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On Case Grammar, John Anderson
On Case Grammar, John Anderson
On Case Grammar, John Anderson
REFERENCES
Andersen, H . (1969). A study in diachronic morphophonemics: the Ukrainian prefixes. Language
45· 8o7- 830.
Anderson, J. M. & Jones, C. ( 1974). Three theses concerning phonological representations. JL 10.
1-26.
Anderson, J.M. &Jones, C. (1977). Phonological structure 011d the history ofEnglish. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Foley, J. (1977). Foundations of theoretical phonology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kiparsky, P. & Menn, L. (1 977). On the acquisition of phonology. In Macnamara, J. (ed.),
Language learning and thought. New York: Academic Press. 47-78.
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them and the surface forms intended to be psychologically real in some sense?
This problem is particularly tantalizing in Anderson's Case G rammar,
because he asserts that the significance of the case relations is 'ultimately
perceptual', but gives no discussion of the possible perceptual correlates. This
failure to embed the often tortuous grammatical discussion within a wider and
perhaps better understood framework of knowledge, or at least theory,
seriously undermines the impact of the book for me.
It is standardly maintained that one of the goals of a semantic theory of a
language is to account for the entailment relations between sentences, and
much of Anderson's argumentation involves entailment relations between
sentences. For instance, he a rgues that the two tokens of moved in John moved
the stone and the stone moved are different verbs, in the same relationship to
each other as kill and die: one is the 'non-causative congener' of the other. He
acknowledges the 'implicational relationship' between these two sentences,
but does not spell out the exact way in which such entailment relations are
actually captured in the general theory he envisages. The closest Anderson
gets to such a specification is his constraint 'the non-causative variant of an
"ergative" verb has an absolutive subject' (82), but the term 'variant' is too
vague and uninformative. In a theory which addresses itself to the central
matter of accounting for entailment relations, as a semantic theory should,
one needs some rule spelled out such as 'An intransitive sentence with verb X
and subject Y in the absolutive case is entailed by a transitive sentence with
verb X and object Yin the ergative case'. Something like this might do the
trick for sentences with transitive and intransitive move, but if it is the same
implicational relation, as Anderson maintains, that holds in the case of
suppletive pairs like kill/die, we would ideally wish the same rule of entailment
to handle that case also. But just because of the suppletion, the suggested rule
will not do in the kill/die case. This is a quite conscious omission on
Anderson's part, since he is primarily preoccupied with identifying the
underlying case relations which NP's bear to their verbs. But the value of any
particular case analysis will be found largely in the degree to which it provides
a convenient basis for the assignment of entailment relations. To put it
somewhat crudely, the particular case relations that N P's bear to verbs are
pretheoretically less obvious than entailment relations between sentences;
judgments about the identity of case relations are less accessible (if they are
accessible at all) to the native speaker's intuition than judgments of entailment
rela tions between sentences. The success of any theory of case relations must
be measured by seeing how successfully it leads to the correct predictions
about entailment relations. And the success of a theory is more visible the
more clearly spelled out are the mechanisms connecting the theoretical
apparatus to the basic predictions. Quite possibly many of Anderson's
conclusions could be justified in this way, but the supplying of the necessary
links is not a trivial process that can be left to a reader: greater explicitness in
this area would have considerably enhanced the value of the book.
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Another example of the failing just noted occurs in the discussion of the
'holistic/partitive' distinction involved in such sentence pairs as bees are
swarming in the garden (partitive) vs the garden is swarming with bees (holistic).
Anderson, and other grammarians who have discussed these sentences, and
with whom he takes issue, concern themselves with finding underlying
representations for these sentences which are distinct in an appropriate way.
Anderson's proposal is that in the holistic sentence garden bears two case
relations, locative and absolutive, to the verb, whereas in the partitive sentence
garden bears only the locative relation to the verb. But this 'solution' really
doesn't get down to the main problem, which is one of how the holistic
sentence entails sentences such as the garden is full ofbees and there are bees all
over the garden, while the partitive does not. In other words, what is the
mechanism connecting the essentially quantificational notion 'holistic inter-
pretation' with the presence of an extra absolutive case relation? The
connection is not spelled out, and it needs to be.
I take the main argument of the book to be for the analysis of case relations
into a universal set of just four, each analysable in terms of the presence or
absence of just two features, as shown above in (I). But a question
immediately arises as to what is being claimed here, since Anderson's theory
also allows a single NP to bear more than one case relation to its verb. For
example, the holistic/partitive ambiguity of smear seen (by some speakers) in
John smeared the wall with paint vs. John smearedpaint on the wall is dealt with
by saying that in the former wall is both locative and absolutive, whereas in the
latter wall is only locative. Clearly it cannot be meant that the case relations
locative and absolutive are nothing more than bundles of the primitive
features 'source' and place' as in (I), because in that case the addition of
absolutive to an NP that is already locative would add nothing in terms of
these features. Put simply, how does the mechanism for combining case
relations in one NP work in terms of the primitive features 'source' and 'place',
to which Anderson seems to claim at the centre of his book that the case
relations can be reduced? One cannot make complete sense of the book's
proposals unless this matter is explained, which it isn't.
I get the impression from this book that it was sent to the publishers
prematurely. It reflects a great deal of concentrated thought about the nature
of case relations: most of the criticisms in the first chapter of the Chomskyan
notion of deep structure are quite telling; and the degree of scholarly erudition
is very impressive. The book argues individual points well, but does not shake
all the individual arguments down together into a solid edifice whose point can
be easily grasped. I am about to become a neighbour of John Anderson's, and
I hope that over the cold winter evenings he will be able to make me see all that
I have missed in this book.
REFERENCES
Anderson, J.M. (1971). The grammar of case: towards a localistic theory. London & New York:
Cambridge University Press.
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