Balacuit v CFI (substantive due process)

Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

Facts:

Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of
Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a
fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment

The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent
court entered its decision declaring the law valid.

Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of’ the Municipal Board to enact
as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for
theaters and not admission rates.

The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section
15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue:

W/N Ordinance 640 – prohibiting payment on theater tickets for children below seven (7) is constitutional?

Ruling:

NO, because it infringes theater owners’ right to property.

There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their
legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing
immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to
purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.

Such ticket represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of
sale. This right is clearly a right of property.The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property.
As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the
clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting the sale
of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state
constitution securing the right of property.

June 29, 2013

GR No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he
was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and
Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally
recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according
to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy
falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction
(1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation
of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs.
Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question.
The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to mandatory constitutional
limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but
it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the
laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of
electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled
by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to the contested
office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners
present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE

Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides
were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.

Tuason vs Register of Deeds of Caloocan GR No 70484 29 January 1988

Facts: Spouses Tuason were retired public school teachers. With funds from their retirement benefits and savings, they
bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land in the latter’s subdivision in Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel’s
Torrens title was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their
property. Some eight years thereafter, the Tuasons’ travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by
presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that
their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been “declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof.”

On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Marcos, invoking his emergency
powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the
Tuasons’ vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into
several lots for sale to the public. Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete
payment of the price.

Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following
imperious manner: order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original
purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers
are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government.

On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons’
title, that their certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the
Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the
Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary
measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional
provisions on due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the
indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory
inscription on their title and restore its efficacy.

Issue: WON the remedy of petition for certiorari was proper

Decision: The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts,
and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts
essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try
and decide or determine a cause.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of
what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being
vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts done by him were
in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief
executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had.

The Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of the former
sufficiently made out a case for the latter. It will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction —
exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws — and had furthermore performed the act in
violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected.

Pelaez v Auditor General

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant
to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the
RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make
or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that
the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may
require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character
not administrative (not executive).

G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

A mere license is always revocable

FACTS:
This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising
crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or
property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a
certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled
that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property
or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.”
xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that
“the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions
as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following
the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any
time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing
restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject
to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this
license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract,
and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental
Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of
the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”