this context and with the firm support of the Holy See, Archbishop Lodomerius
did not hesitate to excommunicate the king in 1287. Desperate to find a solu-
tion to his political dilemma, Ladislas considered an unpopular and impossible
alliance with Nogai.58 Looking for an alternative to this compromised reign,
Lodomerius managed to gather an increasing number of nobles to endorse
Andrew “The Venetian”, grandson of Andrew II, appointed duke of Slavonia,
despite King Ladislas’s opposition.
Between 1286 and 1290, the king frequently visited the eastern regions of his
kingdom, where he wanted to create an internal base of supporters to enable
him to turn the tables to his advantage. After the failure of the Rákos congrega-
tion, in 1286, he retreated to Kewe, where he was arrested in September 4 and
kept in custody until the beginning of the next year.59 Furthermore, during
the interval between the spring of 1287 and the next summer, the king made
desperate attempts to regain his status and tried to intervene decisively in the
rebellious counties located in the northern and western parts of the kingdom.
In the fall of 1288, he found himself in a difficult position, which forced him
to return to the safer regions. Thus, between September 23 and October 8, the
55 RA 3408–3412; Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 292.

56 DIR II 281; HD 466.
59 RA 3418.
king was in Igriş,60 and on October 27, he was in Braşov,61 where he probably
spent the winter. In June 1289, Ladislas summoned the congregation at Föveny,
in a last attempt to reach a compromise with his adversaries. After failing
again, he was forced to retreat eastward, where he remained, with two short
interruptions, until his assassination.62
Ladislas’s persistence in building a base of local supporters overshadowed
voivode Roland Borsa’s authority in Transylvania. Provoked by Lodomerius,
Roland Borsa changed his allegiance, which determined the king to dismiss
Roland and replace him with Moyus Ákos (around 1288). In this period of con-
fusing events, the attitude of Bishop Peter Monoszló played a crucial role. The
bishop had voivode Moyus and the “king’s brother-in-law”, Arbuz the Cuman,
arrested,63 most likely in the spring of 1289. This was presumably a part of a
larger conspiracy orchestrated by Lodomerius. His intention was to deprive
Ladislas of his Transylvanian support and speed up the removal of a king con-
sidered dangerous by most. Peter Monoszló was eventually forced to change
his atittude towards King Ladislas, due to his decision to annul all donations
made to the bishopric during his reign (including the city of Cluj and much
of Alba Iulia, among others). In addition, the king’s arduous efforts to gather
more support had started to pay off.
The generosity he showed, in this period of time, to the Bistriţa colonists
(whose taxes were cut by a third)64 and the Ocna Dejului colonists (removed
from the voivodal jurisdiction,65 and raised to the rank of royal city) as well
as his efforts to attract on his side the Saxons from the province of Sibiu,66
60 RA 3506–3508.

61 RA 3509.
62 Kewe, September, 13th (RA 3532–3533); Berechte, November, 4th (RA 3536); iuxta villam
Toty, November, 9th (RA 3537); Chanadini, December, 7th (RA 3538); iuxta Keressceg,
December, 25th (RA 3539); prope Chegled, March, 5th–6th, 1290 (RA 3551–3552);
Karansebus, April, 29th (RA 3553); Cheenk, May, 21st (RA 3555); Zekes, May, 27th–28th (RA
3557–3560); Chanad, June, 18th (RA 3561); Zorvosholm, June, 24th (RA 3562).
63 DIR II 311–312; ZW 162–163 (“cognatum nostrum”, could also have the generic meaning of
“kin”). Jakó 450: considers the document to be a fake from the early 14th century, however,
information on major political history events could be taken into account.
64 DIR II 306; ZW 149–150; Jakó 446 (July, 22nd, 1289). Reconfirmed on May, 27th, 1290: DIR II
322–323; ZW 166–167; Jakó 458.
65 DIR II 322, 504; ZW 166; Jakó 457 (May, 21st, 1290).
66 On October, 27th, 1288, Provost John (Johannes) of Sibiu was assigned as royal witness:
DIR II 304–305; ZW 158–159; Jakó 440. Confirmed by the king’s presence in Braşov, the
locality where the document was issued.
142 CHAPTER 5
worried archbishop Lodomerius. In the summer of 1288,67 Lodomerius wrote

a letter to the inhabitants of Sibiu and Braşov, in which the king received
various false accusations. The document probably reflected the threat of
Ladislas’s increased notoriety in Transylvania and his successful propaganda.
Furthermore, the Székelys located on the Arieş River received, in 1289, the con-
firmation of their privileges as a reward for their outstanding support given
to the king. Royal generosity was also bestowed on numerous Transylvanian
noblemen, who offered Ladislas the military power he needed. Thus, the mili-
tary campaign led by the king against the rebellious nobility in the Zips county
benefited from large support from the Transylvanian nobility, who were asked
by Ladislas to testify in the matter of some property donations.68 The father
of the beneficiary of this donation, Peter, son of Samson of Gerend (Luncani),
was mentioned from 1288 as a royal witness,69 proving the solid support given
by this Transylvanian noble family to King Ladislas. Another important noble
family, the Geoagiul de Sus noblemen, received from the king, on October 19,
1289, a property that had been previously donated to the German settlers of
Cricău by Stephen V.70 Thus, Ladislas was willing to make major concessions
to keep his supporters close. Moreover, documents show that despite the
excommunication pronounced by Lodomerius, the noblemen of Transylvania
did not seem to have the intent to boycott the king. Thus, Ban Mykud, one
of the important noblemen in Transylvania, did not hesitate to ask the king,
in the spring of 1288, for the confirmation of a donation he had made to the
Bishopric of Transylvania.71 Furthermore, the church of Transylvania, with the
exception of the gap in early 1289, due mostly to Bishop Peter’s political ambi-
tions, maintained cordial relation with the king. In this context, alongside the
reconfirmations or enlargements of older donations,72 the king restituted, in
1288, to the Bishopric of Transylvania the tithes in Ugocsa county, seized by
Beke Borsa.73 Undoubtedly, the massive military and material support received
from Transylvania helped the king overcome the 1287–1288 crises and keep
his hopes of strengthening his political position. Thus, his efforts to gain and
maintain Transylvanian support explain the expansion, in the same period, of
the congregational regime to Transylvania.
67 DIR II 296–299; Jakó 436.

68 DIR II 306–308; HO VI 341–342; Jakó 455.
69 DIR II 304–305; ZW 158–159.
70 DIR II 314–315; ZW 164–165; Jakó 453.
71 Jakó 435 (with text). See also DIR II 294–296; HD 470–472; Jakó 434.
72 See for example: DIR II 306, 309–310; Jakó 447, 448 (both from August, 1289).
73 DIR II 304–305; ZW 158–159.
5.4 The Rise of the Congregational Regime
From the second quarter of the 13th century,74 the county nobility in Hungary’s
transdanubian area attempted to obtain an increased level of self administra-
tion. Furthermore, congregations of noblemen coming from all over the king-
dom were sporadically mentioned since 1267.75 Still, it was King Ladislas IV,
aided by his political group that reinstated the noblemen’s congregations,
the one who redefined their functions and turned them into a fundamen-
tal institution in the government system. The first general congregation was
summoned in May 1277 at Rákos, at the initiative of barons and bishops close
to the Csák party. On this occasion young Ladislas, age 15, was proclaimed
in aetate legitima constitutus and declared his intention to take over the
government.76 Bringing a temporary truce between the most important aris-
tocratic factions, this assembly played a decisive role in the preparation of the
great victory of Marchfeld (1278), which also fulfilled Ladislas’ personal ven-
detta against Ottokar II, his father’s archenemy. Through the congregational
reform initiated on this occasion, Ladislas IV countered the exclusive con-
trol the aristocracy exerted over the internal political life and reestablished
the royalty’s direct connection with the lower nobility. This monarchic ide-
ology echoed in the work of the loyal Simon of Kéza, in the vision of whom
the members of the noble “states” shared equal rights in the election of the
political and military leaders and judges since the beginning of times. In addi-
tion, the famous political doctrine treaty of abbot Engelbert of Admont, De
regimine principum, presented the same ideology and enjoyed broad circula-
tion until the dawn of the modern era.77 Written in the last decade of the 13th
century, the latter work portrayed an ideal past, providing the old Hungary as
an example of regimen mixtum based on a harmonious colaboration between
a powerful central authority and “most inhabitants” of the country,78 whose
association to the act of government could not function in the absence of
a parliamentary structure. In a context featuring such ideas, the king easily
74 Fügedi, The Elefánthy, 36–38; Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 120.
75 DIR II 92–94.
77 Molnár P., A Magyarországi kormányzat mint a regimen mixtum példája Admonti
Engelbertnél (1290-es évek eleje) (The Hungarian kingdom as a regimen mixtum in the work
of Engelbert of Admont (about 1290), in Századok, 133, 1/1999, 113–124.
78 ibidem, 117, 123: quale regimen dicitur aliquando fuisse in regno Hungariae, ubi rex solus
kingbat, singula secundum rationem et dignitates et honores per Kingm distribuebantur,
non secundum nobilitatem generis, sed secundum virtutem, qua se habebat unusquisque ad
bonum regni: et in magnis et novis, beneplacitum majoris partis totius populi expectabatur.
144 CHAPTER 5
identified the ideological support to meet the aspirations of lesser nobility to

be represented in both the kingdom’s general policies and the local and provin-
cial administrative structures. The judicial attributions of county assemblies
were thus extended, by royal initiative, towards gaining a much wider impor-
tance. Moreover, the royal initiative of eliminating the custom posts, abusively
introduced after the death of Stephen V, was enforced not by designating royal
judges (as Bela IV did in the attempt to recover the domains of the royal forts
abusively estranged) but by allowing the counties and the provincial congre-
gations to make the decision. Thus, the landed nobility gained a weapon they
could use against aristocratic interference and abuse, becoming a decision
maker in the issues of commercial activities and freedom of circulation. To
make the congregational system functional, the king instituted the provincial
congregations, meant to relieve noblemen from the suffocating authority of
aristocratic families in some counties, and at the same time to overcome the
nobility’s vulnerability against the barons at the kingdom’s general congrega-
tions. Unsurprisingly, these congregational provinces, which reunited a vari-
able number of counties, followed, whenever these models existed, a number
of old territorial structures, some of them possibly tracking their origin prior
to the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian basin. These political structures
had survived, in various forms, until the 12th century and their memory was
still present in the historical tradition of the time. Thus, the congregational
province instituted between the Someş, Tisza and Meseş (1279)79 revived the
former structure of Menumorout’s country, transformed by the Hungarian con-
querors into Bihor Duchy. Moreover, the group of counties on the lower Mureş
River80 was related to the former territorial structure of Ohtum’s country. This
is especially important considering that the noblemen from the Chanad kin-
dred, the effective rulers of most of the region, were the direct descendants of
some of the protagonists of the events which took place around the year 1000.
At their turn, Transylvania and Slavonia were provinces with distinct admin-
istrative structures, which enjoyed a special status within Hungary, and the
congregational provinces molded to the existing structures.
Transylvania’s evolution towards a congregational structure, ultimately
reaching the status of distinct regnum in the kingdom of Hungary, started at
the time when the province became a corner stone in King Ladislas’ attempt to
achieve stability. As a matter of fact, there is no evidence of a congregational
79 Initially including the counties of Bihor, Solnoc, Satmar, Crasna, Bekes, Zarand and
Szabolcs—DIR II 201–203; Wenzel XII 250–253.
80 In its first form (1285), it included the counties of Timiş, Arad and Cenad—DIR II 274–277;
Wenzel IX 419–422.
system in this province before the Mongol invasion of 1285 and the affirmation
of Transylvania’s privileged position in the internal affairs of King Ladislas in
the years after 1286.
The assertion of the judicial autonomy of Transylvanian nobility could
build on precedents in the kingdom of Hungary. Wider pressures for change,
begun as a reforming movement started by those at the bottom of the privi-
leged ranks,81 had been initiated by the royal servants, as testified by the
Hungarian word szolgabíró, which literally meant judge of servants. According
to Elemer Mályusz’s demonstration,82 this term must have been used from the
time when the people who organized the self-governing institutions of the
county were still called servientes regis, before being named nobiles. In this
context, the oldest references of “royal servants” in the kingdom of Hungary
originate in the Transylvanian space. Even though the first such mention83
remains debatable, Johannes Latinus’ account, placed by King Emerich inter
Theutonicos Transilvanienses at the dawn of the 13th century, is considered to be
straightforward.84 The early advent of this social category in Transylvania is
related to institutional evolutions in the Transdanubian counties (inspired by
Western feudalism) as far back as the castrens structures, in the last decades of
Bela IV’s reign. Transylvania’s special position in the kingdom and the specific
structure of its judicial organization left little room for the de proprio motu
development of such structures. The entire juridical hierarchy of the seven
Transylvanian counties was subordinated to the voivode and implicitly to
his deputy (the vicevoivode), both, more involved than the king in their own
province and far from willings to voluntarily renounce to their important rev-
enues. The voivodes who ruled until 1282 struggled to keep the province under
tight control, without allowing the local nobility the opportunity to manifest
their own political views. Matthew Csák himself, despite the relatively broad
support he enjoyed from the local nobility, did nothing more than to institute
some sort of limited “voivodal council”, in which the participation to the deci-
sion-making was restricted to the members of the aristocratic members of the
faction he ruled.
These precautionary measures proved to be entirely justified. Furthermore,
the noblemen congregation of Transylvania was a major hurdle for various
aristocratic factions attempting to impose their domination in this province
81 Fügedi, The Elefánthy, 41.

82 Elemér Mályusz, A magyar köznemesség kialakulása, Századok, 1942, 272–305.
83 Dating back to the times of Bela III, but available today as a copy from the time of
Stephen V—Fügedi, The Elefánthy, 35; Jakó 18 (1088–1090).
84 Jakó 30; ZW 7–8; DIR I 28–29, 368.
146 CHAPTER 5
and constituted a severe blow to the authority of voivode Roland Borsa. The
particular features of the congregational regime, due mainly to King Ladislas’
attempt to encourage the peripheral regions of the kingdom, led in the case
of Transylvania to representations formed only by the landed aristocracy. In
order to consolidate their autonomy and make these counties efficient politi-
cal instruments in the hands of the provincial nobility, the system seemingly
admitted the exclusion of dignitaries who did not own land in the respective
province, with the exception of the palatine count. Due to this feature char-
acteristic to the Transylvanian representative system (eliminated during the
Angevine dynasty) the voivode Roland Borsa, who did not own properties in
Transylvania, is never mentioned as taking part in the general congregations
of the Transylvanian nobility. According to the sources, the congregations
met always in the absence of the voivode, limiting the authority exerted by
Roland Borsa in the territory he administered. On the other hand, due to the
same mechanisms of the congregational system, Roland’s effective authority
became unchallenged in the counties between Tisza and Meseş, despite the
fact that he didn’t have there any official position in its support. In these coun-
ties, the voivode had all the advantages he lacked in Transylvania: he owned
a great number of estates and fortresses, had a number of stable residences
and received support from numerous allies. As a consequence, he chaired
there all known noblemen congregations. In this context, the king lacked the
legal means to counteract his authority, due to the fact that his position was
bestowed on him not by the king himself, but by the noble congregation. One
of the paradoxes of this incipient stage of the congregational regime was the
firm grip Roland Borsa had on the voivodal authority, despite the intention
of the sovereign to substitute him with Moyus Ákos and the difficulties he
encountered in having his authority acknowledged in the Inner Carpathian
region. The explanation can be found in the influence Roland Borsa exerted
over Archbishop Lodomerius and through him, over the kingdom’s general
congregation, which among its prerogatives included the right to confirm or
reject the dignitaries appointed by King Ladislas. Thus, although dismissed by
the king in the second half of 1288, Roland Borsa had his title confirmed by the
Föveny congregation (1289). This was the last attempt of the king to reach a
compromise with the clergy, barons and nobility.
Under the circumstances, the vicevoivode presided over and administered
the judicial procedures of the Transylvanian noble congregations. For the
next couple of decades the vicevoivodes held a key position in the internal
politics of Transylvania. The relatively great number of vice-voivodes recorded
between 1288 and 1290 indicates the intentions of both Voivode Roland and
King Ladislas to counteract each other’s influence. Thus, while Ladislas of
Sancto Martino, representative of the Transylvanian branch of the Borsa kin-

dred, was obviously the vice-voivode imposed by Roland Borsa and his direct
agent, Andrew (II) of Geoagiul de Sus was a “royalist” nobleman, whose rela-
tions with the voivode were less amicable.85
The first noble congregation (June 8, 1288),86 presided by vice-voivode
Ladislas of Sancto-Martino in association with the four royal judges of the
“Realm of Transylvania” (regnum Transylvanianum), took place in Cristiş/
Oprişani (villa Cruciferorum) and assumed the right to decide on issues related
to properties. Through a previous court decision, presided by Roland Borsa, the
noblemen of the Mykula kindred were forced to pay sixty silver marks to Bishop
Peter of Transylvania, as compensation for the damages they inflicted on the
bishop’s estates. Since the fine was not paid on the due date, the bishop was
given permission by the voivode to confiscate properties that amounted to the
sum owed. Bishop Peter’s receiving into possession of three estates (Dumbrava,
Stana, Zaonateluke) previously owned by the sons of Mykula, nedeed the con-
sultation and approval of the congregation of noblemen of Transylvania. The
congregation authorized Ladislas of Sancto-Martino to entrust the estates to
Archdeacon Paul of Turda, the representative of the Alba Iulia Chapter. In
case the fine was not paid in one year, the Archdeacon would confiscate their
property ownership over the lands. Moreover, the four royal judges who assisted
vice-voivode Ladislas in chairing the assemblies were part of the same pro-
vincial nobility that also included Ladislas of Sancto-Martino. It is possible
that Peter “of Nitra”, earl of Cluj87 was, much like Ladislas of Sancto-Martino,
one of the nobles Roland Borsa introduced in the congregation. The identi-
ties of the other three noble judges mentioned in the 1288 document are only
partly clarified. While count Peter, son of Murun, undoubtedly belonged to
the Iara family88 and count Michael, son of Lawrence, was probably a noble-
man from Solnoc county mentioned in 1280,89 there is little conclusive evi-
dence available regarding the identity of count Peter, son of Clement. Even
so, the available information allow us to conclude that the leading grup of the
Transylvanian nobility was located in the Northern counties.
The complex ethnic and administrative features of the Inner Carpathian
province required a broader congregational structure than that provided
by the seven “voivodal” counties. The new system was going to include the
85 DIR III 32–33.

86 DIR II 300–301; HD 474–475; Jakó 437.
87 DIR II 300, Jakó 437.
88 Jakó 425.
89 DIR II 225; Jakó 381.
148 CHAPTER 5
representatives of all privileged social strata living in the former Duchy of

Transylvania, making this a much more efficient political entity. Such a rep-
resentative structure, which preceded the Diet of Transylvania, could only
be summoned by the king himself, whose authority was acknowledged
by all privileged groups. In 1289, King Ladislas summoned an assembly of
“Transylvanian clerics, Hungarian noblemen, Saxons and Székelys”. In this con-
text he confirmed, among other things, a privilege to the Alba Iulia Chapter.90
This consultative formula, exclusively subordinated to the king, represented
a way of exerting control over the nobility in the counties using the Saxons
and the Székelys, traditionally royalist, and the only possibility of reuniting
Transylvania at its representative structures. Even though there is not much
information available, there are grounds to believe that such general assemblies
had been summoned before 1289 in Transylvania. The letter of 1288, addressed
by Archbishop Lodomerius to “Hungarian, Saxon, Székely and Romanian
noblemen”91 in the counties of Sibiu and Bârsa, phrasing almost identical to
that of the royal diploma of 1289, reflected undoubtedly the prior existence
of this structure. Not surprisingly, the Romanians were not mentioned in the
royal diploma related to the Chapter’s revenues; being Orthodox, they could
not have anything to say in an issue regarding a Catholic institution. On the
other hand, the Romanians might have participated in the 1289 congregation
and even before, as they were probably allowed to discuss issues that regarded
them directly, as would happen in 1291.
5.5 Ladislas IV and the Romanians of Transylvania
King Ladislas’ treatment of the Romanians living in Transylvania deserves

special analysis. The letter addressed by Archbishop Lodomerius to the
Hungarian, Saxon, Székely and Romanian noblemen in the counties of Sibiu and
Bârsa in Transylvania92 is the first late 13th century document that certifies
the Romanians’ attempt to integrate in the structure of privileged classes and
assume a specific position in the new political system.93 The letter written by
90 DIR II 309–310; ZW 161; Jakó 448. See also: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol
Empire, 245.
91 nobilibus Ungarorum, Saxonibus, Syculis et Valachis de Cybiniens et de Burcia county-
ibus Transylvanianis: DIR II 296–299.
92 DIR II 296–299.
93 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 269–270: refers to the equality
between the Romanians and the other “nations” mentioned in this document.
Lodomerius mentions the presence of Romanians among Ladislas’s potential

supporters, indicating the fact that the legitimate ruler of Hungary encour-
aged them to seek political affirmation. As a matter of fact, in his last years of
reign, Ladislas was not longer concerned with ethnical or religious differences.
Despite contrary opinions, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that only
the Romanians in Sibiu and Bârsa counties, the two administrative units men-
tioned by the Archbishop of Esztergom, were seeking political affirmation.
Lodomerius only addressed the inhabitants of these two counties due to the
fact that those were the only Transylvanian regions subordinated to his arch-
diocese. Furthermore, the other Transylvanians regions, most likely received
similar demands and recommendations from the Archbishop of Kalocsa.
Unfortunately, no such text survived.
Nonetheless, interpretations that plead for broader Romanian emancipation
are not mere hypotheses. King Ladislas spent the last years of his life mainly in
regions inhabited by Romanians, which were vital to the king for the human
and material resources, and also the liaison they could provide with the Outer
Carpathian and Balkan territories where Ladislas was looking for new allies.
The Romanians, much like the Cumans, were a regular presence in the king’s
close entourage, which explains the role they received in the Ipatiev Chronicle
regarding the 1290 regicide.94 Furthemore, they were probably also part of the
royal army. Indirect evidence is given by the circumstances of the year 1291,
when the army requested by King Andrew III from Transylvania included
Romanians.95 Under the circumstances, certain interpretations might lead
to the identification Ladislas the Cuman as the legendary Laslau Hungarian
king from the old Romanian chronicles.96 According to the Chronicle written
by Grigore Ureche (Simeon Dascălul), the contribution of the Romanians to
the victory against the Mongols, in the winter war, from the Christmas carnival
until the lent (dating similar to that of the events from January–March 1285),
94 Decei, Relaţii, 79, n. 4: “That year <1292, recte 1290> the Cumans or the Polovts with the
Vlachs killed the Hungarian king named Volodislav”.
95 Balint Hóman, Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria (Roma: Reale Academia d’Italia, 1938),
87. One of the goals of the Alba Iulia assembly of March, 1291 was to approve the draft
of the campaign against Austria: Gheorghe I. Brătianu, “În jurul întemeierii statelor
româneşti (I),” RI 4 (1993): 157; Ioan Aurel Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti. Adunările
cneziale şi nobiliare (boiereşti) din Transylvania în secolele XIV–XVI (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia,
1991), 18.
96 See: Ovidiu Pecican, Troia, Veneţia, Roma. Studii de istoria civilizaţiei europene (Cluj-
Napoca: Ideea Europeană, 1998, 116–117, 140, 150–151, which resumes and develops Bogdan
Petriceicu Haşdeu’s theory (Etymologicum Magnum Romaniae, ed. Grigore Brâncuș
vol. III (Bucharest: Minerva, 1976), 760).
150 CHAPTER 5
determined the king to grant them “estates and inheritances and lands for vil-
lages and boroughs / . . . / where they have lived to this day at Maramoroş”. In
addition, he “promoted them all”, namely he made them into “royal servants”.
The Moldavian chronicler portrayed the rise of the Maramureş Romanians to
nobility and their conversion into royal servants, mentioning that this process
only became possible in “deserted, wild places”, in regions free from noble pos-
sessions, because “the Hungarians would not grant them the right of having
hereditary possessions in the country”.97 Moreover, the Moldavian-Russian
Chronicle mentions the battles waged by King Vladislav with the Mongols on the
Tisza River (most likely the battle on the Hód Lake, with the Cumans mentioned
in the chronicle as the Mongols) and “in Transylvania . . . on the Mureş River”
(battles against the invaders in 1285),98 reflecting the circumstances of 1282–
1285. Dwelling on the contribution to victory of “ancient Romanians”, guards of
the “Greek Christian law”, this source also asserts that the king kept “his faith
in Christ a secret, in his heart, and his language and kingly order were Latin”.99
The fusing of Ladislas the Cuman with the image of King Ladislas I was char-
acteristic for a number of hagiographical legends popular in Orthodox cultural
settings. The most significant, The Legend of Ladislas and Sava, mentions King
Ladislas of Hungary’s miraculous conversion to Orthodoxy during an expedi-
tion against the Serbs. According to Ovidiu Pecican, the story was crafted in
the Banat area, around the middle of the 14th century.100 The survival of the
king’s memory in the orthodox areas of Banat can be only the result of the
increased presence of King Ladislas IV in Banat in 1287–1290. During his most
glorious years, Charles Robert of Anjou was frequently present in Banat, but
there are no remaining traces in the collective memory of the Romanian com-
munities. The prestige and sympathy that Ladislas the Cuman enjoyed among
the Romanians in Transylvania was due to the popularity of his decisions
regarding religious issues,101 and their benefical political consequences. The
Romanians managed to consolidate their institutional autonomy in the border
“countries” (Țara Oltului, Maramureş, most likely the Haţeg area and, beyond
97 Grigore Ureche, Letopiseţul Țării Moldovei, (Bucharest: Minerva, 1978), 12–14.
98 Regarding the battle waged by Tirimia nobles against a Mongol corp of troops, see: DIR II
273–274; SzOkl IV 2–3.
99 Petre P. Panaitescu, Cronicile slavo-romane din secolul XVI culese de Ioan Bogdan
(Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1957), 158–161.
100 Pecican, Troia, Veneţia, Roma, 145–160.
101 For description see: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 263–
265. Gheorghe. I. Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică despre întemeierea statelor româneşti, ed.
V. Râpeanu, Bucureşti, 1980, 137.
Transylvania, the cnezdoms in the mountainous area of Banat) and were also
close to gaining a well-defined role in the political structure of a Transylvanian
regnum that King Ladislas was striving to institute. While the Romanian politi-
cal affirmation did not affect the traditional supremacy of the Hungarian
nobility, it paved the way for Romanian knezes towards noblemen status and
their integration in the structures of an incipient congregational system. The
fact that the Romanians were summoned to the general congregation of Alba
Iulia in March, 1291 was, according to Şerban Papacostea,102 a consequence of
the political emancipation started in the previous years.
The Romanians considered Ladislas the Cuman, to be not just “others’ king”,
but also “their king”, and openly showed their consideration. Willing to tolerate
their faith and cautiously encouraging their aspirations, the image of Ladislas
rose, throughout the centuries, to the legendary features of a founding father,
to which a number of later chroniclers would attribute a role in bringing the
Romanians in Dacia and constituting the Romanian Countries.
5.6 The End of Ladislas IV’s Reign
The great number of privileges and donations that Ladislas granted to his sup-
porters in the last months of 1289, the call to arms of the nobility from the
Eastern Hungarian counties and his obvious interest in forging an alliance
with the Mongols indicated that Ladislas was not going to give up on the
battle against his opponents. Summoned in an order issued in Cheresig, on
December 25, 1289, the army of the Sătmar, Szabolcs and Bereg counties was
placed by the king under the command of brothers Stephen and Paul Kállay.103
They were also old enemies of Roland Borsa, whom they accused of having
orchestrated the assassination of their brother, Peter.104 The king’s very pres-
ence at Cheresig, and the subsequent conquest of the fortress under unclear
circumstances, was a challenge to the Borsa kindred, defied by the king on their
own grounds. Ladislas’ surprising offensive, at the head of an army gathered
during the winter, reached the capital in March, 1290105 but failed to bring a
decisive victory. In late April, the king retreated as far as Caransebeş,106 where
he tried to strengthen his ranks with locals and maybe form alliances with the
102 Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 163–167. For Gh. I. Brătianu’s suggestions see: RI 4 (1993): 41.
103 D IR II 315; CD V/3 506–507.
104 D IR II 312; Wenzel IX 557.
105 R A 3551–3552, March, 5th–6th, 1290 (prope Chegled).
106 R A 3553: April, 29th, 1290, Karansebus.
152 CHAPTER 5
neighboring Balkan rulers. During this time, a new candidate to the Hungarian
crown emerged in the person of Charles Martell of the Angevine house of
Naples, whose family ties recommended him as a formidable contender. His
mother Mary was the daughter of the late King Stephen V. In addition, in 1287 he
married Klemencia of Habsburg, the daughter of King Rudolf of Germany and
enjoyed the full support of Pope Nicholas IV, who did not hesitate to embark
on a massive propaganda campaign on his behalf.107 The new candidate raised
the political stakes and asked for a swift resolution. The political alliance estab-
lished by Lodomerius—Heder—Borsa party had already decided to support
Andrew the Venetian, who was going to become a mere figure head for their
rule. Lacking any kind of influence at Rome or at any of the major European
courts, Andrew the Venetian could not even rely on the full support of Hungary,
indispensable for challenging the supremacy of the high aristocracy. Even his
alleged link to the Arpadian line must have been seen with suspicion by the
contemporaries. His father, Stephen, was without doubt the son of Beatrice
d’Este, King Andrew II’s last wife. This marriage was, however, celebrated in
May 1234. Upon king’s death, which took place on September 21, 1235, Beatrice
attempted to leave the kingdom disguised as a page, accompanied by Palatine
Dionysius, her alleged lover.108 Such roumors spread with great ability trans-
formed Andrew into an ideal candidate for Lodomerius, who preferred a weak
king, who would owe him his crown. The Archbishop’s intentions were dan-
gerously challenged by Germany and Rome. To avoid the failure of his plans,
Lodomerius needed to act swiftly and crown his favorite candidate before the
opposition would grow bigger. His solution was dishonoring but efficient: the
assassination of King Ladislas.
There are, however, clues that this action was tacitly approved by the pope,
who believed it would benefit the Angevine candidate.109 This action was prob-
ably organized by the Borsa kindred,110 helped by the Cumans and perhaps the
Romanians, who were a habitual presence in the royal entourage. The choice
of the assassins might have served propaganda purposes, as a message for the
contemporaries and future kings: the forces that Ladislas believed to be most
reliable were in fact the perpetrators of crime and anarchy. The orchestration
of the 1290 regicide forever dishonored the Borsa kindred. It was in these tragic
107 Addressing Roland Borsa, among others: HD 497.

108 Suspicions confirmed to certain extent by the fact that the new King Bela IV ordered his
eyes to be plucked out: Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 122–123.
110 Chronicon pictum, 98; DIR IV 164–166.
circumstances that the controversial reign of a fascinating, complex, and a typ-

ical character that history has not yet fully deciphered tragically ended.
5.7 The “Constitutional” Reform of King Andrew III
The reforms initiated by Andrew III in the months following his rise to the
throne of Hungary were meant to reintroduce a “constitutional” order in a
kingdom that had fallen into anarchy. Installed on the throne by the combined
action of the barons and the Church, the new king answered their hopes for a
political regime that would reestablish the internal order. The Church was also
supporting the lesser nobility and saught to reach an internal balance and an
efficient central authority. At the same time, Andrew III was forced to reform
the system without interfering with the congregational structures introduced
by his predecessor in his last years of reign. By his own will, knowing about the
existence of similar institutions in Western and Central Europe, or perhaps
under the pressure exerted by the lesser nobility, which was not willing to give
up on the privileges received during the previous years, the new king respected
and encouraged the congregational system, which became a fundamental fac-
tor in the kingdom’s internal policies. Thus, in September 1290, shortly after his
coronation (July 23), Andrew III summoned the kingdom’s general congrega-
tion in Buda, which confirmed and adopted his reform into an organic law. The
“constitutions” adopted by the congregation of Buda further consolidated the
positions held by the nobility and Church, reflecting the king’s intention to
keep under control the anarchic tendencies of the “oligarchy”.
Surprisingly, the resolutions of the Buda congregation lacked legislative value
by themselves in the Transylvanian regnum, which had consolidated a special
position of autonomy inside the kingdom during the last years of Ladislas the
Cuman. In order to have the Buda decisions ratified in Transylvania, the king
traveled in the province accompanied by the most important dignitaries of
his court. In the spring of 1291, he summoned the provincial congregation, the
only institution with legislative attributions in the territory. The necessity to
organize in Transylvania a second general congregation, after the one orga-
nized in Hungary, presided by the same king, indicates that by 1290–1291 the
Arpadian kingdom resembled nothing more than a personal union between
two almost completely distinct state entities (regnum Hungariae and reg-
num Transylvanum), as a consequence of the events in Ladislas the Cuman’s
last years of reign. Under the circumstances, the king had to take action to
limit the attributions of the congregations of noblemen in Transylvanian, in
order to increase royal power. Lacking both the means and most likely the
154 CHAPTER 5
intention to turn to force, the king opted for a parliamentary procedure. In

order to ensure its success, Andrew III had to infiltrate his men in a congre-
gation still faithful to the memory of King Ladislas and therefore distrustful
of his regime. The only legal way to reach this objective was to exert his royal
right of donation. Once in possession of Transylvanian properties, the recipi-
ents of royal donations would become “Transylvanian” noblemen, entitled to
attend the congregations of provincial nobility and influence the decisions
taken therein. The king traveled to Alba Iulia in the middle of winter, accom-
panied by a large entourage. Close to the king were Archbishops Lodomerius
of Esztergom and John of Kalocsa, numerous bishops and also some of the
most important officials of the royal court.111 On December 31, 1290, Andrew III
and his court were in Oradea, where they stayed at least until January 7,
1291.112 On January 29, 1291, while on his way to Transylvania, at Filipişul Mic,
the king took the opportunity and gave to one of his loyals, count Dionysius
Losonci, the possession of the royal domain of Lăpuş in Solnoc county.113 On
February 10, Andrew III was already in Cluj and confirmed a tax exemption
received by the Bistriţa residents from Ladislas IV, thus showing respect to the
late king.114 Upon reaching Alba Iulia around February 20,115 the king remained
in the episcopal town for no less than a month, at least until March 22, 1291.116
It was a period of intense political activity, which we are able to reconstitute
through the existing documents.
The central event of the royal visit was the general congregation of all privi-
leged categories in Transylvania, summoned for the first time on March 11, 1291
(the Invocavit Sunday). A series of preliminary assemblies established the posi-
tions to be adopted at the general congregation by each privileged group. Even
though there is no information available regarding the preliminary assemblies
of the Saxons, Székelys or Romanians, we know however that the nobility’s
meeting, presided by count Benedict, the interim of vice-voivode Ladislas and
the four noble judges, took place in Miraslău (Meruslo), most likely in February.117
In case the preliminary meetings of the Saxons, Székelys and Romanians
indeed took place, this must have occurred in the area of the episcopal town,
perhaps in the neighboring localities where their representatives established
111 D IR II 364–366, 366–367, 370–371; Jakó 472, 473, 478; RA 3704.

112 R A 3683–3700.
113 D IR II 356–357; CD VII/2 166–167; Jakó 468.
114 D IR II 360; ZW 171; Jakó 469.
115 R A 3704–3705.
116 R A 3712–3713.
117 D IR II 347–348; Teutsch-Firnhaber 176. For dating, see: Jakó 467.
their main headquarters. Certainly, the debates carried out in this period
focused on the political reform the king was striving to impose. To clearly flesh
out the topic of the discussions, on February 22, immediately after his arrival to
Alba Iulia, the king promulgated a document which enumerated the decisions
adopted by the Buda congregation in September 1290 and expressed his sup-
port for them.118 During the same time interval (February 22–24), Andrew III
granted a series of privileges to the Chapter of the Transylvania Church and to
Bishop Peter himself as a reward for his friendship and loyalty.119 Three weeks
before the general congregation, the king was looking for a way to pressure the
representatives into accepting his will. As part of his strategy, count Dionysius
Losonci received the possession of the Lăpuş domain,120 which preceded the
royal donation act from March 11, 1291121 and Ugrinus Csák was granted with
the Făgăraş and Sâmbăta properties (in the country of Făgăraş). This iniative
required, however, the approval of the general congregation.
Due to the well-prepared strategy, the pressures exerted and the favorable
impression inspired to the Transylvanian classes by the presence at Alba Iulia
of the kingdom’s most important personalities, the congregation did not raise
any special problems to the king. His objective to “reform the Transylvanian
status”, was attained with no major difficulties. The “constitutional” provi-
sions included in the royal diploma of February 22 were adopted without any
modifications, and a copy was entrusted to the Chapter of Alba Iulia.122 The
confirmation of the privileges granted by Ladislas the Cuman to the Székelys
on the Arieş River123 was most likely just one of the examples of preemptive
attitude that the king manifested towards the Transylvanian classes. According
to the document that reconfirmed that Ugrinus Csák recovered the proper-
ties he claimed in the Făgăraş county, the noblemen, the Saxons, the Székelys
and the Romanians in the assembly were consulted individually as well as
collectively.124 On this occasion the king showed, once again, his determination
in observing the institutionalized procedural formalities. King Andrew III’ was
in fact trying to reach his most important objective of his visit to Transylvania
and of the the congregation summoned in March, 1291. His final goal was to
decrease the autonomy of the province and to reintegrate it in the structures of
118 D IR II 361–365, 505–509; ZW 172–176.

119 D IR II 365–366, 366–367, 367–368; Jakó 472, 473, 474.
120 D IR II 357; Jakó 475.
121 D IR II 368–369; Jakó 476.
122 D IR II 367; ZW 190.
123 D IR II 370–371; HD 511–512.
124 D IR II 369; ZW 177.
156 CHAPTER 5
a centralized governing system. It was for this objective that the king had weak-
ened the homogeneity of the provincial nobility by reconfirming the privileges
granted by Ladislas the Cuman and recalled to order the Székelys, the Saxons
and the other categories of royal colonists, who lacked any interest to disobey
the crowned king. In order to test the loyalty of the Transylvanians, Andrew III
invited them to join him in his 1291 campaign against Austria. Along the rest of
the participants, the Romanians also joined his military forces.
The temporary success of this centralization policy found its expression
in the participation of the Transylvanian Székelys and Saxons to the general
congregation of the kingdom of Hungary held at Pest, in 1298.125 The provin-
cial noblemen were undoubtedly also present, even though they are not men-
tioned distinctively. The affiliation of the representatives of the Transylvanian
classes to the congregations of the entire kingdom interrupted, at least for a
period, the enlarged congregation of Transylvania, an indispensable premise
for an autonomous large-scale political structure extended to the entire former
duchy.126
5.8 The End of Roland Borsa’s Rule (1294)
Roland Borsa took advantage of his position in the new royal order and
was able to keep his voivodal office, while his real authority in Transylvania
remained unchanged. He continued to rule the province through Ladislas
Borsa, whose authority was conditioned by his cooperation with the noble-
men’s congregation since he failed to become a prominent figure among the
provincial nobility. Lacking significant territorial resources, he could not earn
the allegiance of prestigious families. In addition, the other deputy voivodes of
the time appear to have ruled alongside Ladislas. On the other hand, there is
no information available regarding his deputy Benedict, attested in 1291, and it
remains unknown whether he was the voivode’s locum tenens at the congrega-
tion or actually its representative to the voivode. In 1292, Ladislas Borsa was no
longer deputy voivode, most likely after the local nobility’s reaction against his
protector.
Thus, at the outbreak of the open conflict between Roland Borsa and King
Andrew III (whose support for the lesser nobility attracted the hostility of the
barons) the Transylvanian nobility did nothing to support the one person who
had been the nominal holder of the voivodal office for a decade. Roland’s last
125 D IR II 392–393, 443–453; ZW 192–193, 211; Jakó 570, 571.

126 See also: Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 256, 260.
mentioned presence in Transylvania, in the fall of 1293,127 as well as the mea-

sures taken on this occasion to attract supporters and loyalties, proved useless
in the spring of 1294. The free passage granted by Roland, on May 23, 1294, to
the besieged inhabitants of the episcopal fortress of Finiş guaranteed their ref-
uge beyond the territory controlled by the voivode, namely “beyond the Tisza
or the Mureş River or even Gilău, in Transylvania”.128 Thus, Roland Borsa con-
firmed that, at that time, Transylvania refused to acknowledge his authority.
The royal campaign against Roland Borsa, which took place between August
and October 1294,129 culminated with the siege and conquest of the Adrian
fortress, but did not have any other major consequences. Although he received
royal pardon and managed to regain a prominent position between the Tisza
River and Meseş in a matter of years, Roland Borsa never regained the territo-
ries he lost in Transylvania and the influence he exerted during the previous
decade over the kingdom’s political life. Lacking the support of the provincial
nobility, Roland Borsa never succeeded in becoming a dominant personality in
Transylvania’s political life. The fact that, centuries later, he was considered an
uncrowned sovereign of the province, a protagonist in the battle for autonomy
and the main founding father of regnum Transylvanum is, under the circum-
stances, one of the most bizarre paradoxes of history.
5.9 Regnum Transylvanum
In order to establish the true nature of the relations between voivode Roland
Borsa and the provincial nobility of Transylvania we need to revise the real
significance of the regnum notion and the statute of Transylvania as men-
tioned in numerous sources in the last two decades of the 13th century. The
older Romanian historical interpretations, from Ioan Lupaş and Ioan Moga to
Ştefan Pascu, placed this denomination in close connection to a superior form
of territorial organization (“kingship”). This type of territorial organization,
which was allegedly exerted by Roland Borsa, transformed Transylvania into a
“constitutionally sovereign country”.130 This interpretation is however rejected
both by the voivode’s failure to impose his authority over the Transylvanian
nobility and its congregation, and by the fact that the regnum concept itself is
never used in relation to Roland Borsa’s territorial authority.
127 D IR II 399–400; ZW 193–194; Jakó 518.

128 D IR II 404–405; HD 524.
129 R A 3987–3995.
130 Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 187.
158 CHAPTER 5
According to the documents:
Ladizlaus vicevoyouoda June 8, 1288 Peters de Nitra, comes de Kulus,

transsiluanus Michael comes, filius Laurencii /Peters
comes?/ filius Muron, et comes Peters,
filius Clementis, iudices per regnum
Transsilvanum constituti . . .131
Andreas (III.) rex February 22, 1291 . . . nobiles regni nostri et Saxones
Hungariae Transylvaniani predia tenentes et
more nobilium . . .
. . . nobiles regni nostri et predicti
Saxones regni Transylvaniae . . .132
Comes Benedictus May 8, 1291 Nicholas de Gumbas et Gregorio de
gerens vices Ladizlai Sancto Rege comitibus per regnum
vicevaivode Transsiluani Transsilvanum iudicibus
deputatis . . .133
The three references to the regnum Transylvanum/Transylvaniae thus appear

in contexts related to the noblemen’s judicial attributions in the congregations
(June 8, 1288, and May 8, 1291) or the rights and obligations associated to the
noble status (February 22, 1291). At the same time, all three documents pre-
sented above are related to the functioning of the congregational system. While
the two acts of the deputy voivode Ladislas and of his deputy Benedict were
issued during congregations, King Andrew III’s diploma included the provi-
sions that were to be submitted to the general assembly of Alba Iulia, in March
1291. Neither document substantiates the existence of a territorial herrschaft
of Roland, any connection between his persona and the usage of the term reg-
num Transylvanianum becoming thus impossible to prove. We could thus con-
clude, starting from Martyn Rady’s interpretations,134 that the real meaning of
the word regnum, as resulted from the quoted examples, designates the legal
community of Transylvania’s nobility, represented in congregatio nobilium.
Yet such a conclusion, despite its pivotal significance in our research, only
half clarifies the issue. Indeed, regnum (“country”) means here, as elsewhere in
131 C D V/3 434–436; HD 474–475; DIR II 300–301; Jakó 437.

132 C D VII/2 139–147; ZW 172–176; DIR II 361–365, 505–509; Jakó 470.
133 C D VI/1 163–164; ZW 178–179; DIR II 372; Jakó 479.
134 “Voivode and Regnum: Transylvania’s Place in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary,”
in Historians and the History of Transylvania, ed. László Péter (Boulder-New York: East
European Monographs, 1992), 87–101.
the epoch, a “legal country”, a community of the privileged who had reserved
the exertion of “constitutional” rights for themselves. We must not forget,
however, that this community of the privileged could not have constituted a
regnum in the absence of a proper “country”, featuring a well-defined terri-
tory, a juridical statute and an institutional system. Similar legal communi-
ties undoubtedly existed in other congregational provinces in the kingdom of
Hungary. Nonetheless, none was ever mentioned as a regnum. The territories
submitted to the Borsa kindred’s rule, Bihor and the other six neighboring
counties (outer Solnoc, Sătmar, Crasna, Békes, Zarand and Szabolcs) were a
well-defined “congregational province”.135 These counties had a historical tra-
dition that went back to the centuries after the Arpadian conquest, in which
a local Bihor ducatus had functioned.136 The origin of this institution comes
out of the Anonymous Notary’s Gesta, laying in the agreement between Arpad
and the duke of Bihor, Menumorout.137 The limits of the Menumorout’s rule
(regnum), as indicated in the chronicle of Anonymus, overlapped almost in
detail the counties that formed the congregational province in the last quarter
of the 13th century.138 Nonetheless, during the 10th–12th centuries, the high
absorption rate of the territories to the East of Tisza in the Hungarian kingdom
considerably diminished their historic particularities. “The seven counties”
were no longer a well-defined regnum in the second half of the 13th century
and consequently they were no longer referred to as such. The nobility in these
counties did not consider itself different from that of regnum Hungariae. In
addition, these territories were no longer a distinct unit in the kingdom’s politi-
cal structure, and they lacked a specific denomination. Consequently, the “legal
country” formed by the local nobility was just the community of the privileged
from the same regnum Hungariae.
On the other hand, the territorial identity of Transylvania, as seen by the
people of the 13th century, was described by the soucers in the following
manner:
135 The first general congregation (generalem congregationem) of the nobles in these coun-
ties was attested on January, 30th, 1279: DIR II 201–203; Wenzel XII 250–253. In the first
decades of the 14th century, this configuration remained almost unchanged. In 1317
Debreceni Dozsa presided, in Sălacea, the congregation of the Bihor, Szabolcs, Sătmar,
Solnoc and Crasna counties: CD VIII/2 52–53, 98–100; CDHA I 435–436; DIR III 276, 280–
281. The only counties absent compared to 1279, were the counties of Zarand and Békes.
136 Makk F., KMTL 261.
137 See Anonymus, Notary of King Béla, The Deeds of the Hungarians / Anonymi Bele regis
notarii Gesta Hungarorum, edited, translated and annotated by Martyn Rady and László
Veszprémy, in Anonymus and Master Roger (Budapest/New York: CEU Press, 2010), 112–113.
138 Anonymus, The Deeds of the Hungarians, 32–33.
160 CHAPTER 5
Bela, rex primogenitus 1231 . . . inutiles et superfluas donationis / . . . /

destrueremus, positi in Transylvanis
partibus . . .139
Bela (IV.), rex Hungariae 1243 . . . cum fidelem nostrum Laurencium vaivodam
post conflictum Tartarorum ad partes
Transsilvanas misissemus . . .140
Bela (IV.), rex Hungariae 1256 Possessiones . . . in partibus Transylvanis sunt
hec . . .141
Stephanus, iunior rex 1263 . . . quasdam terras udvarnicorum nostrorum in
Vngariae, dux Transsilvanis partibus existentes . . .142
Transylvaniae
Idem 1267 . . . possessiones avi sui Julae magni in partibus
scilicet Transsilvanis existentes . . .143
Idem 1267 Et cum Ladyzlaus woyuoda et Jula frater
eiusdem venissent cum Cumanis contra nos ad
partes Transsilvanas . . .144
Capitulum ecclesie 1278 . . . porcionem suam de terra Hasadad ipsum
Varadinensis contingentem in partibus Transsilvanis
existentem . . .145
Ladislaus (IV.), rex 1285 . . . cum Lorandus filius Mark per suam
Hungariae infidelitatem terram nostram Scepusiensem,
unacum Gylnuchbana et terram Nyr ultra
partem de Tyzael usque ad partem
Transsilvanam contra nostram regia
maiestatem potentialiter ocuparent . . .146
These sources highlight that Transylvania was highly individualized in the

Arpadian kingdom. This “eastern country”, and its particularities in the politi-
cal system of the Hungarian crown, was inhabited by people referred to as
“the people of Transylvania”, “the residents of Transylvania”, “the noblemen of
Transylvania”, or “the Transylvanians”.
139 Z W 54–55; DIR I 32–33, 394–395; Jakó 163.

140 Z W 70–71; Jakó 195.
141 D IR II 21–23; 494–496.
142 C D IV/3 158–159; ZW 89–90; DIR II 51–52; Jakó 241.
143 H O VII 106; ZW 528; DIR II 97–98; Jakó 261.
144 C D IV/3 407–410; DIR II 94–95; Jakó 262.
145 H O VIII 443; DIR II 196–197.
146 H D 452–459; DIR II 271–273; Jakó 406.
Andreas (II.), 1224 . . . fideles hospites nostri Theutonici

rex Hungariae Ultrasilvani . . .147
Bela, rex primogenitus 1231 . . . milites nostros Saxones Ultrasilvanos . . .148
Ladislaus (IV.), 1273 . . . Saxones et alii homines regionis Transsilvane ad
rex Hungariae patrem redierunt, eum naturalem terre dominum
cognoscentes149
Stephanus 1277 . . . quidam Saxo, vite detestabili, nomine Gaan
archiepiscopus filius Alardi / . . . / congregata multitudine sue
Colochensis nationis novissime de partibus Transsilvanis . . .
. . . universos gentis Vngarice in ducatu
commorantes Transsilvano in quibuscumque
latibulis . . .150
Ladislaus (IV.), 1285 . . . contra Gyan filium Alardi in partibus
rex Hungariae Transsilvanicis pro conservatione incolarum partis
illius . . .151
Idem 1285 Insuper cum nostros homines fideles Transsilvanos
unacum Cumanis nostris contra Dormanum et
Bulgaros misissemus, magistrum Georgius
exercitus capitaneum preficientes . . .152
Idem 1289 . . . quas universi Nobiles partis Transsilvaniae tunc
in ipsa expeditione nostra nobiscum
existentes . . .153
Lodomerius, 1288 . . . nobilibus Ungarorum, Saxonibus, Syculis et
archiepiscopus Volachis de Cybiniensi et de Burcia comitatibus
Strigoniensis Transil(v)anis . . .154
Andreas (III.) 1291 . . . cum nos universis Nobilibus, Saxonibus, Syculis
rex Hungariae et Olachis in partibus Transylvanis apud Albam
Jule pro reformatione status eorundem
congregationem cum eisdem fecissemus . . .155
147 Z W 32–35; DIR I 208–210, 383–384.

148 Z W 54–55; DIR I 32–33, 394–395; Jakó 163.
149 Wenzel IV 23–27; Jakó 325.
150 Jakó 351.
151 H D 447–448; DIR II 254–255; Jakó 405.
152 H D 452–459; DIR II 271–273; Jakó 406.
153 C D V/3 457–460; CD VII/4 211–213; DIR II 306–308; Jakó 455.
154 Századok 44, 1910, 8–11; DIR II 296–299; Jakó 436.
155 D IR II 369, 509.
162 CHAPTER 5
The “Transylvanians” mentioned in the first examples were part of the cate-
gory of German settlers who arrived in the area towards the middle of the 12th
century. The number of references mentioning the “noblemen of Transylvania”
increased with the rule of Ladislas the Cuman as a consequence of them acting
as arms bearers, members of the political class, and landlords. The emancipa-
tion and gradual distancing of the nobility of Transylvania from the nobility
of the kingdom were motivated by their specific interests, and their accentu-
ated particular features. Furthermore, these examples from the last decade
of the 13th century, illustrate the political rise of the other components of
Transylvania’s political structure.
The examples below indicate once again that Transylvania was perceived, at
the time, as being different from Hungary proper:
Conventus 1256 . . . occupatione/ . . . / iurium/ . . . / monasterii Sancti

Monasterii beati Benedicti de Grana / . . . / tam in hoc regno, quam in
Hypoliti Martyris parte Transylvana . . .156
de Zobor
Stephanus, iunior 1268 et cum ipsum castrum (Feketeuholm // Codlea) / . . . /
rex Vngariae, dux exivissemus, et paulaltim ad nostrum regnum
Transylvaniae accessissemus domino permittente157
Ladislaus (IV.), 1279 . . . cum dominus rex Bela, avus noster carissimus / . . . /
rex Hungariae dictum patrem nostrum de suo regno miserabiliter ad
partes Transylvanas effugasset158
Even though they do not explicitly refer to Transylvania as regnum, these

examples oppose the province to the regnum Hungariae, and implicitly indi-
cate its statute.
There are, however, documents dating earlier than the ones from 1288–1291
and issued by the royal chancery in which Transylvania is explicitly referred to
as regnum.
156 C D IV/2 405–407; Jakó 220.

157 H O VIII 110–113; DIR II 108–110; Jakó 273.
158 Z W 137–139; DIR II 213–215; Jakó 368.
Andreas (II), rex 1206 . . . primos hospites regni de tribus villis Ultrasilvanis
Hungariae Karako videlicet, Crapundorph et Rams . . .159
Stephanus, iunior 1266 ipsum vaivodam debita sollicitudine invigilantem
rex Vngariae, dux defensionem et remediis regni nostri Transsilvani . . .160
Transylvaniae
In what concerns the royal diploma of 1206, it is less likely that Andrew II was
reffering to the entire kingdom of Hungary when he bestowed the title of pri-
mos hospites regni to the colonisers of Cricău, Ighiu and Romos. In the Western
and central parts of the kingdom the German colonization had been initi-
ated long before Transylvania. In this case, we must accept Thomas Nägler’s
suggestion161 that the regnum to which the king referred is no other than the
regnum Transylvanum.
This much is confirmed by the 1266 diploma of “young king” Stephen.
A strong identification of a regnum nostrum Transsilvanum can be found in
the documents of 1268 and 1279 (quoted above), issued by the chancellery
of Stephen or perhaps that of his son Ladislas, where we see a clear distinc-
tion between Transylvania and regnum Hungariae. Thus, Stephen classified
Transylvania as one of the “countries” subjected to the Hungarian Crown. The
king delegated the most important royal obligation of defending its territory to
the voivode of Transylvania, his direct representative in the province.
The analysis of the sources seems to confirm one of the definitions of the
term regnum given by Ştefan Pascu, that of “autonomous state”.162 However,
Transylvania’s acquiring this status is in no way connected with an improbable
transition to “oligarchy” of the voivodal power in the last decades of the 13th
century. As we have seen, Regnum Transylvanum did not designate the terri-
tory over which Roland Borsa had succeeded in asserting his authority, but a
distinct “country”, governed by a viovode, with its own institutions, laws and
legal community (regnum). Based on the regia in persona fiction, Transylvania’s
voivode was a royal locum tenens, exerting, as the sovereign’s representa-
tive, control over military, administrative and judicial functions of the state.
In many ways his status was close to that of palatine count (regni Hungariae
palatinus) in Hungary proper, and even closer to the prerogatives held by the
Ban of Slavonia (regni Sclavoniae banus). The fact that Hungary, Slavonia, and
159 Z W 9–10; DIR I 31–32, 368–369.

160 Z W 96–98; DIR II 79–80; Jakó 260.
161 Nägler Aşezarea saşilor în Transilvania, 164.
162 Pascu, Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 421.
164 CHAPTER 5
Transylvania were three distinct “countries”, with their own institutional struc-
tures and a broad autonomy within the Arpadian kingdom is highlighted by
the records of magister Gerard of Mutina, from 1281–1286. He acted as pon-
tifical superintendent, charged with collecting the money for the Crusade in
Hungary, Poland and Slavonia, which ascertain that Transylvania occupied
a distinct position in the kingdom of Hungary, the revenues collected from
this province being registered as an individual category.163 In this respect, the
anonymous Dominican geographer offers a much more unequivocal account
in his Description of Oriental Europe, written around 1307–1308 at the request
of Charles of Valois: Hungary is split into two, namely the Transylvanian side
and the Danube side.164 The assertion of the congregational system at this time
resulted into the redefinition of this province’s juridical regime and a signifi-
cant increase of its autonomy. Consequently, the precedent of 1290–1291, when
King Andrew III faced serious difficulties in imposing a “constitutional” reform
in Transylvania which was already implemented in other parts of the kingdom,
threatened to become a reccurent theme over the next centuries. This is what
explains the particular juridical situations so well expressed by E. Mályusz
with his phrase “exceptions in Hungary were rules in Transylvania”.165 The per-
manent concern of the royal chancellery to formally specify that instructions
they issued or sanctions they ruled would apply not only in Hungary, but also
in Transylvania comes as no surprise.166
Transylvania’s institutional specificity is often explained by Hungarian histo-
riography with the status of végvidék (borderland), being consequently compa-
rable to existing forms of government in Slavonia and in the frontiers districts.167
Such a comparison is warranted in the case of Slavonia168 alone, and much less
163 Theiner, Monumenta Vaticana, I 1–11; DIR II 232–233.

164 Anonymi Geographi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. George. Popa-Lisseanu, IIR II.
(Bucharest, 1934), 30, 58: “Diuiditur enim vngaria in duas partes, uidelicet in partem
transiluanam et in partem danubialem”.
165 Elemér Mályusz, “Hungarian Nobles of Medieval Transylvania,” in Nobilities in Central
and Eastern Europe: Kinship, Property and Privilege, ed. János M. Bak. (Budapest: Hajnal
István Alapítvány, 1994), 38.
166 Martyn Rady, “Voivode and Regnum: Transylvania’s Place in the Medieval Kingdom of
Hungary,” in Historians and the History of Transylvania, ed. Laszlo Peter. (Boulder: East
Europe Monographs, 1992), 88.
167 Rady, “Voivode and Regnum”, 91; Makkai and Mócsy, ed., Erdély története, 286–287; Mályusz
Elemer, Az erdélyi magyar társadalom a középkorban (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi
Intézet, 1988), 14–17.
168 The first reference of the regnum Sclavonie dates back to 1240: Tomislav Raukar, Hrvatsko
srednovjekovlje (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1997), 74.
for the Southern frontier districts, whose evolution was characterized by the
development of military and missionary structures. Much like Slavonia, 13th
century Transylvania was a country which met most requirements for a medi-
eval state. Furthermore, it could be distinguished from regnum Hungariae by
its own historical tradition, and its previous independence lost as the result
of confrontations and subsequent political arrangements with the Hungarian
Crown.169 Thus, referring to the result of Stephen I’s victory over Transylvanian
duke Gyula, the Hungarian chronicles of the 14th century, recorded: et ipsum
regnum Erdewel monarchie Vngarie adiunxit.170 Unlike regnum Croatiae, reg-
num Transylvaniae and regnum Slavoniae did not appear in the official titles of
the Hungarian kings undoubtedly because they represented early conquests
which can be dated before the end of the 11th century. It is well known that
the Arpadian kings, from Stephen I to Coloman the Learned held the title of
rex Ungrorum (Pannoniorum). It was only after the the latter’s coronation as
king of Croatia (1102) that the royal title began to include the autonomous
“kingdoms” recently attached to the Hungarian Crown (Croatia, Dalmatia).171
After this date all newly acquired states either conquered or claimed by the
Hungarian Crown would be included in the royal title.172 However, the practice
did not apply to the territories annexed in the previous centuries.
169 See the more recent Ioan Aurel Pop, Romanians and Hungarians in the 9th–13th centu-
ries (Cluj-Napoca: Center of Trasylvanian Studies, 1996), 60–152. Arguments regarding
Transylvania’s statute of “distinct geographical and political entity within the Hungarian
area of settlement”: P. Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 24.
170 S RH II 36.
171 K MTL, 352; Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 35–36.
172 Serviae (1202), Galiciae, Lodomeriae (1206), Comaniae (1237), Bulgariae (1255).
CHAPTER 6
Ladislas Kán (1294–1315): The Transylvanian Nobles

and the Congregational Regime
6.1 The Beginnings of Ladislas Kán’s Power
6.1.1 The Origins of the Kán Influence in Transylvania1

Ladislas Kán’s rise to the voivodal office must have taken place sometime in
1294, during the conflict between King Andrew III and Roland Borsa. It was
a strikingly quasi-anonymous switch of power. Also, there had been no prior
relations between the new voivode and the royalty which could justify his
coronation. Ladislas Kán was indeed the first of the voivodes attested in the
second half of the 13th century who never stood out in the political or mili-
tary services brought to the crown and also the first of whom we possess no
evidence of having belonged to the circle of power around the royal court. At
the same time, Ladislas Kán was the first known voivode of the epoch whose
family had settled in Transylvania at least three generations prior, at a time
when ban Gyula ( Jula) Kán, the great-grandfather of the voivode instated in
1294, was the voivode.
1 Identifying the family of the voivode proved to be a difficult task for several generations of
historians. The controversy in the last decades of the 19th century led to Pór Antal’s article,
“László erdély vajda és a Keán nemzetsége”, Turul IX (1891): 105–112, in which he raised a num-
ber of convincing arguments to this dilemma. The work of the Romanian historians from the
interwar period (Ioan Lupaş, “Un voievod al Transilvaniei în luptă cu regatul ungar (1291–
1315)”, Studii, conferinţe şi comunicări istorice II (1940): 33–40 continue to consider voivode
Ladislas and vice-voivode Ladislas of Sancto Martino the same person and a member of the
Borsa family. Nicolae Iorga (Locul românilor în istoria universală, ed. Radu Constantinescu
(Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1985), 138–140; Istoria românilor din Ardeal
şi Ungaria ed. Georgeta Penelea (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1989), 60;
Istoria Românilor (III, Ctitorii), ed. Victor Spinei (Bucharest: 1993, 128–130), followed sur-
prisingly by Maria Holban (Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 90.) mentions Ladislas as
a member of the Apor family. Lastly, Pataki (Anjou királyaink) published the document from
September, 16th, 1306 and showed that voivode Ladislas and Ladislas of Sancto Martino were
two distinct characters. The same author argued that Voivode Ladislas belonged to the Kán
kindred, based on the testament of Demetrius Necskei’s, the son of the voivode’s sister, which
was signed on May, 3rd, 1336: CDHA III. 277–278; DIR IV. 384.

Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 167
A major figure in the political life of the Hungarian kingdom in the first four
decades of the 13th century, ban Gyula is attested as holder of the voivode title
in 1201 and 1214. As such, he made for himself a vast domain in the Târnava
Mare valley.2 He seems to have also possessed the mountainous domain of
Abrud (terra Obruth),3 whose gold exploitations, despite the traditional tech-
niques employed,4 most certainly had provided him with important revenues.
Gyula Kán also held other major offices during the reign of Andrew II, includ-
ing that of palatine (1222–1226) and ban of Slavonia (1213, 1219, 1229–1235).
In addition, between 1219 and 1221, he was the count of Solnoc, a position
which also presupposed administrative involvement in the intra-Carpathian
region. Despite his alleged Bulgarian origin,5 the genealogy of the Kán kindred
claimed ties with one of the gyula title holders.6 Through their involvement in
Transylvania, its members may have claimed certain rights over the heritage of
Gyula the Transylvanian, the opponent of Stephen I. After 1235, however, the
favors Gyula Kán enjoyed at Andrew II’s court were enough to turn him into
an outcast after the coronation of Bela IV. Accused of treason, Gyula Kán was
imprisoned and the properties he had received as royal donations, including
the ones in Transylvania, were confiscated.7
For more than two decades after ban Gyula’s fall into royal disgrace, the Kán
kindred’s interest in Transylvania diminished. Ladislas I Kán, ban of Slavonia
(1245–1247), does not seem to have manifested any particular interest towards
a province threatened and ruined after the Mongolian invasion. Yet his sons
Ladislas and Gyula, as well as their cousin Nicholas, who had joined the party
of “young king” Stephen after 1260/61, whom they followed in his Transylvanian
“exile”, became a prominent presence in the province’s political and social life.
We have already seen that Ladislas (II) Kán had been voivode before the sec-
ond civil war between king Bela and his son (1260/61–1265), as well as in 1275–
1276, during the Csák domination of Transylvania. He was also count of Sibiu
in 1273,8 which gave him the authority to protect his kindred’s estates on the
Târnava Mare River, which duke Stephen had granted to their brother Gyula in
2 D IR II 97–98; ZW 528; Jakó 261.

3 D IR II. 139; ZW 111; Jakó 287, 310.
4 Valer Butură, Străvechi mărturii de civilizaţie românească. Transilvania—studiu etnografic
(Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1989), 372–380.
5 Gyula Kristó, Keán, “Szent István király ellenfele” Acta Historica 98 (1993): 15–28.
8 R A 2355–2376; DIR II 153, 157 (royal court judge, count of Baranya and Sibiu).
168 CHAPTER 6
1263.9 In 1267 they extended their holdings with the donations received from
the “young king” by Nicholas Kán,10 the son of a brother of ban Ladislas (I),
who bore the name of Gyula, according to family tradition. Nicholas Kán had
a long career of royal vice-chancellor, favorite of widow queen Elisabeth and
aspiring candidate to the Esztergom archbishop position, which he occupied
twice yet without pontifical confirmation. Among his titles was that of pro-
vost of the Alba Iulia chapter until 1277/1278,11 having held this office since
Stephen V’s Transylvanian duchy.12 As such, Nicholas was undoubtedly the
main guarantor of the conservation and increase of his family’s Transylvanian
properties during the troubled times following the events of 1272. His trans-
fer from Alba Iulia to Székesfehérvár must have been connected to the Saxon
rebellion of February 1277, to the outbreak of which Nicholas Kán had contrib-
uted as Péter Kőszegi’s rival to the Esztergom archbishopric. Indeed, the latest
internal document mentioning him as Alba Iulia provost dates back to July 26,
1276,13 prior to the outbreak of the civil war. After this date, Nicholas ceased
assuming this title,14 which was subsequently attributed to him only in two
papal bullae issued by Joan XXI and Nicholas III,15 both unaware of the chang-
ing political circumstances in Transylvania.
The events of this period offer a very good explanation for the tension
that plagued, several decades later, the relations between the Saxons and
voivode Ladislas Kán. Most likely during the violent events of 1277–1279, the
Káns’ domains in the Târnave valley suffered serious devastation. Moreover,
these domains were already subject to Saxon colonization after the middle
of the 13th century, and the colonists who settled there had made their own
distinct organization and aspired to winning the privileges of the “provincials”
in the Sibiu county. Kán’s kindred repossession of properties was timely, prob-
ably during the campaign against the Saxons led by Fyntha Aba (1278/1279).
The tie between the Káns and the Aba kindred was in fact one of the tightest,
9 DIR II 51–52; ZW 89–90; Jakó 241.

10 DIR II 97–98; ZW 528; Jakó 261.
11 The last reference was made on June, 1st, 1278, in a bull issued by Pope Nicolas III
(Theiner I 324–326). As of November 1278 to his death, in late 1279, Nicholas Kán was royal
provost of Alba and royal vice-chancellor (RA 2911–3006).
12 The first reference was made in 1265: DIR II 71–72, Jakó 257.
13 RA 2718.
14 RA 2823–2842.
15 Theiner I 322, 324–326; Theiner Vetera Monumenta Slavorum meridionalium Historiam
Illustrantia I 95–96.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 169
being further consolidated through matrimonial alliance.16 We must also

take into account the possibility that the members of the Kán kindred owned
more Transylvanian properties, which they did not abandon despite the Saxon
rebellion.17 We can thus state that at the time Ladislas (III) Kán became
voivode, as kin to voivode Ladislas (II), his kindred was perfectly integrated in
the noble “class” of Transylvania, with all the resulting privileges of being part
of the regnum.
The Káns’ rooting in Transylvania largely explains the circumstances in
which Ladislas (III) became voivode. The last decade of the 13th century was,
in the kingdom of Hungary, a time when the nobility’s political role increased
unprecedentedly within the congregational system. In the general congrega-
tion of Pest of August 1298, the nobles would impose on King Andrew III their
association in exerting the executive power.18 The nobility’s delegates became
henceforward members of the royal curia, next to the clergy and the high
aristocracy. The high maintenance costs at the court would be supported by the
royalty via a special retribution fund. Failure to obtain prior consent from
the nobility’s representatives rendered any of the king’s measures invalid,
except for major donations and granting of office. By consenting to the nobil-
ity’s role to validate the appointment of the most important royal d ignitaries,
the 1298 congregation did nothing but to acknowledge a state of things already
in place in numerous regions of the kingdom, most certainly including
Transylvania, whose real autonomy had increased remarkably with the rise of
the congregational regime. Besides acquiring the right to choose noble judges,
at the end of the 13th century the landlords managed to seize more control
over the counts in the counties, whom they were empowered to confirm
once appointed. This naturally increased the role played by the voivode in
Transylvania. As for the deputy voivodes of Transylvania, they were not only
selected exclusively from among the provincial nobility, as during the reign of
Ladislas the Cuman; moreover, they were at least confirmed in the position by
the same nobility, if not appointed by them indirectly to begin with. This right
of confirmation was just a step taken towards the final goal of obtaining the
right for direct election, and the favorable circumstances of the time provided
16 János Karacsonyi, A magyar nemzetségek a XIV. század közepéig (Budapest: Kiadja A
Magyar Tudományos Akadémia), 736; Gyula Kristó, “Kán László és Erdély”, in Tanulmányok
az Árpád-korról, ed. Gyula Kristó (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983), 275; CDHA III
277–278; DIR IV 384.
17 A questionable document from 1280 mentioned Jula and Nicholas, sons of the former
voivode Ladislas, selling a property located in the Cluj county: CD VII 4 181; Jakó 385.
18 DIR II 443–453; HD 532–540.
170 CHAPTER 6
necessary the opportunity. This is, in fact, the only explanation for the exis-
tence of such a great number of vice-voivodes during the time of Roland Borsa,
including some of his opponents (e.g. Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus). On the
other hand, the confirmation of vice-voivodes by the nobility was in line with
the reforming spirit of the age, since the judicial attributes associated to this
office were persistently claimed by the congregation.
From this perspective, the congregational nobility’s attempts to impose
similar regulations and means of control over the voivode himself were just
the natural consequence of the political evolutions of the last two decades
of the 13th century. Roland Borsa’s example, the voivode whose lack of affilia-
tion to the “classes” of Transylvania prevented him from exerting control over
the provincial nobility’s congregation, is quite illuminating. By refusing Roland
Borsa’s government, the nobility in Transylvania clearly opted for a voivode
from its own ranks, one who would defend their values and promote the spe-
cific interests of the Transylvanian regnum. The conflict between Andrew III
and Roland Borsa created the ideal opportunity to make these desires come
true. Undoubtedly, just like any other dignitary of the kingdom, Ladislas Kán
benefited from royal investiture, yet his rise to power must have been condi-
tioned by the approval of Transylvania’s nobility, which managed to impose to
the king the transformation of the “royal” voivodeship into a “congregational”
voivodeship in 1294.
At the same time, being the representative of the congregational nobility,
voivode Ladislas’s was not in position to exert a strict control over the territory
under his administration, of the kind exerted by Matthew Csák, Amadé Aba
or Henrik Kőszegi in other parts of the kingdom. Under the circumstances,
the new voivode was faced with the opposition of another center of power,
constituted around the powerful Alba Iulia bishop, Peter Monoszló, who found
himself at the peak of his political career.
6.1.2 Voivodeship and Bishopric in the Last Years of Andrew III (1294–1301)
Taking advantage of his position of strength in the province as well as his influ-
ence over the royal court, in 1294 Peter Monoszló came just one step away from
accomplishing his time-honored goal of bringing Transylvania under the con-
trol of his family. As of 1287,19 bishop Peter had succeeded in imposing Michael
Bő (de genere Beu), his kin from his mother’s side, as provost of the Alba Iulia
chapter, thus gaining complete control over the Transylvanian church. In
1294 Michael Bő’s brother Peter was appointed count of Székely by the king,20
19 DIR II 280–281; Wenzel IV 302–303; Jakó 432.

20 Wenzel XII 557–559; RA 4004; Jakó 530, 533.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 171
which granted the bishop of Transylvania the political and military support
that enabled him to aspire to the dominant position in the province. Bishop
Peter’s competition was all the more menacing as he held a number of key
positions in the heartland of Transylvania. The most important was undoubt-
edly the bishop’s city of Alba Iulia which, as proven by the royal visits of 1285,
1287 and 1291, and the provincial Diet of 1291, had preserved its prestige of being
Transylvania’s true capital. Next was Cluj, a royal town the bishop had taken
over during the troubled days of the mid 1270s, and the two powerful episcopal
fortresses of Tăuţi21 and Floreşti.22 Although numerically inferior compared to
the fortifications owned by the voivode Peter’s strongholds compensated with
their excellent strategic position. Given this strong foothold, the bishop’s prop-
erty expanded remarkably in the last two decades of the 13th century.23 Bishop
Peter expressed his preoccupation with making more territorial acquisitions in
the Mureş and Someşul Mic valleys, where the church of Transylvania managed
to accumulate impressive estates. The bishop’s penchant for land did not slip
unnoticed by his contemporaries. On January 13, 1298, the canons of the Alba
Iulia chapter referred to it as such: “the venerable father Peter, by the grace of
God bishop of Transylvania, our prelate, who with incessant zeal increased the
fortune of the church of Saint Michael and is striving to increase its estates
every day. . .”.24 As for the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the corresponding
revenues, bishop Peter Monoszló was equally interested in having his rights
acknowledged by the Saxon chapters in southern Transylvania, in collecting
the bishop’s tithes in Ugocsa County, obtained in the hazy circumstances of
late 1260s, as well as in incorporating Maramureş in his diocese. The latter con-
firms bishop Peter’s expansionist tendencies, probably in cooperation with
“voivode” Nicholas Pok, count of Ugocsa and Maramureş,25 which triggered
a stiff competition between the Transylvanian and Agria bishoprics in 1298–
1300, the latter being the owner of the counties in the northeastern parts of the
Hungarian kingdom. In February 1299, after having attracted support from some
of the kingdom’s barons, Peter Monoszló challenged Andrew III’s decision to

22 Adrian A. Rusu, Cetatea medievală de la Floreşti ( jud. Cluj), EN III (1993): 281–298.
23 For information regarding the expansion of the episcopal domains see: Zsigmond Jakó,
“Az erdélyi püspökség középkori birtokairól”, in Erdélyi a keresztény magyar királyságban,
(Cluj-Napoca: Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesület, 2001): 100–101.
24 DIR II 439.
25 Before the agreement between the Csák and Aba kindreds, in late 1277, Nicholas Pok
exerted for a brief period the role of voivode of Transylvania. The title of “voivode” which
he assumed since late 13th century seems to have been purely honorary; the information
available does not indicate any competition between him and Ladislas Kán.
172 CHAPTER 6
subordinate Maramureş to the authority of the Agria bishopric, claiming this

region had belonged to the Transylvanian diocese since time immemorial.26
Faced with this pressure, Andrew III initially decided to defer the issue to the
judgment of ecclesiastical forums. Until such judgment, the king revoked
the royal decision in favor of the bishop of Agria,27 which confirmed the Alba
Iulia bishopric’s possession of Maramureş. On August 10, 1299, following arch-
bishop John of Kalocsa’s sentence favorable to bishop Peter and an additional
investigation of the entire issue by Emerich, bishop of Oradea and Ladislas
of Tytel, royal court vice-chancellor, Andrew III decided on subordinating
Maramureş to the Transylvanian bishopric.28 Yet, at the end of the same year,
probably confronted with pressure from the opposing party, Andrew III repos-
sessed bishop Andreas of Agria with spiritual jurisdiction over Maramureş
and with the right to raise tithes, which caused bishop Peter to appeal to the
Apostolic See on January 6, 1300.29
Despite its failure, the argument over Maramureş tested Peter Monoszló’s
influence over the king and the barons and did not find him wanting. His
power enabled him to engage with good odds in the confrontation with his
rivals, despite his hardly justifiable claims. Bishop Peter was in fact a common
presence at the king’s court in Buda, near which the Transylvanian church had
succeeded in gaining numerous properties.30 Peter Monoszló and his broth-
ers were also the landlords of estates located in his native Slavonia,31 as well
as in other counties of the kingdom.32 His influence in Slavonia consolidated
at the time when Michael Bő left the Transylvanian provost to become bishop
of Zagreb, an office of high prestige (1298).33 In the congregation of August
1298, Peter Monoszló was mentioned the first in the list of the bishops, the only
ecclesiastical dignitaries higher in position being the Esztergom and Kalocsa
archbishops.34 Peter Monoszló had in fact attained this position immediately
after the coronation of Andrew III. Moreover, he is occasionally attested as a
member of the king’s limited judgment council.35
26 DIR II 461; HD 540–541.

27 HD 540–541.
28 DIR II 467, 514–515.
29 DIR II 476–478, 515–516.
30 RA 4338.
31 RA 4004.
32 RA 3973.
33 RA 4165.
34 DIR II 443.
35 DIR II 464–467; Wenzel X 329–332.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 173
The prestige and influence he enjoyed, doubled by his considerable fortune,

conferred Peter Monoszló an exceptional advantage over the provincial nobil-
ity. First and foremost he relied on the Dăbâca nobles, who were part of his
kindred and who made numerous donations and property exchanges in favor
of the Alba Iulia church. The number of aristocratic families whose members
had risen in the ranks of the Transylvanian clergy must have also been great,
even if we lack sufficient information from sources. The vast estates of the
bishopric enabled Peter Monoszló to support a great number of servants and
affiliates, the nucleus of his episcopal squadron.
In addition to his political moves, there is enough information to certify that
Peter Monoszló also enhanced the religious spirit of his congregation. If the
Mykud and Emerich Kökényes-Radnót brothers deem necessary to buy back
their father’s crusader vote through a consistent donation for the construction
of the Alba Iulia episcopal cathedral36 (whose long and costly reconstruc-
tion was one of bishop Peter Monoszló’s outstanding feats), the sources also
mention a premiere for Transylvania, the first wills and testaments made by
local nobles to the favor of the Alba Iulia church.37 Without dwelling on these
aspects which need special investigation, we must highlight that this assertion
of religiousness, reflected in the onomastics of the time, pleads once again for
the mutual cooperation and trust between the nobility and the Transylvanian
bishopric. Peter Monoszló also stood out through his excellent organization of
the bishop’s chancellery,38 which would turn into a model for voivodal admin-
istration at that time in full reorganization.
We can say that Ladislas Kán’s authority was severely out-shadowed by the
bishop’s competition in his first years of rule. Unlike Peter Monoszló, Ladislas
Kán did not enjoy much appreciation at the royal court, and his influence
among the barons—to the category of whom he undoubtedly belonged—
was only modest. Unlike other “oligarchs” of the time, the territorial authority
achieved by Ladislas Kán was not based on a family tradition of dominating
Transylvania. It did not originate in the troubled period after the great inva-
sion of 1241 or the kingdom’s division between Bela IV and his son Stephen.
Moreover, it did not even exist during the times of Ladislas the Cuman,
when the other aristocratic principalities were already crystalized in Hungary.
Under the circumstances, Ladislas Kán was forced to rely on claiming the polit-
ical traditions and the ideological program of the Transylvanian regnum. In the
36 DIR II 294–296; HD 470–472; Jakó 434.

37 DIR II 412–413; HO VIII 349–350; Jakó 534.
38 Ciprian A. Dincă, “Despre diplomatica episcopală transilvană (1270–1307)”, Mediaevalia
Transylvanica 3 (1–2/1999): 59–70.
174 CHAPTER 6
first years of his office, he slowly amassed properties, political influence and
regional authority without harming in any way his relations with the provin-
cial nobility.
Unfortunately we lack more information about his vice-voivode Joan
( Johannes) of Deuş (Gyos, Cluj county),39 mentioned in two documents in
the year 1296.40 In 1304, he had already been dead for some time.41 At that
time, the vice-voivode no longer had the prerogatives of presiding over the
kingdom’s noble congregation, transferred to the voivode himself. His judicial
responsibility continued, however, in close cooperation with noble judges of
the counties and the participation in their judicial sessions.42 However, the
vice-voivodes of this period were more than just simple clerks subordinated to
the royal power. The vice-voivode’s relative freedom from the voivode, which
would become more obvious during the time of Ehelleus Ákos, probably origi-
nated in a specific modality to define their reports to the noble congregation.
Besides consolidating his authority in Solnoc county—an important region
due to its economic resources, less affected by the bishop’s authority43—
around 1299 Ladislas Kán enforced his plan to make the strong Deva royal for-
tress his main residence. Firm grasp of these strategic positions enabled him
to extend his influence over the lower Mureş valley and to facilitate liaisons
with the kindred’s estates in Baranya county. The domination of southwestern
Transylvania also enabled him to extend his influence into Banat and to man-
age his political projects in southeastern Europe. The voivode used this strat-
egy with outstanding political skill to overcome the difficulties he was facing
at home. Ladislas Kán’s firm grip over Hunedoara and Haţeg, after eliminating
the episcopal competition, brought him in conflict with Peter Monoszló, who
would turn to pope Boniface VIII in 1300 to stop voivodal abuse.44
The tense situation between the voivodeship and the bishopric did not
break out into open conflict. With the death of King Andrew III (January 14,
1301) and the ensuing dynastic crisis, the balance of power between the bishop
and the voivode changed to the benefit of the latter. The bishop’s main politi-
cal weapon had been his influence at the royal court and its circle of power.
The disappearance of the central power brought Peter Monoszló to an inferior
position against the voivode, whose positions consolidated after numerous
39 DIR III 242, 411.

40 Jakó 546, 550.
41 DIR III 387–388 ( Johannis vicevoyvode bone memorie).
42 DIR III 387–388.
43 On June, 18th, 1296 the voivode issued a document at Românaşi (Egrug): Jakó 550.
44 Jakó 593.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 175
regional alliances. Ladislas Kán prolonged the uncertainty of the situation, as

it allowed him to accumulate power free of supervision, while bishop Peter
fought his way to promote the coronation and acknowledgment of a king who
would offer him the leverage to regain the ground lost to the voivode.
6.2 A Nearly Sovereign Transylvania (1301–1310)
Despite the major role played in the history of medieval Hungary, the disap-
pearance of King Andrew III and the end of the Arpadian dynasty was received
with non-dramatic resignation by the contemporaries. The political stability of
the numerous “principalities” and aristocratic entities that had consolidated
in various regions of Hungary largely constituted a warranty for the political
stability of the kingdom itself. The congregational regimes which had con-
solidated almost everywhere stifled the warlike tendencies of the aristocracy,
preventing the dynastic crisis to escalate into a succession of internal wars
similar to those after the death of Stephen V. Indeed, the congregational sys-
tem had favored the transformation of the aristocratic principalities into siege-
proof bastions not only from the king but also from competing principalities.
The regimes of the “oligarchs” were not exclusively based on their personal
resources but also on the cooperation with local classes, which exerted vari-
ous influence on regional leaders. At any rate, the system made it impossible
to seize the land of any “oligarch” by eliminating him, and the relative balance
between rules was also due to the lack of opportunities for starting conflicts.
Under the circumstances, the expansionist tendencies of the “oligarchs” were
redirected, mainly to the territories and revenues which had been directly
administered by royal clerks until 1301.
6.2.1 Assuming Royal Prerogatives

In the case of Ladislas Kán, the royal estates under his jurisdiction consisted
of the Rodna silver mines, Bistriţa county, the “towns” of Dej, Cojocna and
Sic with the respective salt mines and undoubtedly the various royal reve-
nues resulting from taxes and customs.45 The seizure of these major revenue
sources occurred without major difficulties, since the de facto disappearance
of the royal power made the voivode of Transylvania the sole regional author-
ity entitled to assume its attributes. This considerably strengthened Ladislas
Kán’s position, providing him with the sources to raly the provincial nobility
under his control. It also ensured his undisputed superiority over bishop Peter
45 DIR III 172–173; ZW 295–296.

176 CHAPTER 6
Monoszló, his main internal political rival. Also, the voivode, as we are about to
see, could expand his authority over Székely county and most importantly over
the Saxon colonized territory and to redirect Transylvania’s external policies
according to its security needs.
Assuming and exerting royal prerogatives strictly differentiates Ladislas
Kán’s rule in Transylvania from that of his predecessors. One must be cau-
tious when met with theories that his predecessor Roland Borsa exerted the
same prerogatives.46 These mainly refer to the title and attributes of Roland
Borsa, which were not sovereign in reality and were no different from those of
his immediate predecessors. They undoubtedly reflect the existence of a pro-
cess of enlarged voivodal attributes. However, Roland Borsa’s administration
was far from marking the climactic phase of this process. As for Ladislas Kán,
there is no doubt that assuming such sovereign prerogatives was mainly made
possible by the situation created by the disappearance of the royal power. Such
changes became effective in Transylvania and the other territories under his
control. The voivode not only felt entitled to take into his direct administration
properties and revenues of the king, over which Transylvania’s voivodes had no
legal rights. He imposed his authority—or, at least, reserved the rights in this
respect—over the royal “counties” of the Székelys and Saxons.47 In addition, he
summoned and chaired general congregations, which exceeded the territorial
limits of the seven counties of “voivodal” Transylvania.48 Finally, he assumed
the royal right to seize estates without legal owners and manage them accord-
ingly (ius regium), and he continued to do so, after the compromise of 1310,
even after he pledged his allegiance to King Charles Robert. Significant in this
respect is a document of 1313, which mentions the voivode’s appropriation of
the estate of a certain Tyuan, who passed away without male inheritors, and
then giving it away to the Câlnic nobles.49
46 Ioan Lupaş, “Voievodatul Transilvaniei în secolele XII–XIII,” ARMSI part 3 18 (1936):
94–104; Ioan Moga, “Voievodatul Transilvaniei. Fapte şi interpretări istorice,” AIINCluj 10
(1944): 19–23; Ştefan Pascu, Voievodatul Transilvaniei (Cluj: Dacia, 1971), 1: 186–190; Pascu,
Voivodatul Transilvaniei, 4: 421–422.
47 As mentioned in the Szeged agreement (1310): DIR III 172–173; ZW 295–296.
48 We refer mainly to the Niraj congregation (June, 1308), attended by the nobles from voivo-
dal Transylvania and Szekelys and also by the nobles from Slavonia: DIR III 67; Zichy I
117–118; AkO II 391.
49 DIR III 211–212. Confirming this transaction at the request of the Câlnic nobles, who
wanted to prevent future appeals, Charles Robert’s chancellery would carefully avoid
the reproduction of the passage related to the voivode’s ius eminens: DIR III 215–216;
ZW 309–311.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 177
This is how we must interpret the voivode’s huge accumulation of proper-

ties, as mirrored by the sources of the time, especially during Charles Robert’s
restoration. Only a certain percentage consisted of properties the voivode ruled
effectively as a landlord. Besides the appropriations on the Târnava rivers,50
which would add to the former family estate of the Káns, there were also a
number of properties in other parts of Transylvania, which Ladislas and his
sons seized through various means.51 The other estates seized included the for-
tresses and fairs subordinated to the voivodal administration,52 the vast royal
domains estranged during Andrew III53 or the Mediaş, Biertan and Şeica dis-
tricts, the invasion of which the Saxons complained against in 1315.54 Ladislas
would then redistribute these properties to his relatives and vassals, accord-
ing the sovereign right he had assumed. Ladislas mainly expropriated the
properties given by King Andrew III to the nobles in Transylvanian to ensure
their participation to the congregations. The “victims” included not only
Dionysius Losonci-Bánffy, who lost the estates obtained from Andrew III in
1291–1298, but also Ugrinus Csák, who was coerced to surrender his domains
in Făgăraş county to voivode Ladislas. This policy was undoubtedly supported
by the local nobility, content with the removal from Transylvania of its outside
competitors, who had hitherto hindered their access to major offices and the
corresponding revenues.
6.2.2 Voivodal Administration

This policy conducted in agreement with and to the best interest of the
Transylvanian nobility explains the remarkable support enjoyed by Ladislas
Kán’s regime. With manifestations specific to a sovereign prince of Transyl
vania, Ladislas Kán filled his entire administration, from counts and chaplains
to administrators and tax collectors, with provincial nobles who, at least since
the disappearance of the former royal domain, had not enjoyed such privi-
leges. Such was the case with counts Jacob (Jakab) Cseh of Rediu, count of
50 Jakó 543, 546. Deaj (Deesfalwa), Ceuaş (Chawas), Daia (Danjan), Hagmas, Kurtwelesteleke,
obtained in 1301 in a property exchange with count Nicholas, son of Dees: DIR III 10–12;
ZW 219–220.
51 Viţa, Ceaba, Babus, Beudin of the Solnoc county, and possessions of the sons of Ladislas
(1315): DIR III 241–242; ZW 316–317.
52 Including Bonţida, a major voivodal residence, restituted in 1315 by Charles Robert to the
Csák family: DIR III 238.
53 More important domain being that of Lăpuş (terra Lapus), with gold mines and at least
five villages, confiscated by the voivode from the Losonci family: DIR III 234–235; Banffy I
42–43.
54 DIR III 240–241; ZW 315–316.
178 CHAPTER 6
Cluj in 1312–1314,55 or Dominic of Iara and Nicoalus of Gerend (Luncani),

counts of Turda in 1310 and 1312, respectively56 (the latter also commander of
fortress Lita57), as well as a certain Seem, count of Arieş Székely (1296).58 As
for Dăbâca county, it was most probably ruled by the same Nicholas Dobokai,
son of Ban Mykud, certified in this position in 1317.59 The position of count of
Hunedoara was probably, cumulated—as would happen during the Angevine
restoration—with that of Deva fortress commander, the office being associated
with a certain Paul, son of Ladislas.60 The same happened in the Inner Solnoc,
whose executive count was a certain Mike, commander of fortress Unguraş,61
and in the Arad and Braşov counties, subordinated to voivode Ladislas, whose
owners were the commanders of the fortresses Şoimuş (Alexander, 1309;
Dominic, 1310)62 and, respectively, Codlea (Solomon of Braşov).63 Information
available to us on the castellans of voivode Ladislas—which, besides the
aforementioned, included Nicholas Was of Ciceu,64 Stephen of Piatra Craivii,65
John Nyakas of Glogoveţ66 and Peter of Cetatea de Baltă67—does not com-
pletely cover the great number of fortresses he controlled.68 They are, how-
ever, enough to highlight the powerful rise, especially after 1301, of the castellan
institution, which mirrored the gradual accumulation of power in the hands of
voivode Ladislas.
This system of government, with obvious centralizing tendencies, required
a strong central administration. Indeed, the main structures of the voivodal
administration, at least in the interval that followed his settlement in Deva,
made a huge quality leap, being entirely compatible with the statute of Ladislas
55 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 248.

57 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 358; Adrian A. Rusu, “Castelani din Transilvania în secolele
XIII–XIV,” AIIACluj 22 (1979): 88, 95.
58 Jakó 543.
60 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 299; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 86, 96.
63 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 312; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 86.
64 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 295; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 85–86.
65 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 338; Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 90.
66 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 308, Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 87, 94.
67 Jakó 539.
68 We lack similar information for fortresses like Gogan Varolea, Haţeg, Hălchiu, Hunedoara,
Menteu and Rupea. It is possible that Ladislas Kán had owned other fortresses as well.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 179
Kán’s quasi-sovereign Transylvania. Sources testify to the presence of a court

judge (iudex curiae), a certain count John, and also of a steward (dapiferum),
a certain magister Peter.69 The advent of these offices in Transylvania was an
innovation of Ladislas Kán, offering decisive evidence about the existence of a
powerful central administration. Thus, the position of royal court judge obvi-
ously overlapped the judicial attributes held in the second half of the 13th cen-
tury by Transylvania’s vice-voivode, and it marked the limitation to the latter’s
prerogatives. At the same time, the advent of the steward indicates a more or
less complete voivodal court inspired by the model of the royal one. This would
explain the way local clerks were transferred to the voivode’s subordination
from that of the kingdom’s main dignitaries after 1301. Most certainly, Ladislas
Kán made his contribution to organizing the Transylvanian camera, mentioned
in the text of the Szeged agreement.70 This fiscal organism, whose main activ-
ity was the annual change of currency and the collection of taxes associated
with this business (lucrum camerae), paid also by the nobility, seemed to have
expanded its activity over the entire Transylvania, including Sibiu county and
the Székely area. The control over Transylvania’s camera made the voivode the
patron of a well-organized fiscal system which, besides collecting royal taxes
and episcopal tithes, controlled the entirety of monetary operations, which
included the right to mint coins.71 Under the circumstances, the Deva voivodal
court must have been pretty animated. Maurice, the Cricău parish, received by
Ladislas in November 1308, said that the interview was attended by the Deva
castellan Paul, the son of Ladislas, together with his relative, John Rufus, as well
as count Andrew, son of Iohanka, Bas, son of Balos, John of Lomb and numer-
ous others.72 The presence at the court of a great number of nobles as judicial
witnesses is occasionally certified by Ladislas himself.73 Despite the scarcity of
information, the sources indicate the fact that the nobles present at Ladislas’
court were not associated with other activities. Consequently, they must be
considered the voivode’s personal entourage, the people he could trust and
kept around him at all times.
69 DIR III 176; Zichy I 122.

70 DIR III 172–173; ZW 295–296; AkO II 862.
71 Charles Robert would acknowledge, in 1336, the Chamber of Transylvania’s right (whose
authority was already restricted to the seven counties of the proper voivodate of
Transylvania) to issue gold florins, dimes and small dinars: DIR V 377–381.
72 DIR III 121; Kristó, Kán László, 287.
73 DIR III 32–35; DIR III 384–386. In addition, a smiliar situation is connected with the visit
of a certain Paul, vicar of the Keve archdean, DIR III 122.
180 CHAPTER 6
As for the voivode’s initially rudimentary chancery, it evolved after the model
of the episcopal one of Alba Iulia.74 Its chief, the archdean John of Târnava,
was actually one of bishop Peter’s jurists, on behalf of whom he had even car-
ried out an assignment to the royal court (1300).75 After 1301, this ambitious
character moved into the service of voivode Ladislas, who entrusted him with
the reorganization of his chancellery. The rank of protonotarius, held by John
of Târnava in 1303–1306,76 conferred him the effective leadership of a presum-
ably well-defined chancellery as well as major juridical attributions. In real-
ity, documents ascribe him a position of power close to that of vice-voivode
Ehelleus Ákos, next to whom John of Târnava participated in the authentica-
tion and implementation of voivodal decisions. After John of Târnava’s engage-
ment in the competition for the succession to the episcopal see of Alba Iulia
the voivode’s notary (notarius) position was given to a certain Stephen,77 of
whom nothing else is known.
6.2.3 Solving the Conflict with the Bishopric

Around 1306, Peter Monoszló’s old age and probably deteriorating health
enabled Ladislas Kán to attempt to take over the Alba Iulia bishopric. The
first candidate the voivode prepared for this office was his chancellor, arch-
dean John of Târnava, who—taking advantage of his position as canonic of
the cathedral church and the voivode’s support—managed to take control
over bishop Peter’s chancellery and to become accepted as his successor.
John of Târnava’s political influence largely explains the cooperation between
bishop Peter and voivode Ladislas in the years 1306–1307, a period in which
the bishop adopted a more determined posision in the dispute over the
crown of Hungary, encouraging the voivode to support Otto of Wittelsbach’s
candidature.78 Bishop Peter appealed against the excommunication of the
voivode by archbishop Vincent of Kalocsa, possibly at the urge of John of
Târnava, at a time when he agreed with Ladislas Kán over the takeover of
control over the bishopric.79 In the coming months, the attributes of aged
74 For suggestions: Dincă, Despre diplomatica episcopală, 59–69; Fr Pall, “Cancelaria voievod-
ului Transylvaniei la începutul secolului al XIV-lea,” Revista Arhivelor 3 (1/1960): 270–272.
75 RA 4339.
76 DIR III 33–35, 384–386 (October, 16th, 1303). Pataki, Anjou királyaink, 16–17; AkO II 72.
77 DIR III 121
78 See infra, 6.4.3.
79 DIR III 45–46; CD VIII 1 203–204; AkO II 92. The bishopal chancellor, John of Târnava,
handed in the appeal to the Dominican prior in Alba Iulia; he probably acted on his own,
still, his influence on the bishop appears to be decisive as of that moment.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 181
Peter Monoszló were completely handed over to John of Târnava who, in early
summer, 1307 at the latest, was already the “locum tenens of Transylvania’s
bishop”.80 This translation of power seemed to run smoothly and John of
Târnava seems to have obtained preliminary approval from the canons with
respect to his designation as locum tenens and virtual successor of the bishop
in power.81 Nevertheless, the succession was compromised by an aggressive
intervention of the voivode, who no longer supported his former chancellor,
but decided to instate one of his sons to the episcopal see of Alba Iulia. This
abuse, most likely inspired by Henrik Kőszegi’s similar attempts to impose his
son Nicholas at the head of the Györ bishopric,82 was a real coup and gen-
erated a series of upheavels that undermined the voivode’s position. These
events took place in the summer of 1307, a few months before the death of
Bishop Peter and the masqueraded episcopal elections of January 7, 1308.
Frustrated in his attempts, John of Târnava sought refuge at the court of
Charles Robert, whose vice-chancellor he became.83 Using his newly acquired
influence, he would become one of the fiercest opponents of Ladislas Kán,
the political actions of whom he would in various occasions try to counteract.
At the same time, the voivode’s attitude was met with firm opposition from
some of the canons of the Chapter of Alba Iulia, seemingly determined in
supporting John’s candidature. Under the circumstances, imposing the son
of the voivode on the episcopal see required an act of force, which only
amplified the already mounting tensions. On the day of Bishop Peter’s death
(November 27, 1307), Ladislas stormed into Alba Iulia and arrested the oppos-
ing canons who had failed to take refuge out of the episcopal city. In the coming
weeks, the voivode organized the pursuit of the canons who had fled so that,
on January 7, 1308, he rounded most of the chapter members up for the “elec-
tion” of his son, in fact nothing short of a dictate. Before the canonics released
from confinement, Ladislas Kán in person announced his son’s election,
80 DIR III 60.

81 It is the only interpretation that can be given to the confusing manner in which John
formulated his claims over the Transylvanian bishopric, see: DIR III 78–79; Acta Gentilis
161–162. This preliminary “choice” was, naturally, an informal one, at a time when Bishop
Peter was still alive.
82 Nicholas Kőszegi had become the Györ provost around the same period, thus guarantee-
ing the succession for Theodorus Tengerdi (in 1308, see: Engel, Archontologia, 1: 71). In
the spring of 1307 Nicholas was, for a brief period, Otto of Wittelsbach’s vice-chancellor:
AkO II 131.
83 First incontestable reference was made on August, 26th, 1307: AkO II 230.
182 CHAPTER 6
a document which he had drafted himself, reading it to the audience and ask-
ing them to validate the decision by applying their seals.84
Although not acknowledged by any superior ecclesiastic authority or any
of the other bishops in the kingdom, the episcopal “election” of January 7
enabled Ladislas Kán to exert, in fact, undisputed control over the bishopric,
the chapter and all of their properties for more than half a year (January–
September 1308). For Ladislas Kán this period, which immediately followed
the imprisonment of Otto of Wittelsbach, was the climax of his power. The
act of force in January 1308 was not without consequences in the province.
Unwilling to acknowledge the voivode’s son’s authority, the Saxon chapters in
southern Transylvania refused, as of that date, to pay their monetary dues to
the episcopal institution.85 At the same time, the voivode’s brutal treatment
of the members of the chapter stirred the wrath of that part of Transylvanian
nobility whose interests were related to the Alba Iulia bishopric, and drove it
into the arms of the Angevine party.
6.2.4 Vice-voivode
The vice-voivodal institution enjoyed a special position in the political struc-
ture of Ladislas Kán’s Transylvania, at least from the time its holder became
Ehelleus Ákos (circa 1302–1303). Related to Moyus Ákos, Transylvania’s voivode
(1288) and Székely count (1291), Ehelleus (II) Ákos started his successful politi-
cal career employing his remarkable ability to constitute a chain of personal
relations well anchored in all the compartments of the Transylvanian political
system. The estates of this Transylvanian branch of the vast Ákos kindred lay in
the middle and upper Mureş valley, in the counties of Alba, Târnava and Turda,
their most important residence probably being at Farău (Forro, Alba county).
His father, Ehelleus (I), had received, probably through king Ladislas IV’s dona-
tion, the Trascău domain (Torozko), whose importance considerably accrued
with the iron mines in the region. In 1291, in parallel with the construction of
the noble fortress of Colţeşti, Ehelleus (II) Ákos granted the use of the Piatra
Secuiului fortification86 to the Székelys in the Arieş district, securing their
devotion.87 After a matrimonial alliance seemingly negotiated by his grandfa-
ther, Ehelleus Ákos became related to a kindred of noble Székelys in the Tylegd
district. In order to strengthen the family ties, he made a significant donation
84 DIR III 71–72, 77, 86; Acta Gentilis 154–155, 162, 173.
85 DIR III 144, 151.
87 DIR II 325; ZW 87–88; Jakó 492.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 183
to his kindred in the year 1294.88 His ties to the Székelys thus became a family
tradition and constituted for Ehelleus Ákos the base of a political influence
that could not be overlooked. Bishop Peter Monoszló’s attempts to consoli-
date his own influence among the Székelys by instating Peter Bő as their count
(1294) undoubtedly represented a challenge to the Ákos kindred, determining
his association to the group amassed around voivode Ladislas Kán. Instating
Ehelleus Ákos as the vice-voivode was, in any case, preceded by Peter Bő’ disap-
pearance from Transylvania and, with it, any reference to the count of Székely
office also disappeared. The integration of the Székelys in Ladislas Kán’s politi-
cal system was due, after all probabilities, to the influence exerted over them
by Ehelleus, which explains once more the freedom of action specific to this
position. We must note, however, that the connections to the Székelys were
just one of Ehelleus Ákos’ priorities in growing his political influence. We know
that one of his daughters, Elisabeth, became the wife of Nicholas, the son
of the Saxon “count” Conrad of Tălmaciu,89 and the youngest of his five sons,
destined to an ecclesiastical career, became the Cluj archdean.90 Despite its
scarcity—we do not know, unfortunately, who Ehelleus’ wife was, nor the ori-
gin of the wives of his first four sons—the information available to us shapes
the image of a vice-voivode who enjoyed a distinct position in Transylvania’s
political system: far from being considered a simple familiar to Ladislas Kán, he
was on the contrary one of his necessary allies; the circle of power constituted
around the vice-voivode was an independent one, and his subordination to the
voivode just formal. Owning his own fortresses91 and servients92 and a great
number of allies whom he generously repaid from what seems to have been
a considerable personal fortune, Ehelleus Ákos had his own court in Farău93
with its own chancellery94 and copyists.95 The vice-voivode’s political influ-
ence was certainly perceived by Ladislas Kán as potentially dangerous, which
88 DIR II 402–403; ZW 106–107; Jakó 532: the eastern half of the Gerebenes estate (Grebenişul
de Câmpie, Mureş county); donation made to his cousins Stephen and Andrew, the sons
of Helemban, the husband of his father’s sister.
89 DIR V 374–375; ZW 473–474.
90 DIR IV 8; ZW 349–350.
91 Additional to the Trascău fortifications, Ehelleus Ákos was temporary the owner of the
Zadken fortress, property of the Chapter of Alba Iulia: DIR IV 15–16.
92 A certain Paul, servient (serviens) of Moyus Ákos, repaid with the Tychen Szent Marton
estate (Târnăveni), attested in 1278: DIR II 189; Teutsch-Firnhaber 114–115; Jakó 362.
93 AkO I 354.
94 A certain magister Paulus, notary (notarius) of the vice-voivode, attested in 1314: DIR III
220–221, 403.
95 Stephanus filius David, officialis suis: DIR III 220–221, 403.
184 CHAPTER 6
explains why he tried to restrain it and why collaboration between them was
infrequent. We will see that both Ehelleus Ákos and his political allies whom
he influenced (e.g. the Székelys, Nicholas of Tălmaciu) would adopt their own
political position during the civil war. They hesitated in associating themselves
with the rebellion started in 1316 by the sons of Ladislas Kán, to the point where
they ended up collaborating with the Angevine party, which would enable
them to partially preserve their positions in its regime.
6.2.5 Ladislas Kán’s Territorial Expansion

Even if Ladislas Kán’s center of power lay in Transylvania proper, the crisis
of royal authority favored a much wider expansion of his political influ-
ence. The text of his excommunication pronounced by Cardinal Gentile, on
December 25, 1309, made it obvious that Ladislas controlled territories located,
from the royal court’s perspective, citra silvas, beyond Transylvania’s borders.96
One must not seek these territories northwestwards, towards the Bihor, Crasna
and Sătmar counties—on which the Borsa kindred had a strong hold, and
there is no evidence of any open conflict between them and Ladislas97—but
down the lower Mureş river valley and towards Banat, which were open and
appealing territories and over which the influence of the voivode is well docu-
mented. In 1310–1311, Ladislas Kán’s castellans, installed in the Şoimuş fortress,
were also counts of Arad;98 a few years later, count Dozsa of Debreczen com-
plained about the abusive seizure by voivode Ladislas of his Panad property
(Horia, Arad county),99 located near the former royal fortress of Arad. In April
1310, Ladislas Kán concluded, in Szeged, the preliminary agreement with King
Charles Robert’s representatives.100 In addition, the judge of the voivode’s
court expected, in September 1310, the comeback of Ladislas de Vngaria in
[partes] Transsilvanas,101 and the exertion of at least provisional control
over the locality was consequently plausible.102 Most likely this control over
the lower Mureş extended gradually. The voivode’s possession of the Şoimuş
96 Ultra silvas et citra silvas: DIR III 164–169; HD 568–571.

97 The Kán family did not own estates in Bihor. Magister Ladislas, son of voivode Ladislas,
was owner of the Vasary property (1290): DIR II 325–326; HO VIII. 291–292. Kristó (Kán
László, 279) suggested an identification with Ladislas Kán, but he was, in fact, part of the
Aba kindred.
99 DIR III 231–232; CDHA I 380; Kristó, Kán László, 282.
100 D IR III 172–173; ZW 295–296.
101 D IR III 176; Zichy I 122; Pál Engel, “Az ország újraegyesítese. I. Károly küzdelmei az oli-
garchák ellen (1301–1323),” Századok 122 (1–2/1988): 94.
102 See also: Engel, “Az ország újraegyesítese,” 111; Engel, Archontológia,1: 423.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 185
f ortress, which conferred him military control over the entire county of Arad,
needs to be placed in relation with his residence in Deva which must have
occurred earlier than the year 1300. The subsequent expansion of his authority
in Szeged could have occurred with the later growth of his political influence,
corroborated with the weakening authority of Ugrinus Csák over the counties
in southern Hungary.
As for southern Banat, the buffer region between Transylvania and Serbia, it
was partially controlled by Theodor Weyteh of the Chanad kindred, who after
1306 at the latest entered under the political influence of Ladislas Kán and
his Balkan allies. The fortresses in southwestern Banat (Ilidia, Horom, Vrsac/
Érdsomlyó), before 1311 controlled by Ugrinus Csák,103 seem to have been
placed under Ladislas Kán’s and his allies’ influence. Transylvania’s voivode
also exerted some influence in Slavonia, where his kindred owned properties.104
This influence, confirmed by a document from 1308,105 was due to his leading
position in the anti-Angevine party.
6.3 The Major Coordinates of Kan’s Internal Policy
During the royal crisis, Ladislas Kán managed to build his personal govern-
ment based on effectively assuming and exerting in these territories the pre-
rogatives of a sovereignty which became almost complete with time. The
complex structure of the Transylvanian political system was however far from
completely subordinated to the voivode’s administrative apparatus, no matter
how well articulated it might have been. If in certain areas of the territories
he controlled Ladislas’ authority was almost discretionary—as was the case,
for example, with the county of Hunedoara, in which the voivode’s judgment
never required noble witnesses106—in other areas it was mediated by his rela-
tions in cooperation with the local elite. Such was the case with the congre-
gational nobility, which had not lost its fundamental role in Transylvanian
politics. At the same time, according to the preliminary agreement of Szeged
(1310), Ladislas Kán’s authority nominally expanded over the entire territory
of the Transylvanian “duchy”, being formally acknowledged in the county of
103 Engel, “Az ország újraegyesítese,” 95–97 (map).

104 Györffy, Az Árpád-kori, 256.
105 The voivode’s sentence in a dispute related to a property in the Körös county, favorable
to his family from the mother’s side (of the Tétény kindred): DIR III. 67; Zichy I. 117–118;
AkO II. 391.
106 D IR III 13–15, 16–17.
186 CHAPTER 6
Sibiu and the Székely territories.107 The voivode’s relations with the Saxon and
Székely communities require separate treatment, as they had a major con-
tribution to securing the force and stability of the political system he ran. At
the same time, the necessity to employ all “elements of energy”108 existing
in the province and the direction Ladislas Kán headed to in his external policy
after 1301 drove the voivode to cultivate special relations with the Romanians
in Transylvania, which were a continuation of the policy started by Ladislas
the Cuman.
6.3.1 Nobility and Noble Congregation

Ladislas Kán’s regime was defined, during its long evolution, by the cooperation
between the voivode and the congregational nobility. Even if the regime insti-
tuted by him eluded, to a certain extent, the political role of the noble congre-
gation, no attempts were made to remove its privileges. The interdependence
between Ladislas Kán and the noble “state” of the province became obvious
since the very start of his term: in April 1296, Ladislas himself presided over the
noble congregation that took place in Torda, apud ecclesiam cruciferorum,109
the participants of which included not only the new vice-voivode, named
John,110 but also exceptionally the provost John of Sibiu.111 General congrega-
tions attested henceforth would be presided by the voivode himself, whose
periodic comebacks in villa Cruciferorum would consent to the promotion of
this center as the congregational capital of Transylvania.112 The assemblies,
which usually took place near the church dedicated to the Holy Cross, property
of the Hospitaller order, reunited an impressive number of participants: over
150, in April 1296.113 There were also noble assemblies in other localities as well,
but they were rather an exception. One of these, summoned in Românaşi (villa
Egrug), in June 1296, to solve the litigation between the Church of Transylvania
107 D IR III 172–173; ZW 295–296.

108 Iorga, Locul românilor, 135.
109 Jakó 543, 546.
110 Jakó 546: Johanne vivewoyuoda.
111 Jakó 543, 546: Johannes prepositus Scybiniensis.
112 Pataki, Anjou királyaink, 15–17; AkO II 72 (1306). Counterfeiters in the last decades of the
14th century also claimed Ladislas Kán had issued a series of documents issued in villa
Cruciferorum: Jakó 561, 586 (DIR II 434–435, 470–471). Since none of the forgeries identi-
fied today indicates the voivodal court of Deva as the place of issue indicates that during
the 14th century Ladislas Kán’s name was still associated with the assemblies of Cristiş/
Oprişani and the congregational system.
113 Jakó 543.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 187
and a local senior,114 were more limited in participation. As for the 1308 congre-
gation, which took place in Niraj (Neregh), it was motivated, as we are about to
see, by the voivode’s intent to confer it broader representation, including the
participation of the Székelys. Even in the case of sentences ruled outside
the congregation from his court in Deva, Ladislas would not omit, whenever
necessary, to mention the noble states’ association to the decision-making pro-
cess (prehabita matura deliberatione et consilio nobilium terre Transylvaniane,
qui nobis tunc aderant, according to the formulation of a document of October
1303115), the only one able to confer authority to voivodal sentences.
At county level, the consolidation of the institutions of the noble counties
continued to develop along with a more precise articulation of their attributes.
If the count was appointed by the voivode, at least in the cases where they also
exerted the castellan position of one of the voivodal fortresses, noble judges
were elected by the county nobility and no local assembly could take place
in their absence. The fact that there were two noble judges in Transylvanian
counties, just like in Slavonia (unlike four in most of the counties of regnum
Hungarie), probably hints to the reduced size of the provincial nobility.
Differences in fortune and social position between the nobles were fairly
significant. At its upper level, there was a provincial aristocracy consisting of
no more than ten major families. Besides the Transylvanian branches of the
Kán, Ákos and Kökényes-Rádnoth kindreds, there were also the Wass116 and
Apafi, the families in Luncani (Gerendi), Geoagiul de Sus, Iara and also the
elusive Andrew, son of Ipoch, owner of more fortresses and estates than
the Transylvanian average nobleman, whose interests at that time were con-
fined to the province and who owned key positions inside the administration,
congregational structures or at least in that of noble counties. Noble judges
attested in this period in the counties of Cluj (1304,117 1314118), Solnoc (1299)119
and Alba (1320)120 were generally, just like the assessing judges who assisted
the voivode during general congregations, members of families with solid
ties to the province: Stephen (Stephanus) of Jucu (Suk), Gregory of Geoagiu
(Gyog), Stephen of Sâncraiu (Sancto Rege) etc. Involvement in the voivodal
114 Jakó 550.

115 D IR III 32–35, 384–386.
116 See the excellent report of András W. Kovács, “Familia Wass de Țaga în Evul Mediu
(Societatea nobiliară de mijloc din Transilvania),” AIICj 36 (1997): 55–92.
117 D IR III 41, 387–388.
118 D IR III 226, 405.
119 D RH XI.
120 D IR III 339; ZW 343–344.
188 CHAPTER 6
policy was by no means a rule for the members of this provincial aristocracy.
Some of them (nobles of the families of Dobokai, Suki and Gerendi, to men-
tion only the most obvious examples) were clearly in opposition to Ladislas
Kán’s regime, and a most of them kept a cautious distance. The cases of active
and durable involvement were relatively few: Andrew, son of Ipoch, master of a
vast domain in the Şieu valley,121 and a series of castellans, the most important
being that of Ciceu, Nicholas Was. The properties and political relations of the
members of this kindred constituted a solid base for stability, enabling them
to conserve an autonomous position irrespective of the political regime. This
provincial “aristocracy”, with obvious aspirations for independence, supported
Ladislas Kán so long as he represented an obstacle against the interference of
aristocracy from regnum Hungarie, redoubtable competition due to the privi-
leges and donations received from the royal court. At the start of the civil war,
most of these families were more interested in seeking ways to come closer to
the new royal power than to join in a war against it.
Under the circumstances, Ladislas’ direct supporters tended to be members
of the small and middle nobility, a social category from which the voivode
recruited the retainers, clerks and administrators of his vast domains. These
lesser nobles were interested in preventing the instauration in Transylvania
of a powerful royal authority and the return of the court aristocracy and its
entourage. The immense number of properties seized by Ladislas Kán allowed
him to develop more than the Hungarian traditional system of “familiarity”—
a true vassalic system. The impulse in this direction had been traced by king
Andrew III’s provincial representatives: in an attempt, in 1295, to solve a dis-
pute with count Alard, son of Gyan (the leader of the 1277 rebellion) on the
issue of a property which was rightfully the king’s, his representative, magister
Vyvianus, left the respective property in the possession of the Ocna Sibiului
nobles in exchange for the vassalic oath.122 On his turn, Ladislas Kán seems to
have entrusted much of the domains he had seized to his own vassals, as the
best way to secure their loyalty. The voivode’s military machine seems to have
consisted mainly of small nobles and other categories of free men connected
to the voivode in one way or another. Numerous other structures, retainers or
vassals among other noble families and their own clients, as well as represen-
tatives of the bishopric and the chapter, were a force to be reckoned with. We
have actually seen that vice-voivode Ehelleus Ákos himself held an office prac-
tically independent from Ladislas, as one savvy enough to ensure his politi-
cal survival during the Angevine restoration. No matter how great the number
121 D IR III 323–326; ZW 340–341.

122 D IR II 415–416; ZW 199; Jakó 538.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 189
of servients and familiars of the voivode, they were still insufficient to allow
Ladislas Kán to flagrantly ignore the interests of the provincial nobility.
It is hard to say to what extent the resistance to interference from aris-
tocratic groups outside the province, undoubtedly a common concern of
the Transylvanian nobles, reglardless of rank, could have become a radical
“Transylvanian” ideology of supporting the autonomous tendencies promoted
by Ladislas Kán. The fierce and prolonged resistance met in Transylvania by
the Angevine party as well as Charles Robert’s distrust of the provincial nobil-
ity could constitute arguments in this respect. On the other hand, it is certain
that the Transylvanian nobility was clearly aware of its Hungarian identity and
consequently to its belonging to the greater community of Magyars in the king-
dom of Hungary. In addition, they were loyal to the Hungarian crown, whilst
trying to navigate its relations with the royal power in a way that would enable
them to exert some sort of control over the province.
6.3.2 The Saxons

Getting the Saxons in the “province of Sibiu” under the control of Transylvania’s
voiovodes and the Alba Iulia bishops had long been a priority of both the local
aristocracy and the church. Without attempting to reconstitute the long his-
tory of this long dispute, we should at least highlight the fact that after the
Mongol invasion of 1241 and especially during the Transylvanian duchy of
Stephen V, the Saxon issue had escalated to the next level. Firstly, the ecclesi-
astical autonomy of the Saxons in the “province of Sibiu” had been guaranteed
despite the Alba Iulia bishops’ overt hostility expressed by the Papacy, whose
involvement in Transylvania had climaxed during the offices of Innocent III,
Honorius III and Gregory IX.123 Yet, after the Council of Lyon (1245), the pope
deliberately renounced interfering in the province, leaving Bela IV full liberty
to organize the anti-Mongolian defense.124 This deliberate renunciation had a
negative impact on the Saxons; significant in this respect is the fact that privi-
leges received from king Andrew II (1224) were no longer confirmed by any
of the last Arpadian sovereigns. Secondly, imposing the political model of the
123 The confirmation of the Saxons’ free provost in Transylvania issued by Pope Celestine III
(1191): ZW 1–2; DIR I 11. The Saxons’ conflict with Bishop Adrian and the resolution offered
by the papal legate (1192–1196): ZW 2–3; DIR I 11–12. Innocent III’s attempt to take the
Sibiului provost under papal authority: ZW 10–11; DIR I 152. For the events during the term
of Pope Honorius III see: Sălăgean, “Honorius III,” 78–85.
124 For Transylvania’s situation after the Mongol invasion and the consequences of the Lyon
Council see: Tudor Sălăgean, “Regnum Transylvanianum. Contributii la studierea genezei
unui regim,” MT 2 (1/1998): 117–121.
190 CHAPTER 6
duchy in the second half of the 13th century forced the Saxons to acknowledge
the authority of Transylvania’s rulers time and again, be they members of the
royal family (Stephen V, Ladislas IV) or representatives of the high aristocracy
(Matthew Csák, Fyntha Aba), who strove to reconstitute the politic model of
the Transylvanian duchy to their own best interest.
The first violent reactions of the Saxon colonists against the pressure
exerted against them by the voivode came during the time of Stephen’s duchy
and the internal turmoil that ensued. While the 1264 rebellion had been exclu-
sively directed against the political authority represented by duke Stephen,
the rise to arms of 1277, led by Gyan, son of Alard, was meant to both over-
throw the Csáks political regime and counteract the pressure from the lead-
ers of Transylvania’s church: bishop Peter Monoszló and provost Nicholas
Kán. At the same time, the 1277 events and the long civil war that followed (it
ended only in the winter of 1278/1279, after the victorious expedition against
Sibiu of the Aba kindred’s troops) represented the violent expression of ethnic
intolerance promoted by the authorities and Hungarian nobility, which had
pushed the parties to the brink of war. Barons and prelates reunited in the con-
gregation of May 1277 spoke on this occasion about the Saxons having killed
Hungarians in the “duchy of Transylvania”,125 and burning alive, in the Alba
Iulia cathedral, of two thousand Magyars.126 They also tell about the persecu-
tions the Transylvanian church and its clerics had to suffer from the “cruel tyr-
anny of outlaw Saxons”,127 describing the terms of a ruthless ethnic conflict in
sufficient detail. The last two decades of the 13th century were thus marred by
accumulating tension across Transylvania, following the progress of the Saxon
colonization. The main protagonists of the Saxon claims were the colonists in
the recently colonized territories, who aspired to the political and ecclesiasti-
cal privileges of the Sibiu “provincials” The most fearsome opposition came
not so much from the political authorities of the duchy or of the kingdom itself
but from the Alba Iulia bishopric and chapter, which could not easily accept
the ecclesiastic autonomy claimed by the German “guests”.
Thus, the first to make clear claims for autonomy, immediately after the vic-
tory of king Ladislas IV against the Aba kindred in the civil war of 1282, were
none other than the colonists in the Mediaş deanship, the same who, in 1277,
had successfully emancipated from the influence of Nicholas Kán. Taken by
125 universos gentis Vngaricae in ducatu commorantes Transsilvano in quibuscumque latibulis,

insulis seu munitionibus deprehendere potuit indiferenter gladio interemit: Jakó 351.
126 circa duo millia Vngarorum utriusque sexus, qui causa defensionis in gremium ecclesie
confugeran, in ipsa eccclesia flamme incendio concremavit: Jakó 351.
127 per crudelem tyrannidem Saxonum scelestissimorum: Jakó 351.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 191
surprise and lacking support from any of the central or local political authori-
ties, the Alba Iulia chapter had no alternative but to back down. Through a
negotiated act with the Mediaş parish, sanctioned and guaranteed by bishop
Peter Monoszló, the canons were forced to accept, on June 23, 1283, to redeem
the greater part (3/4) of the cereal, wine, bees and lamb tithes in exchange for
a fixed amount (40 silver marks).128 For Transylvania, the novelty of such an
engagement made it extremely difficult to enforce. Negotiations and contro-
versies on this issue continued in the following years, and even became the
subject of an appeal to the Pontifical See. Eventually, the Mediaş parish won
the dispute: the new agreement with the chapter, signed on the May 28, 1289,129
guaranteed this time not only by bishop Peter Monoszló, but also by the pro-
vost of Sibiu and the prior of the Alba Iulia convent of the Dominican Order,
wholly restated and reinforced the provisions of 1283. Despite leaving room
for abuse from the bishops of Alba, as they permanently looked to bring the
parishes in the Mediaş deanship back under their control,130 this agreement
was a remarkable step towards gaining ecclesiastic autonomy from Sibiu and
also a model to follow by the other Saxon chapters outside the “royal territory”.
The privileges of the Mediaş deanship had been gained under political
circumstances favorable to Saxon communities. The Saxons’ hostility to the
Aba kindred had become justified after palatine Fyntha’s rebellion (1282). In
addition, the change of attitude towards the Saxons was motivated by their
contribution to the fight against the Mongol invasion of 1285. In the last years
of his reign, king Ladislas IV used the Saxon communities’ economic and mili-
tary potential in an attempt to institute a reign that would keep the aristo-
crats under control. The presence of the king in southern Transylvania in the
fall-winter of 1288, along with archbishop Lodomerius’ appeal to the counties
of Sibiu and Braşov and the presence of the Sibiu provost in the royal entou-
rage were proof of the Saxons’ entry in the grace of Ladislas the Cuman, which
also explains the political capital they accumulated. Their privileged position
remained unchanged during the reign of Andrew III. Attending to the “dietal”
congregation of Transylvania of March 1291, and then at the general congrega-
tion of the kingdom in 1298, further cemented the Saxons’ place in the assem-
blies. Essential to their rising political influence was not so much the Saxon
community spirit as the growing influence of the aristocracy. Taking advantage
128 D IR II 249–250; ZW 145; Jakó 399.

129 D IR II 308–309; ZW 159–160; Jakó 445.
130 A complaint against the Archdean of Alba, who claimed hefty amounts in the account of
the right of accommodation, was addressed to Pope Clement V by the dean and rectors of
Mediaş on January, 13th, 1308: DIR III 63–64; ZW 237–238; AkO II 303.
192 CHAPTER 6
of the uncertainty of their position on the frontier and their social mobility,
the Saxon grafs rose as a political factor of real importance. King Andrew III’s
document of February 1291 confirms their assimilation into the “noble” state131
and their entitled claim to benefit from the same rights. This was just the cli-
max of the process of emancipation initiated some decades ago, which had
given some of the Saxon noble families almost permanence direct role in the
military enterprises of the kings of Hungary as well as the opportunity to accu-
mulate major properties. It was not by chance that the Saxon nobility played a
major role in the most significant political and military events which involved
Saxon communities. Saxon counts also played an active role in the new stage
of Saxon colonization in the last decades of the 13th century,132 which resulted
in the settlement of the German colonists, or “guests” in the Secaşelor valley,
around Sighişoara and in the territory between the two Târnava rivers followed
by their subsequent organization into sees and deanships.
As a consequence of this new stage of Saxon community expansion, the
organization of the Sighişoara see was completed in last quarter of the 13th
century,133 when seniores de castro Sex134 were mentioned, clearly pointing out
to an advanced community organization. As for Sebeş, the process ended in
1301, when “the judges, jurors and all the guests in Sebeş”135 responded affir-
matively to the citizens of Sibiu’s new demand for leave of passage. Two years
later (1303) the deanship of Sebeş is mentioned in the agreement concluded
between its parishes with bishop Peter Monoszló on how to charge episcopal
tithes.136 Next to the aforementioned see of Mediaş and the neighboring Şeica
and Biertan sees, the two sees of Sighişoara and Sebeş became the most impor-
tant Saxon communities which defined the structures of the institutional
autonomy outside the initial colonization area. Several smaller deanships
joined their attempts to claim full ecclesiastic autonomy (Saschiz, Târnava
Mare, Târnava Mica, Spring, Cris, and Cosdu) located in the ecclesiastic sub-
ordination of the Alba Iulia bishopric. After 1289, these Saxon chapters made
several attempts to gain the ecclesiastical freedom of the Mediaş deanship at
least. Nonetheless, this model only played a transitional role for these commu-
nities. Their main objective was to become the affiliates of the Sibiu provost
131 nobiles regni nostri et Saxones Transylvaniani predia tenentes et more nobilium. DIR II
505–509; ZW 172–176.
132 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor 203.
133 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 206–208, 277.
134 Z W 141; Jakó 384. Pascu, Voievodatul Transilvaniei, 82–83.
135 iudex, iurati et universi hospites de Sebus: ZW 219; DIR III 6–7.
136 Z W 226–227; DIR III 22–23.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 193
and to gain the same status as other subordinate communities, namely full
autonomy from the Alba Iulia bishopric.
The considerable difference in status among the Saxon territories largely
explains the social complexity in southern Transylvania around the year 1300.
Thus, the territorial boundaries of the Sibiu provost, confined to the Sibiu,
Nocrich and Cincu chapters, were much more restricted than those of the
county of Sibiu which, according to Andrew II’s “constitution” (1224), included
the entire territory “from Baraolt to Orăştie”.137 This case, the causes of which
have not been completely explained, made, for example, the see of Orăştie
depend administratively on the province of Sibiu, yet continue to depend
ecclesiastically on the Alba Iulia bishopric. It was thus more than natural for
the Saxons in southern Transylvania to address their claims, which varied
from appeals to higher instances138 to armed expedition against the chapter,
in February 1308,139 mainly to the Alba Iulia ecclesiastic authorities, the main
hurdle before their goals. Also, the protagonists of most of the Saxons’ violent
actions in this interval, namely the 1277 and 1324 rebellions and the riot of 1308,
were the residents of this troubled region, who aspired to similar freedoms as
those enjoyed by the colonists from the privileged territory.
On the other hand, the interest of the great Saxon communities’ lead-
ers in attending the noble congregations and their assimilation to the noble
statute enabled them to adopt a flexible attitude towards voivode Ladislas
Kán. Under the circumstances, the preliminary agreement signed in Szeged
was non-equivocal: the Sibiu county Saxons were subordinated, until 1308, to
the Transylvanian voivode, the provisional authority of whom they acknowl-
edged as derived from his attributes of the king’s territorial locum tenens.
The causes may have originated from the conflicts of the summer of 1301 in
southern Transylvania.140 The concrete ways in which the acknowledgment
was obtained are difficult to reconstruct. In all probability they did not exceed
the limits of good neighbors, accompanied by the payment to the voivode of
certain taxes and fees. Undoubtedly, the subordination to the voivode, even
formal, “froze” all attempts to extend the privileges inspired from the Sibiu
model, enabling the voivode to quietly enforce his authority over the “districts”
137 D IR I 208–210, 383–384.

138 See the complaint addressed by the chapter to the pontifical legate, Cardinal Gentile,
on January, 1309: the Saxons in the “seven chapters” (Spring, Cosdu, Târnava Mare, Țapu,
Saschiz, Criş and Târnava Mică) offend him, harm him, violate his rights: DIR III 93–95.
139 Enforced by armed clergy and laymen in the Deanship of Sebeş: DIR III 155.
140 D IR III 6–7; ZW 219.
194 CHAPTER 6
of Mediaş, Biertan and Şeica.141 In what concerns the unique exception of 1301,
there is no clue that could help us determine the existence of tense relations
between the voivode and the Sibiu residents, before the outbreak of the 1307–
1308 crisis. On the contrary, in 1306–1307 Ladislas Kán and the Sibiu county
Saxons converged in endorsing Otto of Wittelsbach’s candidature to the throne
of Hungary, marking the climax of good relations that would only deteriorate
after the unscrupulous arrest of the Bavarian duke and the voivode’s takeover
of the bishopric. These events taking place in the second half of 1307 alarmed
the Saxons who then offered their political support to Charles Robert of Anjou.
Even if the relations with Peter Monoszló had not been the most cordial, they
immediately understood that the voivode’s complete victory over the bishopric
made it imminent for Transylvania to become a hereditary principality, which
would pose a threat to the county of Sibiu. As of that moment, the Saxons
in Transylvania suddenly switched from peaceful neutrality towards Ladislas
Kán to full support for the Angevine candidate. Given the unstable balance of
power in the province, the firm position they adopted would bring a decisive
advantage to Charles Robert.
6.3.3 Székelys
The Székelys were much more attached to the political system governed by
Ladislas Kán than the Saxons from the county of Sibiu. Nevertheless, they
were far from completely subdued. At that time, the Székelys were still a gen-
tilic society, organized around family relations dating back to the colonization
period. Of the three traditional ‘orders’, the backbone of their organization,
only that of the notables (primores) had adapted to the noble system to a
certain extent, which provided personal ownership of the land.142 A certain
degree of subordination of the Székely communities to the voivode became,
under the circumstances, a military necessity given the long crisis during the
interregnum. For this subordination, as suggested by the text of the Szeged
pact, Ladislas Kán may have assumed the attributes of Székely count in 1301–
1310, as some of his successors would.
The most powerful bond between the noble counties and the Székely ter-
ritories was still ensured by the Székelys’ voluntary integration within the state
141 D IR III 240–241, 410–411; ZW 315–316.

142 Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 115–117; Ioan-Aurel Pop, Romanians and Hungarians from
the 9th to the 14th century. The Genesis of the Transylvanian Medieval State, (Cluj-Napoca:
Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 1996), 162–164; Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the
Mongol Empire, 257–259; Charles d’Eszlary, Histoire des institutions publiques hongroises,
vol. 1, (Paris: M. Riviere, 1959), 58–74, 337–338.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 195
regime, to a greater extent than that of the Saxon communities. Following the
great Mongol invasion, the Székelys manifested a strong attraction to gaining
noble status and the associated privileges and, as a consequence, the Székely
leaders obtained the right to participate, as a distinct “state”, to Transylvania’s
general congregation (1291) and to that of the kingdom of Hungary (1298).
Their interest in becoming associates to Transylvania’s regime of social states
continued during Ladislas Kán’s regime. Seem, the Székely count in the Arieş
valley attended, in April 1296, the congregation of villa Cruciferorum.143 In June
1308, Ladislas Kán organized the greatest of the state assemblies during his rule
at the boundary of the Székely territory (iuxta Neregh),144 with their leaders’
attendance. Nonetheless, the effective authority the voivode would exert in his
relations with the Székelys seems to have been less significant overall. We have
already seen how the influence exerted by vice-voivode Ehelleus Ákos over
the Székelys in the sees of Arieş and Telegd is much better documented. At the
same time, we have seen that the voivode’s political views did not always con-
verge with those of his locum tenens. The remarkable traditionalism featured
by Saxon communities made it impossible for them to give up on the allegiance
to the king and their involvement in internal political conflicts. There was no
clue about the participation of the Székelys to the rebellion started in 1316–1317
by the sons of voivode Ladislas Kán. On the contrary, both Charles Robert and
Louis of Anjou would always consider the Székelys their most loyal servants.
The Székelys’ subordination to the voivode was much like that of the Saxons,
dictated by the political context. Nonetheless, their attraction to the congrega-
tional system was a clear sign of evolution that would push the Székelys into
the regnum Transylvanianum state regime of the 15th century.
6.3.4 Romanians
The difficulties faced in dominating the Transylvanian political stage, inter-
weaved with military and economic reasons, forced Ladislas Kán to continue
the strategy used by Ladislas the Cuman in the last years of his reign towards the
Romanians in Transylvania. The Romanians’ integration into Transylvania’s
political system and the frail attempts to rise as a distinct entity within its bor-
ders had been the result of the local society’s long adaptation to the system of
values promoted by the Hungarian crown and the constitution of new social
elite that would aspire to noble status. The representatives of this Romanian
knezes’ that owned land had been summoned by King Andrew III to attend the
143 Jakó 543.

144 D IR III 67.
196 CHAPTER 6
general congregation of Alba Iulia, in March 1291.145 Again in 1288 archbishop

Lodomerius asked them to withdraw the support to Ladislas the Cuman given
together with other Transylvanian privileged states. The Transylvanian knezes’
attempts to join the congregational system did not have repercussions on
the representative institutions in the autonomous “Romanian” countries. The
Haţeg country provides the most significant example in this respect, where
knezes’ assemblies attested in the 14th century received strong influences
from the noble congregations of Transylvania, manifested in the structure and
attributes of the assemblies as well as the local chancellery.146 Even though
the status of Romanian knezes in Transylvania was far from being standard-
ized around the year 1300, one cannot doubt that those who had succeeded
in maintaining their relative autonomy “bore all the attributes of a Hungarian
feudal lord, except for the royal donation and Catholic status”.147 They in fact
fully deserved this position especially due to their contribution in defending
the kingdom, better documented as we approach the end of the 13th century.148
In the turmoil of the second half of the 13th century, the Romanians’ mili-
tary role had grown significantly, especially since the process of colonization
during this period was motivated mainly by economic reasons, and not for
gaining more manpower to consolidate Transylvania’s defense system. This
enabled the Romanians to become more than just border guards (as certified
once again during the Mongolian invasion of 1285149) and to engage in vari-
ous offensive campaigns of the Hungarian crown, e.g. the campaign against
Ottokar II (1260)150 and Andrew III’s expedition against Austria (1291),151 which
145 For a more recent approach see: Érszegi Géza, “A román nemesek az erdély tartományi
gyülésen a 13. század végén? (Egy forráshely ésrtelmezéséhez),” in Nobilimea românească
din Transilvania/Az erdélyi román nemesség¸ed. Marius Diaconescu (Satu-Mare: Editura
Muzeului Sătmărean, 1997), 36–63.
146 Ioan-Aurel. Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti. Adunările cnezialeşi nobiliare (boiereşti)
din Transilavania în secolele XIV–XVI (Cluj: Dacia, 1991), 25–26, 59–66, 85–101.
147 Ioan-Aurel Pop, “Elita românească din Transilvania în secolele XIII–XIV (origine, statut,
evoluţie),” in Nobilimea românească din Transilvania/ Az erdélyi román nemesség, ed.
Marius Diaconescu (Satu-Mare: Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, 1997), 45–55 (52); Ioan-
Aurel Pop, “Statutul cnezilor supuşi pe domeniile feudale din Transilvania în secolul al
XIV-lea,” in Civilizaţie medievală şi modernă românească. Studii istorice, ed. Nicolae Edroiu
et al. (Cluj: Dacia, 1985), 102–115; Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti, 36–57.
148 Pop, “Elita românească din Transilvania,” 42–44.
149 Jakó 407.
150 H D 287–288; DocVal 27.
151 Binder, “Antecedente”, 35–36; Gheorghe Brătianu, “În jurul întemeierii statelor româneşti,”
in RI 1–2 (1993): 157; Pop, Instituţii medievale româneşti, 18; Pop, “Elita românească din
Transilvania,” 43.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 197
enhanced the appreciation they enjoyed and increased their military prestige.
The Romanians’ martial values, as highlighted by Ladislas the Cuman, as well
as their presence in the Bihor military structures subordinated to Roland Borsa152
testify to their involvement in the internal conflicts of the 13th century. They
are also indicative of the extension of privileges granted to soldiers also onto
Romanian knezes outside the autonomous “countries” in border regions.
The Romanians’ economic standing improved in the second half of the
13th century, especially because of their skills in raising sheep, as attested in this
period,153 no doubt in close relation to the rise of textile production in Saxon
economic centers. The persistent claims of archbishop Fillip Türje, in 1256 and
1262,154 for the Romanians’ and Székelys’ animal tithes can only be explained
by their significant value. Also, the expansion of noble domains had grown the
interest in using Romanians as labor force. In the first years of Andrew III’s
reign, settling Romanians on various ecclesiastic and noble domains required
a special permit from the king, who was worried this migration would cost
the kingdom some of its most valuable subjects.155 Given the kingdom of
Hungary’s feudal anarchy, these transfers had become assimilated to the colo-
nization of foreign “guests”, occurring during the temporary or even definitive
suspension of their dues to the royal treasury. Thus, in 1292, the settlement
of Romanians on Alexander Ákos’ properties of Ilia, Gurasada and Feneş also
resulted into the exemption of dues and taxes to the king, to the benefit of
local lords.156 This pseudo-colonization was first attested during the anarchy
at the beginning of Ladislas the Cuman’s reign,157 and also represented, beyond
the numerous positive consequences that resulted from increasing the num-
ber of dwellers, a form of tax evasion that the nobles would embrace in order
to increase revenues.
Of the two Romanian “countries” which enjoyed internal autonomy
while being part of the political system of voivodal Transylvania—Făgăraş
and Haţeg—Ladislas Kán became especially interested in the latter after
establishing his residence in Deva. The Haţeg country had developed its own
local life between the 11th and the 13th century, and was affected only to an
152 D IR II 513, 524; DocVal 42–45.

153 D IR II 18–20; 493–494.
154 D IR II 41–43; HD 307–309.
155 See the royal order from November, 7th, 1293, which stipulated that the Romanians
who had deserted the royal domain of Scekes (Cunţa) be brought back: DIR II 400–401;
ZW 195–196; DocVal 38–40.
156 D IR II 389; DocVal 36–38; Jakó 505.
157 Around 1276, King Ladislas the Cuman approved the colonization of sixty households of
Romanians on the Fylesd and Enugd estates of the Chapter of Alba Iulia: DIR II. 400–401;
Jakó 342.
198 CHAPTER 6
extent of 10–20% by the process of feudalization promoted by the Hungarian

state.158 The religious freedom enjoyed by local Romanian knezes, which
favored the construction, in the second half of the 13th century, of stone mon-
asteries and churches such as the ones in Densuş or Peşteana, is also certified
by a Slavonic inscription from the time of Ladislas Kán (1313/1314), knez Balea,
priest Naneş and painter Theophilus, the sponsors and the builders of the old-
est wall of the orthodox church of Streisângiorgiu.159 During Ladislas Kán’s
rule, according to testimonies from the Angevine restoration, the Romanian
knezes Dan and Stanislav seized (recovered?) the Brethonia estate, which had
become the possession, at an unknown time, of an aristocrat by the name of
Thomas and restituted by King Charles Robert, in 1315, to his kin Nicholas.160
The voivode’s acceptance of knezes’ seizing noble properties illustrates the tol-
erance that featured the relations with the Haţeg upper class.
There is no information on Ladislas Kán’s relations with the Romanians in
the Olt (Făgăraş) land. We are unable to establish whether Ugrinus Csák, owner
of the Făgăraş and Sâmbăta properties since 1291, remained in possession after
1301 or if, on the contrary, he shared the fate of Dionysius Banffy, the other
“royalist” noble introduced in Transylvania in the context of King Andrew III’s
efforts to bring this province back under his control. The cooperation between
Ugrinus Csák and Ladislas Kán, suggested by Chronicon Posoniense,161 is not
sufficient evidence to conclude that Csák was still holding this land after
1301. On the contrary, the fact that the Ujláki family did not ask king Charles
Robert after 1315 to restitute these properties seems to suggest that Ugrinus
Csák’s himself gave up his estate in Făgăraş as a result of the agreement con-
cluded with king Ladislas. On the other hand, previous interpretations that the
Romanian voivode settled in the country of Făgăraş (as stipulated by Ottokar
of Styria’s chronicle162) or even that some Romanian voivodes from beyond the
158 Radu Popa, La începuturile evului mediu românesc. Țara Haţegului (Bucharest: Editura
Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988), 61.
159 Vasile Drăguţ, Pictura murală în Transilvania (sec. XIV–XV) (Bucharest: Meridiane, 1970),
40–42; Marius Porumb, Dicţionar de pictură veche românească din Transilvania. Sec. XII–
XVIII (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române, 1998), 388; Cristian Moisescu, Arhitectura
românească veche, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Meridiane, 2001), 41–42.
160 D IR III 234, 406; DIR III 239–240, 409. The analysis of the entire process was made by
Maria Holban, “Deposedări şi judecăţi în Haţeg pe vremea Angevinilor,” in Din cronica
relaţiilor româno-ungare în secolele XIII–XIV (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii
Socialiste, 1981) 232–244.
161 S RH II 48.
162 Adolf Armbruster, “Românii în cronica lui Ottokar de Styria: o nouă interpretare”, Studii.
Revistă de istorie 25 (3/1972): 474–482.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 199
Carpathians exerted, in this interval, direct control over the country163 remain
difficult to accept: the military system subordinated to Ladislas Kán was
clearly defined, and covered the whole of Transylvania and even some outer-
Carpathian prolongations; on the other hand, the “country” ruled by the
voivode mentioned in the German chronicle was undoubtedly situated in
the geographical proximity of the Halych knezdom.
In the absence of more precise information, the concrete circumstances in
which the “dismount” of Negru Vodă (the Black Voivode) occurred (which the
historical tradition sets between 1290 and 1310) are hard to establish. The only
clues we have of these events have been transmitted by historical traditions
referring to the founding of Wallachia, whose late dating raises questions
about its accuracy. If the importance of tradition as historical reference
was well argued by Gheorghe I. Brătianu,164 it is also true that such analysis
requires the same objectivity involved in studying “traditional” sources. The
oldest reference to this tradition, as mirrored by the chronicle of Luccari
(1605), only informs about the seizing of Wallachia, in 1310, by a Negro Voevoda
di natione Ungaro, who, attracted by the country’s beauties and riches, fabricò
la cità in Campoluogo.165 In 1656, Paul of Alep presented Negru Vodă (Voivode)
as a Romanian comes (count) from Transylvania who, “under permission
from the king”, freed Wallachia from the Tatars; also, “his might growing, he
became the lord of the country” and erected the Câmpulung monastery.166 The
story of the country’s birth following the victorious battle against the Tatars
also appears in Paisie Ligaridis’ Chrismology (1656), the founder he indicated
being a certain “Vlah the Wallachian”, natural son to the king of Hungary.167 In
all the works that approach this matter, drafted in 1677–1691, the Moldavian
chronicler Miron Costin invariably indicated the Negru Vodă’s “dismount”
(foundation) as a consequence of the victory against the Tatars by “Laslău the
King” (= Ladislas the Cuman),168 as mirrored by Viaţa preacuviosului părinte
163 L. Chiţescu, “O formaţiune politică la nord şi la sud de Munţii Făgăraş în secolul al XIII-
lea”, RdI 28 (7/1975): 1057–1067. A recent analysis by Lukács (Țara Făgăraşului, 167–171),
indicates several weaker points of this theory.
164 Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică despre întemeierea statelor româneşti, ed. Valeriu
Râpeanu (Bucharest: Editura Eminescu, 1980).
165 Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 249.
166 Maria Holban et al. ed., Călători străini despre ţările române, vol. 4 (Bucharest: Editura
Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1976), 170–171; Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 253–255.
167 Ela Cosma, Ideea de întemeiere în cultura populară românească (Cluj: Presa Universitară
Clujeană, 2000), 515–516.
168 Miron Costin, “Cronica polonă/ Cronica Țărilor Moldovei şi Munteniei (1677),” in Opere,
ed. Petre P. Panaitescu (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1958), 207–209; Miron Costin, “Poema polonă/
200 CHAPTER 6
Nicodim sfintitul (The Life of Devout Father Nicodimus the Holy), published
by monk Stephen of the Tismana monastery in 1763.169 The oldest account of
the foundation in a Wallachian chronicle is Letopiseţul Cantacuzinesc (1690)
(The Cantacuzino Chronicles), yet it does not indicate the reasons that deter-
mined “Radul Negrul-Voivode, high duke of Almaş and Făgăraş” to “come down
the Dâmboviţa river” and start “building the country anew”.170 In an attempt
to make up for this, the historian Radu Popescu, in Istoriile domnilor Țărei
Româneşti (1700) (The histories of Wallachian Lords) suggests two possible
“causes” that drove “Radu Negrul-Vodă” to cross the mountains, yet which he
acknowledges as simple personal “opinions”, unconfirmed by any historical
source:171 a) “to build strongholds for his men and make it easier to defend
those in Transylvania, should the Turks invade”, and b) “perhaps the Romanian
lord had come to enmity with those of the Hungarians and Saxons, for reasons
unknown, and moved herein”.172
Thus, the assumption that the foundation of Wallachia occurred after a
conflict between Transylvanian Romanians, on one side and Hungarians and
Saxons, on the other, was just a simple “opinion” issued by historian Radu
Popescu around 1700, and simply projected a contemporary reality onto a dis-
tant past. Not only this assumption was never confirmed by any of the older
foundation traditions, but the Wallachian chronicler himself considered it only
a possible alternative to the version, common in the other sources, of the moun-
tain cross for the military consolidation of the Transylvanian frontier. The per-
sistence with which this “chronicler’s opinion” was perpetrated in Romanian
historiography becomes hard to explain, all the more as it only seems to be
confirmed by certain Făgăraş “local traditions” collected by patriot scholars in
the last decades of the 19th century (!). On the other hand, the persistence
with which the tradition of the “foundation” indicated, as the first stage of this
process, a “dismount” taking place in Câmpulung needs to be correlated to
Istorie în versuri polone despre Moldova şi Țara Românească (1684),” in Opere, ed. Petre P.
Panaitescu (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1958), 228–235; Miron Costin, “De neamul moldovenilor
(1686–1691) ),” in Opere, ed. Petre P. Panaitescu (Bucharest: ESPLA, 1958), 207, 228, 273, 385.
169 Vladislav, the king of Hungary, killed in battle “Batie, the Mongol emperor”; Vladislav’s
brother, Radu Negru, crossed the mountains and freed from Mongols the “counties” to the
east of Olt River: Cosma, Ideea de întemeiere, 513–514.
170 Mihail Gregorian, ed. et al., Cronicari munteni (Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură, 1961),
1: 84–85.
171 “The reason for which there is nothing written by us or foreigners regarding this, I believe,
is that for one of these two reason they moved the see. Come to think of it, one of these
reasons must have determined the move.” Gregorian, ed., Cronicari munteni, 227.
172 Gregorian, ed., Cronicari munteni, 227–228.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 201
the tombstone of a comes Laurencius de Longo Campo, dated 1300, discov-

ered in the first capital of Wallachia.173 According to Gheorghe I. Brătianu,
this monument “can be interpreted more as evidence of domination by the
Hungarian Crown predating the foundation of a united Wallachia, in the old
voivodal residence.”174 The only remark to the above is that this “rule of the
Hungarian crown” must have been exerted by Transylvania’s voivode Ladislas
Kán. Moreover, the data provided by the historic tradition offers precious
information on how at that time, in the south and southeast Transylvania,
the older military frontier system functioned, with its multi-ethnic complex
structure. Thus, for the author of Letopiseţul Cantacuzinesc, Negru-Vodă’s
crossing of the Carpathians must have occurred “with a multitude of nations:
Romanians, Catholics, Saxons, all sorts of people”,175 followed in this respect by
Johann Filstich, who speaks of “Saxons, Hungarians and Vlahs”.176 As for Paisie
Ligaridis, his enumeration of the entourage following “Vlahul Munteanul”
(Vlahul the Highlander) is much longer, including “Germans, Hungarians,
Cumans, Székelys, and Vlahs, who shattered the musty wings of Tatar tyranny”.177
The simile between the ethnic diversity in the army of “Negru-Vodă” and that
of the expeditionary force led by Joachim Türje ca 1210 against Vidin brings to
life the reconstitution, probably during Ladislas the Cuman, of the older mili-
tary frontier structure, in which the Romanians in Terra Blacorum/the Făgăraş
Country were essential. The Câmpulung “dismount” seems to have been, under
these circumstances, the result of the implantation on the southern side of the
Carpathians, of a border military guard. One of its leaders, probably Romanian,
was substituted to the Argeş voivode, in unclear circumstances, and later laid
the foundations of the “entire Wallachia”.
As for the voivode mentioned in Ottokar of Styria’s chronicle, he seems to
have not been part of Ladislas Kán’s political system, but was rather one of
his more distant allies. This voivode’s “country” must have been located in the
nearby proximity of the Halych knezdom, most likely in Maramureş,178 the
only logical option.
173 Nicolae Iorga, Istoria românilor, vol. 3 of Ctitorii, ed. Victor Spinei, (Bucharest: Editura
Enciclopedică, 1993), 93, 308; Emil Lăzărescu, “Despre piatra de mormânt a comitelui
Laurentiu şi câteva probleme arheologice şi istorice în legătură cu ea,” SCIA 1–2 (1957):
109–127.
174 Brătianu, “În jurul întemeierii,” vol. 4, 155.
175 Gregorian, ed., Cronicari munteni, 1: 84–85.
176 Cosma, Ideea de întemeiere, 516; Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 253.
177 Brătianu, Tradiţia istorică, 515.
178 Emil Lăzărescu, “Despre voievodul românilor din 1307–1308,” in AARMSI s.3 27 (1944–
1945): 65; Popa, Țara Maramureşului, 195. To locate it in northern Moldavia see: Brătianu,
202 CHAPTER 6
The significant differences in the status of Romanians in various regions

of Transylvania, ranging from the quasi-sovereignty of the voivode “from
beyond the forest” and the autonomy of the Haţeg nobility to the subordina-
tion in noble counties, to their global lack of privileges and their belonging to
Orthodox faith undoubtedly constituted the main causes which hindered their
emancipation as individualized “state” in regnum Transylvanianum’s political
system.179 This is not to say that Romanian elites were not attracted by the
privileges deriving from their belonging to Hungary’s aristocracy, it is simply
the fact that they could never constitute an elite based on an ethnic privileged
state.180
6.4 External Policy: Transylvania’s Involvement in the Competition for

the Hungarian Crown
6.4.1 External Policy

The Mongolian threat was the main external issue of the first years of Ladislas
Kán’s rule. Nogai’s 1292 offensive181 ended with the conquest of Severin under
the khan’s allies, the Vidin Sismanides, who would play a major part in south-
east European policy until the battle of Velbujd (1330). In the same year, 1292,
the Bulgarian czar George Terter, who had repeatedly manifested his avail-
ability in joining an anti-Mongolian coalition, was replaced by Nogai with
boyar Smilet, a mere proxy. The Serbian king Stephen Milutin was forced to
accept Mongol suzerainty and participated in the offensive against Hungary.182
The Mongol hegemony over South-Eastern Europe reached its climax after
these events. Moreover, despite the tendencies to turn these relations into
direct domination especially after Nogai’s residence was established on the
Lower Danube, the hegemony decisively contributed to the creation of p olitical
cohesion in the region. Besides the spiritual cohesion provided by the Orthodox
faith and the cultural unity brought by the common Slavic culture, the politi-
cal system created by Nogai contributed to the creation of a historic identity
În jurul întemeierii, 142; Zenovie Pâclişanu, “Unde a fost voievodul român al cronicii lui
Ottokar de Styria,” in RIR 17 (1947): 121.
179 Pop, Elita românească din Transilvania, 53.
180 Pop, Elita românească din Transilvania, 53.
181 R A 3951.
182 Papacostea, Between the Crusade and the Mongol Empire, 192; Tudor Sălăgean, “Relaţiile
internaţionale în Sud-Estul Europei în primul sfert al secolului al XIV-lea,” SUBB-H 46
(1–2/1996): 138.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 203
specific to this region which consolidated in the following decades. Most likely,
this region’s pole of gravity must have attracted Ladislas Kán’s Transylvania,
whose strategic interests brough it closer to Nogai’s political system.
Nonetheless, during the civil war in the Mongol Empire (1298–1300),
Ladislas Kán seems to have granted shelter to Nogai’s son Čaka in Transylvania
after the defeats inflicted by the legitimate khan Toqtai.183 Count Lawrence
of Câmpulung’s tombstone from the same period could testify to the con-
solidation of the Transylvanian defense system in the Carpathian arch. The
Mongolian attacks against “Hungary” (Transylvania), referenced in the papal
correspondence of 1301 and 1302184 must have represented Toqtai’s reprisals
after his final victory over Čaka, with decisive support from the new Bulgarian
czar, Theodor Sviatoslav (1300–1322). With the growing friendship between
the Transylvanian voivode and the Bulgarian czar, around 1303 when Theodor
Sviatoslav started his war against Byzantium, these actions stopped. A few
years later, Transylvania’s reconnection with Serbia and Bulgaria was already
accomplished.185 Moreover, the matrimonial alliance between Ladislas Kán
and the Serbian royal family, the voivode’s association to Charles of Valois’
Balkan projects as well as the military support offered to the anti Angevine
rebellion started by his sons prove a radical dissociation of Transylvania’s
external policy from the one promoted until the last quarter of the 13th cen-
tury by the Arpadian kings. The voivode’s solid attachment to the southeastern
European world represented the premise of the major role the voivode played
in the future competition over Hungary’s crown. His relations with the Serbs,
the Bulgarians, Ruthenians and the Romanians offered him not only the secu-
rity he needed but guaranteed effective political and military support, the lat-
ter being the factor that made the position of the Transylvanian voivode safe
until 1315.
6.4.2 Peter Monoszló, Ladislas Kán and Charles Robert of Anjou’s

Candidature
The competition between Ladislas Kán and bishop Peter Monoszló entered
a new phase with Charles Robert of Anjou’s candidature to the Hungarian
crown.186 Son of Charles Martell and a relative of Charles II the Lame, king of
183 Spinei, Moldavia, 191.

184 H D 557–560. In the same interval (1300–1302) sources record armed clashes in Lublin
between the Poles and a Ruthenian-Lithuanian-Mongol coalition: MPH III 853.
185 Armbruster, “Românii în cronica,” 468–469.
186 Halecki, Jadwiga of Anjou, 19–48; Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen, 128–134; Bálint Hóman,
Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria (Roma: Reale academia d’Italia, 1938).
204 CHAPTER 6
Naples, married to one of Stephen V of Hungary’s daughters, Charles Robert

took advantage of the opportunity provided by the end of the Arpadian
dynasty to avenge his father’s failure in the competition for the crown in 1290,
which resulted in Andrew III’s victory. With aid from pope Boniface VIII,
Charles Robert initially found the same internal support as his father from
the Slavonian nobility and the maritime parts of the kingdom of Hungary, as
well as from noble families alienated by the magnates’ unbearable regime.
Initially, his supporters connected with the Monoszló kindred played an excep-
tional role. The most important was undoubtedly Michael Bő, former provost
of the Chapter of Transylvania, who became, in 1298, bishop of Zagreb.187
Besides the local importance he enjoyed as a provincial bishop in Slavonia,
from where the Angevin party drew the overwhelming majority of support-
ers, Michael Bő was at the same time close to the Transylvanian bishop Peter
Monoszló, one of the very few supporters of Charles Robert from the church
of Hungary. The elected Archbishop of Esztergom, George Bicskei (1298–1303),
was a supporter of Charles Robert’s candidature, while Johannes (János)
Hontpázmány, the archbishop of Kalocsa, was the one who, on August 27, 1301,
had placed the Hungarian crown on the head Wenceslas, son of Bohemian
king Wenceslas (Václav) II Přemysl. In fact, the delegation that accompanied
the archbishop of Kalocsa, in 1301, at the Bohemian court included no less than
five bishops (of Agria, Oradea, Vác, Cenad and Bosnia), as well as the provost
of Zips.188 In 1303, two years after the announcement of his candidature, fol-
lowing the pressure exerted by the pontifical ambassador Nicholas Boccassini,
general master of the Dominican order and cardinal-bishop of Ostia,189 Charles
Robert managed to attract the support of some of the greatest church members
installed before 1301, the most important being the archbishop George Bicskei
and the bishop Theodor Tengerdi of Györ. The other significant supporters of
the Angevine party, including the new archbishop Stephen (István) of Kalocsa,
bishops John (János) of Nitra and Nicholas of Bosnia, largely originated from
the higher officials installed and confirmed starting with 1302,190 based on their
sympathy for the Angevine cause. Under the circumstances, the ascendancy
over the young king by Michael Bő, bishop of Zagreb, enabled him to become,
187 Engel, Archontológia, 79.

188 Thomas Ebendorfer von Haselbach, “Chronicon Austriacum,” in Gombos, Catalogus, 2221.
189 His mission to Hungary occurred in 1301–1303: KMTL 115, 528. See also: Chronicon
Austriacum anonymi; Nicolaus Vischelius, “Chronicon Austriacum” in Gombos, Catalogus,
517, 1707; Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, chapter 92, 102. After the death of Boniface VIII,
Nicolaus Boccassini became pope under the name of Benedict XI (1303–1304).
190 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 64, 72.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 205
in November 1303, immediately after the unexpected death of George Bicskei,

in Anagni, where he traveled upon the invitation of pope Boniface VIII, the
archbishop of Esztergom.191
The immediate consequence of Michael Bő’s rise was the seizure by the
related Monoszló kindred of leading positions in the structures of the pro-
Angevine party. Egidius Monoszló, Bishop Peter’s elder brother, had already
made a comeback on the political stage in 1302, and took over the strategic for-
tress of Fülek (Filakovo) in Charles Robert’s name.192 Peter Monoszló himself
was close to the Angevine candidate, and was mentioned on the August 24, 1304,
the third in rank among church officials, after the Esztergom and Kalocsa arch-
bishops, and the first of the bishops who signed the alliance with Rudolf III’s
of Habsburg, duke of Austria,193 opponent of the Přemyslides and candidate
to the crown of Bohemia.194 Under the circumstances, the Monoszló kindred
revived its older plans to turn Transylvania under the control of their family.
The kingdom’s list of barons in the same treaty with Rudolf III briefly men-
tioned a certain Peter Monoszló as the voivode of Transylvania, a relative of
the homonymous bishop.195 At the same time, on the lower Mureş river, still
subject to Ladislas Kán’s influence, the innovative Charles Robert organized
a “voivodeship” with imprecise boundaries, run by Lawrence Igmánd,196 the
founder of the Pâncota (Pankotai) family. Yet, while Lawrence Igmánd man-
aged to establish a solid territorial base in Zarand county, around the Pâncota
and Dezna fortresses,197 and have his authority acknowledged by the nobles in
the region,198 the members of the Monoszló kindred lost their influence before
king Charles Robert after the death of archbishop Michael Bő, in the fall of
1304. Obviously, after this date the projects to make young Peter Monoszló the
voivode of Transylvania were completely abandoned.
Charles Robert’s intent to withdraw the title of voivode of Transylvania from
Ladislas Kán was been motivated by the support he had given to the cause of
191 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 63; AkO I 470.

192 AkO I 300.
193 C D VIII 1 160–161; AkO I 644.
194 This remarkable diplomatic success ensured Charles Robert with the support of King
Albert I of Habsburg, the father of Rudolf III, see: Annales Colmarensis maiores, in
Gombos, Catalogus, 118.
195 C D VIII 1 160–161; AkO I 644 and Engel, Archontológia, 1: 470. Probably a son of Egidius
Monoszló.
196 C D VIII 1 160–161; AkO I 644.
197 Given in 1317 by Charles Robert to his son Nicholas: Engel, Archontológia, 301, 388.
198 On February, 2nd, 1306, he mediated the conflict between the Borsa kindred and a series
of local noble families: DIR III 46–47; CDHA I 107–108.
206 CHAPTER 6
Wenceslaus of Bohemia. In the summer of 1303, the Esztergom and Kalocsa

archbishops addressed the Transylvanian nobles and priests in an open letter
to notify them of the firm support given by Boniface VIII to Charles Robert,
asking them under threat of excommunication and interdictum, to swear alle-
giance to him and give up their support of Wenceslas Přemysl’s cause, whose
crowning had been invalidated by the pope.199 Thus, Transylvania was obvi-
ously hostile to the Angevine party despite Bishop Peter’s dynastic option,
most certainly due to the position adopted by its leader. The reasons that drove
Ladislas Kán to become the supporter of the Bohemian candidate are hard to
explain, especially since a number of his relatives in the Kán kindred’s place
of origin had been early supporters of the Angevines.200 He may have followed
the example of some of the most important barons of the kingdom (the Csák,
Ákos, Rátót, Kőszegi, Aba or Hontpázmány families, to name only the most
significant) with whom Ladislas Kán must have been in close contact.201
The assassination of King Wenceslas II Přemysl (June 21, 1305) caused the
aristocratic factions in the region to regroup under Charles Robert. Therefore,
some of the Angevines’ initial supporters, recruited mainly among the nobility
in the Slavonian areas and the region east of the Tizsa River, saw their posi-
tions sacrificed again in favor of the older and powerful aristocratic families.
The privileges Charles Robert bestowed onto the aristocracy until recently
reluctant to him were not taking lightly by some of his older partisans who felt
betrayed. The consequences were forthcoming. A great group of the aforemen-
tioned nobles, Leukus Pekri, Apor Peć, Lawrence Igmánd, and Peter Monoszló,
stopped being Charles Robert’s supporters for a long time, and a member of a
major aristocratic family, Theodor Weyteh of the Chanad kindred,202 became
one of his fiercest opponents. Also, the year 1305 saw the advent of a new
counter-candidate to the crown of Hungary, in the person of the Bavarian duke
Otto of Wittelsbach, who managed within a short period of time to attract the
199 D IR III 30–32; CD VIII 1 133–135; AkO I 417 (between June, 26th and September, 7th).
200 It was the case of Leukus (Lökös) Pekri, son of Lawrence, the baron of Charles Robert in
1302–1304, see: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 470, 362. Kristó Gyula, “I. Károly király föúri elitje
(1301–1309),” Századok 133 (1/1999): 42, 45: considers him a member if the Kán kindred.
This opinion is also shared by Engel, who expressed the highly unlikely assumption that
this family has a branch in Ilidia: Engel Archontológia, 1: 470; 2: 122. The Pekri family
(Körös county) probably had some family ties with voivode Ladislas, but there is little
information available regarding their nature, see: DIR III 67; Zichy I 117–118.
201 Ladislas Kán had family ties with some of these families. Thus, one of his sisters was mar-
ried to Alexander Nekcsei of the Aba kindred, see: CDHA III 277–278; DIR V 384.
202 Charles Robert’s baron in 1304: Engel, Archontológia, 471.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 207
support of the nobility to the east of Tisza, primarily of the Borsa kindred,
themselves initial supporters of Charles Robert.203
6.4.3 Otto of Wittelsbach’s Candidature to the Crown of Hungary

Grandson of Bela IV from his daughter’s line, Otto of Wittelsbach compensated
for his late candidature and lack of pontifical support with the endorsement
from the noble faction led by Henrik Kőszegi,204 from the German colonists in
the entire kingdom of Hungary, and most importantly, from the remarkable
edge given to him by the possession of St. Stephen’s Crown and other “sacred”
royal insignia, taken in the summer of 1305 from the underaged son of the
late king Wenceslas (Vencel) II.205 Entering Hungary around August 7, 1305206
escorted by an important contingent of Bavarian knights,207 despite opposition
from his formidable rivals in the House of Habsburg,208 Otto of Wittelsbach
met no armed resistance from the undecided supporters of Charles Robert and
managed to seize control of Buda in November, without major obstacles.209 On
December 6, 1305, bishops Anthony of Cenad and Benedict Rád of Veszprém
officiated the crowning ceremony in Székesfehérvár, handing him the symbols
of Hungarian royalty.210
Despite this impetuous start, Otto of Wittelsbach’s positions deteriorated
significantly in the first half of 1306. His dismissal of the Bavarian knights and
the oscillating attitude of the Kőszegs put him in a difficult position against
Charles Robert’s supporters and found himself incapable of imposing his
authority on the undecided aristocratic factions. In addition, the open hostility
Otto met from the pope and the king of Germany Albert I of Habsburg posed
203 Kristó, “I. Károly király,” 47–53.

204 Ottokar von Steier, “Oesterreichische Reimchronik”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 1927.
205 Wenceslaus I designated through testament Otto of Wittelsbach as his son’s tutor:
Aventinus, “Annales Boiorum”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 385. Wenceslaus III renounced vol-
untarily to the crown of Hungary: Chronicon Aulae regiae; Franciscus Pragensis canoni-
cus, “Chronica Pragensis”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 502, 952—or he was forced to abdicate
by his father: Ottokar von Steier, “Oesterreichische Reimchronik”, in Gombos, Catalogus,
1929.
206 “Anonymi monachi Bavari”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 281; “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in
Gombos, Catalogus, 592.
207 Vitus Arnpeckius, “Chronicon Baioarie,” in Gombos, Catalogus, 2647.
208 “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 592; Ottokar von Steier, “Oes
terreichische Reimchroni,” in Gombos, Catalogus, 1926 (Otto crossed Austria dressed as a
merchant).
209 “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 592.
210 Vitus Arnpeckius, 2647; Thomas Ebendorfer 2222, Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, 93.
208 CHAPTER 6
serious difficulties not only in Hungary, but also on his family e states. The situ-
ation became more alarming when, after the assassination of Wenceslaus III
Přemysl (August 4, 1306), duke Rudolf II of Habsburg, son of Albert I, managed,
after his marriage with Elisabeth, Wenceslaus II’s widow, to get the royal crown
of Bohemia (August 26). After this dynastic change, Bohemia radically changed
its position towards the competition for the Hungarian crown, becoming an
ally of Charles Robert.
Since after losing the Bohemian support, Buda was no longer safe for Otto
of Wittelsbach, turning to the nobility to the east of Tisza was the only alter-
native. The powerful and compact anti-Angevine block constituted in these
regions consisted of numerous friends, potential or declared, of the Bavarian
candidate: a major part of the nobility in the counties of Bihor, Zarand and
Cenad, led by Beke Borsa, Theodor Weyteh and Dozsa Debreczeni; bishop
Anthony of Cenad, already invested as royal chancellor;211 also, the Saxons
in the province of Sibiu, who had already provided Otto with a number of
soldiers.212 However, the most important of them was Ladislas Kán, the power-
ful voivode of Transylvania, whose hostility to the Angevine candidate had been
adamant and who actually had the sufficient military resources to provide Otto
with the protection he needed. Moreover, since the new pope Clement V was
hesitant in adopting a clear stance on the issue of the Hungarian succession,
Ladislas Kán could also rely, in his support for Otto, on Bishop Peter Monoszló,
disappointed with the lack of consideration Charles Robert had shown to his
family. The reconciliation between the voivode and the bishop became obvi-
ous in late 1306, when Peter Monoszló refused to enforce the excommunica-
tion of the voivode pronounced by archbishop Vincent of Kalocsa. To gain
some time and allow Ladislas to define his intents to Otto, Peter Monoszló
addressed the pontifical curia in an appeal against the measure taken by his
hierarchical superior.213
Otto’s near desperate situation led him, after consulting his supporters,214 to
accept a term otherwise impossible in normal circumstances: his marriage
to the daughter of the voivode, who would become the queen of Hungary.
Losing ground to his opponent, Otto of Wittelsbach sacrificed all the benefits
which a potential matrimonial alliance with one of the royal European fami-
lies could provide in exchange for immediate internal support, on which his
211 AkO II 26; DIR III 47–48.

212 D IR III 136–138; ZW 272–274.
213 AkO II 92, 93.
214 Ottokar von Steier, “Oesterreichische Reimchroni”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 1926.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 209
success in the competition for the throne depended. In early Fall 1306,215 in
the company of Beke Borsa216 and other supporters, Otto of Bavaria gave up on
Buda and, taking with him the crown and the other royal insignia, started his
retreat to the east. Initially, he apparently spent some time in Szeged, trying to
prevent the dissolution of his army. With the oncoming winter, Otto crossed
the Tisza and settled most likely in Oradea until early February 1307, attempt-
ing to consolidate his position with the Bihor nobles.217 It was only after this
date that Otto, short of men and resources, headed towards Transylvania, to
honor the terms of the contract with voivode Ladislas and get the support
to launch a new offensive against Charles Robert.
6.4.4 Ladislas Kán and Albert of Habsburg. Otto of Wittelsbach’s Captivity

In the first months of 1307, Ladislas Kán was still determined to observe the
pact made with Otto of Wittelsbach, who, if successful, would have opened up
the prospect of dominating of the Hungarian political stage. The interdict pro-
nounced against him by archbishop Vincent of Kalocsa did not seem to impress
him much: the immediate consequence was the confiscation by the voivode of
the archiepiscopal property of Halmas (Almaş).218 Were we to accept the evi-
dence of the narrative sources, once the marriage between Otto and Ladislas’
daughter was sealed, the voivode’s royal son-in-law initially benefited from
the freedom of action required to relaunch his cause. At this time, he visited the
German town of Bistriţa, whose population was entirely favorable to him219
and, on this occasion, received the oath of allegiance from the Saxons in Sibiu
county, who invited him over.220 However, Otto of Wittelsbach’s planned visit
to the southern regions of Transylvania never took place.
In the summer of 1307 the Angevine party decisively consolidated its posi-
tions following intense diplomatic activity. Firmly supported by the Esztergom
and Kalocsa archbishops and managing to increasingly develop its power base,
Charles Robert succeeded in undermining Otto of Wittelsbach’s position. In
June–August 1307, the Borsa kindred, the former supporters of the Bavarian
prince, were attracted on Charles Robert’s side, who repaid them with donations
in Ugocsa county.221 In the same interval, in unclear circumstances, Anthony,
215 On September, 13th, 1306, Otto was still in Pest: AkO II 70.
216 Chronicon pictum Vindobonense, 93.
217 AkO II 120; DIR III 49; AkO II 131.
218 AkO II 114.
219 D IR III 137.
220 D IR III 137.
221 AkO II 173, 232.
210 CHAPTER 6
Otto’s chancellor, lost the position of Cenad bishop to a certain Benedict,

who endorsed the Angevine party.222 Moreover, in early August, after a long
hesitation, pope Clement V publicly endorsed Charles Robert, continuing
Boniface VIII’s policy. The designation of cardinal Gentile of Sancto Martino
ai Monti as pontifical legate to Hungary on August 8, 1307, came with firm
and detailed instructions for lay and ecclesiastic decision-makers, who were
asked to make all efforts necessary to ensure the succession of the house of
Anjou’s candidate to the throne.223 Two days later, the Roman pontiff renewed
Boniface VIII’s excommunication of Charles Robert’s adversaries, extending
it over Otto of Wittelsbach’s supporters.224 The firm attitude adopted by the
Papacy also contributed in determining the voivode to look for solutions to
terminate the crisis, especially given the impact this decision would have had
on Transylvania’s clergy. What caused a spectacular change in Ladislas’ atti-
tude was most certainly the political factor: during the first months of 1307,
Transylvania’s voivode realized the little chances Otto stood at that point,
but also his own power of negociation, should he decide to switch sides.
Consequently, Ladislas Kán’s attitude towards his royal son-in-law changed
radically.
Indeed, his support of Otto of Wittelsbach had placed Ladislas Kán into the
forefront of international politics, which enabled him to find a spectacular
solution to his conundrum. In the summer of 1307 (before the August 26) the
voivode was visited by one of Charles Robert’s major ambassadors: Paul, pro-
vost of Zips, former vice-chancellor of queen Agnes of Habsburg.225 Although
we do not know the details surrounding the negotiations, we can assume
the king deemed the results very important, since he handomely repayed the
legate for the loyalty shown on this occasion. By far the most attractive offer
came from the king of Germany, Albert I of Habsburg, interested not only in
Otto’s failure in the competition for the throne of Hungary, but also in keep-
ing him in remote Transylvania, so that he could facilitate his son Frederick
the Fair’s ascension to the imperial crown. In fact, Frederick the Fair himself
cherished diplomatic relations with voivode Ladislas: in a letter probably
addressed in the summer of 1307 to one of the kingdom of Hungary’s mag-
nates, he asked for the support of the nuncio he had sent to Transylvania,
allegedly with the mission to persuade the voivode to join Charles Robert’s
222 AkO II 197–198, 221, 232.

223 D IR III 52–55; AkO II 201–220.
224 C D VIII 1 207–219.
225 R DES I 231–232; AkO II 230. As the vice-chancellor of Andrew III’s wife see: RDES I 29.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 211
party.226 At any rate, Chronicon Osterhoviense, a source that provides excellent

information on the political events of the time, clearly states that the decision
of “duke” Ladislas of Transylvania to make Otto of Wittelsbach his prisoner
was taken after Albert of Habsburg’s intrigues who, taking advantage of Otto’s
absence, attempted to take control over Bavaria.227
After these political arrangements, at the end of the summer of 1307 the
fate of Otto had already been sealed, at that time probably being already cap-
tive. Keeping Otto prisoner meant, from Ladislas Kán’s point of view, obtaining
high protection from the German king against pressures exerted onto him by
Charles Robert and Cardinal Gentile. An inspired plan: indeed, none of the
activities run by the king or the cardinal until the summer of 1308 were explic-
itly directed against him, despite having obtained, after his arrest, the crown
the Angevine candidate yearned for. The exceptional fact that the voivode was
not mentioned as one whose deeds had triggered the political anarchy in the
kingdom must be the reward of his ability to exert a triple blackmail on Charles
Robert with the arrest of Otto: holding his foremost political rival into custody;
holding the “Holy Crown”, which conditioned the royal crowning; the protec-
tion of Albert of Habsburg, compelled to support the voivode who kept his
great internal competitor, whose international position enabled him to block
any hostile initiative from the pope. Even so, making Otto of Wittelsbach the
voivode’s prisoner certainly benefitted the Angevin candidate: the disappear-
ance of the former from the race played an important role in determining the
representatives of the most important aristocratic families in the kingdom,
reunited, on October 10, 1307, on the Rákos plain, to acknowledge Charles
Robert as the king of Hungary.228
6.4.5 The Alliance with Serbia. Charles of Valois’ Political Projects

The reasons that eventually led to the release of the Bavarian prince after one
year of captivity were undoubtedly linked with the assassination of King Albert I
of Habsburg, on May 1, 1308. No longer under his protection, keeping Otto pris-
oner became pointless, so Ladislas let him go. Even so, by not surrendering
the Bavarian duke to Charles Robert and instead letting him go home through
Ruthenia and Poland, Ladislas made a clear statement of the fact that he was
226 C D VIII 7 377–378: ceterum quia presencium exhibitorem ad nobilem virum adislaum comi-
tem transiluanum super promocione sepe dicti auunculi nostri regis K(aroli) duximus des-
tinandum, petimus cum affectu per vostram industriam ipsum nunccium modis et verbis
dirigi dicto negocio profuturi suisque verbis fidem credulam adhiberi; AkO II 65.
227 Gombos, Catalogus, 592.
228 AkO II 243.
212 CHAPTER 6
not ready to make a real deal with the Anjou candidate. Significant in this
regard is the fact that Otto’s primary concern, upon returning to Bavaria, was to
start a reprisal campaign against Frederick the Fair, which reignited the flames
of war between the houses of Habsburg and Wittelsbach, making it necessary
for Charles Robert’s troops to step in to support his Austrian ally.229 In order to
maintain his position of power, as he remained the most important opposition
in the entire kingdom of Hungary, Ladislas Kán needed another alliance that
would help him preserve Transylvania’s special position and avoid an uncondi-
tional allegiance to the Angevine king.
The solution attempted by Ladislas for his comeback on the great European
political arena was the alliance with Serbia. The prospect of such an alliance,
sealed by the marriage of the voivode’s daughter with Stephen Dečanski, the
Serbian heir, became the main goal of Ladislas Kan’s foreign policy in 1307 and
represents one of the main reasons for Ladislas’ renunciation of his projects to
become related to the house of Wittelsbach. The influence the ambassadors
of Serbia and Bulgaria had over voivode Ladislas, according to the testimony of
Ottokar of Styria, especially in what concerned the fate of Otto, seems to have
reoriented Transylvania’s external policy.230 The stakes were however much
greater than that of a simple regional alliance meant to protect the common
interests of Serbia and Transylvania against Charles Robert of Anjou’s expan-
sionist tendencies. This Serbian-Transylvanian alliance can only be understood
in its full dimension if we place it in the greater context of the larger central-
southeastern European projects forged in this period by Charles of Valois, the
brother of the king of France, Phillip IV the Fair.
As nominal ruler of the Latin Empire, Charles of Valois made it a prior-
ity to reconquer Constantinople which did not seem so far-fetched in 1306–
1307, after the king received the unconditioned support of pope Clement V.231
Pontifical appeals and the support of the French king resulted in the prelimi-
nary agreement of June 22, 1306, between Charles and the doge of Venice,
which stipulated that Crusaders would embark at Brindisi, on Venetian ships,
sometime between March 1307 and March 1308.232 In this context, the first half
of 1307 witnesses feverish diplomatic activity from Charles’ ambassadors in
southeastern Europe, one of their achievements being the acknowledgment of
229 “Chronicon Osterhoviense”, in Gombos, Catalogus, 593.

230 Armbruster, Românii în cronica, 468–469; Sălăgean, Relaţiile internaţionale, 143–144.
231 For a complete analysis of Charles of Valois’ eastern policy, see: Angeliki E. Laiou,
Constantinople and the Latins. The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972), 200.
232 Laiou, Constantinople and the Latins, 206.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 213
the suzerainty by the Catalan Company233 and the conclusion of a formal alli-
ance with Serbia.234 The stakes of this Serbian alliance had larger implications,
which went beyond the common military enterprise against the Byzantines.
In Stephen Milutin’s vision, the alliance would be strengthened, much like the
Serbian-Transylvanian alliance, by the marriage of Charles, son of Charles of
Valois, with Zorica, Stephen Milutin’s only daughter, resulted from an alleged
marriage with Elisabeth, Stephen V of Hungary’s daughter.235 The main issue
raised by this family bond is that Elisabeth does not seem to have ever been the
legitimate wife of Stephen Milutin. Moreover, upon the death of her first hus-
band (1290) she had joined a convent. Her relation with Stephen Milutin must
have been an adulterous one (at that time, the Serbian king was married) and
apparently against her will.236 The wife of Charles of Valois’ son would thus be
the illegitimate daughter of a ‘schismatic’ king, the result of a probably abu-
sive relation, at any rate adulterine, with a Catholic nun. The great-grandson
of Louis IX must have found it hard to engage in a less suitable matrimony.
We can be sure that the Serbian king’s matrimonial project must have been
doubled by an additional offer that was sufficiently attractive so as to com-
pensate these inconveniences: Charles of Valois’ son and his offspring would
gain legitimate rights over the crown of Hungary. By encouraging such proj-
ects, Charles of Valois only followed the recommendations of his councilor of
the Dominican Order who, on his request, had written a valuable Description
of Oriental Europe. He advised Charles to conclude an alliance with the
king of Hungary, the only one who could offer him enough support to subdue
the “barbarian and schismatic” nations living in this part of the world.237
The role that voivode Ladislas Kán would gain after these developments was
paramount. The fact that he was in possession of the crown and the ‘sacred’
paraphernalia of the Hungarian royalty could have very well introduced yet
another candidate to the Hungarian crown. Moreover, Transylvania’s voivode
had already become the main challenger of Charles Robert’s candidature,

237 Anonymi Geographi, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. G. Popa-Lisseanu (Bucharest,
1934), 28, 54–55. Regarding the daughter of the Serbian king, her maternal descendance
from Hungary’s royal house and the matrimonial projects with Charles of Valois or his son
see: Anonymi Geographi, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, 33, 61. Stephen Milutin was char-
acterized by the author (Anonymi Geographi, Descriptio Europae Orientalis, 26, 52–53) in
negative notes, emphasizing the fact that Serbian king feared Charles of Valois and was
assiduously begging for his friendship.
214 CHAPTER 6
and his role in Otto of Wittelsbach’s candidature only increased his fame.
Together with the king of Serbia, he was going to become the main supporter
of young Charles of Valois, endorsing him in the competition with the other
contenders to the throne. Unfortunately, these projects collapsed, much like
other political avenues pursued by Charles of Valois, as a consequence of his
indecision. A number of unexpected events hastened his failure in Eastern
Europe. The death of his wife Catherine of Courtenay, the nominal empress of
Constantinople (January 2, 1308) practically annulled his right to become the
restorator of the Latin Empire. A few months later, the assassination of Albert
of Habsburg (May 1, 1308) offered him the opportunity to engage, with support
from his brother Philip IV of France and despite pope Clement V’s opposition,
in the competition over the royal crown of Germany.
At this moment, the Serbian-Transylvanian alliance became only a regional
one, aiming to secure the survival of the two states against the danger posed
by the restored Hungarian power. Ladislas Kán’s failed attempts to gain power-
ful external patronage promptly impacted his internal policy. After monitoring
the new political directions Charles of Valois had taken, Cardinal Gentile even-
tually turned his attention to the Transylvanian voivode in September 1308,
and issued an ultimatum to the voivode: his daughter’s marriage to the king of
Serbia had to be annulled.238
6.5 The Compromise of 1310 and Its Consequences
6.5.1 Prerequisites of a Compromise

One year after the tour de force on the Alba Iulia chapter, Ladislas Kán was
still at the height of his power. Being mentioned on November 27, 1308, among
the barons who had sworn allegiance to king Charles Robert at the end of the
Pest congregationwas, in fact, the rather informal confirmation by Charles
Robert and the pontifical legate, cardinal Gentile de San Martino ai Monti,239
of Ladislas Kán’s office held for over fifteen years, as well as a renunciation to
previous attempts to replace him. Also, the document from November 27 con-
firmed the voivode’s prominent position on the political stage of the kingdom
of Hungary.
Largely an expression of Charles Robert’s and cardinal Gentile’s availability
to make some concessions to bring the voivode closer, this political success
was all the more remarkable as Ladislas Kán himself had done almost nothing,
238 D IR III 164–169; Acta Gentilis 369–374.

239 AkO II 494; CD VIII 1 264–269; Acta Gentilis 115–119.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 215
in reality, to deserve it. Firstly, he did not even attend the Pest gathering. On
both dates, November 18, when the congregation started and November 24, the
voivode was in Deva with his court.240 Under the circumstances, his oath to
Charles Robert was at best an indirect one, through a proxy, which according
to the customs of the time significantly decreased its value. Moreover, Ladislas
Kán did not hesitate to adopt a number of measures that obviously defied the
pontifical legate’s authority and his political actions. Being informed that
the Saxons in the province of Sibiu planned to address an appeal against him
to Cardinal Gentile, he forbade them from crossing the territories subject to
the voivodal authorities, thus preventing them from attending the Pest con-
gregation. Insensitive to the protests, he only allowed them free passage “after
St. Martin” (November 11)241 or even, according to some testimonies, “after the
octaves of St. Martin” (November 18).242 At any rate, this took place only when
the assembly had started and the chapters’ delegates stood no chance of
attending it. Last but not least, the voivode had shown no signs of willingness
to return St. Stephen crown and other royal paraphernalia, which had given
him greater negotiation power in Hungary. With his tight relations with Serbia
and its Balkan allies, grabbing hold of the royal insignia was at that time the
most solid warranty in his quest to preserve his positions, perhaps even a pre-
cious trade item for new acquisitions.
What Ladislas Kán had failed to understand at the right time was that
on November 27, 1308, the simultaneous triumph of pope Clement V on the
German Empire’s (Henry VII of Luxembourg) and Hungary’s (Charles Robert
of Anjou) crowns—against Charles of Valois and the ambitious pan-European
projects of Philip IV the Fair put an end to the succession to the crown of Hungary
as an international problem. Indeed, all great candidatures had vanished until
that date, and later challengers (i.e. Vladislav Dragutin, Andrew Iurievich) that
had only enjoyed local support, were essentially doomed to failure. Under the
circumstances, despite the apparent solidity of his alliances and warranties,
Ladislas Kán found himself in a delicate position as of December 1308. If until
November 1308 the possession of royal insignia had made him the unofficial
arbiter of the competition over the throne, it was this ownership that made
him the main subject of Charles Robert and cardinal Gentile’s pressure, who
could not see their mission complete until Charles was enthroned. At the same
time, the Serbian alliance, despite its military guarantees, which also must have
been one of the main reasons that stopped Charles Robert from attempting
240 AkO II 488, 492; DIR III 99–100, 110, 117; ZW 244, 249, 252, 257.
241 D IR III 117, 118, 121.
242 D IR III 119, 120.
216 CHAPTER 6
any military intervention, increased the isolation of the Transylvanian voivode

from the Hungarian clergy and aristocracy, for whom close ties with a ‘schis-
matic’ king was a difficult option.
Thus, the document of November 27, 1308, was the last sign of patience
showed by the Angevine party to the voivode of Transylvania. After this date,
since Ladislas Kán showed no change in attitude, the conflict became inev-
itable. However, due to the fact that the elected king Charles Robert lacked
the military might to engage in an armed conflict, the entire action against the
voivode was left to Cardinal Gentile’s diplomatic abilities.
Less than a month after the Pest assembly, the cardinal began to exploit
the voivode’s weaker points. On December 10, 1308, a certain Peter of Paris,
canon of the church of Transylvania, presented himself before the cardinal as
defender of the chapter against the abuses from voivode Ladislas, the most
important being the imposing of his son as bishop of Alba Iulia.243 On the
December 20, after a first analysis of the documents presented to him, Cardinal
Gentile designated a scrutator to investigate the matter. A few weeks later, on
January 8, 1309, the same cardinal Gentile started an investigation of the dis-
pute between Ladislas Kán and the Saxon chapters in southern Transylvania,
which protested against their ban from attending the Pest congregation and
had unsuccessfully solicited free pass through the voivode’s territories.244 Even
if this investigation took place in the first months of 1309, a rather slow one due
to the hurdles they were met with, it resulted into the rise of internal opposi-
tion against the voivode which clearly undermined his position. Reunited in
Vinţul de Jos on April 4, 1309, the parish leaders of the “seven chapters” in con-
flict with the Transylvanian bishopric presented the instructors designated by
the cardinal with irrefutable proof of the voivode’s abuse, the witnesses that
testified including Sifrid, the prior of the Cistercians of Cârţa, count Solomon
of Câlnic and Nicholas, the judge of Sibiu.245 The assembly of Vinţul de Jos
definitely turned into a political protest against the voivode, causing him much
concern. Thus, through Cardinal Gentile’s manipulations, the voivode had
been twice undermined by the Saxons and the Alba Iulia chapter, forces which
seemed impossible to congregate just a few years before.
In parallel, Cardinal Gentile used his efficient propaganda machine and
leverages at his disposal and promoted a policy of internal reconciliation which
resulted into agreements signed with the noteworthiest of the a ristocratic oppo-
sition, including Matthew Csák, Henrik and Nicholas Kőszegi, the m embers
243 D IR III 71–72; AkO II 514.

244 D IR III 93–95; ZW 240–241.
245 D IR III 95–96.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 217
of the Babonič kindred as well as Paul Subič. The success of his efforts came
to light on the first coronation of Charles Robert, celebrated with a special
crown on the June 15, 1309. The entire Church of Hungary attended the event.
Besides archbishops Thomas of Esztergom, Vincent of Kalocsa and Peter of
Spalato, the ceremony was also attended by bishops Emerich of Oradea, John
of Nitra, Martin of Eger, Aba of Vác, Peter of Pécs, Benedict of Veszprém, Augustin
of Zagreb, Benedict of Cenad, Ladislas of Srim and Gregory of Bosnia, as well
as the provosts of Székesfehérvár, Bratislava and Zips.246 Even the bishop of
Györ, Nicholas Kőszegi, who did not personally attend the ceremony, was rep-
resented by ban Henrik Kőszegi. The same high prelates, except for Nicholas
Kőszegi, signed the document of June 24, 1309, validating the crowning with
provisional paraphernalia, as the original ones were in the custody of Ladislas
Kán.247 Under the circumstances, Transylvania’s bishopric was the only one
that did not attend the ceremony, since it was managed by the son of voivode
Ladislas after the abuse of January 1308. At the same time, the coronation was
also attended by representatives of the most important aristocratic families
in the kingdom, such as Amadé Aba, Dominic Rátót, Demetrius Balassa, Fillip
Türje, Beke Borsa, Péter and Mark Csák, Stephen Pozsegai, Aladár Forrói and
Dionysius Zsadány.248 By pledging their allegiance to Charles Robert, they
overtly rejected Ladislas Kán’s opposition to the new regime. At the same time,
the Buda synod decisively forbade any marriage between “the daughter, grand-
daughter or any blood kin” of a Christian catholic and any “patar, gazar, schis-
matic heretic or any enemy to the Christian faith”, failure to comply within a
month resulting in treating the perpetrators as “heretic enemies of the faith”.249
The general cohesion of the Hungarian clergy and aristocracy around
Cardinal Gentile was clear evidence that the voivode had lost the battle to
impose his son as the Transylvanian bishop. As of that moment, Ladislas Kán’s
attitude started shifting towards reconciliation, a calculated move so typical of
his political abilities. On August 17, 1309, magisters Nicholas and Peter of Paris,
canons of Transylvania’s church, the latter being the chapter’s protesting voice
in December 1308 to the cardinal, communicated to the auditors designated by
cardinal Gentile that, in the elections held on July 24, the bishopric’s siege had
been attributed by the chapter to Benedict, the prior of the Dominican convent
on the island of Buda.250 On the same day of August 17, Benedict, “friend of
246 AkO II 668.

247 AkO II 674.
248 Kristó, I. Károly király, 56–59.
249 D IR III 166; HD 569.
250 D IR III 76–77.
218 CHAPTER 6
late bishop Peter of Transylvania”,251 received approval from the Dominicans’

provincial prior252 so that, on August 30, the two canons were able to present
to the cardinal’s authorities all the documents required by the confirmation
of their chosen one, including an appointment decree signed and sealed by 15 of
the canons of the episcopal church.253 This new manipulation of the voivode,
who clearly intended to have his own man appointed at the head of the bish-
opric in an unchallenged procedure, caused the energic reaction of Cardinal
Gentile, who took immediate measures to counteract it. On September 1, 1309,
the auditors of the cardinal declared the documentation submitted by the
two canons insufficient, asking for the confirmation through physical pres-
ence within 40 days of two instructores designated by the chapter to vouch for
the new election and the circumstances surrounding the process.254 At the same
time, probably as a consequence of the cardinal’s efforts, John, the archdean of
Târnava, former episcopal chancellor and currently provost of Székesfehérvár,
overtly expressed his opposition to the election, for reasons he promised to
detail at a later date.255 Also, the cardinal’s auditors turned to another strategy
of attack: even if the elections of July 24 had proceeded according to canons,
which was justifiably doubtful, Benedict’s election was nonetheless not viable.
The church of Transylvania had failed to pay the accommodation expenses
of the pontifical legate, and therefore the members of the chapter were each
in danger of excommunication, and the chapter itself under that of inter-
dict unless justified reasons could be provided.256 Acknowledging Benedict
became strictly conditioned by the immediate acquittal of the due and by a
valid excuse for the delay. If not, the election made by the excommunicated
canons was null. One day later, on September 2, 1309, Gentile addressed the
priors of the Dominican and Augustinian convents in Alba Iulia the order to
identify and dispatch any alleged contestant of Benedict’s “election”, irrespec-
tive of the motives, the cardinal undertaking to make justice.257
Under the circumstances, the month of September became a decisive
moment for all the parties involved in the conflict over the bishopric. From
Buda, “the elected” bishop Benedict drafted an appeal to the Pontifical See,
protesting against the hurdles raised by cardinal Gentile and his men. Informed
251 D IR III 91.

252 D IR III 75.
253 D IR III 73–75.
254 D IR III 78.
255 D IR III 78.
256 D IR III 79.
257 D IR III 79–81.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 219
of this, the cardinal’s auditors requested a meeting on September 15 to pay the

charges in person, which Benedict stubbornly rejected.258 On September 17
tension reached its climactic point: by moving to the Dominican convent in
Pest themselves, the auditors sent Benedict an order from the cardinal strictly
forbidding any travel to Transylvania under threat of excommunication (!).
Benedict responded that he would obey, despite being already prepared for
departure.259 What were the reasons that required Benedict’s presence in Alba
Iulia and which also provoked such fierce opposition from the cardinal? There
can be only one answer: the episcopal elections (the real ones, this time!)
which were under way in Transylvania.
Indeed, the investigation ordered by cardinal Gentile showed that the decree
of the July “election” had been rigged by Ladislas Kán’s chancellery and its
“authentication” through the 15 seals of the canons being due to the voivode’s
confiscation of the said seals since the electoral masquerade of January
1308.260 Under pressure from the events, forced to set things straight within
the 40 days imposed by the cardinal, Ladislas took the inevitable decision to
resume relations with the canons and try to impose his will onto them. Around
September 13, 1309,261 upon meeting the voivode to ask for the restitution of
some of the chapter’s goods confiscated by his lawful servant, cantor Thomas,
Dean Elijah found himself faced with a major surprise: Ladislas not only gave
him the goods, but also granted him the right to organize episcopal elections.
“And when <Elijah> the dean presented himself before Lord Ladislas to
demand and receive back the aforementioned, the lord voivode ordered for
their return; then he told the dean he would not want to prevent the aforemen-
tioned chapter and the church of Transylvania nor to stop them from electing
<the bishop>, or to carry on with the arguments and discontents, but wanted
the chapter to elect a bishop as <its members> always wanted”.262 However,
immediately after this formal statement, the voivode presented his set of con-
ditions: “However <he said> he would be glad if the chapter elected Friar Peter
of the Augustines, or brother Benedict the prior in the <Buda> isle, of order of
the preachers, but he would be even happier of the <election> of the said
brother Benedict. And if they chose one of these two, he, the voivode, would
return the church all its fortresses and goods, since he knows them and thinks
of them as worthy; /. . ./ yet if / the chapter’s candidate, n.n./ were someone
258 D IR III 81.

259 D IR III 83–84.
260 D IR III 72.
261 D IR III 86.
262 D IR III 90.
220 CHAPTER 6
who is not a friend, he would not return <the aforementioned> to them.

Anyways, they should do as they want. . . .”263 The alternative was as clear as it
could be. The canons had to choose between following the voivode’s directions
and recovering their properties immediately, or acting against his wishes and
hoping for the king’s and cardinal’s intervention to solve the brewing conflict.
After a few days of fierce debates, the voivode prevailed, a resolution which
indicates that the royal authority in Transylvania was not yet perceived as a
sufficient threat to Ladislas Kán’s position. On September 16, the deans of the
seven Saxon chapters confirmed that the voivode was no longer pressing the
Alba Iulia canons, allowing them to run free episcopal elections.264 Three days
later, on September 19, 1309, the elections were a mere acclaim by the can-
ons of the candidate proposed by the voivode: “And on the day decided for
the election the canons of the aforementioned chapter assembled and then
magister Benedict /the Ozd archdean, n.n./, the empowered defender raised
as an archdean and canonic of the said chapter and said: <Honest> gentlemen
and brethren, we are here to elect our shepherd; ponder and see what needs
do <to elect> a worthy man, for this is why we are here, and <added>: brother
Benedict, whom you have many a times examined, would be suitable and wor-
thy, and after saying these he sat. Then the above canons were silent for a while
and then John the Noble canon of the said church and others along said and
cried together: brother Benedict, brother Benedict and started praising the
Lord forthwith.”265 At the same date, archdeans Benedict of Ozd, John of Cluj
and Nicholas of Tylegd were already empowered as chapter procurators, with
the mission to obtain from Cardinal Gentile the confirmation of Benedict’s
election.266 Two weeks later, on October 2, 1309, the prior of the Augustinians
convent responded to the request of September 2 from cardinal Gentile claim-
ing Benedict’s election was met with no opposition.267
The issue of the election solved, the only matter remained the payment of
the maintenance tax, needed to confirm the chapter’s right to lawfully exert its
attributions. The fact that these obligations had obviously not been respected
did not represent a major hurdle for the voivode. In fact, in cooperation with
some of the canons he had managed to draw to his side (e.g. Salvus, the arch-
dean of Turda, vicar general of the Church of Transylvania during the vacancy
of the bishop’s siege, Benedict, archdean of Ozd, and cantor Thomas), Ladislas
263 D IR III 90.

264 D IR III 86.
265 D IR III 90–91.
266 D IR III 85–86.
267 D IR III 87–88.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 221
Kán solved this problem by turning to a new counterfeit: the respective canons
forged a document previously dated with “the 14th of November, 1308”, in which
they claimed to have requested a maintenance tax of 12 silver marks, which the
chapter fully paid.268 This act, which absolved the entire chapter of any guilt,
transferred the responsibility to the three canons. Eventually, the responsibil-
ity remained the sole concern of cantor Thomas, the voivode’s yes-man, who,
on his turn, found the means to rid himself of it.269 Eventually, through meth-
ods unbeknownst, which certify the vast network of relations and the voivode’s
eloquence, he managed to obtain from provost John of Székesfehérvár the
unconditional acceptance of the election of Benedict (on October 30, 1309).270
Consequently, with the entire paperwork ready, the chapter’s proxy, arch-
dean Benedict of Ozd, presented himself before the cardinal’s auditors and
imperatively asked for the validation of the election.271 Even if confirmation
was late to arrive, as it only occurred on July 2, 1310272 the elected bishop
Benedict set off to Transylvania to take office. However, Cardinal Gentile was
not a man to accept defeat easily. Moreover, he understood that it was time
to show what resources he still had. Therefore, in a sinister twist of irony,
the first obligation assigned to Benedict, as Transylvania’s bishop, was to
enforce the excommunication the cardinal had pronounced against his bene-
factor Ladislas Kán.
6.5.2 Excommunication
Pronounced on Christmas Day, 1309,273 the excommunication was largely
the expression of Cardinal Gentile’s frustration accumulated after his failed
attempts to deal with the bishopric’s problems, which resulted into a compro-
mise imposed by the voivode. It was also evidence of his firm intent to suppress
any opportunity for Ladislas to exert his diplomatic abilities and provide more
unpleasant surprises.
268 D IR III 86.

269 Archdean Benedict of Ozd’s testimony before the cardinal’s auditors (December, 8th,
1309) illustrates that at that time cantor Thomas was the only one under the suspicion
of having been excommunicated. Benedict of Ozd however denied this accusation, and
asked for a copy of the excommunication that would nominate cantor Thomas: DIR III
88–89. The copy, however, much like the original, was non-existing. All those who refused
or delayed to pay the support payment were threaten with but no excommunication had
been pronounced on a particular name.
270 D IR III 87.
271 D IR III 87–92.
272 D IR III 92.
273 D IR III 164–169; HD 568–571.
222 CHAPTER 6
The case presented by the cardinal rested on three major points of accusa-
tion, which recapitulated the entire history of disputes with the voivode and
incriminated his lack of receptivity to his demands: Ladislas’ refusal to surren-
der King Charles Robert the property seized from the Hungarian crown; the
marriage of his daughter to the son of Serbia’s schismatic king; the refusal to
restitute “the holy crown of the kingdom of Hungary”. These are hard to classify
based on importance, e.g. the Serbian marriage issue takes half the excommu-
nication document, while the crown allegations only take five percent,—and it
is also unclear whether they reflect the cardinal’s priorities, or if they were only
meant to prepare the ground for even harder measures yet to be pronounced
against the voivode. The alliance with Serbia had changed Ladislas, from the
cardinal’s perspective, into a “supporter of heretics and enemy of the faith”,274
enough to cause a crusade against him, as hinted at in the excommunication.
The voivode’s “vassals, counts, chaplains, judges and serfs” were obliged to dis-
obey him henceforth. Even though less likely to have acted accordingly, the
increasing internal enemies could have made use of this situation.
Indeed, the excommunication put Ladislas in an uncomfortable position.
The practical consequences of his interdict by the archbishop of Kalocsa (1306)
could be endlessly adjourned using ecclesiastic red tape until the prescription
of the main charge against him, the support given to Otto of Wittelsbach was
no longer an issue. This time, however, the excommunication pronounced
by a pontifical legate de latere could no longer be appealed against, and was
to be enforced with immediate effect. The Transylvanian clergy, now run by
Benedict, who was far from being a man of action, seems to have acted with
certain moderatio. Nevertheless, the unforgiving eye of the cardinal, whose
agents were already present in the province, took note and immediate mea-
sures to reprimand any transgression.
Thus, in a matter of months after his and his supporters’ exclusion from the
Christian community, Ladislas Kán was forced to lower the banner of resis-
tance and announce his willingness to negotiate.
6.5.3 The Compromise

The negotiations were initiated sometime in March, at the latest. The first
contacts between the two sides must have taken place immediately after the
start of the new year. This is proven by the change in the terms of the nego-
tiations. On April 8, 1310, in Szeged, before palatine Amadé Aba and Dominic
274 Dominican anonymous identifies “schismatics” with “heretics” when he refers to the
Serbs as scismatici perfidi, or scismatici . . . et heretici pessimi: Dominican anonymous,
Descriptio Europae Orientalis, 24, 50.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 223
Rátót, Ladislas Kán was already willing to sign the preliminary agreement with
Charles Robert’s representatives: archbishop Thomas of Esztergom and frater
Dionysius, the chaplain of Cardinal Gentile.275 The agreement consisted of
four points: a) the voivode’s oath of allegiance to Charles Robert; b) Ladislas’
sworn obligation to meet the king “with honor and submission” in the territo-
ries he controlled; c) the restitution of the royal crown before the 1st of July or
even earlier, should the king decide to come and take it himself; d) the restitu-
tion of the following royal properties: the Rodna silver mine; the counties of
Bistriţa, Sibiu and of the Székelys; the “towns” of Dej, Cluj and Sic, together
with the duty of the royal pantry. The agreement did not make any reference
to Ladislas Kán’s alliance with Stephen Milutin, undoubtedly not because the
voivode had terminated it. If this had been the case then the king’s represen-
tatives would have wanted to include in the text of the agreement the inter-
diction of any alliance of this sort. On the contrary, the king and the cardinal
considered this alliance an accomplished fact, so any reference to it was use-
less. The Szeged agreement made it obvious that Charles Robert’s main con-
cern was to be acknowledged by the voivode as the king of Hungary and to
recover the “Saint Stephen’s” crown. The Szeged document partially responded
to these royal demands. The restitution of the ‘holy crown’, whose exceptional
symbolic value was fully understood by both sides, was still conditioned by the
results of a new round of negotiations, this time between Ladislas and the king:
“And the crown of his kingdom we shall return on the decided day, on the octaves
of Holy John the Baptist; or, should our master come to Transylvania, anytime
before this date, it shall be presented and returned to him, “on condition that,
in the same day, we submit our demands to him and ask for fair treatment
and reward through royal munificence, as appropriate for his royal highness”
(sb. ns.).276 The voivode was obviously seeking to exploit the weak point of a
king in dire need of legitimacy. He expressed his willingness to provide it to
him with the clear hint that in exchange of such a precious gift the simple lift
of excommunication was too small a price.
The Szeged agreement was thus just a preliminary deal, a kind of statement
of intent. Ladislas Kán’s oath of allegiance was quite informal unless sworn by
the voivode in front of the king himself. Nonetheless, the voivode’s propaganda
determined the Transylvanian clergy to suspend the enforcing of the interdict
as of the start of the agreement. On May 2, Cardinal Gentile had to intervene:
the voivode had made nothing but promises until then. The interdict would
275 D IR III 172–173; ZW 295–296.

276 Z W 295–296.
224 CHAPTER 6
be lifted only when the promises were transposed into actions.277 Moreover,
the cardinal expressed his concern about the restitution of the crown. Ladislas
had promised, at a certain time, that this restitution would be made through
Bishop Benedict. Gentile wrote the bishop urging him to rush the transaction,
as it was allegedly supposed to benefit Ladislas, whom was promised by the
cardinal the possibility of profitable conditions.278
The Angevines’ impatience gave the voivode an edge, especially since the
cardinal was unable to exert any additional means of pressure. Under the cir-
cumstances, even if the deadline set in Szeged for the restitution of the crown,
the 1st of June, was not observed, the two sides reached a much wanted agree-
ment either at the end of the same month or at the beginning of the next.
The presence of bishop Benedict at Bratislava and his confirmation279 seem to
have been related to these circumstances. In August 1310, Ladislas Kán himself
went to Hungary to hand over the yearned crown to the king and undoubt-
edly to pledge his allegiance before him. On August 27, Ladislas was one of the
noteworthy participants at the ceremony of Székesfehérvár, in which Charles
Robert finally put the “holy crown” on his royal head.280 Upon returning to
Transylvania in the second half of September,281 Ladislas set the ground for
Charles Robert’s visit to the province, as part of the preliminary agreement
signed in Szeged and most certainly the definitive one in the summer of the
great coronation.
The royal visit occurred at the end of the same year, the propagandistic
impact of which was doubled by a subtle regrouping of the internal opposi-
tion against the voivode. Upon entering Transylvania in early December, at
the head of an impressive suite, which included the Esztergom and Kalocsa
archbishops282 and numerous other dignitaries, the king was timely met by
magister Nicholas of Dăbâca, the son of ban Mykud and one of the most impor-
tant opponents to Ladislas Kán’s regime, who “banqueted with the king” in his
village of Agriş.283 On route towards Transylvania’s religious center, the episco-
pal town of Alba Iulia, the king stopped for a few days, around the December 8,
on another property of the Dăbâca noblemen: the Sânmiclăuş village near
Turda, in which the king issued a number of decrees to the benefit of the
277 D IR III 174–175; CD VIII 1 381–382.

278 Z W 295–296.
279 D IR III 92.
280 S RH I 486; Kristó, Kán László, 291.
281 D IR III 176; Zichy I 122.
282 D IR III 205–206, 398–399.
283 D IR III 180–181; HO VII 362–363.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 225
c olonists from Dej and Satu Mare, the Augustinians convent in Dej and the
Dăbâca nobles.284 The king’s route up to this point seems to have included
the Sînd/ Sănduleşti (Zinda) village,285 property of the Iara noblemen, who,
after 1315, became the beneficiaries of the Angevine restoration. Upon reach-
ing Alba Iulia a few days later,286 Charles Robert failed to organize a political
assembly similar to Andrew III’s, his predecessor, two decades ago. On the con-
trary, he was forced to rush back home to Hungary, where palatine Matthew
Csák, taking advantage of his absence, had started hostilities against the king’s
supporters in the counties he controlled.287 The king’s expected retaliation
against Ladislas thus only managed to reveal his weakness.
What were, under the circumstances, the concrete provisions of the final
agreement signed by Ladislas Kán and Charles Robert in the summer of 1310?
Unfortunately, the document did not survive in its written form. We can, how-
ever, understand its content by looking at the document from April 8 and
the reports between Charles Robert and Transylvania in the next five years. The
mission is simplified by the fact that the Szeged agreement practically con-
tained the totality of the obligations Ladislas Kán had undertaken before the
king: the oath of allegiance, the reception of the king in Transylvania, the res-
titution of the crown and of the royal domains. The king respected the first
three conditions during the same year. As for the fourth, we believe it must
have been one of the objects of the summer of 1310 negotiations: we know
indeed that the city of Bistriţa, which most probably included the silver mines
of Rodna, was returned to the king at this time.288 On the other hand, we do
not possess for the entire 1310–1315 interval, the name of any Sibiu or Székely
count, which makes us believe that after their “restitution” to the king, he
merely “granted” them back to the voivode, within the confinements of the
agreement. If the privileges granted by the king to the Dej guests, in the course
of his visits to Transylvania practically proved the return of this town under
royal control, the lack of any reference to the salt mines of Sic and Cojocna
may indicate that they were left to the voivode. As for the city of Cluj, it main-
tained its uncertain status, due to the fact that the bishopric managed to grab
hold of it (1275) in rather dubious circumstances. As object of dispute between
the bishopric and the voivode, the city remained, after the late 1307 events,
under the voivode’s direct administration. But for the exceptions already
284 AkO II 1002–1006 (villa beati Michaelis).

285 D IR III 180–181; HO VII 362–363.
286 D IR III 205–206, 398–399.
287 D IR III 174–175; Theiner I 826–830.
288 D IR III 186–187; ZW 300.
226 CHAPTER 6
mentioned, the 1310 compromise enabled Ladislas Kán to keep ownership

over the essential components of the political system over which he had long
exerted his authority. With these came the voivodal authority, which the king
acknowledged at the time when homage was paid to the sovereign.
6.5.4 The Regime of Compromise

This regime of compromise, prolonged until the disappearance of the
Transylvanian voivode, constituted, on the one hand, a success of the Angevine
party and at the same time evidence of the king’s inability to move decisively.
Despite the pressure he had to face, the voivode’s “capitulation” was deceiv-
ing. The 1310 agreement indeed gave the king means of political intervention
in the territories controlled by the voivode. However, not all royal attempts
to use them were successful. Taking control over Bistriţa made it possible for
Moyus Ákos, the king’s wine master, to initiate a policy of consolidation of a
local pro-Angevine movement.289 Hoping to turn Moyus Ákos into one of the
instruments meant to contribute to the consolidation of his positions inside
the province, Charles Robert only ignored the voivode’s exceptional persua-
sion skills he had used many a time. Indeed, a few years later, Moyus Ákos
became one of the outstanding leaders of the anti-Angevine rebellion started
by the sons of Ladislas Kán. Overall, this division of power created with the
rise of royal authority in Transylvania was not late to engender a passive ten-
sion among the voivode’s supporters and the pro-Angevine party undergoing
reorganization, which could at any time break into open conflict.
At any rate, despite the skepticism of Pál Engel on this matter,290 which is
partially justified, the Rozgony victory against the sons of Amadé Aba (1312),
followed by the defeat of Matthew Csák’s late intervention troops, provided
Charles Robert with the audacity to take to arms in order to terminate the
anarchy caused by the “oligarchs”. From that moment on, Charles Robert
made it his main priority to reinstate royal domination over Transylvania and
started setting the ground for the great confrontation that would become
the landmark of his entire reign. The 1313 document, through which Cluj was
being reconfirmed to Transylvania’s291 bishopric, took this major center away
from the voivode’s political reach and set the ground for undisputed royal con-
trol. The king’s assumed protectorate over the Alba Iulia chapter292 and the
289 Ibidem.
290 P. Engel, I. Károly király, 89–104.
291 D IR III 218; ZW 311–312.
292 D IR III 205–206, 206–207, 398–399.
Ladislas Kán ( 1294–1315 ) 227
Székelys in the Arieş valley,293 the gratifications to some of his supporters,294

his confirmation of the transactions among the Geoagiul de Sus nobles and
voivode Ladislas295—they all testify that, as of 1313, this latent conflict devel-
oped to the king’s advantage, providing him the time to gain yet more and
more ground. At the same time, the cardinal’s merciless financial pressure
on bishop Benedict296 doubled, probably, by a similar one from the king onto
the voivode, was meant to undermine the material support of a potential
Transylvanian resistance. Given this pressure, Ladislas Kán, seemingly on the
edge of his physical and intellectual capacity, seemed to focus on passing on
his power to one of his sons. Mentioned as the voivode’s associates in purchas-
ing properties,297 or even as confiscators of properties,298 the voivode’s two
sons were clearly trained to inherit their father’s office. The voivode’s dimin-
ishing power also increased the resistance of those who understood that the
restoration of royal power, with its ensuing drawbacks, was occurring to
the worst of their advantage.
With all these preparations, Charles Robert continued to respect the terms
of the compromise, patiently adjourning any move until after the voivode’s
disappearance. He carefully avoided any transgressions not wanting to com-
pletely alienate Ladislas and his allies. He did not even rush to take advantage
of the crisis in Serbia, caused by Stefan Dečanski’s rebellion against his father
(1314). By the first months of 1315, when Ladislas Kán passed away, he had not
yet taken any action against him.
6.5.5 The Personality of Ladislas Kán

We cannot conclude this chapter in the history of Transylvania without
attempting to reconstruct, based on the existing documentation, the defining
features of this remarkable personality that occupied such an important place
in the political life of his age, cherishing relations with the great sovereigns of
the time and attempting to rise to their level. Unlike many of his contempo-
raries, Ladislas Kán acquired his exceptional status mostly through the means
of diplomacy and political intrigue. None of the sources available to us pro-
vides any clue about military conflicts, usually abundant in the biographies of
his contemporaries. Despite fully able to develop a redoubtable military might,
293 D IR III 217, 402–403.

294 D IR III 227–228; ZW 312–313.
295 D IR III 215–216; ZW 309–311.
296 D IR III 195; 200–201, 396–397; 256–270.
297 D IR III 211–214, 215–216; ZW 305–308, 309–311.
298 D IR III 240–241, 241–242; ZW 315–316, 316–317.
228 CHAPTER 6
the voivode seems to have never used it otherwise than as political pressure.
Although challenged multiple times, Ladislas never got engaged in wars. Also,
sources do not record any act of gratuitous violence. The absence of such
events during that time must have been compensated by extraordinary politi-
cal abilities. Failure to do so would have made it impossible for Ladislas to rise
to such a high position.
Indeed, his actions prove Ladislas was an ambitious, tenacious political fig-
ure, resourceful and unscrupulous. His behavior towards Otto of Wittelsbach
was dishonoring, even according to the standards of the time. However, he man-
aged to gain through it outstanding political results. Detaining Otto enabled a
double blackmail against Charles Robert and Albert of Habsburg, and made
his position unassailable until Albert’s assassination. In addition, the royal
crown which he seized represented solid warranty against pressure from the
pro-Angevine party and constituted at the same time the most precious bar-
gaining chip in the negotiations that ensured his political survival. The same
ruthlessness, backed up by a certain lack of consideration to the Church and
its men, became obvious in the circuituous evolution of his relations with the
bishopric. His failure to subscribe to the time’s religious ideals translated into a
remarkable tolerance visible in his attitude towards his Orthodox Balkan allies
or the Romanians. Politically courageous, Ladislas did not hesitate in the criti-
cal times of 1308–1310 to remain alone against virtually everybody, but did not
persist in his rebelliousness beyond the limits of tolerance.
Despite such character and intention to transform his rule into a hereditary
principality, Ladislas Kán was not a tyrant, or at least he was not perceived as
such by his contemporaries. The immense majority of the Transylvanian lesser
nobility remained on his side to the very end. Even his internal opponents
were exempted from the violent persecution common in other parts of the
kingdom. Overall, his long reign seems surprisingly peaceful; often threaten-
ing, Ladislas Kán never excelled in brutality.
Although a tenacious and balanced statesman, he was also ruthless if it
suited his purposes; more of a diplomat than of a soldier; powerful, often
threatening, but never warmongering: these are the personality traits of the
one who rearticulated the state structures of the Transylvanian regnum, con-
siderably consolidating its autonomy and succeeding in bringing Transylvania
to the forefront of European politics.
CHAPTER 7
Charles Robert and Transylvania
7.1 Civil War (1316–1322)
7.1.1 Strategic Preparations. The Voivodate of Nicholas Meggyesi

(1315–1316)
Ladislas Kán’s disappearance was followed by Charles Robert’s general offen-
sive in the territories east of Tisza, which he had never dared to cross. This was
mainly a political offensive, one which did not ignore the strategic aspects of a
seemingly inevitable civil war.
The king’s most important strategic initiative was to open safe access routes
to the heart of the province, which was hostile to him in its entirety, and to
constitute a fortified base that would prevent any armed intervention from
Ladislas’ sons and their Serbian and Bulgarian allies. The former goal was
resolved with the construction of the royal fortress in Bologa1 and the open-
ing of a real strategic road, running parallel to the older, more circulated “salt
road”, the disadvantage of which was that it crossed a great number of noble
properties owned by the king’s adversaries, which provided direct access to the
heart of Transylvania, all the way to Cluj. The latter required the effective
installation of king Charles Robert in the Banat region2 and the erection of
the mighty fortresses of Timişoara and Lipova, both transformed into per-
manent royal residences. From here, Charles Robert could control the Mureş
valley, opened the same spring following the conquest of the Şoimuş fortress
and an equivocal peace agreement with Ladislas Kán’s sons,3 and also the
situation at the southern frontiers. Appointing Thomas Szécsényi as count of
Arad and castellan of Şoimuş and Nicholas Szécsi as castellan of Haţeg, prob-
ably in the same period, responded to the royal necessity of consolidating
these conquests.
These military preparations were completed through an unequivocal
political offensive. Refusing to acknowledge Ladislas (IV) Kán, the son of
1 Adrian A. Rusu, “Începuturile cetăţii feudale de la Bologa,” AMP 4 (1980), 403–420.

2 On March, 14th, 1315, the king was already in the Cenad county, which hints to the fact that
Ladislas Kán’s disappearance had already occurred at that time. The first testimony of his
presence in Lipova dates from May, 13th, 1315, and in Timişoara, from July, 7th, 1315: Engel,
I. Károly király, 137. See also: Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország, 1: 180–181.
3 Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország, 1: 111.

230 CHAPTER 7
the late voivode, who had followed to the ruling position after his father’s
death,4 Charles Robert appointed the aged Nicholas Meggyesi of the Pok
kindred as Transylvania’s voivode, expecting his venerability would elicit the
Transylvanian nobility’s respect. The fact that in his brief term as voivode,
Nicholas Meggyesi’s residence was in the towns of Dej5 and Cluj,6 transformed
by the king’s partisans into real fortresses raised against the rebellious nobility,
is symptomatic for the directions of increasing king’s influence towards the
inner regions of the province. Special attention was paid to Cluj, strategically
located at the end of the road opened by Charles Robert on the Crişul Repede
river. Promoted by Charles Robert, on August 19, 1316,7 at the status of royal
city, Cluj would become within a few decades not just a flourishing economic
center, but also the cornerstone of the Angevine domination in Northern
Transylvania.
In the same context of the political offensive of 1315, brothers Thomas and
Stephen Losonci were installed as counts in the Székely county,8 along with
the recovery of properties granted to their father by Andrew III.9 The king’s
measures in this period were meant to attract as many partisans as possible.
The most important internal political force, which could have made a deci-
sive impact in changing the balance of power in Transylvania, was that of the
Saxon communities in the province of Sibiu and the nearby sieges. Especially
in 1315–1318, when victory was far from certain, Charles Robert courted the
Saxons assiduously and did not hesitate to deliver on their most extravagant
wishes. The May 25, 1317 confirmation10 of the famous Andreanum, whom
none of Andrew II’s successors had dared to renew, was just the effect of such
an attitude. The beginnings of this initiative must be placed on August 12,
1315, when the king approved to the full annexation of the sees of Mediaş,
Şeica and Biertan to the province of Sibiu.11 After the Transylvanian nobility’s
angry reaction to the abuse, the king was forced to cancel this measure in 1318.12
However, he did this by changing the respective sees into a distinct county,
4 Gyula Kristó, “Erdély 1315-ben,” in Emlékkönyv Jakó Zsigmond, ed. Szerkesztette Kovács
András, Sipos Gábor and Tonk Sándor (Cluj: Erdéyi Múzeum-Egyesület, 1996), 333–342;
DIR III 240–241, ZW 315–316.
5 DIR III 241–241; ZW 316–317.
6 DIR III 243–244; CDHA I 387–389.
7 DIR III 251–253; ZW 319–320.
9 DIR III 234–235; Bánffy I 42.
10 DIR III 274–275; ZW 322–323.
11 DIR III 240–241, ZW 315–316.
12 DIR III 284–285, ZW 331–332.
Charles Robert and Transylvania 231
no longer subordinated to Transylvania’s voivode. As an additional compensa-

tion, the king granted the residents the complete exemption from any type of
military obligations, the payment of supplies taxes and the royal housing due.
At the same time, the obligations of the three sees to the king were set to a
fixed amount of 400 silver marks a year, which did not relate to the number of
subjects, which made it possible for them to attract settlers. Such unheard
of privileges would cause the amazement of Louis the Great in 1369, which
refused to take them seriously, pointing out that “following such liberties in
the so-called privilege of our father there could be too little use and profit for
the Royal Majesty”.13 Doubtlessly, such liberties were not made to be observed,
and Charles Robert himself may have been aware of that at the time of their
issue. From the Transylvanian nobility’s point of view, these royal measures
were entirely harmful to their rights. They most certainly contributed to
increasing internal discontent and hastened the outbreak of the great rebel-
lion. The king may have lacked more appropriate means to attract the Saxons
to his side. The royal generous approach of the Saxons however managed to
confine the rebellion to the northern counties of Transylvania.
7.1.2 The Rebellion

It is certain that the king seriously prepared his intervention in Transylvania,
but it is also clear that his adversaries were equally determined to mount a
major rebellion against him. Ladislas Kán’s two sons were the leaders of the
movement, and were joined by the Borsa brothers, who had been taken by
surprise by the royal invasion to the east of Tisza, the former count of Bistriţa,
Moyus Ákos, Peter, Petenye’s son, the sons of ban Lothard Gutkeled, Theodor
Weyteh, the ban of Mehadia and most certainly numerous other local leaders
who considered the rise to arms as the sole solution. Next were the numerous
former servants of the former voivode, counts, chaplains or simple clerks about
to lose, along with their political influence, the very sources of their welfare. The
rebellion was consolidated by the fact that numerous ‘royal’ fortresses in these
territories, including Deva and Ciceu, in Transylvania, as well as the neighbor-
ing Mehadia, had not been restituted to Charles Robert’s representatives, but
remained in the rebels’ possession. This vast internal coalition, already strong
in itself, was supported by numerous external adversaries of the royal power.
Contemporary sources mention among them Andrew Iurevich, great knez of
Halych, whom the rebels made a candidate for the crown of Hungary; Stephen
Milutin, the king of Serbia; Michael Sisman, the czar of Vidin; Basarab, the
voivode of Wallachia, and the Lower Danube Tatars, at the time supported by
13 DRH XIII 617–620.

232 CHAPTER 7
the mighty Bulgarian power of czar Theodor Sviatoslav. Even if sources are not
very generous with details regarding the relations among them, it was obvious
that the flames of war that had engulfed the eastern and middle frontiers of
the Hungarian kingdom in 1316 were part of the same conflict.
The good coordination between the rebels, as well as their external allies
is illustrated by the impact that the start of the rebellion (December 1316)14
had on the positions of the Angevine party: Moyus Ákos’ impetuous offense
drove Nicholas Meggyesi out of Transylvania immediately. Moyus conquered
the royal fortress of Valcău,15 paving the way to the territories controlled by
Kopasz Borsa, his father-in-law. The surprising Serbian offensive in the winter
of 1316/1317 resulted in Stephen Milutin’s overpowering of the Magyar banate of
Mačva. At the same time, in the northeastern counties of the kingdom, Kopasz
Borsa started preparing for a spring offensive, which aimed to remove Charles
Robert from the throne.
7.1.3 The War

The king’s energetic reaction made re-established the balance of power as early
as the spring of 1317. The defeat of the Serbian offensive by the king himself
and the recapturing of Mačva (January–February) were followed by the great
victory of Debrecen, won by Debreceni Dózsa and John Aba against Kopasz
Borsa’s troops. This major victory had been preceded by Philippe Druget’s
defeat of the attempted Ruthenian invasion. Besieged for months, the Adrian
fortress, owned by the Borsa kindred, finally capitulated in the fall of 1317,
thus consolidating the pro-Angevine party’s regional strength. Transylvania
was the only exception to this streak of royal victories: appointed commander
of an army charged with reestablishing order in the province, magister John
( Johannes), son of Benedict, was defeated by Moyus Ákos in May 1317 in a bat-
tle fought before the Ciceu fortress, and then forced to abandon the province.16
The king’s solution to deal with the fierce Transylvanian resistance was to
appoint Dózsa, the Debrecen victor, as voivode (May 1318).17 Entering the prov-
ince via the strategic axis Bologa-Cluj, Dózsa managed to win a major victory
in Topa, in July 1318, against the troops of Moyus Ákos, Kopasz Borsa, Peter, son
of Petenye and the sons of ban Lothard Gutkeled.18 The victory only bought
Charles Robert’s supporters enough time to strengthen their bases of action
14 Engel, I. Károly király, 134.

15 Adrian A. Rusu, “Documentele medievale ale familiei Wesselényi (I.),” AMP 5 (1981), 317.
16 Rusu, “Documentele medievale,” 118 and no. 136.
17 Rusu, “Documentele medievale,” 135; Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11.
in Transylvania, and did not decisively undermine the positions of their oppo-
nents. In early 1320, taking advantage of voivode’s Dózsa’s temporary absence
from the province, Moyus Ákos gathered the rebels and launched an offen-
sive against Cluj, the main royal base of operations. Under the command of
Stephen Losonci, the count of Székely, who hastily rounded up the king’s local
supporters, including the Jucu noblemen, the royal army won a close, yet deci-
sive victory at Bonţida.19 Moyus Ákos himself lost his life (either in the battle or
in the pursuit that followed). Deprived of their main military leader, the rebels
took to their strong fortresses and assumed a defensive stance.
In the meantime, the king’s victorious campaign in Serbia (1319) led to
the full restoration of the Mačva banate and kept the Serbs and Bulgarians
away from the clashes in Transylvania. In addition, the Ruthenian threat was
removed in the summer of 1320, when the king wedded Elisabeth, the daughter
of the Polish king Vladislav Lokietek. The Hungarian-Polish alliance concluded
on this opportunity would be one of Charles Robert’s main lines of external
policy. In 1321, the almost simultaneous disappearance of Serbian king Stephen
Milutin and Bulgarian czar Theodor Sviatoslav triggered internal convulsions
in the two north-Balkan states which gradual withdrawal from the conflict.20
Consequently, John of Weyteh’s long resistance ended with an agreement with
the king, who finally took possession of the castle of Mehadia, unsuccessfully
besieged by the royal troops since 1317. Dózsa Debreceni and Philippe Druget’s
victories, in the summer of 1320, diminished the territories under Matthew
Csák’s control. After his death, on March 18, 1321, his core possessions would
enter, after a frail resistance, under the king’s control.21
The resounding successes of the pro-Angevine party left the Transylvanian
rebels in a hopeless position. The last campaign mounted by Dózsa Debreceni,
in early summer 1321,22 crushed the last remaining pockets of rebellion, bring-
ing a substantial contribution to the pacification of northern Transylvania. In
parallel, after a series of bloody assaults, Nicholas and Dionysius Szécsi, the
brothers of the newly installed bishop of Transylvania, Andrew, managed to
put an end to the lasting resistance of the strong Deva castle, the last refuge
of Ladislas Kán’s sons,23 marking the last armed confrontation of the civil war.
Consequently, the other rebels started negotiating, in an attempt to gain favor-
able capitulation conditions. Indeed, in the second half of 1321, Charles Robert,
19 DIR III 348–349, 427–428; Engel, I. Károly, 129.

20 Sălăgean, Relaţiile internaţionale, 148–149.
21 Engel, I. Károly király, 128–129.
23 Engel, I. Károly király, 129; Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 95.
234 CHAPTER 7
probably advised by Dózsa Debreceni, played the persuasion card on the riot-
ers. Nicholas, son of Conrad of Tălmaciu, was the first to respond, surrendering
the fortress of Salgó (Sibiel) in July, in exchange for a number of properties
formerly owned by late voivode Ladislas.24 In the same month, Ehelleus Ákos,
who, in the meantime had become Transylvania’s vice-voivod,25 engaged
to hand in to the Alba Iulia chapter, within two years, the fortress of Zadkeu
(Vălişoara), which he had unjustly occupied.26 Eventually, on November 1, 1321,
the new voivode Thomas Szécsényi managed, after the negotiations waged
with the castellan Nicholas Wass, to get to surrender the Ciceu castle, the most
important center of the anti-Angevine resistance in northern Transylvania.
The terms of the capitulation made clear the king’s willingness to compromise
in order to put an end to this conflict. Despite the fact that he had kept the for-
tress for so long “for the sons of voivode Ladislas”, Nicholas Wass was granted
in exchange not just absolution for any of his actions and the restitution of all
the properties inherited or acquired, but also the right to hold the royal fair of
Bonţida and collect the revenues of the customs post.27
There were however rebels who would not reconcile with the king and car-
ried on resisting, whenever possible, for years to come. Such was the impres-
sive case of a certain Solomon, a noble from Dăbâca county, appointed count
of Braşov during Ladislas Kán’s reign. Seeking refuge from the Angevine offen-
sive inside the walls of the impregnable fortress of Codlea (where Stefan V had
successfully resisted his father’s assault in 1264), Solomon remained there until
his death, probably of natural causes, sometime in 1331.28 It was only then that,
looking for a solution to return to the royal grace and recover their properties,
his family, the Aşchileu and Jimbor noblemen,29 negotiated the surrender of
the fortress to the king.
7.1.4 Deceptive Peace

The long anti-Angevine resistance in the heavily fortified area of Bârsa
Country, which benefitted strategically from a relative geographical isola-
tion and the external support the noblemen could enjoy, was not a defining
trait for Transylvania’s political evolution. Throughout the province, Charles
24 DIR IV 49–51; ZW 365–367.

25 Attested as such between May, 5th, 1321 and—July, 13th, 1321: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11.
26 DIR IV 15–16; ZW 352–353.
27 DIR IV 19–20.
28 DIR V 34–35, 39–40; ZW 447–448, 449–450.
29 DIR V 300; ZW 459.
Robert’s combination of military pressure with leniency until the death of

Dózsa Debreceni (1322) achieved its purpose. In April 1322, the general congre-
gation of Cristiş (Kereztus), presided by voivode Thomas Szécsényi, the count
of Székely, Simon Kacsics and bishop Andrew Szécsi, with participation of
“nobles from all the parts of Transylvania of the seven counties, as well as the
Székelys and the Saxons”,30 seemed to agree on general peace and the return to
the congregational system. Moreover, the fact that this “dietal” assembly was
not presided by the king, but the voivode, seemed to prolong the status quo
during Ladislas Kán’s regime. Transylvania was still acknowledged as a regnum,
even if the term was no longer used in the documents relating to this assem-
bly. The regime instituted in Transylvania by the king’s loyalists was not bent
on observing the congregational ideals of the provincial nobility, the Saxons,
the Székelys and the Romanians, who had made it possible to maintain state-
hood in this highly complex province in a time when stability was common
nowhere else. However, mimicking congregational rights proved soon to be
just an appearance, same as Charles Robert’s extravagant promises he had
made to ensure victory.
The first to face the political pragmatism of the king were none others
than those who had been generously promised by the king, in the first years
of the civil war, complete fulfillment of their demands: the Saxons in southern
Transylvania. They had undoubtedly joined the royalist side hoping to accom-
plish their older desideratum of extending the privileges of their administrative
and ecclesiastical autonomy enjoyed by the province of Sibiu over the entire
colonist community in their immediate vicinity. The start had been given
by the 1315 annexation of the sees of Mediaş, Biertan and Şeica. Three years
later, the king went back on his decision, compensating it through a series of
unusually generous privileges and by changing the three sees into a county
separated from the administrative structures of voivodal Transylvania. After
1319, with the victory already secured, the king did not grant the same privi-
leges to the other Saxon sees and chapters. On the contrary, after the defeat
of the resistance, the dignitaries who had ensured the king’s victory adopted a
much harsher attitude towards the Saxons than their predecessors. Confronted
with the oppression and huge taxes imposed by Bishop Andrew Szécsi and
archdean John of Alba, the dean and the rectors in the Şeica deanship were the
first who, in the last months of 1322, addressed a complaint to the Pontifical
See.31 Excommunicated by the bishop whom they had previously charged with
30 DIR IV 37, 38–39; ZW 361, 362–363.

31 DIR IV 58–59; ZW 368–369.
236 CHAPTER 7
simony, the Şeica parish made another complaint to Pope John XXII, who on
his turn addressed the king, asking him so solve this problem. The proportions
of the conflict infuriated Charles Robert. In the unequivocal letter he sent to
the Saxons in Şeica he asked them to ignore their wicked parish leaders and
submit to the bishop. The parish’s failure to comply would result in their ban-
ishing. Failure to submit would result in harsh measures taken against them
by the voivode. Also, they were to renounce sending any appeals to the pope:
the king had already taken care of that, informing the pope he would not
allow the country’s prelates and churches to be judged outside his kingdom.32
Addressed to people who had never shown any lack of dignity, such a letter was
an open invitation to revolt. At the same time, to add insult to the injury, the
king appointed voivode Thomas Szécsényi as count of Sibiu,33 replacing
the more temperate Nicholas Telegdi.34
In early 1324, the Saxon rebellion started not as much in the privileged
county of Sibiu as in the same contact area between the Saxon colony and
that of the noble counties, whose unsettled nature was due to its incompletely
defined status. The leaders of the rebellion, the turbulent, fortress owning
Saxon counts, originated from the entire territory of the “seven chapters”. The
most prominent of them, count Henning of Petreşti, was probably the same as
count Hennyng who, in May 1317, had obtained from the king the confirmation
of the famous Andreanum.35 Another prominent leader was Herric Magnus
in Feirighaz,36 originating from the Sighişoara district, who had managed to
obtain, in late 13th century, the acknowledgment of his successful juridical
integration in the privileged community of Sibiu Saxons.37 Despite his violent
nature, which required the king himself to come around the theater of war,
the Saxon rebellion was crushed without major difficulty by the experimented
troops of Thomas Szécsényi. One must not question that, in parallel with the
reprisals, the king showed his willingness to grant the Saxons a number of
unessential concessions. Nonetheless, the 1324 rebellion narrowed down the
support base of the pro-Angevine party in Transylvania. Distrusting the local
forces, the king decided to use abusive, violent, and venal dignitaries on the
sole condition of maintaining order in the province.
32 DIR IV 85; ZW 376.

33 Attested between June, 19th, 1323, and September, 2nd, 1324: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 191.
35 DIR III 274; ZW 322.
36 Today’s Albeşti, near Sighişoara: DIR V 432–433, ZW 490–491.
37 Nagler, Aşezarea saşilor, 277.
7.2 The Political Regime of the Restoration
The regime instituted by Charles Robert in Transylvania, after his victory

over the rebellious nobility, was rightfully deemed particular to a “conquered
country”.38 More or less intact, its institutions shortly became submitted to the
royal court’s intrusive and exploiting policy, usually under the command of
abusive dignitaries, rarely Transylvanian.
Initially, the evolution in this respect was relatively slow. A certain seg-
ment of the Transylvanian nobility had fought alongside Charles Robert in
the civil war. Another, probably numerous, had indirectly contributed to the
success of the restoration by refusing to join the 1316 rebellion. Moreover,
the king had made engagements to the former rebels, whose capitulation
had considerably reduced the duration of the war: the capitulation agree-
ment included a one or two year transition in which they would still keep the
control of occupied fortresses, and even royal domains. In 1324, on the closure
of these episodes, when the first signs of Thomas Szécsényi’s abuses appeared,
the nobles in Transylvania were cautious enough to address the issue in cor-
pore to King Charles Robert, who exempted them from descensus and victua-
lia, which the voivode started claiming.39 In what concerns the participation
of Transylvanians in the administrative structures of the province, the rule of
Dózsa Debreceni proved exemplary. Among other measures he reinstated the
former vice-voivode during the time of Ladislas Kán. In order to complete
the pacification of the province, Thomas Szécsényi initially saw himself obliged
to follow his example. Michael of Jucu (Suki), count of Cluj in 1324, would
become the vice-voivode of Transylvania’s between 1325–1330;40 Nicholas
Gerendi, count of Solnoc (Interior) in 1325 would become, in 1326, count
of Turda, a position he had held during Ladislas Kán;41 the lords of Dăbâca
county must have been the nobles of the Dobokai family until 1330, older sup-
porters of Charles Robert and adversaries to Ladislas Kán; between 1331–1334
the office was transferred to another Transylvanian noble, John (János) of
Morut (Móric).42 Apparently associated until 1330 with more or less impor-
tant administrative positions, the Transylvanians were kept at bay from the
military bases of the Angevine domination. Indeed, none of the castellans of
the powerful royal fortresses active at that time was a Transylvanian noble.
38 Rusu, Castelani din Transilvania, 73.

39 Mályusz, Hungarian Nobles, 29.
41 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 246, 251.
42 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 246–247.
238 CHAPTER 7
Vital for keeping royal control over a province conquered by means of armed
force, these castellans, be they Desiderius Elefánti at Bologa,43 Nicholas Szécsi
at Haţeg,44 Arnold and Nicholas Rimai at Piatra Craivii45 or Martinus Mátéházi
at Deva,46 came from outside of Transylvania, including the king’s trustees or
the voivode’s familiars.
The growing competition over Transylvania between different aristocratic
factions in Hungary eventually led to an even more drastic reduction of
the number of Transylvanian nobles who held offices in their own “country”. The
years 1320–1327 were marked by the domination of the province by the Kacsics
kindred, whose main representatives, voivode Thomas Szécsényi and his kin
Simon, son of Michael,47 had become the holders of the most important offices.
With the disappearance of Simon Kacsics (d. 1327), Charles Robert decided to
put an end to the submission of entire Transylvania to the interests of a sin-
gle kindred. As of this date, the positions previously owned by the voivode’s
kin were transferred to Ladislas (Lack) of the Hermann kindred, the founder
of the Lackfi kindred, who became count of the Székelys, Bistriţa and Mediaş
(1328–1343). There was a fierce competition between the Kacsics and Hermann
families; it often came close to degenerating into conflict when, during the
campaign in Serbia (1335), one of the voivode’s familiars assassinated Emerich,
the son of Ladislas Hermann.48 The king intervened and forced the voivode
and his men to pay consistent reparations.49 This incident revealed the exis-
tence, inside the province, of a potentially conflictual situation, which made
Thomas Szécsényi to only appoint men he could absolutely trust into the
administrative and military offices under his jurisdiction. Obviously untrust-
worthy, the Transylvanians were almost completely replaced by the voivode’s
familiars, “imported” from Hungary’s central and northern counties.
Thus, the vice-voivode position, which had been almost exclusively in the
hands of the Transylvanian nobles since the adoption of the congregational
regime, was entrusted to Simon Zsámboki (1334–1336),50 member of a pres-
tigious family of ancient French origin, based in Pilis county, which included
43 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 408; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 68 (originating from the Nitra
county).
44 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 326; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 222 (Gömör).
45 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 338; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 205 (Gömör).
46 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11, 248, 299–300; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 157 (Gömör).
47 Szekely count 1320–1327; Bistriţa 1320–1327, Mediaş 1320–1327 and count of Caraş 1319–
1325: Engel, Archontológia, 1: 111, 142, 155, 192.
48 DIR V 357–358, 511–512, 512–513.
49 DIR V 374, 376, 511–512.
50 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 11–12.
among its ancestors another voivode of Transylvania.51 A few years later he

was replaced with Peter (Petö) Derencsényi (1337–1342),52 the voivode’s famil-
iar, from Gömör county. The same county must have been the birthplace of
Nicholas Rimai, who after 1330 became castellan of Lita and count of Cluj,53 and
Martinus Mátéházi, who, besides being the castellan of Deva, would become
the count of Hunedoara.54 Castellans Andreas Jonhos of Piatra Craivii (1338)
and Nicholas Zabari of Rupea (1332–1334) came from Nógrád,55 the voivode’s
county of origin; John Csaholyi, count of Solnoc in 1333, came from Sătmar
county,56 while Peter Perényi, count of Târnava, belonged to a noble kindred
from Abaúj county.57 Some of the voivode’s familiars who belonged to pres-
tigious and wealthy aristocratic families were able to supply major resources
and a great number of companions. Of these, the most important was Stephen
Pogány of the Hontpázmány kindred58 who, cumulating the positions of cas-
tellan of Ciceu, Unguraş and Cetatea de Baltă, incorporated them within his
own military structure, which included Pethew, the Ciceu vice-castellan,59
Mark Fogacsi, Unguras vice-castellan60 and Peter, son of Barthales,61 all origi-
nating from Heves-Ujvár county. Under the circumstances, the Transylvanians
were left only with the offices of counts of Dăbâca, Cluj and, perhaps, Turda,
counties in which the nobles were powerful enough to exert certain pressure
on the voivode. Nonetheless, they enjoyed limited attributes and played an
insignificant military role. The major revenues of the new important royal
tax (lucrum camerae) were naturally leased directly by the king. Once again,
Transylvanians played almost no role in this business.62
Voivodal censure was mainly intended to severely restrict the power of the
congregational system. Submitted to a rigid hierarchy and obstructed, frag-
mented in a succession of small local gatherings, the general congregations
were dispersed in time to a formula that would confine them to mere judicial
attributions. Let us take, for instance, the year 1337: by early December, Thomas
51 Smaragdus (1206): KMTL 193.

57 Engel, Archontológia, 1: 250; Engel, Archontológia, 2: 189–190.
58 For being voivode Thomas’ familiar see: DIR V 291–292; ZW 458.
61 DIR V 291–292; ZW 458.
62 DIR V 377–381; Történelmi Tar, 1911, 12–15.
240 CHAPTER 7
Szécsényi had already presided two noble congregations, which took place in
Turda, on May 1 and November 8; on December 2, he summoned a regional
congregation of the nobles in the Dăbâca and Cluj counties in Bonţida,63 later
followed, on December 9–10, by a third general congregation in Turda, with
nobles from across Transylvania.64 One week later, on December 18, another
regional congregation in Cetatea de Baltă was again presided by the voivode,
and was meant to solve the litigations between the nobles in southern
Transylvania and the Saxons in Sibiu.65 Finally, on February 9, 1338, a new judi-
cial assembly took place in Sântimbru, with attendance from the nobles on the
mid-Mureş valley.66 The voivode’s intricate journey between various judicial
sieges was meant to prevent the nobles from reuniting into a single assembly
and regaining political power. After careful selection, participation to the gen-
eral congregations became the privilege of few, which made it a lot less threat-
ening to the voivode. However, the provincial nobility itself felt threatened and
managed to impose on the king and voivode a series of collective privileges
and individual liberties.
Transylvania returned to its former status of the time before the congre-
gational regime, that of an an exploited province, fragmented among offi-
cials hungry for wealth and power, subject to a continuous drain of resources
towards the exterior. The military apparatus maintained by these royal dig-
nitaries was numerous and costly. These private armies of renegade knights
took every opportuny to rob local nobles of their fortune and accumulate illicit
wealth with the voivode’s blessing. Let us examine a single example: in the
year 1332, two of the voivode’s familiars, John Csaholyi and Nicholas Zobory,
seized Legii estate (Legyun), belonging to local noble Iwanka (Janka), son of
Gregory of Palatca. He filed a suit against them but despite conclusive evi-
dence, the voivode ruled for the impostors, holders of major positions in his
military apparatus. Moreover, to cover his biased judgment, Thomas Szécsényi
tried to convince Iwanka to give up on his appeal, under threat of death. At
that moment, Iwanka took the matter to the Alba Iulia chapter, asking for the
authentication of a statement in which, describing the lawlessness of voivode
Thomas and his acolytes, also mentioned the reasons for which he would tem-
porarily drop his case.67 Two years later, considering that the nobles of Palatca
had been quieted down, the two impostors addressed the king, asking for a
63 DIR V 431–432; ZW 488–490.

64 DIR V 432–433, 448–449; ZW 490–491, 494–495.
65 DIR V 432–433; ZW 490–491.
66 DIR V 431–432; ZW 488–490.
67 DIR V 275; ZW 453–454.
donation document. But, as a result of Charles Robert’s order at the request

of the two, the preliminary investigation for the donation was conducted not
by the Alba Iulia chapter, which held attributes in this respect, but by the
one in Oradea.68 The blatant royal complicity compelled the Oradea canons
to quicken the homesteading of the voivode’s familiars and make all proper
arrangements.69 A few months later, the onerous deal came to its final conclu-
sion: the two fresh recipients of the royal donation, filled with “good intent”,
expressed their willingness to acknowledge Iwanka of Palatca’s lawful owner-
ship over the property law and to return it to him. Of course, in exchange for an
additional “detail”, one hundred silver marks which the legitimate owner had
to reimburse them70 to reenter in possession of his own property. The balance
of the whole affair? The voivode’s familiars, obviously not interested in durable
land ownership in the province, obtained a hefty amount of money by sell-
ing Iwanka of Palatca his rightful property, which they had exploited for over
two years.
This and many similar examples cast a doubt on the legality of most land
donations in Transylvania at the beginning of the Angevine era. Assuming
a whole range of risks and succeeding, by means unbeknownst to others, to
pay off a huge ransom for a Transylvanian noble, Iwanka of Palatca was even-
tually able to retain property ownership. Other representatives of the same
social category were probably less determined, poorer or simply less fortunate.
Thomas Szécsényi’s regime was, especially after 1330, one of abuse, confisca-
tion, and unpunished violence. Patron and defender of the members of his
large exploitative apparatus, the voivode himself, who accumulated fabulous
fortunes, became a role model for them. His venal ingenuity enabled him to
snatch properties even from the privileged “province” of Sibiu71 or the free royal
city of Cluj (1340).72 Making individual appeals to the king could not bring any-
thing to the locals, because Charles Robert saw the Transylvanian nobility as
discredited, potentially rebellious, with absolutely nothing to offer. The king
would willingly refuse to contradict the voivode’s decision. In exchange for his
loyalty and the consistent contributions to the royal treasury, he was allowed
to do whatever he wanted. It comes as no surprise that the 1321–1322 agree-
ments became highly questionable. At least Nicholas Wass and his familiars,
under continuous persecution from the king’s local dignitaries, were forced to
68 DIR V 321–322; 576–577.

69 DIR V 326–327; 578–579.
70 DIR V 339–340; ZW 463–464.
71 DIR V 544, ZW 508–509.
72 DIR V 541–543, 608–609.
242 CHAPTER 7
ask Charles Robert for the reconfirmation of their rights in 1338.73 Desiderius
Elefánti, the Bologa royal castellan, had robbed, a few years back, the Sântejude
estate, stealing many horses; others would challenge Wass’s properties.74 All of
this happened even though his nephew Nicholas Wass the Younger had partici-
pated in the 1335 war against Wallachia, as a defender of the Hălchiu frontier
fortress.75
Nothing could better illustrate the precarious positions of Charles Robert in

Transylvania than the circumstances of the 1330 campaign against Wallachian
voivode Basarab.
Had Transylvania’s military system functioned normally, any military cam-
paign across the Carpathians should have considerably relied on the armed
forces of this province. During the 13th century, despite the endemic crisis of
its latter half, local forces in Transylvania had largely contributed to maintain-
ing an area of military security beyond the Carpathians, even in the context of
the Arpadian kingdom’s attempted expansion beyond the safety of its borders.
Charles Robert’s policy, however, was different from his forerunners’. Failing or
not wanting to reconstitute the Transylvanian “duchy”, be it from the sole per-
spective of unifying this province’s military apparatus, the king denied the sole
viable military instrument that would have enabled him to dominate the outer
Carpathians and open access towards the Lower Danube. We see here a typi-
cal contradiction between the objectives and the concrete means that would
enable reaching those objectives. The great problem of Charles Robert’s reign
was not the lack of resources as—Hungary was undoubtedly a military force to
be reckoned with, but the inability to get them mobilized.
Under the circumstances, the Transylvanian participation to the military
campaign against Basarab was insignificant. Not only did the king fail to tap
the province’s military resources, despite the residents’ familiarity with the
opponents they would face, but sources available to us do not include any
of the names of Transylvanian nobles as members of the royal army. The
Transylvanian participation to the royal expedition was consequently reduced
to the three pillars of royal power in Transylvania: voivode Thomas Szécsényi
accompanied by his familiars; Ladislas (Lack) Hermann, count of the Székelys
and of Mediaş; and the royal city of Cluj, a substantial contributor of supplies.76
The system devised by the king to keep Transylvania under tight supervision by
73 DIR V 434, ZW 491–492; DIR V 486, 599.

74 DIR V 431–432; ZW 488–490.
75 DIR V 270; ZW 468.
76 DIR V 23–25, ZW 443–445; DIR V 390–391, CD VIII 4 171–173.
instating excessive centralization, occupation and exploitation, proved inca-

pable to deal with a major external challenge. The lack of popularity of the
representatives of this system and the difficulties they met in keeping the situ-
ation under control are proven by an incident that occurred during this expe-
dition: upon their return from the campaign, Nicholas and Martin, the sons of
Blawch, who had obtained three properties in the Mediaş district77 through a
donation from king Charles Robert, realized that during their absence these
estates had been seized back by the Saxons in the Mediaş and Şeica sees, their
rightful owners.78 The temporary absence of provincial authorities, probably
corroborated with the news of the king’s deafeat, had been enough to let the
situation get out of control at least in these problematic territories.
77 DIR V 9; ZW 441.

78 DIR V 9; ZW 441.
Conclusions
The second half of the 13th century in Transylvania witnessed the rise of the
nobility as social elite with increased political influence. By selecting its
members from a relatively heterogeneous social spectrum, mainly based on
bravery on the battlefield, this new social class won for itself, just like the rest
of the kingdom of Hungary, the status of distinctive “order” or “class”. The
Transylvanian nobility, however, added something more: a specific regional
identity, favored by the administrative-institutional economy of the province,
both rooted in the older traditions of the Transylvanian state consolidated by
the very first generations of Hungarian conquerors.
This nobility would not forget its Hungarian origins and its due allegiance to
the king of Hungary. Hence they would claim their supremacy over the other
residents of Transylvania, who were either conquered (Romanians), allies
(Székelys) or colonists (Saxons). In relation to the nobility abroad, this class
referred to itself as Transylvanian, thus belonging to a “country” over which
they exerted the same rights any noble would over his estate.
With the rise, from royal initiative, of the noblemen’s congregation, an insti-
tution inspired from Western Europe’s corporate thinking, the nobility dis-
covered the most efficient way to identify with the “country” (regnum) itself
and to assert its own rights accordingly. Its main concern was land owner-
ship, as the foundation of its social state and livelihood. In 1331, the nobles
reunited in the Turda congregation would firmly rise to defend the interests
of “noble” John, son of John, son of Geubul of Bistriţa, asking voivode Thomas
to refuse enforcing a royal decision to restitute to Bistriţa citizens one of
its properties. The justification? “As the Ependorph estate is known to be part
of their possessions”.1 “Theirs”, namely the Transylvanian nobles, solidary in
defending what they deemed a common heritage of their “class”.
Once it had become a legal “country” opposing the aristocratic exclusivism
with their own “Transylvanian” exclusivism, the nobility discovered the means
to secure control over an important segment of the administrative and judi-
cial structure of the province, from the counts of noble ascendancy and their
subordinates to the office of vice-voivode if not higher. At the same time, they
possessed the instruments of intervention required to influence Transylvania’s
internal and external policies to match their options and interests, even during
the reign of Ladislas Kán.
1 D IR V 8; ZW 441: cum ipsa possessio Ependorph inter possessiones ipsorum fore dignoscatur.

Conclusions 245
With the end of the difficult first decades of the Angevine domination and
the return to the congregation system, the 14th century continued to provide
numerous examples of solidarity among the noble “classes”, of assertion and
consolidation of their own identity, of preoccupation towards the conservation
of “Transylvania’s rights” against whoever would try to violate them, even the
king himself. For example, on October 4, 1361, two of Nicholas of Dăbâca’s sons,
who had been one of Charles Robert’s first Transylvanian supporters, appeared
before the convent in Cluj-Mănăştur and drafted a protest against their call to
justice at the royal court. The terms of the protest were unequivocal: “And since
this lord king of ours, out of his kingly benevolence, mercifully bestowed this
grace upon all the nobles in Transylvania, that they would not be forced to stand
trial before the said lord king of ours under any reason whatsoever, therefore they
/the Dăbâca nobles, n.n./ would not stand trial at any of these octaves, dreading
that the rights of this part of Transylvania be trampled by them (timentes ne in
hac parte iura ipsius partis Transsilvane per ipsos infringantur); yet should they
start a case and complain against them in Transylvania, namely before our lord
voivode, then they are up and ready to obey the country’s rules (in omnibus
processibus regni presto essent et parati)”.2 The highlight of the juridical speci-
ficity of the “country”, the assertion of “Transylvania’s rights”, is synonymous, in
this case, with the rights of the Transylvanian nobles to refute the judgment of
the king himself! A constant feature of the Transylvanian congregation in the
14th century, which still awaits a proper treatment by historians, is the pro-
cess of developing a system of enlarged congregation (the Diet), which would
eventually replace the “small” congregation of the nobles in the seven counties
to become Transylvania’s main summit. Through the unio fraterna of 1437 and
mostly through the Treaty of Union ( foedus) of 1459, the Transylvanian nobil-
ity and the representatives of the privileged communities of the Székelys and
Saxons established a political system based on the mutual guarantee of liber-
ties. Although these had been granted through royal diplomas, each of these
communities would regard them as inalienable rights, hence they all agreed
on terms of mutual assistance against any attempt to violate them. The three
privileged “nations” of Transylvania thus merged into a single comprehensible
unit (tota universitas et communitas adunata), defined, according to the 1459
treaty, as regnum transsilvaniensis.3
These coordinates can be easily traced in the evolution of Transylvania’s
political system until it became an autonomous Principality. Such an evolution
must have undoubtedly seen cyclical periods of expansion and contraction,
2 D RH XII 44–45.
3 Rady, Voivode and Regnum, 98.
246 Conclusions
the latter often caused by the attempts of the royal power to put an end to this
diverging evolution. The exclusion of Romanians from this political system has
long been debated. This is especially controversial since for a short while, in
1355, the congregational reaction against Charles Robert’s occupation regime
in conjunction with the royal power’s interests at the time led to the temporary
reconfirmation of the Romanians in the positions gained in Transylvania’s rep-
resentative structures during the rule of the last Arpadian kings. Nonetheless, a
detailed, sequential analysis of the stages of this historical process could lead,
in our opinion, to a number of additional explanations. The powerful rise of
the Romanians in the second half of the 13th century was indeed favored by the
collapse, before the royalty’s avidity for new human and material resources, of
the internal barriers between the limited number of conquerors and the het-
erogeneous mass of the conquered. More importantly, the Romanians’ adap-
tation to the values promoted by the new political system on the rise shows
no sign of delay at that time. Their traditional institutions seem to have been
continuously evolving at that time, adapting to the new reality in a timely fash-
ion. This process of parallel development was eventually slowed down by their
exclusion from Transylvania’s political system which could not acknowledge
their privileged status without endangering its very existence.
Could we explain the rise of Transylvania during the reign of Ladislas Kán as
an accident of history, the result of favorable circumstances, as some histori-
ans have proposed? Let us try to shed some light on this notion. It is indeed
possible that, if Andrew III had had a succesor, the political rise of Ladislas
Kán’s Transylvania would have been less impressive. But also, if an unforesee-
able accident in early 1307 had removed Charles Robert from the race, enabling
Otto of Wittelsbach to become the king of Hungary, Transylvania would have
become a hereditary principality, as it was the custom in the Empire. At the
level of the immediate history, such “accidents” can work both ways. This
makes immediate circumstances insufficient for understanding history, giving
true weight to long-term constants which ultimately influence specific events
and circumstances, halt or catalyze them, confine them or trace pathways
for them to follow. We could acknowledge, in this respect, that Ladislas Kán,
a man of his time, was essentially just another “oligarch” in the kingdom of
Hungary in the last decades of the 13th century. Nevertheless, unlike the other
territories under the control of the “oligarchs”, Transylvania was most certainly
different! From this point of view, the rise of the congregational system as
well as Ladislas the Cuman’s and voivode Ladislas Kán’s reigns, respectively,
ensured the continuity of the Transylvanian regnum, from duke Gyula’s reg-
num Erdewel to the regnum transsilvaniensis of the 1459 Union, accomplished
Conclusions 247
by keeping the fundamental notions of its juridical autonomy and basic struc-
tures of its statehood. The objective of the hereby work was to identify the
safeguards and transmitters of these notions. Indeed, analyzing the “long dura-
tion” would prove that any circumstances moderately favorable facilitated the
assertionof the fundamental notions of the Transylvanian regnum ideology.
As for the truly favorable circumstances, they always resulted, in Transylvania,
into the reassertion of the vocation for self-determination.
Annexes
1 General Congregations and Noble Congregations of Transylvania

(1288–1322)123
Date Place Type Chair Causes
1288,1 villa Noble Ladislas Borsa, of Peter Monoszló,

June 8 Cruciferorum congregation Sancto-Martino, bishop of
(generalis vicevoivode; Assisted Transylvania vs.
convocatio) by: Peter of Nitra, earl Keminus and
of Cluj; Michael, son of John, sons of
Lawrence; Peter of Mykula
Iara, son of Murun;
Peter, son of Clement;
judices per regnum
Transilvanum constituti
1291,2 Mirăslău Noble Benedict, deputy of count Nicholas,
January 13 (Meruslo) congregation the vicevoivode son of Mokou vs.
Ladislas of Sancto Chapter pf the
Martino, assisted Transylvanian
by four “judges Church
nominated for the
realm of Transylvania”,
including Nicholas of
Gâmbaş (Gumbas) and
Gregory of Sâncrai (de
Sancto Rege)
1291,3 Alba Iulia General Andrew III, King of Ugrinus Csák vs.
March 11 congregation Hungary unknown.
(nobles, Saxons, Witnesses:
Szeklers, noblemen,
Romaniana) Saxons, Szeklers
and Romanians
1 D IR II 300–301; HD 474–475.
2 D IR II 347–348, 372; Teutsch-Firnhaber 169–170, 176.
3 D IR II 369, 509.

250 Annexes
Table (cont.)
1296,4 April in Torda, apud Noble Ladislas Kán, voivode Ladislas Kán vs.
ecclesiam congregation of Transylvania; Chapter of the
Cruciferorum (judicial Johannes, provost of Transylvanian
(Oprişani) assembly) Sibiu; Myle, preceptor Church
of the Crusaders Testimonies:
House of Turda 150 noblemen
1296,5 prope villam Noble Ladislas Kán, voivode Sons of Bot of
June 18 Egrug congregation of Transylvania, Ludos vs.
(Românaşi) (judicial unacum nobilibus Chapter of the
assembly) partibus Transsilvane Transylvanian
nobiscum Church
consedentibus
1306,6 villa Noble Ladislas Kán, voivode Nichoas and
September 15 Cruciferorum congregation of Transylvania, Peter, sons of
iuxta Torda unacum nobilibus ban Mykud vs.
(Oprişani) partis Transsilvane, qui Ladislas Borsa of
tunc nobiscum erant Sancto Martino
sedentes pro tribunali
1308,7 iuxta Neregh General Ladislas Kán, voivode John and Peter
June 17 (near Niraj) congregation of Transylvania, vs. magister
(congregacio unacum nobilibus regni Zemek
generalis) ad nos pertinentibus
13098 Turda (Torda) Noble (Ladislas Kán, voivode –
congregation of Transylvania)
(congregacio)
45678
4 Jakó 543, 546.

5 Jakó 550.
6 Pataki J., Anjou királyaink és a két román vajdaság, Kolozsvár/Cluj, 1944, 15–17.
7 D IR III 67; Zichy I. 117–118.
8 AkO I. 813//814.
Annexes 251
1322,9 Oprişani General Thomas Szécsényi, Gyegus, son of

April 18–20 (Kereztes, congregation voivode of Nicholas and
Kereztus) (Transylvanian Transylvania, Andrew Jacob, son of Apa
nobles, Szeklers Szécsi, Bishop of vs. count of
and Saxons) Transylvania, Simon Târnava;
Kacsics, Earl of Witnesses: all
Szeklers noblemen,
Szeklers and
Saxons.
2 Dukes of Transylvania
Bela IV, Duke of Transylvania, c. 1225–1235

Stephen V, Duke of Transylvania, 1257–1258, 1261–1270
3 Voivodes and vicevoivodes of Transylvania
Pousa 1226–1229
Gyula Rátót 1230–1231
Dionysius Tomaj 1233–1234
Pousa 1235–1241, March
Ladislas (Aba ?), comes Ultrasilvanus, c. 1235–c. 1239
Lawrence (Aba ?), 1242–după 1252
Herbordus, (vice)voivode (?), c. 1253–c. 1256
Ernye Ákos, Ban of Transylvania, c. 1258–1261
Ladislas I Kán ( first time) 1261–1265
Nicholas Gutkeled 1265–1270
L., (vice)voivode, 1267
Matthew Csák ( first time) 1270–1272, September
Nicholas Geregye 1272, September–1274, June (ante quem)
John (Johannes) Kőszegi, 1273, May 12–29
Egidius Monoszló, 1274, September 26–29
9 D IR IV 37–39; ZW 60–63.
252 Annexes
Matthew Csák (second time), 1274, June (ante quem)–1275, December

Ugrinus Csák ( first time), 1275, December
Ladislas I Kán (second time), 1275, December–1276, February
Ugrinus Csák (second time), 1276, February–1276, July
Matthew Csák (third time), 1276, July–1277, February
Nicholas Meggyesi ( first time), 1277–1278
Fyntha Aba, 1278 (autumn)–1280, July
Stephen (Stephanus), son of Tekus de Mera, 1280 (second half)
Peter, son of Dominic, 1280 (second half)
Roland Borsa ( first time), 1282
Peter, vicevoivode, 1282
Apor Péc, 1283
Roland Borsa (second time), 1284–1285
Moyus Ákos, 1287–1288
Roland Borsa (third time), 1288–1294
Ladislas Borsa, vicevoivode, ante 1288–c. 1291
Benedict, deputy of the vicevoivode Ladislas Borsa, 1291
Andrew of Geoagiul de Sus (Stremţ), vicevoivode, 1290–1292
George Borsa, vicevoivode, c. 1292
Ladislas II Kán, 1294–1315
Peter Monoszló (voivode) 1305
John of Deuş, vicevoivode, 1294–after 1296
Simon, vicevoivode, c. 1300
Nicholas Ákos (voivode) 1307
Ehelleus Ákos, vicevoivode, ante 1303–1315
Ladislas III Kán (unconfirmed) 1315
Nicholas Meggyesi (second time) 1315–1316
Dozsa of Debrecen 1318–1321
Nicholas Vásári, vicevoivode, 1319–1320
Ehelleus Ákos, vicevoivode (second time) 1321
Thomas Szécsényi 1321–1342
Michael of Jucu (Suki) 1325–1330
Simon Zsámboki 1334–1336
Peter (Petö) Derencsényi 1337–1342
4 Counts of the Transylvanian counties
Alba
Holders of the office are the vicevoivodes of Transylvania
Annexes 253
Cluj
Sebastianus 1229
Peter (of Nitra), 1288
Jacob Cseh 1312–1314
Nicolaus of Dezmir 1315 (count/judge of the nobles)?
John Fonói 1317 (also count of Bistriţa)
Michael of Jucu (Suki) 1324
Nicholas of Rima (Rimai) 1331–1332
Dăbâca
Mykud Kökényes-Radnóth 1269
Ponyth Miskolc 1268–1270
Lawrence Aba (also ban of Severin) 1270–1272
Philip (also King’s cupbearer) 1272
Mykud Kökényes-Radnóth 1274
Alexander (also count of Sibiu) 1274–1275
Nicholas Dobokai (Kökényes-Radnóth) 1317
John Mórici 1331–1334
Haţeg
Peter Aba 1276
Nicholas, judge of Haţeg (county) 1315
Hunedoara
Martinus Mátéházi 1333
Târnava
Rachael 1214
Ders 1331
Turda
Dominic of Iara (Járai) 1310
Nicholas Gerendi 1312; 1326
Solnoc (Inner)
Nicholas Gerendi 1325
Braşov
Nicholas, son of Symon, 1294
Solomon . . . —1315 (1327, 1331)
254 Annexes
Counties Outside the Authority of the Voivode

Bistriţa (and Rodna)
Aristaldus (Herystoldus), count of Rodna 1241
Paul, count of Rodna and Bistriţa, 1274
Vyvianus, count of Bistriţa (also earl of the royal chamber) 1295
(Ladislas Kán 1301–1310)
Moyus Ákos (also King’s cupbearer) 1313–1314
John Fonói (also count of Cluj) 1317
Simon Kacsics (also count of the Szeklers) 1320–1327
Mediaş (and Şeica)

Simon Kacsics 1320–1327
Ladislas (Lack), from the Hermann kindred 1328–1343
Sibiu
Iwachinus Türje, c. 1210
Benedict (also judge of King’s Stephen royal court) 1265
Dionysius (also palatine, count of Bács) 1266
Benedict (also palatine, judge of the royal court) 1268
Albert (also magister agasonum) 1270–1272
Nicholas (also magister agasonum) 1272
Ladislas (I.) Kán (also judge of the royal court, count of Baranya) 1273
Alexander (also count of Dăbâca) 1274–1277
Peter Aba (also magister agasonum) 1279–1280
Amadé Aba 1280–1282
(Ladislas II Kán 1301–1310/1315)
Nicholas Telegdi, Chanad kindred 1323
Thomas Szécsényi 1323–1324
Nicholas of Braşov 1329
Solnoc
Paul Geregye 1245–1248
Dionysius Szentgróti, Türje kindred 1251
Starting from 1257/1261, holders of the county are the voivodes of Transylvania
5 Counts of the Szeklers
Moyus Ákos 1291

Peter Bő 1294–after 1295
Annexes 255
(Ladislas II Kán 1301–1310/1315)

Thomas Losonci 1315–1320
Stephen Losonci 1315
Simon Kacsics 1320–1327
Ladislas (Lack), Hermann kindred 1328–1343
Counts/Judges of the Szeklers on Arieş

Seem, 1295
Egidius, son of Kolondus, 1313
Renold, official of Thomas Losonci, count of the Szeklers, 1319
Peter, son of Jacob, judge of the Szeklers on Arieş, 1320
6 Bishops of Transylvania
Artulf 1244, June–1245, October/December

Gallus 1246, May–1270
Peter Monoszló 1270–1307, November 27
(Ladislas, son of voivode Ladislas Kán, unconfirmed, January–July 1308)
Benedict 1308, September–1320, February
Andrew Szécsi 1320, March/July–1356
7 Provosts of the Chapter of Transylvanian Church
Nicholas Kán 1265–1268

Clement 1268
Clement 1276
Clement 1286
Michael Bő 1287–1296
Stephen 1298–1306
Gregory 1307–1313
Andrew Szécsi 1318–1320
Dominic Szécsi 1320–1357
256 Annexes
8 Archdeans of the Transylvanian Church
Alba
Agabitus 1277
Stephanus 1297–1300 (vicechancellor of King Andrew III)
John Nobilis, 1318–1320 (chancellor of Bishop Benedict)
Crasna
John 1286
Santus 1308–1310
Cluj
Peter 1294 (dean of the Chapter in Alba Iulia)
John Nobilis 1308–1312
Michael Ákos 1321
Dăbâca
Dominic 1308–1313
Hunedoara
Ceba 1265
Elias 1308–1313
Kezdi
Nicholas 1308
Ozd
Tiba 1268
Michael 1277
Andrew 1286
Lawrence 1300
Benedict 1307–1313 (episcopal vicar 1313)
Eberhard, parish priest of Teaca, vicearchdean, 1318
John 1319
Solnoc
Regulus 1265
Nicholas 1300 (notary of the bishop of Transylvania)
Gregory 1308
Peter 1318–1320
Annexes 257
Târnava
Bartholomew 1277
John 1300–1318 (vicechancellor of King Charles Robert, provost of Székesfehérvár
1307–1322)
Turda
Bartholomew 1274–1276 (dean of the Transylvanian church)
Paul 1288–1307 (episcopal vicar 1307)
Salvus 1308 (episcopal vicar 1308)
Nicholas 1318–1320 (dean of the Transylvanian church)
Tylegd
Kylianus, doctor decretorum, 1288–1301
Nicholas 1308
Benedict 1319 (general vicar of the bishop of Transylvania)
9 Provosts of Sibiu
Florentinus 1235
Nicholas (royal vicechancellor) 1241
Benedict (royal vicechancellor) 1261–1263
John ( Johannes) 1288–1296
Deans of Sibiu
Reynaldus 1282
Walbrun 1302
Giselbert 1309
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Index
Aba, bishop of Vác 217 Moyus (II), earl of Bistrița, comes

Aba, kindred 81, 112, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, Siculorum 226, 231–233, 254
129, 132, 134, 138, 168, 171, 184, 190, 191, Nicholas, voivode of Transylvania 252
206 Alard, count, father of Gaan (Gyan) 121, 126,
Amadé (Omodeus), earl of Sibiu, judge of 161, 188, 190
the Royal Court, palatine 1, 126, 134, Alba, archdeanship 121, 191, 235, 256
136, 170, 217, 222, 226, 254 county 44, 47, 83, 96, 98, 100, 122, 182,
David, Fyntha’s father 126 187, 252
Fyntha (Phinta), palatine, voivode of Alba Iulia, bishopric, chapter, city,
Transylvania 126, 128, 129, 133, 168, fortress 18, 23, 28, 33, 35, 37, 39–42, 45,
190, 191 52, 56, 57, 96, 97, 99, 100, 112, 116–122,
John, nobleman 232 139, 141, 147–149, 151, 154, 155, 158, 161,
Ladislas, judge of the royal court, voivode 168, 170–173, 180–183, 189–193, 196, 197,
of Transylvania 15 214, 216, 218–220, 224–226, 234, 240, 241,
Lawrence, voivode of 249
Transylvania 56–58, 92, 98, 126, 251 Alberic of Trois-Fontaines (Albericus Trius
Lawrence (II), ban of Severin, earl of Fontium) 15, 21, 22, 63
Dăbâca, treasurer 126–129, 253 Alberigo, Giuseppe, editor 50
Myke (Miko), earl of Bihor 15 Albert, earl of Sibiu, magister
Peter, magister agasonum, earl of Sibiu agasonum 254
and Hațeg, judge of the royal Albert I of Habsburg, king of Germany 140,
court 113, 126–127, 133, 253 205, 207–211, 214, 228
Abaqa, ilkhan 6 Albești (Feirighaz), village 236
Abaújvár, county 81, 128, 239 Alexander, ban of Severin, earl of Dăbâca and
Abulafia, D., historian 50 Sibiu 80, 82, 84, 85, 88, 92, 111, 117, 119, 253
Adrian, bishop of Transylvania 189 Alexander, castellan of Șoimuș 178
Adrian (Adorján), castle 42, 55, 123, 126, 132, Alexander IV, pope 62, 67, 70
157, 232 Alexander, son of Durugh, nobleman 83, 85,
Agabitus, archdean of Alba 121, 256 88, 92
Agnes of Habsburg, Hungarian queen 210 Alexandrescu, A. D., archaeologist 86
Agriș, village 224 Almăjd, village 55
Akadas, Szekler 62 Almaș, dukedom 294
Ákos, kindred 182, 183, 187, 206 Almaș (Halmas), village 218
Alexander, nobleman 197 Anagni, town 205
Ehelleus (I), nobleman 174, 182 Andreas, bishop of Eger (Agria) 172
Ehelleus (II), vicevoivode of Andreas, son of Szerafin 54
Transylvania 180, 182–184, 188, 195, Andreas Ekly, nobleman 38
234, 252 Andreas Jonhos, castellan of Piatra
Elisabeth, daughter of Ehelleus (II) 184 Craivii 239
Ernye, ban of Transylvania 68–71, 73, 87, Andrew, son of Helemban 183
113, 251 Andrew, son of Iohanka, count 179
Michael, archdean of Cluj 256 Andrew, son of Ipoch, nobleman 187, 188
Moyus (I), voivode of Transylvania 141, Andrew, son of Ivancha, count 65, 81, 83, 85,
146, 182, 183, 252 87, 88, 92
Index 275
Andrew II, king of Hungary 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, Aurel Vlaicu, see Binținți
20, 23, 44, 52, 63, 72, 123, 140, 152, 163, Austria, country 9, 10, 14, 32, 58, 68, 88, 140,
167, 189, 193, 230 149, 156, 196, 205, 207, 212
Andrew III, king of Hungary 123, 140, 149, Aventinus, chronicler 207
152–156, 158, 164, 166, 169–172, 174, 175, Avrig, castle 22, 43
177, 188, 191, 192, 195–198, 204, 210, 225, Azov, Sea of 15
230, 246, 249
Andrew (I) of Geoagiu de Sus, count 71, 83, Baas, judge of the royal court 92, 98
126 Babonič, kindred 217
Andrew (II) of Geoagiu de Sus, vicevoivode Babus (Solnoc county), village 177
of Transylvania 147, 170, 252 Bačman, Cuman leader 26
Andrew, father of count Demetrius 83, 84 Bács, county 92, 254
Anghel, Gheorghe, historian 28, 39–44, 104, Bak, János M., historian 7, 53, 165
171, 182 Baksa, George, magister 127, 136, 161
Anjou, House of 139, 210, 212 Balassa, Demetrius, nobleman 217
Anna, princess, daughter of Bela IV 51, 81, 87 Balaton, Lake 59
Anonymus (Notarius) 159 Balea, knez 198
Anonymus Geographus 164, 213 Balkans 9, 26, 67, 71, 78, 93, 104, 105, 133, 138,
Anonymus Leobiensis 34, 77, 79, 135 149, 152, 185, 203, 215, 228, 233
Antonius, bishop of Cenad 207, 208, 209 Balos, nobleman 179
Apa, father of Jacob 251 Banat, region 9, 29, 97, 150, 151, 174, 184, 185,
Apafi, family 187 229
Apold, village 103 Banate of Severin, see Severin
Apor, kindred 166 Baranya, county 59, 80, 93, 113, 167, 174, 254
palace 37 Baraolt 193
Arad, castle 23, 184 Barbat, voivode 127
county 36, 86, 144, 178, 184, 185, 229 Bärkäčar, Mongol commander 7
provost 24, 52, 76, 86, 94 Bârsa 11, 12, 18–21, 148, 149, 234
Arbuz, Cuman 141 Barthales, father of Peter 239
Argeș, river 18 Bartholomew, archdean of Târnava 121, 257
voivode 201 Bartholomew, archdean of Turda 257
Arieș, river 40, 101, 136, 142 Bas, son of Balos 267
seat, region 101, 136, 155, 178, 182, 195, 227, Basarab I, voivode of Wallachia 231, 242
255 Bâtca Doamnei (Piatra Neamț), castle 22, 26
Arieșul de Câmpie (Aranyos, Oronos), castle, Battelli, G., historian 50
village, custom 42, 66, 97 Batu, khan of the Golden Horde 7–10, 14, 16,
Aristaldus (Herystoldus), count of 25, 26, 29–33, 51, 58, 67, 135
Rodna 27, 254 Bavaria 194, 206–209, 211, 212
Armbruster, Adolf, historian 198, 203, 212 Baydar, Mongol commander 7, 8, 10, 25
Armenia, country 15 Bazna (Bozna) 101
Arnold of Apold, count 103 Beatrice d’Este, Queen of Hungary 152
Arpad, House of 1, 14, 15, 25, 31–33, 49, 63, Begovars, Cuman leader 13
65, 72, 73, 94, 104, 138, 139, 152, 153, 159, Békefi, R., historian 121
160, 164, 165, 175, 189, 203, 204, 242, 246 Bela, prince, son of Bela IV 65, 74, 77–81, 89,
Arpad, Hungarian leader 159 90, 106
Artulf, bishop of Transylvania 38, 56, 255 Bela III, King of Hungary 52, 145
Așchileu, village 234 Bela IV, King of Hungary 6, 8, 12–16, 18, 20,
Augustin, bishop of Zagreb 217 21, 23, 29, 30, 38, 42, 45, 49, 51–56,
276 Index
Bela IV, King of Hungary (cont.) county 101, 122, 175, 223, 231, 238, 253, 254
58–63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71–82, 85–89, Bistrița, valley 22, 26
92–97, 99, 104, 106, 108, 135, 139, 144, 145, Black Sea 16, 31, 33
152, 160–162, 167, 173, 189, 207, 251 Blawch, nobleman 243
Bela Rostislavici, duke of Mačva 78, 87, 88, Bő (Beu), kindred 170
108 Michael, provost of Transylvanian church,
Beliu, village 55 bishop of Zagreb, archbishop of
Beltiug (Beltuk), village 86, 90 Esztergom 170, 172, 204, 205, 255
Benchench, Szekely leader 103 Peter, earl of the Szekelys 183, 254
Bendeffy, L., historian 14 Boba, Imre, historian 382
Benedict, archbishop of Esztergom 76, 94, Boc (Bucteluk), village 101
95, 120, 257 Boccasini, Nicolaus, pontifical legate 182,
Benedict, archdean of Ozd 220, 221 204
Benedict, achdean of Telegd 257 Böček (Bochetor), Mongol
Benedict, bishop of Cenad 210, 217 commander 6–10, 26, 27, 29
Benedict, bishop of Oradea 24, 38 Boch, earl of Bihor 24
Benedict, bishop of Transylvania 217–222, Bogdan, Alexandru, archaeologist 29, 39
224, 227, 255, 256 Bohemia, kingdom 8, 32, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74,
Benedict, count, deputy of vicevoivode 76, 77, 79, 86, 105, 106, 110, 123–126,
Ladislas Borsa 154, 156, 158, 249, 252 204–206, 208
Benedict, earl of Sibiu, palatine 92, 254 Bojena Beatrix of Bohemia, sister of
Benedict, father of magister John 232 Ottokar II 79
Benedict, from Zala county 94 Boleslav (Boleslaus) Pudicus, duke of
Benedict XI, pope 204 Krakow 70, 78, 82, 105
Benedict Rád, bishop of Veszprém 207, 217 Boleslav the Pious, duke of Gnyezno 78
Benkő, E., historian 19, 20 Bologa, castle 229, 232, 238, 242
Bennet, R. F., historian 12 Bologna 95
Bereg, county 75, 81, 82, 84, 86, 90, 151 Boniface VIII, pope 174, 204–206, 210
Berke, Khan of the Golden Horde 9, 70, 105 Bonțida (Bonchhyda) 91, 101, 177, 233, 234,
Besenyő, village 98 240
Beudin (Solnoc county), village 177 Borchol, Cuman kindred 93
Bical, village 55 Boril, Bulgarian czar 17
Bicskei, George, archbishop of Borsa, kindred 47, 55, 95, 125, 130–134, 140,
Esztergom 204, 205 147, 151, 152, 159, 166, 184, 205, 207, 209,
Biertan, district, seat 177, 192, 194, 230, 235 231, 232
Bigalli, Davide, historian 49 Beke, nobleman 142, 208, 209, 217
Bihor, castle 83, 88 George, vicevoivode of Transylvania 252
county 15, 24, 36, 47, 55, 66, 75, 86, 101, Jacob (Kopasz), earl of Borsod, magister
110, 117, 123, 125, 126, 130–134, 144, 159, agasonum 232
184, 197, 208, 209 Ladislas (de Sancto Martino), vicevoivode
duchy (ducatus Byhariensis) 144, 159 of Transylvania 45, 131, 147, 156, 249,
Bileag, village 35 250, 252
Binder, Paul, historian 19, 20, 28, 36, 196 Roland (Lorandus), voivode of
Binținți (Aurel Vlaicu, Sothelik), village 100, Transylvania 1, 130–134, 136, 139, 141,
103 146, 147, 151, 152, 156, 157, 163, 166, 170,
Birnbaum, Marianna, historian 53 176, 197, 252
Birtin, village 47, 66 Thomas, count 131
Bistrița (Bistiche, Nosa), town 27, 37, 43, 79, Borșa, valley 130
111, 135, 136, 141, 154, 209, 225, 226, 244 Borșea, village 55
Index 277
Borsod, castle 75 Cârța, monastery 17, 28, 36, 42, 71, 78, 216
county 59, 68, 128, 134 Casimir, duke of Kujawia 78
Bortz, Cuman leader 13 Catalan company 213
Borynka (Baranka), fortress 81, 84, 90 Catherine of Courtenay 214
Bosnia, bishopric 73, 204, 217 Charles, son of Charles of Valois 213
Bot of Ludos, nobleman 250 Charles II of Anjou, king of Naples 106, 203
Bozouch, son of Inouch 103 Charles of Anjou, king of Naples 106, 140
Brâncuș, Gheorghe, editor 149 Charles of Valois 164, 203, 211–215
Brandenburg, margraviate 79, 86 Charles Martell 152, 203
Brașov, town 20, 83, 103, 141, 178, 254 Charles Robert of Anjou, king of Hungary
county 21, 135, 142, 178, 191, 234, 253 1, 114, 130, 150, 176, 177, 179, 181, 184, 189,
Brătianu, Gheorghe I., historian 149–151, 194, 195, 198, 203–217, 222–238, 241–243,
196, 199, 201 245, 246, 257
Bratislava 75–80, 89, 93, 98, 106, 110, 217, 224 Ceaba 177
Brethonia, village 198 Ceba, archdean of Hunedoara 256
Brindisi 212 Cegléd (Chegled) 141, 151
Buda 10, 24, 30, 53, 54, 56, 59, 65, 77, 82, 87, Celestin III, pope 52, 189
88, 111–113, 119, 120, 128, 153, 155, 172, Cenad, castle 23, 29
207–209, 217–219 county 144, 208, 230
Budjak, steppe 26 bishopric 24, 204, 207, 208, 210, 217
Bulchu, bishop of Cenad 24 Central Asia 32
Bulci, monastery 29 Cetatea de Baltă, castle 28, 39, 41, 57, 178,
Bulgaria, kingdom 9, 17, 18, 33, 61, 70, 74, 75, 239, 240
102, 105, 165, 203, 212 Ceuaș (Chawas) 177
Büri, Mongol commander 6, 7, 9, 10, 25–30 Chagatai, Mongol khan 9
Burundai, Mongol commander 70 Chalanus, village 101
Burzenland (Burcia, Burza), county 11, 12, Chanad, kindred 47, 55, 66, 144, 185, 206,
18–21, 148, 149, 234 254
Busuioc-von Hasselbach, Dan Nicolae, Ladislas, nobleman 66
historian 17, 18, 22, 23 Thomas, nobleman 66
Butură Valeriu, ethnographer 167 Chernigov 9
Byzantine, Empire 74, 203 Chelmac (Eperjes), monastery 29
Cheresig, castle 151
Čaka, Mongol ruler 203 Chidioșan, N., historian 130
Călata, region 62, 101, 103 Chintelnic (Kendtelek, Kendteluk),
Câlnic (Kalnuk), castle 43, 81, 83, 88, 103, village 57, 126
104, 111, 176, 216 Chirovsky, Nicholas L., historian 51, 67, 70
Campoluogo, see Câmpulung Chițescu, L., historian 199
Câmpulung, town 199–201, 203 Chiuza (Kuzepfolua), village 58
Căpud (Cupud), village 100 Chmielnik, battle of 10
Căpuș (Kopus), village 122 Chyl of Câlnic, count 81, 83, 88, 103, 104, 111
Caransebeș (Karansebus), borrough 141, 151 Ciceu (Chycho), castle, estate 42, 134, 178,
Caraș, county 93, 238 188, 231, 232, 234, 239
Carinthia, duchy 111 Cincu, chapter 193
Carpathian Basin 144 Ciocâltan, Virgil, historian 31, 105
Carpathians, mountains 4, 6–10, 12, 13, 16, Cisnădie, castle 43
18, 22, 24, 26, 27, 32, 56, 57, 61, 71, 104, Cisnădioara, village 42
135, 136, 138, 146, 147, 149, 167, 199, 201, Clement, father of count Peter 147, 158, 249
203, 242 Clement, provost 255
278 Index
Clement IV, pope 86, 89, 106 Csaholyi, John, earl of Solnoc 239, 240
Clement V, pope 191, 208, 210, 212, 214, 215 Csák, kindred 83, 89, 92, 102, 110–120,
Cloașter (predium Nicolai), village 101 122–127, 138, 143, 167, 171, 177, 190, 198,
Cluj (Clus, Cluse, Clwsvar, Kulus, Kulusvar, 206
Kuluswar), archdeanship 101, 183, 220, Demetrius, nobleman 54
256 Dominic, nobleman 83, 92
castle, town 10, 29, 37, 39, 45, 57, 91, 101, Margaret, mother of Matthew 118
102, 116, 117, 122, 141, 157, 171, 223, 225, Mark, nobleman 217
226, 229, 230, 232, 233, 241, 242 Matthew (Mattheus) (I), ban of Slavonia,
county 101, 103, 122, 147, 169, 174, 178, 187, voivode of Transylvania 86, 87,
237, 239, 240, 249, 253, 254 110–112, 114–119, 121, 128, 133, 134, 145, 170,
Cluj-Mănăștur, abbey 39, 41, 42, 52, 136, 245 190, 251, 252
castle 27, 41 Matthew (Mattheus) (II), palatine 1, 216,
Codlea (Feketeuholm), castle 19, 21, 81–83, 225, 226, 233
85, 86, 91, 162, 178, 234 Peter, nobleman 217
Cojocna, borrough 175, 225 Peter, palatine 81, 82, 84, 86–88, 96, 114,
Coloman, duke of Slavonia 12 121, 123, 124
Coloman I the Learned, king of Stephen (István, Stephanus), ban of
Hungary 165 Severin 56
Colțești, castle 182 Thomas, nobleman 83
Comana de Jos, castle 20, 43 Ugrinus, archbishop of Kalocsa 10
Comes Ultrasilvanus (see Aba, Ladislas) 15 Ugrinus, voivode of Transylvania, ban of
Conrad of Tălmaciu, count 183, 234 Severin 92, 114–116, 127, 155, 177, 185,
Conrad, son of Kemyn 83 198, 249, 252
Constantin Tich, czar of Târnovo 74, 105 Cseh, Jacob of Rediu, earl of Cluj 177, 253
Constantinople (Istanbul) 4, 11, 17, 212, 214 Cumania (Comania), bishopric, region 13,
Copand (Coppan), village 100 74, 165
Corrardus, earl of Borsod 69 Cuming, G. J., editor 50
Coșdu, chapter, deanship 192, 193 Cunța (Scekes), estate 197
Cosma, Ela, historian 199–201 Cuzdrioara, village 55
Costanza, princess 60
Costin, Miron, chronicler 199, 200 Dăbâca (Doboka, Dobokavarfalva),
Crainimăt (Querali), village 79 archdeanship 256
Crasna, archdeanship 256 castle, village 27, 37, 39–41, 45, 46, 92,
county 47, 55, 110, 144, 159, 184 131, 173, 224, 225, 245
Crăciunelul de Jos (Aruszegh), village 100 county 92, 101, 111, 117, 119, 126, 130, 178,
Cricău (Karako), village 98, 103, 142, 163, 179 234, 237, 239, 240, 253, 254
Crihalma, castle 22 Dacia, ancient kingdom 151
Crimea, peninsula 26 Daia (Danjan), village 177
Criș, chapter, deanship 192, 193 Danube, river 8–10, 18, 26, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35,
Cristiș (Kereztes, Kereztus, villa 38, 49, 53, 54, 60–62, 65, 74–76, 86, 89,
Cruciferorum), see Oprișani 105, 137, 138, 164, 202, 231, 242
Crișul Alb, river 9 Dalmatia, province 9, 53, 54, 56, 68, 98, 138,
Crișul Negru, river 9, 131 165
Crișul Repede, river 9, 230 Dâmbovița, river 200
Criț, village 103 Dan, knez 198
Croatia, banate, province 97, 98, 138, 165 Dan, Mihail P., historian 73
Cruceburg, castle (Teliu) 20 Daniel of Wrbou, count 104
Index 279
Daniil Romanovich, knez/king of Halych 13, Dopca 36

16, 51, 58, 59, 67, 70, 82, 90 Dorman, Bulgarian ruler 161
Debran, village 36 Drăganu, Nicolae, historian 130
Debreceni, Dózsa, voivode of Drăguț, Vasile, art historian 198
Transylvania 159, 232–235, 237, 252 Druget, Philippe, palatine 232, 233
Decei, Aurel, historian 6, 9, 26, 29, 43, 71, 149 Dubicha, county 65
Dedek, L., editor 52 Dumbrava, village 147
Dees, father of count Nicholas 177 Durut, Cuman tribe 13
Dej (Deesfalva, Deesvar), borrough 27, 46,
69, 75, 91, 99, 133, 134, 175, 223, 225, 230 Ebendorfer von Haselbach, Thomas,
Demetrius, son of Andrew 83 chronicler 204, 207
Densuș, village 198 Eberhard, parish priest of Teaca 256
Derencsényi, Peter, vicevoivode of Ebl of Brașov, nobleman 83
Transylvania 239, 252 Edroiu, Nicolae, historian 196
Ders, count of Târnava 253 Eger (Agria), bishopric, city 24, 171, 172, 204
Dešt-i Kipčak, steppe 9, 33 Egidius, earl of the Szekelys on Arieș 255
Deuș (Gyos), village 174, 252 Egidius, parish priest of Satu Mare 91
Deva (Dewa), castle 39, 42, 81, 82, 84, 96, Ekly, Andreas, nobleman 38
102, 174, 178, 179, 185–187, 197, 215, 231, Elefánti, Desiderius, castellan of
233, 238, 239 Bologa 238, 242
Dezmir, village 253 Elias, archdean of Hunedoara 256
Dezna, castle 205 Elijah, dean 219
Diaconescu, Marius, historian 136 Elisabeth, daughter of Ehelleus Ákos 183
Dincă, Ciprian A., historian 173, 180 Elisabeth, daughter of Stephen V 213
Dionysius, bishop of Győr 118 Elisabeth, queen of Bohemia 208
Dionysius, chaplain 223 Elisabeth, queen of Hungary, wife of Charles
Dionysius, earl of Bacs and Sibiu, Robert of Anjou 233
palatine 254 Elisabeth, queen of Hungary, wife of
Dionysius, nobleman of Sfărașu 101 Ladislas IV 106
Dionysius, palatine 152 Elisabeth, queen of Hungary, wife of
Dionysius (Tomaj), palatine 10, 24 Stephen V 78, 80, 81, 89, 91, 94, 112, 119,
Dniester, river 26 120, 124, 127, 168
Dobokai, family 102, 188, 237 Elisabeth of Hungary, Saint 65
Mykud (I), count 72, 83 Emerich, bishop of Oradea 172, 217
Nicholas, count, son of ban Mykud 224, Emerich, count 83
250 Emerich, king of Hungary 145
Peter, son of ban Mykud 250 Engel Pál, historian 43, 55, 56, 106, 135, 139,
Dogaru, Mircea, historian 26 140, 143, 165, 167, 178, 181, 184, 185, 194,
Dominic, archdean of Dăbâca 256 203–206, 226, 229, 230, 232–234,
Dominic, brother of magister Pous 84 236–239
Dominic, castellan of Șoimuș 178 Engelbert of Admont, abbot 143
Dominic, father of vicevoivode Peter 128, 252 Enugd (Aiudu de Sus), village 197
Dominic, son of Andrew 84 Ependorph, village 244
Dominik, son of Andronikos 83 Epternach (Austria) 26
Dominic, son of Benchench 103 Esztergom, archbishopric 52, 59, 62, 63, 66,
Dominic of Guzmán, saint 11, 12 69, 70, 76, 79, 89, 94, 95, 117–122, 127,
Dominic of Iara, earl of Turda 178, 253 132, 149, 154, 168, 172, 204–206, 209, 217,
Domnești (Bylok) 122 223, 224
280 Index
Europe 4, 7, 9, 12, 14, 21, 25, 30, 31, 50, 51, 58, Gallus, bishop of Transylvania 35, 40, 52, 57,
60, 152, 208, 212, 215, 228 255
Central 25, 31, 32, 70, 77, 105, 153 Gâmbaș (Gumbas) 158, 249
Southeastern 4, 17, 174, 202, 203, 212 Gârbova 44, 104
Western 153, 244 Gecske, county 216
Eastern 11, 13, 30–32, 59, 73, 104, 164, 213, Geled, monastery 29
214 Gentile de Sancto Martino ai Monti,
cardinal 184, 193, 210, 211, 214–221, 223,
Făgăraș, castle, estate 17, 19, 22, 28, 155, 177, 224
197, 198, 200, 201 Geoagiul de Sus (Gyogh, Gyogh Superior,
region 17, 18, 22, 28, 155, 177, 197, 198, 200, today Stremț) 71, 83, 102, 104, 112, 126,
201 142, 147, 170, 187, 227, 252
Fărău (Forro) 182, 183 Georgia, kingdom 15
Feirighhaz (Albești) 236 Gerard of Mutina, papal superintendent 164
Felcheriu 55 Geregye, kindred 47, 66, 89, 110, 111, 123, 125,
Feldioara, castle 19–21 131
Fenes 102 Akon, nobleman 128, 132
Feneș 197 Gregen, nobleman 125
Fild 55 Nicholas, voivode of Transylvania 108,
Filipișul Mic, village 154 110–112, 115, 122, 125–127, 130, 251
Finiș, castle 131, 157 Paul, earl of Solnoc, judge of royal
Florentinus, provost of Sibiu 257 court 9, 35, 37, 38, 42, 46, 47, 53–58,
Florești, castle 171 61, 66, 69, 110, 131, 254
Fogacsi, Mark, vicecastellan of Unguraș 239 Gerend, see Luncani
Fonói, John, earl of Cluj and Bistrița 253 Gerendi, noble family 187, 188
Forrói, Aladár, nobleman 217 Jacob, nobleman 102
Föveny, battle, congregation 113, 114, 141, 146 Nicholas, earl of Turda and Solnoc
France, kingdom 212, 214 (Inner) 178, 237, 253
Franciscus Pragensis, canon 207 Germany 140, 152, 207, 210, 214
Franco, captain 75 Geubul, nobleman 244
Frata, village 35 Gheorghi I Terter, czar of Bulgaria 202
Frederick II, emperor 50, 60 Gilău (Gylo) 35, 122, 157
Frederick the Fair, duke of Austria 210, 212 Giselbert, dean of Sibiu 257
Frederick of Babenberg, duke of Austria 10, Glogoveț, castle 178
14 Gnyezno, duchy 78
Fügedi, Erik, historian 42, 46, 59, 75, 80, 81, Gogan Varolea, castle 178
143, 145 Golden Horde 31, 51, 58, 67, 70, 74, 75, 87
Fundătura (Geneu), village 101, 103 Gombos, Franciscus Albinus, historian 10,
Fylek (Filakovo, Fülek), castle 75, 205 15, 22, 33, 34, 51, 63, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80,
Fylesd, village 197 135, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 212
Fyless, forest 117 Gömör, county 86, 92, 238, 239
Fyoch, nobleman 103 Gran, river 66
Fyzer (Füzer), castle 81 Grebenișu de Câmpie (Gerebenes),
village 183
Gaan (Gyan), son of Alard 121, 125, 126, 161, Greece 119
188, 190 Gregory, archdean of Solnoc 256
Gaal de Kachuz, nobleman 84 Gregory, earl of Zips 122
Gabriel, magister 83 Gregory, bishop of Bosnia 217
Galicia 15, 165, see Halych Gregory, provost 255
Index 281
Gregory IX, pope 12, 15, 19, 189 Heitel, Radu, historian 42, 43, 104
Gregory of Geoagiu, judge of the nobles 187 Helemban, Szekely nobleman 183
Gregory of Palatca, nobleman 240 Hench of Rodna, count 126
Gregory of Sâncraiu, nobleman 249 Henning of Petrești, count 236
Grousset, René, historian 7, 9, 11, 67, 70 Henry VII of Luxemburg, emperor 215
Gurasada, village 197 Henry II, duke of Silesia 7, 8, 10
Gurbeu, village 102 Herbord, son of Osl, count 65
Gutkeled, kindred 47, 55, 86, 89, 97, 98, 102, Herbord, vicevoivode of Transylvania 62,
103, 111–114, 120, 124–126 251
Alexander, earl of Szabolcs 83, 85, 88, 92 Herina (Herena), village 35, 122
Cosma, count 83 Hermann, kindred 238
Cosma, son of count Cosma 83 Emerich 238
Durugh, nobleman 83, 85, 88, 92, 125 Ladislas (Lack), earl of the Szekelys, of
Stephen (I), palatine 63, 65, 66, 97 Bistrița and Mediaș 238, 242, 254, 255
Stephen (II), ban, judge of royal Hermann of Fatha, count 103
court 124, 127, 128 Hermann von Salza, Teutonic Grand
Joachim, ban of Slavonia 97, 98, 102, 107, Master 12, 21
110, 124 Herrandus, earl of Trenčin 76
Lothard, ban 231, 232 Herric Magnus, graf 236
Nicholas, voivode 88, 97, 251 Heves-Újvár, county 239
Nicholas, judge of royal court 98 Hód, Lake 133, 138, 150
Paul, palatine 43, 66, 97 Hoghiz, village 36
Peter, son of Durugh 125 Holban, Maria, historian 27, 61, 166, 198, 199,
Güyük, Mongol Great Khan 9, 50, 58–61 233
Gwd, count 83, 84, 88 Holy Land 50, 78
Gyegus, son of Nicholas 251 Holy See 51, 79, 120, 140, 191, 218, 235
Gylnuchbana (Gelnica) 123, 160 Hóman Bálint, historian 8, 149, 203
Győr, bishopric, town 38, 57, 79, 118, 181, 204, Honorius III, pope 12, 52, 189
217 Honorius IV, pope 140
Györffy, György, historian 55, 102, 123, 128, Hont, archdeanship 76
131, 132, 185, 229 Hontpázmány, kindred 206, 239
Gyula, duke of Transylvania 165, 167, 246 John, archbishop of Kalocsa 204
Horedt, Kurt, historian 19, 22, 23
Habsburg, House of 207, 212 Horom, castle 29, 185
Hădăreni (Hodryv), village 101 Hortobagy (Hurtubag), village 209, 246
Hagmas, village 177 Hostislai, see Rostislav Mihailovich
Haieu, village 55 Hrushevsky, Michael, historian 51
Halasu, A., historian 39, 42 Hunedoara, archdeanship 102, 256
Hălchiu (Heldenburg), castle 178, 242 castle 29, 39, 40, 42, 57, 174, 178
Halecki, Oskar, historian 106, 203 county 102, 178, 185, 239, 253
Halych, kingdom 13, 25, 26, 33, 51, 54, 58, 59,
67, 70, 82, 90, 93, 199, 201, 231 Iakov Sventislav, czar of Bulgaria (Vidin) 75,
Hamadan (Iran), town 6 78, 81, 96, 104, 105
Hașag (Hassach), village 100 Iambor, Petru, historian 29, 39–42, 135–137
Hasdeu, Bogdan Petriceicu, polyhistor 149 Iara, village 147, 178, 187, 225, 249, 253
Hațeg (Hatzok), castle, estate 97, 98, 102, Ighiu (Craphundorph), village 98, 103, 163
124, 150, 174, 178, 196–198, 202, 229, 238, Igmánd of Pâncota, Laurent, voivode 205,
253 206
Heder, kindred 77, 108, 111, 134, 138, 140, 152 Igriș, monastery 29, 141
282 Index
Igruchteluk, village 101 John, judex curiae 179

Ilia, village 197 John, magister, son of Benedict 232
Ilidia (Yliad), castle 197 John, provost of Arad 76
Ilva, river 26 John, provost of Sibiu 141, 186, 257
India, country 15 John, provost of Székesfehérvár 221
Innocent III, pope 52, 189 John, son of count Gwd 83, 84
Innocent IV, pope 38, 50–52, 58–61 John, son of Geubul of Bistrița 244
Inouch, father of Bozouch 103 John, son of Mykula 249
Ionescu, Grigore, art historian 19 John XXI, pope 168
Iorga, Nicolae, historian 130, 166, 186, 201 John XXII, pope 236
Ip, village 103 John of Deuș, vicevoivode of
Ipatiev, Chronicle 135, 149 Transylvania 186, 252
Ipoch, father of Andrew 187 John of Lomb, nobleman 179
Isabella of Anjou, queen of Hungary 106, John of Moruț, earl of Dăbâca 237
140 John Nobilis, archdean of Alba and
Isaszeg, battle 78, 97, 89, 94, 97 Cluj 220, 256
Iskar, river 74 John the Baptist, Saint 223
Iwanka (Janka) of Palatca, nobleman 240, Jonhos, Andreas, castellan of Piatra
241 Craivii 239
Iwankateleke, village 100 Jucu (Suk) 187, 233, 237, 252, 253
Izvoru Crișului (Keresfev), village 117, 122 Julian, dominican friar 14
Juvaini (Ala ad-Din Ata-Malik), historian 6,
Jacob, father of judge Peter 255 14
Jacob, serf of Bihor castle 83
Jacob, serf of Vasvár castle 83 Kachuz (Kačanov), village 83
Jacob, son of Apa 251 Kacsics, kindred 238
Jacob, son of count Emerich 83 Michael, earl of Szekelys, Bistrița,
Jadani, village 55 Mediaș 238
Jakó, Zsigmond, historian 10, 15, 17, 26, 28, Simon, earl of Szekelys 235, 238, 251, 254,
36, 40, 45, 55, 56, 58, 66, 71, 72, 74, 78–81, 255
83–86, 88, 96, 97, 100–103, 112, 115–119, Kadan, Mongol commander 6–10, 24–27,
121–124, 126, 127, 132–134, 139–142, 145, 29, 33, 53, 54, 135
147, 148, 154–158, 160–163, 167–171, 173, Kaidu, Mongol commander 8, 10
174, 177, 178, 182, 183, 186–188, 190–192, Kalka, battle 11–14
195–197, 230, 250 Kállay, Paul, nobleman 151
Jelna (Zolosim), village 79 Kállay, Peter, nobleman 151
Jerusalem 50 Kállay, Stephen, nobleman 151
Jimbor, village 234 Kalnik, county 97
Jiu, river 18 Kalocsa, archbishopric 10, 76, 94, 95, 118,
Joanche, archdean of Orăștie 79 149, 154, 172, 180, 204–206, 208, 209, 217,
Jochi, Mongol commander 7 222, 224
Johannes Latinus, royal servant 17, 145 Kán, kindred 56, 102, 103, 112, 124, 166–169,
John, archbishop of Kalocsa 154, 172 177, 184, 187, 206
John, archdean of Alba 235 Gyula (I), ban, voivode of
John, archdean of Crasna 256 Transylvania 69, 96, 166, 167
John, archdean of Ozd 256 Gyula (II), son of Gyula (I) 96, 99
John, archdean of Târnava, provost of Gyula (III), son of Ladislas (I), brother of
Székesfehérvár 180, 181, 218, 257 Ladislas (II) 77, 81, 96, 99, 160, 167, 168
John, bishop of Nitra 204 Jula, son of Ladislas (II) 169
Index 283
Ladislas (I), ban of Slavonia 63, 96, 167 Mykud (II), ban of Severin, earl of
Ladislas (II), voivode of Transylvania Dăbâca 83, 86, 87, 88, 92, 102, 115–117,
(as Ladislas I) 77, 80, 96, 111, 116, 160, 119, 131, 136, 142, 173, 178, 224, 250, 253
167, 169, 251, 252, 254 Komjathy, Anthony T., historian 8
Ladislas (III), voivode of Transylvania Kőrös, county 185
(as Ladislas II) 1, 2, 57, 166, 168–171, Košcev, V. K., historian 7
173–186, 188, 189, 193–195, 197–199, Kőszegi, kindred 111–114, 120, 122, 123, 125, 206
201–203, 205, 206, 208–217, 219–229, Henrik, ban 217
234, 235, 237, 244, 246, 250, 252, 254, Henrik (I), palatine 1, 77, 87, 88, 105, 108,
255 111, 113
Ladislas (IV), voivode of Transylvania Henrik (II), palatine 134, 170, 181, 207,
(as Ladislas III) 229, 252 216
Ladislas (V), bishop 229, 255 Ivan, ban of Slavonia 134
Nicholas (I), provost of Alba Iulia, John, son of Henrik 88
archbishop of Esztergom 96, 119, 120, John, voivode of Transylvania 111, 251
122, 127, 168, 190, 255 Nicholas, bishop of Győr 181, 217
sons of Ladislas (III), see also Ladislas (IV) Nicholas, palatine 216
and Ladislas (V) 229, 231, 233 Peter, bishop of Veszprém 120, 121, 168
Kany, kindred 123 Kosztolnyik, Z. J., historian 10, 12, 42, 51, 53,
Thoma, royal servant 125 55, 59, 60, 63, 65, 78, 80, 92, 94, 106, 108,
Karácsonyi, János, historian 93, 95, 115, 130, 120, 121, 134, 140, 152, 167
131, 169 Krakow 82, 105
Karbić, Damir, historian 46 Kristó, Gyula, historian 63, 65, 167, 169, 179,
Kata, kindred 45, 103, 123 184, 206, 207, 217, 224, 230
Abraham, nobleman 103, 117, 119 Kroissenbrunn, battle 71–73
Ponyth, nobleman 103, 117 Kuban, river 9
Kata, wife of Egidius Monoszló 115 Kujawia, duchy 78
Kemāl Pasha-Zāde, chronicler 70–71 Kulcsó (Kulchou), banate 128
Keminus, son of Mykula 249 Kumelburch, placename 28
Kemyn, father of palatine Lawrence 71, 81, Kunigunda, duchess of Krakow 78, 105
83, 84, 92, 106 Kunigunda, queen of Bohemia 73
Kenezmonostor, monastery 29 Kunigunda of Brandenburg 79
Kerekyghaz, village 101 Kurtwelesteleke, village 177
Keve (Kewe), archdeanship 29, 140, 141, Küsternig, A., historian 125
castle 179 Kuthen, Cuman khan 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 31
Keyran, Cuman khan 93 Kylianus, archdean of Telegd 257
Kezdi, archdeanship 256
Szekely seat 103 L., vicevoivode of Transylvania 98, 251
Kiev, city 9, 16, 32, 33, 51, 70 Lackfi, noble family 138
Klemencia of Habsburg, wife of Charles Ladislas, archdean of Hont 76
Martell 152 Ladislas, bishop of Srim 217
Klissa, town 56 Ladislas, comes Ultrasilvanus 15
Knauz, Ferdinandus, historian 52, 137 Ladislas, father of Paul 178
Kniezsa, I., historian 130 Ladislas I the Saint, king of Hungary 150
Kolondus, father of Egidius 255 Ladislas IV the Cuman, king of Hungary 81,
Kökényes-Radnót, kindred 40, 103, 131, 187 82, 87, 102, 106–108, 110, 115, 123–125, 128,
see also Dobokai family 129, 131–146, 148–156, 162, 163, 169, 173,
Emerich 83, 86, 102, 173 182, 186, 190, 191, 195–199, 201, 246
Mykud (I) 83, 87, 88, 92, 102, 115, 116 Ladislas of Tytel, royal vice-chancellor 172
284 Index
Laiou, Angeliki E., historian 212, 213 Luncani (Gerend), village 45, 103, 142, 178,
Lăpuș (terra Lapus), estate 154, 155, 177 187
Lastruch, castle 111 Lupaș, Ioan, historian 130, 157, 167, 176
László, Péter, editor 158, 164 Lvov, town 34
Latin Empire 4, 11, 17, 50, 212, 214 Lyon, Council of 49–51, 189
Laurencio barbato 98
Lawrence, archdean of Ozd 256 Măceu (Machou), village 102
Lawrence, brother of Herbord 62 Mačva, banate 78, 87, 232, 233
Lawrence, father of count Michael 147, 249 Makk, Ferenc, historian 65, 159
Lawrence, father of Leukus Pekri 206 Makkai, László, historian 30, 130, 131, 164
Lawrence, son of Kemyn, palatine 71, 81–85, Mályusz, Elemér, historian 145, 164, 237
106 Mănărade (Munora), village 36, 101
Lawrence of Câmpulung (Laurencius de Mansi, G. D., historian 50
Longo Campo), count 203 Maramureș, county, terra 86, 91, 150, 171, 172,
Lăzărescu, E., historian 201 201
Legii (Legyun), village 240 Marcell, son of Jacob 83, 88
Legnica, battle 7, 8, 10 Marchfeld, battle 125, 138, 143
Leporum, island 56 Marcu, M., archaeologist 21
Leszek the Black, prince of Kujawia 78, 82 Margaret of Hungary, Saint 118
Lev Danilovich, knez of Halych 60 Mark, father of Roland 122
Lewe, serf of Alba castle 99 Martin IV, pope 140
Lipova, castle 229 Martin, bishop of Eger 217
Lita, castle 178, 239 Martin, son of Blawch 243
Lithuania, country 70, 135 Martin, Saint 103, 215
Litovoi, voivode 78, 81, 97, 127 Mary, queen of Naples 106, 152
Lodomeria, province 165 Mary Laskaris, queen of Hungary 51, 63, 74,
Lodomerius, bishop of Oradea, archbishop of 77, 79, 89, 106
Esztergom 95, 118, 125, 127, 131, 132, 134, Mátéházi, Martinus, castellan of Deva, earl of
140–142, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 161, 191, Hunedoara 238, 239, 253
196 Maurice, parrish priest of Cricău 179
Lomb, village 45, 179 Mediaș (Mediesy), town, county, district 101,
Lona, valley 130 177, 190–192, 194, 230, 235, 238, 242, 243,
Longo Campo see Câmpulung 254
Losonci, kindred 177 Meggyes, nobleman 103
Banffy, Dionysius 154, 155, 177 Mehadia, castle, estate 97, 98, 124, 231, 233
Stephen, earl of Szekelys 230, 233, 255 Mejhedey, nobleman of Sumurduc 101
Thomas, earl of Szekelys 230, 255 Melloni, Alberto, historian 50
Lotru, castle 23 Menk, Cuman leader 86
Louis IX the Saint, king of France 213 Menteu, castle 178
Louis the Great, of Anjou, king of Hungary Menumorout, duke of Bihor 144, 153
and Poland 105, 195, 231 Mera (Slovakia), village 128, 252
Lublin, town 10, 51, 203 Meșcreac (Germand), village 100
Lucas, Saint 63 Meseș, Mountains 99, 144, 146, 157
Luccari, chronicler 199 Micăsasa (Mykazaza), village 101
Lujerdiu (Lusad), village 101 Michael, archdean of Ozd 121, 256
Lukács, Antal, historian 17, 18, 22, 28, 43, Michael, brother of Bela of Mačva 78
130–132, 199 Michael, son of Lawrence 147, 158
Luna de Jos (Lona), village 101 Michael Sisman, czar of Bulgaria 231
Index 285
Michael Vsevolodovich, great knez of Mykud, nobleman of Kachuz 83

Kiev 16, 51 Mykula, kindred 123, 147
Micloșoara, village 22 father of Keminus and John 147, 249
Miechovius, Matthias, chronicler 135 Myle, preceptor 250
Miercurea, seat 29, 36
Mike, castellan of Unguraș 178 Nägler, Thomas, historian 19, 21, 23, 29, 36,
Mintiu Gherlii (villa Nemty), village 101 43, 163, 192, 236
Mirăslău (Meruslo), village 103, 154, 249 Naneș, priest 198
Mišelav, voivode 6, 27 Naples (Napoli), kingdom 106, 139
Mishin, D., historian 6 Necskei, Alexander, nobleman 206
Miskolc, kindred 102 Necskei, Demetrius, nobleman 166
Ponyth, ban of Severin, earl of Negru Vodă, voivode, founder of
Dăbâca 74, 82, 85, 87, 88, 92, 105, 253 Wallachia 199–201, see also Radu Negru
Mócsy, A., historian 131 Nicephor Gregoras 27
Moga, Ioan, historian 157, 176 Nicholas, archdean of Kezdi 256
Mohi, battle 8, 10, 24, 29, 32, 54 Nicholas, archdean of Solnoc 256
Moisescu, Cristian, art historian 198 Nicholas, archdean of Telegd 220, 257
Mokou, father of count Nicholas 249 Nicholas, archdean of Turda 257
Moldova, province 22, 150, 199, 201 Nicholas, bishop of Bosnia 204
Molnár, Péter, historian 143 Nicholas, canon 217
Mongol Empire 6, 31, 50, 51, 58, 104, 203 Nicholas, count of Nyr 126
Möngke, Mongol Great Khan 6, 9 Nicholas, count, son of Dees 177
Monoszló, kindred 89, 93, 115, 116, 204, 205 Nicholas, earl of Sibiu, magister
Egidius, royal treasurer, voivode of agasonum 254
Transylvania 87, 88, 92–95, 108, Nicholas, father of Gyegus 251
111–115, 205, 251 Nicholas, judge of Hațeg 253
Gregory (II), earl of Caraș 93, 94 Nicholas, judge of Sibiu 216
Gregory (III), royal treasurer 94, 108 Nicholas, provost of Sibiu 24, 257
Peter (I), bishop of Transylvania 94, 96, Nicholas, son of Blawch 243
102, 108, 110, 111, 116, 117, 121, 122, 141, Nicholas, son of Laurent Igmand 205
170–176, 180, 181, 183, 190–192, 194, Nicholas, son of Conrad of Tălmaciu 183, 234
203–206, 208, 249, 255 Nicholas, son of Symon, earl of Brașov 253
Peter (II), voivode of Transylvania 205, Nicholas, son of Tywan of Vărșand 47
252 Nicholas, son of Chyl of Câlnic 111
Thomas, ban 93 Nicholas III, pope 118, 168
Moravia, province 77, 123, 125 Nicholas IV, pope 152
Mórichida, village 53 Nicholas of Brethonia 198
Mórici, John, earl of Dăbâca 253 Nicholas of Dezmir, judge of nobles 253
Moruț, village 237 Nicholas of Dubicha, count 158, 249
Moson, castle 80 Nicolai, indagines 22
Moyus, judge of royal court 116 Nicolai, predium 101
Munteanu Beșliu, Petru, arheolog 23 Niraj, village 176, 187, 250
Mureni, village 103 Nitra, castle, town 53, 80, 147, 249
Mureș, county 183 county 81, 238, 253
river 9, 29, 57, 80, 101, 102, 130, 144, 150, bishopric 204, 217
157, 171, 174, 182, 184, 205, 229, 240 Nochrich, chapter 36, 193
Murun, nobleman of Iara 147, 249 Nogai, Mongol khan 86, 105, 134, 135, 137,
Mykola, son of Philip 103 138, 140, 202, 203
286 Index
Nógrád, county 90, 239 Pálóczi-Horváth, András, historian 16, 58,

Nușfalău, village 55 65, 125
Nussbächer, Gernot, historian 19–21 Palota, castle 123, 125
Nyakas, John, castellan of Glogoveț 178 Panad, village 184
Nyr, territory 123, 125, 126, 158, 160 Panaitescu, Petre P., historian 150, 199, 200
Pâncota, castle 205
Ocani, village 55 Pâncota (Pankotai), noble family 205
Ocna Dejului, village, salt mine 55, 136, 141 Pannonia 29, 30, 35
Ocna Sibiului, estate 121, 188 Papacostea, Șerban, historian 6, 11, 13, 18, 30,
Ocnele Turzii, salt mine 136 49–51, 59, 67, 68, 70, 105, 135–137, 148,
Odorhei, castle 22 150, 151, 156, 194, 202
Odverem (Zwkmand), village 100 Parabuch, count 93
Ögödei, Mongol Great Khan 6, 8, 30 Pascu, Ștefan, historian 27, 39, 41, 122, 157,
Ohtum, duke 144 163, 176, 192
Oituz, pass 27 Patak, castle 81, 90, 91, 129, 132
Olt, river 22, 28, 200 Pataki, József, historian 131, 166, 180, 186, 250
Omodeus, archbishop of Győr 79 Paul, archdean of Turda 147, 257
Onciul, Dimitrie, historian 6 Paul, deputy archdean 179
Oprișani (Cristiș, Kereztes, Kereztus, villa Paul, earl of Rodna and Bistrița 111, 254
Cruciferorum), village 147, 186, 250, 251 Paul, notary of the vicevoivode 183
195, 249 Paul, provost of Zips 210
Oradea, town, bishopric 10, 24, 27, 29, 38, 75, Paul, royal servant 183
86, 90, 95, 99, 118, 125, 127, 131, 132, 134, Paul, son of Ladislas, castellan of Deva 178
154, 172, 204, 209, 217, 241 Paul of Alep, author 199
Orăștie, archdeanship 29, 36, 79, 193 Paul of Kachuz, nobleman 83
Ordu, Mongol commander 7, 8, 25, 32 Pătruț, I., philologist 143
Orlat, castle 23, 43 Peć, kindred
Orrothlonheda, village 101 Apor (Opour), voivode of
Ortvay, Tivadar, editor 93 Transylvania 133, 134, 206, 252
Orvieto, town 79 Dionysius, ban of Slavonia 113, 124
Osl, nobleman 65 Gregory, nobleman 133
Ostia, town 204 Pecican, Ovidiu, historian 149, 150
Otto III of Brabdenburg, margrave 79 Pécs, bishopric 217
Otto of Wittelsbach, duke of Bavaria, king of Pekri, noble family 206
Hungary 180–182, 194, 206–212, 214, 222, Leukus, nobleman 206
228, 246 Pelliot, Paul, historian 50
Ottokar II Přemysl, king of Bohemia 71, 73, Penelea, Georgeta, historian 166
76, 77, 79, 80, 105, 106, 123–125, 143, 196 Perényi, Peter, earl of Târnava 239
Ottokar of Styria (von Steier), Perșani, Mountains 28, 36
chronicler 198, 201, 202, 207, 208 Persia, kingdom 6
Oulaqtchi, khan of Golden Horde 67, 70 Pest, town 10, 29, 59, 136, 156, 169, 209,
Ozd, archdeanship 121, 122, 221, 256 214–216, 219
Peșteana, village 198
Pâclișanu, Z., historian 202 Petenye, son of Peter 231, 232
Pâglișa (Puklustheluky), village 131 Peter, archdean of Cluj 256
Paisie Ligaridis, chronicler 199, 201 Peter, archdean of Halych 51
Palatca, village 240, 241 Peter, archdean of Solnoc 256
Pall, Francisc, historian 180 Peter, archdean of Spalato 217
Index 287
Peter, augustinian prior 220 Popescu, Radu, chronicler 200

Peter, bishop of Pécs 217 Pór, Antal, historian 166
Peter, serf of Bihor castle 83, 88 Poroszló, village 76
Peter, son of Barthales 239 Porumb, Marius, art historian 198
Peter, son of Clement, nobleman 147, 158, Pottenburg, castle 79
249 Potthast, Augustus, editor 12, 58
Peter, son of Dominic, voivode of Pouka, bishop of Syrmium 118
Transylvania 128, 252 Pous, magister 84, 88
Peter, son of Jacob, judge of the Szekelys on Pousa, voivode of Transylvania 15, 21, 24, 28,
Arieș 255 251
Peter, son of Murun of Iara 147, 249 Prejmer (Tartilleu, Tartilleri), castle 20, 21
Peter, son of Petenye 231, 232 Přemysl, dinasty 205
Peter, son of Peter the Szekely 103 Prester John 50
Peter, castellan of Cetatea de Baltă 178 Preussel, Henrik, captain 75, 87, 88
Peter, count of Gömör 86 Prox, A., historian 19
Peter of Gerend, nobleman 86, 88, 142 Prussia, margraviate 59, 68, 70
Peter of Nitra, earl of Cluj 147, 158, 249, 253 Purcell, Maureen, historian 50
Peter of Paris, canon 216, 217 Pozsegai, Stephen, nobleman 217
Peter of Sáros, nobleman 136
Peter the Szekely, count 103 Rabbits Island (Holy Virgin, St. Margaret,
Pețelca (Polcholca), village 100 Buda) 82, 93, 98, 118, 133, 217
Pethew, vicecastellan of Ciceu 239 Racha, pleban 121
Petrești, village 236 Rachael, earl of Târnava 253
Philip, archbishop of Esztergom 76, 79, 89 Racoșu de Jos (Mihályvára), castle 20
Philip, bishop of Vác 76 Racoșu de Sus, village 36
Philip, earl of Dăbâca 253 Rád, Benedict, bishop of Veszprém 207, 217
Philip, father of Mykola 103 Rădești (Kend), village 100
Philip IV the Fair, king of France 214, 215 Radu Negru, voivode, founder of
Philip of Fermo, cardinal 127, 128, 132 Wallachia 200
Piatra Craivii, castle 178, 238, 239 Rady, Martyn, historian 7, 17, 158, 159, 164, 245
Piatra Secuiului, castle 182 Rákos, village 124, 140, 143, 211
Piatra Șoimului (Solyomkő), castle 42, 55, Rákos, I., historian 66
120, 123, 131, 238 Râpeanu, Valeriu, historian 150, 199
Pilis, county 120, 238 Rashid od-Din, chronicler 6, 7, 10, 27, 34
Pintic, village 45 Rășinari, castle 43
Plano Carpini, Giovanni, franciscan friar 30, Râșnov, castle 20
32, 50, 51, 58, 59 Rátót, kindred 112, 134, 206
Pleven, castle 74, 105 Dominic, nobleman 217, 223
Pogány, Stephen, castellan of Ciceu, Unguraș Gyula, voivode of Transylvania 251
and Cetatea de Baltă 239 Roland, palatin 113
Pok, kindred Raynaldus, bishop of Transylvania 24
Nicholas Meggyesi, voivode of Rediu, village 177
Transylvania 113, 124, 171, 230 Regnum Erdewel 165, 246
Poland, country 7–9, 15, 25, 29, 34, 49–51, 59, Regnum Transilvanum (Transilvaniae,
70, 86, 164, 211 Transsilvaniensis) 1, 108, 147, 153, 157–159,
Pop, Ioan-Aurel, historian 149, 165, 194, 196 162, 163, 165, 170, 173, 195, 202, 228, 235,
Popa, Radu, historian 22, 129, 131, 132, 198, 201 245, 247, 249
Popa-Lisseanu, G., historian 110, 164, 213 Regulus, archdean of Solnoc 256
288 Index
Renold, clerk 255 Sălacea (Zoloch), village 69, 75, 90, 91, 159

Reteag (Retheg), estate 134 Sălăgean, Tudor, historian 52, 189, 202
Reynaldus, dean of Sibiu 257 Salvus, archbishop of Turda 220, 257
Riazan, town 9 Sâmbăta, estate 155, 198
Ricardus, dominican friar 14 Samson of Gerend (Luncani),
Richard, Jean, historian 49 nobleman 102, 142
Rimai, Arnold, castellan of Piatra Sâncel (Zonchel), village 35, 62, 103
Craivii 238 Sâncraiu (Sancto Rege), village 122, 187
Rimai, Nicholas, castellan of Piatra Craivii Sând (Zinda), village 225
and Lita, earl of Cluj 238, 239, 253 Sângătin (Enyed), village 100
Rimetea Trascăului, village 136 Sânmiclăuș (Scenthmyklous), village 40, 101,
Robert, archbishop of Esztergom 63 136, 224
Rodna, town, county 8, 24, 26, 27, 29, 36, 37, Sânnicolau de Beiuș, village 130, 131
79, 111, 126, 175, 223, 225, 254 Sânpetru, village 20, 21
Rogerius, canon, writer 7, 24–26, 33, 35, 36, Sântejude, village 242
38, 43 Sântimbru (Gywmurd), village 100, 240
Rogers, Greg S., historian 30, 31 Santus, archdean of Crasna 256
Rohonczamonostor, monastery 29 Sărand, village 55
Roland, son of Mark, earl of Zips and Sărata (Sofalua), village 57, 126
Vasvár 122, 123 Sărățel (Zereth), village 57, 126
Roma, city 59, 67, 152 Saray (on Volga), town 51, 70
Roman Msistlavich, knez of Halych 51 Sáros, county 90, 91, 129, 136
Românași (Egrug), village 174, 186, 250 Sartaq, khan of the Golden Horde 67
Romos (Rams), village 163 Săsarm (Zeyzorma), village 58
Rostislav Mihailovich, czar of Bulgaria (Vidin) Saschiz, chapter, deanship 192, 193
51, 63, 73, 75, 81, 87, 93 Săsciori, castle 43
Rotho, count 43 Sătmar, county 36, 68, 75, 86, 91, 119, 144, 151,
Rozgony, battle 226 159, 184, 239
Rucăr, castle 20 Satu Mare, town 91, 225
Rudolf I of Habsburg, king of the Sava, Saint 150
Romans 124, 140, 152 Sceuke, Nicholas, nobleman 86
Rudolf II of Habsburg, duke of Austria 208 Schobolotelky, village 101
Rudolf III of Habsburg, duke of Austria 205 Schullerus, Joachim, historian 22
Rufus, John, nobleman 179 Schütz, Ödön, historian 30
Runciman, Steven, historian 106 Sebastian, earl of Cluj 253
Rupea (Cohalm), castle, village 28, 178, 239 Sebeș (Sebus), deanship 192, 193
Russia, country 25, 30, 32, 50, 58, 59, 67, 135, village 29, 52
150 seat 36, 192
Rusu, Adrian Andrei, historian 22, 23, 25, 37, Secașelor, valley 192
40, 97, 104, 171, 178, 229, 232, 237 Seczechov, village 51
Rusu, Mircea, historian 22, 41 Seem, earl of Szekelys on Arieș 178, 195, 255
Ruși (Nogrech), village 36, 100 Seneslav, voivode 6
Senga, Toru, historian 60
Săcădate, castle 22 Serbia, kingdom 9, 33, 185, 202, 203, 211–215,
Sacerdoțeanu, Aurelian, historian 6–8, 10, 222, 227, 230–233, 238
27, 28, 30, 33 Severin, banate 18, 27, 29, 56, 60, 61, 70, 71,
Šaiban, Mongol commander 10 75, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 92, 102, 111, 114–116,
Salimbene, chronicler 137 118, 119, 126, 127, 202, 253
Index 289
Sfărașu (Fornos), village 101 Spinei, Victor, historian 6–16, 22, 26, 27, 31,
Sibiel, castle 43, 234 32, 34, 50, 51, 135, 137, 166, 201, 203
Sibiu (Cibinium), county 17, 18, 23, 92, 94, Sreza-Cârțișoara, village 28
111, 117, 119, 121, 126, 148, 149, 167, 168, 179, Srim, bishopric 217
186, 191, 193, 194, 209, 223, 225, 253, 254 St. Benedict, monastery 66, 97
town 10, 23, 28, 29, 37, 39, 40, 142, 190, St. Hypolitus, monastery 162
192 Stana, village 147
provostship 24, 52, 76, 94, 121, 141, 186, Stanislav, knez 198
189, 191–193, 216, 250, 257 Stanislaw, Saint 105, 106
province 18, 36, 96, 118, 121, 122, 125, 126, Stephantelke, village 101
141, 189, 190, 193, 194, 208, 215, 230, 235, Stephen, archbishop of Kalocsa 118, 204
240, 241 Stephen, archdean of Alba 256
Sic 175, 223, 225 Stephen, castellan of Piatra Craivii 178
Sicilia, island 106 Stephen, monk of Tismana 200
Sifrid, prior 216 Stephen, notary 180
Sighișoara, seat 192, 236 Stephen, priest 79
Silesia, province 7, 8 Stephen, provost of Alba Iulia 255
Silva Blacorum et Bissenorum 18 Stephen, son of Benchench 103
Simeon Dascălul, chronicler 149 Stephen, son of count Gwd 83, 84, 88
Simon, vicevoivode of Transylvania 252 Stephen, son of David, clerk 183
Simonis of Keza, chronicler 8, 110, 125, 143 Stephen, son of Helemban 183
Sinor, Denis, historian 7, 30 Stephen, son of king Andrew II 152
Siret (Serech), river 26 Stephen, son of Tekus of Mera, voivode of
Sismanid, dinasty 202 Transylvania 128, 252
Slavonia, province 12, 59, 63, 65, 68, 76, 77, Stephen I, St., king of Hungary 63, 165, 167,
83, 97, 98, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 123, 133, 207, 215, 223
134, 138, 140, 144, 163–165, 167, 172, 176, Stephen V, duke of Transylvania, king of
185, 187, 204, 206 Hungary 1, 36, 37, 39, 46, 63, 65, 66, 68,
Slovakia, country 75, 81 69, 71–108, 110, 112, 113, 116–119, 122, 131,
Smaragdus, archbishop of Kalocsa 76, 239 133, 142, 144, 145, 152, 163, 167, 168, 173,
Smilet, czar of Bulgaria 202 175, 190, 204, 213, 251, 254
Solnoc, archdeanship 256 Stephen Dečanski, king of Serbia 212, 227
castle 45, 55 Stephen of Juc, judge of the nobles 187
county 24, 38, 42, 43, 45, 47, 55, 56, 69, Stephen of Sâncraiu 187
97–99, 101, 110, 114, 126, 134, 144, 147, 154, Stephen Milutin, king of Serbia 202, 213,
159, 167, 174, 177, 178, 187, 237, 239, 253, 223, 231–233
254 Streisângiorgiu, village 198
Solomon, earl of Brașov 178, 234, 253 Stremț, village 83, 103, 126, 252
Solomon, count of Câlnic 216 see also Geoagiu de Sus
Someș, river 36, 43, 56, 144 Stupini (terra Solmus), village 101
Someștelec (Someșeni), village 55 Stylyteluk, village 101
Someșul Mic, river 171 Styria, duchy 63, 65, 68, 71, 94, 97, 198, 201,
Somogy, county 80, 114, 115 202, 212
Song, Empire 8 Subič, Paul, ban of Croatia 217
Sopron, castle 80 Subutai, Mongol commander 7–9, 16, 33
county 111, 114, 115 Suki, noble family 188
Soranzo, G., historian 49 Michael, earl of Cluj, vicevoivode of
Spalato (Split), archbishopric 33, 217 Transylvania 237, 252, 253
290 Index
Sumurduc (Zomordogi), village 101 Tălmaciu, village 183, 184, 234

Suplac, village 103 Tămașda (Pontes Thome, Tamashida),
Suzdal, Russian knezate 14, 59 village 35
Swarno, knez of Vladimir 82 Tâmpa, castle 20
Symon, father of Nicholas 253 Tănase, Michel, historian 20, 21
Syrmium, county, bishopric 114, 118 Târnava, archdeanship 121, 180, 181, 218,
Szabolcs, county 92, 144, 151, 159 257
Szakolyi (Zokol), monastery 90 county 101, 182, 239, 251, 253
Szalánc, castle 132 Târnava Mare, deanship 192, 193
Szcsesinak, B., historian 51 river 62, 167, 177, 192
Szécsényi, Thomas, voivode of Târnava Mică, deanship 192, 193
Transylvania 229, 234–238, 240–242, 251, river 62, 177, 192
252, 254 Târnave, region 36
Szécsi, Andrew, bishop of Transylvania 233, Târnăveni, village 36, 183
235, 251, 255 Târnovo, city 74, 105
Szécsi, Dionysius, castellan of Jdioara and Tășnad, village 35
Mehadia 233 Tăuți, castle 171
Szécsi, Dominic, provost of Alba 255 Teaca, village 256
Szécsi, Nicholas, castellan of Hațeg 229, 233, Teel, son of Ebl 83, 103
238 Teiuș, village 256
Szeged, town 133, 176, 179, 184, 185, 193, 194, Tekus of Mera, count 128, 252
209, 222–225 Telegd, archdeanship 220, 257
Székely, Gy., historian 59 seat 195
Székesfehérvár (Fehérvár), castle 9, 17, 53, Telegdi, Nicholas, earl of Sibiu 236, 254
257 Teliu (Cruceburg), castle 20
county 53, 54, 59, 113, 168 Temethyn, castle 81
provostship 207, 217, 218, 221, 224 Tengerdi, Theodore, bishop of Győr 181, 204
Szekfű, Gyula, historian 8 Terra Blachorum 17, 18
Szentgróti, Dionysius, earl of Solnoc 254 Terra Hasadad 160
Szentpétery, Imre, editor 69, 93 Terra Obruth 167
Szepes, county 59 Terra Siculorum 18
Szerafin, father of Andrew 54 Teremia (Teremy), village 101
Szigliget, island 59 Tétény, kindred 185
Szűcs, Jenő, historian 108, 113, 121, 133 Peter, ban of Slavonia 138
Șard (Sard), village 122 Teutsch, G. D., editor 45, 99, 103, 116, 117, 154,
Șeica, deanship 235, 236 183, 249
county 254 Theiner, Augustinus, editor 15, 38, 52, 78–80,
district 177, 194 89, 164, 168, 225
seat 192, 230, 235, 243 Theodor Sviatoslav, czar of Bulgaria 203,
Șieu, river 57, 188 232, 233
Șieu-Măgheruș (Monyoros), village 58 Theodoric, parish priest of Sebeș 52
Șieu-Odorhei (Drauchwrduarhel), Thomas, archbishop of Esztergom 217, 223
village 101 Thomas, singer 219–221
Șoimi, castle 131 Thomas of Spalato, chronicler 33, 217
Șoimuș, castle 178, 184, 229 Tiba, archdean of Ozd 256
Șprenghi, castle 20 Tilișca, castle 43
Șpring, chapter 193 Timiș, river 9
deanship 192 Timișoara, castle 230
Ștefănescu, R., archaeologist 22 Timotheus, bishop of Zagreb 118
Index 291
Tirimia 98, 101, see Teremia Várpatak, valley 20

Tisza, river 9, 29, 35, 36, 55, 61, 75, 83, 86, 87, Vărșag, castle 22
123, 130, 139, 140, 144, 146, 150, 157, 159, Vărșand, village 47
207–209, 229, 231 Vásáry, Nicholas, vicevoivode of
Tismana, monastery 200 Transylvania 252
Toksoba, Cuman tribe 13 Vasary, village 184
Tolna, county 128 Vasilko, knez 51, 59, 82
Tomaj, Dionysius, voivode of Transylvania Vasvár, castle 83, 88
251 county 113, 122
Topa, battle 232 Vătășianu, Virgil, art historian 19, 23
Toqtai, khan of the Golden Horde 203 Velbujd, battle 202
Trascău (Thuruczkou, Torozko), castle 136, Venezia, city 212
183 Verecke, pass 24, 25, 29, 135
estate 182 Vernadsky, George, historian 51, 67, 70
Trenčin, county 76, 115 Verőce (Virovitica), town 53
Trivet, Nicholas, chronicler 15 Veszprém, bishopric 95, 120–122, 207, 217
Trogir (Trau), town 53 Veza (Wiz) 36, 100
Tula Buga, Mongol khan 134, 135 Vidin, city 74, 78, 81, 104, 105, 201, 202, 231
Tului, Mongol commander 7, 9 Vienna, city 80
Turcuș, Șerban, historian 11, 13, 61, 120, 128 Villa Cruciferorum see Oprișani
Turda, archdeanship 147, 220, 257 Vincent, archbishop of Kalocsa 180, 208,
castle, town 28, 39–41, 45, 101, 103, 117, 209, 217
136, 224, 240, 244, 250 Vințu de Jos, village 216
county 100, 122, 178, 182, 237, 239, 253 Vischelius, Nicholas, chronicler 204
Türje, kindred Vița, village 177
Joachim (Iwachinus), earl of Sibiu 17, Vitus Arnpeckius, chronicler 207
201, 254 Vizza, castle 80, see Pottenburg
Philip, archbishop of Esztergom 197 Vladimir, Russian knezate 25, 59, 82
Philip, nobleman 217 Vladislav, king 150
Túróc (Turuz), castle 53, 56 Vladislav Dragutin, contender to the
Tyuan, nobleman 176 Hungarian crown 215
Țapu, chapter 193 Vladislav Lokietek, king of Poland 233
Țoca, Mircea, art historian 97 Voiavoda, centurion 45
Volga, river 9, 13, 14, 30
Ugocsa, county 83, 91, 142, 171, 209 Vršac, castle 185
Ujláki, noble family 198 Vurpăr, castle 43, 57
Ungra, castle 22 Vyvianus, earl of Bistrița 188, 254
Unguraș (Balwanus), castle 101, 178, 239
Ungurei (Gregorfalva), village 47 Walbrun, dean of Sibiu 257
Urban IV, pope 78, 79, 95 Wallachia 199–201, 231, 242
Ureche, Grigore, chronicler 149, 150 Wass, kindred 187
Nicholas, castellan of Ciceu 234, 241, 242
Vác, bishopric 76, 118, 204, 217 Nicholas the Younger 242
town 10 Wenceslas I Přemysl, king of Bohemia 206,
Valcău (Valko), castle 55, 131, 232 207
Vălișoara (Zadkeu), castle 234 Wenceslas II Přemysl, king of Bohemia ans
Valkó, county 55, 62 Hungary 204, 206, 207, 208
Varasd (Worost), county 68 Wenceslas III Přemysl, king of Bohemia 208
292 Index
Wenzel, Gusztáv, editor 14, 17, 45, 47, 55, 59, Zarand, county 79, 159, 205, 208
62, 66, 69, 78, 80, 83, 87, 92, 94, 96, 97, Zăuan (Zwan), village 55
99, 101, 125, 126, 144, 151, 159, 161, 170, 172 Zawychost, battle 82
Weyteh, John of, nobleman 233 Zek, village 36
Weyteh, Theodore, ban of Mehadia 185, Zelench, castle 129
206, 208, 231 Zeyhanus, Cuman leader 65
Wittelsbach, House of 212 Zimmermann, Harald, historian 11
Wrbou 104, see Gârbova Zips (Spišské Podhradie), county 122–124,
Wrokław 10 142
Wyngaert, P. A. van den, editor 32 provostship 204, 210, 217
town 122, 139
Yaprak Tak, Mountains 6 Zobory, Nicholas, castellan of Rupea 240
Yaroslav, battle 51 Zonuk, terra 101
Yolanda, wife of Bołeslaw of Gnyezno 78 Zonwk, castrum 47
Zorica, princess 213
Zagreb, bishopric 118, 172, 204, 217 Zosyma, bishop of Oradea 86, 90, 95
Zala, castle 80, 83 Zsadány, Dionysius nobleman 217
county 94, 111 Zsámboki, Simon, vicevoivode of
Zalău, village 35 Transylvania 238, 252
Zalnoc, village 101 Zsoldos, Attila, historian 108, 113, 121, 129,
Zaonateluke, village 147 130, 132, 133

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Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century

East Central and Eastern Europe

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ecee

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Sălăgean, Tudor.

Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

1 The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath 4

2 From the Mongol Retreat to the Transylvanian Duchy (1243–1257) 49

3 The Duchy of Transylvania 63

4 Political Crisis in the First Years of Ladislas the Cuman’s Reign:

5 Regnum Transilvanum: The Rise of the Congregational Regime 130

5.7 The “Constitutional” Reform of King Andrew iii 153

6 Ladislas Kán (1294–1315): The Transylvanian Nobles and the

7 Charles Robert and Transylvania 229

1 The Mongol Invasion (1241–1242) 5

In the late 13th century, a number of sources refer to Transylvania as a regnum,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_002

The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_003

1 Adrian 18 Făgăraș 35 Ocna Dejului 52 Sebeș

1235–1236.15 He had also participated in the great European campaign of Batu

15 Grousset, L’empire, 323.

22 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 420.

who were engaged in converting the Cumans to Christianity.36 The Teutonic

their hegemony.44 In an attempt to keep the Mongols as far away as possible

44 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 299.

51 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 424.

1.2 The Organization of Transylvania’s Defense

69 DIR I. 150–151, 369–370; ZW 11–12.

of Braşov (Tâmpa, Şprenghi or another, yet unidentified location),73 Hălchiu

73 Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4; Benkő, KMTL, 126.

fortresses were Ungra89 and Hălmeag,90 both mentioned together with

1.2.3 Flaws in the System

101 Thomas Nägler, “Cetăţile feudale de la Orlat şi continuitatea românilor în sudul

106 Master Roger, Epistle, 160–161.

1.3 The Campaign

114 Master Roger, Epistle, 164–167.

127 Master Roger, Epistle, 198–201.

136 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 198.

claimed additional distinctions and behaved accordingly. In fact, it was he

1.4 The Tartar Retreat: The Second Devastation of Transylvania

143 Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221.

149 For a different opinion see G. Rogers, 15–20.

154 Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221.

1.5 The Aftermath of the Invasion

1.5.1 Immediate Consequences

158 S RH, I, 468: et seminare illis temporis non potuerunt Hungari,.

166 D IR I 335–337, 427–428, HD 245–247.

170 D IR II. 5, ZW 79, Jáko 217.

1.5.1.3 Banditry and Insecurity. Institutional Crisis

1.5.2 Long-term Consequences

188 Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 92–94; Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 125–126.

becoming a simple stronghold owned by one of the branches of the Kökényes-

193 D IR II. 213–215, ZW 137, Jakó 294.

the significantly better populated royal fortification of Cluj-Mănăştur (220 × 98

199 Pascu, et al. “Cetatea Dăbâca”, 157.

202 R A 769, Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 187.

219 Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, 123.

impose on the Teutonic Knights a reconstruction plan with an old-fashioned

230 D IR II 33–34, ZW 26.

All these changes ultimately brought about a radical transformation in the

234 D IR I 335–337, 427–428; HD 245–247.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_002

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_003

15 Grousset, L’empire, 323.

22 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 420.

44 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 299.

51 Spinei, The Great Migrations, 424.

69 DIR I. 150–151, 369–370; ZW 11–12.

73 Bakó, and Nussbächer, “Hundertschaften,” 4; Benkő, KMTL, 126.

101 Thomas Nägler, “Cetăţile feudale de la Orlat şi continuitatea românilor în sudul

106 Master Roger, Epistle, 160–161.

114 Master Roger, Epistle, 164–167.

127 Master Roger, Epistle, 198–201.

136 Nägler, Aşezarea saşilor, 198.

143 Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221.

149 For a different opinion see G. Rogers, 15–20.

154 Master Roger, Epistle, 220–221.

158 S RH, I, 468: et seminare illis temporis non potuerunt Hungari,.

166 D IR I 335–337, 427–428, HD 245–247.

170 D IR II. 5, ZW 79, Jáko 217.

188 Anghel, Fortificaţii medievale, 92–94; Iambor, Aşezări fortificate, 125–126.

193 D IR II. 213–215, ZW 137, Jakó 294.

199 Pascu, et al. “Cetatea Dăbâca”, 157.

202 R A 769, Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 187.

219 Anghel, “Cetatea feudală de la Vurpăr”, 123.

230 D IR II 33–34, ZW 26.

234 D IR I 335–337, 427–428; HD 245–247.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_004

2 Melloni, “I fondamenti del regime”, 67.

14 DIR I 326; ZW 71–72.

64 De Plano Carpini “Ystoria Mongalorum”, 93–95, 121.

73 Maria Holban, Din cronica relaţiilor româno-ungare, 73–85.

77 DIR I. 426–427.

1 Albericus, in Gombos, Catalogus, 33–34; MGH, SS, XXIII, 811.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004311343_005

3 Kosztolnyik, Hungary, 190–191.

6 István Rákos, “IV Béla birtokrestaurációs politikája”, in Acta Historica Szegedinensis,

28 DIR II. 41–43, HD 307–309.

43 DIR II. 133–135, HD 347–348, Jakó 290.

58 DIR II. 158–162, HD 388–391.

77 DIR II. 94–95, 101–103; HD 331–333.

93 DIR II. 108–110, 133–135.

111 D IR II. 101–103.

127 D IR II. 158–162.

158 D IR II. 82–85, Theiner I 284–287.

162 D IR II. 96–97, HD 335–336; DIR II. 118–119, ZW 105.

171 D IR II 158–162; HD 388–391.

178 D IR II 52; HO V 40.

206 D IR II 124–125; Jakó 284.

235 D IR II 124–125, HO VI. 166–167, Jakó 284.