Tañada v.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27

DOCTRINE: The phrase unless it is otherwise provided does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.

FACTS: The petitioner filed a a writ of mandamus, invoking the right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern, to compel the respondent public officials
to cause the publication of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations, and
administrative order. Respondent further contend that the publication in Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law because law
themselves provides their own effectivity dates.

ISSUE: W/N the publication in Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
takes effect

HELD: Yes. The publication of all presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must
first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative or
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concern. On the other hand, presidential issuances of general
applicability which have not been published shall have no force & effect.

Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of
improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of
P1,000 plus interest. The parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with
interest within 4 ½ years., and in such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also
agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4
½ years and that she would pay the tax. After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay
the tax. Hence the stipulations were verbally modified by the same parties in the sense that
Kasilag would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on the
condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend
to the payment of the land tax. These were made by the parties independently and were
calculated to alter the contract of mortgage and convert it into a contract of antichresis. The
contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land such is illegal and void
because such is considered as legal and valid.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because
he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is
invalidated

RULING: Yes. Kasilag is a possessor in good faith based on his excusable ignorance of the
law. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition,
aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is
whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Gross and inexcusable
ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may
be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not
a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis
and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations concludes
that Kasilag’s ignorance eis excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

David vs Agbay – Retroactive application

Facts: In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon 
their

retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000,
they purchased a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro.
However, in the year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed
a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO). In the said application, petitioner indicated that
he is a Filipino citizen. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner,
a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint
for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
against the petitioner. While petitioner’s MLA was pending, petitioner re-acquired
his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225. Petitioner averred that at
the time he filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as
a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the
right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution
of civil and criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family. The office of
the provincial prosecutor found probable cause in indicting David for violation of Art
172 of the RPC. A petition for review was filed before the DOJ by David. David’s
MLA was rejected. It was ruled that his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio. David
however argued that once a natural born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized
in another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino
citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.

Issue: Whether or not David can be indicted for falsification for representing himself
as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225?

Ruling:
YES. David is rightfully indicted for the falsely representing himself in his
MLA. He made an untruthful statement in his MLA that he was a Filipino citizen at
the time he filed the application but truth and in fact he was at that time a Canadian
Citizen. Even though he subsequently reacquired his Filipino citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225, such has no retroactive effect in as so far as his false misrepresentation
is concerned. Under Commonwealth Act 63, the governing law at the time he was
naturalized as a Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among
those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification
was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as
his dual citizenship status is concerned.

DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

Doctrine: Waiver of rights
FACTS: A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors when the platform which
he was on board fell from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for DM
Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened because the pin inserted to the
platform loosened and there was no safety lock. His widow filed with RTC of Pasig
a complaint for damages against DM Consunji Inc. The employer averred that the
widow already availed benefits from the State Insurance Fund and that she cannot
recover civil damages from the company anymore.

ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the
Civil Code because she already availed damages under the Labor Code

HELD: Waiver is the relinquishment of a known right. In the case at bar, the wife
was not aware of her right under the Civil Code and thus could not waive the same.
The general rule under the Workmen’s Compensation is that a claim thereunder is
one that excludes all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the
remedies provided under the law, the claimants are deemed to have waived their
known right of the remedies provided by other laws. However this case falls under
the exceptions since the wife was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed
her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The court said that had
the court been aware, she would have opted to avail of a better remedy that of
which she already have. The argument that ignorance of the law excuses no one is
not applicable in this case because it is only applicable to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.

DELA CRUZ VS. DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo C. Dela Cruz claimed that in 1975 he and his sister,
respondent Lucila and Cornelia bought on installment a 240-square meter land in
Las Piñas from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. Isabelo and Cornelia paid the down payment
and the monthly amortizations. Upon Lucia’s plea to help their financially distress
cousin, Corazon, the siblings agreed to make use of the lot as collateral for the
loan. Lucila paid the P8, 000.00 that they still owed to Gatchalian Realty, Inc. and
had the deed of title registered in her name. The title was mortgaged for Corazon’s
benefit. However, Corazon failed to pay her loan so the bank foreclosed the
property. After three years, Lucila redeemed the property. In 2002, Lucila executed
an affidavit of waiver, relinquishing all her share, interest, and participation to half of
the lot to Isabelo and the other half to her niece, Emelinda. Isabelo then filed an
action for partition seeking the segregation of his portion of the land and the
issuance of the corresponding title in his name. Lucila however averred that the
waiver she executed ceding ownership of her share to Isabelo was subject to a
condition that their family problems would be resolved. She claims that the said
condition did not happen and that she had every right to revoke the waiver. It was
made evident by the revocation she made through an affidavit dated September 24,
2004.The RTC ruled in favor of Lucia and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Lucila’s cession of the property to
Isabelo through waiver did not have the effect of making him part owner of the
property with a right to demand partition.

RULING: Lucila’s waiver was absolute and contained no precondition. The court
noted that the phrase “That to put everything in proper order, I hereby waive all my
share, interest and participation” means that the intention of Lucila was to waive her
right to the property, irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to it. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s interpretation that such wordings
intends a precondition of waiver for if such was the intent, the phrase containing
words such as “ subject to the condition that everything is put in order” would have
been used. After he and his co-owner Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo
became the owner of half of the subject property having the right to demand its
partition.

Dona Adela Export International Inc. vs. Tidcorp & BPI (February 11, 2015) –
Waiver of rights

Facts: Petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency. The RTC later issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent and
staying all civil proceedings against petitioner. Atty. Gonzales was appointed as
receiver. Atty. Gonzales then proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged
appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof of their respective claims. It later
filed a Motion for Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement incorporating therein
her proposed terms of compromise.

Petitioner through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource
Center (TRC) entered into a Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement wherein
petitioner agreed to transfer a parcel of land with existing improvements situated in
the Barrio of Hulo, Mandaluyong City, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s
obligation. The agreement bears the conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC
filed a Compliance, Manifestation and Motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by
Compromise Agreement.

The creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement
which contained some terms and conditions for their benefit. The RTC approved the
Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement and the Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement.

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration and claimed that TIDCORP and
BPI’s agreement imposes on it several obligations such as payment of expenses and
taxes and waiver of confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and
signatory to the said agreement. RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s
silence and acquiescence to the joint motion to approve compromise agreement
while creditors BPI and TIDCORP set it for hearing was tantamount to admission and
acquiescence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the provision in the BPI-TIDCORP
Joint Motion to Approve Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to
confidentiality of its bank deposit?

Ruling: No. In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by
BPI and TIDCORP only. There was no written consent given by petitioner or its
representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner was waiving the confidentiality of
its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s
bank deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore that
petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was without the express
consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement. It is
an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively demonstrated
since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a
waiver must not only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly,
intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. There must be persuasive evidence to show an actual intention to
relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right should not be
construed as surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against the existence and validity of such waiver.

Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married
and had one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain
housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the
woman left the family home together with their daughter and told her servants that
she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in
Basilan. When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office
issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed
another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of habeas corpus
enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that
it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997)
gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it
impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129
(The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Yes. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369
revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors.
The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving
petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred
from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy
since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and
negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of children.
Pesca vs Pesca

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot
four children. She contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
“psychological incapacity” to perform his marital obligations starting 1988. Petitioner
and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon
City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out
as expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for
about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue.
He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. Petitioner sued respondent
before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null and void
ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and
ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in
turn reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and
petitioner still subsists.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

HELD: The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the
legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis
interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by
a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by
the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter
as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex
prospicit, non respicit.Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from
the Canon Law, was given legal life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case
of Molina, additional procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity was
added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and Molina have the force and effect of law.
Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are mandatory in nature. The petition was
denied.

UCPB VS UY

THE FACTS: Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the
joint developers of the Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In
1997, spouses Walter and Lily Uy (respondents) entered into a Contract to Sell with
PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills. The total contract price amounted to ₱1, 151,718. 7
5 payable according to the following terms: (a) ₱l00,000.00 as down payment; and
(b) the balance paid in 40 monthly installments at ₱26,297.97 from 16 January
1997 to 16 April 2000. PPGI and petitioner United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) executed the following: Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), and Sale
of Receivables and Assignment of Rights and Interests. By virtue of the said
agreements, PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the buyers,
which included respondents, of units in Kiener Hills. The parties entered into the
said agreement as PPGI's partial settlement of its ₱l,814,500,000.00 loan with
UCPB. The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office received
respondents' complaint for sum of money and damages against PPGI and UCPB.
They claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to
complete the construction of their units in Kiener Hills.

HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled to a refund in view of
PPGI' s failure to complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that
UCPB cannot be solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables
were conveyed to UCPB and not the entire condominium project. The HLURB
Regional Office suspended the proceedings as to PPGI on account of its being in
corporate rehabilitation. HLURB Board reversed and set aside the HL URB
Regional Office decision. It agreed that the proceedings against PPGI should be
suspended on account of its corporate rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the HLURB
Board found UCPB solidarily liable with PPGI because it stepped into the latter's
shoes insofar as Kiener Hills is concerned pursuant to the MOA between them. It
noted that UCPB was PPGI's successor-in-interest, such that the delay in the
completion of the condominium project could be attributable to it and subject it to
liability. The HLURB Board ruled that as PPGI's assignee, UCPB was bound to
refund the payments made, without prejudice to its right of action against PPGI.
UCPB appealed before the OP. In its 24 March 2010 decision, the OP affirmed the
decision of the HLURB Board. It explained that the agreement between PPGI and
UCPB clearly transferred all rights, titles, interests, and participations over Kiener
Hills to the latter. It concluded that as successor-in-interest, UCPB now had the
obligations relating to Kiener Hills, including the reimbursement of payments to
respondents. The OP added that benefit of suspension of actions only attached to
PPGI and not to UCPB.

CA affirmed with modification the OP decision. While the appellate court agreed
that respondents are entitled to a full refund of the payments they may have made,
it ruled that UCPB is not solidarily liable with PPGI, and as such cannot be held
liable for the full satisfaction of respondents' payments. It limited UCPB's liability to
the amount respondents have paid upon the former's assumption as the party
entitled to receive payments or on 23 April 1998 when the MOA
and AIR Agreement were made between UCPB and PPGI.

In addition, the appellate court noted the pronouncements of the CA in United

Coconut Planters Bank v. O'Halloran. It explained that it involved similar facts and
issues where the CA ruled that the assignment of the receivables did not make
UCPB the developer of Kiener Hills it being merely the assignee of the receivables
under the contract to sell and, as such, UCPB cannot be deemed as the debtor with
respect to the construction, development, and delivery of the subject condominium
units.
Issue: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT MISCONSTRUED THE APPLICABILITY TO THE INSTANT
CASE OF THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION IN UNITED COCONUT
PLANTERS BANK V. JOHN P. O'HALLORAN AND JOSEFINA O'HALLORAN (CA-
G.R. SP NO. 101699, 23 JULY 1999) UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE
DECISIS; AND

Ruling: Respondents assailed that the CA erred in applying O'Halloran because the
circumstances were different, notably the issue that estoppel did not arise in the
said case. In addition, they argued that 0 'Halloran and the other cases cited by
UCPB are not binding pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis because they were
decided by the CA and not by this Court. As such, respondents posited that only
decisions of the Court, excluding all other courts such as the CA, form part of the
legal system.

On the other hand, UCPB countered that the only issue to be resolved in the
present petition is the actual amount of its liability. It explained that the assailed CA
decision had become final and executory after respondents failed to appeal the
same. UCPB pointed out that the issues respondents raised were already ventilated
before the appellate court. It believed that respondents should have filed their own
appeal to assail the issues they found questionable.

Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court: As above-
mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on 0 'Halloran arguing that it
was not a binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De Mesa v.
Pepsi-Cola Products Phils. Inc., the Court explained that the doctrine of stare
decisis deems decisions of this Court binding on the lower courts. The principle
of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to
wit: It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule
already established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in
the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question
of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument. In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative
only when judicial precedents are set by pronouncements of this Court to the
exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless whether the decisions of the lower
courts are logically or legally sound as only decisions issued by this Court become
part of the legal system. At the most, decisions of lower courts only have a
persuasive effect. Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the application of the
doctrine of stare decisis when the CA relied on decisions it had issued.

Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest

Facts: On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant
(used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came
from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in
order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by,
the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and
overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff’s head. The defendant
contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the
accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at
Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of
the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the
forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises
that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the
horses since he was thrown upon the ground. From the stated facts, the court ruled
that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph
of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team
(of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such
driver.

Ruling: NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in
the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or
performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are
approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted
by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily
hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would
be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to
deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident.
It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of
accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.

CIR VS AICHI FORGING

Facts: Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zero-rated
sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division partially
granted respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed
beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections
112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year,
the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the
two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13
of the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is equivalent
to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC.
According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a “condition
precedent” before a judicial claim can be filed. The CTA denied the MPR thus the
case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for review. The decision was affirmed. Thus
the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the non-
observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax
refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both
claims are filed within the two-year prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent
cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12
(1968)] where it was ruled that “if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the
period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA
before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.”

Issue: Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period
Held: Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year period
should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc
(G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the
Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar
months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the
legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. Thus, applying this to the present case,
the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s
administrative claim was timely filed.

Tenchavez v. Escano
Facts: Vicente Escano, 2nd yr student of commerce, from a well-to-do and
prominent family in Cebu, married petitioner Pastor Tenchavez, an engineer,
without the knowledge of her parents. Their marriage was the culmination of a love
affair, and was duly registered with the local civil register.Their plan to elope was
disrupted by her mother who took her home, where she admitted the marriage. Her
parents were surprised and disgusted. A letter was handed to Mamerto Escano
which discloses an amorous relationship between Tenchavez and Pacita Noel, their
friend. Thereafter, the couple became estranged. Later without informing her
husband, Escano applied for a passport for which she indicated that she was
single, and after approval, she left for the US. In the District Court of Nevada, she
filed for divorce, which was eventually granted, on the ground of extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character. Escano married an American, Russel Leo Moran, in
Nevada, with whom she had children. She acquired US citizenship. Tenchavez then
initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint on the annulment of the marriage,
and asked for legal separation and damages. But Escano claimed that her divorce
was valid, and so is her marriage to her present husband.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce was valid

Held: No. It is not valid. Tenchavez and Escano were validly married to each other,
under the civil law. The valid marriage between Tenchavez and Escano remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the divorce
obtained from the Court of Nevada. At the time the divorce was issued, Escano, like
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. Thus, she was then subject to Philippine
law. According to Art. 15 of the Civil Code (Nationality rule): Laws relating to family
rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philppines, even though living abroad. Also the
Philippine courts cannot recognize a foreign decree of absolute divorce. Art. 17 of
Civil Code: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Board of Commissioners vs DelaRosa

Facts: On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was

recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified
that he has 5 children. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old
minor arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually
granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a
memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to
review all cases where entry was allowed among which was that of William
Gatchalian.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance

with Philippine law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no
proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the
same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore,
William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen. Philippine
law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally
valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted
abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that “all
marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country …” And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the
extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the
consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this
manner: “In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family.

YAO KEE VS. GONZALES

FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City where he was then
residing leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.Private
respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a petition for the grant of letters or
administration alleging that they were the children of the deceased with Asuncion
Gillego. Petition was opposed by herein petitioners (Yao Kee et al.,) alleging that
they were the legitimate family. The probate court found that Sy Kiat was legally
married to Yao Kee and that their 3 offsprings were the legitimate children. The
court likewise ruled that respondents are the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of
Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego. On appeal, the lower court’s decision was set aside
declaring petitioners as the acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat and Asuncion
Gillego. Oppostiors were declared the acknowelged natural children of the
deceased since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China
had not been proven to be valid to the laws of China.

ISSUE: Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a
custom?
HELD: Custom is defined as “a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.” The
law requires that “a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state that
“ a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or
custom on marriage not only because they are self serving evidence, but more
importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject
matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity
of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao
Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

Aznar vs Garcia

Facts: Helen Christensen Garcia filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court the
decision of the lower court in Davao declaring that Maria Lucy Christensen is the
sole heir of testator Edward Christensen. Edward Christensen was born in New
York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. He
came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will,
he declared to have only one child (natural daughter) Maria Lucy Christensen as his
only heir. However, he left a sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia, an
acknowledged natural child, though not in any way related to the deceased. Helen
claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be
applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.

HELD: Yes. Article 16 of the Civil Code states that succesional rights are determined
by the national law of the country where the deceased is a citizen hence the internal
law of California since it was ruled that Edward Christensen is a citizen of California.
Said internal law distinguishes the rule to be applied to Californians domiciled in
California and for Californians domiciled outside of California. For Californians
residing in other jurisdiction, the law of said country must apply. Edward Christensen
being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. Article
16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions
are governed by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The
provision in the laws of California giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of
his estate is the internal law which applies only to persons domiciled within the said
estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California stating that personal
property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws
rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the
Philippines, in which the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the regime
of legitimes must be respected.
Amos vs Bellis
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman. By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines dividing his estate and giving $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen and P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis. The remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives. Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila. The People's Bank and
Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed. Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
 Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas law, the national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity
of the will?
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed. Doctrine of Processual
Presumption: The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the
proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same
as the law of the forum. In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Apply Philippine laws.
 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was
a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas
law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated
FACTS: Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left
among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation
domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the
Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but
County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part
with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order
declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue
new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated
appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in
existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD: Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and
possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. It
is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an
earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more
than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property
in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in
both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is
termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the
ancillary administration. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has
no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a
person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts
or to be distributed among his heirs."

Del Soccorro vs Van Wilsem

Facts: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support
to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien.

ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law?

RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure in doing such.
This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to
a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead
and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Hasegawa vs. Kitamura

Facts: Nippon, a Japanese consultancy firm entered into an Independent Contractor

Agreement (ICA) in Japan with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national
permanently residing in the Philippines. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as
the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the
Philippines On 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for
its International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more
intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the
company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31,
2000, just in time for the ICA’s expiry. Threatened with impending unemployment,
respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded
that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondent’s contract
was for a fixed term. As he was not able to generate a positive response from the
petitioners, respondent consequently initiated an action for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners contended that the ICA had been
perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper
pre-termination of respondent’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper
courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.
The RTC, denied the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners on certiorari invoked the defense of forum non conveniens. On petition for
review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the
forum non conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the
applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule

Issue: Whether the case is dismissible on the ground of principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, forum non conveniens and state of the most
significant relationship rule.

Ruling: Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the
law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci
contractus means the “law of the place where a contract is executed or to be per-
formed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may
pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,”
to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which
state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case
involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. Since these three principles in conflict of laws make
reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second
phase, the choice of law. Clearly the RTC has jurisdiction over the action is it one of
those incapable of pecuniary estimation. There was a premature invocation of the
choice of law rule since before determining which law should apply, first there should
exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules.

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR.

Facts: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI
hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts. Rouzie filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc.
(RUST), for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to
pay respondent’s money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Rouzie, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union against
Raytheon. Rouzie essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case, and Rouzie
also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and
functioned as one company. In its Answer, Raytheon alleged that contrary to
respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the
latter any sum of money. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which
disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST,
denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut.

Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a

cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim. The RTC denied Raytheon’s omnibus motion. The trial
court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be
admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also
ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial
court could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to
do business in the Philippines.Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds of failure to state acause of action & forum non conveniens & prayed for
damages by way of compulsory counterclaim. The RTC denied Raytheon’s motion.
The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and Whether the complaint
should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
Ruling: Yes. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the
case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules
of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is
an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein. Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an
alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC. On the second issue, No.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may
refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to
oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties
involved. Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum
non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to
abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts
are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.