Aquino vs COMELEC purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of

origin should be deemed to continue. 
Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati Ople vs Torres
City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political
party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Facts:   Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as
Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December
candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order
Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be
immediately preceding the elections.
 invalidated on two constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation

 of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to
Issue:   Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence privacy.
qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6,
Art. VI of the Constitution
 Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?


Held:  Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite
Representative of the Second   District   of Makati City, he standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of
must provethat he has established not just residence but domicile of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
choice.
 Ople’s concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the
Petitioner, in his   certificate   of candidacy for the 1992 lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and
Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same the power of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, balance and cannot be allowed.
his certificateindicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. Hisbirth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the Arroyo vs De Venecia
birthplace of his parents. What   stands   consistently clear and
unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time Facts:
of   filing   of his most recentcertificate   of candidacy for the 1995 A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240,
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the
one. While a   lease contract   may be indicative of petitioner’s House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
permanency required toprove   abandonment of one’s original The law originated in the House of Representatives. The
domicile.
 Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The
by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
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Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of
the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being
none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved
but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
Republic of Flour Mills Manila vs Customs
FACTS:
From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills
(petitioner) exported Pollard and/or bran which was loaded from
lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored
near the breakwater. The Commissioner of Customs and The Court
of Tax Appeals (respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of
wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00,
which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest. In this case,
Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to interpret the
words “products of the Philippines” found in Section 2802 of the
Tariff and Custom Code,as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak)
on the ground that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is
imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste from the
production of flour. 
Another main argument of the petitioner is that no
government or private wharves or government facilities were
utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would not be
liable at all for the wharfage dues assessed under such section by
respondent Commission of Customs. On the other hand, the stand
of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was
liable for wharfage dues “upon receipt or discharge of the exported
goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use
of government-owned or private wharves.”
  Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action
taken by the Commissioner of Customs under the appropriate
provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance
with law
RULING/HELD:
As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom
Code, "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the
Philippines exported from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per
gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage." appears to be quite precise.
Section 2802 refers to what is imported and exported.
The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if there
is doubt to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation
should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If  petitioner
were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to
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be excluded from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code
would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It was
desirable then that the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction
of the coverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end result
would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate
The decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of
November 27, 1967 is affirmed with costs against petitioner
Pesigan vs Angeles
Facts:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers
transported on April 2. 1982, twenty-six (26) carabaos & a calf from
Camarines Norte with Batangas as its destination. They were
provided with health certificates from the provincial veterinarian
and three (3) other permits attesting that the cattle was not part of
lose, stolen or questionable animals.
Despite this, the said cattle was confiscated by respondents
Zenarosa and Miranda, who were respectively the police station
commander and provincial veterianarian of Basud, Camarines
Norte. The confiscation was on the basis of said EO 626-A which
was dated   October 25, 1980   but was published in theOfficial
Gazette on June 14, 1982.
Executive Order 626-A provides, "that henceforth, no
carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The
carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by
the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case
of carabaos".
The Pesigans filed an action for replevin against herein
respondents for the recovery of the subject cattle but this could not
be executed by the sheriff. Subsequently, the judge dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action. Hence, the petitioners filed an
appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A dated October
25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the
government of cattle transported from one province to another,
can be enforced even before its actual publication in the Official
Gazette of June 14, 1982
HELD: NO
The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A is a penal
regulation published more than two months after the confiscation of
the cattle or in June 14, 1982. Hence, it became effective only
fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. It
should therefore not be enforced against the petitioners. 
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. (People v Que Po). Justice and fairness
dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means
of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order
can be bound thereby.
Note: The word "laws" in Article 2 of the NCC also
includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or
exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange
of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,
Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings
as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2)
of the Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that
a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power
not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
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initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of
the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630
did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on
the same day. But this was because the President had certified S.
No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President
the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
Mirasol vs CA
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar
production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing
scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel
Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and
sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of
their obligations to it.
 Regional Trial Courts.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974
authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase
sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's
purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might
realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the
proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,
petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it
ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and
to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank.
PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts.
As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to
extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a
deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the
proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could
offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its
stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since
under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained
to the National Government. 

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting,
specific performance, and damages against PNB.



Issues:



(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a
statute unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General
where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution
of the Trial Court.



(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.



Held: 
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute,
presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all


The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3
is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be
tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress
that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and
similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is
required in "any action" and not just actions involving declaratory
relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule,
there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.

4 of 9
 Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing
issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the
prohibition against the taking of private property without just
compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power
of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for
the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the
person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.  such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder,
or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management
expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2)
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more
than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong
Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security,
which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
 
Issues:
1 Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2 Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony.
3 Whether or not the submission of matching bid is
premature
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1 It is a self-executing provision.
1 Since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A
provision which lays down a general principle,
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing.
2 A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
3 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that in the grant
5 of 9
 of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on
the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which
all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
2 The Court agree.
1 In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2 It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial
of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively
an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a
concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which
have shaped Philippine history.
3 Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51%
of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the hotel.
In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands.
3 It is not premature.
1 In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits
the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.
And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must
be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be
simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2 The Court does not discount the apprehension that
this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are
understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a
foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring
to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know
his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.
 
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
Astorga vs Villegas
Facts: 
House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the
House of Representatives, was passed on third reading without
6 of 9
amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate,
substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino.
Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. There was
also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does
not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been
acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its
approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the
ones actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill
were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then the President
affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became
RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong
version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not
embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the
Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate President invalidated his
signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his
signature on H.B. 9266.
Issue:  necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act”
Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered
to.
Held:  as: All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due
to coequal and independent departments, which requires the judicial
department to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the right manner.
Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment,
required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of
the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate President
declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in
the journal should be consulted.
Victorias Milling vs Social Security Commissions
Facts
• The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on
October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in computing
premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses
and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of other
media remuneration.
• The petitioner(Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest
against the circular as it is contrary to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
• Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers’ and the employees’
respective monthly premium contributions.
• The counsel questioned the validity of the circular
• Social Security Commission overruled the objections
• Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal
Issue
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the
Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to
the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be
Held
Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash. Except:
• that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received
during the month;
• bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
• dismissal and all other payments which the employer may
make, although not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation”
to: (f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include
the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than
cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00
received during the month.
Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees
concerned with the interpretation of the law as amended which was
Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce.   The Commission
simply stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed
and that such circular did not require presidential approval and
7 of 9
publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it
renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation of law is at best
merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Morales vs Subido
FACTS:
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police
department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a
bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the
Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel.
He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his
present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales
 was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same
time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the
mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service,
approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his
appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil
service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead,
Subido   certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido
invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. –
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning
and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of
any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person
“who has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified
for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was
being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the
following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or who
has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which
was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from
the conference committee the only change made in the provision
was the insertion of the phrase “or has served as chief of police
with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by
producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum
which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate
bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the
then bill being deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the
bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into
the matter.
HELD: 
No.   The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative
secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is
exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by
the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to
discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith
and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the
official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC
would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying
to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of
lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in
all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there
are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity
of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters
entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon
but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC
does not now decide.   All the SC holds is that with respect to
matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
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Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
FACTS:
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the
province of Mindoro were ordered  by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live
in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who
were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was   placed in prison at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by   Rubi and
other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the
reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this
case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are
found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board.
was challenged.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be
given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was
intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-
Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes
were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and
to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle
them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board
of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and
stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of
the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization
of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that
due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws,
there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code

constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are
being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under
the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to
determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial
governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the
law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to
the provincial governor.   The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact.

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