Malabanan v Ramento; G.R. NO.

62270; 21 May 1984; 129 SCRA 359

Claudine | 29 September 2017 | 0 Comments

FACTS:
Petitioners, all officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, sought
and were granted a permit to hold a meeting. At such gathering they manifested their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They marched and
demonstrated outside the place indicated in the permit, disturbing the classes being held. They were later
suspended for one academic year for holding an illegal assembly.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free
speech in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed.

RULING:
YES. Petitioners are entitled to their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They enjoy like the rest of
the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in
gatherings. While the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it
cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards.

Petition is GRANTED.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to property rights,
Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly and rights of petition

FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise of their constitutional right
of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of
the municipality of Pasig at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first,
second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon where PBMEO
confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution
but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation thus whoever fails to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed for violation of the
existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation since they gave
prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the petitioners.

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• In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is
the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or
agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester
and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of
which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be
illegal picketing or strike
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of
their property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request
of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the
day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to
support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring
about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the
superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.
Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in
Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Under the
Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate
the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-
organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic
well-being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction secured

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at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after
the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is
not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It
is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors
to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the
Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would
be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually
loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling
reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. It is
an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require."

Bayan v Ermita

Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly
the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate
attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464
to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and
were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’
power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power
is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
– which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned
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and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in
aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour,
it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information
that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress
to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing
custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however,
be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of
privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

TMPCWA vs NLRC

Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation vs Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association
– Labor Law – Labor Relations – Categories of Illegal Strikes
In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota
filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually
appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but the latter
refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive
mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyota’s appeal.
In relation to Toyota’s appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed to attend
the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But despite this, many Union members and officers
failed to render overtime and work on the following day which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union
members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned their work.
This resulted to another rally within Toyota’s premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of Toyota
preventing non-strikers from going to work.
In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-work
order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June 2001, union members still
conducted rallies and pickets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal.

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HELD: Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227 employees were
terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure required by the Labor Code. It cannot
be said that the strike conducted before the BLR is beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor
Code. The Union argues that the “strike” is actually a protest directed against the government and is covered
by their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The
SC disagreed with this argument because the Union failed to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was
biased against them. Further, if this were the kind of protest they were claiming, they should have secured a
rally permit. Further still, this case involves a labor dispute. The employees may shroud their “strike” as mere
demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are temporary work stoppages.
The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute are illegal for they
violated the return-to-work order.
The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:
1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental
functions; or
2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a
valid strike]; or
3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor
practice against non-union employees; or
4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-
strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by
the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or
6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause

Yates v. United States

Argued October 8-9, 1956

Decided June 17, 1957* 354 U.S. 298

The 14 petitioners, leaders of the Communist Party in California, were indicted in 1951 in a Federal District
Court under § 3 of the Smith Act and 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring (1) to advocate and teach the duty and
necessity of overthrowing the Government of the United States by force and violence, and (2) to organize, as
the Communist Party of the United States, a society of persons who so advocate and teach, all with the intent
of causing the overthrow of the Government by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit.
The indictment charged that the conspiracy originated in 1940 and continued down to the date of the
indictment, and that, in carrying it out, petitioners and their coconspirators would (a) become members and
officers of the Communist Party, with knowledge of its unlawful purposes, and assume leadership in carrying
out its policies and activities, (b) cause to be organized units of the Party in California and elsewhere, (c) write
and publish articles on such advocacy and teaching, (d) conduct schools for the indoctrination of Party
members in such advocacy and teaching, and (e) recruit new Party members, particularly from among
persons employed in the key industries of the Nation. It also alleged 23 overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Petitioners were convicted after a jury trial, and their convictions were sustained by the Court of
Appeals.

Held: The convictions are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with directions to enter
judgments of acquittal as to five of the petitioners and to grant a new trial as to the others. Pp. 354 U. S. 300-
338.

1. Since the Communist Party came into being in 1945, and the indictment was not returned until 1951, the
three-year statute of limitations had run on the "organizing" charge, and required the withdrawal of that part
of the indictment from the jury's consideration. Pp. 354 U. S. 303-312.

Page 354 U. S. 299

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(a) Applying the rule that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly, the word "organize," as used in the
Smith Act, is construed as referring only to acts entering into the creation of a new organization, and not to
acts thereafter performed in carrying on its activities, even though the latter may loosely be termed
"organizational." Pp. 303-311.

(b) The trial court's mistaken construction of the word "organize" was not harmless error; the circumstances
are such as to call for application of the rule which requires a verdict to be set aside where it is supportable
on one ground, but not another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. Pp. 354 U. S. 311-
312.

2. The Smith Act does not prohibit advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow of the Government as an
abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end; the trial court's charge to the jury
furnished wholly inadequate guidance on this central point in the case, and the conviction cannot be allowed
to stand. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, distinguished. Pp. 354 U. S. 312-327.

3. The evidence against five of the petitioners is so clearly insufficient that their acquittal should be ordered,
but that as to the others is such as not to justify closing the way to their retrial. Pp. 354 U. S. 327-334.

4. Determinations favorable to petitioner Schneiderman made by this Court in Schneiderman v. United

States, 320 U. S. 118, a denaturalization proceeding in which he was the prevailing party, are not conclusive
in this proceeding under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and he is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal
on that ground. Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683. Pp. 354 U. S. 335-338.

225 F.2d 146, reversed and remanded.

NAACP v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson

Argued January 15-16, 1958

Decided June 30, 1958. 357 U.S. 449

Petitioner is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York for the purpose of
advancing the welfare of Negroes. It operates through chartered affiliates which are independent
unincorporated associations, with membership therein equivalent to membership in petitioner. It had local
affiliates in Alabama, and opened an office of its own there without complying with an Alabama statute which,
with some exceptions, requires a foreign corporation to qualify before doing business in the State by filing its
corporate charter and designating a place of business and an agent to receive service of process. Alleging that
petitioner's activities were causing irreparable injury to the citizens of the State for which criminal
prosecution and civil actions at law afforded no adequate relief, the State brought an equity suit in a state
court to enjoin petitioner from conducting further activities in, and to oust it from, the State. The court issued
an ex parte order restraining petitioner, pendente lite, from engaging in further activities in the State and from
taking any steps to qualify to do business there. Petitioner moved to dissolve the restraining order, and the
court, on the State's motion, ordered the production of many of petitioner's records, including its membership
lists. After some delay, petitioner produced substantially all the data called for except its membership lists. It
was adjudged in contempt, and fined $100,000 for failure to produce the lists. The State Supreme Court
denied certiorari to review the contempt judgment, and this Court granted certiorari.

Held:

1. Denial of relief by the State Supreme Court did not rest on an adequate state ground, and this Court has
jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's federal claims. Pp. 357 U. S. 454-458.

2. Petitioner has a right to assert on behalf of its members a claim that they are entitled under the Federal
Constitution to be protected from being compelled by the State to disclose their affiliation with the
Association. Pp. 357 U. S. 458-460.

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Page 357 U. S. 450

3. Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to
come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State has failed to show a controlling
justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of
petitioner's membership lists is likely to have. Accordingly, the judgment of civil contempt and the fine which
resulted from petitioner's refusal to produce its membership lists must fall. Pp. 357 U. S. 460-466.

(a) Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the
"liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 357 U. S. 460-461.

(b) In the circumstances of this case, compelled disclosure of petitioner's membership lists is likely to
constitute an effective restraint on its members' freedom of association. Pp. 357 U. S. 461-463.

(c) Whatever interest the State may have in obtaining the names of petitioner's ordinary members, it has not
been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the production order. Pp. 357
U. S. 463-466.

4. The question whether the state court's temporary restraining order preventing petitioner from soliciting
support in the State violates the Fourteenth Amendment is not properly before this Court, since the merits of
the controversy have not been passed on by the state courts. Pp. 357 U. S. 466-467.

265 Ala. 349, 91 So.2d 214, reversed, and cause remanded

PEOPLE VS. FERRER 43 SCRA 382

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of Sec. 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the CFI of Tarlac. Respondent was an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communists Party of the Philippines (CPP), an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of illegal means for the purpose of establisihing a totalitarian
regime. He is an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the NPA, the
military arm of the CPP. Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding
a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. Co
moved to quash thee information on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Acts is a bill of attainder.

Anther criminal complaint was filed with the same court, charging the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others
with subversion. The above accused were officers and/or ranking leaders of the Kabatasang Makabayan
(KM), a subversive organization as defined in RA 1700. Tayag moved to quash on the ground that the statute
is a bill of attainder.

ISSUE: WON the Acts violates the right to freedom of speech and association?

HELD: Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be
enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-
making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of
attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil
that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden
on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.

Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to
render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons
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 mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
been declared not to be a bill of attainder. Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society
having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such
society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was
shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan.

the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence or other illegal means.
Whatever interest in freedom of speech and freedom of association is infringed by the prohibition against
knowing membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to be
clearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerations of national security and the preservation of
democratic institutions in his country.

The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Act is similar in many respects to the membership provision
of the Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:

Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes
or is a member of, or affiliated with, any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose
thereof —

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible
for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction....

In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States:

It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected
speech, and it was further established that a combination to promote such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of
what purports to be a political party, is not such association as is protected by the first Amendment. We can
discern no reason why membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in
this same forbidden advocacy, should receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that
Amendment.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating
Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the approval of this Act,
the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme
Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly
recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed integration.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to “integration”
in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

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 Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law, integration
fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.”
Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as well
as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court
held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a
member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only
compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a
member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer may be used
for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government
exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to positions taken
by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an overwhelming
majority of lawyers who favored integration.

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32066. August 6, 1979

FACTS:

Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a movie entitled
"The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto
Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story".

The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November,
1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried
and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political
history."

Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt
with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de
Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.

On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of her mother, private
respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie.

On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner and private respondent
executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of
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P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961;
P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor
(private respondent) grants authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the
life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental
to said production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the use of
LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby
granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any of the acts herein authorized.

After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different theaters all over the
country.

Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December
22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor
ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the
Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2%
royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.

Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie
were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over
those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed
the same only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought
for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and of the press.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the
latter was a public figure.

2. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
of the press.

RULING:

1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla
Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray
publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held
in Schuyler v. Curtis,” a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his
memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation
of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."

Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to
invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true
that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he
included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.

2. No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It
would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media
as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation."

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In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -
freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that
under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.

AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs. CAPULONG

FACTS:

Petitioner McElroy, an Australian Film maker, and AYER PRODUCTIONS, his movie production company
envisioned, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and International Release, the historic peaceful struggle
of the Filipinos at EDSA.

The proposed Motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted.

Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-
series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background.

David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an
American historian have developed a script.

Private Respondent Ponce Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production,
film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.

Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to
privacy is unlawfully intruded.

Petitioner contended that:

a. the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and
b. the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on the individual
private life of respondent Senator.

RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family
and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial
or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:

a. W/N the Freedom of Speech/ Expression includes freedom to film and produce motion pictures.

b. W/N Right to Privacy of Respondent Enrile is violated by the Motion Picture of “Four Day Revolution”.

RULING:

a. Yes. Freedom of Speech includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such
motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Along with press, radio and television,
motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for information, education and
entertainment.

This freedom of Speech is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion
picture companies.

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 b. The projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
private respondent’s right of privacy. Whether the “balancing of interest test” or the “clear and present
danger test” be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion
must here be reached.

Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy
that private respondent could lawfully assert.

The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-bloody change of government which
took place at EDSA. Clearly such subject matter is one of public interest and concern or even
international interest. The subject matter relates to a highly critical state in the history of this country
and thus passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
coverage by any form of mass media. The synopsis provided by petitioner does not relate to the individual
life and certainly not the private life of respondent Ponce Enrile. The “Four Day Revolution” is not
principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile.

Moreso, Private respondent Enrile is a public figure (which gives the public a legitimate interest of his
doings, his affairs, his character and has become a public “personage”), in other words he is a celebrity.
To be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing
before the public. This includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even
ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, in short anyone who has arrived at a position where public is
focused upon him as a person. Private respondent Enrile is a public figure because of his participation
as principal action in the culminating events of the change of government. The right of privacy of a
public figure is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.

But it must be noted that the proposed motion picture is required to be fairly truthful and historical in
its presentation of events. This serves as a line of equilibrium in this case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy. There must be no presentation of the
private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing
personal facts. Portrayal of the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution should be
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered
the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband

Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence

Held:

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(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution
is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets
of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom
of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And
this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

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