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2. CAUSATION
General rule: if the negligence of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury/ damage to property, then plaintiff may claim damages.
Exception: If the negligence of the plaintiff is the proximate cause of the injury or
damage, the plaintiff is wholly responsible for the same and he cannot recover
damages.
2.1 Definition of Proximate Cause
VDA DE BATACLAN VS MEDINA
On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, lef
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
ConradoSaylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and
conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the
right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger
apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the lef side of the driver, and a woman
named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about
2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction
of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the
passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named
Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, afer
they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus,
particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out
of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers
already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any
attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the
vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood.
Afer half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made
of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers
trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over
and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that
the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it
on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus
were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his
widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral,
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. Afer
trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600
as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan
to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the
defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed
the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their
burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
Held: No.
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for
the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
back,the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural
area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
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over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence
on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-
reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Proximate cause- that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS IAC
FACTS:
Petitioners: PHOENIX Construction Inc., and Armando U. CARBONEL Respondents:
The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Leonardo DIONISIO
On November 15, 1975 (Martial Law period), about 1:30AM, respondent Dionisio, a
marketing man, was driving home from a dinner meeting where he had a shot or
two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
and while driving down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he
switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2
½ meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a
curfew pass that night.
The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the
company’ driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the
lane that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It
was parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor were
there any “early warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck, front or
rear. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to
be used the nextmorning.4.
Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the lef, but
it was toolate. His car smashed into the truck. Dionisio suffered physical injuries,
including permanent facial scars, “a nervous breakdown” and loss of two gold
bridge dentures.
HELD
CFI:
 An action for damages was commenced by Dionisio in the CFI, claiming
that the legal andproximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked thedump truck entrusted to him by
his employer Phoenix.
 Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio’s
injuries was his own
 recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
influence of liquor,without his headlights on, and without a curfew pass.
 Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the
selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
 The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel.
IAC:
Upon appeal to the IAC, that court affirmed the CFI’s decision.
Hence, the present petition.
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ISSUE: WON Dionisio’s negligence was an intervening, efficient cause determinative
of the accident and the injuries he sustained
DECISION:
NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence was not an
intervening,
efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio’s
injuries was the
negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he parked the dump truck.
Petitioners are liable for damages, but these damages must be mitigated because of
Dionisio’s contributory negligence. Decision modified whereby Dionisio will
shoulder 20% of awarded damages.
HELD:[Resolution of factual issues]
The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a curfew pass. Since
he was without a curfew pass, he was hurrying home, driving at a fast speed in
order to avoid the police. Worse, he turned off his headlights as he was driving
down that street in order to escape notice from the nearby police station. However,
the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor he had did not show that he
was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute an act of reckless
imprudence. Taken all together, however, the Court drew the conclusion that
Dionisio was negligent on the night of the accident.[Note: During the period of
Martial Law, no person was allowed to be outside his home during curfew hours,
unless he has a curfew pass.]
Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them
Petitioners urge that the Carbonel’s negligence was merelt a “passive and static
condition” and that Dionisio’s negligence was an “efficient intervening cause,” and
that consequently Dionisio’s negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
However, the distinctions between “cause” and “condition have been “almost
entirely discredited.”
The Court quotes significantly from
Prosser and Keeton
. The following parts were quoted with emphasis:
“Cause and condition… So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which
have gone before… Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
“condition” remains static will not necessarily affect liability… “Cause”
and“condition”
still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases,
it is not the distinction between “cause” and “condition” which is important, but
the nature of the risk and the ch aracter of the intervening cause.”
Dionisio’s negligence is not an efficient intervening cause Carbonel’s negligence is
far from being a “passive and static condition” –it was an indispensable and
efficient cause. The collision would not have happened had the truck not been
parked askew and without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down the street and for having so created this risk, Carbonel must be held
responsible. Carbonel owed a duty to Dionisio and others similarly situated not
to impose upon them the very risk that Carbonel had created. Dionisio’s negligence
was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain
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of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the
juris vinculum of liability.The Court quoted parts of
Prosser and Keeton
. With emphasis were the following: “Foresseable Intervening Causes. If the
intervening cause is one which is ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the
particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons,
because of failure to guard
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason… There is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce result, and…
the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that
very risk.
“Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk
or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within th e scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence.
“Thus it has been held… that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a
railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it.
“The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. Xxx The standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against ‘that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated… One who
parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it…”
Dionisio had contributory negligence
The court held that Dionisio’s negligence was “only contributory,” that the
“immediate and proximate cause” of the injury remained Carbonel’s “lack of due
care” and that consequently Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
are subject to mitigation by the court.
Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of 20-80 ratio should be
followed, where20% shall be borne by Dionisio, while 80% shall be borne by
petitioners.
Last Clear Chance cannot apply
Petitioners ask the application of the “last clear chance” doctrine. It cannot apply.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our
jurisdiction by
Picart vs. Smith
but is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Its historical function was to mitigate the harshness of
another common law doctrine or rule – contributory negligence. The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had
also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid
the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by
the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The Court believes that there is no general concept of “last clear chance” that may
be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s
– was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. Chronology of plaintiff’s and
defendant’s negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account.
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Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community.
Phoenix is presumed negligent for failing to supervise its employees properly and
adequately
Carbonel’s proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of
his employer Phoenix
in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to
overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to show any effort on the part of
Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck if parked when away
from company premises. It is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the
part of Phoenix. Decision modified as to the allocation of award of damages.
BELARMINO VS EEC
FERNANDO VS CA
FACTS: November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won.
November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank.
o The bodies were removed by a fireman.
o The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia
and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic
tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market
master.
o Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" -
diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the
ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause
therefore can be liable for damages
HELD: NO. CA affirmed.
Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
o Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
Standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences
o The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light
of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case
o Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
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o Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its

determining factors, he can not recover.
o Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a
suitable equivalent for his own imprudence

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the
New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the
public
o While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost
compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of
warning signs is not one of those requirements

Accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless
 The Altis, driving at 5-10kph, was trying to cross Katipunan Ave. from R.
one removes its covers
Matanda from the lef (going to Blue Ridge), and has already crossed the

Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which
has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly
be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards
of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.
RAMOS VS C.O.L REALTY
Facts:
 Collision incident, parties are: Toyota Altis sedan owned by COL Realty,
driven by Larin, with passenger Estela; and Ford Expedition, owned by
Ramos, driven by Rodel.
 Collision occurred along Katipunan and R. Matanda St., see image:
center lane of Katipunan, when the Ford Expedition (heading North) hit
the rear right door of the Altis, sending it turning 180 degrees towards the
direction it came from.
 Estela suffered injuries. COL Realty demanded payment for repairs of the
Altis and costs of the medical service to Estela. Ramos refused.
 COL Realty filed suit against Ramos in the MeTC QC for damages under
quasi-delict.
 Ramos denied liability, arguing that the Altis was in the wrong
for crossing Katipunan despite the concrete barriers installed
thereon to prevent cars from crossing it. Ramos further argued
he wasn’t in the car when the accident happened, and has
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
Rodel.
 MeTC dismissed the case. RTC affirmed the dismissal.
 CA modified holding that while the Altis negligent for crossing
Katipunan despite the concrete barriers, relying on the
certification of MMDA that such act is prohibited due to the
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ongoing road construction in the area and that the Altis still
crossed Katipunan through the broken cracks in the barricade, it
held that the Ford Expedition was contributorily negligent for
driving the car at a high speed (given that the Altis rotated 180
degrees upon being hit) through a busy intersection despite the
ongoing road construction.
 Hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ford Expedition’s speed in driving along Katipunan despite the
ongoing construction makes it liable
RULING:
NO. The Altis’s violation in crossing Katipunan despite the barrier is the proximate
cause of the collision.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is
imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third
person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it
was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and
thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the
accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward
event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred,
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural
and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest
error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article
2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
Thus it is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence,
since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate
and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance
only in the event that Ramos (the Expedition owner) seeks to recover from
respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will
have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an
assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner;
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it could not eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the
proximate result of the accident.
PHIL NATIONAL RAILWAYS VS VIZCARRA
FACTS: The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant
Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and bound
for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio
Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afernoon of August 10, 1974, got
stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus
and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fify-three (53) others suffered
physical injuries.
Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, HonorioCirbado, in
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores,
signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against
defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of
the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by
the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo
Hughes.
ISSUES:
Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit Incorporated and
HonorioCabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine National Railways was negligent in
the operation of their respective vehicles, or whether or both were negligent?
Could either of the companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine
National Railways be held accountable for the collision because of negligence?
HELD:
It was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent
rain which should have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution.
Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat,
indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 kilometers
per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was
approaching the intersection, it would probably not have travelled 190 meters more
from the place of the accident.
All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct
conclusion that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last
opportunity within his hands vis-a-visthe weather condition including the presence
of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he
slackened his speed and applied the brakes. These considerations were addressed
to the trial judge was in a better position to assign weight on factual questions.
Having resolved the question of negligence between the train engineer and the bus
driver afer collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafer thus
commands great respect especially so in this case where respondent court gave its
nod of approval to the findings of the court of origin.
DRA LEILA DELA LLANA VS BIONG
FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan delaLlana was driving and his sister, Dra.
delaLlana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the
signal lightturned red. A few seconds afer the car halted, a dump truck rammed
the car’s rear end,violently pushing the car forward.Dra. DelaLlana suffered minor
wounds. The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as
Joel Primero who is an employee of respondent Rebecca Biong. In the first week of May
2000, Dra.delaLlana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the lef side of hernneck and
shoulder. The pain became more intense as dayspassed by. Her injury became more severe.
On June 9, 2000, she to suffer from
a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her l
ef arm and is required to undergo serious medication to alleviate her condition.
Thus she demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This
made her sued Biong for damages before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. delaLlana but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
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whiplash injury
HELD:
Dra. delaLlana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. 28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the
breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain members of
society to others. 29
Based on these requisites, Dra. delaLlana must first establish by preponderance of
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability
as Joel’s employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
Only afer she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this
Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifh
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifh paragraph of Article
2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed
by his employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in
extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of
evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s
negligence and Dra.delaLlana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. delaLlana. She must
establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. 36
Notably, Dra.delaLlana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the
causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
DAY SIX
Dra. delaLlana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary
facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as
fully discussed below
ndeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial
court shows that Dra. DelaLlana did not present any testimonial or documentary
evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident
and Dra. DelaLlana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash
injury was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence
during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that
vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge,
or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. 46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine.
Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of
the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra.delaLlana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of
evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and
impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. delaLlana’s
favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.
2.2 Tests of Proximate Cause
2.2.1 Cause in fact
2.2.2 Effectiveness of the cause (sine qua non) “but for” rule
2.2.3 Substantial factor test
2.2.4 Foreseeability Test
UMALI VS BACANI
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission
line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire.
The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was lef hanging on the electric
post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain Bueno
of San Pedro saw CiprianoBaldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but
the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to
look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafer, a small boy of 3 years and 8
months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite
side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in
contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
afer the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or
tort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause
of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but
rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut
the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee
CiprianoBaldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of
negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that
time.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event-
storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence
on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim
by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and
tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which
were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting
the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary
foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric
line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take
the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware
of the possible damage the storm of May14, 1972, could have caused their
electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not
DAY SIX
cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines , an act they could have
easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third,
employee CiprianoBaldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident
because even if he was already madeaware of the live cut wire, he did not have
the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and
that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was
foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left
unattended to it could endanger life and property.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability.
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in
par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
2.2.5 Natural and probable consequence test
2.2.6 Ordinary and natural or direct consequence test
2.3 INTERVENING CAUSE
RAKES VS ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO.
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work, transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car
was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing
560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to
the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the
car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged,
the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the
plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was aferwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it
existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged
with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along
the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work afer noticing the
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence,
barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his
witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman
swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary
cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event
giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the
iron rails.
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1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer
for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first
prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with
the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may
proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to
his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
"Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred
through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted
in Philippine jurisprudence.
TAYLOR VS MANILA ELCTRIC CO.
FACTS: Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the injuries
that gave rise to this complaint. On September 30, 1905, plaintiff and Manuel
Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant
to visit one Murphy, an employee. Not being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the
boys for curiosity wandered around the premises and reached the place where the
company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found
some 20-30 fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for
explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive power. The boys picked
up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year
old girl. The 3 went to Manuel’s house and performed a little experiment. They
opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied
it on the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance
exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessie’s neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of David’s
eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages.
Issue: Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the children to be
exposed to the harmful substances
Held:
Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges
by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all
the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that
the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found
by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the
defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps
under its possession and control.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps
been lef exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and
had he not thereafer deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to
its contents.
Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity
and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here will usually be found
whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and
indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will
draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron
which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises,
therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the
public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner
knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play,
"must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly."
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his
part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match
to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
DAY SIX
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the general rule in regard to
an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault
or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the
rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child
is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstances of the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the
accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt
that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought
about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that
he knew what he was about.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he
put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for
the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be
held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless
act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred
but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of
the accident which inflicted the injury
TEAGUE VS FERNANDEZ
Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes
FACTS: The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building,
a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and
Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was owned and operated by Teague. The said second
floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although
it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each
of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of
said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials
located about ten meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing
the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and
thereafer, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the
Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not be
subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-
escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, afer the panic
was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede. The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages
against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.
CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by
the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is
based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with
the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of the
ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had
only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each,
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway
under construction.
The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes
Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3)
shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and
DAY SIX
death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a
remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a
number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. According
to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.”
ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence
HELD:
It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question was
ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was
coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing
one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That
situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate
the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing
which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” To consider the violation
of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation
in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at
the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.
Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of
proximate cause applies to such violation.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
MCKEE VS IAC
FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car driven by Jose Koh along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and
San Fernando, Pampanga. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors
George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the
baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was
seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car
while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two
hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward
from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When
the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the
lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved
to the lef and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of
the car, applied the brakes and thereafer attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. While an Information charging Ruben Galang
with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
CFI rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal
case finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property. Upon the other hand, the two (2) civil cases were
dismisse and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
CA reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants damages. The decision is anchored principally
DAY SIX
on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or
reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said
that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private
respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter;
it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
and supervising the said employee.
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was
subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the respondent
Court, reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto the trial
court's judgment. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the
respondent Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the findings of respondent court is supported by evience
RULING:
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent
man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding
such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow
down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a
place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he
fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We
find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid
hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of
negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that
his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been
defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events
in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial
act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The
entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision
had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and
give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down
and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary
measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed
towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of
the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could
pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the
bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any
reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the
car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his
truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give
credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by
DAY SIX

the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in Pampango as to whether
the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes
that official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the
contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is
based on mere conjecture.
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take
the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was
the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
SC RULING: In the light of recent decisions of this Court, the indemnity for death
must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November
1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that
the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the
death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. 56

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it
was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the
truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they
are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible defense is
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.

The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to
prove it.

The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in
reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and
4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual
moorings.