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Lewis, D. 1983. New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of

Philosophy 61: 343–77. Reprinted in Lewis 1999: 8–55.
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Schaffer, J. 2009. On what grounds what. In Metametaphysics, eds. D. J. Chalmers,
D. Manley, and R. Wasserman, 347–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Does Your Metaphysics Need Structure?

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GABRIELE CONTESSA

Theodore Sider’s Writing the Book of the World (2012) is a sustained case
for what Sider calls realism about structure (or, as I will call it here, structure
realism). But what does ‘structure’ mean here? Although Sider assures us that
‘structure is a worldly, not conceptual or linguistic, matter’ (5, n. 5),1 the best
way to get a preliminary handle on what Sider means by ‘structure’ seems to
be through the old question of whether a certain language (or, if you prefer, a
certain conceptual scheme) ‘carves nature at its joints’. A language carves
nature at its joints only to the extent to which its terms latch (more or less
directly) onto the world’s fundamental structure. To use Nelson Goodman’s
classic example, ordinary English presumably carves nature at its joints better
than ‘Gruesome English’, which is just like ordinary English except that
‘green’ and ‘blue’ are replaced by ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’.2 If ‘green’ and ‘blue’
carve nature neatly at its joints, then the properties being blue and being
green are perfectly natural properties and, as such, they are part of the
world’s fundamental structure.
Sider’s main argument for structure realism is that the notion of structure
has many philosophically useful applications. The example we just
considered suggests a first possible application of the notion of structure –
structure realism offers a response to inductive scepticism (or at least to in-
ductive scepticism of the ‘gruesome’ variety). Since all emeralds observed so
far have been found to be both green and grue, why, asks the inductive
sceptic, should we infer that all emeralds are green as opposed to grue?
The structure realist’s answer is that it is because ‘green’ carves nature at
the joints better than ‘grue’.
If the green/grue example gives us a first glimpse into the meaning of
‘structure’, to get a better handle on it, we should turn to another of structure
realism’s potential applications. Structure realism might help its supporters
avert the threat of another sort of scepticism, namely semantic scepticism.

1 All references are to Writing the Book of the World, by Ted Sider, unless otherwise noted.
2 Where something is grue if and only if, say, it is examined before year 2500 and it is green
or it is not examined before year 2500 and it is blue.

Analysis Reviews Vol 73 | Number 4 | October 2013 | pp. 715–721 doi:10.1093/analys/ant068

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716 | book symposium

Consider, for instance, the Quinean field linguist who is trying to figure out
what the word ‘gavagai’ means in some isolated language (call it Gavanese).
‘Gavagai’ is often used by native Gavanese speakers when ostensibly
talking about rabbits, but does ‘gavagai’ mean ‘rabbit’ or does it mean,
say, ‘undetached-rabbit-parts’ (or ‘rabbit-within-5,000–miles-of-the-
speaker’, or . . .)? Assuming each of these interpretations is compatible
with all linguistic and non-linguistic behaviours of native Gavanese speakers,
why, asks the semantic sceptic, should we privilege one of them over the

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others?
A possible reply is to adopt a package of views that includes structure
realism along with the (meta-)semantic view often referred to as reference
magnetism. The idea is, roughly, that ‘rabbit’ is a more eligible meaning for
‘gavagai’ than any of the other candidate meanings, for rabbits are part of the
(presumably non-fundamental) structure of the world, while undetached-
rabbit-parts or rabbits-within-5,000–miles-of-the-speaker are not. In other
words, even if the meaning of ‘gavagai’ were underdetermined by all relevant
linguistic, psychological and sociological facts, there would still be a fact of
the matter as to what ‘gavagai’ means insofar as one of its possible meanings
carves nature at its joints better than all the others.
This second application of structure realism is probably the one that gives
us the clearest sense of how broad and inclusive Sider’s notion of structure is.
As Sider persuasively argues, if the combination of reference magnetism and
structure realism is to defuse all forms of semantic scepticism, then the
world’s structure must include more than just rabbits and being green, for
semantic underdetermination threatens our interpretations of terms such as
‘plus’, ‘exists’ and ‘not’ no less than our interpretations of terms such as
‘green’ or ‘gavagai’.
One might even argue that, from a philosophical point of view, some of
these other cases of semantic underdetermination are even more serious than
the first two we have considered. Consider, for example, ‘exists’. Many
debates in metaphysics concern the existence of entities of a certain sort –
e.g. universals, bare particulars, holes or statues. If there were a number of
equally eligible meanings of ‘exists’, however, these debates would rest on
equivocation – it might be true that universals exist in one sense of ‘exist’ but
not in another sense. If ontological questions are to be substantive, argues
Sider, one interpretation of ‘exists’ must carve nature at its joints better than
any alternate interpretation. Similar considerations seem to apply to many
debates about logic – if, say, the classical and intuitionistic interpretations of
‘or’ or ‘it is not the case that’ carve nature at its joints equally well, then there
simply is no fact of the matter as to which of those two interpretations is
correct.
If the conjunction of structure realism and reference magnetism can really
avert the threat of all forms of semantic scepticism in one fell swoop, as Sider
seems to suggest it does, then Sider’s proposal is indeed tempting. However,
 book symposium | 717

I doubt that structure realism can actually deliver on all its promises. Let me
explain. Personally, I am sympathetic to the idea that something along the
lines of reference magnetism can provide us with plausible responses to some
forms of semantic scepticism (although for reasons somewhat different from
Sider’s, but let’s leave that aside). For example, I think it is plausible to claim
that reference magnetism contributes to fixing the meanings of terms such as
‘green’ or ‘gavagai’. However, I doubt that reference magnetism is a cure-all
for all forms of semantic underdetermination. In particular, I doubt that it

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can contribute to fixing the meanings of expressions such as ‘exist’ or ‘or’.
Ultimately, this is because I cannot see what in the world could possibly act
as a reference magnet for those words.
For example, take ‘either . . . or . . .’ and ‘it is not the case that’ in the sen-
tence ‘Either every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes or
it is not the case that every even number greater than two is the sum of two
primes’. If their correct interpretation is classical, then that sentence expresses
a tautology, for, on that interpretation, to assert that disjunction is to assert
that at least one of its disjuncts is true and, since, on its classical interpret-
ation, one of the disjuncts cannot be false unless the other one is true, the
proposition expressed by that sentence must be true. If the correct interpret-
ation of ‘either . . . or . . .’ and ‘it is not the case that’ is intuitionistic, however,
to assert the above disjunction is to assert that there is a proof of at least one
of the disjuncts and, since in this case (as well as other cases) this is not true,
we are not in a position to assert that sentence. But what in the world could
make one of these candidate meanings of ‘either . . . or . . .’ and ‘it is not the
case that’ more eligible than the other (other than linguistic use, conventions,
philosophical considerations or some combination of these and other factors,
that is)?
As far as I can see, the answer is ‘Nothing!’. However, defending my
answer against Sider’s arguments would take me away from my main
point, which is that even if I deny the existence of a reference magnet for
‘either . . . or . . .’ and ‘it is not the case that’, my denial does not necessarily
make me a structure anti-realist. I might well be a structure realist who denies
that any of the candidate interpretations of ‘either . . . or . . .’ and ‘it is not the
case that’ compatible with the ordinary uses of those expressions carves
nature at its joints better than any other. In fact, I might even be a structure
realist who thinks that the very question of which interpretations of
‘either . . . or . . .’ and ‘it is not the case that’ carve nature at its joint is mis-
guided, because such expressions are not meant to carve nature in the first
place. In other words, I might believe that the world has a structure (as
opposed to many structures or none) but deny that that structure contains
anything that can act as a reference magnet for ‘either . . . or . . .’ or ‘it is not
the case that’.
But why would this pose a problem for structure realists? I think it does
because it goes to show that structure (qua structure) is ultimately idle. What
718 | book symposium

does the job in virtually every supposed application of structure is not the
world’s structure as a whole but one or more of its components. The world’s
structure, for example, does not act as a reference magnet for ‘green’,
‘gavagai’, ‘either . . . or . . .’, or ‘it is not the case that’. Rather, some of its
components do, and structure realists can legitimately disagree with one
another as to which specific components of the world’s structure (if any!)
act as reference magnets for each of those expressions. So, structure realism,
in and of itself, does not provide its supporters with the tools to defuse all

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forms of semantic scepticism; only realism about the specific components of
the world’s structure that act as reference magnets for some term that can do
so. Furthermore, structure realism seems to be completely silent as to what
the components of the world’s structure are, for all structure realists need to
agree on to be structure realists is that the world has a structure, as opposed
to none or many.3
This brings me to one of my main worries about the notion of structure.
My worry is that this talk of the world’s structure is useful only insofar as
‘structure’ is taken to be a placeholder for whatever the world might turn out
to contain (at a fundamental level). If that’s the case, then ‘structure’ is likely
to turn out to be a term of convenience, a term that picks out a motley
assortment of entities with little or nothing in common besides their being
collectively referred to as ‘structure’. The referent of ‘structure’ might turn
out to be a metaphysical hodgepodge of radically heterogeneous entities, as
opposed to something that one can be genuinely realist about (independently
of one’s being realist about its specific components, that is).4
Although Sider himself does not seem to be entirely immune to this sort of
worry, he makes short shrift of it. As far as I can see, there are only two
passages in the book that raise somewhat similar worries. The first occurs
early in the book, where Sider writes:
The posit of structure will be unjustified if its alleged ‘applications’ – its
connections to similarity, intrinsicality, and the rest – are in the end
unified by nothing beyond a bare assertion that a single notion of struc-
ture plays the needed role in each case. . . . But positing structure is not

3 Similar considerations would seem to apply to the first application of structure. Inductive
scepticism is undermined by the structure realist’s response only if the world’s structure is
such that ordinary English carves at its joints better than ‘Gruesome English’. However, a
structure realist can coherently deny that to be the case
4 Structure realists might reply that this sort of situation is not peculiar to structure realism
and that it arises for other forms of realism too. They might argue that, for example,
realists about universals often disagree about which universals there are, but this does not
seem to make universals something one cannot be realist about. The two situations, how-
ever, are not analogous. Realists about universals all agree that there are entities of a
certain sort; realists about structure, on the other hand, do not need to agree about what
sorts of entities there are, for structure does not seem to be a sort of entity.
 book symposium | 719

like this sort of bare assertion, since the applications are all intertwined.
(11; emphasis in the original)
The second is a crucial passage near the end of Chapter 7, in which Sider
states:
The ‘first-order heterogeneity’ of structure, and of structure-involving
notions, is an in-principle obstacle to a non-disjunctive definition of
structure. Thus the choice is stark: either adopt extreme realism about

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structure – holding that structure is itself structural – or else give up
altogether on explanations that invoke structure, which is tantamount
to giving up on structure itself. My choice is for the former. The status
of metaphysics itself hangs on this choice. In their loftiest moments,
metaphysicians think of themselves as engaged in a profoundly import-
ant and foundational intellectual enterprise. But if fundamentality is
highly disjunctive, the field of metaphysics itself – which is delineated
by its focus on fundamental questions – would be an arbitrarily demar-
cated one. (140)
I am not persuaded by the arguments in either passage. Consider the
argument in the first passage first. To start with, as I have already argued,
the alleged ‘applications’ of structure do not seem to be applications of struc-
ture in the first place. At most, they are applications of one or more of the
specific components of structure, and different applications will usually rely
on different sets of components. Consider, for example, the two applications
that Sider mentions in the first quote above – the connections between the
notion of structure and the notions of similarity and intrinsicality. As far as
I can see, those connections stem exclusively from one sort of component of
the world’s structure – i.e. natural properties. Whatever counterparts, say,
quantifiers or connectives might have out there in the world, they would seem
to play no significant role in grounding the genuine similarities between
particulars or the intrinsicality of (some of) their properties. Similar consid-
erations would seem to apply to one of the applications we have already
considered – i.e. inductive scepticism; even in that case, natural properties
seem to be doing all the substantive work, while the other components of the
world’s structure would seem to be idle.
In fact, as far as I can see, the only application of structure that might put
all of the components of the world’s structure to work is reference magnet-
ism. However, even so, the world’s structure as a whole does not seem to act
as a reference magnet for anything (with the possible exception of phrases
such as ‘the world’s structure’). Moreover, the fact that all components of
structure can act as reference magnets seems to do little to ease the hetero-
geneity worry, for it is well-known that very dissimilar things can sometimes
perform the same function, and I doubt that reference magnets need to have
much in common with one another in order to act as reference magnets.
720 | book symposium

A structure realist might argue that, even if, say, chairs are extremely dis-
similar from one another, it seems like they must share at least some of their
features in order to perform their common function (all chairs, for example,
would seem to have to be solid middle-sized objects with a sufficiently large,
roughly horizontal surface that is neither too far off the floor nor too close to
it). The same, they might argue, applies to reference magnets – no matter how
dissimilar from one another they might seem, they must have some common
feature in virtue of which they can exert their reference magnetism. However,

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I doubt that reference magnets need to have very much in common in order
to act as reference magnets. It is tempting to think that all it takes for some-
thing to act as a reference magnet is simply to exist and, if Sider is right in
suggesting that even ‘exists’ has a reference magnet, then even existence
might be too strong a requirement. Presumably, existence itself (i.e. whatever
might act as a reference magnet for ‘exists’) does not exist (my intuitions on
the matter, however, are admittedly very hazy, for, as I mentioned, I am not
even sure of how to interpret the claim that existence is part of the world’s
structure in its own right).
At this point, structure realists might suggest that what all components of
structure have in common is not their existence but their fundamentality.
They might claim that this is sufficient to alleviate the heterogeneity worry.
However, I find it hard to believe that, say, universals and existence can be
said to be ‘fundamental’ in exactly the same sense of the word. After all, it
seems that we can say of universals that they exist, and this would seem to
make existence more fundamental than universals (but, again, my intuitions
about these matters are far from clear, as I am not certain what existence
might be other than the existence of some thing or other).
Let me now turn to the arguments in the second passage above. Since
I have already expressed my reservations about structure (as opposed to its
specific components) playing any genuine role in metaphysical explanations,
let me focus on Sider’s second argument – i.e. the one according to which, if
the world’s fundamental structure were heterogeneous, then the object of
metaphysics would be arbitrarily demarcated. Even if we concede that the
object of metaphysics is what Sider calls ‘the world’s fundamental structure’,
it seems that part of the aim of metaphysics is to figure out what the contents
of that structure are, which, in turn, seems to involve (among other things)
determining whether or not those contents are homogeneous (i.e. whether,
for example, the right fundamental ontology is a one-category or multi-
category one). Does this mean that metaphysics has an arbitrarily demarcated
object? I see no good reason to think so. Consider the analogy with another
field of inquiry with ambitions of fundamentality – i.e. physics. Like meta-
physics, physics might also be said to investigate the world’s fundamental
structure. In the case of physics, however, the question of whether the con-
tents of that structure turn out to be homogeneous or heterogeneous (i.e. the
question of whether, for example, the world contains only strings or fields or
 book symposium | 721

contains a plethora of different kinds of particles) does not seem to bear on

the question of whether or not the object of physics is demarcated in a
principled manner. But, if the possible heterogeneity of its object does not
pose a problem for physics as a field of inquiry, I don’t see why it should pose
one for metaphysics.
So far I have expressed my misgivings about structure realism. Does this
mean that I deny or at least doubt that the world has one structure (as
opposed to none or many)? The short answer is ‘No!’. A slightly longer

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(and more informative) answer may require distinguishing two senses in
which one can believe that the world has a structure, which we might call
strong and weak structure realism. Strong structure realism is what I take
Sider to be advocating in Writing the Book of the World – it is the view that
we do not just need to be realist about what the individual components of the
world’s fundamental structure are (which might include, depending on one’s
metaphysical views, universals or bare particulars or what-have-you) but also
about the world’s structure itself. Weak structure realism, on the other hand,
is simply the thesis that the world has one structure (as opposed to none or
many), a thesis whose denial leads to various forms of metaphysical plural-
ism or metaphysical anti-realism. Weak structure realism takes ‘structure’ to
be just a placeholder for whatever the world contains at the fundamental
metaphysical level (as opposed to something one can be genuinely realist
about). In this article, I have tried to explain why, although I find weak
structure realism very plausible, I was not persuaded by Sider’s case for
strong structure realism.5

Carleton University
Ottawa, ON, K1S 5B6, Canada
gabriele_contessa@carleton.ca

Reference
Sider, T. 2012. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5 I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for
support in the form of a Standard Research Grant and Eli Shupe for her helpful comments
and for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this paper.