Executive Consolidated PDF

MACALINTAL V.
PET
FACTS:
Macalintal filed a motion for reconsideration on SC’s decision dismissing the former’s petition and declaring
the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.
Macalintal questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he
chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of
personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President
under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.
2. Whether or not the designation of the members of the supreme court as members of the PET is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Art VIII of thre Constitution.
HELD:
1. Yes. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But
neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other related
provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
Records of the Constitutional Commission clearly show that it is in the intent of the Commission for the
Supreme Court to be the sole judge as stated in Sec 4 Art VII.
The Supreme Court said "To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET
simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution.
2.As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution,
The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:
https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Page 1 of 36
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that
the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."
Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable"
44 is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to
include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."45
The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner
will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI,
explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals,
respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII.
In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
The petition was dismissed.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 Feb. 1991
FACTS:
The case seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and
their deputies or assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government admits of certain
exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the
exception.
Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13
of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President
being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the
Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII,
Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
ISSUE:
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
thus:
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

Page 2 of 36
RULING:
We rule in the negative. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional.
Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries
may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment
in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision,
Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the
prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "
(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the latter
provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The
prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public
and private office or employment.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article
VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member
of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials.
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position."

Page 3 of 36
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the
purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition
embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be
required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office.
We have made it clear that only the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the
primary functions may be considered as not constituting "any other office."
Respondents to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office.
Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2 March 2001

Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, 3 April 2001
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and subsequent to the event we know
as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as
president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began when For. Gov. Luis
Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as
having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and many personalities had
asked for the resignation of the petitioner including the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP).
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21 senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial with
SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. By the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a decision to not open the second
envelop allegedly containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account under the name
“Jose Velarde” containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the 2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the
streets and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes
marched to EDSA shrine and declared “on behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the
Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” PNP Chief,
Director General Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power.
But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and
his family left Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:
“20 January 2001” STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA:
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that
will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for
the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may

Page 4 of 36
come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said
resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened on
January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the Philippines. The House
then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines.” It also approved
Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its
congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation’s
goals under the Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7, the Senate
adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Several cases were filed against the petitioner. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757
and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No.
146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same
day, February 6, required the respondents “to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001.” On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No.
146738 and the filing of the respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15.”
ISSUES:
I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II. Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President.
III. Whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
IV. Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune
from criminal prosecution.
V. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
RULING:
I. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

Page 5 of 36
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
overthrew the whole government. freedom of assemblyto petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting
government that resulted from it cannot be the President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
subject of judicial review President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; Involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
prejudicial publicity.
II. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when
President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues
—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation. SC declared that the resignation of
President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace.
In the press release containing his final statement:

• He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
• He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process
(he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to re-assume the
Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
• He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
• He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
• He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after
January 20, 2001.
III. The law states that Congress has the sole authority to say whether a President is incapable of performing the
duties required of him of his office. Given the resolutions passed by Congress immediately after GMA’s oath-
taking and the fact that both houses filed bills signed by GMA into law, the Court recognizes that petitioner’s
inability to perform was permanent and also, the Court would have no jurisdiction to change the decision already
done by Congress on his capacity as President.
IV. Regarding immunity from suit, history shows us that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not retain the
1973 Constitution provision on executive immunity. Also, the Impeachment court has become functus officio. It
is, then, untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can
be prosecuted.
V. As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a
fair trial and the free press are incompatible. They’re essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does
not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that
the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the
Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the
case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with
justice and less with prosecution.

Page 6 of 36
Biraogo v. PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto in-existent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
3. WON E.O. No. 1 violates the Equal Protection Clause
RULING:

Page 7 of 36
1. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.
2. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
3. Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s
power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality
of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting
the inquiry.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and
in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

Page 8 of 36
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No.1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Dadole vs Commission on Audit
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM’s Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances
to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and
municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall
be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1000 from
the last six months.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy
remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec. 4, Art.
X of 1987 constitution: “The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local government or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be
removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.
They are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the
sphere of their legitimate powers. The president can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he/she
finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory powers over LGUs.
DENR v. DENR Employees, G.R. No. 149724, 19 August 2003
Control of Executive Departments

Sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
FACTS:
Petition for review assailing CA decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and denial of motion for
consideration.
November 15, 1999 – Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of
the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato
—Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in the
Regional and Field Offices
Sec 1. Realignment of Administrative Units. 1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South
Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred from Region XI to XII

Page 9 of 36
Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction. RTC of
Cotabato issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional Executive Director from transferring the offices.
DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that;
• The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) is executive in nature.
• The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No. 429, which reorganized
Region XII.
• The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Case of Chiongbian vs.
Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
• Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature citing Chiongbian, the
Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
• RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum Order xxx for
being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on their part, and they are further ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional
Offices 12 to Cotabato City.
• Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for procedural errors: (1) failure to submit a written
explanation why personal service was not done on the adverse party; (2) failure to attach affidavit of
service; (3) failure to indicate the material dates when copies of the orders of the lower court were
received; (4) failure to attach certified true copy of the order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; (5) for improper verification, the same being based on petitioners knowledge and belief,
and (6) wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal.
• Motion for Reconsideration denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid;
2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
RULING:
1. Yes: (see discussion below)

2. Yes:
Take note of the qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII
Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly
be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. This is so

Page 10 of 36
because as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally
In this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR
XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority
by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had
not expressly repudiated the same.
Government of the Philippine Island vs. Springer
FACTS:
The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine
Legislature as amended by Act No. 2822, and of the Corporation law. By the terms of the charter of the
corporation, the Governor-General was directed to subscribe on behalf of the Government of the Philippine
Islands for at least fifty-one per cent of the capital of the corporation. The government eventually became the
owner of more than ninety-nine per cent of the thirty thousand outstanding shares of stocks of the National Coal
Company. Only nineteen shares stand in the names of private individuals.
On November 9, 1926, the Government-General promulgated Executive Order No. 37. Reference was made
therein to opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army and of the Acting Attorney-
General of the United States wherein it was held that the provisions of the statutes passed by the Philippine
Legislature creating a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and powers thereof with
respect to certain corporations in which the Philippine Government is the owner of stock, are nullities.
Announcement was made that on account of the invalidity of the portions of the Acts creating the voting
committee or board of control, the Governor-General would, thereafter, exercise exclusively the duties and
powers theretofore assumed by the voting committee or board of control. Notice of the contents of this executive
order was given to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
A special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company was called for December 6, 1926, at 3
o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of electing directors and the transaction of such other business. Prior
thereto, on November 29, 1926, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as
members of the voting committee, requested the Governor-General to convene the committee at 2:30 p. m., on
December 6, 1926, to decide upon the manner in which the stock held by the Government in the National Coal
Company should be voted. The Governor-General acknowledged receipt of this communication but declined to
participate in the proposed meeting. The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
did in fact meet at the time and place specified in their letter to the Governor-General. It was then and there
resolved by them that at the special meeting of the stockholders, the votes represented by the stock of the
Government in the National Coal Company, should be cast in favor of five specified persons for directors of the
company.
On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal
Company was held in accordance with the call. The Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the
sole power to vote the stock of the Government. The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the secretary of the company a certified copy of the minutes
of the meeting of the committee held at the office of the company a half hour before. The Governor-General,
through his representative, thereupon objected to the asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the latter likewise objected to the assertion of the Governor-
General.
The chair recognized the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in their

Page 11 of 36
capacity as majority members of the voting committee as the persons lawfully entitled to represent and vote the
Government stock. To this the representative of the Governor- General made protest and demanded that it be
entered of record in the minutes. The vote cast by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives was in favor of Alberto Barretto, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, Anselmo Hilario, and
Frank B. Ingersoll. The Governor-General through his represetative, alleging representation of the Government
stock, cast his vote in favor of Alberto Barreto, Romarico Agcaoili, Frank B. Ingersoll, H. L. Heath, and
Salvador Lagdameo. The chair declared the ballot cast by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House as electing the names therein indicated, directors of the National Coal Company.
ISSUE:
Where does the power to appoint to public office reside?
RULING:
It may finally be inferred from the books that the appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as
properly an executive function. The power of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power.
Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts, but when so made be taken as an incident to the
discharge of functions properly within their respective spheres.
From the viewpoint of one outside looking in, it would seem that the State legislatures have all too often been
permitted to emasculate the powers properly belonging to the executive department, and that the governor of the
State has been placed with the responsibility of administering the government without the means of doing so.
The operations of the executive department have been fundamentally varied by the legislative department.
The legislature has absorbed strength, the executive has lost it. This tendency has rather been tolerated than
acquiesced in. The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state.
He should have complete control of the instrumentalities through whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still
true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a geeble execution of the government. A feeble
execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory,
must be in practice a bad government." The mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here..
According to Mr. Chief Justice Robertson, appointments to office are intrinsically executive, but that it might be
performed by a judicial officer when the duties of the office pertains strictly to the court. In the decision in the
Sibert vs. Garrett case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky after reviewing the authorities refused to be frightened
by the bugaboo that numerically a greater number of courts take a contrary view. It said: "We are convinced that
they by doing so are inviting destruction of the constitutional barriers separating the departments of government,
and that our interpretation is much the sounder one and is essential to the future preservation of our
constitutional form of government as originally intended by the forefathers who conceived it. . . . Such power (of
appointment) on the part of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be persisted in, would, enable it to
gradually absorb to itself the patronage and control of the greater part of the functioning agencies of the state and
county governments, and, thus endowed, it would be little short of a legislative oligarchy."
The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the Government of the
United States to the executive branch of the government which it has set up in the Philippines. Let the Organic
Law speak upon this proposition.
The Organic Act of August 29, 1916, included what follows on the subject of appointments. The governor-
General "shall, unless otherwise herein provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, such
officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-General,or such as he is authorized by law to appoint."
(Organic Act, sec. 21.) The exception to the general grant is that the Philippine Legislature "shall provide for the
appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General." (Organic Act,
sec. 22.)

Page 12 of 36
Each House of the Philippine Legislature may also elect a presiding officer, a clerk, a sergeant at arms, and such
other officers and assistants as may be required. (Organic Act, sec. 18.) The Philippine Legislature is authorized
to choose two Resident commissioners to the United States. (Organic Act, sec. 20.)
The prohibition on the local Legislature, which has been thought of as referring to the Resident Commissioners,
is that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to
any office the election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any office of trust or profit
which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term."
(Organic Act, sec. 18.)
The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-
General shall have such specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and
also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth," including the special powers and duties "(a) To nominate and
appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the Government of the Philippine Islands. (b)
To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed
officials. For disloyalty to the Government of the United States, the Governor-General may at any time remove a
person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].)
The Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.)
It will also not escape attention that the only reference made to appointments by the Legislature relates to the
selection of Secretaries of Departments, of officers and employees for the Legislature, and of Resident
Commissioners, from which it would naturally be inferred that no other officers and employees may be chosen
by it. The exceptions made in favor of the Legislature strengthen rather than weaken the grant to the executive.
The specific mention of the authority of the Legislature to name certain officers is indicative of a purpose to
limit the legislative authority in the matter of selecting officers. The expression of one thing not expressed. Had
it been intended to give to the Philippine Legislature the power to name individuals to fill the offices which it
has created, the grant would have been included among the legislative powers and not among the executive
powers. The administrative control of the Government of the Philippine Islands by the Governor-General to
whom is confided the responsibility of executing the laws excludes the idea of legislative control of
administration.
Membership in the Committee created by Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822 is an office. No attempt will be made to
accomplish the impossible, which is to formulate an exact judicial definitions of term "office." The point is that
the positions in question constitute an "office," whether within the meaning of that word as used in the Code of
Civil Procedure under the topic "Usurpation of Office," and in the jurisprudence of Ohio from which these
portions of the Code were taken; whether within the local definitions of "office" found in the Administrative
Code and the Penal Code; or whether within the constitutional definitions approved by the United States
Supreme Court. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 197 et seq., 519; Act No. 136, sec. 17) The Legislature did more
than add incidental or occasional duties to existing executive offices for two of the members of the voting
committee are representatives of the legislative branch. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that the
Act of the General Assembly giving to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives the power to appoint proxies and directors in all corporations in which the State has an interest,
creates a public office and fills the same by appointment of the Legislature.
Not for a moment should there be dismissed from our minds the unusual and potently effective proviso of
section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government must be directly under the
Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the
Governor-General." At the very least, the performance of duties appurtenant to membership in the voting
committee is an executive function on the Government, which the Organic Act requires must be subject to the
unhampered control of the Government-General. The administrative domination of a governmentally organized
and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-making power.
The incorporation of the National Coal Company has not served to disconnect the Company or the stock which
the Government owns in it from the Government and executive control. The Philippine Legislatures empowered
to create and control private corporations. The National Coal Company is a private corporation. By becoming a
stockholder in the National Coal Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as
respects the transactions of the corporation. Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of
government. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in speaking of the Bank of the United States said, "It was not created for

Page 13 of 36
its own sake, or for private purposes. It has never been supposed that Congress could create such a corporation."
Of the National Coal Company, it has been said by Mr. Justice Johnson as the organ of the court that "The
Government of the Philippine Islands is made the majority stockholder, evidently in order to insure proper
governmental supervision and control, and thus to place the Government in a position to render all possible
encouragement, assistance and help in the prosecution and furtherance of the company's business.”
It further is inconvertible that the Government, like any other stockholder, is justified in intervening in the
transactions in the corporation, and in protecting its property rights in the corporation. Public funds were
appropriated to create the National Coal Company. Those funds were used to purchase stock. The voting of the
government stock is the prerogative of the stockholder, not the prerogative of the corporation. It is transaction in,
but not of, the corporation. The stock is property. The Government, the owner of the majority stock in the
company, naturally dominates the management of its property. The Government may enforce its policies and
secure relief in and through the corporation and as stockholder.
Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce that the power of appointment in the Philippines
appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in
question is an office or executive function; that the National Coal Company and similar corporations are
instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government property
belongs to the executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting
committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive Department.
Under a system of government of delegated powers, under which delegation legislative power vests in the
Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under which Governor-General
and a specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly
perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding officers as majority members of
a body which has executive functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory of the division of
powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the Organic Law. That has been the decided trend of persuasive
judicial opinion.
The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is authorized to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has
lawfully provided for a National Coal Company, but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the
committee. Would this court be doing violence to the legislative will if the voting power be continued solely in
the hands of the Governor-General until different action is taken by the Legislature? We conclude that we would
not, for the reason that the primordial purpose of the Legislature was "to promote the business of developing
coal deposits . . . and of mining . . . and selling the coal contained in said deposits." (Act No. 2705, sec 2; Act
No.2822, sec.1.) The incidental purpose of the Legislature was to provide a method to vote the stock owned by
the Government in the National Coal company. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, "The striking
out is not necessarily by erasing words, but it may be by disregarding the unconstitutional provision and reading
the statute as if that provision was not there."
We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act
No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. It
results, therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and as it would be impracticable for the defendants to answer,
judgment shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the offices of directors of the National Coal
Company. So ordered, without costs.
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002
FACTS:
Maria J. Angelina G. Matibag questions the constitutionality of the appointment by President Arroyo of
Benipayo (Chairman of the Commission on Elections), and Bora and Tuason (COMELEC Commissioners). She
questions the legality of appointment by Benipayo of Velma J. Cinco as Director IV of the Comelec’s EID and
reassigning her to the Law department. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman
together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the
Law Department.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding

Page 14 of 36
heads of government offices that “transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an
administrative and criminal complaint Department17 against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution.
RULING:
We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution
itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.”
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General
Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision should be
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the
COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the
appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is
contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also
run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.”
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, G.R. NO. 139565
FACTS:
Petitioners in GR No. 139565, led by Baltazar N. Endriga (the Endriga group), were appointed members of the
board of trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the
qualification that their appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. On December 22, 1998, then
President Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new appointees to the CCP
board, led by Armita B. Rufino (the Rufino group). Having been dislodged from the CCP, Endriga filed quo
warranto proceedings questioning the President’s authority to appoint new members in the CCP board.
It was alleged that under Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree No. 15, vacancies in the board “shall be filled by
election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x.” The Endriga group
claimed that it was only when the board was entirely vacant that the President of the Philippines may fill the

Page 15 of 36
vacancies, in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. The members of the group believed that since
only one seat was vacant, President Estrada could not appoint a new board. They averred that presidential
appointment was unjustified, since the CCP board still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to
fill any vacancy in the board by election.
On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the quo warranto Petition. It declared the Endriga group
lawfully entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP board. The CA held that Section 6(b) of
Presidential Decree (PD) 15 had clearly vested in the remaining members of the board the power to elect new
trustees. It ruled that the President could exercise the power to appoint only when the board was entirely vacant.
In its appeal before this Court, the Rufino group asserted that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the CCP
trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should be declared unconstitutional. The provision was allegedly repugnant
to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in rank”
than the appointing power.
ISSUE:
The lone issue was whether Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was unconstitutional in the light of Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
RULING:
At the outset, the Court recognized the occurrence of a supervening event that could have rendered the case
moot – the resignation of the Rufino group and the appointment of new CCP trustees by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court, however, deemed it best to pass upon the merits of the case, in order to prevent a
repeat of this regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine
politics. Moreover, the Court brushed aside procedural barriers, in view of the paramount importance of the
constitutional issues involved.
By a vote of 10-3, the Court held that Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was irreconcilable with Section 16 of Article
VII of the Constitution.
The clear and categorical language of Section 6 (b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP board shall be
filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. It is only when the board becomes entirely vacant that the
vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines, acting in consultation with the same ranking officers
of the CCP. Thus, Section 6 (b) empowers the remaining trustees of the board to fill the vacancies by electing
their fellow trustees. Simply put, this provision authorizes the appointing officer to appoint an officer who will
be equal in rank to the former.
In its Decision, the Court held that the power of appointment granted in Section 6 (b) of PD 15 transgressed
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. It explained that the power to appoint – vested by Section 16 in the
President; or the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards – was restricted only to officers lower
in rank. This constitutional provision clearly excluded a situation in which the appointing officers appointed an
officer who would be equal to them in rank.
This latter situation, however, was present in the CCP, whose trustees were appointing new co-trustees who
would be equal in rank to the former. Thus, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional,
insofar as it violated the constitutional mandate that the head of the board may be authorized to appoint lower-
ranking officers only.
Further, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution authorized Congress to vest specifically in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards – and in no other person – the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers. The word “heads” referred to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards, not to their members, for
several reasons.
First, the 1935, the 1973, and the 1987 Constitutions made a clear distinction whenever the power to appoint

Page 16 of 36
lower-ranked officers was granted to the members of or the head of a collegial body. When conferring the power
of appointment to the members of that collegial body, our past and present Constitutions used the phrases “in the
courts,”“courts,” “the Supreme Court,” “members of the Cabinet,” 4and “the Constitutional Commissions.”
Thus, if the intention was to grant to members of a commission or board the power to appoint lower-ranked
officials, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution should have used the phrase “in the commissions or
boards.” But in sharp contrast, this provision vested the power “in the heads of the departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.”
Second, the deliberations of the present Constitution revealed that the framers had intended the phrase “in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards” to be an enumeration of offices whose heads may be
vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, in the enumeration, what applied to the
first office applied also to the succeeding offices mentioned.
Third, all commissions or boards had chief executives who were their heads. Since the Constitution spoke of
“heads” of office, and all commissions or boards had chief executives or heads, that word could have referred
only to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards.
Given that the word “heads” referred to the commission or board chairpersons, not members, the Court ruled
that the head of the CCP was the chairperson of the CCP board of trustees. This conclusion was further
supported by the fact that Section 8 of PD 15 and Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the CCP
recognized that its board chairperson – as the head of the CCP – had the power to appoint, remove, and
discipline all officers, staff and personnel of the CCP.
Pursuant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, the chairperson of the CCP board, as the head of the
CCP, was the only officer who could be vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the
CCP. Section 6 (b) of PD 15 could not validly grant this power of appointment to the members of the CCP board,
as they were not the head of the CCP.
Moreover, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, because it ran afoul of the President’s
power of control under Section 17 of Article VII of the Constitution.[11] It was noted that the CCP was an
agency that fell under the Executive Branch.
Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency “not placed by law or order creating them under
any specific department” fell “under the Office of the President.” Since the CCP did not fall under the
Legislative or the Judicial Branch of government and was not an independent constitutional or quasi-judicial
body or local government unit, then the CCP necessarily fell under the Executive Branch and should be subject
to the President’s control.
However, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15, by authorizing the trustees of the CCP board to fill its vacancies,
insulated the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President. This authority made the
CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the Chief Executive. Such public office or board
could not legally exist under the present Constitution.
The legislature could not have validly enacted a law that would put a government office in the Executive Branch
outside the control of the President. While the charter of the CCP vested it with autonomy of policy and
operation, this charter did not free it from the President’s control. As part of the Executive Branch, the CCP
could not be cut off from that control in the guise of insulating the latter from presidential influence.
Arturo de Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On
December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the

Page 17 of 36
JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of
announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with
its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to
the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of
intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the
shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that
Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions
during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
RULING:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4, Article VIII, states: Section 4. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4, Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4, Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Page 18 of 36
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint.
The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the
rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if
they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4.
Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057
FACTS:
Two potential scenarios have gripped the public mind. The first is the specter of the failure of our first ever
automated election which has evoked numerous doomsday predictions. The second is the possibility of the
appointment by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after the
compulsory retirement of incumbent Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno on May 17, 2010. This has generated
frenzied debates in media, in various lawyers assemblies, in the academe, and in coffee shops. It has even
spawned a number of rallies and demonstrations by civil society groups and by self-styled constitutional experts.
these two situations are merely possibilities, that they are conjectural and speculative at this moment in time.
They have, nonetheless, captured the public imagination, and have ushered an open season for unfettered
discussion and for dire prognostication. Not unexpectedly, the controversy posed by the second scenario
involving concerns closest to homehas arrived in this Court through various petitions and intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sitting President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, can validly appoint the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court when the incumbent Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno, compulsorily retires on May
17, 2010 in light of two apparently conflicting provisions of the Constitution?
Ruling:
Yes, In Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court
in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their
conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension.
Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to
happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing
the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and
tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution
to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official
duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342
FACTS
The case molest about the constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by
appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left
vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for
every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the

Page 19 of 36
President or the Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next
Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC to immediately transmit to
the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution in the
event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution..
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy, considering that the JBC has
initiated the process of receiving applications for the position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the
evaluation process for the applications to the position, and is perilously near completing the nomination process
and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the President, entering into the period of the ban on
midnight appointments on March 10, 2010, which only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of
prohibition to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list, especially if it will be cone within
the period of the ban on midnight appointments.
The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position from
the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was
chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice
since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the
prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE
-WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice..
- Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President without committing
a grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President from making
midnight appointments two months immediately preceding the next presidential elections until the end of her
term?
RULING
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.
If the framer of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief Justice, then
they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT),
Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).
Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive Department.
-It was held that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a
short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as
the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of
nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial
determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list
of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.
IBP v. Zamora GR. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

Page 20 of 36
FACTS:
President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such
order, the PNP through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated
02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a
memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul
LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military
on the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the IBP has legal standing in the case at bar.
2) Whether or not the president's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces subject to
judicial review.
3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate
constitutional provisions on civilian supremact over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
RULING:
In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the case at bar in that it has
failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in any way. It's contention that it is
fighting to uplhold the rule of law and the constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague.
As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General that the president's act is
a political question beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of power is qualified or subject to
limitations, the issue becomes whether the prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question of
legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then subject to the Court's review power.
As regards to the third issue, in view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as
there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is "militarized" in violation of Section 3, Article II of the Constitution. The deployment of the
Marines does not constitute a breach of civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of
the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols
does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
PETITION DISMISSED.
Lacson vs Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001
FACTS:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an armed mob assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in NCR. She also issued

Page 21 of 36
General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" followed. Aggrieved, 4 related petitions were filed before the
Court. The case at bar is for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus
(with an urgent application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction).
Petitioners assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by PGMA and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected
by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. On May 6, 2001, PGMA ordered the lifting of the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot
and academic. As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the
authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to
arrest specific persons in connection with the "rebellion."
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
RULING:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of
rebellion." Petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not
justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to
warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. The prayer for prohibition and
mandamus is improper at this time. As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against
them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of
the subject hold departure orders in their petition. They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in
the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from
unlawful restraint, a matter which remains speculative up to this very day. Petition is DISMISSED. However,
respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents,
representatives, and all persons acting for and in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting petitioners
therein without the required judicial warrant for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May
1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.
SANLAKAS VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY , G.R. NO. 159085, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
FACTS:
• Three hundred junior officers and enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) staged a
mutiny by storming the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City on July 27, 2003
• The mutineers cried of corruption in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; demanded for the resignation of the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
• In lieu of the said mutiny, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring
a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion
• The mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003
• After negotiations with the soldiers to return to their barracks, the President lifted the state of rebellion five
days later on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435
• Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa (PM), and Social Justice Society (SJS), in relation to Section 18,
Art. VII of the Constitution, contend that:
o The declaration of a state of rebellion is not required to call out the armed forces
o Due to the cessation of the rebellion, there exists no factual basis for the imposition of a state of
rebellion in an indefinite period (the mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003; the state of
rebellion ensued for five days until August 1, 2003)
o The report circumvents the report requirement, which requires the President to make a report 48
hours after the proclamation of martial law

Page 22 of 36
• Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is an indirect
exercise of emergency powers
o Said petitioner contends that under Section 23 (2), Art. VII of the Constitution, such exercise of
emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the declaration made by the President thus
results to the latter’s usurpation of their said exclusive power
• Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends that the presidential issuances constitute an unwarranted exercise of
martial law power, which is baseless under the Constitution
o Said petitioner fears that the said declaration of the President may pave way for the unconstitutional
imposition of warrantless arrests
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic

2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
3. Whether or not a declaration of a state of rebellion is required to call out the armed forces
4. Whether or not there is factual basis for the imposition of a state of rebellion
5. Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers
6. Whether or not the issuances are tantamount to exercising martial law powers
RULING:
1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the Supreme Court recognizes jurisdiction over cases that are
capable of repetition yet evading review
• The petitions are deemed moot and academic, because the state of rebellion has been lifted already on
August 1, 2003
• The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that this case is capable of repetition; in the said case, an angry
mob that stormed Malacanang on May 1, 2001 has compelled the President to call upon the AFP and
PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1
• In this case, the Supreme Court went on to assess the validity of the President’s declaration
2. Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS, have no legal standing to sue; Petitioners Suplico et al. and Pimentel
(Members of Congress) have standing to sue
• Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are considered “people’s organizations” that represents the interest of
the people, the Supreme Court is still observant of the rule that only real parties in interest or those who
would suffer a direct injury from the controversy, are the ones who may invoke the judicial power
• Petitioners Members of Congress have made clear the validity of their legal standing, since their
contention involving the alleged usurpation of the President of their constitutional power speaks of their
incurrence of direct damage
3. For purposes of exercising the calling out power, the President is not required to declare a state of rebellion
• Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution: …whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
• Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, in her capacity as Commander-in-Chief, the
following powers:
o Calling out power
o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
o Power to declare martial law
• In order for the President to exercise the latter two powers, these two conditions must exist:
o Actual invasion or rebellion
o Exercise of said power required for ensuring public safety
• The aforementioned conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power

Page 23 of 36
• The Constitution of the United States of America (USA) serves as the foundation of the overall concept of
the President’s power as Chief Executive and Commander-In-Chief
• Residual executive powers of the President, as suggested by Justice Cortes, rests upon the President
o Such is due to the highly unitary and centralized nature of the Philippines government
o Exemplified in Marcos vs. Manglapus, wherein residual executive power is practiced by the
President by barring the return of former President Marcos due to perceived threats of
destabilization against the government and other forms of socio-political disturbances
4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a state of rebellion
• Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, ad must promulgate its decision thereon
within three days from its filing.
• No proof was shown by the petitioners that the President has acted without factual basis
5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces is in
consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
• There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers as both Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief
6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the declaration of martial law
• No indication that military tribunals have taken over jurisdiction over civil courts
• No indication of curtailment of civil and political rights
• No indication of President’s encroachment of other branches of government
• No indication of attempt, at all, that President attempted to exercise martial law
Petitions DISMISSED.
David VS Arroyo
FACTS:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)
was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot
visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress.

Page 24 of 36
Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim
that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights.
The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue
of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in
fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC
can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time
some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military.
Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in
free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually
a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is
not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth
are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again,
that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains
to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s
‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From

Page 25 of 36
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power
is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of
the calling out power of the president by the president
Fortun vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and
buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on
November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central
Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of
persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in
person or in writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,

Page 26 of 36
quantity, and quality of the rebels’ weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions,
the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and
14 other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized “PNP/Police”
markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the President’s action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302, 190307,
190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President Arroyo’s
Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before Congress
could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanao’s inhabitants
could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead horse.
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of Proclamation No. 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the writ in the province of
Maguindanao, rendered the issues raised in the petitions moot and academic.
RULING:
Yes. The court said that Proclamation No. 1963 in the petitions raised moot and academic because the court has
nothing to review. The Proclamation on Martial Law and Writ of habeas corpus was already lifted through
Proclamation No. 1963 before the Congress could perform its duty to review and validate. It is evident that
under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in
entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department.
The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the
very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One – President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or
invalidate the same.
The pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
“Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.”

Page 27 of 36
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The President’s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing to
Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation or
suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the President’s proclamation or suspension, allow their
limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in
the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has
nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Two –Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ o habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take
over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or
decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had
been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.
Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days.
The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely
populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a
determined and amply armed government presence.
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an
appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Thus –
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and
the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot
and academic.
David v. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396

Page 28 of 36
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . . and in my capacity
as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP
"to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it
is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury”
resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII … do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a

Page 29 of 36
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This
is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no
legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed
upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not
the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this
Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

Page 30 of 36
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable
by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA, G.R. No. 158088, 6 July 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. On 28 December 2000, the Philippines signed the
Rome Statute through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations
(PMUN). However, the treaty’s provisions require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the
signatory states.
Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for
ratification.
The Office of the Solicitor General, commenting for the respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners
to file the instant suit. It also contended that the petition at bar violates the rule on hierarchy of courts. On the
substantive issue raised by petitioners, respondents argue that the executive department has no duty to transmit
the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.
RULING:
NO. The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is
the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts
as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Although it is correct that the Constitution, in Article VII, Section 21, provides for the concurrence of 2/3 of all
members of the Senate for validating a treaty and is deemed essential to provide check on the executive’s foreign
relations, it is not absolute. The power to ratify does not belong to the Senate.
The processes in treaty-making are negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of
ratification.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the latter is limited only to giving consent to the ratification. Hence, the
President has the authority to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate, and/or refuse to ratify it.

Page 31 of 36
Arthur D. Lim vs. Hon. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 151445)
FACTS:

In the beginning of 2002, the personnel of Armed Forces of the United States started to arrive in the Philippines
which will participate in the Balikatan 02-1 pursuant to the VFA ( Visitig Forces Agreement) signed in 1999.
The Balikatan 02-1 is a simulation of Joint military maneuvers or exercises of Filipino and American which was
pursuant to MDT ( Mutual Defense Treaty) a bilateral agreement entered into by the Philippine Government and
United States Government in 1951. The entry of the American troops in the Philippines is partly rooted from the
campaign of US President George Bush against international terrorism as a result of terrorist attacks in United
States which was the cause of numerous loss of lives.

The petitioners, Arthur Lim and Paulino Ersando, as citizens, lawyers, and taxpayers, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition and attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan 02-1 or the joint exercise.
Subsequently, they were joined by SANLAKAS and Partido ng Manggagawa by filing a petition-in-intervention,
the claimed that some of their members were situated in the places were the exercise are being conducted.

However the Solicitor General, claimed that were lack of locus standi, does not involve tax spending, and there
is no proof of direct personal injury.
ISSUE:
W/O the Balikatan 02-1 is covered by the VFA.
W/O the VFA is constitutional.

RULING:

The VFA permits the US personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of
which was undefined. The permit under VFA grants US personnel a wide scope of undertaking subject only to
approval of the Philippine government. In general US personnel must abstain from any activities inconsistent
with the agreement, and in particular, from an political activities. All other activities, in other words, are fair
game.

In aid of the case at bar, the Vienna Convention on the Law of T
reaties Article 31 and 32 which contains
the provisions governing the interpretation of international agreements. The cardinal rule of interpretation must
involve an examination of the text which is presume to verbalise the intentions of the parties.

The word activities in the view of the court it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a leeway for
negotiations. In this manner, the US forces may sojourn in the territory of the Philippines for purposes other than
military. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to
assume that Balikatan 02-1, a mutual anti-terrorism, advising, assisting and training exercise falls under the
context of the agreement.

From the facts obtaining, the court find that the Balikatan 02-1 joint military exercises has not intruded into that
penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction on the part of the court. The respondents did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wherefore, the petition and
petition-in-intervention are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing of new petition sufficient in form
and substance in the proper regional trial court.

Bayan v. Executive Secretary (Zamora), G.R. No. 138570, 10 Oct. 2000

Page 32 of 36
FACTS
Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition are issues
relating to, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the United
States of America (USA).
On March 14, 1947, the RP and USA forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel.
On August 30, 1951, the Mutual Defense Treaty was created to further strengthen both parties’ defense and
security relationship to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security which would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997, US Defense Deputy Assec Kurt Campbell met with DFA Usec Rodolfo Severino Jr., to
exchange notes on their strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Discussion and negotiations on elements of
the VFA ensued which was approved by Pres. Ramos and signed by DFA Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, VFA was ratified by Pres. Estrada, through DFA Secretary Siazon.
On October 6, 1998, Pres. Estrada through Exec. Secretary Zamora, officially transmitted the Instrument of
Ratification (the letter of the President and the VFA) for Senate’s concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article 7
of the 1987 Constitution.
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3)
vote or 16 votes of its members.
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between Secretary Siazon and
US Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA, essentially a framework for promoting the common security interest of the two countries, consists of a
Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions
under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines for temporary visits and
engage in joint military exercises.
ISSUES
I. Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?
II. Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article 7 or of Section 25, Article 18 of the
Constitution?
III. Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US military
personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher?
IV Does the VFA violate:
a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b. the Prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
RULING
I. No.
Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the VFA. He must have been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege, or that he is

Page 33 of 36
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.
As taxpayers, it was not established that the VFA involves Congress exercise of its taxing or spending powers
since no public funds derived from taxation were illegally disbursed of. As legislators, there was no clear
showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
II. Both.
The power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
One focal point of inquiry is the determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with regard to the
exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA.
Section 21, Article 7 Section 25, Article 18
Specific General
Requires that a treaty or international agreement, to Provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by
be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at the Senate as one of the requisites to render
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. compliance with the constitutional requirements
and to consider the agreement binding.
In both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or
international agreement valid and effective.
Foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may
be allowed in the Philippines only by (a) virtue
of a treaty (b) duly concurred in by the Senate,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so
required by Congress, and (c) recognized as such
by the other contracting state.
More Issues on Section 25, Article 18
1. No foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA.
The provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the subject of which could be
either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone as
separate and independent subjects places it under the coverage of the VFA.
2. (c) recognized as such (a treaty) by the other contracting state (USA)
The letter of US Ambassador Hubbard stating that the VFA is binding on the US Government is
conclusive and signifies that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the USA.
According to Fr. Bernas during the deliberations of the ConCom: "We will accept whatever they say. If
they say that we have done everything to make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept
it as a treaty." The phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because,
under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, provides that there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers.
III. No.
The VFA does not give unrestricted access or unhampered movement to US Forces in the Philippines; in fact, it
recognizes the Philippine government as the sole authority to approve the conduct of any visit or activity in the
country by US Forces, hence the VFA is not a derogation of Philippine sovereignty.
The VFA gives Philippine courts primary jurisdiction over offenses that may be committed by US personnel
within Philippine territory, with the exception of those incurred solely against the security or property of the US
or solely against the person or property of US personnel, and those committed in the performance of official
duty.
IV.
a. No.
b. No. In Article II of the VFA, the United States commits to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
including the Constitution, which declares in Article II, Section 8 thereof, a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons consistent with the national interest.
The instant petitions were DISMISSED.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. LANTION, G.R. NO. 139465, 17 OCT. 2000

Page 34 of 36
FACTS:
This case involves the continuation of the Extradition case of private respondent Mark Jimenez under the
"Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (RP-US Extradition Treaty).
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable
period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. He assails the decision on the following
grounds:
There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition
in court and a preliminary investigation.
Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness.
In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective.
The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended to
prevent flight.
There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an
individual.
The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be
dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing.
By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the
constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government.
Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings."
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
W/N the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process.
RULING:
Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
[In relation to our topic:]

In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due process. On the other
end of the balancing pole, petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our national commitment
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons charged with
violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on
matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the
right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer
is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice.

Page 35 of 36
Under our constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines. Executive power
includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements. The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the
executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in the international arena. It is
traditionally held that the President has power and even supremacy over the country’s foreign relations. The
executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of foreign relations considering the Presidents most
comprehensive and most confidential information about the international scene of which he is regularly briefed
by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited.
The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the principle of separation of powers. This
principle is one of the cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our
government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government. More and more, crimes are
becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal
whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private
respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial
proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the
degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will
be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords
an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court.
The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in
court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent
escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for
his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential
to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of
interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the
administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into
play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft
restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist
the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental
fairness is assured a party.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar
promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED.

Page 36 of 36

Executive Consolidated PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Executive Consolidated PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MACALINTAL V.

1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

The petition was dismissed.

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2 March 2001

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

I. Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

presented a political question; Involves legal questions.

In the press release containing his final statement:

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

They argued that:

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

The test has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Dadole vs Commission on Audit

DENR v. DENR Employees, G.R. No. 149724, 19 August 2003

Control of Executive Departments

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

• Motion for Reconsideration denied. Hence, this petition.

1. Yes: (see discussion below)

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Government of the Philippine Island vs. Springer

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, G.R. NO. 139565

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Soriano v. JBC; GR No. 191057

Peralta v. JBC; GR No. 191342

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

IBP v. Zamora GR. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Lacson vs Perez, GR No. 147780, May 10, 2001

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Whether or not there is a valid warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a state of rebellion

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

Fortun vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/EXECUTIVE-CONSOLID…wkI25_pZfcdixOJOWrRFNaoe4d6NRbs7Gi5x1GrrTXVv7Cqru6A 24/06/2018, 10[05 PM

David v. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396

W/O the VFA is constitutional.