CARPIO MORALES v. CA GR Nos.
217126-27 Binay filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking nullification of the PSO
November 10, 2015 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN Fernandez
SUMMARY: Binay, Jr. et al were charged administratively and criminally
before the OMB which issued a PSO. Binay filed a petition for certiorari with
prayer for TRO and/or WPI before the CA, which granted the TRO, and
subsequently issued a WPI. OMB assailed the jurisdiction of the CA in enjoining
the implementation of the PSO, claiming that Par. 1, Sec. 14, RA 6770, in
conjunction with its independence under the 1988 Const., insulated it from
judicial intervention, particularly from injunctive reliefs issued by the courts. SC
held that CA had jurisdiction over the main case and the power to issue TRO
and/or WPI.
DOCTRINE: The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested
unto the courts.
[NOTE: Focused on procedure]
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: Rule 65 certiorari and prohibition with the
SC filed by the OMB through SolGen assailing: a) the resolution of the CA which
granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for issuance of TRO against implementation of Joint
Order of OMB preventively suspending him and several officers of Makati City for
6 mos without pay and; b) the resolution ordering the OMB to comment of Binay’s
petition for contempt. CA also issued WPI further enjoining the implementation of
the PSO.
FACTS:
A complaint-affidavit was filed before the OMB against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of Makati City Govt accusing them of Plunder, violation of
RA 3019, in connection with the 5 phases of the procurement and construction of
the Makati City Hall Parking Bldg.
OMB constituted a Special Panel of Investigators, which charged Binay et.al. with 6
admin cases for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, and 5 crim cases for violation of Sec.3(e), RA 3019,
malversation of public funds and falsification of public documents (OMB Cases).
Binay’s 1st Term: issued notices of award for Phases III-V to Hilmarc’s
Construction Corp, and consequently executed the corresponding contract without
required publication and lack of architectural design, and approved the release of
funds therefor.
Binay’s 2nd Term: Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of
contract with Hilmarc for Phase V, as well as for the remaining balance of the
contract with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. for the design and
architectural services of the Makati Parking Bldg.
OMB issued a PSO, placing the former under preventive suspension for not more
than 6 mos without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.
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and praying for issuance of TRO and/or WPI. He primarily argued that he could
not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending the 5
phases by virtue of the condonation doctrine. In any event, OMB failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him was strong. CA granted prayer for
TRO, notwithstanding Peña, Jr.’s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that
day.
OMB manifested that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that
since PSO has already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to
restrain. On the same day, Binay filed a petition for contempt against Sec. Roxas,
Dir. Brion, PNP, Peña, Jr., OMB and Sec. De Lima for refusing to obey the TRO.
CA consolidated the 2 cases and ordered OMB to comment. OMB filed present
petition. CA issued WPI permanently enjoining the PSO’s implementation. Thus,
OMB filed a supplemental petition.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S): CA has no jurisdiction to issue TRO and WPI
against OMB to enjoin PSO, invoking Sec. 14, RA 6770, in conjunction with the
OMB’s independence under the 1987 Const. OMB argues that in order to further
ensure the OMB’s independence, RA 6770 likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention, particularly, from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the
courts, claiming that said writs may work just as effectively as direct harassment or
political pressure would.
ISSUE(S):
1) WoN CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition –
2) WoN CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue TRO and WPI
enjoining implementation of PSO issued by OMB – YES.
HELD:
1) Sec. 14, RA 6770: “No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
“No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.”
This provision may be dissected into 2 parts. The 1st par. Is a prohibition against
any court, except the SC from issuing a writ of injunction (provisional) to delay an
investigation being conducted by the OMB. Exception: Prima facie evidence that
the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the OMB. On
the other hand, 2nd par. Provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be
heard against the decision or findings of the OMB, with the exception of the SC on
pure questions of law.
OMB submits that the legislative intent behind Sec. 14, particularly on the matter
of judicial review of the OMB’s decisions or findings is clear from the Senate
deliberations, wherein the word “review” was deleted from the phrase “petition for
review” and in lieu thereof, inserted the word “certiorari”, so that, review or appeal
from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for
review, but on certiorari.
SC held that said deliberations do not pertain to Sec. 14. Rather, they refer to Sec.
27, on the effectivity and finality of OMB decisions, wherein it is stated that said
decisions may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within 10 days
from receipt of notice, or denial of MR, iaw Rule 45, RoC. SC further clarified the
perceived ambiguity re: “petition for certiorari” and “iaw Rule 45”, since under 1997
RoC, “petition for certiorari” pertains to Rule 65. It stated that the OMB Act was
passed in 1989, while the governing rule was the 1964 RoC. Under the said rule, an
appeal under Rule 45 was called a “petition for certiorari” thus, explaining the
denomination.
SC stated that as a general rule, par. 2 bans the whole range of remedies against
issuances of the OMB by prohibiting: 1) an appeal against any decision or finding of
the OMB, and 2) “any application of remedy” against the same. Exception: Rule 45
appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the SC on “pure questions
of law”.
SC held that par. 2, of Sec. 14 inappropriately limits the remedy against “decisions
or findings” of the OMB to a rule 45 appeal, thus, taking away the remedy of
certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power
constitutionally vested in courts. It also increased the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
by altering the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory findings of
the OMB (note: Rule 45 only applies to final decisions. Under Sec. 14, it can apply
to findings, which may either be final or provisional, hence, increasing the scope),
without the SC’s advice and concurrence, in violation of Sec. 30, Art. VI, Const.
Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure. Hence, Sec. 14 is invalid.
(note: SC stated that par. 2. Sec. 14 is similar to par. 4, Sec. 27, which it previously
held in Fabian v. Desierto as invalid).
CAB: Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the CA to nullify PSO issued by OMB,
an interlocutory order, hence, not appealable. In several cases after Fabian, SC ruled
that R65 petitions for certiorari against unappealable issuances of the OMB should
be filed before the CA and not directly before the SC, in observance of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts (OMB v. Capulong; Dagan v. OMB). Thus, with the
unconstitutionality of par. 2, Sec. 14, and consistent with jurisprudence, SC
held that CA had jurisdiction over the main petition.
2) Sec. 5, Art. XI, Const. guarantees the independence of the OMB. In Gonzales III
v. OP, SC grappled with the meaning of the OMB’s independence from vis-à-vis the
independence of the other constitutional bodies. The OMB’s independence covers 3
things: a) Creation by the constitution; b) fiscal autonomy; and c) insulation from
executive supervision and control. All 3 intend to protect the OMB from political
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harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the “insidious tentacles of politics”. As
such, the concept of OMB’s independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the OMB from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts.
Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals
and apply even justice to all. Hence, OMB’s notion that it can be exempt from
judicial power – that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a PSO – clearly
strays from the concept’s rationale. Nevertheless, par. 1, Sec. 14 textually prohibits
courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation
conducted by the OMB, except for the SC.
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Congress has no authority
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
The power of a court to issue provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its
inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and other means necessary to
carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Sec. 6, Rule 135, RoC. These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the
power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the
litigants.
In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or
preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make
its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or
ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the
injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is
not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within
the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this
inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or denied.
SC held that Congress, in passing Sec. 14, took away from the courts their power to
issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the OMB. It
encroached upon the SC’s constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these
issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under
the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong
exclusively within the province of this Court.
Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under
its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent
to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the
proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to
be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the
Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus,
pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole
prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare
as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from
issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure without the Court’s
consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned
injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. These issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA’s
certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129 and
which it had already acquired over the main case.

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