V.

D Affidavit and Bond

Advent Capital v. Young, G.R. No. 183018, 3 August 2011

Facts:
Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with the RTC. The rehabilitation court approved the rehab
plan which included in the inventory of Advents assets the subject car of former president and ceo,
Young. Young's obstinate refusal to return the subject car, after repeated demands, prompted Advent to
file the replevin case. After Advents posting of replevin bond the trial court issued a Writ of Seizure
directing the Sheriff to seize the subject car from Young. Upon receipt of the Writ of Seizure, Young
turned over the car to Advent, which delivered the same to the rehabilitation receiver.

RTC - the trial court issued an Order dismissing the replevin case without prejudice for Advents failure
to prosecute.

It appears that as of July 28, 2003, subject motor vehicle has been turned over to the plaintiff,
thru its authorized representative, and adknowledged by the parties respective counsels in separate
Manifestations filed. To date, no action had been taken by the plaintiff in the further prosecution of this
case. Accordingly, this case is ordered dismissed without prejudice on the ground of failure to
prosecute.

It is noteworthy that the case was dismissed by the court a quo for failure of Advent to
prosecute the same. Upon dismissal of the case, the writ of seizure issued as an incident of the main
action (for replevin) became functus officio and should have been recalled or lifted. Since there was no
adjudication on the merits of the case, the issue of who between Advent and petitioner has the better
right to possess the subject car was not determined. As such, the parties should be restored to their
status immediately before the institution of the case.

CA - partly granted. The court ordered the return of the car, and ordering the court to set a hearing for
the determination of damages.

Issue:
Did the CA commit reversible error in directing the return of the seized car?; and ordering the court to
set a hearing for the determination of damages against the replevin bond?

Answer:
No. Upon the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure became functus
officio and should have been lifted. However, Young cannot demand payment becuase it is not valid
and even if valid, has been "stayed" by order of rehabilitation.

Yes. Sec 10, Rule 60 of the ROC, provides that in replevin cases, the damages to be awarded upon the
bond "shall be claimed, ascertained and granted" in accordance with Sec.20, Rule 57, which allows the
application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes executory.

It should be filed in the same case that is the main action and with the court having jurisdiction over the
case at the time of the application. In this case, there was no application for damages against
Stronghold resulting from the issuance of the writ of seizure before the finality of the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to prosecute. Thus, Young is barred from claiming damages against the replevin
bond. With this the CA erred in ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of
damages against the replevin bond
SHORT VERSION:

Facts:
Y, a company currently filed for corporate rehabilitation was approved of their rehab plan. X, former
president and ceo of Y has the subject car in posession via replevin. Eventually, the main case was
dismissed by the court. Upon dismissal of the case, the writ of seizure became functus officio and such
that replevin should have been recalled or lifted. The court then order the return of the subject car and
to set a hearing for the determination of damages.

Issue:
Did the court commit reversible error in ordering the trial court to set a hearing for the determination of
damagas against the replevin bond?

Held:
Yes.
Sec 10, Rule 60 of the ROC, provides that in replevin cases, the damages to be awarded upon the bond
"shall be claimed, ascertained and granted" in accordance with Sec.20, Rule 57, which allows the
application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes executory.

In this case, there was no application for damages resulting from the issuance of the writ of seizure
before the finality of the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute. Thus, X is barred from
claiming damages against the replevin bond. With this the CA erred in ordering the trial court to set a
hearing for the determination of damages against the replevin bond

V. E Order
Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing, G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000

After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be considered as personal or
movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper
subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the other contracting party.

Facts:

PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI) filed a complaint for a sum of money with an application of writ
of replevin. The judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machinery
and equipment to PCI.

Serg filed a motion for special protective order praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer the
enforcement of the writ of replevin contending that the machines were not proper subjects of the writ
because they are in fact real property defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether the machinery are considered a real or personal property? to be subjected to a writ of replevin

Answer:
Yes. The machinery are considered personal property.
SEC. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an
order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully
detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody.

The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of
any material fact found therein.

Hence, Serg is estopped from denying the characterization of the machinery as personal property,
which are proper subjects of Writ of Seizure.

SHORT VERSION:

Facts:

X filed a complaint for a sum of money against Y with an application of writ of replevin. The judge
granted the issuance of a writ of replevin, and directed the sheriff to seize and deliver the machinery
and equipment of Y. X filed a motion for protective order alleging that such machinery cannot be
proper subjects of replevin because they are in fact real property.

Issue:
Whether machinery are considered real or personal property?

Answer:
Yes the machinery are considered personal property.

Rule 60 Sec. 3. Order. -- Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall
issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin describing the personal property alleged to be
wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody.

The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of
any material fact found therein. Hence, Serg is estopped from denying the characterization of the
machinery as personal property.
V.F Duty of Sheriff
Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, 5 June 2009

Facts:
Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner and several John Does before the RTC, for the recovery of a
150 T/H rock crushing plant. Vargas claims that the said object was only entrusted to Rivera's husband.
According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husbands death despite his
repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The complaint was accompanied by a
prayer for issuance of writ of replevin and the bond.
The writ of replevin was served upon and signed by the security guard on duty in the petitioners
crushing plant.

The RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioners redelivery bond application for failure to comply
with the requirements under Section 5 and 6 of Rule 60. The RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to
file the application for redelivery bond within five (5) days from the date of seizure as provided in the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner elevated the matter to CA, invoking Rule 65 but was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner then filed via Rule 45, stating the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her
counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of time. She contends that the mandatory five-day
period did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service of the writ of replevin,
contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.

Issue:
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in not approving the redelivery bond application?

Held:
Yes.

The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all the
requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court. The writ must also
satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the
sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy
thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit,
and the replevin bond.

In this case the RTC, denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory
period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is
correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall
commence to run.
SHORT VERSION
Facts:
X filed a complaint against Y for the recovery of a rock crushing plant. X claims that Y failed to return
the said equipment despite repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action with writ of
replevin. The writ of replevin was served upon and signed by the security guard on duty in the
petitioners crushing plant. The RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioners redelivery bond
application for failure to comply with the requirements under Section 5 and 6 of Rule 60. The RTC
faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for redelivery bond within five (5) days from the
date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court. X contends that the mandatory 5 day period did not
run in this case due to improper service of the writ of replevin.

Issue:
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in not approving the redelivery bond application?

Held:
Yes.

The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all the
requirements as to matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court. The writ must also
satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the
sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy
thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit,
and the replevin bond.

In this case, denial of the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period
prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct
in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall
commence to run.

V.F Duty of Sheriff

Spouses Bautista v. Sula, A.M. No. P-04-1920, 17 August 2007

Facts:
Ruth borrowed money from Glor. The loan, payable in three months, bore a monthly interest. To secure
the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of Glor. Upon maturity of the
loan, Glor repeatedly demanded payment from Ruth. Despite repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay
her debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Glor filed with the RTC, a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of writ of replevin. The trial court issued
the writ of replevin, directing respondent, Sula, the sheriff, to take possession of the vehicle.
Respondent enforced the writ. Ruth filed with the trial court an urgent motion for the return of the
vehicle by submission of counter-bond pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60. Because the trial court failed
to approve complainants counter-bond, Glor asked respondent to deliver the vehicle to her.

Complainants alleged that respondent approached that he was willing to ignore Glors request of
returning the vehicle, in exchange for sum of money. Since Ruth could not produce the amount, the
sheriff filed a sheriffs manifestation asking the court what to do of the property, and without waiting for
the court to decide, delivered the property to Glor and filed his sheriff's return. Complainants then filed
a complaint against respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue:
Is the sheriff correct in delivering the vehicle without waiting for the trial courts instructions?

Held:
No.

SEC. 5. Return of property. If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicants bond, or of
the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does
not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return
thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double
the value of the property as stated in the applicants affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if
such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the
adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.

Sec 6 of Rule 60 provides:

If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to
the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and
the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the
property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.

In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for
the return of the vehicle. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004,
complainants filed their urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of counter-bond
and, on 21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion and change the same with an
omnibus motion. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the
vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of the five-day period. Later, the trial court approved
complainants counter-bond. Thus, respondent committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the
vehicle to Glor.

Under the Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ of
replevin to the plaintiff. This is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession
and may not be deprived of it without due process.[43] The purpose of the five-day period in Section 6
is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter-
bond
SHORT VERSION:

Facts:
X borrowed money from Y, securing the loan with a chattel mortgage of her car in favor of Y. Upon
maturity of loan, and repeated demands for payment which X refused to pay, Y filed a civil case for
judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of writ of replevin. Upon approval
and enforcement of the replevin, May 17 2004, X wanted to recover the property by way of counter-
bond, May 21 2004, but the court failed to approve the said counter-bond. The sheriff approached X
that he will ignore Y's request of returning the vehicle to her, in exchange for a sum of money. X could
not come up with the money so the sheriff made a manifestation asking the court what to do with the
property, and not waiting for the court's decision, delivered the property to Y.

Issue:
Is the sheriff correct in delivering the vehicle without waiting for the trial courts instructions?

Held:
SEC. 5. Return of property. If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicants bond, or of
the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does
not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return
thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double
the value of the property as stated in the applicants affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if
such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the
adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.

Sec 6 of Rule 60 provides:

If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to
the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and
the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the
property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.

In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 for
the return of the vehicle. Both the urgent motion and the omnibus motion were filed before the delivery
of the vehicle to Glor, before the expiration of the five-day period, and with no order from the court.
Thus, respondent committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor. Under the
Rules of Court, the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ of replevin
to the plaintiff. This is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession and may
not be deprived of it without due process. The purpose of the five-day period in Section 6 is to give
defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter-bond
V.G Enforcement
Fernandez v. The International Corporate Bank, G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999

A writ of replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court may be served and enforced anywhere in the
Philippines. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount of the claim alleged in
the complaint, not by the value of the chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.

Facts:
Spouses Fernandez purchased a car through a financing scheme of respondent, International Corporate
Bank, and the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of t the institution. The bank filed an unfounded
complaint for a sum of money with replevin before the MTC of Pasay City. Petitioners claimed that the
bank was filing a baseless case to unjustly enrich themselves. Petitioner filed for the outright dismissal
of the complaint, as well as the lifting of the writ of replevin but was denied citing the reason that
plaintiffs office is in Makati and defendants residence is in Quezon City.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be validly executed
anywhere in Metro Manila because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129, authorized the establishment of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila with eighty-two (82) branches.

Aggrieved, petitioners now seeks reversal of judgment.

Issue:
May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the city?

Held:
Yes.

Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated January 11, 1983, providing for the interim
rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in
the present case may be served anywhere in the Philippines.

The Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines.
Petitioners confused the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the
other, its power to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.
Applying the said Rule, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals reiterated the foregoing distinction between the
jurisdiction of the trial court and the administrative area in which it could enforce its orders and
processes pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred on it.
SHORT VERSION

Facts:
X purchased a car through financing schemes of Y bank. Petitioners claimed that the bank was filing a
baseless case to unjustly enrich themselves. X filed for the outright dismissal of the complaint, as well
as the lifting of the writ of replevin but was denied citing the reason that plaintiff's writ was no longer
valid because it was beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Issue:
May a writ of replevin be enforced outside the city?

Held:
Yes.

Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated January 11, 1983, providing for the interim
rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in
the present case may be served anywhere in the Philippines.

The Writ of Replevin issued may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused
the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the other, its power to
issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.

V.K Judgment
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation v. CA, G. R. No. 127261, September 7, 2001

Facts:
Plaintiffs, Ibajan, alleged that they were the owners of an Isuzu jeepney which was forcibly and
unlawfully taken by defendants Bartolome. Ibahan filed a complaint against Bartolome, for replevin to
recover from them the possession of the Isuzu jeepney. Ibajan filed a replevin bond through Visayan
Surety for the return of the property to defendant.
Dominador Ibajan, the father, filed with the trial court a motion for leave of court to intervene, stating
he has a right superior. The trial court granted the motion to intervene.
Dominador Ibajan filed with the trial court a motion/application for judgment against plaintiffs bond
which the court granted.

Issue:
Whether the surety is liable to intervenor on a replevin bond posted by petitioner in favor of
respondents.

Held:
No.

The obligation of a surety cannot be extended by implication beyond its specified limits. When a surety
executes a bond, it does not guarantee that the plaintiffs cause of action is meritorious, and that it will
be responsible for all the costs that may be adjudicated against its principal in case the action fails. The
extent of a suretys liability is determined only by the clause of the contract of suretyship. A contract of
surety is not presumed; it cannot extend to more than what is stipulated.

Since the obligation of the surety cannot be extended by implication, it follows that the surety cannot
be held liable to the intervenor when the relationship and obligation of the surety is limited to the
defendants specified in the contract of surety. In this case, Visayan Surety is not liable under the
replevin bond to the intervenor Dominador Ibajan.

SHORT VERSION:

Facts:
X, alleged that they own the car which was forcibly and unlawfully taken by Y. X filed a complaint
against Y, for replevin to recover the possession of the vehicle. Replevin bond was bought under W, as
surety. Later on, Z filed for leave of court to intervene, stating he has a right superior. Motion to
intervene was granted. Z as intervenor filed with the trial court a motion/application for judgment
against plaintiffs

Issue:
Whether the surety is liable to intervenor on a replevin bond posted by petitioner in favor of
respondents.

Held:
No.

The obligation of a surety cannot be extended by implication beyond its specified limits. The extent of
a surety's liability is determined only by the clause of the contract of suretyship. A contract of surety is
not presumed; it cannot extend to more than what is stipulated.

Since the obligation of the surety cannot be extended by implication, it follows that the surety cannot
be held liable to the intervenor when the relationship and obligation of the surety is limited to the
defendants specified in the contract of surety. In this case, W (surety) is not liable under the replevin
bond to the intervenor Z.