THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 168641. April 27, 2007.]

PHILIPPINES petitioner, vs . CLEMENTE BAUTISTA,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BAUTISTA
respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J :
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, p

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari led by the People of the Philippines
assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
72784, reversing the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Manila and
dismissing the criminal case for slight physical injuries against respondent on the ground
that the offense charged had already prescribed.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida
Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant led a Complaint with the O ce of the Barangay of Malate,
Manila, but no settlement was reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certi cation
to file action dated August 11, 1999. 2 EHCDSI

On August 16, 1999, private complainant led with the O ce of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-
accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong
issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the ling of an
Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date
of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, led with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the
time the Information was led, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the
commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled
that the offense had not yet prescribed.
Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but the RTC
denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC. EDcICT

Respondent then led a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005, the CA
rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the 60-day prescriptive period was
interrupted when the offended party led a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August
16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the
Information was filed with the MeTC, reasoning as follows:
In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP
Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively terminated the proceedings at the OCP.
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 Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his designated alter ego,
to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been
taken as late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was led with
the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next
year. To use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC, the
proceedings at the CPO was "unjusti ably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him (the accused)" for a time very much more than the
prescriptive period of only two (2) months. months The offense charged had,
therefore, already prescribed when led with the court on June 20, 2000. . . . 3
(Emphasis supplied)

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the appealed Orders
of both courts below and Criminal Case No. 344030-CR, entitled: "People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, — versus — Clemente Bautista and Leonida Bautista,
Accused," is ordered DISMISSED . Costs de oficio. SIAEHC

SO ORDERED. 4

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA
Decision. The Court gives due course to the petition notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner did not le a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA before the
ling of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for the ling of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 5
The Court finds merit in the petition.
It is not disputed that the ling of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted
the running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight
physical injuries. However, the sole issue for resolution in this case is whether the
prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation to le the proper criminal information against respondent was approved
by the City Prosecutor. CAScIH

The answer is in the negative.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the ling of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjusti ably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him.
him

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)

The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating
prosecutor's recommendation for the ling of an information against respondent, the
period of prescription began to run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule
that the ling of the complaint with the scal's o ce suspends the running of the
prescriptive period. 6

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 The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's
approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be led
with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was
led with the O ce of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted
or acquitted by the proper court. caSDCA

The O ce of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in ling the information
but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and
the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte , 7 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to le the
requisite complaint. 8
The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the
petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in the conduct of
preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the ling of the Information after the City
Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to le the
information.
The O ce of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in
the ling of the information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the
deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly in icted on
him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time.
The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors' apparent lack of a sense of urgency in
ful lling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more appropriate course of action
should be the ling of an administrative disciplinary action against the erring public
officials. EIDTAa

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 02-103990 is hereby REINSTATED.
Let the Secretary of the Department of Justice be furnished a copy of herein
Decision for appropriate action against the erring officials.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired) and concurred in by

Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Magdangal M. De Leon; rollo, pp. 31-44.

2. Section 410 (c), Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government Code
provides:

Section 410. (c) Suspension of prescriptive periods of offense — While the dispute is
under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration the prescriptive periods for offenses and
cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint with
the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to
file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such
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 interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay.
3. Rollo, p. 42.
4. Id. at 43.
5. Almora v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 23, 35 (1999); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Hantex Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 136975, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 301, 320.
6. Arambulo v. Laqui, Sr., 396 Phil. 914, 923 (2000); Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil.
471, 477 (1983); People v. Olarte, 125 Phil. 895, 902 (1967).

7. People v. Olarte, id.

8. Id.

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