Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vs. Hon. Francis E. Garchitorena, Hon
Vs. Hon. Francis E. Garchitorena, Hon
Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the
crime of kidnapping, the case was filed in the first division of
Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to
submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the
[G.R. No. L-27124. May 29, 1970.]
new information contained the place where the victim was brought.
FRANCISCO COLMENARES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JUDGE ARTURO
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a
P. VILLAR, Municipal Judge of La Castellana, Negros Occidental, and
reinvestigation be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest
ATTY. OTHELO CABALES, Chief of Police of La Castellana, Negros
be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman. The accused
Occidental, Respondents-Appellees.
thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to
hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same
Ibrado & Ibrado for Petitioner-Appellant.
was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
Manuel Dizon, Jr. for Respondents-Appellees.
charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit
their selves to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which
invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their persons, their
motion for reconsideration was again denied.
SYLLABUS
Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did
not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office- 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURTS; JURISDICTION,
related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. —
belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. It must be remembered that jurisdiction of the court over a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Here the complaint filed with the La Carlota, Negros Occidental, by the La Carlota policemen, and not
municipal court of La Castellana recited that on 22 Dec. 1966 the in La Castellana where the complaint was filed. The municipal court
accused, Francisco Colmenares, was found in possession of two having denied this motion, the accused went to the Court of First
unlicensed firearms in the municipality of La Castellana. That Instance of Negros Occidental in a petition for certiorari (Civil Case
allegation makes the filing of the case in the La Castellana municipal No. 7929), raising the same issue of improper venue. And as prayed
court proper. for in the petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by said
court, restraining the Municipal Judge of La Castellana from
3. ID.; ID.; VENUE; RULE 110, SEC. 14, REVISED RULES COURT. — proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 1257.
Under Sec. 14, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court, criminal actions shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province Therein respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential Castellana, traversing the averments of the petition, contended that
ingredients thereof took place. although the alleged unlicensed firearms were taken from the
custody of the accused by La Carlota policemen such unlawful act of
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AS MALUM carrying unlicensed firearms started from La Castellana; that the La
PROHIBITUM, EXPLAINED. — That the firearms were confiscated from Carlota policemen intercepted the accused and took the firearms
him in another town than the municipality where the case was from him only because they were earlier requested, by telephone, by
instituted does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. For, being the policemen of La Castellana, then a pursuit of the accused, who
malum prohibitum, the crime of illegal possession of firearms is was fleeing in a taxicab (Koken No. 25), to assist them in the
consummated by the very fact of its performance; by the firearms apprehension of the latter.
being possessed or held by the accused without proper authorization
therefor. The place where said firearms were finally confiscated and On 7 September 1966, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition
taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have added for lack of merit. The accused moved for reconsideration thereof and,
anything to the nature of the unlawful act completed and when it was denied, he came to this Court on Appeal, reiterating the
consummated earlier. argument that since the firearms specified in the complaint were
found in and removed from his custody in the municipality of La
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATIONS OF SITUS OF OFFENSE CHARGED Carlota, the municipal court of La Castellana has no jurisdiction to
SATISFIED IN INSTANT CASE. — For purposes of the proceeding take cognizance of the case for illegal possession of such arms. There
instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is sufficient that, is no merit in the appeal.
according to the prosecution, the accused was in possession of the
unlicensed firearms while he was in that municipality, for in the It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the court over a case
determination of the correct venue, the vital point is the allegation of is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
the situs of the offense charged in the complaint or information and Here, the complaint filed with the municipal court of La Castellana
that is satisfied in this case. recited that on 22 December 1966 the accused, Francisco
Colmenares, was found in possession of two unlicensed firearms in
the municipality of La Castellana. That allegation makes the filing of
the case in the La Castellana municipal court proper. Under the Rules,
DECISION
criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.’ 2 That the
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros firearms were confiscated from him by the La Carlota policemen
Occidental (in Civil Case No. 7929) dismissing for lack of merit the within the territorial boundaries of that municipality would not
petition for certiorari filed therein. sustain the motion for quashal of the complaint in this case nor affect
the merits thereof. It is not altogether improbable that the offense of
The case arose from the filing in the Municipal Court of La Castellana, unlawful possession of firearms could have been committed in La
Negros Occidental, by the Chief of Police of the same municipality of Castellana, as stated in the complaint, and also in La Carlota, as
a complaint against one Francisco Colmenares for illegal possession manifested by the appellant. For, being malum prohibitum the crime
of firearms (Criminal Case No. 1257), allegedly committed as follows: is consummated by the very fact of its performance; by the firearms
being possessed or held by the accused without proper authorization
"That on the 22nd day of December, 1965, at about 1:30 in the therefor. The place where the said firearms were finally confiscated
afternoon more or less, in the municipality of La Castellana, Province and taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this added anything to the nature of the unlawful act completed and
Honorable Court, the herein accused, Francisco Colmenares, did then consummated earlier. 3 Thus, for purposes of the proceeding
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is sufficient that,
and under his custody and control two (2) firearms to wit: one (1) Colt according to the prosecution, the accused was in possession of the
super .38 bearing SN 45975 with magazine loaded with 9 rounds of unlicensed firearms while he was in La Castellana. To determine the
live ammunition and WTC Austen MK.I No. 70 with magazine loaded correct venue, the vital point is the allegation of the situs of the
with 23 rounds of live ammunitions, without first having obtained offense charged in the complaint or information, 4 and that is
proper license therefor. satisfied in this case.
An Act Contrary to law. WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.
Named in the complaint as witnesses were Eduardo Colmenares, also
CASE DIGEST
of La Castellana, Negros Occidental, and others.
FACTS:
The accused thereafter filed a motion to quash the complaint 1 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was claimed that venue was Petitioner Colmenares was charged for illegal possession of firearms.
improperly laid, because the firearms mentioned in the complaint He thereafter filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground of
were taken from the possession of the accused in the municipality of lack of jurisdiction. It was claimed that venue was improperly laid,
because the firearms mentioned in the complaint were taken from MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T.
the possession of the accused in the municipality of La Carlota, Negros DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L.
Occidental, by the La Carlota policemen, and not in La Castellana DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A.
where the complaint was filed. The motion was denied. Hence, the REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
accused went to the CFI of Negros Occidental in a petition MENDOZA, respondents.
for certiorari, raising the same issue of improper venue. And as
prayed for in the petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
by said court, restraining the Municipal Judge of La Castellana from
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
proceeding with the trial.
vs.
Therein respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
Castellana contended that although the alleged unlicensed firearms MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
were taken from the custody of the accused by La Carlota policemen ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
such unlawful act of carrying unlicensed firearms started from La VERSOZA, respondents.
Castellana; that the La Carlota policemen intercepted the accused and
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
took the firearms from him only because they were earlier requested,
by telephone, by the policemen of La Castellana.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
The court ordered the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
ISSUE: MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO
BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
Whether or not the municipal court of La Castellana has no UBALDO, respondents.
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case for illegal possession of
such arms. G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred
AQUINO, accused. with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the
offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677 outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
VIOL. OF PAR. 3, related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness
or public disorder.
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
No. 266 of the Chief
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed
Executive dated April 1, 1975
weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried
under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the
INFORMATION
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality,
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and
to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of
1975, committed as follows: this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed
weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches, xxx xxx xxx
the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32) charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless —
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the
of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by
before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30,
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash rollo of L-46229-32)
cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times
more incriminating than the infamous paltik. 3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his
order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and
wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is ... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited
back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an
inclined to backsliding. allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of
heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton
resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and
this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66) anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the
country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and
as follows: deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under
the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling
xxx xxx xxx
when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to
ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by
mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all
xxx xxx xxx
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during
that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is
residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm
No. 9 is one that abetssubversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-
about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the 46997)
fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of
similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of
does not contain any repealing clause or provisions. (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same
time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the
xxx xxx xxx accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate
release unless held on other charges.
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons
if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by
aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and the People.
punishable by law.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful
and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes
it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just
DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for
THEREFORE.
punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to
ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it
1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were
6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated
to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the prosecution
September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in
promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
oppression and tyranny or of extortion. Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal
result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that: dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that
unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer: the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy.1
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution
as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory
involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is
or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying
persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of
used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to
causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days.
Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is
Proclamation No. 1081: determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life
violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may direct,
information.2
when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph; E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be 1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, accusation against him.3
companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient
6 and 7. it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute,
and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific
in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact,
by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute
of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly
pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city
objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten
to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed
about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall,
blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a
"balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period
being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty discretion of the court.
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to
ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance
No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more
is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who
committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise
offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly
for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed. weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the
particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the
commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute
President
and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3)
does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
Republic of the Philippines
implication is not favored. 6This principle holds true with greater force
D. — The arguments of the People — with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed
strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact,
Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the
subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential
made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that
That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed
accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the
easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo
misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by of 46997)
respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are
daily exposed to such dangers. We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses
of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
treated in the presidential decree in question? of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects
not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West
that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may,
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation,
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285,
any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this
the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be
when the circumstances so warrant. ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of
an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase
reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3). might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general
situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the provision may have a limited application if read together with other
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of provisions. 9
motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of
"statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its its reason or intent.
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause,
guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed the presidential decree states:
and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief
state.
of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
presidential decree in these cases — the primary rule is to search for Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
xxx xxx xxx
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those
statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence
related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders
to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and
therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason
bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
for P.D. 9(3).
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our
enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the
duly constituted government and against our people, and having
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of
committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and
martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated
rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton
September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as
acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of
well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned
public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and
in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder
seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-
safety and the security of the nation, ... 42050-66)
xxx xxx xxx And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by
anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo
of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and
duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing
satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and
ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree
terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and
machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and insensible results?
being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged
to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and 6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and liberally in favor of an accused.
ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this
country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ... American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
(See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39) establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12
desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D.
9(3), and nothing else. Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner,
viz:
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be
Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied) any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the
statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the
pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as
Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied) an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v.
Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into
the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
the paragraph is followed.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which by the facts alleged therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious is in order.
consequences.9-a
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the
President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an facts charged do not constitute an offense.
oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression,
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged
arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the
so on.10
Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
following:
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts
charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1,
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless — Republic Act 145. 15
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair
of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a
stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody,
cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not filed Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We
withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further time as have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a
the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which
custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads
some other charge. the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in
as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information
defendant. under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under
other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
xxx xxx xxx
Without costs.
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of
the Informations in these cases, viz: SO ORDERED.
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed
an amended Information to include the second element of the offense
as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled CASE DIGEST
that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a
FACTS:
punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Information.16
Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint
it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D.
either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City
No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that
Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
Section 8. Rule 117 states that: organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a
perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another related to subversive activities and that they are essentially
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring
murder[2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5,
charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact. 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 granting, the Special Prosecutors motion for
informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4] concurring and dissenting opinion.
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5,
8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that: SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be
known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the offenses committed by public officers and employees including those
situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to office as may be determined by law."
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot- The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under
dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was
1486[21] created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws
again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners
on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as
1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No.
provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer
1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No.
be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
8249.[27] Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the following
facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused
cases:
in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural due process
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
hereby further amended to read as follows:
innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands
rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
violating the one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. [17]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
that while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending
offense:
before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if their case is
tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
before recourse to the Supreme Court. (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the engineers, and other provincial department heads;
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from department heads;
notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the
subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047- (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of and higher;
the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No.
8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. officers of higher rank;
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period. superintendent or higher;
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and prosecutor;
argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government- The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational R.A. 7975 provides:
institutions or foundations;
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606,
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27 as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989; SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. offense:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office. higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and department heads;
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
amended. and higher;
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
over final judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts officers of high rank;
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over (f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus, and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary prosecutor;
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order
institutions or foundations;
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:Provided, That the jurisdiction
over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
1989;
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
the Constitution;
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme (4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the their office.
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states: In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
hereof.(Emphasis supplied) thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular violate their right to equal protection of the law[33] because its
courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
xxxxxxxxx presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-
application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes subject provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on
an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to the wording in the title of the law that it defines
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975. expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title[57] is
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute
or
seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is severally interpreted and should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was
sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
committed; or
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed, and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general
subject.[59] The Congress, in employing the word define in the title of
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the
different testimony than the law required at the time of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define,
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43] prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.[44] amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall
This Court added two more to the list, namely: now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it
is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
intervenors.
was lawful;
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[45]
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,[61] and
laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62]
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section
for their violations;[47]or those that define crimes, treat of their
4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
nature, and provide for their punishment. [48] R.A. 7975, which
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its
have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in
mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
mandated that the Sandiganbayanshall have jurisdiction over
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including
all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
their office as may be determined by law. This constitutional
unconstitutional.
mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue
appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already provided by law.
been rejected by the court several times[50] considering that the right
to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT.
multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP.
accused PNP officers. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS,
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
was in the performance of his official functions.[65] This intimate Code committed as follows:
relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information.[66] That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates: T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO
G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F.
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
languagewithout repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
their public and official positions as officers and members of the
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage
of their superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
the charge is the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M.
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[68]
ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
The noble object of written accusations cannot be
MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as
enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of his officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein
the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so above alleged by among others falsely representing that there
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or
be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
is made up of certain actsand intent these must be set forth in the
CONTRARY TO LAW
complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named
circumstances. In short, the complaint must
principal accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts
police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that are imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[70]
killed the latter while in their custody.
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein
find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner
petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact,
and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and
the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by,
the discharge of official function of the offenders.
among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
informations[71] for murder reads: Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of
May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during
AMENDED INFORMATION the raid conducted by the accused surprises the reader. There is no
indication in the amended information that the victim was one of
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the those arrested by the accused during the raid.Worse, the raid and
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque,
CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T. Metro Manila but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph
ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. in the amended information that the said accessories committed the
offense in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we, official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in
however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused original jurisdiction over said cases.
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is
merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show SO ORDERED.
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
the accuseds official duties.
CASEDIGEST
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an
the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the Information for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether two (2) Informations[2] were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were
the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2)
jurisdiction. informations respectively read as follows:
The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the
that he is the primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the Information were fatally defective in view of the absence of any
primary peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action specific allegation that would indicate that the crimes charged were
on his part which deviates from that function is an office-related committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of
offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged for having their official functions.
cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower
rank in the same municipality in the supposed falsification of the The petition is meritorious.
results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy
were totally unrelated to any of the administrative or executive The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction
functions over which the mayor may have supervision and, more or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired
specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the jurisdiction of the into.[5] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly
Court covers not only the offenses committed by the officials of Grade from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
Level 27 or higher as the principal accused but even where such presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the
officials are also accused together with some other public officials jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the
who may be at a level below Grade Level 27 in connection with the commencement of the action.[6]
performance of their duties.
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction
a position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined
Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that, and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The
necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606 as last
elevates the entire case to this Court primarily because somebody amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as
over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together amended provides insofar as pertinent:
with the lower ranking officer.[3]
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
Hence, this petition alleging that- original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
25521 and 25522.[4] following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the offense:
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an
offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the xxx xxx xxx
offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
paragraph (a) in relation to their office, i.e. it should be intimately
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
connected with the office of the offender, and should have been
1989.
perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the
xxx xxx xxx
information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the
Informations do not contain factual averments showing that they b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
charged are intimately connected with their respective offices and subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
were perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of
their duties and functions. xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Prosecutor, posits that even if the offense charged was not Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
committed by the accused while in the performance of his official exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
functions, the same could still be considered done in relation to his regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
office if the acts were committed in line of duty. Respondents position municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
is that an offense may be considered committed in relation to office jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
if it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-
performance of an official duty or function; thus the offense of xxx xxx xxx
falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related considering that
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,[7] this Court held that the Municipal false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police
Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
the government under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in
Occupational Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the performance of official function.Indeed the offenses defined in
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person whether a public officer
or a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be the offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No. 25522
considered as committed in relation to their office as this phrase is states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy
employed in the above-quoted Section 4. report would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the
son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.Thus
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,[8] this Court has interpreted the
there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller
requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office to
had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would have
mean that the offense cannot exist without the office or that the
committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined and
the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code
(referring to the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs. A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor
Montejo[9] enunciated the principle that the offense must be as enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and
while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of
official functions. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice criminal cases are not among such duties and functions, and the
Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis
crime of murder in (the) abstract, the facts in a particular case may for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall
show that - under his functions as Municipal Mayor.[16] What is obvious is that
petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged
xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the
assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than
accuseds) respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in
official duty.
the performance though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to commit Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges
the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held were intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions
their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal
Brown obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial
as Mayor of Basilan City.[10] Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are
Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,[11] Republic vs. SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.No
Asuncion,[12] and Cunanan vs. Arceo.[13] The case of Republic vs. costs.
Asuncion categorically pronounced that the fact that offense was
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information: SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO-
earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other
BRION,
cases set earlier which have a rightto expect priority.It would be most
unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the PERALTA, an
highestprovincial office in their command if they are deprived of his
services for an indefinite period with thetermination of his case BERSAMIN,
possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big
number ofsequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
public finds and other more serious offensesplus incidents and
Respondent. Promulgated
resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the
expediteddetermination of his innocence or guilt.The court ruled that
a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13
ofRepublic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under April 24, 200
Section 42 of Presidential Decree No.807, the Civil Service Decree,
which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thecircumstances of this case.The petition is GRANTED. x
Petitioners,
NACHURA, J.:
- versus -
PUNO, C.J.,
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman
of *the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the
QUISUMBING,
Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City.[5] The speech was subsequently published in
CARPIO,
the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.[6]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
- versus -
respondent when he stated in his speech that
CARPIO MORALES,
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a
6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been
bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE
requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract
that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends
common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF
price tag.[7]
LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED IN RELATION TO
HIS OFFICE; AND
The Ruling of the Court The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which
categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with
the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their
pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of
respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R.
conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v.
determine which courtthe RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In
over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which
parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of
the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, the matter to us, respondent judges orders were nullified for lack of
under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written jurisdiction, as follows:
defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent
jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Courts Orders
whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are
declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and
said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded
to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a Quezon City for proper disposition.
retroactive application thereof.[30]Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the
Code (RPC),[31] as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on
matter:
which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error
committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention xxxx
** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to
try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION
months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No. CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases COURTS.(Underscoring supplied)[40]
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v.
Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and
and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of
analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the
Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the
law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions
exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all
applied to libel cases.
other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of
an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in
respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case for writing or by similar means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of
libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued. jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office,
similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest
the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets
relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4,
of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later
8249,[44] cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even
enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a
simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.[45]
law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a
particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the
Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties
Court of First Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment like to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus,
RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent
a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is,
regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore,
a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-
a general law on the MTC. 02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts
for further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary
any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for
manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there
review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406
was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so
and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional
indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as
Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A
special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent SO ORDERED.
general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal,
a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should
exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of
CASE DIGEST
the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely
incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first
level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial
PEOPLE v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, GR No. 154473, 2009-04-24
Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have
been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of Facts:
the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first
sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections
referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases (COMELEC),... delivered a speech in... at
of criminal libel.
University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus,... Quezon City.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996,
this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence was subsequently published in
settled the matter with finality:
Manila Bulletin.
RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY,
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS
respondent... filed,... an Affidavit-Complaint... for libel.
CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES. an impeachable office
Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information... for Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by
libel against... the respondent,... respondent... moved for the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision
dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the
jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases
thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court... during his cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no
incumbency... assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular
Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case courts.
should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:
trial court... dismissing Criminal Case... considering that the alleged
libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office--he In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. the authority to file the corresponding information/s against
petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
case to the exclusion of all other courts.
It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:
PUNO, J.:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.[2]
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; Ombudsman.[3] Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
xxx Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine
the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latters
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to
supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary
enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
where the evidence warrants.[4] To carry out this duty, the law allows
the Sandiganbayan. It states:
him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. x x x
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
xxx prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him work under his supervision and control.[5] The law likewise allows
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA
Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the 6770.
Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
following powers: effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office.[6] A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal reveals this intent.
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and 19th century, referring to an officer appointed by the legislature to
handle the peoples grievances against administrative and judicial
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
actions. He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the persons aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or appropriate administrative agency based on his findings. He relied
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The mainly on the power of persuasion and the high prestige of the office
law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the to effect his recommendations.[7]
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were
held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is
established by past Presidents to serve as the peoples medium for
broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
airing grievances and seeking redress against abuses and misconduct
employee.[1]
in the government. These offices were conceived with the view of
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the raising the standard in public service and ensuring integrity and
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman efficiency in the government. In May 1950, President Elpidio Quirino
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against
Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty and
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the irregularity in office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as complaints. The Integrity Board was succeeded by several other
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the agencies which performed basically the same functions of
Ombudsman to such cases. complaints-handling and investigation. These were the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission under President Ramon
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over Magsaysay, the Presidential Committee on Administration
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary Performance Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any Presidential Anti-Graft Committee under President Diosdado
stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government
investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not Operations and the Office of the Citizens Counselor, both under
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving President Ferdinand Marcos. It was observed, however, that these
public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The agencies failed to realize their objective for they did not enjoy the
exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases political independence necessary for the effective performance of
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the their function as government critic. Furthermore, their powers
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses extended to no more than fact-finding and recommending.[8]
committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Sec. 10. Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:
Constitutional Convention saw the need to constitutionalize the office
of an Ombudsman, to give it political independence and adequate (a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own
powers to enforce its recommendations.[9] The 1973 Constitution motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any
mandated the legislature to create an office of the Ombudsman to be criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any
known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not be limited to receiving government-owned or controlled corporation;
complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the
xxx
filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case before
the appropriate body in case of failure of justice. Section 6, Article XIII
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he
of the 1973 Constitution read:
may file the necessary information or complaint with the
Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the
prosecute the same.
Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
Section 18 further stated:
government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, Sec. 18. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.--If the
file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee
case before the proper court or body. or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or
disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary
Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on
investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal
June 11, 1978, exercising his power under Proclamation 1081,
or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court
enacted Presidential Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the
or before the proper administrative agency.
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its principal task was to
investigate, on complaint, any administrative act[10] of any With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the
administrative agency[11] including any government-owned or Ombudsman was created. The present Ombudsman, as protector of
controlled corporation.[12] The Tanodbayan also had the duty to file the people, is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative form or manner against public officials or employees of the
case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person including government-owned or controlled corporations, and to
has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice.[13]It should be notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
noted, however, that the prosecution of cases falling within the thereof.[20] He possesses the following powers, functions and duties:
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to be done by the Tanodbayan
through the Special Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486,[14] had the 1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
information for and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
court. The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of Justice.[15] 2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
took effect on December 10, 1978. The amendatory law broadened controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any
administrative agencies by authorizing it to conduct an investigation abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
on its own motion or initiative, even without a complaint from any
person.[16] The new law also expanded the prosecutory function of 3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
the Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
in the Office of the Tanodbayan and placing under his direction and suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
control the Special Prosecutor who had the exclusive authority to compliance therewith.
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject
Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control
to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies
the prosecution of said cases therein.[17] Thus, the law provided that
of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his
if the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official,
office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties,
employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal
and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be
appropriate action.
investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall
file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case 5. Request any government agency for assistance and information
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
administrative agency.[18] necessary, pertinent records and documents.
On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487 6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances
and PD 1607. PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and so warrant and with due prudence.
transferred the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to
the Tanodbayan himself. Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to 7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement,
directly conduct preliminary investigation, file information and fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
other courts. The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the exclusive standards of ethics and efficiency.
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and 8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers
control the prosecution of said cases.[19] Section 10 of PD 1630 or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.[21]
provided:
As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be
Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor which under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the
continued to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution.[22] cases in the sense defined (therein).[25] The law recognizes a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman
The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of
the Special Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon Aquino cases cognizable by regular courts.
in Executive Order (EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9,
In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the 1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman
functional and structural organization of the Office of the exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Ombudsman. As in the previous laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
gave the present Ombudsman not only the duty to receive and relay
the people's grievances, but also the duty to investigate and CASE DIGEST
prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and administrative
offenses committed by government officers and employees as Issue: Wether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has
embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law. no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts?
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical
Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process Held: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law
the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government to the Ombudsman us plenary and unqualified. It has been held that
personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public officials” is broad
armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be tenure of office.
committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested
malfeasance – bad and illegal acts, especially by a public official.
him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own
Misfeasance – An act that is legal but performed improperly.
actions. Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court cannot
Nonfeasance – omission to do a duty.
derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. It is apparent from the history and the language of
The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power
the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not
of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive
only to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
those within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The Court observed in
offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the
the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]
Office of Ombudman provides: The prosecution of case cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman. The law recognizes a
then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman
issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office
and other investigate agencies of government in the prosecution of
of the Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate
cases cognizable by regular courts.
and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and
even the regular courts.
xxx
Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then
G.R. No. L-62075 April 15, 1987
Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for
the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE PERALTA,
Ombudsman. This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG,
the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own or on EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, petitioners,
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or vs.
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN L. VILLANUEVA,
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x. JR., AND ESTEBAN MANGASER, respondents.
Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to Simplicio M. Sevilleja for respondent E. Mangaser.
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the
regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular RESOLUTION
prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the
prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction
CORTES, J.:
with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to
investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie Peralta,
officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and Leola Neog were members
Demetriou[24] that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January
of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or 30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus, Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a
Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private
provides: respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice.
mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand
E. Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer
voting centers during the election. On instruction from the or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional Election Director of offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
September 29, 1981 submitted its report recommending to the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981, jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view
private respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
with the COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the
Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the COMELEC dismissed the WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of electioneering filed against
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. the petitioners had already been dismissed by the COMELEC for
insufficiency of evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary complaint filed by private respondent being investigated anew by the
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with the same election offense,
against the same parties and on the same charges previously DISMISSED.
dismissed by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office
entered its appearance for the respondents (except Director Epifanio SO ORDERED.
Castillejos and Edgar Castillejos) and moved for dismissal of the
complaint. The motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting
exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the
CASE DIGEST
COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly
deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct 233 Phil. 279
preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by
COMELEC officials in relation to their office. (Rollo, p. 102) A motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after considering the CORTES, J.:
pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised considered the
comment of the Solicitor General an Answer to the petition and Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie Peralta,
considered the case submitted for decision. Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and Leola Neog were members
of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January
In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-61998, February 30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the
28, 1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court dealt with the following question Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a
of first impression relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private
election offenses committed by public officials: respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice-
mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand
Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and E. Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election
try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the
office — the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance voting centers during the election. On instruction from the
(now the regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional Election Director of
Sandiganbayan? San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on
September 29, 1981 submitted its report recommending to the
This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the
COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981,
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
private respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed
officers and employees in relation to their office, thus:
with the COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the
Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the COMELEC dismissed the
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary
offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the
against the same parties and on the same charges previously
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would
dismissed by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office
result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere
entered its appearance for the respondents (except Director Epifanio
Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen
Castillejos and Edgar Castillejos) and moved for dismissal of the
to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
complaint. The motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly
clear constitutional mandate.
deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant COMELEC officials in relation to their office. (Rollo p. 102) A motion
to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by for certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after considering
public officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised considered
the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction the comment of the Solicitor General an Answer to the petition and
upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 considered the case submitted for decision.
and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-61998, February
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court dealt with the following question
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC of first impression relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over
election offenses committed by public officials: WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR
FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and MORO
Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS),
try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his represented by ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.
office the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance
(now the regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan and the x-----------------------x
Sandiganbayan?
G.R. No. 178193
This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the
DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner,
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
vs.
officers and employees in relation to their office, thus:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the VELASCO, JR., J.:
concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional For consideration is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the the Court dated January 24, 2012 interposed by petitioners in G.R.
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would Nos. 177857-58, namely: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador
idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz,
to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa.
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this On March 14, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a Manifestation and
clear constitutional mandate. Motion stating that they failed to include the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in the list of persons to be furnished with a copy of the
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by Motion for Reconsideration. They accordingly moved that their
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant belated service of a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration on the
to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to OSG be considered compliance with the rules on service of motions
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by for reconsideration. This Court noted and accepted the Manifestation
public officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from and Motion. On March 15, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a
the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction Memorandum in support of the instant motion for reconsideration.
upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182
To the said motion, intervenors Wigberto E. Tañada, et al. filed on
and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
June 10, 2012 their Comment and Opposition. The OSG, on the other
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election hand, after filing two motions for extension on May 22, 2012 and June
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC 21, 2012, respectively, filed its Motion to Admit Comment, with
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses Comment attached, on July 13, 2012. This Court noted and admitted
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer the Comment.
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
As will be recalled, the Court, in its January 24, 2012 Decision,
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
affirmed, with modification, the Partial Summary Judgments (PSJs)
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
rendered by the Sandiganbayan (1) on July 11, 2003 in Civil Case No.
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
0033-A (PSJ-A), as amended by a Resolution issued on June 5, 2007;
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view
and (2) on
of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F (PSJ-F), as amended by a
WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of electioneering filed against Resolution issued on May 11, 2007.
the petitioners had already been dismissed by the COMELEC for
insufficiency of evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the In this recourse, petitioner-movants urge the Court to reconsider its
complaint filed by private respondent being investigated anew by the Decision of January 24, 2012 on the ground that it:
Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with the same election offense,
DISMISSED. 1. Made erroneous findings of fact;
The net dividend earnings and/or redemption proceeds from the …and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to
Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be deposited in an escrow account distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the
with the Land Bank of the Philippines or the Development Bank of the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate.
Philippines.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i)
Respondent Republic, thru the PCGG, is hereby directed to cause the for having allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private
CIIF companies, including their respective directors, officers, interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute
employees, agents, and all other persons acting in their behalf, to ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the
perform such acts and execute such documents as required to CCSF to the undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or
effectuate the conversion of the common shares into SMC Series 1 circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D.
Preferred Shares, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly
Once the conversion is accomplished, the SMC Common Shares delegated legislative power to the PCA.
previously registered in the names of the CIIF companies shall be
released from sequestration. b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78
SO ORDERED.4 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it that the distribution of
shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or directly the
The CIIF block of SMC shares, as converted, is the same shares of aforementioned public purpose or national policy declared by P.D.
stocks that are subject matter of, and declared as owned by the No. 755.
Government in, the January 24, 2012 Decision. Hence, the need to
clarify. 2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy
funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds nor part
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY the instant of the general funds of the national government and similar
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 14, 2012 for lack of merit. provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No.
1468 contravene the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art.
The Court further resolves to CLARIFY that the 753,848,312 SMC
IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
Series 1 preferred shares of the CIIF companies converted from the
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and 12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
validly obtained title of ownership over the subject UCPB shares by
virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between 13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules,
14. First Meridian Development, Inc.
namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES TOTALING
4. The so-called "Farmers’ UCPB shares" covered by 64.98% of the
753,848,312 SHARES SUBJECT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT
UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2% of the shares
DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 TOGETHER "WITH ALL DIVIDENDS
of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB, the entire
DECLARED, PAID OR ISSUEDTHEREON AFTER THAT DATE, AS WELL AS
consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby
ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the
EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE
Philippines.
GOVERNMENT TO RE USED ONLY FOH THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT
xxx xxx xxx FARMERS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY.
AND ORDERED HECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.
SO ORDERED.
THE COURT AFFIRMIS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F dated May 7, SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON
2004, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows: MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE
NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF PARTIAL SUMMARY OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CHF
JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES OF STOCK) dated August BLOCK OF SMC SHARES AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE
8, 2005 of the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However, FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMIENTIONED PARTIAL
this Court orders the severance of this particular claim of Plaintiff. The SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.
Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now considered a
separate final and appealable judgment with respect to the said CIIF SO ORDERED.
Block of SMC shares of stock.1âwphi1
Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al., in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified Danilo S. Ursua in G.R. No. 178193.
by deleting the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, which will
now read, as follows: No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of Judgment be
made in due course.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
SO ORDERED.
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF
Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al) filed by Plaintiff
is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:
6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
Promulgated:
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
Respondent. January 25, 20
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
x--------------------------------------------------x
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows: CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding
accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp, confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
and which offense was committed in the manner described in the
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to
corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum,
gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she paid.
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake
and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth
SO ORDERED.[6]
demanded the return of the money.
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas
and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency,
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a we use the name Treas, under which he was accused in the
Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in Information.
the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the
Reconsideration,[7] which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated
PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that
2 July 2008.[8]
the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal
demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was
filed against him.[3]
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the
RTC.[9] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July
2010, the CA rendered a Decision[10] affirming that of the RTC. On 4
August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.[11]
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that
to File Petition for Review on Certiorari[12] before this Court. He asked the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not
for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any.
the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the
credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors: weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance, which is not the case here.
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION of no valid demand was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless,
APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION; the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the
complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita.
Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners
signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE
petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and
OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;[13]
failing health.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 (2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, surmises or conjectures;
it was actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus,
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings
the latters demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand
of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the
demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand (4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, facts;
there is no showing that the demand was actually received by
petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not (5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the
proven to be that of petitioners. issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the (6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on
Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, misapprehension of facts;
praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its
Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 (7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts
September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition. (8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting (9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the
petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute specific evidence on which they are based; and
the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery
of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence
on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered,
evidence on record.[14] could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and
assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great
issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.[17]
without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual
without any finding as to where it was committed: findings of the lower courts.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one
believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
receipts were fabricated documents.[15] cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with
an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture, case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that
thus: the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was
incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on
the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing
evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the
scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere what ifs. x x x offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused
and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of
the court.
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa,
would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22 of the offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court
December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the ruled:
P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in
Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination
been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted
paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires
concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati,
because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an
documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to essential element of jurisdiction. x x x
consider favorably.[16]
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in
this wise: In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was
filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x
comment on the formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present
any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations
that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence,
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed
Hectors allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.
in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu
on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale
offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto
failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu attached as Annex C,
in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22,
1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October
18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR
the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its
TREAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less
custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is
the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly
authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to
paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all
the elements of the offense charged had been committed in
Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of
Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject 7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela
aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the
representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]
wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to
buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence
initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage. was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under its elements was committed in Makati City.
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as
Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received
Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money. by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
xxx such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended
party to the offender.[22]
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the
that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any
prosecution[23] that points to where the offense, or any of its
of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of
shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was
the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction,
allegedly committed:
without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with
the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied) Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what
happened next?
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense
of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. have to and she will work for the Deed of Sale.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
information as follows:
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)[20] Q What was the amount quoted to you?
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint
A Yes, sir.
executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the
offense was committed. It provides in part: Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to
ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is
agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for
of which is hereto attached as Annex B, documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other
expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the
latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. Q Did he issue a receipt?
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax,
A Yes, sir. Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir. Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those others kept by him.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already
identified during the pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears to be a receipt When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
Atty. Treas issued to you? the client how the money was spent.[30] If he does not use the money
for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was
a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next?
Responsibility.[31]
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or
properties as they fall due or upon demand.[32] His failure to return
the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. [33] It is a gross
of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC. violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is punishment.[34]
nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of
the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks
settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral
or on appeal.[25] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any
case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account
for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only include an order to immediately return the amount of ₱130,000 to his
by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[26] client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand
until full payment.
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it 2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of
is not the court of proper venue.[27]Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that [s]ubject of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137,
to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-
fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not B of the Rules of Court.
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of
the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him SO ORDERED.
great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence
in another place.[28] This principle echoes more strongly in this case,
where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age
CASE DIGEST
and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the
charges against him. Petitioner: HECTOR TREÑASRespondent
There being no showing that the offense was committed within PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.[29]
G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by
petitioner. DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a personcharged with an offense
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of committed outside its limited territory.Facts:
Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners
conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of 1. Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist
the Code provides: in the titling of a house and lot locatedin Iloilo City. Treñas prepared
and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also
gaveElizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to
P120,000. However, when Elizabeth consultedwith the BIR, she was OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,
informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector vs.
admitted to her thatthe receipts were fake and that he used the THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent
money for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded thereturn of
the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against DECISION
Hector.2. An Information was filed by the Office of the City
PERALTA, J.:
Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendereda Decision
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed Resolution1 dated February 2, 2015 and Decision2 dated November
with the CA which alsorendered a Decision 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with
modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime of
malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.
affirming that of the RTC.3.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC),Cordillera Administrative
was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an accounting
evidence shows that the Receipt issuedby petitioner was without any clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of
indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as
Salewith Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed cashier, disbursement and collection officer.3 As such, petitioner
and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitionerclaims that the only logical received cash and other collections from customers and clients for
conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message
City,especially since his residence and office were situated there as fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account
well. Absent any direct proof as to theplace of delivery, one must rely of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City
on the disputable presumption that things happened according to Branch.4
theordinary course of nature.
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the
Issue: Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the
accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior,
1. Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.
Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
Ruling + Ratio:
₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the
venue of the action but is an essentialelement of jurisdiction. For LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found,
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense she and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-
should have beencommitted or any one of its essential ingredients over to them by petitioner.6 On the basis of said findings, Narag sent
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of thecourt. a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances made by petitioner.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the teller's
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance orto try the offense allegedly blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on
over a personcharged with an offense allegedly committed outside of September 19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00 and November 29,
that limited territory.Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20.7
criminal case is determined by the allegations in thecomplaint or
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez,
information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the
instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own
offense of estafa was committedwithin the jurisdiction of the RTC of
independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996,
Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth
the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
does notcontain any allegation as to where the offense was
office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to write
committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no
to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances
other evidence was presented by the prosecution toprove that the
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that
offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is
petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but not for
nothing in the documentaryevidence offered by the prosecution that
the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the
points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was
whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the
committed.There being no showing that the offense was committed
COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation.
within Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the
The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on September
case.The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for
19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC.9 Thus, the COA
investigation and recommendation pursuantto Section 1 of Rule 139-
demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however,
B of the Rules of Court.
refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of
DISPOSITION public funds against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment
: There being no showing that the offense was committed within for the loss of ₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged
Makati, The RTC of that city hasno jurisdiction over the case. before the RTC of Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
G.R. No. 217874
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-named accused, a Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon
Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it
accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the
of ₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and collected for the DOTC, Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade
Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position, while 27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen,
in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated
position, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment
misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment or negligence, of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive
permit other persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the opinion of which reads:
damage and prejudice of the government.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is
CONTRARY TO LAW.11 hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate
penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days
the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued. of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties
under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by
two (2) COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well
the accused.
as three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina
Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo.12 In response, the defense presented SO ORDERED.18
the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21,
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia 2009 alleging that during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was
Paraiso, went to the LBP Baguio branch and personally deposited the unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said
exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in six (6) counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents
copies.13 Since there were many clients who came ahead of her, she that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The
decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated
the teller and telling her that she would just come back to retrieve the August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally offered
deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she before the court below cannot be considered on appeal.19
identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at around 3 o'clock in
the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on Reconsideration became final and executory and was recorded in the
it. Being contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, Book of Entries of Judgments.20 On July 26, 2013, petitioner's new
she returned to her office and kept them in her vault. It was only counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen
during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
out that the said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP. Execution.21 In a Resolution22 dated December 4, 2013, however, the
When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the
that she be allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following
Estafa that she would file with the National Bureau of Investigation requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be
against some personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by
Ngaosi.14 The complaint, however, was eventually dismissed.15 the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued
only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from
decision states: the issuance of the order.23
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for
rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a
Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the
of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months case be reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of
and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.24 In a Resolution dated
temporalmaximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of
₱11,300.00. merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion
for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those
perpetual special disqualification.
raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could
not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on for
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to
appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has
the government the amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon
additional evidence to present, were already thoroughly discussed in
at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the
the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover,
filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on point.25
Costs against the accused.
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the
SO ORDERED.16 following arguments:
I.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE decision he intends to assail.30 It bears stressing that the
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no
JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE EXTRAORDINARY AND ordinary course of law.31 If the Order or Resolution sought to be
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE. assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved
party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
II. of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE
her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said
PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTTON FOR REOPENING
resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings
BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is,
therefore, improper.
III.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
Court still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2,
JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND
2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of
CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL
evidence; and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
OF THE DECISION.
2013.33
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel
the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her
was not properly notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice
Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was
thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the entry of
erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La
judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in
herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the
the Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public
absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her counsel's
address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the
appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not
parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on
properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is
record.34 It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system
premature.26 In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling
for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the
in People v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of judgment
counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address.35 If
without receipt of the resolution is premature.
counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the
necessary evidence for her defense due to the fact that the odds were finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial
against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain
application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed
court for further reception of evidence.28 In particular, petitioner and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably
seeks the reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an resides or holds office.36
accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the
Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as
court of the change in her office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad,
well as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of
Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact
evidence would show that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe
that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for
branch of the LBP was actually the deposit made by petitioner and
Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to
not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This
the court. As previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take
is because the ₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of
notice of every single time the counsel of a party changes address.
two (2) different amounts, which, if proper accounting procedure is
Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly admitted
followed, shall be recorded in the bank statement as two (2) separate
having received the subject resolution "sometime in September or
amounts and not their total sum of ₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the
October 2010."37 Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the
Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the case is
same. As respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge
capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her
of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the time of the
additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.
filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion with the PA0.38 Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's
to reopen and petition for reconsideration are considered as a second reliance on the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive
and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited the resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence
pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to on his paii.39 Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject
introduce were not available during the trial of her case. resolution was mainly attributable not only to her counsel's
negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to
The petition is devoid of merit. remind litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they should
not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to
Office of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is,
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper therefore, their responsibility to check the status of their case from
remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies time to time.40
available, a party aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision
must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a
Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or
13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her of property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or
the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the property were public funds or prope1iy for which he was accountable;
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
resolution became final in the absence of any pleading filed through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to
thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of Entries of take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public
Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he
petitioner, through her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the be prima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution uses.47
dated December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed her Petition
for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan,
of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9, petitioner's defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia
2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2, Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00 deposit
2015 Resolution. to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one,
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another,
year period from the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner
upon the malversation case against her through the filing of her fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of
well be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
concluded by reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did
Court is under the impression that had she not heard of the recording not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made,
of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48
on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about the Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable
appears to have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's
appeal via a petition for review on certioraribefore the Court.42 On ruling, viz.:
this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to
deny the instant petition. Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of
₱11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be
motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since believed and then it came out that the said ₱11,300.00 was not
the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in fact
has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of malversation
existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the because in this latter situation she permits through her inexcusable
reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality of a negligence another person to take the money. And this is still
judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own malversation under Article 217.49
initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing
is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its
and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should Decision, thus:
be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.43
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and should therefore be
the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction held liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court doubts
already cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The records of the case clearly the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence,
reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become use public property or funds under his custody for his personal
final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or,
Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The
supposed predicament about her former counsel failing to present accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for the
witnesses and documents should have been advanced before the trial misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which
court.44 It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the were not machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by
Court, which receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the contrary, it all the more
offered.45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to advance emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she
additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so accepted deposit slips which were not machinevalidated, her only
in the lower court. An appellate court will generally not disturb the proof of receipt of her deposits. 50
trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's
overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate
finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for
the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on
reconsideration are practically second and third motions for
a misapprehension of facts.46
reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the the rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section
Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that the grounds raised
when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those raised
fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds were
appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its subject
this score, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of
pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the 1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum
substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).
should be guided by its averments.51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings
filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with xxxx
Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt them
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.
embezzled.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused,
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the
and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are
of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries
modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused,56 she may even
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render
apply for probation,57 as long as she does not possess any ground for
its execution unjust and inequitable.52 None of the exceptions is
disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A.
present in this case.
No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968,
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As
becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning that she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing
resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such
judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable
schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, penalty.59
time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
this Court should write finis to this litigation.53
suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry
to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-
penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is ₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
the land.54 When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the
Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such exceptional Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner.60 Hence, taking into
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c),55 Rule II of the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the penalty
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision
novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its
Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An minimum period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in
which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised accordance with Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should be
as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period of arresto
the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of
such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides: four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows: years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as
maximum.
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case.
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the
be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified
property, shall suffer: theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief,
malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof,
have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration
the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For
as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall
find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the
time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service
CASE DIGEST
of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable
instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting
OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already
begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already GR No. 217874 December 5, 2017
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case,
moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds
directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks
the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a PONENTE: Peralta
similar purpose.
FACTS:
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of
Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR
the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
in Baguio City. By virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier,
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
disbursement and collection officer.
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which
is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from
penalties to be imposed. customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll
fees, and special message fees. The collections she received were
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and
deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the
Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine
Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.
if there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the
accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to Hernan was conducted. It was found out that the deposit slips dated
represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2) P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt
For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then informed
imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the
cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the
old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00.
necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing
trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds
for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the with the amount of P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty.
accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed her conviction but modified
appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the
sentence of the crime charged against them based on the penalties case.
imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate
release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s
Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused decision but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion
Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts, for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated August
including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to 31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner’s MR
those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged became final and executory.
imprisonment.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.
is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the execution of the
November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division judgment of conviction.
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with
mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay
twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term. of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise
denied.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level ISSUE:
courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
for the crime of malversation of public funds.
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the
National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and 2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance, reception of evidence.
and appropriate action.
HELD:
Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines,
and the House of Representatives, be furnished copies of this FIRST ISSUE: YES.
Decision for their information.
The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime
SO ORDERED. of malversation of public funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however,
Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer; circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
(2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give
of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the
funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951
This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime
to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused,
uses.
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan, penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
petitioner’s defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be
Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of
to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For 10707.
another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21)
even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the
for malversation. new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2)
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an
amendatory law favorable to the accused. The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such
as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not
the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment,
judgment of conviction already cripples the Motion to Reopen the the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt
Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010 but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact,
was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26,
2013.
The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court