Immersed in Illusion

IMMERSED IN ILLUSION
Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 244
© Katriina Pajunen
Graphic design: Katriina Pajunen
ISSN 0788-7604
ISBN 978-952-484-591-5 (nid.)
ISBN 978-952-484-592-2 (PDF)
Bookwell, Jyväskylä 2012

Katriina Pajunen
IMMERSED IN ILLUSION
An Ecological Approach to the Virtual Set
4 IMMERSED IN ILLUSION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I started my journey roughly fourteen years ago, when the initial ideas
of the virtual set production L’Enfant et les sortilèges (Kroma Produc-
tions 2004) were born. This was the most hectic time of the devel-
opment of computer generated imagery (CGI) within film, and I
couldn’t even dream in those days, the things that I eventually ended
up doing with my research. After this time, a second virtual set pro-
duction Luonnotar (Kroma Productions 2011), and a lengthy writing
process, there are several people I wish to thank.
First and foremost I wish to thank the director and producer
Marikki Hakola, who courageously took the responsibility of manag-
ing the two experimental artistic productions under her wing. With-
out her, L’Enfant and Luonnotar would not exist. I also wish to thank
my fellow artists, digital compositor Sami Haartemo, with whom I
collaborated in L’Enfant and digital compositors Tanja Bastamow and
Heikki Ulmanen, with whom I collaborated in Luonnotar. Without
their work, the virtual sets of the L’Enfant and Luonnotar would not
have turned out so well.
For supporting my writing process, I especially thank Professor
Eija Timonen, who has patiently given her advice whenever needed.
I also wish to thank Eeva Kurki, for her advice at the beginning of
the road. I also thank the pre-examiners Mauri Kaipainen and Pia
Tikka for their critical remarks and admire the commitment of my
opponent Pia Tikka.
Throughout the journey there have been different people I also
owe a thank you to for supporting my research, amongst whom are:
IMMERSED IN ILLUSION 5
Anu Maja, Lauri Törhönen, Yrjö Sotamaa, Mauri Ylä-Kotola, Elukka
Eskelinen, and Toni Tolin.
For financing my research, there are several parties to be acknowl-
edged. Elomedia, Oskar Öflunds Stiftelse, Finnish Cultural Founda-
tion, AVEK, Niilo Helander Foundation, the Jenny and Antti Wihuri
Foundation and the University of Lapland have all generously funded
my writing process. For supporting my virtual set research I also wish
to thank The Media Centre Lume at Aalto University - the former
University of Art and Design, Helsinki.
Finally I wish to thank Jukka for his thoroughly encouraging at-
titude towards my writing process, and Veera, who grew up as a teen-
ager in the course of this research.
ABSTRACT
In this research I have asked; what do we see when we see a virtual set
- do we see pixels in a two dimensional picture, or three dimensional
environments? As a starting point I assume that every virtual set de-
ludes our senses, or in other words creates an illusion. In this sense
the virtual set continues the tradition of production design illusion
technologies, however it is not necessarily similar to those kinds of il-
lusion as realized with traditional illusion techniques, such as trompe
l’oeil painting. This assumption has been important in my research
and has led to the question of how the virtual set differs from earlier
illusions. Furthermore, it asks how the virtual set meets the challenges
that every production design has to conquer in order to be able to
create a world of cinema.
My research is conducted in the light of two virtual set produc-
tions: L’Enfant et les Sortilèges (Kroma Productions 2004) and Lu-
onnotar (Kroma Productions 2011). Both of these productions have
been shot entirely in a bluescreen studio with virtual sets. Practical ex-
amples from these productions are used as information, to show how
the virtual set creates believable fictional environments. These pro-
ductions have also been the test bed for artistic ‘making and match-
ing’, as they form a research result part of their own, for instance
when the experiences gained in the making of L’Enfant were utilized
in the making of Luonnotar. As such, my research is an example of a
case study, in which practice-based knowledge is utilized.
The theoretical framework of my thesis is formulated by cogni-
tive and ecological psychology, especially the work of ecological psy-
chologist James J. Gibson. His idea of ecological vision comprising
an ambient optic array forms a basis of my research. This approach
emphasizes the perception of surfaces in the environment. According
to Gibson, we don’t live in space - instead we live in an environment
consisting of substances and a medium. The medium is a gaseous
atmosphere and surfaces separate the substances from this medium.
In addition to Gibson’s work, a variety of film research is emphasized,
especially film researcher Richard Allen’s categories of illusion, which
are applied within the research.
The central outcome of the research is that the virtual set is iden-
tified as a moving illusion, i.e. something alive. This is in contrast to
previous illusion technologies, which were only able to create an im-
pression of the three dimensional environment as still images (trompe
l’oeil). Thus, a novel concept of the animate optic array is established
to depict the kind of mobile illusion actualized by the virtual set. ‘Ani-
mate’ stands in opposition to Gibson’s concept of ‘frozen’. An animate
optic array emphasizes that the virtual set is a vision of a digital pic-
ture that is ‘non-frozen’ and thus subject to constant change. Animate
optic array also recognizes the nature of the virtual set as being formed
by synthetic, moving surfaces.
The virtual set also puts in place a whole new series of rules for
the fictional universe. Within the research, I have pointed out that
the experience of production design is analogical to the experience of
the real world. An understanding of such design needs to be based
on the perceptual and cognitive processes of everyday life. However,
the digital universe doesn’t behave like our everyday world; instead,
it promotes unusual experiences. For instance, we can fluently transit
from microcosmos to macrocosmos within single shot - spaces be-
comes navigable. Another example of this new logic is liquid scenery
and in the digital universe, scenery surfaces can undergo transforma-
tions in an unlimited way.
I have further proposed that production design can also be in-
terpreted through Gibson’s concept of affordance. As an example; a
chair can have an affordance in the real world, it can be perceived as
‘sit-on-able’. Likewise in the production design context; the charac-
ter is positioned in relationship to his environment which in turn is
designed to meet the requirements of the story and its events. So, the
design provides the chair for character on which to ‘sit’ and based on
the character’s active behavior needs, the scenic elements can also be
perceived as meaningful.
The research has provided much needed material in a field where
there has little prior research. The use of two of my own produc-
tions has provided enlightening examples, on which to solidly base
the research. The research results echo the tendencies in current film
industry of digital effects and shows that there is much room for fur-
ther exploration in the area of production design research. Ecological
theory might well provide a valuable means to approach the subject
and particularly, Gibson’s theoretical approach to the environment
provides a good base from which to examine the theory of production
design.
Key terms: virtual set, digital effects, production design, ecological
psychology, illusion.
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 5
FOREWORD 13
I STARTING POINTS 19
1. ILLUSION TECHNOLOGY 20
1.1. A hunch of new technology 20
1.2. Architects of illusion 23
1.3. Simulated realities 28
1.4. Defining the virtual set 32
2. ARTISTIC ORIENTED RESEARCH 36
2.1. Practice based framework 36
2.2. L’Enfant 39
2.3. Luonnotar 43
2.4. Research expectations 44
2.5. Research question 46
II ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 49
3. COGNITIVE CONSIDERATIONS 50
3.1. Cognitive turn in film theory 50
3.2. Ecological theory of visual perception 52
3.3. Ecological approach to cognitive film theory 56
3.4. Psychology of the artefact emotion 60
III TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 65
4. CHALLENGES OF THE VIRTUAL SET 66
4.1. Mobility as a challenge 66
4.2. Chromakey inputs 69
4.3. Depth cues 70
4.4. Camera transitions 73
5. I LLUSION DEFINED 79
5.1. Question of illusion 79
5.2. Kinds of illusions 81
5.3. Compelling illusion 84
5.4. Delusion of trompe l’oeil 87
5.5. Allen’s reproductive illusion 89
5.6. Diegetic effect 91
5.7. Simulation and illusion 92
6. ILLUSION OF SPACE IN L’ENFANT 96
6.1. Between photograph and trompe l’oeil 96
6.2. Perception of movement 99
6.3. Widening the idea of perspective 102
6.4. Impossibility of frozen image 106
6.5. Multi-layered digital illusion 108
6.6. Information of artificiality 112
7. ECOLOGICAL VISION IN LUONNOTAR 116
7.1. Virtual set as a changing vision 116
7.2. Oriented in horizon 120
7.3. Optic flow 125
8. ILLUSION OF A DIEGETIC SPACE 129
8.1. Presence in the world of film 129
8.2. World alike logic 131
8.3. Spatial structures 135
8.4. Immersion as experience 138
8.5. A synthetic world and an alive character 140
8.6. The two fictional worlds 144
8.7. Liquid scenery 147
8.8. Navigable space 151
9. WHAT DOES AN ILLUSION AFFORD? 156
9.1. Gibson’s affordances 156
9.2. Scenography interpreted as affordances 159
9.3. Conceptual and perceptual meanings 161
9.4. Character involvement 162
9.5. Affordances and the virtual set 165
9.6. Working with the illusion 166
9.7. Metamorphosis or animism? 167
10. APPRECIATION THE ARTEFACT 172
10.1. A question of real 172
10.2. Film and emotions 174
10.3. Evidently fake 176
10.4. Artefact emotions 178
IV CONCLUSIONS 181
11. THE OUTCOME OF THE RESEARCH 182
11.1. Merging the art and the theory 182
11.2. The two productions compared 184
11.3. Animate optic array 186
11.4. A new mobile illusion 189
11.5. New rules of the fictional universe 191
11.6. Virtual set directly perceived 193
11.7. Future visions of virtual set 19
REFERENCES 197
FIGURES 204
FILMS 206
APPENDIX 1 207
APPENDIX 2 209
FOREWORD
An idea to experiment with a virtual set within television opera was
already founded in 1995. The opera in question was Maurice Ravel’s
L’Enfant et les Sortilèges. I had participated in the virtual set demo
project at the YLE broadcasting company in 1994 as well as having
designed the virtual set for the YLE main news in 1995. These proj-
ects allowed a broad possibility to make practical tests in the field of
virtual sets. At this time, the technique itself was quite unknown in
Finland.
At the same time, 3D computer animation reached one of its
greatest milestones. The first full length 3D animation Toy Story was
distributed (Pixar 1995). Toy story was a film that genuinely utilized
the possibilities of 3D illusion in the story of a toyworld. This toy-
world was an early model for L’Enfant and a similar kind of playful
magic was the intended aim for the production I had in mind.
The choice of the piece was originally my own as well as a concept
to evolve a digital fantasy world. It is not very common in the Finn-
ish production environment, that a designer gets to propose her own
choice for production. However, the idea was accepted by director,
producer Marikki Hakola at Kroma Productions in 1998. Different
schemes of how to realize the production were devised. Mrs. Hakola
agreed to direct the production herself in 2000. The preproduction
phase started in 2000 being unusually long, when compared with the
normal production design process in Finnish practice. Expectations
of the new design technology were high. Throughout tedious trial and
effort, L’Enfant was completed in 2004. The end results were notable
and a new knowledge of digital scenery was unveiled.
FOREWORD 13
L’Enfant was to begin with, a research project. However, the for-
mation of the theoretical basis of my work took years. I was research-
ing something very new to me and something that was new overall
- digital production design. From the very beginning it was clear to
me, that I wanted to tie together practice, my own practical work as
an artist, as well as theory. How this was going to happen, remained
somewhat cloudy for a very long time. Only when I was finishing
the virtual set for L’Enfant did I gradually see how the related theory
could be interwoven with the artistic work, and how the vast amount
of material became one research. For the second production of Luon-
notar completed in 2010, I had a clear concept from the beginning, of
where to go and why. In the end I felt that my artistic work was even
nourished by the contribution of theory.
To see things clearly in the beginning was somewhat difficult,
since there were simply no existing experiences in the field of vir-
tual set available and there was no previous work to refer to, or ex-
amples to look at. The situation though, started to rapidly change.
Such phenomena as The Lord of the Rings trilogy (New Line Cinema
2001, 2002, 2003), indelibly changed ideas within the film industry,
as to what digital scenic illusion made possible to actualize. However,
in Finnish film practice, where full length feature financing is state-
supported and budgets are small, the new technology was approached
slowly, and mainly in the field of commercials. The application of the
virtual set in L’Enfant and Luonnotar can be seen as a very small scale
version of the international film industries counterpart. Since neither
of them were full length, they were produced primary for television.
The research aspect however, was present from the outset.
Luonnotar offers one way by which to approach a virtual set,
where the animated set conforms the narrative. This approach can be
seen as one of the results of my research, even though I do not pro-
pose it to be the only answer on how to design virtual sets. I believe
artistic research results are often like this, in that they produce a solu-
tion to a specific production related problem, rather than a suitable
prototype for multipurpose ends. In opposition to the self conscious
trying of different approaches in L’Enfant, Luonnotar quite plainly re-
lies on a strategy of creating a meaningful environment out of simple
set elements. The question here is no longer of experimenting, but of
choosing a valid approach to the artistic production.
The artistic expectations of what it was possible to do with the
digital scenery were tremendous. For example, when I visited the IBC
conference in Amsterdam in 2000, I entered a Maya Paint Effects
demo presenting a forest with a sigh of wind. The moment felt magi-
cal, as if I could have sensed the movement of every single leaf. I then
realized truly for the first time, what creative power 3D computer
graphics held. The sense of presence in the lively conference environ-
ment felt compelling and inviting and I was left with a tremendous
enthusiasm for the possibility to create boundless imaginary worlds.
It was only later, when my enthusiasm was tested, that I found the
fictional world simply wasn’t that attainable due to the technological
complexity of the 3D computer graphics involved.
There were an endless amount of technique related issues that
were difficult to perceive in advance, but the process of L’Enfant
shows a gradual loosening of tight expectations, and how the virtual
set should visually turn out. The photorealistic vision changed to a
more picturesque vision; that which confined the visual world. The is-
sues I confronted made me ask a very simple question. What do I see
when I see the virtual set - What is it that I am aiming to display with
it? Compared with traditional production design it felt like magic: I
was attempting to create an impression of a lively French room or of
the ancient world out of pixels. So what was I ultimately seeing, pixels
on a surface or a French room?
At the same time I recognized the virtual set as forming a scenic
illusion, one, that I believed to contribute to the tradition of produc-
tion design illusion technologies. As I have discussed earlier, produc-
tion design as an art and practice has defined itself in respect to the
concept of illusion. My original assumption, as to what kind of real-
ity status could be attained by the virtual set, was inconstant. Most
often, the result I got from my artistic work was that a full virtual set
could be recognized as an artificial digital image. Nevertheless, virtual
sets succeeded in creating a sense of a three dimensional environment
and of character being present there. This contradiction was intrigu-
ing. Since my artistic goals were focused in designing the productions
thoroughly with the virtual set in mind, it left very little room to hide
or confuse the very self-evident characteristic of the virtual set as a
digital realm.
FOREWORD 15
Similar productions (but full length features) shot almost entirely
in a Chromakey studio may include Sin City (Dimension Films 2005)
or The Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow (Paramount 2004).
Both of these films create a cinematic world that is quite overtly arti-
ficial. In my experience, the special effects scenes in a film that has a
considerable amount a live action footage combined with traditional
set elements, functions differently: the end result being that it feels
not that heavily ‘digital’. For instance, the effects scenes I was in-
volved as a production designer and special effects artist in Storm-
heart (Stormheart 2009) surprised me. I was highly convinced that
everybody would have perceived our 1980’s Berlin scenes with their
extensive digital mattes as being fake, but none of the critics even
mentioned them. Since the reality was established elsewhere in the
film, our artificial landscapes were left in peace and went unnoticed.
Full virtual set productions though, are in this sense much more chal-
lenging. Of course, the definition of the ‘full virtual set production’ is
vague, as films simply have a different amount of computer generated
imagery and a different amount of traditional sequences.
Thus the artistic process of L’Enfant and Luonnotar for me meant
growing to understand the rules of the virtual set. Sometimes the
lessons were harsh, and lot of trying, failing and trying again was
endured. In Luonnotar, I had already accepted a different strategy
than that I had originally utilized with L’Enfant. In L’Enfant I spent
days modeling a French fireplace or a Rococo style chair. The tedious
amount of detail was there, since I believed it as creating a convincing
reality. As Manovich (2001, 294) summarizes: “Given enough time
and money, almost anything can be simulated on a computer” - given
enough time and money, which we did not have. I also became very
aware of the danger of an endless chase for complete realistic simula-
tion. In other words, one could always add more details. Instead I
found myself asking more prominently: what can I display with the
virtual set? What was most important?
While the virtual set as a television based technology did not quite
seem to take off, I focused on the film, were the computer generated
imagery was more successful. Through watching films like Twister
(Warner Bros 1996) and The Perfect Storm (Warner Bros 2000), I
started to think differently about digital design. Instead of creating
terrific models, that would be more and more detailed every time,
I started to long for the design elements that would be more alive
than just a still model of the virtual set. In L’Enfant, the most success-
ful scenes for me were the ones that contained animated elements:
the garden in the wind, the room in the whirling mist. The move-
ment itself became a subject of my artistic study: in my expectations
I coupled movement with emotion, i.e. by expressing the movement
it would be possible to expressed emotion. As discussed, in Luon-
notar the design consisted of elements that were there prominently
in order to indicate the movement: the clouds were pillowing, the
sea was storming. This ten minute production ended up being fully
animated, thus entailing a totally new kind of approach for me as a
designer - I had made a move from a modeled set to an animated set.
Throughout, I have been tremendously interested in the moment
where the virtual set ceases to be just a digital background, but starts
to function as an illusion of something alive. This becomes accessible,
if we understand the virtual set in a dynamic, perceiver driven way.
Therefore I became interested in ecological psychology, where the one
who experiences is as important as the one that is experienced. I was
especially influenced by psychologist James J. Gibson in the forma-
tion of my research framework. Gibson believed the quality of en-
vironment was a direct reason why humans and animals behave the
way they do. Gibson’s ideas led me to ask, how does the virtual set
function as an environment and how do we interact with it. Follow-
ing Gibson, I found those areas of cognitive and ecological theory, of
which my final research questions were born.
FOREWORD 17
I STARTING POINTS
A sketch for L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
STARTING POINTS 19
1. ILLUSION TECHNOLOGY
1.1. A hunch of new technology
In the beginning there was just a hunch. In 1990’s, the virtual set
was one of the rapidly developing digital simulation technologies, and
seen as a new and stimulating virtual reality application for film and
television. Simulation can be regarded as an imitation of real objects
or events (Hegarty 2006), thus the virtual set typically mimics the
real set. Another notion for the simulation is as a copy of the model
(Massumi 1987). The use of a simulator usually comprises represent-
ing the chosen key characteristics or behaviors of a selected system,
for example - the virtual set system may allow certain limited cam-
era movements equal to those possible using real scenery. Simulation
shows us the condition of events or the possible alternate routes in
which an event can take place. Described this way, simulation in-
volves a functioning model: “virtual realities that resemble particular
operational or observational environments” (Tikka 2008, 44). 20th
century evolution of digital simulation has provided many uses, for
instance in education, computer games, engineering and medical sci-
ences. Usually, simulation such as the virtual set, is used when the real
thing is not accessible, is too difficult to access, or it just doesn’t exist.
This is the case of simulation where the copy exists without a model
(Massumi 1987).
The virtual set promised something strikingly new to everyone
involved in creating scenic environments, in other words, those places
the events and stories took place in. As shown by several virtual set
applications, it was finally possible to replace a complex three dimen-
sional set or stage with an artificial substitute, that was accurate and
convincing, allowed fluent flow of events and with which it was pos-
sible to interact with a camera in a dynamic and flexible way. Thus the
mission of virtual reality could be understood as something highly
sophisticated, as opposed to a clumsy idea of mere simulation, a real
world experience that at the fundamental level was nothing but syn-
thetic. Therefore it was no wonder, that as a phenomenon, virtual
reality was soon to be celebrated even in the form of futuristic hype,
resembling the techno enthusiasm of the early 20th century. While
the virtual set was just one of the virtual reality applications exposed,
it seemed to be thoroughly a part of the zeitgeist dream. The possibil-
ity of perfect immersion in limitless digital realities fed the mind and
anticipated wild changes in worldview and models of living. It is im-
portant here to acknowledge the idea of immersion: it can be referred
as the state of consciousness where a viewer’s physical self awareness
is diminished due to the feeling that he is surrounded by an environ-
ment, other than that where he actually is.
In this period of hype, film and television were right on board.
What could be more engaging in the field of entertainment industry,
than the idea of limitless realities, endless possibilities in world cre-
ation? The most complete model for the real time simulation of set
environments was first brought into the limelight in the area of tele-
vision production design. This happened in the early 1990’s, before
digital effects truly hit in the film industry. In the year 2000, Virtual
Studio author Moshe Moshkovitz (2000, 31) summarized:
The virtual studio will no doubt change the ‘look’ of many TV

programs in the years to come and the look of television in gen-
eral. It will give it a more modern and ‘computer age’ appearance
or any other appearance designers will give it. New possibilities
will be opened up in terms of shape, color, texture and movement.
Studio scenery will no longer be limited to what you can build out
of the existing materials such as wood, cardboard and metal and
to textures you can obtain by using a few cans of paint. Virtual
scenery elements will be able to move in three-dimensional space,
STARTING POINTS 21
not attached or constrained in any way. Only the talent and imagi-
nation of the designers will limit the appearance and the diversity
of virtual scenery. The traditional way in which TV programs are
produced today will be changed.
The relief that it might be possible to avoid the laborious phase

of set construction is brought here to the forefront. Both in film and
television, the building of scenery is commonly thought as a heavy-
duty, time and money consuming process. Thus, the avoidance of
unnecessary work was seen as one of the prior motivations for the new
technology. However, Moshkovitz gives a hint that with the virtual
set, it will be possible to build scenery that couldn’t be built out of
existing materials, in other words something that could not exist in
reality. Even though his idea is not very elaborate, it is truly intrigu-
ing: what is the scenery that is possible to build with the virtual set?
Especially, what is the scenery that is “not limited to what you can
build out of existing materials?”
As the developer of the virtual set technology for television, Mos-
kowitz himself gives some hint of the future in promise, but Alex
McDowell (2004, 20), a famous production designer, poses a more a
drastic question: “Why build sets at all?” At this point of the work,
we were in 2004 and the film industry had changed forever and was
fully exploring the possibilities of digital world creation in cinematic
expression. Remarkable special effects films followed each other, for
example Titanic (Twentieth Century Fox 1997), The Lord of the Rings
trilogy (New Line Cinema 2001, 2002, 2003), Moulin Rouge (Twen-
tieth Century Fox 2001). McDowell wanted to make, I believe, an
ambiguous statement regarding the production designer’s overall role
in the film and television industry. But he also made a conceptual
contest - why were physical sets truly needed when could the physi-
cal scenery be replaced with a digital version? McDowell’s discussion
takes place in the context of film education, nevertheless in the most
crucial essence in McDowell’s thinking is, that the actual process of
building a physical set is conceptually meaningless in the eventual film-
making.
Here, we are eventually talking in the same terms as Moshkovitz:
wood, cardboard, metal, paint. McDowell (2004, 20) claims:
There will seldom be a time when a production designer in real
world production will need to build and paint a set. If they do, any
of them could learn most of the requisite skills in an afternoon.
Instead, a talent against the bluescreen means according to McDowell

(Ibid.) an open playground for the filmmaker, a playground that is
associated with “intelligence, instinct and knowledge of pure design
theory”.
I would not wish to argue here for the lost meaning of craftsman-
ship in contemporary production design. Neither, I believe, would
McDowell. What I am hoping to address, is the radical beat of the
discussion. None of the early cinema effect technologies had reached
out to the same extent within the idea of artificial scenery as a com-
prehensive model than the virtual set.
1.2. Architects of illusion

Before I progress further with new technology, I need to back up. I
should pose two questions; what was production design art and prac-
tice alike before the digital revolution, and what were the elements of
the art and practice, that became quite intensely digitalized?
Firstly, it is worthwhile to define the basic terms. The production
designer can be seen as the head of the art department, primarily
responsible for giving a film a cohesive visual concept through the de-
sign of interior and exterior sets. Compared with theater scenography,
this is a straightforward understanding, since in modern theater: “sce-
nography is not simply concerned with creating and presenting imag-
es to an audience; it is concerned with audience reception and engage-
ment. It is a sensory as well as an intellectual experience, emotional
as well as rational” (McKinney et al. 2009, 4). By film production
design, in this research it is meant as an art that urges the production
of a coherent, unified vision of the scene of the film story. In this way,
the environment in which the narrative may happen is created. Re-
lated art forms within film could be cinematography, costume design,
and sound design. In practice production design, art has many ways
to provide its aim, such as in studio construction, location scouting
STARTING POINTS 23
and currently, digital effects. However, within this research the focus
lies in the eventual holistic experience of the world of the film, which
is a consequence of the diverse methods employed. Film as a term
will be understood broadly in the sense of narrative film and video.
A production design illusion is an optical illusion. This kind of
illusion is an image that can be understood as being deceptive or
misleading. Thus, the information perceived doesn’t physically equal
what is actually present in the stimulus source. Illusions are primarily
researched, because it is believed that they reveal how the perceptual
system works. We can capture an entire world inside our head based
on false information. This innate ability of illusion is very important
in understanding how the technologies of production design have
evolved, i.e. how the production designer uses the knowledge and
how the brain handles the visual information.
Caligari’s Cabinet and Other Grand Illusions is the English title of
a History of Film Design by Léon Barsacq (1976), a French produc-
tion designer and historian of film design. Barsacq has shown the
development of the present day status of the art, and how techniques
of illusion have served film design during different era of film design,
taking new shapes, formulating themselves alongside the new tech-
nologies and providing a response to the needs of expression. The
questions of the early stages of production design seem to be surpris-
ingly similar to the questions of today during the era of the newly
digitalized set – those of spatiality and reality (Ibid. 6-7, 16). Peter
Ettedgui (1999, 10) also defines the illusion as being central to prac-
tice: “In both aesthetic and practical terms, we can define the role of
production designer as being the architect of the illusions depicted on
screen”. Aesthetic here can be understood as a manifestation of visual
design, and practical as a plan with which to realize the visual ideas.
The relationship between illusion and reality has been ambiguous.
Production designer Dante Ferretti (in Ettedgui 1999, 61) discusses
his collaboration with film directors Pier Paolo Pasolini and Federico
Fellini, and the way these famous directors approached production
design. “Pasolini liked to work on location because it gave the film a
sense of reality”. For Fellini, though, a relationship with the existing
location was conversed: “Fellini only used locations as a source of
inspiration. For example, once we drove out of Rome to go to the
seaside. We spent hours staring at the sea, studying it, trying to figure
out how we could recreate it in the studio” (Ibid.).
What Ferretti describes, can actually be seen as a common scheme
in production design practice. Since the beginning of the history of
film design, there have been two essential ways to build up a films’
environment. First, the art of production design has been associated
with the central process of choosing the filming locations. The film-
maker’s decision has been (as in the case of Pasolini in the example
above), to shoot on an existing, designated location. This location ex-
ists in the real world, belongs to it, yet at same time it will be - through
the film making process - captured and enhanced as “the world of
film”. World of film is a concept production designers commonly
use, and in this specific practice-related meaning it refers to the vision
of the environment for the story to take place in. Emphasizing the
vision as a ‘world’, associates with the concept of comprehensiveness.
The eventual world of film can share the sense of placement similar
and comparable to the sense of placement that is essential to our expe-
rience of the real world, and the concept of ‘place’ in that world (like
Berlin being Berlin). It is also possible, that the existing locations will
be transcended as to something which forms an imaginary place for
the film, and this choice might emphasize some conscious, recognized
narration, from which the visual theme in the filmmaking whole is
originated.
Commonly, choosing the filming locations is a complex task
where several artistic and practical factors are taken into consider-
ation. When the existing locations cease to meet the production crite-
ria, other means to create filmic locations come into use. Built studio
constructions, miniature models and painted backdrops are the most
important techniques for fictional environments, which to some ex-
tent really exist - they are associated as illusion techniques. Creating
the environment of the film, in general, will consciously become a
process of building or constructing instead of mere a process of choice.
From the viewpoint of filmmaking practice, this means a conscious-
ness, that the filmic world is a construction and this construction
consists of fragments, referred to as the imagined whole.
In present day film making practice, most of the films intensely
and powerfully combine the use of existing and constructed shooting
STARTING POINTS 25
locations as their working method. The chosen method can thematize
a films’ vision, in the same way that “the real location” for Pasolini
meant an underlined sense of reality. At the same time however, it is
interesting what happened next in Ferretti’s story: Fellini ended up
creating the sea in the studio out of plastic, inspired by the plastic he
saw on tomato fields. Fellini simply thought: “It looks like the sea…”
It seems, that for Fellini (in Ettedgui 1999, 61) there was a certain
fascination of the illusion itself, almost a confession at the very start
as to the sea not being real.
Between Fellini and Pasolini, or to be more precise, between the
production design methods Fellini and Pasolini as filmmakers applied
(and the methods which Ferretti saw as extremities), there exist sev-
eral production design conventions that combine both real and con-
structed elements in various ways within one film production. How-
ever, the actual practice is extremely diverse. What practice seems to
widely combine different approaches, is an attempt to hide the seams
between the real and fake elements: I see this is a singular effort to
keep the world of film as a homogeneous whole and giving the idea
of credibility.
Realism has become a considerable issue regarding production
design. The cinema has tackled this question early on. Barsacq writes
(1976, 7) “Here, perhaps is one of the fundamental requirements of
the cinema: to give the impression of having photographed real ob-
jects”. While this statement will need further critical discussion, here
it is used to illustrate how the Barsacq sees the essential motivation
of design as a response to the idea, that films present events as they
would be photographed in the real or real alike world.
The illusion of real has thus become such a major theme in pro-
duction design. Production designer Allan Starski (in Ettedgui 1999,
97) says: “Film stories, even taken from life are fictions. The designer
responsibility is to make the audience believe that the artifice they are
watching is real.” Real in this case means convincing (at least on some
levels), so that the spectator can genuinely become immersed in the
experience of the film.
However, as Fellini’s case exemplifies, there has also been a need
to create imaginary realities or filmic worlds that very consciously are
not real – as opposed being real in a transparent way. French director
Rene Clair (in Barsacq 1976, vii) explains:
From the very birth of moving pictures, dialectic developed. The
Lumière brothers, who came to films from photography, focused
on aspects of reality (today they followers would talk of cinéma-
vérité). In turn, Méliès, who came to films from illusionism and
theater, was less interested in reproducing what he saw than trans-
forming it into what he imagined. A magician, he produced it as
if from a hat a surreal world that prefigured both the distortions of
Caligari and the contemporary fantasies of science fiction. Between
these two extremes lies the concept of ‘imitated’ reality, the equiva-
lent of sculpture as compared to a plaster art.
With this discussion, I am trying to describe how the illusion

is traditionally approached within production design practice. I am
also trying to lead into one of my central ideas; that the concept of
illusion within production design will need further discussion. As in
the case of the work of Fellini and Pasolini, or Méliès and Lumière,
the art of production design has shown a tremendous ability to both
capture and create realities, and produce an illusion of a whole world
on screen. When computer generated images started to replace tradi-
tional illusion techniques, one of the fundamental themes was again,
reality effect. The work of new media researcher Lev Manovich, as a
whole, shows a genuine celebration of 3D computer graphics’ ability
to assemble reality. This can naturally be seen as a consequence of 3D
computer graphics’ “ability to simulate three-dimensional images of
both existent and imagined objects and environments” (Manovich
1992, 12).
Much of this discussion is based on my own experiences of the
production design art of constantly creating an illusion and a digitally
designed set as a specific kind of illusion. At this point it is useful to
refer to the idea of the environment as captured through a window
and the idea of the environment as constructed within a frame. These
metaphors (a window and a frame) can generally be seen as describing
the realist and formalist film theories. When we rely upon the reduc-
tion as a window, having a whole and entire world in front of us, we
emphasize the scenic process as a perception. On the other hand,
when we rely upon a reduction as a frame, we can also recognize the
scenic process as an expression.
STARTING POINTS 27
Traditionally, the opposing ways in which Méliès and Lumière
approached the idea of the filmic world, have often been referred
to. While Lumière captured the illusion of real in his films in a way
the early film audience could hardly differentiate (what they saw on
screen was taken from what actually existed), Méliès created a fantasy
realm of his own by the use of scenery tricks that owed much to the
scenery of theater.
However, in the course of film history, the choice between the
found and the constructed has not been made solely on the basis of
stylistic reasons. The development of production design has reflected
the deep technological issues which penetrate the whole of filmmak-
ing practice. The extravagant studio style developed in Hollywood in
the 30’s and 40’s, was heavily due to the prerequisite of the sound
techniques used in those days. When lightweight portable recording
equipment became available, the filmmaking technology was literally
liberated. The French new wave presented as an outburst of freedom
and the return to real and natural shooting locations, and as such, the
escape from the heavily crafted studio environment was experienced
almost on a metaphorical level.
In theater design, the Brechtian revolution was crucially the
liberation from theatrical illusion as well as the accompanying illu-
sion scenery, and a conscious spectator was witnessing the authentic
theatrical event taking place in the concurrent realm. From Brecht
onwards, the postmodern scenography allowed an even more clear
position for the spectator and there has been a distinct urge to dem-
onstrate the scenic essence as artificial. In film production design, the
similar revelation of the essential scenic quality seems not to be pur-
sued. On the contrary, film production design balances between the
transparency of the medium and the apparent scenery.
1.3. Simulated realities

Production designer Anna Asp (in Ettedgui 1999, 119) confesses her
skeptical feelings about computer generated imagery:
Working on Les Misérables, however, gave me the opportunity to

work with computer-generated imagery for the first time, in order
to extend the wall of Paris and build up the city skyline behind it. It
was fascinating experience, but I have to confess to mixed feelings
about CGI. One can envisage a day when new technology makes
the work of production designer redundant. However, the com-
puter is a tool which allows you to achieve things which you cannot
construct on the stage. On a personal level, though, it doesn’t really
interest me: I like to work in three dimensions, I like the physical-
ity of a set or a model. I Iike to be able to reach out and touch it.
The quotation from Asp reveals, that despite of its fascinating

qualities, computer generated imagery lacks something fundamental,
which in Asp’s words is physicality; we are not able to touch computer
generated environments and objects. A similar kind of rejection is
seen in media artist Toni Dove’s (1994, 24) description of the anxi-
ety around the virtual reality experience: “Will this be some kind of
nightmare escalation of worst aspects of television? Will we get lost
in a synthetic reality that isolates each of us in an electronic dream,
cut off from each other and from the physical world? “. Eventually
what she states, is that the idea of dislocation as a consequence of
the new technical revolution, challenges “the construction of gender,
identity, division of labor and the shape of public and private space”
(Ibid.). The computers (also as “icons” themselves) provide in her
terms, a lack of “the body presence” and “deep anxiety about the loss
of boundaries” (Ibid.). Even though the virtual set differs as an experi-
ence to the full virtual reality applications Dove refers to, similarities
exist and isolation in the digital world might remain also as a topmost
feeling in the question of new virtual scenery.
Asp sees the issue oppositely to McDowell, and recognizes the
meaning of the physical presence even in the design process. For de-
signers, the scenic model has represented an instructional copy of the
original, which in this case is the conceit of the actual scenery. The
scenic model has also turned into an instrument of the rough idea of
simulation, as is clear in production designer Dan Weil’s (in Ettedgui
1999, 195) description of working with Stanley Kubrick:
You couldn’t do a vague sketch for Stanley; it was absolutely criti-

cal that you knew exact size of everything that you drew. Sketches
STARTING POINTS 29
would be turned into models, and then Stanley would photograph
the models from every angle on different lenses so that every design
permutation was thoroughly explored before construction started.
Thus, in the scenic model the same viewing positions will become
available as in the eventual set construction. A scenic model is the
depiction of the mental image of the scenery. It is a physical object
consisting of cardboard and wood, and it is something that is possible
to touch. To some extent, scenic models have been replaced by digital
previzualizations and furthermore, digital models have replaced the
physical scenery itself, so becoming scenery themselves.
The virtual set can be seen as a special form of virtual reality or
VR -technology:
The medium of ‘immersive virtual space,’ or virtual reality—as it

is generally known—has intriguing potential as an arena for con-
structing metaphors about our existential being-in-the-world and
for exploring consciousness as it is experienced subjectively, as it is
felt. Such environments can provide a new kind of “place” through
which our minds may float among three-dimensionally extended
yet virtual forms in a paradoxical combination of the ephemerally
immaterial with what is perceived and bodily felt to be real (Davies
1997, 293).
There has been much debate over this topic, ranging from philosophi-
cal discourse to practical applications in computing.
With modern computer generated imagery it is possible to build
cinematic environments that were not possible with earlier special
effects methods, an example of which is The Lord of the Rings trilogy
(New Line Cinema 2001, 2002, 2003) and the breathtaking fantasy
world it offered. However, it seems almost like the encounter with the
virtual set has made the filmmakers to ask, ‘what is reality’? Matrix
(Warner Bros 1999) is a most famous example of a film that utilizes
the subject of an artificial reality. The reality people live in Matrix is a
product of an advanced computer program and beneath it there is a
real world waiting to be exposed. The idea of simulated reality has had
a fundamental effect on production design art. Alongside computers
there have risen ideas, that the universe we live is a sophisticated emu-
lation of the real universe. Everything, including us, is part of a com-
puter simulation that is indistinguishable from true reality (Bostrom
2003, 243-255). Such films as Matrix reflect these kinds of anxious
hypotheses typical of a computer age and as such, the way scenery is
made is also contributory to the problematic crux of the story.
The term itself ‘artificial reality’, was invented by Myron Krueger
(1983) to be used to describe his immersive environments. Krueger’s
concept can be associated with “the system that fosters the feeling
of immersion and interactivity, the sense of being in a new kind of
space”, thus anticipating the idea of virtual reality (Rheingold 1993
[1991], 115). Virtual reality refers to computer simulated environ-
ments that create a sense a presence in the real or imaginary world.
What is the crucial difference between the traditional special ef-
fect techniques and the new digital ones? What the early special ef-
fects techniques offered was a method of imitation. With the emer-
gence of the virtual set there was raised an issue of simulated reality,
which meant that reality was not only imitated, it was replaced with
the artificial substitute. Thought in this way, the virtual set is not an
imitation of the real set, it is a synthetic replica. Here also lies the
core of the conflict: on one hand there are unlimited possibilities for
imagination, but on the other hand there is the anxiety of an artificial
reality.
Simulation makes it possible to create sensory delusion in a way
that has not been previously possible. The essence of the overall VR
experience is that the spectator senses to be interactively present in
the simulated environment. The virtual set as a VR application for
television and film does not actually allow this: the interaction exists
between the author and the virtual set technology only during the
television or film making process. In my research I will approach the
virtual set as a simulation in a broad manner, and simulation in my
research firstly means that an artificial reality replaces an authentic
one. Artificial reality has a denotation of an imitation or even a copy
whereas authentic reality is labeled as an original model. Furthermore,
different virtual set methods utilize different possibilities of comput-
er simulation. Currently, the virtual set does not perhaps arouse as
strong a discussion as in earlier times and this may partly reflect that
STARTING POINTS 31
simulation technologies have become more sophisticated and more an
everyday part of filmmaking.
1.4. Defining the virtual set

For the purposes of this research, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss
what is meant by the term ‘the virtual set’. In this research, this term
is used for the computer generated 3D image that is used as a back-
ground for a live character. The virtual set thus situates the charac-
ter somewhere she or he is not, and usually does this by the aid of
a technology called chroma keying. Chroma keying or Chromakey
compositing, removes (makes transparent) the colored background
behind the character (for example green in a green studio) and re-
places it with the virtual set (image). This technique is also referred to
as color keying, green screen, or blue screen. Strictly speaking chroma
keying refers to a technically specific keying among television, but is
used here as a general term for all kinds of color based keying.
A real time virtual set allows the real time combination of the
characters and the background i.e. the virtual set in a seamless, virtual
reality-like manner. Figure 1, A virtual set background (L’Enfant et les
Sortilèges 2004), and Figure 2, A character and a virtual set background
(L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004), show an example of a background
and a character combined with the background. For the integration
of the characters and background, Chromakey technology is again
used. The key point in the function of the real time virtual set is that
the real camera can move in Chromakey studio with the character,
whilst the virtual camera is being rendered as repeating the real cam-
era movement. Sometimes a real time virtual set is called a virtual
studio. Moshkovitz (2000, 6-7) describes the virtual studio:
In virtual studio computer generated images are used as back-

grounds. The foreground camera output and the background
computer-generate images are fed to a chroma-keyer that combines
two pictures. All foreground camera movements are tracked, the
movement data is processed and fed to the computer that produces
and renders the background picture, which is moved accordingly
(...) In this way a visually coordinated combination of foreground
Figure 1: A virtual set background
(L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 2: A character and a virtual set

background (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
STARTING POINTS 33
and background movement is created. The resulting combination
looks real and it appears to viewer that talent is actually inside the
artificial surrounding and is an integral part of it.
Moshkovitz (Ibid. 6) also recommends the term virtual set for

the virtual studio, however, it is important to notice, that I have dif-
ferentiated a real time virtual set and a virtual set. A virtual set in my
definition can be a very simple combination of foreground character
and the background computer generated image without any camera
movement. On the other hand, as defined by Moshkovitz, a virtual
studio (a real time virtual set) differs from the visual effect techniques
used in film, in which scenes are edited later. A virtual studio does
not necessarily need any post production since it is in real time. Es-
sentially, the real time virtual set system combines two video outputs,
one from the background rendering software and one from the fore-
ground camera live action shootage.
However, as I have defined the virtual set, it can contain the post-
produced camera movement in the scene. This movement can be cre-
ated with the aid of so-called match moving software. In film, match
moving is a visual effects technique that makes it possible to insert
computer generated imagery into live-action footage with correct po-
sition, scale, orientation, and motion, relative to the filmed objects
in the shot. Match moving can be sometimes referred to as motion
tracking. Again, a real time virtual set contains real time motion
tracking, compared with the match moving produced during post
production.
A virtual set, that contains post-tracked motion, is not usually
considered as a virtual set, however for my research purposes I find
this terminology appropriate. I will approach the idea of the virtual
set in a more generalized manner and simply address the issues of real
time computer graphics, as these are not the focus of this research.
Still, I do not wish to claim that the question, as to whether the mo-
tion of the virtual set is created in real time or post-produced, does
not matter. For instance, a real time virtual set can be used for live
broadcasts.
Likewise the motion tracking systems are different from each
other; they can be either mechanical or optical in their measurement
and the rendering software using the camera data and generating a
synthetic image differs from one manufacturer to another. A real time
virtual set usually requires very specific rendering software, where as
match moving software can read data from ordinary 3D animation
software and vice versa. Overall the variation and the possibilities of
techniques range extensively, and precisely for this reason I have de-
cided to approach a virtual set at a prototype level. The combination
of the virtual set software, the tracking solution and the video mixer
(needed for Chromakey) is termed within this research as the real
time virtual set system.
An important factor considered in this research is the idea of how
the virtual set needs to adapt to the different camera settings (such as
angle and zoom), or movement types (pan, tilt, dolly, track, crane).
With post-produced match moving software, usually a very complex
movement can be detected and replicated in the rendering software.
The real time virtual set tracking systems differ, and are able for ex-
ample, to detect only the settings of zoom, pan and tilt, or, on the
other hand, be able to track the most complicated handheld camera
(usually if this is the case there is a combination of different tracking
methods used). In cinematic expression, the limitation of camera
movement possibilities can prove crucial.
Different tracking methods can be associated with different types
of virtual set system. A 3D virtual set system allows unlimited camera
movement at best. A 2D virtual set system is more constrained using
pre-rendered background plates. For instance at the BBC, the 2D vir-
tual set has been used successfully. The BBC technical director Danny
Popkin (1997, 17-18) has noted that in BBC television productions,
many of the shots did not actually move at all and when they moved,
a modest pan, tilt and zoom was applied. In the case of the BBC, some
of the research has showed that this has been actually the case in 90%
of programmes. Thus it is not necessary to have an excessive computer
capacity to render the full view of a set all the time. The background
can be moved in sympathy with the foreground by using a 2D virtual
set system, effectively generating a windowed view of a pre-rendered
wide-angle shot. The background is not generated in real time, hence
much less computing power is required for rendering.
STARTING POINTS 35
2. ARTISTIC ORIENTED RESEARCH
2.1. Practice based framework
The problem with artistic oriented research is how to generalize the
possible outcomes of a perhaps foggy subjective process. In my pro-
cess I have been trying to establish a ground from which it is possible
to extrapolate. I have had a clear baseline in my experience as a tradi-
tionally trained designer, therefore some comparison between tradi-
tional and digital scenery has been possible. This is not, however, the
only benefit of an artistic background. The major idea in my research
is that the virtual set illusion is tested in a real production environ-
ment. As such, my research is an example of a case study (Yin 1994,
13-26). This approach has been pivotal in my attempt to evaluate the
virtual set as a pictorial illusion, and as something that indeed changes
in time and becomes an integral part of the whole. Art historian Ernst
Gombrich (1968, 24) has referred to this kind of artistic search as
“making and matching”. As such, it felt very interesting to be able to
experiment within the scale of full productions. Usually, film projects
are quite tight in the sense of what can be done in terms of their
resources. It is precisely because of this empirical aspect, that there
seems to be even unmotivated elements in L’Enfant, such as the chair
and the mirror hanging in the air in the princess scene: they were
there because of the general idea just to experiment with the different
possibilities of illusion. The ghostly appearance of the chair simply
implies the urge to come to terms with what is possible with 3D sur-
faces - they can become transparent. Luonnotar as an artistic whole is
much more precise, and all the elements feel necessary. In this sense
I allowed myself much less freedom in Luonnotar.
In order to provide focus, I have decided to deal only with those
parts of the artistic process that are directly associated with the pro-
duction designer’s task in the digital film making process. In every
production there exists the artistic crew and the production is to
much extent the consequence of collective dynamics. In my example
production, I have found my experience of co-operation with the di-
rector and the digital compositors especially important. However, in
this research I will speak rather strictly from the point of view of the
profession of a production designer. What the designer’s task in the
digital workflow was initially not too easy to define, since digital tools
change the traditional design workflow itself. For example, when de-
signing for virtual set and post-produced scenery effects, a production
designer needs to define the lightning involved. In large scale interna-
tional productions involving computer generated imagery, there exists
a variety of new job descriptions. The practice itself has been chang-
ing, though the role of production designer has remained central.
Illusions are successful insofar they engage us. Through trial and
error, films have developed conventions and styles that are realistic
and “potentially acceptable to every human being on earth” (Ander-
son 1996, 11-12). This process has taken decades to reach the pres-
ent day status of film art. Computer generated imagery was truly a
new technology of film I have been able to trace from its beginnings.
Therefore the empirical research was a very natural thing to associ-
ate with the artistic work: everything was so new, that it needed to
be thoroughly explored anyhow. However, my research is not merely
practice oriented. I am rather aimed at the fundamental, large-scale
issues of the virtual set illusion, which I am hoping to describe from a
practice-based perspective, giving examples through real productions.
Related theory is used to structure the major issues as they have arisen
in L’Enfant and Luonnotar, as well as to explain those questions that
have emerged.
What is the reverse influence? The theoretical views have been for-
mulated around practice-based issues, so has there been an impact the
STARTING POINTS 37
other way round? Yes, but that process has been very sophisticated. I
have been impressioned upon by the theoretical part of my research
and therefore the theory started to formulate my artistic responses. I
had always thought of scenery as a static structure that allowed the
lightning and the movement of the camera. My theoretical findings
articulated this vision as constantly changing, as something that is
never still. Why should the virtual set then be inanimate? As a result,
I felt it appropriate to change the focus of the artistic work into a
process of designing movement and not on static scenic structures. In
L’Enfant for instance, I felt unhappy of the distant atmosphere of the
artificial set. Due to my theoretical considerations, I started to re-
think digital scenery: I reinvented the movement. Furthermore, I be-
came assured that in certain styles and conventions it is not fatal to be
overtly artificial, though it is important that all the information that a
set conveys, is in a right way meaningful. Right way meaningful refers
here to the narrative and the demands of the specific artistic interpre-
tation. My theoretical thinking gave me the conclusion, whereas the
movement was essential in creating meanings.
What is clear though is that film productions have a logic of their
own, and they don’t exemplify such a thing as the exact experimental
circumstance. Instead the film making process has many variables,
and the success or the failure of the illusion can be the consequence of
many things. This is the challenge of artistic research. But, if it would
be otherwise, such things as the emotional response to the film’s digi-
tal world - this as an entirety, would be quite impossible to even dis-
cuss from the point of view of a practitioner. Here, I have to hope that
tacit knowledge will guide the processing, and rest on the assumption,
that an artistic background can in fact produce worthwhile views, and
that together with theoretical insights can produce new thinking. I
generally feel, that the end result of my research, whether the artistic
outcomes (L’Enfant and Luonnotar) or the theoretical outcome (the
conclusions of this thesis), are expressions of the same gained knowl-
edge, even though they are formally different.
2.2. L’Enfant
Composer Maurice Ravel (1924) subtitled L’Enfant et les sortilèges as
“the lyrical fantasy”. The story resembles Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adven-
tures in Wonderland (1869). The libretto by Colette proceeds with the
logic of surrealism: the bored little boy imagines how the furniture
becomes alive, the wallpaper figures start to sing, and the animals
speak and feel like humans. The boy has been naughty towards his
environment and pet animals, and so experiences a kind of nightmare
revenge. However, in the end a certain maturing takes place, and the
boy is able to confront his environment with empathy.
The purpose was to fully use a virtual set in this opera of approxi-
mately one hour duration. Thus, when the production was finally
realized 2004, it was done, with the exception of one scene, in the
bluescreen studio with a virtual set. The technique used mostly in
L’Enfant, was the real time 2D virtual set. In this type of virtual set, all
the rendering of the scenic environments is made before the recording
in studio. Usually this kind of system is referred as a “low level system”
of the real time virtual set. In L’Enfant there was a relatively precise
storyboard, according to which the predefined 2D backgrounds could
be designed. Since a 2D virtual set consists of essentially 2D images, it
does not allow the similar kind of 3D simulation, as a true 3D virtual
set system would. However, a modest camera movement with pan, tilt
and zoom functions is adequately achieved. The camera however, isn’t
though allowed to track or dolly, i.e. to change viewpoint.
As such, the selection of L’Enfant for the piece was very inten-
tional. It was based on the 90’s knowledge of the virtual set: L’Enfant
felt like a story made purposeful to realize by using the new technol-
ogy. The traditional animation film has continuously stepped into the
area of surrealism. A typical example of this is the first full length
animation film Snow White and Seven Dwarfs (Disney 1937). In the
film there exists a famous scene, where the inner fears of an escaping
Snow White are visualized by presenting the trees in the forest as live,
monster-like beings. This resembles the basic story of L’Enfant, with
the environment becoming magically alive. It is also notable, that the
production, from its very beginning, was meant to be a source for
STARTING POINTS 39
research. However, my original vision of the production was still very
modest. I was assuming no more than a reduced look of the set I
presumed a virtual set could afford and I believed, with the virtual
set you couldn’t accomplish a very challenging or complicated scenic
environment.
However, at the same time we were planning our production,
the computer generated image technologies within film had just ex-
ploded. The applications were innumerable and were adapted in mul-
tiple ways. The animated characters came into being, dynamic phe-
nomenon stormed and imaginary environments were constructed.
From the 1990’s perspective, it was an unexpected revolution. Much
was also argued, as to whether the digital effects had truly brought
something new to the scene or were they just a new tool amongst a
traditional tool box. This question eventually underlines the research
project of L’Enfant. Nonetheless, it can be confirmed, that the pos-
sibilities of the digital effects have provided new workflows and a new
kind of end result.
The sophisticated digital effects that occupied the cinema screen
could not be without influence on our work. The virtual set in itself
is simple, even a prototype kind of application of computer generated
imagery. Many of the ideas in the storyboard demanded the inclusion
of post-produced effects. In other words, they were not possible to
initially realize with virtual set technology. However, an advantage of
the virtual set technology was especially useful in shooting the dance
scenes. The production was not realized exactly as a television opera
with singing characters, but as an opera film with dancers. Thus an
existing recording of the opera was used as a soundtrack. Each of the
musical numbers was choreographed and the ability of the virtual
camera to follow the movement was extremely beneficial.
I worked on L’Enfant with director Marikki Hakola. She had a
background in media art and especially with dance productions. Al-
though we in general relied on a classic narrative style, we also wanted
to look for some unconventional solutions. If the production design
can be defined as postmodern, then a similar tone is to be seen in the
choreography, which brings together many different dancing types
from buto to ballet. As a musical piece, L’Enfant lends to this by com-
bining stylistically uneven musical material. As a whole, the interpre-
Figure 3: A virtual set background plate used in the Armchair
dancing scene in L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 4: A virtual set background plate used in the Princess

dancing scene in L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
STARTING POINTS 41
tation itself has borrowed stylistic ideas from the music film as well
as the musical genre. Ravel (in Nichols 1988, 16) himself described:
Emphasis is on melody, allied to a subject which I chose to treat

in the spirit of American musical comedy. Mme Colette’s libretto
allowed this freedom in treating the magical story. The vocal line
is the important thing. Even though the orchestra does not reject
virtuosity, it is none the less of secondary importance.
The production was realized with a new technology offered chal-

lenging problems in every phase: in pre-production, preparation of
shooting, shooting and post-production. These problems were both
artistic and technical. In the virtual set the relationship between the
interpretation and new technology is complex. The technology used
is very specific and puts a certain label on the whole production. Of
the problems, the most challenging was something I would term as
‘shootability’: the 2D virtual set is very tricky and brings all kind of
obstacles for fluent shooting. To freely be able to decide the shooting
angle during the shooting is essential in traditional filmmaking but
the 2D virtual set doesn’t allow this freedom. Instead you are limited
to angles of the pre-rendered images. For instance, point of view shots
are very sensitive and would have needed another way of shooting
than the 2D virtual set. Figure 3, A virtual set background plate used in
the Armchair dancing scene in L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004),
and Figure 4, A virtual set background plate used in the Princess danc-
ing scene in L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004), illustrate the 2D
virtual set background plates used in L’Enfant.
The making of L’Enfant was a long and complicated process. Tele-
vision opera has a very marginal audience and overall it is a difficult
genre to finance. In addition, the artistically and technologically ex-
perimental production proved quite a complex equation in the Finn-
ish financing system. After many ups and downs however, the televi-
sion version of L’Enfant was finished in 2004 and shooting was done
in August-October 2003.
2.3. Luonnotar
The process of Luonnotar was very different from the L’Enfant, since
the production didn’t involve the use of any real time virtual sets.
Instead, post-rendered 3D animations were applied. Thus, for the
first time in my career, I started my design work completely after
the shooting had taken place. This exemplifies how the workflow in
virtual set productions can be thoroughly different from those tradi-
tional ones. The bluescreen shootage was edited to its final composi-
tion, when I received it, and here lay the eventual challenge of the
production: to match the background animation with the action of
the foreground characters.
The director in Luonnotar was Marikki Hakola and a production
company was used - Kroma Productions. Luonnotar can be described
as a 10-minute musical poem for a soprano and a symphony orches-
tra. The realization was done with a soprano playing the role of Luon-
notar, a female spirit of nature. In addition to her, there was a dancer
playing the part of the Sotka, the bird. Luonnotar is a mythical story
of the creation of the land and sky, originating from the Finnish na-
tional epos Kalevala. Sotka lays an egg upon the knee of Luonnotar,
the egg falls down and cracks and out of the pieces, the sky, moon and
stars are born.
The interpretation of Hakola’s version of Luonnotar emphasizes
the journey of Luonnotar through the ancient world, first in the emp-
ty space, then through clouds onto a frozen planet and eventually
onto an ice raft across the sea. A tidal wave sweeps Luonnotar down
to the sea floor, where a protozoan is born. Meanwhile the sea calms
allowing Sotka to dance on it. While searching for the place to build a
nest however, she encounters a dust storm, that ends with the ground
rising from the sea. Sotka burns when laying a golden egg. The egg
cracks and the universe is born.
The story itself can be described as symbolic, and consequently
any literal realism was not the goal of the visualization. However,
Sibelius’s music is very powerful in nature and certainly demands a
similar strength in visual realization. Unlike L’Enfant, which was in-
fluenced by the varied advancements of computer generated imagery,
STARTING POINTS 43
I was quite confident in beginning, as to what was possible with the
virtual set illusion. I relied on a simplistic idea, of how to enchant the
viewer. Much of this was done through animating the set, so that all
the time it was in rigorous movement. The motivation driving the
virtual set was to emphasize the dramatic story of the creation, thus
guiding the emotional response of the spectator.
The production time of this production was again long. There
were approximately 100 shots, each of which required a particular
animation. The animations were calculated during 2008-2010. Maya
Fluid simulation techniques were used extensively. Maya Fluid is
an extension of Maya Software, which allows you to generate quite
complex physical phenomenon, such as fire, fog, clouds and sea in
an efficient way. The animated natural phenomenon supported the
story and the music by intensely depicting the event of creation. An
extremely tedious phase of the production was to pre-plan the ani-
mations, so that they were consistent with the acting and dancing as
well as the pre-edited structure. Since I knew we could not reach the
exact level of convincing quality as that of the expensive special ef-
fects films, a sincere, fluent appearance of movement was crucial. The
design elements were extremely simple, just clouds, fogs and weather
in motion, and a self-evident artificiality was part of the look of this
picturesque film.
2.4. Research expectations

The production of L’Enfant was considerably heavy for a first virtual
set production. In that sense it was not a minor test, but quite a chal-
lenging artistic production. This kind of multi-faceted work naturally
provides many possible emphases on the research question. Through-
out my project I have anticipated, that a knowledge which is gained in
the context of the narrative whole, is very valuable in terms of under-
standing how the virtual set works as an illusion. Is the virtual set illu-
sion inviting enough to allow us to immerse ourselves in the fictional
world of the film? Once I buried my ideas of the perfect simulation
and assumed a certain medium awareness would govern the experi-
ence of the virtual set. This is a tricky question: if medium awareness
was too considerable, then no kind of illusion would be possible and
no kind of immersion in the fictional world would happen. But based
on test shootings and the eventual production of L’Enfant, the no-
tion of illusion persistently seemed to govern the experience of the
virtual set. The three-dimensional space simply existed there, even in
the rough test shooting. But what existed there also, was a rough sense
of digital artificiality.
Thus it was clear that the virtual set delivered contradicting in-
formation, and how this contradicting information can be analyzed
formulates the key focus for my research. The question is there: what
do I see, when I see a virtual set? Do I see the environment or the
picture of the environment? I have ended up looking for the answers
to these questions especially in these works. My research expectations
originate from the idea, that a two dimensional picture is always a
treated surface. The virtual set is also such a surface and in order to
understand what this ‘treatment’ in question is, ecological and cogni-
tive film theories are of great value. The virtual set makes us confront
a design environment that is executed as a two-dimensional image
despite the fact that it depicts a three-dimensional one. The virtual
set, throughout the production process is essentially flat. It is only
the simulation process of the virtual set, that makes us respond to the
virtual set in equal ways to those in which we respond to real spaces,
both on the film making level and as spectators.
Thus some analysis, as to how the pictorial illusion overall can be
understood and categorized, is needed. In which respect is the vir-
tual set similar to the traditional production design illusion? I am
assuming that the virtual set differs clearly from traditional produc-
tion design illusions in terms of what is technologically possible. Fur-
thermore, production design illusion as such doesn’t exist in vacuum,
as a single snapshot illusion; it is related to the general experience of
the film as an illusion. How do the virtual sets of the L’Enfant and
Luonnotar succeed to build their fictional worlds out of flat surfaces?
How can the concept of the world of film be understood, especially as
a three-dimensional mental construction? In which respect does the
world of film relate to our emotional response to the film itself? In all
of these questions I assume I can gain insight through my practice-
based research.
STARTING POINTS 45
2.5. Research question
As discussed above, the focus of my research is the virtual set as an
illusion. This also implies an understanding of the film being an il-
lusion itself. I will base my definition of what kind of illusion film is
in terms of cognitive film research. The term illusion is understood
fundamentally through ecological psychology, as something that is a
consequence of our perceptual system being confronted with pictorial
strategies of the virtual set, production design or at the top level, the
film itself. By differentiating the various kinds of pictorial illusions,
some understanding of the mechanism of the virtual set illusion can
be gained. In the cognitive framework, I will be asking: what is it we
see, when we see a virtual set?
Of the production aims of L’Enfant and Luonnotar, the most
important is their circumstance; that they both utilize the virtual set
completely, yet they have a story to tell, even an emotional impact to
make. In the chain of creating a cinematic illusion, the perception of
the virtual set is crucial. Does it succeed in meeting the challenges
every production design has to conquer in order to be able to cre-
ate a world of cinema? The special effects film has brought us a very
convincing type of digital scenery usage. This prompted the ques-
tions: What if the whole piece is filmed in the Chromakey studio with
the virtual set? To what extent can we escape medium awareness, or
are we left as spectators at the mercy a synthetic digital realm? Is the
awareness of the medium different with the virtual set than with the
traditional production design?
These issues touch the fundamental question of the experience
of the film as a fictional world. In the next chapter, this question is
brought forward by the ecological film theory and the psychological
research of film. Discussing of the virtual set as a world creation prob-
lem thus touches such basic issues, such as the immersion in the world
of film and the emotional response to it.
STARTING POINTS 47
II ECOLOGICAL APPROACH
A virtual set for Luonnotar (Luonnotar 2011).
ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 49
3. COGNITIVE CONSIDERATIONS
3.1. Cognitive turn in film theory
One of the basic aims of this research is to focus on what happens in
the frame of film fiction, when an artificial, simulated phenomenon
such as the virtual set is picked up by our perceptual system, which
has evolved to encounter the environment on a daily basis. In my at-
tempt to clarify this problem, I will refer to cognitive film theory and
to a great extent, ecological psychology. Thus it would be appropriate
to first look at what the cognitive turn in film theory has meant over-
all in the theory of film.
Cognitive film theory can be seen as relatively multidisciplinary.
Its formation can be seen to take place in the 80’s, when such influ-
ential works as film researcher David Bordwell’s Narration in Fiction
Film (1985) and film researcher Noël Carroll’s Mystifying Movies: Fad
and Fallacies in Film Studies (1988) were published. Narration in the
Fiction Film was largely based on “New Look” psychology, the first
row of cognitive research in psychology (Bordwell 2008). Such pio-
neers as cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser (1976) proposed, that
the mind has an active role in building the structures of meaning, on
the basis of incomplete information. In 1980’s cognitive theory, or-
dinary comprehension and memory seemed intriguing. Such human
activities as recognition, comprehension, inference-making, interpre-
tation, judgment, memory and imagination are among those, which
cognitive theory seeks to understand. In order to do so, such entities
as perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions, plans, skills, and
feelings needed to be identified (Bordwell 1989, 12-13). The general
idea here is reductive in nature: it is possible to recognize and indi-
vidually understand the separate components of mental functions.
On the other hand, Carroll’s Mystifying Movies provided a pro-
vocative disquisition, where the general target was “Marxist-psycho-
analytic-semiology”. Hereby, cognitive film theory positioned itself
against the dominant film theories of Saussurean linguistics (1990
[1916], 2006 [2002]); Metz’s semiotics (1974 [1971], 1982 [1977]);
and the prevalent psychoanalytical view originating from the work of
Sigmund Freud. In the “Case for Cognitivism” Bordwell (1989, 11)
wrote:
In sketching what I shall call cognitive theory, or the cognitive per-

spective or frame of a reference, I will link what would usually be
called ‘cognitive science’, with a wider body of inquiry resting (...)
on significantly similar assumptions (...) So I should say at the out-
set that it seems to me no single metatheory can comprehend the
diversity of cinematic phenomena (...).
Bordwell and Carroll subsequently edited Post-Theory: Recon-

structing Film Studies (1996), in which they further developed the
case against the one dominant theory. Bordwell (2008) later sum-
marized, that he found it “more fruitful to develop film theories in
the middle-level fashion, shifting from concrete problems to broader
explanatory frameworks”.
In the late 1990’s the scene in cognitive film theory changed con-
siderably and film researcher Joseph Anderson’s The Reality of Illu-
sion: An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film Theory (1996) brought
a new insight to it. Anderson proposed an alternative to the New
Look orientation by grounding his approach in James J. Gibson’s
theory of ecological perception. Gibson emphasized the importance
of the environment, especially that the direct perception of the envi-
ronment guided behavior. At the same time as the Anderson’s theory,
such work as film researcher Ed S. Tan’s Emotion and the Structure of
Narrative Film (1996) and Torben Grodal’s Moving Pictures (1997)
were published. The more recent cognitive theory suggested that there
existed relatively universal psychological structures that humans have
evolved, that were relevant to viewing films. Also, the use of recent
empirical approaches whilst describing these psychological structures
was brought to the fore. While Anderson concentrated on visual in-
formation processing, Tan’s main interest was on the emotional re-
sponse to the film. Grodal’s Moving Pictures is a comprehensive theory
of cinema that is grounded in cognitive science and focuses especially
on brain function. Since the work of Anderson and Tan are of central
interest to this thesis, I will further explore their ideas in the following
chapters. Before that however, it may be useful to consider Gibson’s
theory of visual perception.
3.2. Ecological theory of visual perception

In the previous chapter I noted, that Anderson’s ecological approach
to cognitive film theory is based on the work of Gibson. Since this
approach is of major interest in my research, I regard it as worthwhile
to briefly introduce the main ideas of Gibson. To start with, Gibson
himself rejected some of the cornerstone ideas of cognitive psychol-
ogy. In doing so, he established his own theory of ecological psychol-
ogy, which in-turn later became influential within cognitive psychol-
ogy. Gibson’s most radical claim was undoubtedly the idea of direct
perception (Gibson 1979, 147). Compared with ecologists, cognitive
psychologists rather support the concept of representational realism.
According to direct realism, we perceive world directly without the
need of a mental representation between the world and the observer.
Representative realism on the other hand, insists that such percep-
tion is mediated i.e. what we see is an internal copy of the world. It
is only the later revisionist approaches that have been closing the gap
between the cognitive and ecological ideas of perception (Bruce et al.
2004, 406-409).
My interest in Gibson’s theory lies in his account of depth and
motion perception. In the world of illusions, depth and motion per-
ception are phenomena that can be powerfully manipulated in art
and especially in the field of the virtual set. Our visual ability to see
in three dimensions, as well as our capacity to evaluate the distances
of objects are skills we respond to while producing scenic illusions in
art. The virtual set is there especially to create an environment, a space
for the character. In the virtual set, the sense of depth and movement
are created artificially, thus being profoundly illusional, and so how
can we recognize, understand and analyze these illusions? This is a
question to be further explored in the light of the ecological theory
of perception.
What are then the key ideas in Gibson’s theory of vision and how
did he arrive at his solutions? During World War II, Gibson was in-
tensely researching how to train pilots effectively. The most difficult
task in flying was landing and take-off, since it needed proper posi-
tion and speed. Gibson presumed that good depth perception was an
elementary prerequisite for good flying. He discovered though, that
the tests based on the pictorial depth cues or training utilizing depth
information brought little success in achieving better flying. These
results prompted Gibson to seek new ground in the theory of human
vision in psychology (Bruce et al. 2004, 302) and in a revolutionary
way, Gibson disregarded the traditional idea of space perception.
Gibson’s last book The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception
(1979) summarizes his ideas. Here Gibson poses a single question:
how do we see an environment around us? At this point Gibson has
given up explanation of the orthodox theory of the retinal image.
Instead, he establishes his idea of vision on the concept of the ambi-
ent optic array. This approach emphasizes the perception of surfaces
in the environment. According to Gibson (Ibid. 35), we don’t live in
space; instead we live in an environment consisting of substances and
a medium. The medium is a gaseous atmosphere and surfaces separate
the substances from this medium (Ibid). Gibson specially emphasizes
the ground, on which all animals live. The surfaces of the environ-
ment need to be distinguished, and a way to do so is to differentiate
surfaces by texture. Examples of textures could be pebbles, grains of
sand, blades of grass: these are structurally based on statistical regular-
ity and their elements have an average size and spacing that remain
approximately constant. The properties of surfaces are (among oth-
ers): layout, texture, the property of being lit or shaded, the property
of reflecting certain fraction of illuminating. These properties either
will or will not resist change (Ibid.).
Gibson insists that we need an adequate geometry to describe the
environment. Mathematical abstractions as plane or points cannot be
seen like surfaces. Gibson (Ibid.) writes: “A surface is substantial; a
plane is not. A surface is never perfectly transparent; a plane is. A sur-
face can be seen; a plane can only be visualized.” Surfaces in turn are
illuminated by ambient light that consequently reaches the observer
according to the structures of the surfaces. Gibson (Ibid. 51) writes:
“Only if ambient light has structure does it specify the environment.”
Furthermore,
Ambient light coming to a point in the air is profoundly differ-

ent from radiant light leaving a point source. The ambient light
has structure, where as radiant light has not. Hence, ambient light
makes available information about reflecting surfaces, whereas ra-
diant light can at most transmit information about atoms from
which it comes (Ibid.)..
In order to understand structured light, a concept of ecological

optics is needed. Here, Gibson’s (Ibid.) rejection of the retinal image
as a starting point for visual processing is clear:
The orthodox theory of the formation of an image on a screen,

based on the correspondence between radiating points and focus
points, is rejected on the basis for explanation of ecological vision.
This theory applies to design of optical instruments and cameras,
but it is seductive fallacy to conceive ocular system in this way. One
of the worst results of the fallacy is the interference that the retinal
image is transmitted to the brain.
Furthermore, for Gibson, perception directly means the whole array

of light rays when structured by surfaces in the environment, and
provides direct information about the layout of these surfaces.
The structured light which forms when reflected from a surface
is called a texture gradient. The texture gradient can inform an ob-
server about the shape and orientation of a surface. Figure 5, The
texture gradient of a vanishing surface, shows an example of the texture
gradient of a vanishing surface. Another way texture gradients can
inform the observer, is in the distance and size of objects (substantial
surfaces). In this way, optic array provides us with information about
the surrounding world (Ibid. 25-28). An important aspect in Gibson’s
theory is that transformations in the optic array are essential for visual
perception. While there are invariants in the structure of the array ac-
cording to the nature of the texture elements (e.g. pebbles vs. tile), the
movement of the observer or movement of the objects in the world
brings out variants in the array. For Gibson, the idea that the observ-
ers are actively moving around the world, provides a powerful way to
gain information regarding the world and one’s position in relation to
other structures or one’s own movement.
Another prominent idea in Gibson’s research is the theory of af-
fordances. As such, this theory can be seen as a starting point of the
interpretation of what specific scenery choices mean in the context of
artistic production. This promising approach is by no means limited
to film design, but also applicable to theatrical design. Gibson saw,
Figure 5: The texture gradient of a vanishing

surface. An illustration by Katriina Pajunen.
that in addition to there being information in light for the perception
of surfaces, there is also information for the perception they afford.
Gibson wrote (Ibid. 127): “The affordances of the environment are
what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good
or ill.” For instance, the terrestrial surface is horizontal. Since it is flat,
extended and rigid, it provides support for the animal. However, such
properties as horizontal, flat, extended or rigid are not as such physical
properties, but properties relative to the animal. In this sense they are
unique. The basic affordances of the environment are, according to
Gibson, perceivable directly without an excessive amount of learning.
Gibson (Ibid. 143) doesn’t elaborate very far on this idea, however he
admits: “If the affordances of a thing are perceived correctly, we say
that it looks like what it is. But we must, of course, learn to see what
things really are - for example the innocent looking leaf is really a
nettle or that helpful-sounding politician is really a demagogue. And
this can be very difficult.”
Gibson’s optical theory is specifically interesting from the point
of view of the virtual set for several reasons. 3D renderings are ex-
ecuted as basing on polygonal or nurbs surfaces. Thus the 3D effect
(depth cues) is the consequence of information that is available in
those rendered surfaces. However, Gibson is especially interested in
his theory in moving surfaces. This provides a start point from which
to evaluate the virtual set as a synthetic moving optic array. In this
way we can begin to estimate how the surfaces of the virtual set pro-
vide such information, when compared with the surface information
we pick on a daily basis in the real world. The way Gibson defines
the environment being in a completing relationship with an observer
is also intriguing.
3.3. Ecological approach to cognitive film theory

Gibson himself was actually interested in film, due to the fact that
he utilized film in his own research. Therefore he wrote also a whole
chapter on film in his latest book The Ecological Approach to Visual
Perception. Gibson terms film as a progressive picture, in contrast to
an arrested (still) picture. As such, Gibson (1979, 302) considered
that a progressive picture “yields something closer to natural visual
perception than does the arrested picture.” Gibson (Ibid.) further
summarized:
It [film] provides a changing optic array of limited scope to a point

of observation in front of a picture, an array that makes informa-
tion available to a viewer at the point of observation. This delim-
ited array is analogous to the temporary field of view of a human
observer in natural environment surrounding the observer (...) This
is over and above the information in the display for an awareness
of events and places at which the events are happening, along with
awareness of the objects, persons, or creatures of imagination to
which events are happening.
Gibson (Ibid. 301) differentiated the filmic depiction from the or-
dinary depiction, and admitted that even though the observer is not
fully deceived, “the feeling of being present in the world of magic
window is very strong”.
Anderson pretty much continues from here. For him, film is an
illusion, made available by the visual and auditory system of cinema.
He adheres to the strong form of illusionism. It is important to un-
derstand, that while we discuss film as an illusion, we do not speak in
terms of it being a similar illusion to that of a virtual set. The virtual
set is an animated pictorial illusion that is used in order to create a
cinematic illusion.
Anderson’s illusion based account is founded on exposition; that
stimuli (images and sound) interact with a program that runs in the
mind of the viewer. He revises Gibson’s model of direct perception
with the work of David Marr. Marr (1982) accepts the value of eco-
logical optics, where the invariant properties are directly perceived in
the optic array, but sustains the need for algorithmic explanations as
to how properties of the optic array are detected. Even though Marr
(Ibid. 27-29) regarded Gibson’s idea of direct perception as oversim-
plified, he saw it’s advances:
Although algorithms and mechanisms are empirically more acces-

sible, in the top level, the level of computational theory which is
critically important (...) the nature of computations that underlie
perception depends more upon computational problems that have
to be solved than upon the particular hardware in which these solu-
tions are implemented (...) In perception, perhaps the nearest any-
one came to the level of computational theory was Gibson (1966).
While Gibson himself rejected computational theory, after his death

in 1979 and Marr’s death in 1980, much development happened
in computational theory and it’s convergence with Gibson’s theory,
which according to Anderson (1998, 31), “provides the opportunity
to build a new theoretical understanding of motion picture”.
Anderson (Ibid. 12) quite openly describes, how “the motion pic-
ture can be thought of as a program”, and “the viewer can be thought
of as a standard audio/video processor”. Especially interesting is An-
derson’s (Ibid. 12-13) notion of filmmakers. It is particularly useful
in helping to understand the filmmaker’s task as well as in describing
the filmmaking process from the point of view of artistically oriented
research.
Filmmakers can be seen as programmers who develop programs to

run on a computer they do not understand and whose operating
system was designed for another purpose. Since filmmakers/pro-
grammers do not understand the operating system, they are never
sure exactly what will happen with any frame or sequence of their
programs. They therefore proceed by trial and error. They follow
certain filmic conventions and then go beyond them by guessing.
They test the outcome (that is, how their programs will be handled
in the minds of the viewers) by becoming viewers themselves and
running the program in their own minds (...) But filmmakers-
turned-viewers are not proceeding completely recklessly and ir-
responsibly, because the ‘hardware’ of the mind and most of the
‘software’ is standard and universal.
However, here I would suggest that according to Anderson (Ibid.

155), filmmakers are also aware of the schemata they have developed
while watching other films, in other words, they have brought the
schemata of their other experiences of the world, into a film. The film
itself must therefore have the ability to modify the schemata with
which we in general interact with the world. Schemata here can be
understood as being a mental set or representation that takes place
beyond ordinary recollection.
Anderson also suggests that we can more deeply understand how
filmmakers run these programs by looking at the “hardware”, i.e. the
brain, neurons, and the neural system generally. This path has been
taken in recent film research, for instance film researcher Pia Tik-
ka’s Enactive Cinema (2008) as well as in Grodal’s Embodied Visions
(2009). Both researchers find a specific interest in the so called mirror
neuron system. The mirror neuron network is a relatively recent find.
Mirror neurons are neurons that fire, for example, when a monkey
tries to grasp something, but also when it witnesses other monkeys
grasping. A similar function of these mirror neurons is also antici-
pated in humans. The key idea is that the neuron mirrors the action
of others, as if the observer themselves would be acting (Rizzolatti and
Graighero. 2004, 169-74). Tikka (2008, 220) sees that mirror neu-
rons can explain “the human ability to imitate, understand, and an-
ticipate the actions, intentions, and emotions of others”. Tikka (Ibid.
229) also suggests that the mirroring process as mental imitation is
central in the film experience. Mirror neurons are discussed further
in chapter 8.5.
However, now is the time to look, how a new ecological under-
standing of moving picture theory is applicable to the area of the
virtual set? Here, we can gain much understanding by considering
the perceptual system that picks up the virtual set. Due to the rules of
visual perception, we are able to capture the virtual set as something
more than it is. Instead of seeing it as a two dimensional animation
behind the character, we are able to see it as a space for character to be
in, which involves a question of nonveridical perception. Our percep-
tual system has developed over the ages in order to provide veridical
or reliable information on our surroundings (Anderson 1998, 14).
Thus nonveridical perception implies a perception or an interpreta-
tion, that does not accurately represent our reality. Yet we sometimes
experience illusions and this is also the case with the virtual set. Thus,
it is worthwhile to look at what is the information derivable from the
virtual set, from which we are able to produce this nonveridical per-
ception. We encounter the virtual set with a perceptual system that is
thoroughly developed for other purposes, so we can assume therefore,
that we may gain an understanding of the virtual set through an un-
derstanding of our perceptual system.
3.4. Psychology of the artefact emotion

So far we have been discussing perception. In the process of explain-
ing the mechanism of the virtual set, the understanding of the human
perception is constitutive. But perception is followed by a reaction in
a spectator, a reaction that orients our bodily attitude towards what
is perceived. Grodal (2009, 146-48) establishes a so called PECMA
flow, exemplifying the order we experience events. First there is per-
ception (P), followed by emotion (E) and cognition (C). As our re-
sponse we provide motion (M) and action (A). The PECMA flow
highlights the human experience from bottom-up, but can also be
understood from top-down. The main task of emotion is to control
the cognitive processes (Tan 1996, 43). Emotions can be seen as ten-
dencies to action, guiding the body in what to approach and what to
avoid (Grodal 2009, 145). An emotion is an action readiness, based
on how a subject appraises a situation or event (Tan 1996, 46). The
emotional activation of the body and brain coincides with the viewer’s
engagement with the film, and it gives a rise to mental simulations
of motor actions, which are relevant to the events in the film (Gro-
dal 2009, 161). Mental simulation thus brings a new aspect of the
concept of simulation, an aspect where sensorimotor knowledge of
film guides internal imitative imagination patterns. Tan (1996, 53)
proposes that when watching a film:
The contemplation of the artefact is almost entirely replaced by

sensation that one is not only faced with, but also literally - indeed,
physically - present in the fictional world and is witnessing the ac-
tion take place around one.
In this witnessing process, people try to understand others. As

Grodal writes (2009, 187), “by a first-person perspective by running
a simulation: if I were in that situation, what would I think or do?” In
other words, this means that the viewer resonates the character’s cog-
nitive, emotional and situational experiences (Ibid. 187, Tikka 2008,
229). Neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese has presented the basis of this
phenomenon as embodied simulation as forming the basis of all inter-
subjective understanding. Gallese (2005, 42) summarizes:
There are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi level

personal background experience we entertain of our lived body,
and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others.
Such personal body-related experience enables us to understand the
actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions
and sensations they experience (original italics).
Film watching in general is motivated and this motivation (char-

acterized as emotion arousal), makes us willingly immerse ourselves in
the world of film. Tan (1996, 32-33) states:
In other words, the fact that the members of the audience are fas-
cinated by - or even lose themselves in - the fictional world would
appear to be one of the most important primary motives. The plea-
sure of observation and the pleasure of losing oneself in the fic-
tional world may be considered two sides of the same coin.
However, there is also a second category that is complementary to

the involvement and that motivates film watching. Here it is impor-
tant to understand film not only as a representation of other, but as
an independent artefact. Thus, it is quite possible for even an average
film-viewer to enjoy the technical aspects of film. Here Tan proposes
that special effects can be pleasurable as themselves, in a similar man-
ner to the acting of a favorite star. Tan (Ibid. 33-34) writes:
Like Bordwell (1985), we assume than the stylistic characteristics

inherent in the film technique make themselves felt because they
form patterns in time. Although the effects of these patterns gener-
ally go unnoticed, they are occasionally recognized, as in the case of
repeated or contrasting camera positions, two-dimensional compo-
sition of the image, and the mobility of the mise-en-scène.
Thus concluded; films are watched, since they produce a specific kind
of emotion. In addition to the need to be involved in the fiction, there
is a need to appreciate the artefact. These needs form the basic motiva-
tions for film emotions.
The question of emotion in relation to this research was raised
from practice. It was especially L’Enfant, that made me ask, whether
sincere emotions can be aroused on the basis of a production that
clearly takes place in a synthetic world. To a certain extent, this is the
question: whether the artefact emotions are highlighted or whether
the fiction emotions are disturbed by the fact of ‘non-credibility’ -
that the set is something that could not exist in reality. As such, I feel
the discussion of film emotions is crucial in terms of this research.
This also refers to the structures we have developed in terms of under-
standing, what is the credible production design, and what kind of re-
lationship we assume it to bear to the thing we value as the real world.
III TOWARDS
VIRTUAL SET
ILLUSION
A scene from L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 65

4. CHALLENGES OF THE VIRTUAL SET
4.1. Mobility as a challenge
In order to create the illusion, every aspect of film is constructed. An-
derson (1996, 52) writes of film: “Every element is scripted, designed,
and choreographed; little is left to chance.” Thus, films with their
production design provide carefully crafted and selected information
for the viewers. Even if the structural issues are not within the focus
of this research, it is worthwhile to look at what kind of structural
entity the virtual set is. As a general background to my discussion on
the illusion created with the virtual set, I will first concentrate on the
virtual set as a structure. This structure is organized in a specific way
in order to provide information, such as information on space and
depth, but how is this information construed and what are the rules,
according which the virtual set is arranged?
Every design must meet the challenges that cinematic structure it-
self poses. An obvious one of these structural challenges is that caused
by movement, which, in turn is motivated by the narrative. How can
movement in the film understood? Gibson defined movement as a
means to gain information and this information can be concluded
as the movement of objects in the world as well as the movement of
the observer. Both include the idea that movement brings out the
relationships of the moving observer and moving objects in relation
to the world. Film displays movement in a form of a shot-to-shot ar-
rangement. However, keeping in mind Gibson’s perspective, we can
look how movement has been approached in film theory. Film re-
searcher Stephen Heath has differentiated in his large-scale, synthetic
essay “Narrative Space” (1986), the aspects of mobility in film. Natu-
rally Gibson (1979, 74-75) as an ecological psychologist wouldn’t use
the term ‘space’, but rather the term ‘environment’, since space re-
fers to something that exists independently of the observer. However,
Heath’s categorization is illuminating and I have found it suitable for
my purposes. “Narrative Space” essentially sees the cinematic space as
an expression of the Renaissance perspective, depicting three-dimen-
sional objects upon a plane surface (Heath 1986, 386).
According to Heath, the mobility in film can be seen as “move-
ment of figures ‘in’ film, camera movement, movement from shot
to shot”. What Heath sees as a distinctively special feature of film is
providing movement between the shots. Movement of figures “gives
the means of creating perspective” (Ibid.), and furthermore it can
(in a shot), “’bring out the space, show relative positions, suggest
depth” (Ibid). All this can be understood eventually in Gibson’s terms
as information of size, distance and orientation. Thus, for example, a
character walking in a room makes us conscious of the room’s envi-
ronment and gives us information on the distances between objects
within the room. Camera movement means the establishment of ‘the
eye-camera’, where the camera executes the same movements as the
head and “is strictly regulated in the interests of the maintenance of
scenographic space” (Heath 1986, 388-389) or “a version of space”
(Ibid.). In ecological psychology it is fundamental fact, that “one sees
the environment not just with eyes but with eyes in the head on the
shoulders of a body that gets about” (Gibson 1979, 222). From an
ecological point of view, our understanding of camera position as pro-
viding a meaningful artificial array is based on this resemblance of the
eyes positioned in a certain physiological manner.
When thinking of production design, Heath’s last category is
instructive: whilst producing cohesiveness, mobility can also show
the unlimited angles of the space, reinventing it for again and again.
Movement from shot to shot “is apt to receive the comparative moti-
vation” (Heath 1986, 388-389) since the film (despite editing), gives
us a life-like experience of how we see things. In this way, movement

from shot to shot “indicates the filmic nature of film space, film as
constantly the construction of a space” (Ibid.). Heath’s essay is of
primary value in terms of understanding how the three dimensional
space is arranged as a visual narration and how perspective structures
emphasize the narrative viewpoint.
The task of a production designer has much to do with the cohe-
siveness of the visual look of the film. Therefore it is a task of produc-
ing a comprehensive and convincing vision of the places, in which
the narrative events take place. As Heath (1986, 401) summarizes,
“movement represents a potentially radical disturbance of the smooth
stability of the scenographic vision.” Thus movement is a challenge
for every production design, which urges us to maintain sustainable
features of the narrative environment. In production design on the
other hand, it is a question of maintaining of a singular space, yet also
paradoxically a question of creating variation in filmic locations.
The craft of traditional production design has produced skills and
conventions to counter this dilemma. Sets are designed for the moving
camera taking into account such principles as a changing viewpoint
or the shot to shot continuity. However, new digital technologies can
provide abrupt changes in traditional working methods. While work-
ing on a virtual set of L’Enfant, I came to an understanding that there
are obvious similarities compared with working with the traditional
set, however, quite crucial differences exist. First and foremost is the
fact that the set does not exist in reality and this affects considerably
on every aspect of production – the virtual set is possible to interact
with only through screens.
The mobility of film Heath described also creates challenges for
the virtual set. This is due to the fact that something moves in the
frame, or the frame itself moves or is transitioned from shot-to-shot.
I will look how these challenges are met in the virtual set using as an
example the scene, in which the boy of L’Enfant has a temper tantrum
and teases his pet squirrel in the cage next to his working table. He
makes funny faces at the squirrel and eventually opens the cage door,
letting the squirrel out. I will be looking how the shots are staged as
well as how the scene sustains continuity, and how this happens in
respect of the choices made in design.
4.2. Chromakey inputs
A single shot taken in the virtual set differs quite crucially from one
taken in the traditional set. A shot in a virtual set usually consists of at
least two image sources, whereas the traditional film usually consists
of only one (although this doesn’t apply to the special effects type
film). The first image is the input from the Chromakey studio and
the second image is the input from the virtual set software. The two
images are then composited together. Manovich defines compositing
in the following steps: First, there is the “construction of a seamless
3-D virtual space from different elements”; second, a “simulation of
a camera move through this space” and thirdly, a “simulation of the
artifacts of a particular media” – (the last two steps mentioned are
optional).
Thus a character moving in the space (which is included in the
first of Heath’s categories) is an illusion as the character is truly mov-
ing in a Chromakey studio. This consequently means challenges for
the unity of the scenographic vision within the shot. Will the live
character be technically integrated in the digital background? Do they
actually seem to be located in the digital environment? The keying
systems vary, with some of them bringing out a very subtle and fine
integration of the character and the background, whilst others pose
difficulties as they provide a visible seam between the character and
the background. In L’Enfant, for instance, the seams felt tremendous-
ly problematical, and seem to seriously threaten the coherence of the
scenographic vision. This is especially problematic, since the charac-
ters get the most obvious attention of the viewer. As Heath (1986,
388) states, “”film is said to destroy the ‘ordinary laws’ of pictorial
organization because of its moving figures which capture attention
against anything else”. So everything unusual is respect to characters,
like seams between them and the background will stand out.
In the scene earlier described, the focus is on the establishing
shot of this scene with the boy and the squirrel, and the final out-
come consists of three video sources. The first two inputs are from the
Chromakey studio, and from these inputs, the input of the squirrel is
scaled in size, in relation to the virtual set. Thus the dancer acting the

squirrel becomes small enough to fit into the digital cage. Ultimately,
the virtual set system allows as many video sources as the capacity of
the mixer will accommodate, and there is not necessary one seam be-
tween the character and the background, but multiple seams between
sources.
4.3. Depth cues

In my attempt to describe the essence of how the virtual set is com-
posited as a whole, I will use depth cues in my analysis. I am assum-
ing, that the virtual set design as a task can be specified as the task of
providing the pictorial illusion of depth. In virtual set design there
is a basic question: how the 2D digital image transforms into an il-
lusionary space for a character to move and act in. For instance, char-
acters cannot be hidden behind the virtual set objects unless the set is
designed in a particular way. Here, an understanding of depth cues
is needed. Psychologist James E. Cutting (2007, 10) brings forward
nine different “sources of layout information” from the real world
and applied to film, traditionally referred to as depth cues: occlusion,
height in visual field, relative size, relative density, aerial perspective,
convergence, binocular disparity and motion perspective. I am basi-
cally dealing with the four first mentioned, which are those associated
with the pictorial (renaissance) perspective.
A phenomenon of one object hiding another one is called occlu-
sion. According to Cutting (Ibid.), occlusion has been recognized as
one of the first pictorial cues of depth in art, to be found already in
paleolithic times. The spatial relationships are realized through the oc-
clusion within the shot, and this is something to consider beforehand
in the design of a virtual set. For instance, sometimes it useful struc-
turally, in that the prop elements the boy interacts with, are actually
real elements. In the practice of the virtual set, it is quite usual (but
not necessary) that furniture in the virtual set is in fact real furniture.
This was also the case in L’Enfant; with real furniture it was easier to
show how the boy sits at the table or how he runs behind the table.
The table was simply located in the same Chromakey studio as the
boy, and they were keyed together. However, a virtual set technique
allows occlusion also by the aid of so called alpha compositing. With
Figure 6: The use of matte channel
Figure 7: The use of several matte

channels (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges
2004).

alpha compositing it is possible to create a matte channel indicating
the coverage information of one image in respect to another. Thus,
the foreground image is revealed through the partial transparency (in-
dicated by the matte channel) of the background image.
In the establishment shot of the boy and the squirrel, there is one
matte channel allowing the squirrel to be placed behind the bars of
the cage (Figure 6, The use of matte channels - L’Enfant et les Sortilèges
2004). In a shot showing how the situation later proceeds, (Figure 7,
The use of several matte channels - L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004), there
are three matte channels: one for the squirrel placed in a cage, two
for placing the boy behind the bars and behind the squirrel. Thus,
the virtual set can realize quite complex examples of the occlusion
information.
While occlusion tells of the mutual relationships in the room
space, there is also the relative height of objects in the visual field, that
informs that the boy and the table are not near the camera’s viewing
point. Cutting (Ibid. 11) writes:
The height in the visual field concerns object positions in the field
of view, or in frame. Objects occupying higher positions are gen-
erally farther away. This information typically measures relations
among the bases of the objects in a three-dimensional environment
as projected to the eye or camera.
Film camera typically allows the manipulation of this aspect.

High level and low level cameras differ in to the way they produce in-
formation and can be used in order to achieve a specific effect. In the
L’Enfant virtual set the way in which decisions of the camera height
were made, was different from traditional film production. Since we
mostly used the real time 2D virtual set, it meant that the background
images needed to be rendered beforehand. So the eventual precise
decision of camera height was left to me as a virtual set designer: on
the basis of the storyboard by Marikki Hakola, I defined the height
for the imaginary virtual camera and most often, the height was based
on the eye-level of the boy.
Relative height in visual field and occlusion can be associated with
the linear perspective invented in the Renaissance. However, in addi-
tion to occlusion and relative height, the use of Renaissance perspec-
tive couples with the information of relative size and relative density.
Together, these four - occlusion, height, size and density, form a strong
source of depth information especially in pictorial representations.
Perspective as a whole has been referred as a depth cue in itself (Bruce
et. al. 187). I would rather see the definition the way Cutting refers
to it, where the linear perspective can be seen also as an artificial con-
vention utilizing the sources of depth information, so I will speak of
perspective information as meaning the four of Cutting’s depth cues.
Relative size and relative density show how big objects are in re-
spect to each other and how many of them are seen on the examined
area. Cutting also provides other depth cues, such as aerial perspec-
tive, however, in the case of the virtual set, the four specified seem to
be the most relevant. The relative size and relative density can be easily
seen in the example scene, as the respective change of pattern on the
walls and on the floor. Altogether, for the boy to walk in the room and
be persistent in size in relationship to the set elements like floor pat-
terns, a very precise camera angle and lens values were needed. This
assured that the perspective in the Chromakey studio input camera as
well as the perspective of the virtual set camera were equal in respect
to each other. If it were not so, the effect was a bit like the one in the
famous Ames Room (invented 1934 by Adelbert Ames, Jr.), which is
a distorted room used to create an optical illusion. As a result of the il-
lusion, one person standing in the room appears to be a giant and the
other appears to be a dwarf. Similarly the boy started to either grow-
ing or diminishing in size whilst moving in a room, unless the studio
camera settings were matched with the settings of the virtual camera
used for rendering the virtual set image. This shows, how vulnerable
the 2D image is, when used as an imaginary scenic space.
4.4. Camera transitions

How can movement in cinema be described? Heath (1986, 393)
writes: “The figures move in the frame, they come and go, and there
is then need to change the frame, reframing with a camera movement
or moving to another shot. The transitions thus effected pose acutely

the problem of the filmic construction of space, of achieving a coher-
ence of place and positioning the spectator as the unified and unifying
subject of its vision”. For Heath, the filmic construction of space is
thus a creation of the persistence of a space, as well as defining the
imaginary placement of the observer. Constructing space ultimately
means for Heath, an ideologically driven construction of the specta-
tor. Since this idea of the constructed spectator is not in the focus of
this research however, I would rather at this point discuss the imagi-
nary camera position.
Virtual set systems differ strikingly from each other on the basis of
what kind of camera movement is possible in the real time virtual set.
The most sophisticated 3D real time virtual set systems allow practi-
cally unlimited movement of camera. The virtual set system which
was used in L’Enfant, was not this flexible and this was due to the
limits of the mechanical tracking system. The trackers were mounted
on a camera head and allowed the camera to pan, tilt or zoom. The
pre-rendered background images were rendered in high resolution. In
Figure 8: A Close-up of the backround

plate (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
the end, the size of the background limited the eventual movement:
the pan, for example, couldn’t continue beyond the background’s
boundaries. The system naturally allowed the change of frame. For
instance the background of the Figure 8, A close-up of the background
plate (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004), is a close-up of the background
plate in the Figure 9, The original background plate (L’Enfant et les Sor-
tilèges 2004). In this way, background plates allow different framings.
However, it is also clear that when zooming, panning or tilting, a true
accommodation of the lens doesn’t happen in the background plate.
If the orientation of the camera changes in the 2D virtual set, it
basically needs a new and appropriate large-scale background for the
new position. The backgrounds of the boy’s room (before a fantasy
changes it again), consisted of eight major background angles. For
special storyboard purposes, such as the shot seen in Figure 7, a spe-
cific background for the purposes of this precise camera-angle was
needed.
Structurally, the 2D virtual set system provides uneven logic in
Figure 9: The original background

plate (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).

Figure 10: The Boy interacts with
cage (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges
2004).
Figure 11: The Boy opening the

cage door (L’Enfant et les Sorti-
lèges 2004).
terms of defining camera angles. A real time 3D system most likely

wouldn’t produce similar problems. The process of L’Enfant was truly
interesting in allowing the possibility to create relatively effectively,
the digital world of the fiction. However, the limitations of the 2D
virtual set system are an essential consideration, and a very important
process of the workflow - the defining of the camera angle, becomes
somewhat vague. In the end, the eventual angles entail some kind of
compromises to be made on the basis of the pre rendered images. The
technique which allows the kind of camera movement as provided by
the 2D virtual set is probably most suitable for very simple television
productions, such as one or two characters in front of the background.
The virtual set of L’Enfant consisted of several background images
requiring quite a lot pre planning. Also, the shot to shot transitions
needed careful thought. Real world is spatially and temporally con-
tinuous, however film is not. Film is comprised of different shots per-
haps filmed on different days. In production design it is also common
to construct a singular filmic location out of several locations, for
instance in the case of the shot and the reverse shot. We see the char-
acter and expect him to see something, and this “something” is shot in
a totally different place from where the character is shot. Maintenance
of the scenic space is always a challenge in production design.
Shot to shot transitions are a double sided coin. As Anderson
(1998, 91) writes: “Through a process of trial and error, filmmak-
ers have learned to construct a fictional world on film, that when
interfaced with the human perceptual system, is seen by that system
as having both spatial and temporal continuity. The final continuity
of a motion picture, if it is to be effective, must be foreseen in every
phase of the production.” Thus, in production design practice there
are several conventions that both make uncontinuous objects appear
continuous, although on the other hand, continuity is something to
emphasized consciously through the set.
Figure 12: The Boy pushing the digital

Grandfather Clock (L’Enfant et les Sortilegèg-
es 2004).

In the scene we are focusing on - the boy with the squirrel and
the cage, there is a quite classical example of how production design
convention handles continuity issues on the basis of practical needs.
In the beginning, the squirrel exists in the cage (Figure 6). The cage is
a digital cage with an alpha channel, so the squirrel can be posited in
the cage. However, in the scene the boy also needs to interact with the
cage. He needs to peak his fingers through the bars as seen in Figure
10, The Boy interacts with cage (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004), and
eventually open the cage door, Figure 11, The Boy opens the gage door
(L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004). Now, a real cage is used instead of the
digital replica. Despite the considerable difference in the look of the
two cages, they are experienced as both one and a single cage. This is
a point where every filmmaker has to rely on his instincts - you never
know beforehand, what ultimately functions and what doesn’t. What
can be said though, is that both the virtual set and the digital set pres-
ent these kinds of issues, where continuity is tested. It is still difficult
to interact with digital objects, as Figure 12, The Boy pushing the digi-
tal Grandfather Clock (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004) illustrates. The
boy is trying to shake the digital grandfather clock. Tedious postpro-
duction is needed in these kinds of cases. Thus, switching between the
real and virtual scenery, will be of major importance in the example
of the virtual set and presents one of the most obvious challenges for
scenic unity from shot-to-shot.
5. ILLUSION DEFINED
5.1. Question of illusion
One of the main purposes of my research is to ask, what kind of illu-
sion does a virtual set produce. I see a virtual set as a specific case of
cinematic illusion or rather a pictorial illusion that contributes to the
cinematic illusion. A virtual set illusion shares similarities with the
illusion techniques used in painting or photograph, especially in the
way it creates the illusionary sense of depth. On the other hand how-
ever, it reaches out to be alike of cinematic illusion, where a spectator
imagines themselves to be present in the flow of the fictional world.
These characteristics are the starting point from which to study the
particular quality of the virtual set illusion. I am assuming that the
virtual set illusion presents features which no other illusion technique
has done previously. In a way, it also raises the question as to what has
become possible with the aid of computer technology. In this sense,
the virtual set has provided a new and powerful way for us to immerse
ourselves in our inner fantasies.
As earlier discussed, I base my research on cognitive film theory as
well as ecological psychology. My assumption is, that through under-
standing our everyday perception, we can better define what we see,
when we view the virtual set. I suggest that what we see can partially
be defined as an illusion or several illusions. Thus, it is important
to ask, how the concept of illusion explains the perceptual processes

while watching film. This is the question asked by cognitive film re-
search, and consequently it will be a focus in my research. Due to
the multidisciplinary quality of cognitive film research, the cognitive
film theorists themselves to have opposing views concerning illusion.
However, psychologists, like Anderson and Tan, base their thinking
profoundly on the concept of illusion.
Both Anderson and Tan agree, that the cinematic illusion is of
“nested” quality; that is, film is a series of overlapping illusions (Tan,
236-251; Anderson 1996, 162-163). From the point of view of the
virtual set, this allows us to examine the virtual set as an illusion, based
on several experiential levels. My idea (based on L’Enfant and Luon-
notar), is that the virtual set must work in a certain, assuring way on a
perceptual level, which means we need to basically accept the virtual
set as a convincing environment for the story. This perceptual level
experience gives a platform to a more comprehensive understanding
of a virtual set as an illusionary fictional world. The perceptual level
experience is of a compelling nature, and thus invites us to be present
in the imaginary world of virtual set.
Anderson for example, focuses strongly in his work, on the per-
ception state of film viewing. In a revolutionary way, he asks whether
it is necessary to form a mental representation of the object/event in
the world in order to perceive it, and concentrates on defining the in-
terface between the viewer and the film. However, he emphasizes that
while we see and hear the world, we are generally unaware of either
the arrays of energies or our own sensory processing. But, a compu-
tational model (which is an abstract understanding of the structure
of visual information processing) is needed for explaining how the
properties of the world are detected (Anderson 1996, 28-36). Basing
on the work of Anderson and Gibson, I will analyze the perceptual
processes taking place when viewing the virtual set.
On a more general level though, we can posit production design as
one of the structures of visual information within the film, specifically
meant to orient us in relation to the cinematic world. Throughout the
history of production design, many of the design techniques have de-
veloped as strategies favoring the cinematic illusion. In my thinking,
perceptual illusions are a gateway to the fictional world of film, that is
also a comprehensive quality illusion in itself. One of the main tasks
of the production designer is thus to make the immersion of the view-
er in this world possible. Like Tan (1996, 36-37), I see film viewing as
a goal-directed activity, and an important motivation for experiencing
the cinematic illusion is the need for a genuine emotional and imagi-
native engagement with the film. In order us to experience immersion
in the fictional world of film, a certain spectator engagement with the
film needs to take place. How does an illusion-based account explain
this engagement? How does the virtual set illusion work in terms of
creating this fictional world of film? Do we feel comfortable with im-
mersing ourselves in virtual realities? These are questions I am looking
to explore, as in terms of world-creating especially, digital technology
has presented new possibilities for the field of film.
In my research, the question of illusion is considered in the frame-
work of the artistic productions, L’Enfant and Luonnotar. In L’Enfant,
the emphasis was on way the illusion of depth was created through the
virtual set, and how this illusion of depth was related to the cinematic
movement. In Luonnotar the emphasis was shifted more towards the
illusion of the vision as a constantly changing optic array. The prob-
lems identified during the production of L’Enfant had an impact on
how the virtual set design process of Luonnotar was approached. Both
productions exemplify a digital world creation, not possible with a
traditional set. In L’Enfant, the boy’s room is magically transformed
according to his fantasies: it grows in size, changes in color, starts to
grow grass and an oak tree. In Luonnotar, the main character makes
an adventurous journey through the ancient space and earth, huge
in scale. A major problem is however, whether these fictional worlds
grow as convincing entities, and if not, what might be the reason.
5.2. Kinds of illusions

Gibson gives attention to the usual ways in which illusion has been
approached in the study of perception. Gibson (1979, 243) terms
illusions as “a theoretical perplexity”, common for any approach of
the study of perception. Gibson (Ibid.) sees that the central objective
for the illusion is to create a misperception, a delusionary perception.
He asks, whether the information of the illusion is “impoverished,

masked, ambiguous, equivocal, contradictory or even false”. This is
especially critical in the case of visual information. In his survey of the
mechanism of misperception, he discovers many separable situations
of how misinformation enters us. The key question for Gibson is, that
we, (for different reasons) are not able to pick up all the possible or
available information. Furthermore Gibson (Ibid. 244) recognizes,
how “picture makers have been experimenting on us for centuries
with artificial displays of information in a special form. They enrich or
impoverish it, mask or clarify it, ambiguate or disambiguate it. They
often try to produce a discrepancy of information, an equivocation or
contradiction, in the same display.”
Tan, on the other hand, sees the concept of illusion in a larger
context than merely as optical misinformation. According to him,
illusion is a hierarchical system typical for a film. Tan (1996, 236)
states:
From a psychological point of view, action of watching the feature

film is characterized above all the fact that the viewer cherishes a
number of illusions, in Carroll’s ‘epistemologically benign’ sense.
The viewer knows that what he or she is seeing is an artefact, one
that is related to reality in more or less complex manner. My term
illusion encompasses not only avoidable effects but also those from
which it is possible, albeit with great effort, to escape.
Carroll’s (1988, 97) original example of the “the epistemically benign

sense of illusion” contained no more than a stage flat of a house, that
contained “relevant similarities to a house” but did not commit the
perceiver “to believing that the stage flat is a house”.
Tan (1996, 228) believes, viewers have “at least some belief in
the reality of film”. Furthermore he rejects the idea, that film viewers
would be deceived, as is the case in the primitive version of illusion
theory. Tan (Ibid. 66-67) believes that viewers have multiple coding
- an awareness both that the filmed world is “real” and that it is also
a construction. He argues that film creates an illusion in this sense,
but not a delusion. Tan (Ibid. 228-229) bases his thinking of illusion
largely on Carroll’s (1990) division of pretend, illusion and thought
theories.
Like Carroll, Tan thinks, that the pretend theory is false: accord-
ing to it, film as an artefact would not be able to arouse genuine
feelings. Tan rejects pretend theory as being phenomenologically
untrue according to the facts. Our film emotions are not pretend-
ing, but something he terms as ‘witness emotions’. Viewers have the
impression that they are present “in the guise of the invisible witness
or spectator” (Tan 1996, 240). Illusion theory would assume, that
the spectators would truly believe what they see is reality. That case
is never true since the spectator consciously knows that what he is
watching is an artefact. However, Tan believes that illusion can be
discussed in a more flexible way than being labeled with a strict deci-
sion of reality status. For Tan (Ibid. 228), a decisive factor of illusion
is the ambiguous question of belief and disbelief: “The one of which
I consider the most important is of psychological nature the fact that
one cannot resolve to believe or disbelieve something.” Tan sees Car-
roll’s thought theory as providing a solution to the dilemma created
by the pretend and illusion theories. A mental representation - an idea
or thought, can evoke true emotions in the same way as a true event.
We are capable of imagining in our minds that something exists and
that subsequently opens the path to genuine experience.
Tan goes on further to meditate on film researcher Richard Allen’s
concept of projective illusion. Allen explores the different kinds of il-
lusions and ends up with quite a sophisticated concept of “projective
illusion.” Allen (1997, 98) writes:
Most illusions are deceptive in two respects: they deceive the senses,
and they lead us to make false inferences. We see something that
does not really exist. These two kinds of deception are distinguish-
able, however: We may experience sensory illusion without being
deceived into believing that what we see is real. The definition of
illusion as deception must be modified. An illusion is something
that deceives or is liable to deceive spectator, but the deception
need not to be of epistemic kind. Sensory deception does not entail
epistemic deception.
Allen differentiates the kinds of illusion on the basis of whether

the illusions are necessarily experienced or not, and/or whether they

involve ‘seeing-as’ or not. Allen gains his evidence from trompe l’oeil.
According to Ettedqui (1999, 205), the trompe l’oeil is a “generic
term for a variety of optical effects pioneered by painters during the
Renaissance and designed to deceive the eye into believing that it is
witnessing three-dimensional reality”. Allen (1997, 101) presumes,
the trompe l’oeil painting is necessarily experienced as compelling, but
involves ‘seeing-as’, or imaginative thinking as to what the painting
depicts. For Allen (Ibid. 87), the ‘medium-awareness’ of the spectator
is crucial: an illusion created by the forms photographic reproduction
depends “upon the transparency of the photograph or the relation-
ship that the photograph bears to reality”. Allen (Ibid.) differentiates
a photographic illusion (where the reality status of the photograph is
false), as a kind of fake photograph (for instance a photograph of fake
oranges not revealing the fakeness). This specific case of the photo-
graph and reproductive illusion differs from the illusion of the trompe
l’oeil painting, merely by questioning the status of the reality.
Films allow us to voluntarily experience a species of illusion in
which we perceive the film “as if it were a fully realized world of expe-
rience and not a representation” (Ibid. 82). This experience is a “vir-
tual one” and entails “a loss of medium awareness” (Ibid.). Instead,
due to the resemblance the image bears to the object it depicts, we
start to see the event of film as if we had taken the perceptual point of
view of the camera. By associating the film viewing experience with
the process of active daydreaming, Allen opens up the possibility to
examine it as a dynamic interaction with the imagination. Tan as-
sociates Allen’s concept of projective illusion as the diegetic effect of
the film. Unlike Allen, Tan (1996, 237-238) thinks, that the viewer
doesn’t have the ability to choose, or whether or not to experience
cinematic illusion.
5.3. Compelling illusion

In the next chapters, I will further on discuss Allen’s division of dif-
ferent kinds of illusions. As earlier mentioned, the determinant fac-
tors for Allen are; whether the illusion is compelling, and whether
it is necessarily experienced as illusion, or involves ‘seeing-as’ . The
concept of seeing-as for Allen (Allen 1997, 101) is based on the phi-
losopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1968, II xi) discussion on the seeing-
as phenomenon, where we experience a change in the way we see an
object in the course of perception. The duck-rabbit figure is one fa-
mous example of this, in which one sees the image first as a duck and
then as a rabbit. An important characteristic of this event is that one
cannot see the duck and the rabbit at the same time, but only one at
a time, sequentially. For Wittgenstein (Ibid.), this example illustrates
how our cognitive thought of an object cannot be separated from our
perception. ‘Seeing-as’ the figure as a rabbit or a duck doesn’t involve
illusion: it is a matter of our focus, as to which one of the two choices
we see.
Thus, Allen reasons, some illusions are experienced involuntary
and no matter what, they deceive the senses. These would be the il-
lusions that are necessarily experienced. Some illusions though are
more context-dependent, and thus are not necessarily experienced.
Furthermore some illusions involve seeing-as. Here the characteriza-
tion is subtle: “Seeing-as opens up the possibility of a limited escape
from the hold of an illusion that would otherwise be necessarily expe-
rienced” (Allen 1997, 106). According to Allen (Ibid.) illusions could
be categorized as follows:
1. Illusions that are necessarily experienced but do not involve
seeing-as (Müller-Lyer illusion).
2. Illusions that are not necessarily experienced as illusions and do
not involve seeing-as (Reproductive illusion).
3. Illusions that are necessarily experienced and do involve seeing-
as (Trompe l’oeil illusion).
4. Illusions that are not necessarily experienced as illusions but do
involve seeing-as (Projective illusion).
The Müller-Lyer illusion (Figure 13, Müller-Lyer illusion) falls to
the first category and is a classical example of an illusion that in a
powerful way, deceives the observer. This spatial illusion originates
from the second half of the 19th century, which was an era of picto-
rial illusions and a formative time in experimental psychology. Picto-
rial illusions as such as the Müller-Lyer were used as two-dimensional
stimuli in perceptual experiments, thus giving the vision “the aura of
scientific respectability” (Wade 2005, 128). The Müller-Lyer illusion

Figure 13: The Müller-Lyer illusion
from Allen 1997, 99.
depicts a situation, where two parallel lines of equal length are experi-
enced as lines of unequal length. The trick of this illusion is that even
when you are told that the lines are of equal length, they still seem to
differ. The Müller-Lyer illusion confuses our judgment, because the
information gained through our senses is deluding.
According to Allen, the Müller-Lyer illusion presents a type of
illusion that in every way is impossible to escape - our thoughts can-
not actualize the way to do so. The Müller-Lyer illusion employs the
artful use of pictorial perspective for the purpose of manipulating the
senses. Gibson considered this kind of imagery as simply oddities pro-
viding no use in the study of perception. Gibson (1979, 244) refers to
the pictorial depth cues as follows:
Painters invented the cues for depth in the first place, and psy-
chologists looked at their paintings and began to talk about cues.
The notions of counterbalanced cues, of figure-ground reversals, of
equivocal perspectives, on different perspectives on the same ob-
ject, of “impossible objects” - all these come from artists (...)
Gibson’s view might be well justified, however, in the research of per-
ception and illusion, the target is often art and conventions of it.
5.4. Delusion of trompe l’oeil

Unlike the Müller-Lyer illusion that can be regarded as a theoreti-
cal extremity, the trompe l’oeil illusion is firmly established in film
and theater scenography. The early film sets executed by the inventor
of production design, Georges Méliès, were painted. They utilized a
scenery technique borrowed from the then present theater. This con-
sisted of painting trompe l’oeil perspectives that created an impression
of relief and suggested depth. Barsacq (1976, 6-7) writes:
Despite the primitive means at his disposal, Méliès succeeded in

giving spectators the impression of reality, even in his fantastic
films. He was successful because at the start he discovered the laws
governing film sets: an illusion of depth; a judicious choice of ele-
ments composing the set; their detailed realistic execution; and,
finally, their effective presentation.
Even though constructed sets soon replaced the painted ones, this
form of illusion is still in use in newly applied forms in film produc-
tion design.
Painted backdrops have partially turned into digital enlargements
in current production design practice. Nowadays it is quite common
to use a digital enlargement of a photograph as a scenery backdrop
behind the window of the studio set. Before the digital revolution,
matte paintings were used on film. In famous special effects films such
as The Raiders of the Lost Ark (Paramount Pictures 1981), there can
be several scenes were only a small amount of the picture area is truly
three dimensional. The idea of combining a two dimensional picture
with the live character is thus not new in the practice of production
design. Whether on stage or in film however, the usage of trompe
l’oeil has meant the creation of the imaginary space.
As mentioned, the trompe l’oeil illusion dates back to the Renais-
sance and the invention of the artificial, linear perspective. In Allen’s

categorization, the trompe l’oeil illusion is necessarily experienced,
but allows to some extent an escape, a voluntary seeing-as, which can
be explained as an entertainment of thought. Allen (1997, 82) notes,
that the traditional trompe l’oeil painting entails a loss of medium
awareness: “In a trompe l’oeil painting I see the painting as if it were
the object and not a painting at all.” Allen continues: “When we
experience trompe l’oeil, our customary perception of the painting
as a painting (our medium awareness) is inhibited. We experience a
difficulty or uncanniness in our perception” (Ibid.). Art critic Arthur
Danto (1981, 151) confirms this viewpoint:
If illusion is to occur, the viewer cannot be conscious of any prop-

erties that really belong to that medium, for to the degree that we
perceive that it is a medium, illusion is effectively aborted. So the
medium must, as it were, be invisible (...).
According to Allen (1997, 83), the revealing of the trompe l’oeil

causes “shock or surprise” and we lose our interest in it as a conse-
quence. This is a result of our becoming conscious of the cognitive
aspects of trompe l’oeil.
Psychologist Michael Kubovy (1986, 77) asks, what is it about the
delusion of the trompe l’oeil that makes such work interesting:
After all, there is nothing fascinating in a trompe l’oeil painting

until the delusion has dispelled; and once it has been dispelled, the
work is most often of no more than minor esthetic interest. We en-
joy examining an object endowed with the power to throw us into
a delusory state of mind after it has divulged its secret to us; looking
at it send a shiver down our metaphysical spines (...) A trompe l’oeil
picture is an epistemological close call (...).
In theater, the trompe l’oeil illusion probably negotiates throughout

the performance of the magic of the three-dimensional illusion and
its urge to be revealed. In films, though, an aspect of becoming aware
of the nature of the artefact is not generally an aim of the production
design. On the contrary; if the trompe l’oeil is used, it is used in a way,
that the effect itself remains hidden.
Some important aspects of trompe l’oeil still need to be discussed.
Architectural illusionistic paintings require a spectator to be in an
exact position in order for an image to be seen in the correct per-
spective. However, very seldom does the schema of the architecture
allow the visitor to enter to this precise place in the building. On the
contrary, what the spectator usually sees at first sight is the distorted
version. Despite this, Kubovy points out, spectators very much enjoy
the experience of trompe l’oeil. Kubovy (Ibid. 80) calls this a mental
collusion with the artist - mental collusion meaning “an operating
much closer to the roots of perception, more an order of a suggestion
than a frame of mind.”
Another notable characteristic of trompe l’oeil brought up by
Kubovy (Ibid. 71), is the fact that the trompe l’oeil technique was
not solely dependent on the linear perspective, but in fact contained
a variety of techniques to simulate a sense of texture. Different types
of simulation were named, for instance according to the color of the
simulated object: grisaille meant the simulation of the grey stone,
whilst camaïeu meant the simulation of such materials as bronze, ter-
racotta, onyx, marble or wood. In terms of our future discussion on
3D computer graphics, this is an interesting observation.
5.5. Allen’s reproductive illusion

In Allen’s categorization, a photograph can be seen as representing
qualities of a reproductive illusion. Allen (1997, 84) writes:
Reproductive illusion trades upon qualities of the photograph that

it does not share with painting. A photograph is produced by the
mechanical imprint of the image of an object through the causal
process by which light reflected from the object registers on pho-
tochemical emulsions. This causal process underlying the photo-
graphic image parallels the causal process underlying human vision:
The photograph depends upon direct connection between an ob-
ject and photographic plate, just as what we see depends on a direct
causal connection between object and retina.

Digital photography has changed this process in the that image re-
cording happens through an electronic image sensor. However, the
optical system works the same as in film cameras. The correct amount
of light is admitted to the imager, just as with film, but the image
pickup is electronic instead of chemical.
Allen (Ibid. 86-87) disagrees with philosopher Roland Barthes,
who has prominently spoken for the causal process underlying the
production of the photograph. For Barthes, the causal process means
that an object is in fact, documented as such in the certain past. Al-
len argues that only some photographs can be viewed in such a way
that they reveal their age. This is the case in photographs that we
value for their age, for instance the photographs of ancestors. Most
photographs such as many of the nature or still photographs, are not
accompanied with an awareness of the past. According to Allen, these
photographs lack altogether a temporal index.
From the viewpoint of production design, the reproductive il-
lusion is an important strategy of misinformation. It is essential to
understand, that reproductive illusion means not the photograph as
such, but rather it’s capacity to mislead its status of reality. Thus re-
productive illusion is not limited to the photograph, but can also exist
within the film image. As a simple example of the reproductive illu-
sion, Allen (Ibid. 87) takes a bowl of fake oranges that skillfully pho-
tographed, looks like a photo of real oranges. Here, the photograph
simply reproduces the illusion by recording it. Production design as
a whole is the art of utilizing the possibility of reproductive illusion
in such away, that the fictive status of the cinematographed object
is carefully disguised. A studio set of an apartment with a landscape
backdrop is just a studio set, but when shot skillfully, it looks like a
real apartment with windows showing an exterior scene. Also, the
earlier example of Ferretti constructing a sea out of plastic, as such
employs the reproductive illusion: what we end up seeing is not the
plastic, but the sea. All these examples tell in a forceful way, that the
reproductive illusion is context dependent: if we are not informed
in any way of the false reality status, we will be deceived. Reproduc-
tive illusion thus relies on the impression of the transparency of the
medium (or lack thereof ), and we are brought to a fake scene that is
meant not to be exposed.
Allen (Ibid. 96) differentiates a situation in the making of a film,
“where a matte part of the shot functions as trompe l’oeil” thus ulti-
mately creating a reproductive illusion. This refers to the case where
a matte painting is used as a so called scene extension in order to give
the idea that the portrayed things are in the landscape that in fact
does not exist. Due to digitalization and the integration of digital
technologies in filmmaking, it has become far more easy to meld arti-
ficial digital elements with live shootage. Manovich (2001, 295) quite
rightly poses the following question:
But what happens to cinema’s indexical identity if it is now pos-

sible to generate photorealistic scenes entirely on a computer us-
ing 3-D computer animation; modify individual frames or whole
scenes with the help of a digital paint program; cut, bend, stretch,
and stitch digitized film images into something with perfect photo-
graphic credibility, even though it was never actually filmed?
Manovich (Ibid. 302) gives also unexpected answers: “Digital cin-

ema is a particular case of animation that uses live-action footage as
one of its many sources.” On the basis of this, we can presume that the
trompe l’oeil illusion and reproductive illusion have been intertwined
with each other in current digital cinema, which in this context also
includes the virtual set.
5.6. Diegetic effect

The fourth and the last of Allen’s categories is the projective illusion.
The subtle division of illusions depicted here works for Allen primar-
ily as a way to establish this category of illusion. The fictional world
in which the situations and events narrated take place can be called
a diegesis. Tan (1996, 52) describes, that “the perceptual and cog-
nitive basis for inevitability of the situational meanings is that the
film creates an illusion of being present in the fictional world”. Film
researcher Noël Burch (1979, 19) explains the diegetic effect of the
film as something “whereby spectators experience the diegetic world
as environment”. Here, we as film spectators experience an illusion

that we are surrounded by the fictional world. Film researcher Edward
Branigan (1984, 43) brings up an important aspect of diegesis by
defining it as a story space:
The term diegesis is a subcategory of origin in that it seeks to assign

a source to the space, sound, titles, dialogue, etc. of a film on the
basis whether (and how) one or more elements are within or out-
side the story space. More specifically, the diegesis in film comprises
those elements which give rise to the fictional world of characters,
landscapes, and events. The diegetic is implied spatial, temporal,
and causal system of characters.
Furthermore, Branigan interprets the diegetic to include those aspects

of the fictional world that are accessible to characters. The diegesis of
a narrative is its entire created world. Any cinematic narrative, despite
the genre, involves a diegesis. However, each kind of story will or-
ganize that time-space continuum in different ways. The suspension
of disbelief that we all perform before entering into a fictional world
entails an acceptance of a story’s diegesis.
Tan (1996, 52) defines the illusion of diegetic effect as a compre-
hensive illusion. Whatever causes there are by the narrative, the dieg-
esis will include them. On the one hand, diegesis means an experience
of the fictional world as reality, but on the other hand, this world
exists on its own as an objective reality. Thus, narrative functions as
a window or a frame for this fictional reality. However, the viewer is
conscious that what he is seeing is an artefact, “one that is related to
reality in a more or less complex manner” (Ibid. 236).
5.7. Simulation and illusion

Tikka (2008, 44) sees the simulation method as a consequence of
the digital computer. Computers have enabled “the monitoring and
testing of complex processes with different parameters and values,
with speculative hypothetical and epistemological purpose”. This fur-
ther denotes one purpose of simulation, namely experimentation. In
production design there has been a practice from very early on, to
present scenic models that anticipate quite explicitly the intended set
construction. These scenic models have allowed a fair amount of test-
ing and trying, experimenting on a small scale. The computer aided
previsualization methods such as digital models were generally ac-
cepted in production design at the beginning of 90’s. Ideally they
would produce optimal possibilities for preproduction examination,
such as the preview of precise camera angles. The virtual set as I see it,
has developed gaining influence from both digital previsualization in
architecture as well as from computer animation. What is possible to
experiment with or conduct with the virtual set has grown more com-
plex as more sophisticated software and hardware has been developed.
This certainly allows the kind of sophisticated simulation application
that Tikka refers to, that had not been possible in the pre-computer
age.
Simulation can been seeing as a functional process aimed at hav-
ing an effect on our senses, which in-turn means simulation is not
necessarily just a visual phenomenon. The real time virtual set can be
regarded as one form of visual simulation and a close relative to all
virtual reality simulation. An interesting question from the viewpoint
of this research is; how the concepts of illusion and simulation relate
to each other. Every illusion isn’t necessary a simulation, but does the
concept of simulation imply the one of illusion? Philosopher Brian
Massumi (1987, 2) suggests, that the general idea of the simulation
is, that “the simulacrum is a copy of a copy whose relation to the
model has become so attenuated that it can no longer properly be
said to be a copy. It stands on its own as a copy without the model”.
Thus we might say, the virtual set vies to be a copy of the real set,
that we might have been able to construct in our imagination. How-
ever, according to philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1983, 48), to define a
simulation as a copy, is most likely not enough to explain what the
simulation essentially is. The concept of copy denotes that there is an
internal, essential relation of resemblance with the model. However,
the simulacrum manifests only external and deceptive resemblance
to the model. This is the way the simulation and illusion are linked
together: the resemblance of the simulacrum with the model can be
determined as an illusionary.
A similar view of simulation is offered by the French philosopher
Jean-Paul Baudrillard and his famous writing “Simulacra and Simula-

tions” (1998). Reality and meaning have been replaced by the signs
and images in a current cultural context. Baudrillard’s idea of simu-
lacra is constructed on the basis of sign-order. Thus the image can be
a faithful copy of the reality or it can eventually replace the reality by
becoming one itself. In between these stages, the image can mask the
reality or pretend to be a faithful copy. It is the postmodern idea that
the simulacra replace the original and the distinction between real-
ity and representation vanishes. There is only the simulacrum, and
originality becomes a totally meaningless concept. Baudrillard (Ibid.)
writes:
Such is simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Rep-

resentation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign
and the real (even is this equivivalence is utopian, it is a funda-
mental axiom). Simulation on the contrary, stems from the utopia
of the principle of equivivalence, from the radical negation of the
sign as value, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every
reference. Whereas representation attempts to absorb simulation
as a false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of
representation itself as simulacrum.
A virtual set defined from previous standpoints is not meant to

be a copy of a real set (even an imagined one); instead it can produce
a life of its own. This idea distances the concept of simulation from
the vocabulary of representation. As such, the virtual set as an illu-
sion, a resemblance, emphasizes inherently given means for a vital
new dimension.
Particularly the question between a model and a copy can be also
expressed as a question between original and synthetic. For example,
does the synthetic quality of the virtual set need to be discovered, in
so far that the virtual set can be considered, perhaps as less complete
than an original, traditional set. Our perceptual and cognitive system
is developed to receive and analyze the stimulus of the real world
phenomenon. Production design practice has developed in preceding
decades to meet our requirements in this regard. In my research it
has turned out to be quite a specific problem as to how we approach
wholly synthetic scenic environments such as the virtual set. Despite
the illusionary qualities the virtual set has, it quite soon alarms us,
that the world we encounter is fake. Within the focus on digital illu-
sion, we will be delving eventually into to the essential questions of
digital simulation.

6. ILLUSION OF SPACE IN L’ENFANT
6.1. Between photograph and trompe l’oeil
Manovich (2001, 184) has pointed out, how:
‘Realism’ is the concept that inevitably accompanies the develop-

ment and assimilation of 3D computer graphics (...) a progression
toward realism - the ability to simulate any object in such a way
that its computer image is indistinguishable from a photograph.
I believe most of those who have been involved in working with 3D

computer graphics recognize this characteristic property of them; the
ability to create an undeniable impression of realism. This was also the
case with my design work in L’Enfant: I started the whole production
from the assumption, that an adequate vision of the virtual set (as if it
would be a photographed real set) would allow a smooth or genuine
experience of the film viewing.
Let us first consider the issue of reality: what makes 3D computer
graphics look so ‘real’ - what is the secret behind it? By no doubt it
is - as Manovich earlier states, the ability to present objects in such a
way that they look like photographed reality. In other words we speak
of such things as the simulated sense of shape and depth, light and
texture. 3D computer graphics brings up these features by default,
by the generalization of algorithms, as photograph-like. Interestingly
though, Manovich doesn’t refer directly to the real world and its ob-
jects, but a mechanical reproduction of that world - mechanical re-
production being one aspect of the photograph.
However, if we think of Allen’s categories of illusion, we might
not refer to a virtual set as a reproductive illusion, as being a kind
of fake photograph as such. Rather, the illusion of the space of the
virtual set is compelling, more like a trompe l’oeil illusion we cannot
but experience even though we are aware of its’ picturesque quality.
This is the motivation of the virtual set; as trompe l’oeil, it is meant
to produce a nonveridical perception and invites us to experience the
dual quality of the image. Philosopher Richard Wolheim (1987, 46)
has characterized this experience as seeing-in:
When seeing-in occurs, two things happen: I am visually aware of

the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in front
of, or (in certain cases) receding behind something else.
This duality is also emphasized by Anderson (1998, 47), when he ap-

proaches film as an illusion:
A motion picture contains two sets of information: one for a three-

dimensional world and one for a flat screen (...) I would suggest
that at the most perceptual level the film viewer alternates between
the two percepts frequently and without significant distraction
from events unfolding in three-dimensional world of the alternate
percept.
Also Manovich (2001, 184) brings up, that synthetic realism is

“qualitatively different from the realism of optically based image tech-
nologies (photography, film), for the simulated realism is not indexi-
cally related to the existing world”. As a consequence, a virtual set em-
ploys complex illusion mechanisms. According to Anderson (1998,
1-2), films seem so real because they are illusions. For Anderson, this
reality is of the photographic origin and we can describe the screen as
a window to the existing, live world. Consequently we can ask how
the cinematic illusion differs, when we actually film an existing room
instead of it’s digital replica?

A photograph differs from trompe l’oeil due to its mechanical
production process. Allen (1997, 86) gets influenced by philosopher
Walton Kendall in his way to specify the difference between trompe
l’oeil and photograph. Kendall (1984, 252) claims, that seeing an ob-
ject in a standard photograph is like seeing an object with mechanical
equipment such as a mirror, telescope, or eyeglasses. A photograph
also conveys “the transparency of depiction”; it allows the spectator
see through the frame into a profilmic event (Allen 1997, 86). This
kind of mechanism is not produced by the virtual set, which posits us
with an imaginary event instead of an event that has existed in reality.
However, a trompe l’oeil can be seen as imitating a photograph pre-
cisely in the way Manovich suggested. This is an example of a trompe
l’oeil misleading us about its own status, which might be the case
when trompe l’oeil hides its status as a painting (or as a digital im-
age). However, a photograph can also be misleading, as in the case of
reproductive illusion:
A stage set of a city street is a fabrication, but carefully photo-

graphed it may look like a street. The minimal contribution of the
photograph, then is to record an illusion, but it may also contribute
to the production of illusion by presenting the phenomenon in a
way that disguises its fictive status. Reproductive illusion (...) trades
on the ability of the photograph to provide a transparent access to
the referent (Allen 1997, 87).
In a production like L’Enfant which is essentially a virtual set pro-

duction, there is little possibility to make the spectator believe on a
cognitive level that they are witnessing reality. The technology itself
is too robust to create a perfect photograph-like impression and it is
clear from the beginning, that it is a question of the realm of com-
puter graphics. However, the illusion of 3D space is there. Allen has
described, that the impact of the trompe l’oeil illusion, is necessarily
experienced. The several test shoots with considerably unfinished vir-
tual sets in L’Enfant, seemed to confirm that despite of their rough-
ness, the illusion of 3D depth was still experienced. The virtual set
with its clear trompe l’oeil kind of perspective information seem to
be extremely compelling, and makes it almost impossible to think of
Figure 14: A strong effect of perspec-
tive (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
as consisting of a merely flat illusionary 2D background. Thinking in

Cutting’s terms, we speak here of occlusion, height, relative size and
relative density. Figure 14, A strong effect of perspective (L’Enfant et les
Sortilèges 2004), shows an example of the virtual set with a compelling
perspective.
6.2. Perception of movement

While there is a possibility to achieve a certain photorealistic quality
of the virtual set itself (that is, in the background image), the vir-
tual set system as a whole also offers possibility for camera movement
within the virtual set. The virtuosity of the technique lies in its ability
to present an illusion of the 3D space in movement and at the same
time keep us assured, that what we see, is an objective space. The
camera moves, the vision changes, but we accept it as a truth that we
have encountered a constant space.

We can see the virtual set from different camera angles and fur-
thermore, we can follow the characters moving in it. The three di-
mensionality of the virtual set is not the character of the objects it
consists of, but the possibility of simulated movement. However, the
depth that the virtual set suggests does not truly exist. At a most fun-
damental level, what does exist, is a series of more or less photorealistic
computer generated images, which when seen successively (one after
another), form an animation of camera movement.
L’Enfant consists of several dance scenes, for example the grand-
father clock coming to life or a bat attacking the boy, among oth-
ers. These dance scenes with continuous character movement created
challenges for the virtual set: how would the camera grasp and ac-
centuate this movement. Could the tracking system reproduce the
camera movement accurately in the virtual set? It may be considered
however, that it is precisely what the virtual set system is for: with the
aid of complex tracking systems it allows the camera to move in the
virtual set and thus, move in order to follow and express movement.
Gibson supposes that there are essentially two different and dis-
tinct kinds of movement-perception in film: thus the movement of
camera can fundamentally be seen as the movement of the observer
of the situation and in this way it differs from the movement of those
objects seen on the screen. Gibson (1979, 10) writes “By putting the
camera in place of the observer and moving it through an artificial or
a natural environment, the experience of visual motion is imparted to
the observer himself ”.
While the camera moves, our vision moves, and we redefine our
position in respect to space. Phenomenologist Maurice Merleu-Ponty
(1945, 311) writes:
Movement is displacement or change in position (...) As we ini-

tially encountered an idea of position which defines it in terms of
relationships in objective space, so there is objective conception of
movement which defines it in terms of relations within the world,
taking experience of the world for granted.”
Gibson (1979, 22-23) has pointed out, how the moving image con-
tains more information of space and distance than a still photograph.

Figure 15-1 Figure 15-2
Figure 15-1 - 15-6: A camera movement in the

virtual set (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).

That is, the movement concerned brings out the relationship of the
observer and the space. Even the most subtle movement of camera
creates arresting information of the space depicted, as can be seen in
Figures 15-1 - 15-6, Camera movement in the virtual set (L’Enfant et les
Sortilèges 2004). Along with movement, we can also form the idea of
the mutual relationships of the set elements.
When the camera moves, our vision of the virtual set changes.
Heath defines the viewpoint of the observer as the “camera-eye”, and
explains how the camera movement ultimately creates changing per-
spectives. The movement of a character can further “bring out” the
space, show relative positions and suggest depth. He also compares
the movements “camera-eye” with the movements of the head: hori-
zontal movement is like panning etc, etc. For Heath (1986, 390-391),
the correct perspectives lay in the establishment of the identification
of the observer and the perspective itself as a cultural creation. In
contrast with Heath’s cultural constructivism, cognitive science dif-
fers strikingly in this matter by grounding observations on the neuro-
physiological findings that the illusion of depth from linear perspec-
tive drawing is processed “relatively low on a visual system”, which
consequently implies perspective as not being a cultural convention
(Anderson 1998, 74-75).
6.3. Widening the idea of perspective

Working with L’Enfant caused me to further question, how the illu-
sion of depth was achieved, and led to the conclusion, that surface
textures played an important role in defining the sense of depth. I
came to notice, that the 3D simulation of textured surfaces seems to
bring out a powerful illusion of solid shapes and further establish the
a sense of depth.
This observation coincides very well with Gibson’s ecological idea
of human vision. Gibson further formulated the idea of depth and
space, and emphasized instead the perception of surfaces with char-
acteristic features (such as texture, shape, and reflectance) in the en-
vironment. The vision of 3D space relies on texture density gradients
created by the light reflected from surfaces. As described earlier, for

Gibson (1979, 65-66) the human vision is not a frozen snapshot, but
a constantly moving optic array consisting of these texture gradients.
Gibson (Ibid. 70) differentiated the artificial perspective (linear
perspective) from the natural perspective:
Natural perspective, as I conceive it, is the study of an ambient ar-

ray of solid angles that correspond to certain distinct geometrical
parts of a terrestrial environment, those that are separated by edges
and corners
and “What we loosely call an outline in picture refers to outer edges

of the face of an object” (Ibid. 287). This means the linear structure
of perspective is an abstraction and furthermore a convention: what
we truly see in pictorial images is “the surface of the picture and the
surfaces in the picture” (Ibid. 282).
In order to minimize the computation task, many 3D anima-
tion softwares actually utilize 2D techniques. Instead of reproducing
tediously the complex and detailed geometrical shape of the coating
of a surface, so called bump maps are used. Bump maps achieve their
effect of surface texture by changing how an illuminated surface reacts
to light without actually modifying the size or shape of the surface.
Real time 3D graphics often use variations of the bump map tech-
nique in order to simulate textures at a lower computational cost.
This is the case with 3D virtual set systems as well, in that they can
for example base 3D simulation on a technique called baking surface
attribute maps: brightness, roughness or other features of the surface
are pre-computed and not done in real time. In L’Enfant the effect of
the texture simulation in the 2D real time virtual set is similar to the
one with a baked surface map - the background images were actu-
ally 2D images of light reflecting surfaces. The consequence is clear:
while the camera moves, the surfaces of the virtual set don’t ‘live’ in
illumination or shadow or in any other aspect. Our perception of this
kind of synthetic surface is thus crucially different than our percep-
tion of real life surfaces. While the texture gradient moves, it doesn’t
produce the vividness of illumination and light reflectance on a true
3D surface shape.
For L’Enfant we did also one complex post-produced motion
tracking with a relatively simple background: there is only a carpet

(with magical grass!) surface behind. The shot depicts the flying bat’s
vision of the boy in the Bat Scene of L’Enfant. The true 3D simula-
tion of the bump map texture (i.e. without pre computing) of the
carpet actually brings a very forceful sense of motion, even though the
information of the space itself is otherwise very limited. This means
that more time spent with consuming computational processes may
have quite promising results in terms of simulating texture gradients
(Fig16-1 - 16-2, The viewpoint of the flying Bat, L’Enfant et les Sorti-
lèges 2004).
As mentioned earlier, Gibson developed his ideas especially dur-
ing World War II alongside his investigations in the need to train pi-
lots in a reliable and easy way. The situation of flying is dynamic in the
sense of constantly changing vision. Virtual set systems are however
developed primarily for television use, and they seem to best fulfill
their task by the use of slow camera movement with a relatively slight
change in perspective. Television convention generally relies in the
case of close-ups, on the telephoto lens which typically produces a
flattened sense of depth. Therefore it is quite adequate for many tele-
vision applications to have surfaces with a flat and lifeless sense that
pre-computing the attribute maps (or the whole background image)
can cause. However, pre-computed surfaces do not seem to allow a
very fine tuned expression of surfaces in space.
Gibson (1976, 33, 66) brought up in an underlined manner,
that a texture gradient is not a mere depth cue (which is possible
to combine with other depth cues) but a fundamental property of a
perceiver’s ecological environment. Consequently it means that the
computational processing of textures is particularly crucial for the suc-
cess of the virtual set. The better the simulated movement of textures
is replicated, the more realistic is the light emitting from the sur-
faces. However, this light emitting has to be in consistency with the
movement of the viewpoint and thus provide a flowing optic array in
Gibson’s sense. This also means that if we are sensitive in an ecologi-
cal sense to the texture gradients of our environment, we might react
very quickly to the cartoony look of real time graphics. In my own
evaluation, the above mentioned test we did with the Bat Scene was
very interesting and quite well fulfilled the purpose of seeing the boy
from the bat’s viewpoint.

Figure 16-1
Figure 16-2
Figure 16-1 - 16-2: The view-

point of the flying Bat (L’Enfant et
les Sortilèges 2004).

6.4. Impossibility of frozen image
The example in chapter 1.2 of Ferretti designing a sea on a sound-
stage out of plastic, illustrates how crucial the impression of a sur-
face reflecting light rays is for the scenic illusion. When captured in
movement caused by the wind, the plastic surface gives the perceptual
illusion of the sea. Computer generated surfaces can be thought in
a similar way: even though they are just surfaces, their movement,
texture and brightness on the first hand, gives an impression, that we
gain the meaning of. also It was considered how Gibson emphasized
the perception of surfaces in the human vision: they form a kind of
changing optic array. The movement of the observer is experienced as
a transformation of this optic array - when the observer moves, the
optic array changes. It was also raised, that real-time computer graph-
ics have limitations, which may mean that illusionary textures do not
seem to reflect light as we perceive them to in the real world. Thus,
the virtual set does not necessarily produce adequate depth cues in the
case of texture gradients and the surfaces of the virtual set are simply
not experienced as vividly as those in real world perception.
What it is most important to understand however, is that the
movement of the observer as seen by Gibson, means the gaining of
information. Our visual system has developed over time to detect
movement: it is simply the basis of the choice in evolution. We are
equipped to detect variations in textures in a very sensitive way; that
is we can differentiate very the fine grain in textures (Gibson 1979,
28). It may simply mean that the virtual set does not provide enough
information in this sense.
We can quickly grasp this idea by envisioning the real surface
of the sea - the nuanced movement, the lively light. Could Ferretti’s
plastic do the same? Most likely not. In a similar way, 3D computer
graphics are based on algorithms, that are simpler and more of a pro-
totype quality than the mathematical model of the real life phenom-
enon.
What are the consequences of the limitations in expressing tex-
ture gradients? Especially in the case with rough textures (as opposite
to smooth), the surface brightness variation is limited to the look of

a 2D attribute map image (or the otherwise 2D essence of the back-
ground image in the case of the 2D virtual set). A viewer can notice
that despite considerable changes of viewpoint, the background sur-
face looks precisely the same i.e. the illumination and reflection do
not change according to the viewpoint. The true 3D coating of the
texture shape in light is not sufficiently depicted.
This feature consequently creates an impression of the virtual
set surfaces that according to Gibson we might call “frozen”. As dis-
cussed, Gibson (1979, 87) carefully emphasized the urgency of the
moving optic array. He formulated his theory thus:
The sources of invariant optical structure in relation to the sources

of variation in optical structure (...) frozen structure, is a myth, or
at least limiting case. Invariants of structure do not exist except in
relation to variants.
Variants, for Gibson were caused “by a moving point of obser-

vation” and secondly “by a moving source of illumination” (Ibid.).
Invariants are properties of the optic array, which remain constant as
other conditions vary.
The surprising effect for me was that the sense of artificiality and
especially the sense of a motionless, silent environment was so thor-
ough within the virtual set. I consider this at least partially to be the
consequence of an inadequate optic array, the insufficient look of the
‘surfaces in the picture’. But the impression of a frozen world may also
be partially a consequence of the other limiting features of motion
possibilities within the virtual set system, such as the limitation of the
camera movement simulation and the limitation of the simulation
of other artifacts on the set. However, to summarize, it is a sense of
deadness, a lack of movement, which ecologically thinking is some-
thing we react strongly to. This is the dilemma the virtual set has to
struggle against, by developing better techniques of simulation, such
techniques that allow a more live sense of the virtual set.
In L’Enfant, we made an enlightening experiment. I created a
scene for the magical garden in the Boy’s room containing a fountain
of water frozen as a still (i.e. the surface texture of the water was not
moving at all, but it was literally frozen as though silent throughout

the scene). I presumed that it would be perceived as very uncanny
from the viewer’s point. What really puzzled me however, that within
the virtual set of L’Enfant it felt somewhat indifferent as to whether
the water was actually moving or not. With the world of otherwise in
a frozen texture look, the frozen water seemed to belong to it, as seen
in Figure 17, The frozen water (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
6.5. Multi-layered digital illusion

The virtual set works in a very similar way to trompe l’oeil, but can be
much more complex. The division between the surface of the picture
and surfaces in the picture is not necessarily simple. According to the
diverse matte channels, there can be a hierarchical structure of the
main surface and several sub surfaces of the picture. These surfaces
in the picture can serve as a basis for several overlapping two dimen-
sional illusions.
Figure 17: The frozen water (L’Enfant

et les Sortilèges 2004).

In L’Enfant I made an attempt to explore the possibilities of this
kind of multi-layering possibility. In the story there is a fantasy scene
in which the boy imagines the two chairs (the armchair and the small-
er chair) as having a dance scene. The room has changed into a festive
glimmering place for a party. As a texture file for the walls I used the
original background image, so the walls were surfaces for the dupli-
cated picture on them, containing again the surfaces of the room. It
had a kind of kaleidoscope effect as seen in Figure 18, A play with the
surfaces (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004). The dancer is brought into a
picture several times through multiplying the video source image. In a
music video related fantasy we do not seem to have problems in expe-
riencing a scene like this and music video convention allows this kind
of idea of “reflecting several realities”. Naturally, this is quite a sensi-
tive approach, as it is hard to know beforehand, what the contract
with the spectator allows us (as an artist) to do. However, music vid-
eos especially utilize the possibilities of the virtual set and/or multiple
matte channels, so the convention for this kind of imagery use exists.
Another example of this kind of unusual use of the possibilities of
matte within the work, is the princess dancing in front of the mirror.
The question is not about a true reflection in the real world sense, but
a horizontal secondary video source of the dancing character as seen
in Figure 19, A secondary video source (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
As a moving realm, the virtual set has truly provided a new type of
illusion. Where as a perfect trompe l’oeil experience requires a specta-
tor being in precisely the right position, a virtual set convinces the
spectator of the illusion with the correct perspective movement of the
elements. In L’Enfant, the backgrounds worked without any excep-
tion so that the character felt as if they were positioned in the digital
environment. Compellingly, the perspective seems to inevitably posi-
tion a character into a picture. However, on a cognitive level, all kind
of aftershocks were experienced: the digital environments seemed to
contain too much information of its own artificial quality. It felt as
if the illusion was experienced, and then recognized as an impossible
illusion. Allen (1997, 83) describes “that our perception of how the
object is depicted enters into our perception of the object “.
According to the ecological view, film provides us with informa-
tion. Anderson and Jessica Hodgins (2004, 65) have given an illus-

Figure 18: A play with the surfaces
trating example, of how crucial is not only the information, but also
misinformation. In order to exemplify this, they arranged a test, how
we perceive motion in digital simulation. Three running figures were
constructed digitally, one consisting of dots, another of sticks and
the last was fully designed polygonal model. Each of these figures
was animated in a running motion and then showed to a test audi-
ence. The audience was asked which of the three figures moved in the
most natural way. Although the movement itself was equal for each
of the figures, the test audience consistently felt, that the dot figure
moved most naturally. The full polygonal model was felt to be the
least natural. The test is interesting and Anderson notices “as viewers
we perceive information that is present and seldom miss information
that might have been there but is not, unless its absence is called to
our attention” (Ibid.). Also, “there is little information that tells us
that the figure (dot figure) was constructed using dynamic simulation
and hand-tuned control algorithms. The stick figure and polygonal
figures give us comparatively much more information, but the ad-

Figure 19: A secondary video source
ditional information is not all about human motion; a good portion

of it is about nonhuman shapes and surfaces that move in nonhuman
ways” (Ibid.).
My experience of the L’Enfant virtual set is that it without doubt
contains a considerable amount of misinformation, with artificial
surfaces not creating a ‘real’ kind of vision. When a large amount of
shootage consists of real time graphics, there are considerable limita-
tions in respect to quality. I am convinced that one of the most crucial
limitations of the virtual set as a whole, is the inadequate impression
of the moving optic array. According to Anderson and Hodgins, com-
puter-generated animation - this applies to the virtual set - presents
a synthetic optic array (Ibid. 65). The vision in the first place is not
caught by the eye, it is not filmed by the camera but it is “wavelengths
and brightnesses created by the digital artist” (Ibid.). Thus we can
use the term synthetic optic array, when we talk of surface percep-
tion when related to the virtual set. Synthetic optic array equals the
artificial look of the virtual set, which is hard to overcome, especially

when you are trying to accomplish something in the framework of
narrative. We simply become aware, that no world could be like this
- especially a world we could regard as real, in the sense that one
could possibly be situated in that world. This quite forcefully tells
me, how primary our perceptual relationship with our world is and
in the virtual set, this primary relationship is violated and problems
arise. As obstacles, are they impossible to overcome? As an answer, one
might say that there is also a strong fascination with a world that is
recognizably quite artificial, but the very fact of which almost makes
us believe the reality of it. This is something to be discussed in the
following chapters.
6.6. Information of artificiality

The practical example of L’Enfant shows, that it seems to be practi-
cally clear to viewers, that the virtual set is of synthetic origin. Many
cinema special effects go unnoticed, but there is a growing tradition in
digital cinema that ‘approves’ from the very beginning, the synthetic
attributes. In the previous chapter we noted, how digital imagery can
give additional information that might be disturbing, for example
information on the polygonal surfaces. It means that in addition to
the information that is purposeful in respect to the narrative, other
information that reveals the digital origin is present.
As Manovich noticed, given enough time and resources almost
everything is possible with the digital effects technology. L’Enfant was
not a production with unlimited resources, but tightly resourced.
Therefore the sets were done with the resources that were available,
which meant quite many compromises being made. It was not the
goal of the production, that the spectator would believe that the scen-
ery was real and it was clear that with the given resources, only a
modest sense of photorealism could be achieved. However, it was not
the intention either, that the viewer would regard the scenery as fake.
Rather the question was; would it be possible to design a production
with the assumption, that the viewer would respond with the willing
suspension of disbelief?
The synthetic set questions our demand for realism in films. As
discussed elsewhere in this research, the viewers are generally at some

level consciousness that what they see is a fiction. However, they also
seem to have an idea, that the scenery they see, despite of its origin, is
three dimensional. As film researchers Richard Maltby and Ian Craven
(1995, 191) have noticed, “whatever the camera records has to exist
in material form”. From the point of view of traditional scenery this
is true. Digital scenery breaks this rule. However, despite of this fact,
the viewers expectations remain, and they seem to simply assume that
they are witnessing a three dimensional realm. This is largely based
on my knowledge as a practitioner: all the design methods (whether
two or three dimensional), are meant to convey the three-dimensional
world, where the character can be imaginarily present. This implies,
that certain ‘as-if ’ states remain: the scenery is assumed in a similar
way to be real like the things in our world. A crucial question is,
whether the virtual set functions within this assumption. Practice
shows, that it does quite well and three-dimensionality seems not to
be an issue (this assures the illusion is compelling), and it is rather a
question of origin.
Tan (1996, 239) has noted, that “the experience of reality by the
viewer is not a question all of all-or-nothing-at-all”. While such a
virtual set as in L’Enfant conveys information of synthetic origin, it
also looks as if spectators eventually have several possible modes of
experiencing, and can grasp the film despite misinformation. At the
same time, whilst it is clear, that L’Enfant gives considerable reasons
for a spectator to question the origin of the scenery, it was possible
to experience it both as a work of art and the story of a naughty boy.
In this experience, the spectator is clearly willing to approve the ad-
ditional information of artificiality and deal with the tension concern-
ing the sense of realism.
One might even ask, whether the appeal of this kind of produc-
tion is similar than the fascination of trompe l’oeil, where we are con-
fronted by the fact that we are deceived so well with the artificial illu-
sion. Compelling illusion is something that enchants us, and despite
that we acknowledge that we are deceived by it, the delight remains. It
seems as if every production defines it own logic, and the virtual set in
this sense offers a new kind of illusionistic experience within cinema.
Information of artificiality also brings to the fore, that such a pro-
duction as L’Enfant, is an artefact. As Tan (Ibid. 34-36) has proposed,

the emotions of film are raised due to the experience of fiction and
the experience of artefact. Experience of film contains an involvement
in the fiction and an appreciation of the artefact. The term apprecia-
tion of artefact is used “to refer to the motive that consists in finding
enjoyment in formal film characteristics” (Ibid. 34). Here we can see
that spectators are willing to accept the virtual set production as a
fiction in which to immerse themselves as well as to enjoy the formal
characteristics of it. The practical example of L’Enfant proves this is
possible, although some scenes seem to be more successful in creating
the possibility for immersion. The idea of formal film characteristics
can be understood to have consequences in two ways. On one hand,
it can imply additional information that reveals the synthetic origin
in a distracting way. The more this governs the experience, the more
difficult is the immersion to access. On the other hand it can imply a
successful sense of artificial fantasy, as seen in Figure 20, The twinkling
Princess (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004). This adds to the enjoyment
Figure 20: The twinkling Princess


of digital art and furthermore adds the possibility of immersion. Thus
artificiality in itself is not an obstacle for immersion. The consider-
ation of what information ends up being distracting however, is quite
likely to be delicate.

7. ECOLOGICAL VISION IN LUONNOTAR
7.1. Virtual set as a changing vision
In this chapter I am going to discuss ecological vision in Luonnotar.
By ecological vision, I mean Gibson’s definition of vision as an ambi-
ent optic array. For Gibson (Gibson 1979, 72), ambient optic array
was constantly changing, since the “observation implies movement,
that is locomotion with reference to the rigid environment, because
all observers are animals and all animals are mobile”. Therefore the
movement of the optic array is in the forefront of this chapter.
One of the conclusions of the L’Enfant project was the realization
that a virtual set can’t produce a similar vision of surfaces than that of
our real world experience. Consequently, the design process of Luon-
notar was influenced by this fact. I felt handicapped by the technique
and longed for new kinds of approaches. In Luonnotar my aim was
set in accordance with Sibelius’ music, and my interpretation of it as
‘fervent’. Director Marikki Hakola (2010, 1) describes the strength of
the music as “hypnotitizing” .
The crucial question was how we might create a vision that would
generate the intense emotional experience that the music of Luonno-
tar suggests. Luonnotar’s journey through the ancient space and time
is full of feeling, so how could I resonate this voyage of Luonnotar
with the virtual set?
I became fascinated with the idea of a feverish flying scene with
the main character Luonnotar and this constituted the opening se-

quence of the work. The connection between the pictorial material
needed for the Luonnotar production and Gibson’s (1947, 5) test ma-
terial and results, was coincidental but striking:
The kind of behavior primarily involved in the task of flying is lo-

comotion in space and on that account is extended in time. Hence,
performances required in flying are predominantly characterized by
motion, by being continuous, and by possessing tempo.
Gibson’s formulation of a human vision as the constantly moving

optic array made me aware that the virtual set should imitate this
moving array of the vision itself, and not concentrate on creating the
‘frozen’ or ‘arrested’ pictorial image of the set. Here we approach an
interesting question: could the idea of the virtual set illusion be ex-
panded to be an illusion of a vision of scenery and not an illusion of
the scenery? Would there be a difference in designing space over time
rather than a space seen in a given time?
Along these lines, the expression of a continuous moving vision
of the scenic environment became a major goal of the virtual set in
Luonnotar. As psychologist Albert Michotte (1950, 115-116) brings
forward; movement as such contains expressive quality, that is picked
by the viewers despite the nature of the moving objects. Thus viewers
might recognize from the movement itself, such things as the emo-
tional relations. This eventually formulated as a key idea for me: to
create movement, that would arouse emotions, despite the fact that
the moving object would be something we would regard as inanimate.
In the virtual set of Luonnotar, every shot consisted of a set that was
in movement: the surfaces of the clouds and the sea were constantly
billowing. Practically this meant that instead of modeling the virtual
set, the animating of it became crucial.
What else could the moving vision stand for except the moving
of the scenery elements? Let us consider how Gibson came to his
conclusions of the moving optic array. Gibson originally presumed
that good depth perception was essential for flying. However, the tests
based on this assumption bore no fruit in training the pilots. Based
on this, Gibson formulated his theory anew (Bruce et al. 2003, 302).
As described earlier, Gibson extended the idea of traditional space

and depth and established his own theory of human vision on the
perception of surfaces. What is most important is that for Gibson, the
texture gradients of the optic array were not just merely depth cues
suggesting the distances and sizes of objects. Instead, they were a more
fundamental property of ecological optics that specifies the layout of
a perceiver’s surroundings.
Human perception is thus like the constant sampling of the op-
tic array, which provides information about the surrounding world.
What produces the transformations in the optic array is the active
movement of the observer. As Gibson (1979, 111) writes: “When
a point of observation is occupied, there is also optical information
to specify the observer himself ”. According to Kubovy (1986, 154),
optic array includes two kinds of information. Firstly, there is extero-
ceptive information, the information of the layout of surfaces in the
environment. Secondly, there is exproprioceptive information, that is,
information of the location of our body and its parts in the environ-
ment. Films naturally do not contain the body parts of the fictional
witness, however films do create an awareness of the similarly un-
derstood witness position through other means such as perspective.
Thus, the designing of a virtual set also entails designing the position
of the fictional witness. With real time virtual set systems the fictional
witness position is obtained through camera tracking, but in a post-
produced virtual set, defining this position relies on the designer’s
response.
In Luonnotar, the decision was taken not to use a real time virtual
set system. Instead, the virtual set was animated and composited in
post-production. This technological choice gave way to the nontra-
ditional idea to think of a virtual set as being a synthetic, constantly
moving optic array i.e. a series of animation clips containing a wit-
ness position. This kind of approach made it possible to concentrate
on how the virtual set is envisioned, rather than what is envisioned.
Movement of the scenery objects was not meant to be a separate
movement of elements, but an integrated movement of the wholistic
vision. On the basis of this new thinking of the virtual set, the new
concept of an animate optic array can be formed. Animate optic array
emphasizes, that the virtual set is a vision of a digital picture that is
opposite to Gibson’s concept of the frozen picture. It is thus subject

to constant change. Animate optic array also recognizes the nature of
the virtual set formed by synthetic, moving surfaces.
In the sequence, where Luonnotar is flying with her balloon and
eventually ends up surfing on the ice raft, the movement is meant to
be feverish and dynamic. Luonnotar truly rushes through the enor-
mous forces of nature, through the cloudy sky and the wavy sea. This
sequence is shot in a way that we as spectators, see Luonnotar’s jour-
ney mostly from another person’s position and not from her perspec-
tive. Tan (1996, 239-240) points out, that this is the illusion of the
controlled viewer. “Viewers have the impression not only that they are
present in the fictional world, but also they are present in the guise
of an invisible witness or spectator”. The camera gazes at Luonnotar,
and only a couple of times captures events from her point of view.
The illusion of character movement in relation to her environment
is accomplished through the backgrounds with moving perspective.
Despite the fact that the character is shot in the studio making her
gestures on one spot, the eventual sequence complete with final an-
imated backgrounds gives an idea of the continuous movement of
Luonnotar, and the camera following her. Hereby is obtained the im-
pression of an information seeking observer, who moves in the same
environment relative to the objects present.
There are three main cycles of movement in Luonnotar: the fly-
ing sequence in the air, the drifting sequence on the ice raft and the
dancing sequence on the water’s surface. These sequences depict how
Luonnotar flies through empty space and lands on the ancient earth
that is covered with water. In an enormous storm, Luonnotar sinks
into the depths of the sea. Sotka, the ancient bird then takes her place
as a carrier of the narrative. Whilst Luonnotar is played by a singer,
Sotka is played by a dancer. Sotka dances on the water’s surface and
struggles against the forces of nature. Eventually the water transforms
into solid ground and lets Sotka lay an egg, from which the cosmos
is to be born.

7.2. Oriented in horizon
According to Gibson, the active movement of an observer is essential
for visual perception. Through movement, the observer gains infor-
mation of their world and also of their own position in that world
from a motion perspective. In following, we can concentrate on the
information concerning the observer’s position in the world in rela-
tion to the other objects of that world.
Anderson (1998, 112) writes: “Knowing where we are is so basic
to our survival, so fundamental to our perception, that we are uncom-
fortable with disorientation, and we panic when we are lost.” When
we are moving around, we are gathering information that confirms
our position in the world. According to Gibson (1979, 148), human
vision is fundamentally a terrestrial vision: “I considered ‘the possibil-
ity that there is literally no such thing as perception of space without
the perception of a continuous background surface’. I called this a
ground theory of the space perception that seemed to underlie the
old approach. The idea was that the world consisted of a basic surface
with adjoining surfaces, not bodies in empty air.” Furthermore, there
is evidence, that the evaluation of the distances of objects is influenced
by the structure on the ground surface on which they are positioned
(Bruce et al. 2004, 304). In production design, this implies that there
is always a background in the form of the ground against which the
scenery elements are positioned.
In Gibson’s (1979, 67) ground theory, our vision consists of
“structured array from earth” and “unstructured light from the sky”.
Gibson (Ibid. 66) continues: “And in any case, to put it radically, the
environment does not consist of objects. The environment consists of
the earth and the sky with objects on earth and in the sky, of moun-
tains and clouds, fires and sunsets, pebbles and stars.” Grodal (2007,
15) continues of the same issue by presenting that the environment
consists of the light above:
Under those natural lightning conditions, which existed during

prehistoric period of time in which our visual system developed,
directed light always arrives at a scene from above, from the sun

Figure 21: Luonnotar flying (Luonnotar
2011).
and the moon. Human beings probably got permanent access to

cultural sources of light (fires) only after our present visual system
was fully developed. Thus, underlighting is a strongly antinatural-
istic effect.
The basic tendency of our vision to build up on the earth-sky

-duality was explored in Luonnotar. Since our vision is a terrestrial vi-
sion, we seem to need to definition of the horizon, even in the space.
During Luonnotar’s flying sequence as seen in Figure 21, Luonnotar
flying (Luonnotar 2011), Luonnotar is actually in an empty space.
This kind of space, according to Gibson, belongs not to our normal
sphere of experience. The directions of up and down are referred by
the lighting source being from above, despite of the fact that in a
space light could come from any direction. In addition to this, Luon-
notar’s balloon establishes the vertical relationships, the balloon being
above Luonnotar’s head, holding up the swing Luonnotar sits on. It
is seemingly so, that in film we need to make an allusion to things in

the way in which we have truly experienced them: weightless rotation
doesn’t belong to our normal experience. It is quite common trend
in science fiction films, that the places in a space are not presented as
weightless. The spectator’s experience of the film needs to be oriented.
I wanted to experiment during the flight sequence, and in one
of shots, I made the background animation where the clouds rotates
upside down as seen in Figure 22-1 -22-3, Rotating clouds (Luonnotar
2011). Basically, as we experience the forward motion of the mov-
ing perspective as an effect created with the background animations,
we should experience Luonnotar turning upside down. This effect,
though, creates a perception that clouds rotate instead of Luonnotar:
the phenomenological reality of the character in Chromakey studio
not rotating probably gives this result. However, it seems that the
moving horizontal perspective is easier to establish as an illusion, than
a change in our perceptual understanding of what is up and what
is down. Cinematographic frame is always upside up, never upside
down.
In my experience, the designing of the virtual set touches quite
fundamental questions of our orientation in the world and how we
are positioned in relation to the environment. Designing traditional
sets very seldom brings forth these kinds of issues in a phenomeno-
logical sense. Gibson (1979, 207) states:
Visual world is the outcome of picking up of invariant information

in the ambient optic array by an exploring visual system, and the
awareness of the observer’s own body in the world is a part of the
experience.
When designing traditional sets, the possibility of being bodily

present in real sets or locations gives us a penetrating idea of how the
pro-filmic event is positioned in relation to this scenic environment.
The virtual set however, disconnects us from our natural environ-
ment, so even in the filmmaking phase, we might end up with a con-
fusion of our position in relation to the imagined environment of the
virtual set. I believe, this confusion is both of our placement and of
whose vision are we experiencing. While this disconnectedness pres-
ents the possibility to be present in imagined digital environments,

Figure 22-1
Figure 22-2
Figure 22-1 - 22-3: Rotating

clouds (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 22-3

it also brings about the need to artificially construct one’s vision of
that environment. This is the essence of the synthetic optic array of
the virtual set. As previously noted; when using a real time virtual set
system, the simulative system allows the cinematographer to control
the vision, but this is not the case with the post-produced virtual set.
As Heath (1986, 389) points out, the camera is aimed to give an
ideal picture of the scene. This ideal is not an abstraction; the tradi-
tional vision of the camera is based on the cinematographer’s percep-
tion of the pro-filmic event. Eventually the vision of camera can be
traced to the cinematographer’s view as a flowing optic array. Natu-
rally, plenty of pre-planning of the whole artistic crew anticipates the
actual shooting situation. Nonetheless, the moving optic array of film
is a consequence of the superior vision of a cinematographer, vision
in the sense that the cinematographer actively in practice executes
the final outlook of the film thus establishing his unitary view. The
virtual set however, needs to utilize different technological methods
to establish the oneness of the vision. The real time virtual set system
with accurate preview possibilities comes closest: it gives interactively,
a precise idea of how the character combined with the digital back-
ground will look like. In Luonnotar, the vision of the character in the
environment was established during the post-production phase on
the basis of the original Chromakey footage. The relationship of the
camera and the character was thus pre-existing. The relationship be-
tween the camera, character and the scenic environment needed thus
to be established through the virtual set designing process, wherein
lay the question; how we are positioned in respect to the environ-
ment? On one hand it was such an enormous task to design a whole
ancient universe for Luonnotar to explore, but on the other hand,
defining the basic orientation of how this universe is seen became an
essential part of the designing process.
There are approximately a hundred shots in Luonnotar, and every
one of them required a process of establishing the virtual camera po-
sition in relation to the digital environment. The difficulty of main-
taining the cohesive orientation was seemingly huge, when compared
with traditional production design. Eventually, cues of orientation
build up the scheme, how the fictional world was organized spatially
and how the different surfaces in space were related to each other and

in respect of the point of view of the spectator. In Luonnotar, digital
tool allows this scheme to be vast in imaginary size, discovering di-
mensions that it would not be possible to create with traditional film
production design.
Thus the virtual set afforded me a way to experiment thoroughly
with the measures of the digital environment. The elements of the
design could be huge in scale, and they could be positioned far away
from each other. Likewise, the work in terms of how things were ori-
ented, were ground breaking in the digital universe and working with
such dimensions that were not based on direct perceptions was dif-
ficult, though interesting.
7.3. Optic flow

Through movement the entire optic array changes. When an observer
moves, this locomotion is always accompanied by a flow in the optic
array. For example, during a flight when the pilot is landing, there
will be streaming in the optic array radiating out from the point he
is planning to land. Different types of flows specify different kinds of
movement, such as distancing or approaching.
Gibson (1979, 122-123) writes:
The centrifugal outflow of the array that specifies the locomotion

does not interfere with the information that specifies surface lay-
out; the invariants are all the better for the transformation. The
moving self and the unmoving world are reciprocal aspects of the
same perception. To say that one perceives an outflow of the world
ahead and an inflow of the world behind as one moves forward in
the environment would be quite false. One experiences the rigid
world and a flowing array. The optical flow of the ambient array is
almost never perceived as motion; it is simply experienced as kines-
thesis, that is egolocomotion.
This is the way the moving optic array conveys information not
only of our fixed position, but our position as a moving entity. In
Luonnotar, almost all of the shots with the character were shot on the

Chromakey studio with a fixed camera position. There was no camera
movement at all. How was it possible to create the impression of the
constant movement of the camera? This was done quite successfully
through the first half of Luonnotar, where Luonnotar rushes through
the ancient universe.
It is precisely due to the optic flow that allows us to establish such
illusions as the moving perspective. Hochberg and Brooks (1996,
369) describe this phenomenon:
We perceive the framework-relative paths of motion, and not the

displacements on the screen which determine the low-level mo-
tion. An object may be perfectly stationary on the screen and yet
it will appear to irresistibly move, if given a moving framework or
background, and the actual motions of the frameworks and back-
grounds themselves are often not noticeable. This is part of a rich
body of phenomena known as induced motion (...) Thanks to this
phenomenon, a continuous motion can be presented over a spaces
that may be many times larger than the screen (...) (original italics).
Here, through the animating camera movements of the virtual set,

the impression of the character actually moving is gained. Also, our
observer position is moving despite the fact that the original shootage
contains no such movement. A similar illusion technique called front/
back projection was previously used. The characters were filmed for
instance sitting in a car, and the film containing the moving scenery
was projected behind the characters, thus creating an illusion that the
car is actually moving in the landscape. Interestingly, this kind of il-
lusion technique allows us to use much larger distances than a virtual
set system based movement that is ultimately limited to the size of the
Chromakey studio and the freedom of actual camera movement. One
might also compare the illusion effects used in Luonnotar with a so
called traveling matte used in the first Superman movie (Warner Bros
1978). Traveling matte was a pre-digital technique allowing Super-
man to fly convincingly though the scene.
The types of movement allowed by the moving perspective illu-
sion are those that Gibson differentiated as different types of optic
flow fields. Flow of the ambient array depicts the locomotion and

Figure 23: The inflow of the optic
array (Luonnotar 2011),
Figure 24: The optic flow field

(Luonnotar 2011).

non-flow depicts stasis. Outflow of the optic array depicts approach-
ing movement and inflow an opposite distancing movement. Figure
23, The inflow of the optic array (Luonnotar 2011), exemplifies the use
of inflow of the optic array in Luonnotar. Figure 24, The optic flow
field (Luonnotar 2011), illustrates the optic flow field while Luonno-
tar travels from right to left through the clouds. Both of the examples
contain very simple scenic elements, water surface or clouds. Thus the
virtual set of Luonnotar provides basic surface textures that allow the
movement of Luonnotar and the observer to be expressed.

8. ILLUSION OF A DIEGETIC SPACE
8.1. Presence in the world of film
We concluded the last chapter by confirming that in the case of the
virtual set, we are not limited to the bodily presence in the space. In-
stead, through the virtual set we have been able to visit places where
we possibly have not been able to dream of being present. The longing
for fantastic places is not of course anything new in film. As psycholo-
gist Sheena Rogers (2004, 217) writes,
Filmmakers and photographers have long sought to create new

worlds and preserve old ones (...) Through narrative and visual
trickery, real objects and events thus captured can show worlds
unknown, times and places no living person has seen. Yet, while
knowing there is artifice at work, we cannot shed the feeling that
we observe reality.
Gibson (1979, 16-17) continues on the same issue:
This tendency for scenes on screen to appear real should not be

overlooked (...) To great extent, the observer loses himself in the
scene, i. e., locates himself in the environment and in the situation
being portrayed. This attitude of being there and seeing it happen is
compelling (...) this attitude of reality is much more striking in mo-
tion pictures than in any other form of pictorial or phorographic
representation.

The compelling and striking aspect of the fictional world of cin-
ema is its overwhelming entirety. The fictional world created by the
filmmaker, is like our world, yet still it is different. We as viewers can
become engaged with it, yet we cannot touch or otherwise interact
with it. Since the rise of digital effects and the virtual set, more full
and detailed presentations of fictional worlds have appeared. Fantasy
and science fiction genres have especially celebrated the new tool-
box for creating imaginary worlds. The breathtaking quality of these
worlds have blurred the fact, that it is not ultimately the immeasur-
able amount of fictional worlds that can be created, but the possibility
to be present in these new universes, that is groundbreaking. Simply
put, it is not the virtual set but the virtual camera that is pioneering
and the virtual camera has taken us into places unseen, such as the
middle of a storm.
The possibility of the new digital imagery empowers a joyful jour-
ney, a metaphorical voyage to our inner dreams - a newly established
presence in fantasy. Production design is the profit of designer imagi-
nation. Design sketches and other pre-visualization methods impli-
cate this process. Designer imagination is founded on the experience
of the perceiving subject. As psychologist Ulric Neisser (1976, 108)
expresses it, imagining is not perceiving, but its origin is linked with
perception. “(...) images are indeed derivates of perceptual activity. In
particular, they are the anticipatory phases of that activity, schemata
that the perceiver has detached from perceptual cycle for other pur-
poses”. Furthermore, the production design process involves imagina-
tion of complete fictional worlds. The term world can be understood
here according to Gibson’s ecological ground theory which has been
previously discussed: the world comprises a horizon, against which
the objects and events are portrayed. Thus, we will approach this
world as such, that it is prevailed by distinguishable logic. This logic,
as we will discuss in future chapters, can be understood as consisting
of mental hierarchies.
The world of film on the screen is there simply to be seen. “The
motion picture is the artifact, constructed to exploit everyday percep-
tual processes” (Rogers 2004, 217). This means that however artificial
the film is, we confront it with a perceptual system developed not
for watching films, but for gaining information in the everyday en-

vironment. The perceptual illusion of the virtual set functions as the
gateway to the comprehensive illusion of the diegetic world of film.
Here we confront a new kind of cinematic illusion, a kind of moving
trompe l’oeil, as discussed in Chapter 7. While watching film, our ev-
eryday visual and auditory processing makes it possible to encounter
the illusion, that we are surrounded by the diegetic space. The film’s
emotional impact is furthermore dependable upon how we are able
to remain immersed in this fictional world. Here, the illusion of real-
ity of the cinematic world plays an important role (Anderson 1998,
113). Within, also lies a basic requirement for a virtual set as well as
for any production design: it needs to overcome the disbelief of the
reality status of the portrayed world and allow the acceptance of the
diegesis.
8.2. World alike logic

Ecological thinking emphasizes everyday experience in our process of
exploring film. Anderson (1998, 159) writes: “An ecologically based
theory of film would elevate ordinary perception, ordinary thinking,
ordinary feeling, for the world of the fictional motion picture, as it has
developed, is constructed of the ordinary materials (places, personali-
ties, clothing, bits of relationships, and so forth) that we deal with
everyday in the world.”
From the point of view of the production design process, we may
conclude that a design process has to be governed by and also gain its
sources from everyday experience, in order that this aspect of every-
day experience may be possible to pass on. The design of the film can
capture and convey us to the most imaginable places, yet these places
must echo the perceptual and cognitive experiences of real life. This
is possible by building a world alike logic that structures the world,
production design portrays.
We have discussed earlier, how the basic orientation in respect to
horizon builds our vision. This is on a fundamental level, one property
that contributes to the idea of creating a world alike logic in a design.
Traditional production design seldom goes so deep in this matter, that
it would question as to where is the ground, what is the sky, or how

the horizon is defined, however the virtual set as a digital universe
makes us rethink issues we have possibly taken for granted. The digital
universe does not necessarily require the same kind of logic than the
real world, it is not governed by gravity or the ambient light from
above, as our terrestrial environment is. I believe, the reason we pres-
ent the digital worlds as having such features, is because they would
be meaningless to us otherwise. In order to engage us, narratives need
to be about something of which we have experience based knowledge.
Of course though, we as humans do not have experiences in digital
worlds with irrational logic.
The logic of the diegetic world determines the rules of how events
or phenomena take place. A good example of the process of defining
a rule in the diegetic world of film is the way of deciding how the set
is lit. In traditional sets, much effort is generally made to establish a
convincing and expressive lightning atmosphere. Traditional studio
practices resemble the virtual set in a sense that artificial light is also
used in the studio. Of course this artificial lightning is not digital, but
nevertheless there is a process of simulating a natural phenomenon.
A cohesive production design is usually very suggestive in terms of
lightning. Interestingly, there has been some obscurity in the division
of work already in traditional production design.
Production designer Stuart Graig (in Ettedgui 1999, 83) makes
a point:
There’s a degree of trepidation in how one first approaches the D.P.

[Director of Photography], because in some degree the designer has
already lit the set by deciding, where the windows will be, or where
the practical lights are.
The decision of windows or more precisely the decision of basic

lightning directions is one of those decisions that are linked to our
basic perception of real world, as lit with ambient light and artificial
light sources. Cinematographer Sven Nyqvist (in Ettedgui 1998, 41)
describes how they made preparations for Winter Light (Svensk Film-
industri 1963). The story of the film took place in a church during a
three hour period. The film was meant to be shot in a studio, however
director Ingmar Bergman and Nyqvist went to a real church and took

Figure 25: The sunlight simulation
(L’Enfant et les Sortlilèges 2004).
photos every 5 minutes, in order to research how the light changes

during that time span. On the basis of the studied experience, they
built the eventual lightning in the studio. Similarly, in L’Enfant, there
is scene where the sun is animated as going down - as seen in Figure
25, The sunlight simulation (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004). It was an
elementary task of the design to simulate a real world alike lighting
event, as it is experienced in the real world. Here though comes the
crucial difference in the virtual set when compared with the tradi-
tional one: In most virtual set systems the lightning decisions are
made before shooting, usually by the designer, that is, digital light-
ning accompanies the digital set. It is only the most advanced real
time systems, that allow lighting changes during the shooting period.
Thinking of the traditional division of the labor, this is a remarkable
difference, and creates a new situation for a designer, who generally is
not trained as a lightning designer or cinematographer.
While working with the virtual set, the shift in emphasis changes:
the self-evident space creation process that relies on the practice of

production design, is transformed into a process where it is more cru-
cial for a designer to create primary meanings and operate on the level
of information we are capable of achieving without decoding. The
virtual set is a thoroughly mental construction, a pure simulation, and
the fundamental properties of the environment need to be established.
It means for example, that in the virtual world, there is no ground - it
needs to be imagined, as well as the light or the surfaces other than
the ground. Nothing can be taken for granted; everything needs to
be thought out. In the virtual set, natural physics is not a given, it
can only be simulated through different algorithms, often typified by
the programs used. Units are indifferent in the virtual world. In our
ecological environment, we are tied to our perceptual system, which is
not equipped to gain information from ‘the atom or the galaxies’, but
from an environment that is relevant to our own bodily scale (Gibson
1979, 9). However, a virtual set allows us to fluently transit from mi-
crocosmos to macrocosmos. It is quite an equal task in the virtual set
to light either a room, as in L’Enfant, or a moon, as in Luonnotar. The
fantasy is given a new dimension by enlarging the scope of our active
environment and through mediated experience, it is possible to be
present not only in the room, but on the moon, as well.
The design process itself will surely be redefined in the process of
virtual set design. The way design is imagined in pre-visualization will
be based on different schemata than previously. We discovered earlier,
how Neisser emphasized the imagination as anticipating perceptual
acts. We are able to imagine, based on our earlier perceptual experi-
ences. However, our perceptual experiences do not only constitute of
real life experiences - they include also pictures that have been pre-
sented in real life and certainly, films. Creating such environments
as those in Luonnotar, could not be based on my own experiences of
flying in space and discovering the ancient earth yet I still had quite
a clear image in my mind, of what space consists of and how we can
behave in such an environment. I could imagine in my mind the
concept of flying. This means, that we are able to build mental spa-
tial structures, and according to which we can arrange the shots for
describing the diegetic world. Designing a film, like any other act in
life, can be affected by images produced earlier (and maybe for totally
different purposes). Anderson (1998, 155) brings up, how films can
change our perceptual and cognitive schemata:

Beyond what is usually thought as a memory, we may ask whether
there are other consequences of watching film. Do we take any-
thing else from the experience; are we changed by it? I have said
that the schemata we bring to films are those we bring to other
experiences in the world, and when film experience modifies those
schemata (as all perceptual and cognitive cycles do) it has some way
changed the way we will interact with a world.
Eventually what this means, is that by creating a new kind of logic

in the virtual set, we expand our mental space and make it even more
diffuse to encompass both what is real and what is imagined.
8.3. Spatial structures

Let us now consider what Merleau-Ponty (2003 [1945], 235) wrote
of the experience of walking around his flat:
When I walk around my flat, the various aspects in which it pres-

ents itself to me could not possibly appear as views of one and the
same thing if I did not know that each of them represents the flat
seen from one spot or another, as if I were unaware of those move-
ments, and of my body as retaining its identity through the stages
of those movements.
We experience an objective space, despite the fact that we cannot see

the whole of the room at once. We see through constantly changing
glances at the room, but still we are able to construct a mental image
of the actual room itself. The recognized movement of the body is an
essential process in order to create the image of the whole.
Anderson (1998, 90) writes: “While the world is continuous in
both time and space, the shots that make up a motion picture are
not.” According to Anderson (Ibid. 109), there are three categories
of continuity conventions guiding the transition from one shot to
another: shot-to-shot transition, orientational relationships and hi-
erarchical spatial comprehension. By separating these categories,
Anderson (Ibid.) tries to “show how each (of them) interfaces with
specific capacities of human mind.” In the first category there is the

shot-to-shot continuity editing for example during movement, in the
second category such rules as shot-reverse-shots, point-of-view-shots,
over-the-shoulder-shots and eyeline-matches, and finally in the third
category hierarchical spatial relationships (Ibid.).
Film practice shows that production design in film can be seen
subtly structured along these conventions, so allowing cinematic
continuity. The design process involves several pre-planning meth-
ods, through which the filmmakers, designers, cinematographers and
directors try to pre-visualize how the eventual shooting schema will
look. Film production design is thus structured more than anything
else: the contiguous, persistent place in a film turns out to consist of
several separate shooting locations. It is the production designer’s task
to pre-imagine the world of film and then, suggest the appropriate
locations, either real or studio or, in the present day, digital. This pre-
imagining requires mental structures that indicate how the different
places in the diegesis are located in relation to each other. However,
the filmic construction of space is not necessarily equal to real world
spatial organization.
Heath (1986, 395) discusses this in his essay:
The filmic construction of space is recognized in its difference but

that difference is the term of an ultimate similarity (indeed, a final
‘illusion’); the space is ‘unlike’ but at the same time ‘reconstitutes’,
using elements lifted from real space. In fact, we are back in the
realm of ‘composition’, where composition is now the laying out
of succession of images in order to give the picture, to produce the
implication of coherent ‘real’ space; in short to create continuity.
According to Anderson, the diegetic world is based on hierarchi-

cal spatial comprehension. This construction “provide[s] viewers with
information for comprehending the entire diegetic world of movie
even though that world is never seen altogether in one shot from one
perspective” (Anderson 1998, 108). In ecological psychology, the
place “can be located by its inclusion in its larger place (for example,
the fireplace in the cabin by the bend of the river in the Great Plains)”
(Gibson 1966, 34). Our ability to mentally construct a comprehen-
sive imaginary world is based on remembering. We can remember the

places where we have been as well as the spatial relationships between
those places. Neisser (1988, 369) further explains the characteristics
of the spatial cognitive system. What is truly interesting here, is that
this system allows us to gather information in a nested structure - it
stores the spatial information effectively and above all, allows us “to
‘mentally’ revisit places that we have once encountered without actu-
ally returning to them”. Through remembering, the spectator is able
to visualize the whole spatial structure embedded in film.
What Neisser suggests here, actually means we are very well
equipped for creating a kind of mental map of complex spatial struc-
tures and able to maintain these imaginative structures in our minds.
Thus, through remembering, we are able to build a comprehensive
scenic structure out of places in the separate shots and scenes. Fur-
thermore, imagining places and their relationships to each other is a
tremendous source for the work of actually designing and executing
the film’s world. Production designer Charles Shiro Tashiro (1998,
18) has made an attempt to describe the hierarchical composition of
production design by applying the categories presented by architect
Christian Norberg-Schultz. These categories are based on structures
of world understood as “ever-widening affective circles extending
from human subject” (Ibid.). The seven categories include costume/
makeup, graspable objects, furniture, the house/the set, the street, a
landscape and a space (Ibid.). It is interesting, that Norberg-Schultz’s
original categorization lacks the category of space, but Tashiro feels
a need to add it. As earlier discussed, the involvement with a cos-
mic space cannot be included in our everyday experience. As Gibson
(1979, 9) puts it, we are “concerned here with things at the ecological
level, with the habitat of animals and men, because we all behave with
respect to things we can look and feel, or smell and taste, and events
we can listen to. The sense organs of animals, the perceptual systems,
are not capable of detecting atoms and galaxies.” Thus, cinematic
worlds can expand our everyday experience of the terrestrial world.
Screening space is based on our ability to imagine or ‘think’ and visu-
alize non-existing places. Here, film entirely depends on techniques
such as computer generated imagery (Tashiro 1998, 36).

8.4. Immersion as experience
What kind of event is it to enter into a film’s fictional world? In film
projection, there are two sets of information, one for the scene and
one for the surface, but we don’t see them equally as there is more
information in the scene, the fictional world of the movie. Thus we
primarily choose the scene, keeping in mind, that according to Allen
(1979, 104) the spectator can voluntarily decide whether to become
involved in the projective illusion of cinema or not. Tan (1996, 237)
argues the opposite, and for him the film as an illusion:
is difficult if not impossible to resist (...) it would be impossible to

suppress the illusion of motion by telling ourselves that what we are
seeing is actually a motion across a flat surface.
Anderson suggests that our engagement with diegesis is under-

scored with knowledge of ‘pretending’. Here the earlier discussed dual
quality of the cinematic image means on the perceptual level, a con-
stant “push-and-pull, in and out of the illusion of reality” (Anderson
1998, 123). The fictional world of film co-exists with the external
world, and we alternate between the immersion in the illusion of real-
ity and an awareness of that illusion as illusion. Tan (1996, 237-238)
suggests that the awareness of the artefact is guided by the structures
of the film. As an example he brings forth scene transitions, during
which a medium awareness may quite well take over the diegetic ef-
fect.
For Allen (1979, 122-123), spectator immersion means an imag-
ined, even dreamlike presence in the fictional world. He further pro-
poses, that we need to become entertained by the thought that the
world we see is ‘real’ (Ibid. 122). This ‘realness’ should be understood,
at a fundamental level as the realness of the cinematic world. Rog-
ers (2004, 219-220) writes: “As observers we become immersed in
the world of the motion pictures because it shares its natural (non-
symbolic) meaning with the real world it depicts”. Rogers (Ibid. 220)
goes on further:
To be informative, particular structures must specify, without am-

biguity, some states of affairs of the world, with respect to capabili-

ties of a particular observer. If these structures exist and if we can
detect them, we can know the world.
This is what we can call seeing the world and oneself in it. Im-
mersion in Roger’s (Ibid. 221) thinking includes an embodiment in
camera: “The camera shows us our own view of the other world, and
that view shows us ‘we’ (...) are in relation to it.”
Both Anderson and Tan see the unbroken diegesis as an immense
emotion-producing effect. Tan (1996, 237-238) explores, how “the
viewer is shaken out of the illusion by the fact that artefact itself
comes to the fore”. Anderson (1998, 124) states:
The diegesis might as well remain unbroken. The viewer needs to

be protected from ‘absorption’. It is not necessary to ‘reveal the
work’ of a motion picture; we can see that ‘this is pretend’. And a
seamless fictional world is a tremendous power in the cinema - it
provides a stable and continuous basis for the involvement of the
viewer experience in the film. The viewer can maintain an uninter-
rupted emotional/psychological involvement in the diegesis, allow-
ing the impact of the film to build to maximum effect.
According to Tan, the viewer’s presence in the fictional world can

be seen as the sub-illusion of the diegetic effect. Presence itself is char-
acterized as being a guise of the invisible witness or spectator. Thus,
“the events do not befall the spectator in flesh nor do they affect him
or her as they would one of the actors in the fictional narrative” (Tan
1996, 240). The presence of the viewer has no apparent consequences
in that world. Following on from this illusion, it is natural to assume
the viewer as having an observational attitude towards the events
in fiction. This is an illusion of a controlled witness. The control is
caused by a narrative agent, an ‘invisible assistant’ that in Tan’s terms,
‘guides’ the experience of the viewing. Tan (1996, 241) writes:
We can elucidate the illusion by means of a slightly grisly meta-

phor: the subject in fiction is actually a head without the body,
which is placed in cart by an obliging assistant and wheeled - or
even flown - around through time and space in fictional world.

What could then be said of the immersion in a cinematic world
that is generated digitally? Without doubt, the above ideas raise fur-
ther questions: can the virtual set provide information without am-
biguity of the status of the fictional world? Does the digital illusion
remain unbroken - or, is it so that we easily become shaken by the
consciousness of the artefact?
It is a considerable requirement for a synthetic world to maintain
the sense of the uninterrupted presence of a spectator as a witness in
the fictional realm. In my evaluation there is a difference between the
sense of presence in the real set and that of the virtual set. Production
design in film is generally motivated by a narrative. As a vehicle for
narrative, it can itself convey for instance a visual atmosphere. How-
ever, there is a variety of interaction between the character and the set.
In the virtual set, this interaction in thoroughly different than in the
traditional set.
8.5. A synthetic world and an alive character

So far we have discussed spatial hierarchies as being something that
builds the logic of a space in the linear continuity of film. However,
the spatial montage can be approached in a new way within the shot.
Earlier, we discussed how a single shot in the virtual set can con-
tain various layers. A process called compositing is needed to create a
single seamless space out of these layers. As well as providing a tension
between shots, there exists a tension in the film between these layers
within the shot. Manovich (2001, 322) has pointed out, that in addi-
tion to the temporal or linear montage, there exists a spatial montage
in digital film:
In general, spatial montage could involve a number of images, po-

tentially of different sizes and proportions, appearing on the screen
at the same time. This juxtaposition by itself of course does not
result in montage; it is up to filmmaker to construct a logic that
determines which images appear together, when they appear, and
what kind of relationships they enter into with another.

Compositing usually means, that the borders between different
worlds will be erased and different spaces will be matched in perspec-
tive, scale and lightning. Especially crucial to this, is when we are
combining a layer with an actor to other layers of different origin. The
core arrangement of the film is that we feel immersed, where the char-
acter we identify with is positioned. For instance, in L’Enfant, the boy
is in the room. We as spectators feel we are observing the boy in the
room, or even have a sense of being located in the room. Our sense
of location in the fictional world we are witnessing, is inseparable
from the protagonist’s position in that world, however, spatial mon-
tage brings together elements from different realities. The character is
shot in Chromakey studio, the virtual set is modeled with animation
software and these sources are brought together either through a real
time virtual set system or compositing. Thus the interaction of the
character with the scenic environment is limited or even more pre-
cisely, it is not interaction in the sense of the way we interact with our
environment. It is a pictorially constructed pretense of interaction.
In order to understand what would be the consequence of this
limited interaction with the environment one needs to question, in
which way we might approach this interaction between the character
and the cinematic environment. Here some interesting viewpoints
are offered by the recent findings of neurophysiology. Tikka (2008,
224) has raised, that the discovery of mirror neurons indicate a radi-
cally new way to understand the authoring and experiencing of film as
one being a mental imitative simulation system of the other:
The mirror neuron findings suggest that sensorimotor imitation

forms the physiological basis for socio-emotional interaction, lan-
guage production and comprehension, other mediated images and
forms of actions, goals and intention relations.
As neuroscientists David Freedberg and Gallese (1998, 198) note:
Our capacity to pre-rationally make sense of the actions, emotions

and sensations of others depends on embodied simulation, a func-
tional mechanism through which the actions, emotions or sensa-
tions we see activate our own internal representations of the body

states with these social stimuli as if we were engaged in a similar
action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation.
Gallese and Freedberg (Ibid. 201) further discuss how the embod-
ied simulation in aesthetic experience functions. Important elements
are 1) the viewer’s bodily engagement in gestures, 2) identification
with the emotion of observed others, and 3) the feeling of empathy
for bodily sensations. With the virtual set we have a clear problem:
if the scenic environment does not hold the same reality status as a
character, the characters or the observed others do not truly ‘experi-
ence’ the artificial environment. For instance, a character grasping a
digital object might not turn out to be convincing, but alternatively
creating a situation whereby we inadvertently come to notice the fake.
This problem clearly implies that the feelings of empathy experienced
via mirror neurons are quite crucial and automatic. What if the em-
bodied simulation is not necessarily genuinely experienced with the
virtual set? It is much the measure of how successful an illusion is, that
the feelings of empathy to may be felt.
Thus it is an important function of the scenic environment, that
it allows goal oriented action, that can be ‘mirrored’. Based on the
productions L’Enfant and Luonnotar, the problems specifically arise,
when there is a need for character contact i.e. touching the virtual set.
As discussed, many virtual sets often include real elements such as
props and furniture. This was a strategy especially in L’Enfant, where
the boy needs to interact with the scenic elements. For example, in
the scene with the temper tantrum during which the boy throws ev-
erything off the table, it would have been quite difficult to achieve
with only the digital elements. This is shown in Figure 26-1 - 26-2,
The use of real elements (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004). However, there
are scenes, where the boy shakes the grandfather clock, blows the fire
etc. Especially, the touch with the grandfather clock seems perhaps
unintentional or diffuse, indicating that touch with a virtual element
is hard to enact. These scenes where such interaction is required seem
to make it obvious that the virtual set is not real, and that the virtual
set and the character are not in the same reality. In other words, the
virtual set challenges the embodied simulation process and we are
urged to imagine we are bodily present, in a place that is ultimately a
digital illusion.

Figure 26-1
Figure 26-2
Figure 26-1 - 26-2: The use of real el-

ements (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).

Intentional interaction is not the only type of interaction that is
challenged by the spatial montage. As mentioned, compositing gener-
ally means the matching of the perspective, lightning and scale of dif-
ferent layers. Lightning, for example, reflects the interaction between
the character and the scenic environment. In the scene where the boy
is warming up next to the digital fire, a special lightning effect is used
in the Chromakey studio, in order to indicate the connection between
the fire as a lightning source and the boy’s face as lit by that same fire
(seen in Figure 27-1 - 27-2, The light from the fireplace; L’Enfant et
les Sortilèges 2004). Vice versa, in L’Enfant there were scenes where
the continuity of lightning was created with digital animation. In the
scene with the princess dancing, the shadow of the princess on the
floor is thoroughly an animation created with the aid of the composit-
ing program (Figure 20). However, scale and perspective are sensitive
matters in terms of spatial continuity within the shot. As such, the
match between the input of the virtual set and the input of the Chro-
makey studio has to be perfect.
8.6. The two fictional worlds

What is important for a production designer, when designing a film?
Each designer might answer this differently, but according to my pro-
fessional knowledge, designers very commonly speak in terms of the
world they create for a film. How does this conceptual idea of produc-
tion design as a world relate to the diegesis of film? Quite simply, the
task of production design is to control the scenery elements that are
visible in the diegetic world. Thus far, we have discussed the diegetic
world as something to be immersed in from the point of view of the
spectator. Now I intend to look at the designer’s starting points when
constituting a film’s world and especially, a digitally created one.
When Asp (in Ettedgui 1999, 111) referred to the design of Fan-
ny and Alexander (Cinematograph AB 1982) as “a whole world on a
screen” she wanted to create, it revealed the entirety of the intended
design experience. Production design fulfils an uttermost important
task by maintaining a cohesive and comprehensive look of the sur-
roundings in which the film takes place. The more successful the
film is in this regard, the more impressive is the experience of the

Figure 27-1
Figure 27-2
Figure 27-1 - 27-2: The light from the

fireplace (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).

film’s world. However, the diegetic world also contains other visible
elements than merely design, such as characters, costumes and lights
which are essential in the task of creating the world of the story. Note
also, that the diegetic world contains non-visible elements, such as
sounds, that are fictionally audible in the story space.
Why is it essential that production design is paralleled with the
concept of world? The world, as I have discussed, is governed with a
logic that defines the relational aspects of its phenomena. According
to ecological optics the logic of our world is based on surface behav-
ior in our environment. Surfaces in computer environments do not
behave in the same way as surfaces in real life: in fact their behavior
is a consequence of complicated algorithms. Rigid surfaces can turn
to soft only with the change of parameters, on so on, so would this
eventually affect how the world created by the virtual set would end
up looking or even behaving?
Both L’Enfant and Luonnotar exemplify a case, where the world of
film is constructed as digital fantasy. In L’Enfant, the boy is in many
ways tied to his environment. It is his room for rest and homework,
and when working doesn’t interest him anymore, he reacts against it
by terrorizing his small pet animals and furniture. Events proceed,
and the fictional fantasy figures from the boy’s immediate surround-
ings (the Armchair, the Squirrel, the Grandfather Clock, the Princess
etc) come to sing to him of what they have to say of his bad behavior.
Although the possibilities were by no means unlimited, digital
tools allowed us to approach this production with a specific sense of
fantastical things and events in mind. Despite this aspect, basic asso-
ciations needed to be established, the room especially as forming the
home environment. However, the setting of the room as it turned out
in the beginning, seemed not to be enough for the application of the
fantasy sequences to come. Thus, a design task was not formulated
simply according to how the world of a room was designed, but more
so in how the room evolves in the course of the film.
In Luonnotar we travel the ancient world in the scale of the whole
cosmos. It is not a room anymore, not a singly-defined man made
entity. Luonnotar rushes through space, ice and sea, and we are sud-
denly experiencing quite amazing dimensions. As such, it will be
worthwhile to look at what kind of process this unlimited exploration

of the universe is and to consider whether it is typical for 3D com-
puter graphics?
Both L’Enfant and Luonnotar turn out to be specific cases, in
that their designs needed to express something ultimate that would be
difficult, or even impossible to express with traditional design. They
exploit the virtual set in extreme ways. In next two chapters, I will
consider what kind of new logic it is possible for 3D computer graph-
ics to establish in the virtual set.
8.7. Liquid scenery

In beginning our discussion on the fictional worlds of the two pro-
ductions presented in this research, we might consider, how it is dif-
ferent to build a fictional world using a virtual set, rather than by
means of traditional scenery. Are these processes similar, despite new
technology? We build imaginary hierarchical structures, so that they
might consist of details as well as of larger spatial schemes, and finally
form something that can be comprehended as a fictional world. Based
on my experience, this is in fact quite true. The virtual set design
process does not differ to any certain extent from the traditional set
design process. In L’Enfant I used similar previsualization methods to
those I have used in any other production. The collection of reference
material helped shape the visual specificity of the world of L’Enfant
and sketches (partly done with 3D software), elaborated the ideas of
the world furthermore.
In L’Enfant, the basic motivation of the production design was
that the imaginative metamorphosis of the room, where the Boy
remains as if arrested. Initially there was an idea to try to establish
as realistic a scenic illusion as possible with the aid of digital tools.
Then, when the narrative starts to unfold and the boy’s imaginary vi-
sion takes over, the room literally becomes more fantastic: it loses the
ceiling, the walls become transparent, it grows in size, the lightning
changes and eventually a garden grows into it. In one scene, there is
even a gigantic zipper, by which you can open the walls to a night
view of the garden (as seen in Figure 28, The gigantic zipper; L’Enfant
et les Sortilèges 2004).

One might say that the spatial orientation, based on our ability
to build hierarchical nested structures, does not change, since it is
something we construct using all of our experiences. However I see
not indifferently, the flexibility of the imagination that accompanies
the digital set. This can quite effectively modify anew, the world alike
logic that production design provides. With a traditional set it would
have been practically impossible to visualize the changes in the size
of the room or its color, or any other texture feature of the room.
Similarly, one might be quite as helpless in an effort to make a garden
to grow into the room during the story. The looseness of change and
metamorphosis is one consequence of the digital technology.
In fact, this might be the same thing which Manovich refers to as
liquid architecture, first introduced by architect Marcos Novak. Liquid
architecture is favored by the new media as being opposite to “static
architecture”, as favored by traditional media (Manovich 2001, 284).
Liquid architecture is defined ‘poetically’ by architect Marcos Novak
(1993, 283-284):
What is liquid architecture? A liquid architecture is an architecture

whose form is contingent on the interests of the beholder; it is an
architecture that opens to welcome you and closes to defend you;
it is an architecture without doors and hallways, where the next
room is always where it needs to be and what it needs to be. It is an
architecture that dances or pulsates, becomes tranquil or agitated.
Liquid architecture indicates that architecture can formulate itself

in respect of the needs of a spectator. Thus, it is intriguing to think,
that a virtual set can actually be transformed according to the needs of
the character-based narration. This might be a good point to discuss
liquid scenery, in which scenery changes according to the situation
into whatever it needs to be. L’Enfant suggests the application of a
new kind of logic while approaching the diegetic space. The room as a
basic space defines the spatial logic in the first place: in the beginning
of the film it is approached as a room in real life - the windows are
for light, the door is for comings and goings. The mathematic note-
book is on the table, which is in the room surrounded by the garden.
However, the logic is abruptly changed when the boy’s imagination

Figure 28: The gigantic zipper
takes over and makes him see objects and events in a surrealist way.
The room is transformed, becomes fluid and open to change, yet re-
sistance to change is our everyday concept of an architectural room.
Film philosopher Siegfried Kracauer (1960, 188-189) writes on
surrealistic film:
The content itself evidently falls in the area of fantasy. To be pre-

cise, it is fantasy which, by implication, claims to be more real and
weighty than the world of our senses…And there the matter might
rest were it not for the fact that surrealist films have a trait in com-
mon which distinguishes them from the rest of the films of fantasy.
Unlike the bulk of the latter, they are based on belief that inner
reality is infinitely superior to outer reality.
The need to depict inner reality can be seen as a narrative motiva-

tion for the new kind of spatial logic and the logic itself seems curi-
ously to be the consequence of the encounter with the 3D tool itself.
While there is a level of logic in L’Enfant that can be called world alike

logic, there is another level of logic that suggests nothing more than
the characteristics for operations of the 3D software. L’Enfant was a
conscious experiment with the virtual set. During a relatively long
pre-production phase and intense testing with the tool, this new logic
was almost unconsciously established.
In ecological optics, surfaces for instance resist deformation and
disintegration or they have a characteristic texture, shape, illumina-
tion, reflectance etc. (Gibson 1979, 24-25). Gibson (Ibid. 22) writes:
“Insofar as substances persist, their surfaces persist. All surfaces have
certain layout, as I will call it, and the layout tends to persist. The
persistence of the layout depends on the resistance of the substance to
change.” Computer visualization does not obey these Gibsonian eco-
logical laws of surfaces: it is possible to animate any single parameter,
whether this be color, transparency or size. The current 3D software
allows efficient deformation tools for surface manipulation.
L’Enfant consists of several independent musical pieces each pre-
senting a new major character, like a grandfather clock, armchair, cat
or fire. For each of these pieces, there is a major transformation in the
room, either in size, texture, shape or otherwise. Only the first one of
these transformations is actually shown as happening, then, by seeing
once that the room can change, we can accept that it can do so many
times, without that the repeated need to see it happen. The transfor-
mations reflect the operations it is possible to execute with the aid of
3D software, thus the logic of the space is inherently a logic derived
as a consequence of the artists encounter with the computer program.
As a whole, the dense integration of computer generated imagery
as a tool into our cinematic storytelling apparel simply proves the fact,
that our spatial imagination has been able to provide sophisticated
fantasies, whether or not we have been earlier able to visualize them
convincingly in film. Computer generated imagery has provided a
wave of newly exposed fantasy imagery in film, unveiling objects and
events that were earlier hidden in the depths of our minds. Again,
the key idea here, is that new digital imagery is not silent but able to
express movement.

8.8. Navigable space
Having discussed the characteristics of the logic of the world-alike
space in L’Enfant, we came to a conclusion, that a new kind of liq-
uid quality defines the virtual set of the production even to a point
where scenery modifies itself according to the needs of the narrative
expression. In Luonnotar it will be shown how much more important
this is, when exploring the diegetic world. Luonnotar presents long
scenes with uninterrupted camera movement. Manovich (2001, 248)
sees such similar, continuous camera movement as a typical feature of
1980’s computer animation. The exploring camera wanders through
complex digital environments, like the terrain of a mountain or a
series of rooms and movement itself is enough to create the content
of narration.
According to new media researcher Janet Murray (1997, 79)
“digital environments are spatial”. This means “the new digital en-
vironments are characterized by their power to represent navigable
space. Linear media such a books and films can portray space, either
by verbal description or image, but only digital environments can
present space we can move through” (Ibid.). Manovich (2001, 251-
252) confirms that new media has typically enabled a new way to
explore space, referred to as navigation. Navigable space can be seen
as particular interface to a database, thus “space comes to a media
type”. In this way, “all operations, that are possible with media as a
result of its conversion to computer data can also apply to representa-
tions of 3-D space” (Ibid.). Manovich refers to the first virtual reality
installations, that “liberated the virtual camera from its enslavement
to the simulation of humanly possibly navigation - walking, driving
a car, pedaling a bicycle, scuba diving” (Ibid. 261-262). He interest-
ingly points out, that digital tools have allowed artists to experiment
in ways that firstly do not simulate natural perception in the way it is
established in conventional cinema (Ibid. 262). According to Gibson
(1979, 223), human locomotion has evolved “from swimming in the
sea to crawling and walking on land to clinging and climbing on the
protuberances that clutter up the land (..), to flying through the air”.
The camera in the cinematic convention has evolved to reiterate these

functions, and the new virtual camera clearly shows evidence of being
able to break this restricted condition by means of navigation.
The last shot of Luonnotar probably exemplifies the navigation
aspect of space exploring. The shot starts from showing Luonnotar
as standing with her back facing the spectator. We are close enough
to see the grass starting to grow under her feet. Gradually, the camera
starts to dolly backwards, moving further away from Luonnotar. The
camera recedes to a point, where Luonnotar becomes invisible and
the entire globe fills the frame. Eventually, the camera moves so far,
that also the globe becomes invisible, and only the vastness of space is
seen (as seen in Figure 29-1 - 29-4, The unlimited zoom out; Luonnotar
2011). We have traveled cosmic distances within a single shot and the
movement seems intent to continue endlessly in the chosen direction.
Earlier, it was discussed, how the realm of production design has
expanded to contain such vast environments, not possible to grasp
with everyday human experience (for example space distances which
are measured in light years). We have traveled far beyond what Gib-
son (1979, 8-9) has described as the ecological environment, when
compared to the physical environment:
The world of physics encompasses everything from atoms through

terrestrial world to galaxies. These things exist on different levels of
size that go to almost unimaginable extremes. The physical world
of atoms and their ultimate particles is measured at the level of mil-
lionths of a millimeter or less. The astronomical world of stars and
galaxies is measured at the level of light-years or more. Neither of
these extremes is an environment. The size-level at which environ-
ment exists is the intermediate one that is measured in millimeters
and meters. The ordinary familiar things of the earth are of this size
- actually a narrow band of sizes relative to far extremes.
However, it is not just the territory of fiction that has broadened

- it is our way in which we encounter these vast new spaces, that
is fundamentally new. Luonnotar exemplifies the way we explore the
environment with the virtual camera, without limitations of physical
constraints. This is opposite to the tendency in which film strives to
establish the resemblance of everyday perception and the film experi-

Figure 29-1 - 29-4: The

unlimited zoom out (Luon-
notar 2011).
ence, thus actualizing the human scale as the basic relational measure-
ment.
While the concept of space itself has become liquid, the explor-
ing of such space has become unobstructed. Extraordinary camera
movements have been seen in new digital film, made possible by the
camera simulation in the virtual environment. For instance, in Ma-
trix (Warner Bros. 1999), quite complex spiral dollies were presented.
In Luonnotar, the camera depicts a free flowing movement from the
perspective of the flying Luonnotar. However in this free movement,
the terrestrial domain will become broken allowing the scope of infi-
niteness. Hereby, the ecological environment as an experiential level
is fragmented. The new order of the virtual set depicts the physical
world as an imaginary experience which goes beyond the limits of
the ecologically understood environment. It is important to notice,

that his preceding quote, Gibson mentioned almost unimaginable ex-
tremes. It quite seemingly appears that the virtual set has brought us
concretely up to the fact of “how far” our imagination can take us.
Horizontal movement doesn’t necessarily govern the new virtual
universe, but other directions can dominate as well. Another shot
that illustrates the lust for limitless camera trajectory, is that in which
Luonnotar slowly sinking to the depths of the sea (as seen in Fig-
ure 30-1 - 30-2, Luonnotar sinking; Luonnotar 2011). The shot is ap-
proximately one minute long, and it is realized atypically as a vertical
movement with the camera facing downwards on Luonnotar, who is
rotating in a whirlpool. Thus, we see Luonnotar falling to the bottom
and follow her gently down. The shot is unusual even in Luonnotar,
which mostly presents Luonnotar’s forward movement as being hori-
zontal. The length of the shot makes it even more unorthodox. Tikka
has referred to cinema as embodied simulation, a term first coined by
Gallese (2005), especially when examined from the viewpoint of the
author’s mind, and recognizes how cinema creating (and most also
obviously observing) activate the “as-if ” perspective, that is the po-
tential simulative body state in the mind of the author (Tikka 2008,
230-231). Movement that is not usual in our daily bodily experience
(as perhaps extreme vertical movement), will not end up as authored
in conventional cinema, since we do not have the basis in our mind
for as-if motion-based simulation. Here, computer space allows a new
agenda. Manovich (2001, 260) states:
On the one hand, while not indexically tied to physical reality or

the human body, computer space is isotropic. In contrast to hu-
man space, in which the verticality of the body and the direction of
the horizon are two dominant directions, computer space does not
privilege any particular axis.
Through navigation in the computer space, we will have new spa-

tial experiences that are not possible in our ecological realm. We have
a new sense of simulation, new as-if positions on the basis of our
experiences in the virtual world of the computer. Since the computer
space can be seen specifically as conversed data, every operation that
can be executed to modify that data, can also be performed to modify
the actual digital space (Ibid. 251-252).

Figure 30-1
Figure 30-2
Figure 30-1 - 30-2: Luonnotar sinking

(Luonnotar 2011)

9. WHAT DOES AN ILLUSION AFFORD?
9.1. Gibson’s affordances
We have briefly discussed Gibson’s affordances in chapter 3.2. An
ecological theory of the visual perception of Gibson’s theory of affor-
dances is of extraordinary value, since it points out how we enter to
values and meanings on the basis of the environment. It is a question
of what animals actually perceive. The basic idea of the affordances
is simple: the values and meanings can be captured directly from the
environment without the insertion of mental representations as inter-
mediating agents. In inferential theories, meaning arises in animals,
based on the interaction they have encountered with the environ-
ment. In direct theories of perception, meaning, in contrast exists
in the environment and is provided for animals pick up. Meaning
here is not dependable on inference. Thus an animal gathers avail-
able information from a meaning laden environment. As philosopher
Anthony Chemero (2009, 135) puts it: “The environment is meaning
laden in that it contains affordances, and affordances are meaningful
to animals.” According to Gibson’s (1979, 127) original idea, affor-
dances are, what the environment offers for animal, whether that be
good or ill. Chemero (Ibid. 136) refers to this as indicating, that an
affordance is “a resource that environment offers any animal that has
capabilities to perceive and use it”. While affordances are properties of
the environment, they need to be taken into consideration in relation
to the animal.

Gibson (1979, 129) himself, after having first defined an affor-
dance in a simple way, ended up to write the confusing lines:
An affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective

property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the
dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its
inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of be-
havior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance
points both ways, to the environment and to the observer.
Post-Gibsonian writing has attempted to define affordances fur-

thermore, with clarified ontology. Chemero (2009, 136-137) has
summarized, that such ecological psychologists as Edward S. Reed,
Michael Turvey, Claire Michaels and Harry Heft have been accepting
that “affordances are animal-relative properties of the environment”.
Even more; that “affordances are properties of the environment that
have significance to some animal’s behavior” (Ibid. 137). However,
there are varying viewpoints. Reed (1996, 43) emphasizes, that “af-
fordances are features not of the environment or the habitat as such
but of the environment in relation to a given population of animals”.
While he speaks of animals in the context of population, he empha-
sizes that “the key to understanding resource use, whether in evolution
generally or more specifically in regard to psychological evolution, is
to find the selective process that constrain and change the varieties
of resource use in a population” (Ibid. 29). Thus affordances for him
are understood as resources, and resource use is selectionist in nature.
Heft (2001, 123) defines an affordance as “the perceived func-
tional significance of an object, event, or place for the individual”.
Thus the provided meaning is tied to the functional aspect of the
environmental property. For Heft, the development of the concept
affordance was intended to exemplify, that meaning is also a feature
of perceptual experience. Heft differentiates between the perceptual
meaning and conceptual meaning. Affordances are there without
need to be classified, as the ongoing flow of the perception. The fact
that affordances are part of the perceiver-environment relationship
makes affordances to be understood as relational to the human body.
Heft (Ibid. 130) writes:

Because affordances are specified relative to some action of/ by
the individual, they do have determinate boundaries. Most funda-
mentally, and in simplest cases, they are de-limitable relative to the
body-scaling of the individual.
Chemero on the other hand emphasizes an affordance itself as

a relation between the animals and the features of situations. For
Chemero (2009, 141), environment affords a specific behavior for
the organism. He disagrees, that environmental relations in affor-
dances should be expressed as properties, but as features. Furthermore
Chemero (Ibid. 142-143) insists that the mutual ratios of the body
and environmental measurements should not make a difference - in-
stead affordances are rather experienced as the relation between the
ability and the feature of the environment. Since affordances are not
the property of the environment, there is no need for their effectivi-
ties as being complementary to the properties of the organism. The
concept of ability is also crucially different from the concept of dis-
position. While dispositions are without exception going to manifest
within right conditions, abilities can involve failing, i.e. an ability to
walk does not preclude the event of falling even in ideal conditions
(Ibid. 145).
Chemero also takes an important step in furthering the theory
of affordances. While all the earlier discussed views of affordances re-
main as static explanations, Chemero tries to merge dynamic system
theory and the theory of affordances. The enactivist movement within
cognitive science certainly is a direction which is noteworthy to take
into consideration, while developing a theory of affordances particu-
larly related to virtual sets and digital film production, and has al-
ready been suggested by Tikka (2008). In a theory where affordances
are not regarded as static phenomenon, the environmental niche and
sensori-motor coupling have an ability to impact each other, eventu-
ally meaning that each one is subject to a change (Ibid. 150-54).

9.2. Scenography interpreted as affordances
Cynthia Freeland (1997, 6) has notified, that one way to interpret the
film can be traced back to Gibson’s concept of affordances, but how
is this so? How could the interpretation of the meanings in film sce-
nography carry through the ecological concept of affordance? Heft’s
argument, that affordances are of a fleeting meaning, is quite intrigu-
ing. To much extent, as I see it, the production design in film can be
seen as being fleeting meaning as well. We don’t have time to register
everything that is hidden in the design; instead what we will be reg-
istering is the accentuated elements of design, exactly, those elements
usually employed to further the action of the narrative.
The theory of affordances in scenography is obviously unwritten,
but based on my knowledge as a production designer, I will try to
offer some input in this regard. We might think back on our earlier
discussion of the categorization Tashiro outlined in terms of exempli-
fying how the production design functions. Design consists of nested
elements, such as props within architectural elements within land-
scapes. In a similar way, affordances can also be seen as nested: there
exist smaller-scale abilities within larger abilities (Chemero 2009,
147). Thus the behavior afforded by the props probably cannot be
separated from the behavior afforded by the architectural elements.
In simple terms we can think of the chair as a scenic element. The
Gibsonian way to think of the chair is that it is ‘sit-on-able’. The chair
resonates the possibility of a change in the behavior of the observer
(sitting). In narrative, the character is likewise positioned in relation-
ship to his environment. This environment is designed to meet the
requirements of the story and its events. The design provides the chair
on which to sit. However, as Heft (2001, 131) has pointed out, af-
fordances can have multiple meanings. Depending upon situational
needs, the chair can serve as a place to sit, but can also serve as some-
thing to step on (if you need to climb) or something to use for kicking
(if you are angry). These different functions will be revealed when the
intention of the character is made clear. For a younger character, a
chair can afford an element to play with, though naturally the same
affordance would not exist in similar manner for an adult. Thinking

of affordances in the framework of narrative, it can be seen that they
exist in relation to the situational needs of the character. In other
circumstances, where similar situational needs are not existing, the
affordances in question are not relevant. However, both Heft (2001,
132-134) and Chemero (2009, 149-150) point out, that affordances
exist also without the presence of an observer. Heft (2001, 132-133)
however, emphasizes there is a difference between potentially available
opportunities when compared with actually used opportunities. As
such, production design may well be a structure which outlines both
of these as implicating a design meaning and value.
The task of production design as I see it, is to much extent to
visually articulate those elements within the environment that are
relevant. To visually articulate here means to specify rather than to
emphasize. The primary functions of production design usually need
to be defined quite early in the design process. When the narrative
unfolds, it reveals how these affordances are taken into use. It is not
though indifferent, as to which affordances exist (are available in the
scenery), and which do not, and the unused possibilities might also
have a story to tell. The series of affordances depicted to much extent
reflects the environment in question. Gibson (Gibson 1979, 133)
himself speaks of objects and places. He notes that the affordances
are “loosely” the same as the objects we generally speak of. Place is
explained in the following way: “The habitat of given animal contains
places. A place is not an object with definite boundaries but a region.
The different places of habitat may have different affordances” (Ibid.
136).
Different architectural places or landscapes provide a different se-
ries of affordances that are available for a character to explore. These
affordances are usually equal to those we experience as ourselves. A
room for instance can contain objects, that at their simplest afford
for example sitting (chair) or working (table) or sleeping (bed). A
room itself contains elements, that allow walking on (floor), watching
through (window), walking through (door). In ecological psychology
these features of an environment are possible to perceive directly, i.e.
those features that can be understood as meaningful without infer-
ence. Thus visual meanings in scenography can be seen as emerging
directly in the design environment.

9.3. Conceptual and perceptual meanings
To what extent can affordances explain meaning in production de-
sign, an does something’s potential as an affordance motivate all the
design choices? One might answer “no” in this matter. It is important
to remember, that the concept of affordance was developed in order to
describe how we gather information from our surroundings through
a perceptual act. Affordances in the first place are meant to explain
animal or human behavior, so that should be held in mind when we
associate affordances with meanings.
Gibson (1979, 134) himself has emphasized, that to perceive an
object is not to classify an object:
We have thousands of names for such objects, and we classify them

in many ways (...) they can all be said to have properties or quali-
ties: color, texture, composition, size, shape and features of shape,
mass, elasticity, rigidity and mobility. Orthodox psychology asserts
that we perceive these objects insofar as we discriminate their properties
or qualities (...) But I now suggest that what perceive when we look
at objects are their affordances, not their qualities [original italics].
This assumption, of course is of huge effect on production de-

sign theory, as it establishes a kind of first-hand network of meanings
based on affordances.
The issue of rejecting classification that exists in the idea of per-
ceiving meaning directly from affordances was not unfamiliar to Heft.
In fact, Heft (2001, 130) bases a view on William James’s radical em-
pirism, and points out, that there is a distinction between percepts
and concepts:
Affordances are percepts rather that concepts in a Jamesian sense of

these terms. Affordances are part of the ongoing flow of immediate
experience specified by perceptual information, and concepts are
abstractions from that flow. In other words, affordances are directly
perceived and concepts are derived.
Heft (2001, 130-131) further suggests that a distinction between

affordances and concepts can be drawn on the basis of how precisely

meaning boundaries can be differentiated. Here, affordance (as per-
ceptual meaning) is very defined, in relation to the action of the indi-
vidual, hence it has specific meaning boundaries. Conceptual mean-
ings, on the other hand, are based on the idea, that we are able to store
information in our brain and are consequently able to return to it. In
the event of the storage and handling of conceptual meanings, the
classification act of objects is needed. This classification does not need
to be distinct and determinate. In fact, members of a category tend
to have a “family resemblance” rather than a strict list of common
features (Ibid.). The idea of conceptual categorization naturally opens
a whole new level of study. For further discussion of categorization,
see Eleanor Rosch “Principles of Categorization” (1978) in Cogni-
tion and Categorization (Rosch and Lloyd, 1978) and George Lakoff
Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the
Mind (1987).
Conceptual meanings are derived from perceptual meanings,
however they can become autonomous from everyday life. According
to Heft (Ibid. 131), “it is this characteristic that give concepts their
great creative power, such as can be seen in arts”. In this way, a design
might well be based on the imaginative act that originates from the
perceiving. Design affords perceptual meanings for a character, but it
also offers refined meanings other than affordances. This is an impor-
tant point to make, as affordances and the direct interaction with the
scenic environment are in the focus of this research.
9.4. Character involvement

In our involvement with the fictional world, the role of the charac-
ter is important. Bordwell and Kristin Thompson (2004, 72) write:
“Usually the agents of cause and effect are characters. By triggering
and reacting to events, characters play roles within the film’s formal
system.” We don’t see events as such, but rather as they are meaning-
ful to someone in the story. In ecological psychology our relation-
ship with the environment is based on what the environment affords
us, like a path affords us to move from one place to another. In this
way, the path becomes meaningful to us. Production design creates

meanings by suggesting affordances that would be available in a story
context. Through a character, we experience what the diegetic world,
its objects and places can afford him. There is connection between the
diegetic world and the way the character is portrayed in their experi-
encing of this world. Production design can be seen as echoing this
relationship, to the degree that many designers actually feel that it is
precisely the world of the characters they are designing.
Anna Asp (in Ettedgui 1999, 114), production designer of many
Bergman films, speaks strongly for this:
I like to create a whole world on the screen. My starting point is

the script. I am not concerned so much with how the writer has
described the story’s settings, as with who the characters are.
This is the clear statement of how the production designer finds

her task as ‘creating the world’, as well as this world being emotionally
driven by characterization:
The characters immediately evoked their settings in my mind. The

grandmother was the ‘queen’, a great prima donna of the theatre.
Her environment had to suggest power and theatricality. By con-
trast, the apartment of her son Oscar, his wife Emilie, and their
children Fanny and Alexander needed to feel airier and lighter,
whereas the house of the bishop whom Emilie marries after Oscar’s
premature death was clearly a prison for the children (Ibid.).
Clearly, Asp also describes here what we could term the conceptu-
al meanings of production design. The thematic network inspired by
the characters is often a fundamental source for the designer to inter-
pret a script as a metaphor. However in this connection, most impor-
tant are the next two statements. Firstly, again, the production design,
can be thought of as a world. It is not a real world, but it resembles it,
and gains strength in being alike, but still, it is a whole world. This is
on a metaphorical level with the essential meaning that every design
shares. Secondly, it is a world that inhabits and describes the charac-
ters, thus building on a narrative. However, a production design itself
isn’t the diegesis as such, since diegesis consists also of elements other

than the design, however, the only purpose of a production design is
certainly to comprehend the diegetic world. Especially in the light of
ecological theory, production design fulfils the task of affording the
imaginary possibilities from the viewpoint of the character.
Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980], 3) have argued that metaphors
are “pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and
action”. According to them, metaphors can be understood through a
comparison, that shows how two things that are not alike in most
ways are similar in another important way. Lakoff and Johnson (Ibid.
5) summarize, that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”. This is relevant
in terms of the design metaphors, that are formulated, for instance
like HOME IS PRISON. Subsequently, the production design would
emphasis the prisonlike appearance of the character’s home.
Furthermore, even though the production design of Fanny and
Alexander can be seen as an expression of the conceptual meanings
the production designer has evolved on the basis of the narrative, it
doesn’t mean that the perceptual meanings would not exist - they do
and in fact, they support the message of the concept. For instance,
the house of the bishop is austere in its setting, and affords no fancy
places for children to play, no fancy foods - even the bedclothes are
extreme, simple and unpleasant. Thus the conceptual meaning Asp
has described can be derived from the perceptual meaning. Through
the characters of Fanny and Alexander, we as spectators experience liv-
ing in the austere environment, we witness the children’s misery and
their longing for a more desirable place to live.
It is also important to note at this point, that according to Gib-
son, objects and places are not the only affordances in our environ-
ment. Gibson (1979, 135) writes: “The richest and most elaborate
affordances of the environment are provided by other animals and, for
us, other people.” Human bodies are so different from other objects,
that infants almost from the beginning differentiate them from plants
and other nonliving things:
When touched, they touch back, when struck, they strike back; in
short they interact with observer and with one another. Behavior
affords behavior, and the whole subject matter of psychology and

other social sciences can be thought of elaboration of this basic fact
(Ibid.).
Production design as such deals only with places and objects and
the task of a designer is to define their outlook. However, the imag-
ined behavioral attitudes of the characters cannot be left out when
thinking of these: character’s behavioral attitudes influence the design
choices precisely in the way Asp has described.
9.5. Affordances and the virtual set

This far I have discussed affordances at length as well as the mean-
ings they convey in the context of real world and consequently in
traditional production design. Now is a time to question, what the
digitally generated scenic world allows for the performers and ulti-
mately, us as witnesses? We have seen that the traditional set allows for
example the actors to walk on the ground, and plenty of other things,
like sitting at the table, walking through doors etc. Quite drastically,
the virtual set doesn’t afford anything for the performers in the sense
that the real environment affords things for them to explore. The vir-
tual set is just a background image behind the actors. A background
image in itself does not afford anything except being an image. This
fact is quite crucial in terms of thinking of the virtual set. However,
even though the virtual set doesn’t afford things literally, in film, as
in the form of an illusion, it can be seen to imaginarily afford things.
One of the key questions is how these imaginary affordances can be
understood.
In the earlier chapters we discussed how in L’Enfant there was the
use of real objects as props. This was one way to create an interaction
between the scenic environment and the performer. The set was only
partially digital and whenever real interaction was needed, the prob-
lem was solved by the scenic elements being actually real, something
that was possible to touch. L’Enfant also shows this in reverse: the
actor adapts his actions so, that it looks like he is interacting with the
virtual set. This is for instance the case, where the boy blows a fire and
gets it to burn with a brighter flame. Only digital elements are used

but the studio lightning gives the impression, that boy is near the
warm light of the fire. Therefore the quality of compositing different
image sources together as well as the intensity of acting gives us the
illusionary effect of being near the fire.
The possibility of illusion is dependent on our judgment on the
basis of visual information. One example showing evidence of visual
judgment is the so called Visual Cliff. Two checkerboard platforms
of different height were separated from each other by a narrow cen-
tral platform. Both platforms were covered by glass so that despite
of the different heights of the platforms, the glass would provide the
necessary support. The structure was tested with animals and young
children. Based on the optical information, the deep side was strongly
avoided, even though it would have allowed the same support as the
shallow side (Bruce et al. 2004, 328-9).
The Visual Cliff proves visual information is crucial in terms of
defining our locomotion. In a similar way than the case of the visual
cliff, the virtual set is purely dependent on optical information assur-
ing us there is actually a real space in the virtual set. The urgency of
the optical information guarantees the success of the virtual set.
9.6. Working with the illusion

The complexity of the virtual set illusion also has its effects in the
process of creating the film. In the question of traditional sets, the
most usual way to proceed would be to select the shooting locations
or to build a set on a soundstage. Both of these design methods allow
the crew and artistic team actually inhabit the imaginary environment
while shooting. The virtual set differs from traditional sets in this mat-
ter. In L’Enfant the settings existed only as background images that
were available during the shooting via a preview system. In Luonnotar,
the shooting was done wholly in the bluescreen studio without even
knowledge of how the set would look.
Thus the scenery is encountered only as an illusion, not a possible
place to inhabit during the working phase. Performers need in differ-
ent ways, to imagine or preview how the set looks. But it is not only
the performers that face this challenge: the whole crew and artistic

team have to relate to the unusual workflow with the non-existing set.
They need to work with an illusion of space instead of real space. The
feedback from the L’Enfant crew was, that they experienced work-
ing with the digital scenery as somewhat challenging. It was though
interesting to notice, that the dancers generally had become used to
working with imaginary environments.
Earlier cinema effects were associated with the urge for transpar-
ency and a certain invisibility was sought when using effects. Film
researcher Aylish Wood (2007, 43) has noted, how technological im-
agery has become increasingly visible in the world of digital cinema.
One way this has happened, is through the growing number of addi-
tional material in DVDs. Many current DVD cinema releases contain
commentaries by filmmakers or ‘making of ’ segments covering for in-
stance effects or design and including sets and costumes (Ibid.). This
means, that the work behind the construction is hoped to be revealed.
L’Enfant, when released on DVD, did not contain a ‘the making of ’
segment, however, a separate web -page was published (www.virtuaa-
lilavastus.net ), which openly showed how the illusion was achieved.
All this illustrates the new tendency, where illusions are revealed and
even celebrated, as cinematic magic. Would it be then, that part of the
illusion is the act of unfolding it? As seen earlier, this was precisely the
case with trompe l’oeil; a certain shock came after the realization, that
the three dimensional objects were merely a two dimensional illusion
9.7. Metamorphosis or animism?

We have been discussing the term affordance, which refers to the op-
portunities for action provided by a particular object, animal or en-
vironment. In L’Enfant, the digital tool allowed new ways to think of
affordances, since what objects, an animal or an environment could
afford, was not limited to the realm of physical world. Metamorphosis
grew as the key concept in L’Enfant. This meant, the metamorphosis
of things - them growing into something else or becoming different.
A typical example of a metamorphosis scene in L’Enfant is the one,
where the fire takes a form of a dancing lady or the Old Oak tree starts
to moan (as seen in Figure 31, The Fire lady; L’Enfant et les Sortilèges

Figure 31: The Fire lady (L’Enfant et
Figure 32: The Old Oak (L’Enfant et


2004, and Figure 32, The Old Oak; L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
The usual role of the scenic objects and environments as affor-
dances is that they contribute to the actions of the characters. Deleuze
(1986a, 141) has raised the concept of the action-image, which he
describes as the relation between a character and a situation. Situa-
tion is here defined as the combination of the surroundings, other
characters and the ongoing action. How the affordances will be used,
is dependable on the character and the situation. The objects and en-
vironments that do not succeed in becoming a part of the action,
remain as background. On the other hand, in L’Enfant, objects and
environments become more than just a part of the action, as in the
fire or the Old Oak, they become alive and are actually adopting the
role of a character.
The post-rendered animation was used sparingly in L’Enfant, and
only in the scenes where the room was transferred to a magical dance
hall and where the garden grows inside the room. Novak (1991,
1983) has interestingly referred to a changed sense of aliveness of the
space elements, while dealing with the digital space:
Cyberspace calls us to consider the difference between animism and

animation, and animation and metamorphosis. Animism suggests
that entities have a ‘spirit’ that guides their behavior. Animation
adds the capability of change in location, through time. Metamor-
phosis is change in form, through time or space. More broadly,
metamorphosis implies changes in one aspect of an entity as a func-
tion of other aspects, continuously or discontinuously.
In L’Enfant, scenery objects were transformed through a meta-

morphosis, a modification of their form. At the same time their qual-
ity as affordances changed drastically, for instance the Fire becoming
a frightening figure. While the Fire offered warmth and light during
the cold evening, it now afforded a scary figure which was hard to
interact with. In Luonnotar, animation techniques were used much
more intensively, since basically every shot contained a digital anima-
tion. Most often, this animation was the movement of the clouds
or the rippling of the waves. However, when the animated element
gets an intensified role, it is worth wile asking if it starts to live a life

of its own, instead of simply supporting the action of the characters.
Wood (2007, 51) has referred to the consequence of this feature of the
digital effects as the expanded narrative space, where the effect itself
becomes an agent of a story. In this sense Novak’s idea of animism in
the context of the digital environment becomes intriguing. Due to its
digital essence, any parameters of the virtual set can be manipulated
and animated in such a way, that it almost resembles giving a spirit to
it. Figure 33, The big wave (Luonnotar 2011), shows an example of a
scenic element that is animated in such a way, that it becomes a digital
counterpart of the figure of Luonnotar. This figure shows an image of
the big wave that challenges Luonnotar drifting on her ice raft. Fig-
ure 34, The dark clouds (Luonnotar 2011), shows how the patterns of
clouds echo the state of mind of Sotka.

Figure 33: The big wave (Luonnotar 2011)
Figure 34: The dark clouds (Luonnotar 2011)

10. APPRECIATION THE ARTEFACT
10.1. A question of real
In this chapter I aim to discuss, whether a virtual set illusion can be
regarded as convincingly real, and how it creates emotions. Firstly, in
order to define what is convincingly real, I need to ask what is ‘real’?
What does it mean, if a virtual set looks or doesn’t look real? As we
have discussed, digital scenery has presented a lot of possibilities to
create places that would be impossible to realize without the aid of the
digital tool. In this way the virtual set can be regarded as ‘hyperreal’.
However, this is not the aspect of realness I am looking for. Rather, in
the cases of L’Enfant and Luonnotar the case is that the digital scen-
ery reveals its synthetic nature from the very beginning. Due to the
quality of the artificial optic array it is practically impossible to make
the spectator believe that he is witnessing real, existing scenery, but
rather a digital substitute. With real, existing scenery I mean, that a
production design (in the traditional context) consists of real shooting
locations, whether they are existing locations or locations built on a
soundstage. These kinds of locations make it possible for actors and
crew members to walk into the scenery, to literally inhabit it. Digital
scenery brings quite a new dilemma, in that it challenges us with un-
reality: it is not possible to inhabit digital scenery.
Manovich (2001, 200) states, that computer graphics have faked
“of course, not reality, but photographic reality, reality seen as by the

camera lens. In other words, what computer graphics has (almost)
achieved is not realism, but rather only photorealism - the ability to
fake not our perceptual and bodily experience of reality but only its
photographic image.” Thought of in this way, the task of digital scen-
ery can be seen at best as giving a photorealistic impression, though
the artificial optic array of digital scenery resembles the optic array
which is captured through the lens in the ordinary scenery,
Realism and film in itself is certainly a confusing question. As
Grodal (2009, 251) has described,
Reality and realism are among the central terms used to describe
media representations. Because they are central, it is no wonder
they are used in many different ways, giving rise to ambiguity and
inconsistency (...) Our notions of what is real are based on many
different elements, and in given representation these various ele-
ments may each have their own reality status.
In L’Enfant and in Luonnotar both have strong extradiegetic ele-

ments, such as music. In L’Enfant there is the position of a dance
film with an existing recording conducted by Armin Jordan as a
soundtrack. L’Enfant belongs in the first place to the musical film
genre. A musical genre favors the use of fantastical scenery, and it
seems to make it easier for spectator to accept digital scenery as a
fabulous element of the film. One can for instance think of Moulin
Rouge (Twentieth Century Fox 2001), a musical film of lavishly pic-
turesque digital effects.
In Luonnotar the relationship to the music is extradiegetic in a
similar manner, even though this time soprano Riikka Hakola, who
plays the part of the young and old Luonnotar, sings the part herself.
The conductor this time is Leif Segerstam. Musical fantasy again gives
more freedom for visualization than an ordinary film would have
given. In a process of evaluating how the virtual set illusion func-
tions in L’Enfant and Luonnotar, it is crucial to understand the spell
of magic as forming the starting points of the productions in ques-
tion. To put it another way, whatever might have worked out in these
musical films, may not have been appropriate in films belonging to
other genres.

However fantastic the story though, the question of real can still
be presented. In production design, another way to define real is just
the way it is specified in earlier discussions: through the concept of
the diegetic world. The diegetic world is something, we on some
level regard as true or real - otherwise we couldn’t become immersed
in the film. Elements, we regard in this way real, need to confirm the
cohesiveness of the diegetic world. This does not mean we would at
the same time be unable to understand, that the film is just ‘pretend’.
Stylistic matters can relate to the genre. I have quite consciously
adopted a picturesque style, close to that of children books, especially
in L’Enfant. In Luonnotar, the style was meant to be slightly painterly,
influenced by early national romantic Finnish painting. Still, even
though L’Enfant and Luonnotar don’t aim stylistically to be realistic,
the computer graphics themselves are meant to be to as photorealistic
as possible with the given resources – the computer graphics are used
to create a space somebody could inhabit.
Both L’Enfant and Luonnotar are fictions, where one is a surreal
fantasy, in which the animals and furniture start to sing and talk, and
the other is an ancient Kalevala myth of the birth of life on earth.
How to visualize these stories, as discussed, was not a question of the
realism for me. However, when a real actor is posed against digital
backgrounds, these should not look like they belong to a different re-
ality than the actor. In L’Enfant and Luonnotar a sense of photorealism
was aimed at in order to create the unified look and to give the feeling
of an actor belonging to the scene.
10.2. Film and emotions

Previously I have questioned, whether L’Enfant and Luonnotar with
their synthetic sceneries stir up genuine emotions. Hereby I have also
called the diegesis in the above productions into question. I have ex-
amined the diegetic world as something that has a logic and creates
a comprehensive experience. At this point it is worthwhile to look
at, in which way the immersion in the film’s world is an emotional
experience, and whether such a synthetic entity as computer graph-
ics can rouse feelings of rejection. Or perhaps simply, are we just so

overwhelmed by the digital look of the film, that we would accept
whatever we are offered?
Firstly I need to consider what an emotion is. Tan (1996, 46) states
that “an emotion may be defined as a change in action readiness as a
result of the subject’s appraisal of the situation or the event.” Tan sees
Gibson’s immediately observable affordances as creating the primary
appraisal of the situation. Gibson (Ibid. 47) furthermore sees that the
results of primary appraisal “are directly related to the stimulus and
may be seen as antecedents of the emotion”. Secondary appraisal is
“accompanied by the emotional significance that is not directly evi-
dent from the situation itself ” (Ibid.). As an example of an emotion
that clearly demonstrates primary and secondary appraisal Tan (Ibid.)
suggests guilt, that has both a realization phase and a sensing respon-
sibility phase. In this way Gibson’s affordances can be linked with the
emotional effect of watching a film. Gibson himself was not interested
in defining the emotions and the way they function.
Grodal (2002 [1997], 43) associates emotions with the auto-
nomic nervous system and notes: “When a viewer chooses to watch
a film, he thereby chooses to be cued into having constant fluctua-
tion of heartbeat, perspiration, adrenalin-secretion, and so on. These
reactions not only passively trail film input, but also have voluntary
elements such as emphatic, vicarious evaluations of situations and of
hypothetical options for the protagonists.” According to Grodal (Ibid.
44) emotions are not “irrational forces, but necessary motivators for
cognition and the possible resulting actions.” Grodal (2002 [1997],
43) further recognizes the differences between the sympathetic and
parasympathetic nervous systems:
The main division between sympathetic and parasympathetic reac-

tions seems to be whether these reactions support active-aversive-
controlling or passive-accepting situations irrespective of hedonic
tone; in other words, whether the situation is positive or negative.
According to Tan (1996, 49), the viewer accepts his position in

respect to the film:
The active anticipation of structural developments and synthesis

or unconscious imitation of mobility, camera movement, say, pro-

duce a pleasant involvement with the artefact, a kind of identifica-
tion with the film that is experienced in place of or alongside the
viewer’s identification with the fictional characters.
In film experience, this process of identification is essential. It

means that the viewer immersion in film will be established. Further-
more, and as discussed above, emotions are only partially based on
passive reception. Reactions while watching film are to some extent
also voluntary. In terms of the virtual set it is interesting to further
investigate, which kind of emotional reactions the virtual set triggers.
How do viewers evaluate the virtual set as a stimulus and on what
basis do they respond?
10.3. Evidently fake

We have discussed L’Enfant and Luonnotar virtual sets in a sense,
that they create an illusion of a three dimensional space that can in-
habit an actor. The diegetic effect has been enough to explain the act
of spectator immersion with the film. Furthermore I have defined
the virtual set as an illusion of compelling nature. This is partially
due to the fact, that even in the rough test shootings, the 3D virtual
set turned out as looking more like an illusion of a space than a flat
background.
At best, the virtual set illusion in L’Enfant and Luonnotar work in
such a way, that even a convincing photorealistic setting is possible.
This is especially the case in the early scenes of L’Enfant. However,
most of the time the virtual set can be identified as a digital realm,
so even though there is a question of a functioning perceptual illu-
sion, on a conceptual level the scenery can be recognized as ‘fake’. In
neither the productions, L’Enfant nor Luonnotar, does the sense of
‘fakeness’ make it impossible to experience the productions as a work
of art. Rather it appears that the sense of the digital realm becomes
a part of the spectator experience (using myself as a spectator) from
the beginning, and once the spectator has realized this is not real but
a digital fake, he has a capacity to accept it. Tan (1996, 68) identi-
fies a similar situation in the event of the ordinary film: even though

spectators recognize they are watching a staged event, they continue
to believe they are “physically present in front of or in the scene”.
One might ask, is it because of the countless forms of audiovisual
imagery, that one can accept this combination of real and fake? Or is
it so, that the virtual set illusion is enough to create the cinematic en-
vironment? There are high budget films, such as Alice in Wonderland
(Walt Disney Pictures 2010) and Charlie and the Chocolate Factory
(Warner Bros 2005), that quite openly bring up the fact, that they are
digital fantasies. Digital landscapes are clearly distinguishable in these
movies and digitally-made creatures merge with real actors, and this
doesn’t seem to be a problem.
I have earlier discussed, that computer graphics can bring a con-
siderable amount of misinformation, information of the polygonal
surfaces etc. Thus computer graphics brings (even when utterly pho-
torealistic), quite an amount of information of the technology itself.
Despite this misinformation however, for me, both L’Enfant and Lu-
onnotar persist. Even though I find the 3D space these films depict as
some form of digital illustration, the enjoyment of the fiction is still
there and I understand it as having accepted the digital optic array of
the film.
The change happening through the digitalization of film is de-
scribed by Manovich (2001, 308): “Cinema becomes a particular
branch of painting - painting in time.” By this Manovich means, that
the cinematic image can during the digital era easily be retouched and
become a product of computer-generated imagery. Thus, it is more
and more common to accept the artificial digital elements as part of
a whole. Wood (2007, 43) has also noticed, that the use of digital
effects no more associates only with “transparency” or “overinvest-
ment in the surface of the things”: instead, digital effects imagery
has become increasingly visible in cinema. This kind of visibility can
manifest itself in two ways, either through watching the actual images
themselves or through participating in the discourse over the effects,
like watching the extra material in DVDs (Ibid).

10.4. Artefact emotions
Emotional involvement with a film can be seen as one of the major
motivations to watch movies. However, these emotions don’t exist
only towards the fictional status of the film. Tan (1996, 65) raises
another source for emotions while watching films - the appreciation
of the artefact: “As the final manifestation of the film artefact, we have
the tours de force: the spectacular special effects, a sample of superb
acting talent, and/or impressive photography or staging.” Thus watch-
ing films evokes ‘F’ emotions, emotions for fiction, which in tradi-
tional film is dominant. The viewer of the traditional film is interested
in the first place, in the events taking place in the fictional world. In
addition to F emotions, ‘A’ emotions, emotions for the artefact can
be aroused (Ibid. 81-82). The major ‘A emotions include enjoyment,
desire, admiration and astonishment for the artefact elements (Ibid.
82). Artefact emotions are interesting in the case of the virtual set.
Since the emphasis in the making process has been on the technology
and the set being digital has been a dominant factor in the produc-
tion, it is clear that this artefact aspect is underlined in both L’Enfant
and Luonnotar. It can be asked, whether this has influences on the F
emotions, emotions that are aroused by the story.
A virtual set both in L’Enfant and Luonnotar clearly demonstrates
the artificial quality. I will now look closer at L’Enfant. It is a story of
young boy, who has to learn to treat his environment in a more friend-
ly manner. The fiction elements of L’Enfant have a strong emotional
content. When a whole story happens in an artificial environment,
we cannot help having emotions towards this artificial entity. Often
I recognize these emotions of being the enjoyment of the brilliance
of the digital tool itself - as in the case of the magic of the garden
growing in the room. Sometimes however, these emotions seemed
like rejection: for example I had feelings of disbelief in the digital
environment. Whatever these emotions are, they are in interaction
with how the fiction is witnessed. Thus, according to the experiences
portrayed in L’Enfant, not all the artefact emotions are positive. If
negative artefact emotions arise, the appreciation of the fiction clearly
seems to diminish. On the other hand, if positive artefact emotions

remain, the appreciation of the fiction rises. L’Enfant shows this kind
of connection between the emotions aroused by the artificial scenery
and the fiction. A virtual set being such a dominant tool, it felt espe-
cially in L’Enfant, that the fictional elements were at the mercy of the
digital scenery.
When I was working on Luonnotar, there was already more
knowledge of the virtual set. Thus the utilization of artefact emotions
could be considered more carefully than was possible in L’Enfant. The
emotional content of Luonnotar is much dependent on the quality of
Sibelius’s music. Fiction elements on the other hand are clear, as Lu-
onnotar travels on the ancient earth and gets drowned by the gigantic
wave. Sotka, the bird, looks for the place to lay an egg, but is unable
to find it until Luonnotar offers her knee. Sotka lays an egg, which
cracks, and out of the parts of the egg, the universe - a moon, a sky
with stars - is born. Of the two productions, Luonnotar is more suc-
cessful and I believe it to be so, because it pleasantly creates a visually
fascinating digital artefact that we can have emotions for. Thus we
have strong artefact emotions alongside our fiction emotions, that in
fact are not in the forefront. The accomplishment of Luonnotar thus
summarizes this research, giving it a relevant ending point. Also, the
impression of the final results of this research is generally very positive
in regard to the future of digital scenery.

IV CONCLUSIONS
A scene from Luonnotar (Luonnotar 2011).
CONCLUSIONS 181
11. THE OUTCOME OF THE RESEARCH
11.1. Merging the art and the theory
Since there practically exists very little research in the area of produc-
tion design, this research has been to much extent, a process of creat-
ing a theoretical application of my own. The attempt to create an un-
derstanding of the virtual set through ecological psychology lays some
basis for an overall apprehension of ecological production design theory,
which would especially explain the relationship of the perceiver and
design environment according to Gibson’s ideas. This is though just
a beginning: more work is needed and will be hopefully executed,
and I see this viewpoint as promising. The future results might not
be limited to the area of film design, but also to the field of theater
scenography. In Finland, Teemu Paavolainen’s Theatre/Ecology/Cogni-
tion. Theorizing Performer-Object Interaction in Grotowski, Kantor, and
Meyerhold (2011) is an existent example of this development.
Thus, my research has been tightly bound with ecological psy-
chology. I have evaluated my artistic work from several aspects of it.
Basically, my interest has been pinned on such major ecological con-
cepts as the ambient optic array and affordances. I have also searched
the psychological viewpoint as to the conceit of spectator immersion
in the illusionary world of the virtual set. I have voluntary chosen to
work within quite a precise context, therefore it is clear, that all the
aspects of the artistic work will not be covered in this research. Both

L’Enfant and Luonnotar were extensive productions for a production
designer. There would have been several other viewpoints to choose
for the emphasis of this research, for instance the questions surround-
ing a design style in respect to the virtual set might have been interest-
ing. However, I have preferred to limit the area of interest.
I have been focusing on the perceptual level encounter with the
virtual set and the consequences of that encounter with the event of
spectator immersion. This is quite a logical choice, since the virtual
set provides a crucial issue of how it is perceived as a digital illusion.
Question of virtual set illusion consequently nailed my focus into
the sphere of perception. Realizing this has influenced on my artistic
work: in Luonnotar, illusion is more consciously manipulated than in
L’Enfant. It is also constructed according to the ecological concept of
changing optic array. The process shows one way to link the artistic
work and the associated theory. The idea of changing optic array has
helped to define more clearly, the possibilities of the virtual set. The
virtual set is something that is possible to animate. Especially, the
virtual set is an animated vision, an animate optic array.
Practically this meant a considerable conceptual change in my
work, since designers more likely imagine their scenery beforehand
as still images, not as clips of animation. My understanding of the
designer task as a set modeler was modified. This turn in the artistic
work also had an impact in the theoretical work. The question of a
changing, animate illusion became central, though the digital essence
of the virtual set has also been emphasized. On the basis of Luon-
notar, I was quite satisfied with the results and the production ended
up being fluent and fast. The virtual set of Luonnotar did not create
the similar sense of silent and uneventful scenery, as I had analyzed
being sometimes the case in L’Enfant. At this point it was clear, that if
enough animate information is provided, some pitfalls of the virtual
set itself might go unnoticed or become unimportant.
The practice setting was furthermore fruitful for the research in
the sense that it also roused other issues that were of central interest. In
respect to these I could observe my own reactions as artist-spectator.
This was the case for instance, with the problem of immersion, where
I gained valuable knowledge through practice. All the aspects of the
actor being in the Chromakey studio would have been quite impos-
CONCLUSIONS 183
sible to imagine without my own knowledge of production practice.
This implies naturally, that the virtual set technology is subtle, and
even more subtle it seems, when one thinks of all the variety of ap-
plications that are actually used in the field. However, my attempt has
been to generalize, and to find some overall trends of the virtual set.
Therefore the details of technique have not been in the forefront.
All the issues brought up in theoretical discussion originate from
practice. It has been the practice of L’Enfant that manifested the idea
of a compelling trompe l’oeil illusion; it was Luonnotar that revealed
the question of changing optic array. In both Luonnotar and L’Enfant,
the new possibilities of the virtual set were both presented and real-
ized in the realm of diegesis. The new digital world created in both
productions raised questions that I attempted to address by means of
related theory. The discussion of Chromakey technology and what
it meant overall to the whole artistic process was based on my own
experiences: this lead to presenting the idea of affordances in the con-
text of production design. Therefore the framework of practice is very
meaningful, in terms of thinking of the conclusions of this research.
Sometimes reasoning has been purely based on practice, like the eval-
uation of the quality of the virtual set illusion as being compelling.
This kind of tradition is relatively new, but I am assured, it brings
good possibilities to emphasize the essential substance.
11.2. The two productions compared

In my research I have analyzed two virtual set productions, L’Enfant
and Luonnotar. They differ in each other in the ways they present the
virtual set; L’Enfant being based on the use of a real time 2D virtual
system whereas Luonnotar is based on the use of post-production ef-
fects. One might say these two productions represent the different
kinds of limitations that the virtual set as a technology suggests. The
real time virtual set is dependent on economical computational pro-
cesses, which at the same time implies compromises in the quality of
the graphics, for instance in surface texturing. Also notable is, that the
real time virtual set is dependent on the essential size of the TV stu-
dio: while the virtual set can be considerable larger in perceived mea-

surement than the actual Chromakey studio, the camera movement
is limited to what can really be executed in the actual studio space.
Post-produced virtual sets on the other hand allow for a large
scheme in which the camera can move, not only in a sense that the
camera can see enormous landscapes, but it can also travel large dis-
tances through those landscapes. The distances will no longer be lim-
ited to those allowed by the virtual studio. This is truly a revolutionary
aspect of the virtual camera, and has provided contemporary cinema
scenes with new kinds of long, spectacular camera tracks through
digitally generated environments. I have only vaguely touched upon
the question of workloads in each of the systems: naturally the post-
produced virtual set is much more time consuming. However, much
more complicated set structures can be executed, when compared
with the real time virtual studio.
Formerly, we got to know trompe l’oeil. Like trompe l’oeil, the
virtual set is efficient in conveying depth cues. The nature of 3D
computer graphics truly justifies the understanding of the illusion
of depth in virtual set, not only as a consequence of the perspective
cues, but as a manifestation of the human vision as an optic array
consisting of surface textures in light. Shading is an aspect for which
computer graphics has provided powerful new pictorial tools, despite
(as we have discussed) the shortcomings that such tools might have.
However, my interest in the information that optic array provides has
shifted from the information concerning the position of objects in
the world, to the information that concerns our awareness of our own
position in that world. This is basically the information perspective
provides in pictorial presentations; perspective brings an awareness of
our spatial orientation. In the virtual set, the information of perspec-
tive is moving, thus implying our moving position. Therefore it is
logical to assume, that the information seeking observer looks for the
same constant sense of change in the artificial optic array provided
by the film and the synthetic optic array provided by the virtual set.
Both L’Enfant and Luonnotar as research material confirm this.
They present different ways by which to approach cinematic move-
ment, understood as an aspect of the virtual set. Both productions
challenged the workflow of the traditional film making process, in
a way that at least some of the cinematographic choices (lightning,
CONCLUSIONS 185
position of a camera in respect to the design) were left to the designer.
Generally I feel that the real time virtual studio allows possibilities
that are too limited for narrative film, however it might find quite
excellent use in television programs. Post-produced virtual set, in con-
trast, provides almost unlimited possibilities and eventually the ques-
tion will be, what kinds of workflows are economical. Thus, neither
of the research productions themselves provide a model of how virtual
set productions should be done. In real life, the use of computer aided
design technologies will be combined with traditional production de-
sign practices, and most likely the productions that use only virtual
set, will be marginal. The outcome of this can clearly be seen in the
contemporary film industry, that has forcefully integrated the virtual
set as one part of the whole film making process.
What these two productions, L’Enfant and Luonnotar both stand
for, is a mode for an observer to encounter the virtual set and they
provide methods or ways with which to perceive the digital universe.
Both productions tell their own versions of how we become aware of
the virtual set space. Do we approach it as digitally modeled entity
that we can reach with sophisticated camera tracking systems, that
replace the mechanical reproduction system of the camera? In such a
case, we can speak of the virtual set as an illusion of a set. Or do we
approach the whole virtual set as an animated artificial vision replac-
ing metaphorically our own perceptual system? Here we might speak
of our vision of the virtual set as an illusion. Both ways however, chal-
lenge the traditional way of thinking of a set as a persistent, one might
say, invariant, location. Virtual set truly exists only through percep-
tion and in accordance with it. The traditional idea of literal presence
is no longer valid in the context of the virtual set.
11.3. Animate optic array

On the basis of this research, it is possible to launch a new idea of
the animate optic array, that depicts digital moving imagery. Animate
optic array is an artificial optic array, a vision of a digital picture that
is constantly in change. The virtual set as an animate optic array em-
phasizes its nature as transformable surfaces within a transformable

surface. Understanding the virtual set this way instead of simply a
simulation of space brings a new emphasis on creating virtual sets.
Understanding the virtual set through ecological optics gives us
means to evaluate in which sense the virtual set fulfils our need for
visual information. While we understand the vision as a flowing op-
tic array, we can compare the perception of the virtual set with the
perception of the traditional set. In ecological optics, the surfaces are
of great importance in forming the vision. The spatial relationships
in the world are defined on the basis of the surface layout i.e. texture
gradients. Surfaces also have other features such as illumination and
reflectance, which define the surface outlook. Since surfaces are so
important in forming the flowing optic array, it is crucial to examine,
how the surfaces in the virtual set are formed.
Analysis shows, that the most obvious disadvantages of the virtual
set lie in the way the surfaces are rendered by the system. The surfaces
of the virtual set do not achieve a sense of real world surface while the
camera moves. This is partially due to the algorithms, on which the
bump maps and illumination capacity of the 3D software are based.
In the first place, the possibility to create a surface effect similar to
either the real world or even traditional film is not there. Hence, com-
puter photorealism is an illusion itself. Despite this, 3D software has
a powerful means by which to create a photorealistic effect. Different
software programs vary in their methods in calculating surfaces, espe-
cially in the case of real time graphics. The problem of surface render-
ing was obvious in L’Enfant, even though it mostly utilized the 2D
real time virtual set system. While the camera moved, the shadows or
reflections did not change. As such, it creates a very dead impression
of the environment and it is not an environment with a flowing optic
array in the sense that Gibson meant.
Since the human need for information that is animate in move-
ment, was made so clear on the basis of Gibson’s concept of the con-
stantly flowing vision, the artistic approach in Luonnotar was thought
anew. It was not possible to change the virtual set as a technique,
but it was possible to grasp the perceiver’s attention with other kinds
of movement, than those caused by variants of vision. Therefore the
scenery of Luonnotar consisted wholly of different patterns that were
designed to move, for example moving clouds and waves. This ap-
CONCLUSIONS 187
proach does not solve all the problems of the virtual set, but it was a
solution that was suitable given the content of Luonnotar, where the
scenery was aimed to depict the primitive forces of nature. In summa-
ry, this implies, that while working with virtual set, all kinds of strate-
gies need to be developed in order to better achieve an impression of
the flowing optic array. For example, in television design, where the
real time 3D virtual set is commonly used, a lot of moving inserts
are used as a part of the virtual set. Also, the digital effects in film are
most often very rapid and drastically animate, visualizing explosions,
fires etc. In general, to get the digital effect or scenery to move is an
important goal for film practitioners.
Even if the surfaces of the virtual set do not correspond to the
surfaces in the real world or even traditional film, they are convinc-
ing enough to create a powerful 3D illusion. The L’Enfant virtual set
hardly ever fails to position the character in the environment. This
is due to the texture gradients that very correctly create a sense of
space. The virtual set is very accurate in respect to depth cues: occlu-
sion, height in visual field, relative size and relative density turn out
precisely. Therefore the illusion of space is quite persuasive. It is rather
due to the misinformation that the artificial optic array portrays, that
the digital environment might turn out looking unnatural. By misin-
formation I mean the information that reveals the technology itself.
This of course is not the intended result and a disadvantage of the
technology.
As discussed, the practical working process of the two produc-
tions analyzed entailed a clear shift in the design emphasis. While
the process of L’Enfant concentrated on creating the model of the
virtual set, the process of Luonnotar concentrated on digital produc-
tion design as a changing optic array. Therefore the design of Luon-
notar emphasized the scenery not as static images, but more as clips
of animation. This implies, that the virtual set indicates a new kind
of design practice, where the skills of modeling and animating a set
are fused. One might ask, to which extent this changes the profession,
will there be new divisions of labor or will task of digital production
design include also animation.

11.4. A new mobile illusion
The virtual set challenges all the categorizations of pictorial illusion.
It is truly a new type of illusion. In my defining the types of scenic
illusion, I have referred to Allen, since his categorization seems most
valid in terms of production design and the illusion types that are
presented in practice. A traditional matte painting or backdrop is a
typical example of the trompe l’oeil illusion used in production de-
sign, where a two-dimensional image is taken as if it would provide a
three-dimensional scenic space. On the other hand, a street environ-
ment made out of plastic tiles is a good example of the reproduc-
tive illusion, where the artificial three-dimensional replica is meant to
be seen as being real. Photographic technique is used to deceive the
viewer that the objects being depicted are original. The practice of
production design is full of examples utilizing these types of illusion,
so it is quite crucial to ask, whether the virtual set offers just an old
trick realized by new tools.
Herein lies the difference. The virtual set by means of its most
novel applications, allows more than the above mentioned illusion
types. Digital 3D illusion is very similar to the trompe l’oeil illusion:
a false idea of space is created by a two-dimensional surface. However,
no traditional trompe l’oeil technique has been able to mobilize the
three-dimensional illusion in the way that a virtual set does. Painted
trompe l’oeil is a still image that is fundamentally different than the
virtual set. The reproductive illusion of the virtual set however, allows
the camera to move in a truly three-dimensional artificial realm. In
this sense, the virtual set resembles the reproductive illusion in that it
pursues photorealism and tries to hide the unauthentic origins of the
scenery. Overall, the character of the virtual set is one of trompe l’oeil,
however in this case trompe l’oeil is animate.
Mobility of illusion is a new feature that makes the perceived il-
lusion even more credible. When the camera actually seems to move
in a three-dimensional digital space, it is perhaps difficult to question
the illusions quality. Although in Allen’s terms we might still place the
virtual set in the category of trompe l’oeil, a virtual set will also pro-
vide a loss of awareness in a different sense than the traditional silent
CONCLUSIONS 189
trompe l’oeil. As Allen (1997, 107) has noticed, movement brings a
sense of presence, which eventually implies “a fully realized though
fictional world that has all the perceptual immediance of our own”.
Here, the virtual set would acquire the features of projective illusion -
illusion as a diegetic effect.
The virtual set involves seeing-as, seeing both the surface of the
virtual set projection and the surfaces within that surface projection.
However, as a projecting illusion, the virtual set is not necessarily ex-
perienced in the same way as trompe l’oeil. The virtual set is context
dependent unlike trompe l’oeil: our knowledge of what we are seeing
can break the hold of the illusion. The initial perceptual experience
of the virtual set is, however, different: the illusion is experienced as
compelling. Thus the multi-level experience of illusion can in its dif-
ferent aspects, provide inconsistent results. This, of course will result
in that the experience of the virtual set is equivocal. In this; firstly, we
may come to the conclusion, that the performer is placed in the vir-
tual realm (trompe l’oeil level). Secondly, we note we can then give up
the illusion by recognizing that what we see is only a film (projective
illusion level). This is not to say that the trompe l’oeil cannot be re-
vealed, but this can happen only after the illusion is first experienced,
and this is precisely why trompe l’oeil remains fascinating.
In practice the moving trompe l’oeil illusion gives many options.
In both L’Enfant and Luonnotar there was only one scene that was
realized in full 3D simulation of the virtual set. That was scene in
L’Enfant, which is seen from the bat’s viewpoint while he approaches
the boy. The figures of the scene are presented earlier (Figure 16-1
and 16-2, The viewpoint of the flying Bat). All the other scenes either
utilized the real time 2D virtual set (L’Enfant) or motion perspective
(Luonnotar). This means, that any possibility for movement, even if
limited in terms of three-dimensionality, is a very powerful addition
to the still and motionless trompe l’oeil illusion. 2D virtual set tech-
nology covers quite many needs from the point of view of cinematic
expression. While in television it seems worthwhile to have real time
3D virtual set systems, in film it is useful to consider, when true 3D
simulation is really needed as 3D simulation always requires much
more rendering capacity, than any of the 2D virtual set methods.

11.5. New rules of the fictional universe
Conceptually the animate trompe l’oeil brings the possibility for a
new kind of presence in fictional worlds. These fictional worlds do
not necessarily follow the rules of our real world, but they can de-
velop new, unexpected forms. In ecological psychology, the quality
of the environment for an observer is defined: invariant structures do
not turn out to be variant and vice versa. Surfaces resist the variation
of solidity and breakability. The niche of the human is such, that it
does not include experience of events in micro or macrocosmic scale.
Digital fiction does not respect these predefined rules of an ecological
environment. The environment itself becomes unstable and based on
the motivations in the narrative, the scenery can go through various
transformations. Everyday ecological optics is challenged by the digi-
tal scenery, in that it can present itself in uncountable forms.
Quite justifiably, a new term inspired by Novak can be taken into
use: liquid scenery. As noted, surfaces resist deformation and disinte-
gration. Liquid scenery offers surfaces that behave quite oppositely.
Liquid scenery is a scenery of transformation - it opens up the door
wherever or whenever you need it. If earlier cinema could present
dreams and nightmares only in the form of rigid scenery which hin-
ders subsequent change, liquid scenery allows variations amazingly
easy. Especially in the production of L’Enfant, the use of liquid scen-
ery was extensive. A room turns into a dancehall, it changes in size,
form, color, shininess, pattern; it transforms into a garden through
innumerable modifications. In L’Enfant the story is about magical
events, but it is quite clear that new kinds of fantasies will emerge,
such as occur in Inception (Warner Bros. 2010). This is a movie that
presents a twisted world where the ecological relationships within the
environment are abandoned.
As well as the scenery becoming liquid, the encounter with the
scenery is brought to us by the virtual camera. The virtual camera is
a new, relentless, unobstructed tool that can zoom out from atomic
sizes to galaxies. The virtual camera can be present in any thinkable
event, starting from the eye of the storm as in Luonnotar. The explo-
ration that the virtual camera can execute seems unlimited, and even
CONCLUSIONS 191
in small scale productions such as Luonnotar, it was possible for the
main character to fly in outer space or surf in the middle of the storm.
The camera’s movement can more accurately be termed as navigation,
rather than movements such as a pan or a dolly.
Since the digital environment ultimately consists of data, it can
employ all parameter based operations. The objects and places of the
digital environment can also be understood through the concept of
affordance. The digital environment provides new and unexpected
visual meanings to be picked up. Both the productions L’Enfant and
Luonnotar provide examples of this. In L’Enfant, we do not see the
fire just as a warming and illuminating phenomenon; it becomes a
frightening figure that dances for the boy. In Luonnotar clouds twirl
as if they would be an animate expression of Luonnotar’s mind. In
ecological optics there is a definite distinction between the animate
animals and the inanimate objects of the environment. In the digital
environment, this distinction will fade. People and objects will share
the same qualities of aliveness and through such notions as metamor-
phosis and animism we can better understand what it is, that digital
environment provides us.
The quality of digital environment we have earlier discussed, and
liquidness should as well, be understood eventually as a means to af-
ford. The digital environment provides us with a mutability, which
drastically transforms our expectations of what the scenery can offer
us. The logic of the story becomes very important here. We can pre-
sume that every cinematic story defines throughout its course, what
is valid in its own context. For instance in L’Enfant it becomes viable,
that animals and objects change, take other forms and behave atypi-
cality. The same things would not be thinkable in some other story
that took place in a more everyday sphere. Thus virtual scenery wid-
ens the scope of prospective realities, and in doing so, adds surprising
possibilities.
Furthermore, when inanimate objects start to acquire animate
features, it also means that the autocracy of the character diminishes.
In film, it has been quite evident, that the character is a focus of at-
tention. Our immersion in the film is based on the witness emotions
we experience for the character. Now, the objects that have tradition-
ally remained in the background, start to have expressive qualities.

Digital objects become characters - they draw attention. This implies
that the space of the narrative has changed alongside digital scenery.
An example of this is the animated sea in Luonnotar, something that
becomes an ‘agent’ of the story, something that arouses emotions.
11.6. Virtual set directly perceived

My goal in this research was not to claim for or against the concept of
direct perception. I am however rather convinced, that based on these
two virtual set productions, that the encounter with the virtual set
can be described if not as direct then at least immediate. Gibson’s idea
of direct perception means we encounter our environment with our
perceptual system without inference. It also means that the informa-
tion is there in the environment, ready to be directly picked up. It is
possible, that the virtual set would be first experienced as a represen-
tation of the real set, however this seems not to be the case. Overtly
complex mental processes would not seem to govern the imminent
experience of the virtual set, but the virtual set is rather experienced as
an environment, in a similar manner to which the real film environ-
ment is. The virtual set is there, as information which confirms our
need to position the performer. Despite the problems of technology,
the practical experiment with the virtual set confirmed, that it seems
to have a considerable power to place the performer in the set. The
performer seems to ‘be’ there, since the artificial optic array of the
virtual set environment is convincing enough to convey this.
This ‘immediateness’ characterizes the basic perceptual process of
how the virtual set is encountered. If we do not gain in the first place,
the same sense of presence that the traditional film conveys with tradi-
tional sets, then we are unable to maintain our immersive relationship
with the film. Thus, the perceptual level encounter with the virtual set
is most crucial. The information that describes the character position
needs to be there, and it needs to be in a form that our perceptual
system is able to interpret. The virtual set may well meet this standard
with its rather sophisticated technology and varied applications.
Gibson’s ecological psychology shows us the way our perceptual
system encounters the world. Anderson has brought us insight, as to
how the film as an illusion utilizes the very same perceptual system. I
CONCLUSIONS 193
have attempted to show, how the virtual set is an illusion nested with-
in the entire film illusion, using Allen’s categories as my tools. The
virtual set illusion that is eventually encountered with the perceptual
system is thus multilayered and lacks the indexical relationship that a
traditional set does. Despite this complexity, if the virtual set succeeds
on a perceptual level to convince the spectator, that the experience
itself can be described as simple.
The conceivable evidence for the immediateness of perception
is precisely the compelling quality of the virtual set. If the virtual
set illusion is compelling, would it not then employ complex mental
representations? It rather infers that it is possible to derive informa-
tion from the environment in a relatively straightforward manner. I
truly believe that there is something to consider in regard to Gibson’s
thinking that the perceptual system is tuned to gain immediate in-
formation without inference from the surroundings. Why does the
virtual set seem to so compelling? Is it perhaps, that we as ecological
creatures are accustomed to seeing a person as always in their relation-
ship to their environment, and our perceptual system simply takes
this proposition as granted? The virtual set provides enough informa-
tion of the spatial situation, so it is initially successful, even though
the disbelief might follow the immediate reaction.
Also, it is interesting to consider that the kind of information
that is sufficient to position the character in the scenic environment,
might well tell something about the information that is crucial for us
to understand our placement in the world and traditionally we think
of depth cues as being integral. In L’Enfant the use of perspective
background images were important. In Luonnotar the method was
slightly different: texture gradients were consciously used instead. The
experiences gained in Luonnotar confirmed Gibson’s statement, that
the information of texture gradients is enough to create the spatial
position.

11.7. Future visions of virtual set
I started this research by suggesting that production design is an
art of illusion. I am ending it by briefly summarizing the future pos-
sibilities that the virtual set provides for filmmaking. In the tradition
of cinematic illusion, the virtual set has provided a new and powerful
tool. Both L’Enfant and Luonnotar are examples of this. They are pro-
ductions which it would not be possible to accomplish without the
virtual set. The ecologically oriented analysis of these productions has
shown how the illusion of animate optic array was created. In this, the
virtual set is highly efficient, since it renders animated surfaces. In the
future, it can be likely assumed, that more sophisticated applications
will become available and this means more photorealistic surfaces will
be possible with the these new virtual set systems.
What will change with the use of this illusion creating tool? Both
L’Enfant and Luonnotar have utilized the virtual set in an essential
way, in that both productions transfer the viewer to imaginary places.
This indicates that the virtual set has a tendency to free the filmmaker
from practical limitations. Such a transfer gives access to places that
would otherwise be far beyond any physical access available. An ex-
treme example of this can be found in Luonnotar, in the scene which
positions the viewer in the eye of the storm. For production design
art, this means new kinds of future possibilities to liberate the films
fiction to take place in most incredible places, places that are either
hard to come by or places that do not really exist.
Digital scenery can be encountered in new ways. The new rules
of the digital universe make possible for instance unlimited camera
movements. Likewise it is possible to be ‘wherever’ - it is possible to
see in an unlimited way. This feature of the virtual set will certainly
change the way that films are narrated. The new, mobile illusion is
flexible in terms of camera movement and it is quite reasonable to
speak of the virtual set as a liberated illusion. Viewers will be able to
be present in unbelievable places, in unbelievable ways. Like Moshko-
vitz (2001, 31) forecast, “only the talent and imagination of the de-
signers will limit the appearance and the diversity of virtual scenery.”
Liquid scenery is an aspect very specific to the virtual set. Virtual
scenery allows transformations for filmmakers. A practical example of
CONCLUSIONS 195
this, are the many catastrophe films presenting earthquakes or other
of nature’s phenomena. In L’Enfant there was a sophisticated use of
transformations and the boy’s room changed from scene to scene. In
Luonnotar, the set was thoroughly animated so it was experienced as
almost being alive. The virtual set can be accompanied by animism
and this naturally gives production design a new role, where it is not
the rigid background of the story but rather an active agent.
When the emphasis in design changes from creating the sets to
animating the sets, the job description also changes. The virtual set
demands new skills, and also a new kind of division of labor. The
traditional skills of the production designer will be replaced with the
knowledge of the animator. In addition to these changing job descrip-
tions, wholly new job descriptions will be required. A compositor, the
person who combines the different animated layers, is an example of
this, and altogether this means a considerable change in the profes-
sion.
In practice virtual sets exist in many different applications, some
of them being suitable for film, and some for television. The only pos-
sible disadvantage regarding the virtual set will be the fact, that its use
remains expensive and time consuming. Thus it cannot be expected,
that the virtual set will provide the solution for every production. It is
only for the productions, where special kinds of scenery are needed.
The changes the virtual set brings are nevertheless quite funda-
mental. It is almost as if the human would be detached from his eco-
logical niche to govern his universe in unobstructed ways. This is an
interesting position from which to look to the future - how will film-
makers use the possibilities that virtual set has to offer?

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FIGURES
Figure 1: A virtual set background (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 2: A character and a virtual set background (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 3: A virtual set background plate used in the Armchair dancing scene in
L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 4: A virtual set background plate used in the Princess dancing scene in
L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 5: Texture gradient of a vanishing surface. An illustration by Katriina Pa-
junen.
Figure 6: The use of matte channel (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 7: The use of several matte channels (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 8: A close-up of the background plate (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 9: The original background plate (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 10: The Boy interacts with cage (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 11: The Boy opening the cage door (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 12: The boy pushing the digital Grandfather Clock (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges
2004).
Figure 13: Müller-Lyer illusion from Allen 1997, 99.
Figure 14: A strong effect of perspective (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 15-1 - 15-6: A camera movement in the virtual set (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges
2004).

Figure 16-1 - 16-2: The viewpoint of the flying Bat (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 17: The frozen water (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 18: A play with the surfaces (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 19: A secondary video source (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 20: The twinkling Princess (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 21: Luonnotar flying (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 22-1 - 22-3: Rotating clouds (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 23: The inflow of the optic array (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 24: The optic flow field (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 25: The sunlight simulation (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 26-1 - 26-2: The use of real elements (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 27-1 - 27-2: The light from the fireplace (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 28: The gigantic zipper (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 29-1 - 29-4: The unlimited zoom out (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 30-1 - 30-2: Luonnotar sinking (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 31: The Fire lady (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 32: The Old Oak (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).
Figure 33: The big wave (Luonnotar 2011).
Figure 34: The dark clouds (Luonnotar 2011).
FIGURES 205
FILMS
BERGMAN, Ingmar: Fanny and Alexander (Cinematograph AB 1982).
BERGMAN, Ingmar: Winter Light (Svensk Filmindustri 1963).
BURTON, Tim: Alice in Wonderland (Walt Disney Pictures 2010).
BURTON, Tim: Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (Warner Bros 2005).
CAMERON, James: Titanic (Twentieth Century Fox 1997).
CONRAN, Kerry: The Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow (Paramount 2004).
DE BONT, Jan: Twister (Warner Bros 1996).
DONNER, Richard: Superman (Warner Bros 1978).
HAND, David: Snow White and Seven Dwarfs (Disney 1937).
JACKSON, Peter: The Lord of the Rings trilogy (New Line Cinema 2001, 2002, 2003).
LASSETER, John: Toy Story (Pixar 1995).
LUHRMANN, Baz: Moulin Rouge (Twentieth Century Fox 2001).
MILLER, Frank and Rodriguez, Robert: Sin City (Dimension Films 2005).
NOLAN, Christopher: Inception (Warner Bros 2010).
PETERSEN, Wolfgang: The Perfect Storm (Warner Bros 2000).
RASTIMO, Kaisa: Stormheart (Stormheart 2009).
SPIELBERG, Steven: The Raiders of the Lost Ark (Paramount Pictures 1981).
WACHOWSKI, Andy and Wachowski Lana: Matrix (Warner Bros 1999).

APPENDIX 1
L’ENFANT ET LES SORTILÈGES CREDITS
SCRIPT AND DIRECTION Marikki Hakola
VIRTUAL SET DESIGN Katriina Ilmaranta
DANCE AND CHOREOGRAPHY Mikael Kivimäki
Alpo Aaltokoski
Nina Hyvärinen
Aki Suzuki
Jyrki Karttunen
Sampo Kivelä
Anne Koutonen
Miguel Verdecia
Soila Grenot
Teemu Korjuslommi
Step Up Kids
Vanessa Janatuinen
Christa Kauppinen
Cindy Koivula
Ari-Matti Koivunen
Lassi Virtanen
CONDUCTOR Armin Jordan
La Manècanterie
Conservatoire Populaire
Musicue Genéve
Orchestre de la
Suisse Romande
Choeur de la Radio
Suisse Romande
VOCALS Colette Elliot-Lucaz
Arlette Chedel
Elisabeth Vidal
Audrey Michael
Isabel Garcisanz
Michel Sénéchal
Michel Brodard
Philippe Huttenlocher
Denise Probst
Andrée-Lise Hoffmann
Réginald Boyce
Jean-Pascal Laedermann
AUDIO DESIGN Epa Tamminen
FOLEY EFFECTS Antti Hytti
Epa Tamminen
AUDIO MIX Olli Pärnanen
Epa Tamminen
PHOTOGRAPHY Raimo Uunila
2ND CAMERA Liina Toiviainen
LIGHT DESIGN Jouni Lähteenaho
STUDIO MANAGER Toni Tolin
VIDEO RECORDING Riku Makkonen
STUDIO ASSISTANT Mazdak Nassir
COSTUME DESIGN Katriina Ilmaranta
Niina Pasanen
Johanna Heikkilä
COSTUME MAKERS Liisu Vartija-Rissanen
Marita Kuusniemi
APPENDIX 207
AMTEK Näyttämöpukuvalmistajat
Pirjo Heponiemi, Pia Hirvaskoski,
Tanja Lahti, Kalle Laine, Teemu
Leino, Kaisu Luomajärvi, Minna
Manninen, Pauliina Määttänen,
Aija Nurminen, Mia Raitanen, Tiitta
Räsänen, Nina Virkki
Helsingin Ammattikorkeakoulu
Vaatetusalan koulutusohjelma
Eija-Liisa Javanainen, Riitta Niemi,
Sari Perde, Anne Seppä-Murto, Kaija
Vänni, Raija Lindfors, Tiina Pöllänen
MAKE-UP ARTIST Jari Kettunen
2ND MAKE-UP ARTIST Tiina Kiuru
SET DESIGN ASSISTANT Christer Andersson
Tanja Bastamow
CARPENTER Jyri Lahelma
PROPS MAKER Katariina Kapi
ONSET DRESSER Camilla Sirén
MECHANICAL EFFECTS Esa Parkatti
Epa Tamminen
EDITING Marikki Hakola
SHAKE COMPOSITING Sami Haartemo
MAYA 3D ANIMATION Katriina Ilmaranta¨
Andriy Khrupa
Tanja Bastamow
Tapio Schultz
MORPHING Otso Pakarinen
COMPOSITING ASSISTANT Olli Leppänen
COLOR CORRECTION Marko Terävä
ORIGINAL MUSIC Maurice Ravel & Gabrielle Colette
Courtesy of Edition Durand/
BMG Music Publishing Scandinavia AB
MUSIC RECORDING Erato Classics, (P) 1987 CD 0630-19991-2
Courtesy of Warner Classics
MUSIC COPYRIGHT ACQUIRY Näytelmäkulma Nordic Drama Corner Ltd.
PRODUCTION MANAGER Riikka Poulsen
ADMINISTRATION Jaana Hertell-Amokrane
PRODUCTION PLANNING Marikki Hakola
Riikka Poulsen
Sanna-Kaisa Hakkarainen
CASTING CONSULTATION Sanna Kekäläinen
INFORMATION SERVICES Anne Tapanainen
TRANSLATIONS Eija Pokkinen
Aline Vannier-Simola
Pietari Tamminen
FINNISH SUBTITLES Eija Pokkinen
ENGLISH SUBTITLES Outi Kainulainen
GRAPHIC DESIGNER Camilla Sirén
WEB DESIGN Ilari Raja
Camilla Sirén
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT Miikkali Korkolainen
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER Marikki Hakola

APPENDIX 2
LUONNOTAR CREDITS
MUSIC Jean Sibelius “Luonnotar”
DIRECTOR, SCRIPT Marikki Hakola
SOPRANO Riikka Hakola
CHOREOGRAPHY, DANCE Nina Hyvärinen
CONDUCTOR Leif Segerstam
ORCHESTRA Slovak Radio Symphony Orchestra
CAMERA Raimo Uunila
EDITING Marikki Hakola
VIRTUAL SET DESIGN Katriina Ilmaranta
MAYA ANIMATOR Katriina Ilmaranta
2ND MAYA ANIMATOR Tanja Bastamow
MAYA ANIMATION EQUIPMENT Digital Orchard Oy
COMPOSITING Tanja Bastamow
2ND COMPOSITING Heikki Ulmanen
COLORIST Marko Terävä, Post Control Oy
MUSIC RECORDING Hubert Geschwander
Epa Tamminen
AUDIO DESIGN Epa Tamminen
AUDIO AND MUSIC MIX Epa Tamminen
Olli Pärnanen, Meguru Oy
MUSIC MIX ASSISTANT Antti Hytti
COSTUME DESIGN Marikki Hakola
COSTUME MAKER Liisu Vartija-Rissanen
MAKE-UP ARTIST Jari Kettunen
DIRECTOR’S ASSISTANT Saara Tamminen
STUDIO ASSISTANT Viljami Mehto
ADMINISTRATION, ACCOUNTS Jaana Hertell-Amokrane
Artedata Oy
JEAN SIBELIUS “LUONNOTAR”
MUSIC COPYRIGHT HOLDER Breitkopf & Härtel
Audio recording
copyright holder Kroma Productions Ltd
Production support ESES/LUSES AV Division
Finnish Cultural Foundation
Finnish Film Foundation
AVEK Vieteri development support
Warm thanks to Riikka Hakola
Marko Laine
Leif Segerstam
Nina Hyvärinen
Katriina Ilmaranta
Tanja Bastamow
Copywright holders of Jean Sibelius
Arts Council of Finland
Embassy of Finland in Bratislava
Rauno and Sirkka Viemerö
Matej Drlicka
Veronika Wiedermannova
Apollon Pictures
Twentyfourseven
Arto Juselius
Autodesk
APPENDIX 209
Talvi Digital
Klaus Heydemann
Sari Volanen
Niina Tynkkynen
Ulla Simonen
Miia Haavisto
Ulla Saari
Petri Riikonen
Hannele Hakola
Aino Rissanen
Frans Backlund
Magnusborg Studios
Produs Network
Post Control Oy
Leena Hirvonen
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER Marikki Hakola
IN ASSOCIATION WITH YLE Teema
YLE Co-productions
PRODUCTION Kroma Productions Ltd 2010


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Acta Universitatis Lapponiensis 244

Bookwell, Jyväskylä 2012

A sketch for L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).

The virtual studio will no doubt change the ‘look’ of many TV

The relief that it might be possible to avoid the laborious phase

Instead, a talent against the bluescreen means according to McDowell

1.2. Architects of illusion

With this discussion, I am trying to describe how the illusion

1.3. Simulated realities

Working on Les Misérables, however, gave me the opportunity to

The quotation from Asp reveals, that despite of its fascinating

You couldn’t do a vague sketch for Stanley; it was absolutely criti-

The medium of ‘immersive virtual space,’ or virtual reality—as it

1.4. Defining the virtual set

In virtual studio computer generated images are used as back-

Figure 2: A character and a virtual set

Moshkovitz (Ibid. 6) also recommends the term virtual set for

Figure 4: A virtual set background plate used in the Princess

Emphasis is on melody, allied to a subject which I chose to treat

The production was realized with a new technology offered chal-

2.4. Research expectations

A virtual set for Luonnotar (Luonnotar 2011).

In sketching what I shall call cognitive theory, or the cognitive per-

Bordwell and Carroll subsequently edited Post-Theory: Recon-

3.2. Ecological theory of visual perception

Ambient light coming to a point in the air is profoundly differ-

In order to understand structured light, a concept of ecological

The orthodox theory of the formation of an image on a screen,

Furthermore, for Gibson, perception directly means the whole array

Figure 5: The texture gradient of a vanishing

3.3. Ecological approach to cognitive film theory

It [film] provides a changing optic array of limited scope to a point

Although algorithms and mechanisms are empirically more acces-

While Gibson himself rejected computational theory, after his death

Filmmakers can be seen as programmers who develop programs to

However, here I would suggest that according to Anderson (Ibid.

3.4. Psychology of the artefact emotion

The contemplation of the artefact is almost entirely replaced by

In this witnessing process, people try to understand others. As

There are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi level

Film watching in general is motivated and this motivation (char-

However, there is also a second category that is complementary to

Like Bordwell (1985), we assume than the stylistic characteristics

A scene from L’Enfant (L’Enfant et les Sortilèges 2004).

TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 65

TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 67

TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 69

4.3. Depth cues

Figure 7: The use of several matte

TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 71

Film camera typically allows the manipulation of this aspect.

4.4. Camera transitions

TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 73

Figure 8: A Close-up of the backround

Figure 9: The original background

TOWARDS VIRTUAL SET ILLUSION 75

Figure 11: The Boy opening the