Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic Jeremy Adelman PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS2 + Iatoduetion ‘These ate some of the might-have-beens that need to be understood as part of a more general appraisal. Inthe end, this book shies away from Clegant theories premised on simplifying assumptions that gloss over hhow and why agents made the choices they did, If nothing else, the com- parisons invoked here should illustrate the effects of strategic decisions bby people who had to make judgment calls in a historic juncture in which the foundations of power were under threat at home and abroad. The Choices and the eonificts they produced yielded to histosies that none intended and few envisioned, Yet, in making history by groping through 4 labyrinth of forked paths they created the opportunity for their heirs fo imagine anew the prospects for personal and political sovereignty. 1 Empires That Bleed Ina lever to the ruler of the Portuguese empire, Dom Joao V, Overseas Councillor Alexandre de Gusmio, likened monarchies to bodies whose lifeblood was tade. Writing in 1748, he observed that losing trade was the “same as what happens to human bodies when blood is drained, Speaking fcankly, tis is where Portugal is heading, for while we struggle to extract money she is heading for poverty and, asa consequence, hee Ruin.” Gusmio, a powerful minister and architect of imperial policy inthe middie of che eighteenth century, echoed a longstanding belie in early modern European statecaft: private wealth and public welfare were inextricably tied to commercial power! “The concern about the wealth of the empire and che health of the monarchy also obsessed insiders in Madrid. José del Camyillo y Cosio, minister of state, navy, war, and the Indies to Flipe V, penned similar diag noses and prescriptions that influenced later generations of imperial thinkers and policymakers, tapping into idioms of the body to drive a spot At Hoteles Spe psiloc lected Ceara argued. Her defenses were decrepit, her education was antiquated, and her administration amounted to lethargic enforcement of obsolete reg lavions. Bue above all, Spanish commerce had become the preserve of hhandfal of entrenched monopolies that stifled trade and business Campillo’s Nuevo sistema de gobierno econémsico para la América (1743) called for reconstituting the monarchy not as the agglomeration of dis: persed provinces bound by systems of privilege, but as the center of vast dominions teeming with competitive traders: an ideal empice. Nuevo slstema also drew the pavalel between monarchies and bodies sustained by the circulation of commodities owing throughout the dominions and so ano de 1748 por Alas de Gouna’ in ikotess Neconl de 3 (hereafer BNL, Coledo Pombalina fret CP, ‘nde Gua ne nie Chri, Alexandre de Ga ‘aloe L the body et14 © Chaptet One converging on the hear: Spain, “Commerce” he wrote, “is what maintains the body olive like the cicculation of blood in the natural hody.™* Ir likening monarchies to bodies was nothing new in discourses of European statecrat, what was becoming clearer in the eighteenth century was how important the circulation of commodities was in defining power polis The apotheosis of mercantilst empires and the heightened atention to the tes between teade and monarchies, blood and bodies, coincided with the apogee of European dynastic rivaleies. Especially once the politcal geography of dynastic boundaries of western Europe took shape after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, competitors looked overseas—and especially tothe Americas—in the quest for markets, materials, and military superi ‘ovity. For Iberian powers, the frst claimants to extensive colonies in the Americas, expansion had always brought rivalries in cow. Bur after 1648, the Dutch, French, and increasingly the English fixed their atention on tains in the New World ta sete scores in the Old World, $0 it was not jnst that Therians were losing trade, and therefore blood. They were los fg ieto ther svals. Gusmao and Campillo were therefore vexed by a his: toric riddle: how could Portugal and Spain, mature empires, catch up with theie rivals whose hody polis were more youthful, ital, and encrgeic?* Perceptions of backwardness and vulnerable sovereignty framed the policies with which imperial rulers and magnates governed their domains ‘The concern to reverse the trend raised a set of thorny issues ahout the proper balance besween public good and private interest. In general, Enlightenmene thinkers promoted the idea that private interests were not js the cornerstones of public good, but enjoyed an autonomous status Tf monarchies needed trade, they had to accepe their dependence on members of the civitas that did the srading. Thus, the health of the regimes was tied explicitly to the privileges of private trading fortunes, ‘Wise monarchs encouraged private interests a8 a way of promoting public welfare, This has become a common way to understand the origins of sniodern political economy and of the Ealightenment’s bequest to think ing about wealth and public affairs. ‘el Campillo y oso, Nuvo sistoma de gobierno econimico para la Anica 14, Circa Universi delon Andes 1971)p. 7. The work eased pend wah fa ein, ul ae th author death "A fneovesew ofthe tenons cested by impr seat Peggy Li, Alani Empire The Ket ‘Tae and Revolton 171-1426 (Balke [ato Hope Uaieacy Pres 1983), Ser alo the fist ball of To alpen Dong, Reforma ‘Aslan doe per Io, ‘Anas Editor 1985, On the lai wag cnc dco pl espa ‘sy modern rope see David MeNal the Rie of Cal ‘Rett Becerra of California Pr 1988) ep ha. 2. ye Fr Enpires That Bleed © 15 Bur the view that there was an essential primacy to the private world ‘of property and personal interests a8 « condition of the commonwealth ‘wat more troublesome when it came to Europe's less dynamic flanks, Iberian rulers and their ministerial cicles did not shy away from the “underlying notion thar public and private spheres were autonomous. But ‘autonomy was nor che same as independence. Rather, they insisted on ‘mutual dependence of private interests and publie welfare because unfet ered personal drives too easly cascaded into private vice and corup- tion, Some public check was necessary to curb the excesses of private avarice. Good rulers had to create a centralized, more elfectve state prevent private rights from backsliding into pessonal privileges, and then ‘obstacles go socal betterment. Merchants and monarchs shared the same fate—and the prosperity of one gave anew lease on life to the other. The art of statecraft implied creating calibrated, countervailing sources of authority 10 halance—indeed, to integrate more vireuously—private and public domains while respecting the autonomy of exch? If one hears echoes of Montesquieu’ doctrine that abuses of power oF privilege required checks and balances, this chapter explores bow, in the Iberian context, the concern for a new equipoise was heightened because imbalances had weakened the monarchies and lft them prey to Europe's rising dynasties. Foe Iberians, therefore, the political economy of statecrafe reflected much more than a European skill. Rather, the fates ofpivate and public fortunes were coiled in Atlantic imperial structures. Empire was the means to realize a strong monarchy and aa opulent merchant class because merchant capitalism made its fortunes through imperial ventures and empires rested on politcal foundations thas presumed that kings were nat- ural conveyors of godliness andl affluence to the rst of the world.” Irena, Wans If the Iberian Atlantic shared norms and institutions, it was nonetheless ‘turbulent sea of politcal and commercial rivalry, Warfare simultane ‘ously intagrated and featared the lgal frameworks of sovereigaty for all “Jos tina age, ihe Ceniy Spi Pal Ean: Epemoogy and Dating” Eighteenth Cnr Though 1 (203) 295-314 “ILM. Elbe, Se eee and clei Exly South Cetuy Spain” Past 2 Obj of Fran Pay in the In D.C. Coleman, ey Reso of Merce (ono