Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas ARMAND MAURER CSB. "THE pages which follow malke no pretension to treat of St, Thomas’ notions of form and essence in all thelr aspects, A large volume would be re- quired for that, Their aim is simply to study several paragraphs in the Angelic Doctor’s Commentary on the Metaphysics’ which raise a specific problem con- cerning the essence of material substances: Is theix essence identical with thelr form? What is the status of matter with regard to the essence? Is tt indluded in it es an integral part, or is it in some way extrinsically related to it? St, Thomas recognizes that philosophers have given different answers to these questions, and in the section of his Commentary under consideration he. outlines them briefly, giving at the same tlme his own views. We shall follow him in his ex- position of the opinions of his predecessors, commenting on its historical accuracy; finally we shall see his own solution to the problem and its doctrinal significance, 1, AVERROES AND ARISTOTLE. ‘The first opinion regarding the essence of material substances St. Thomas attributes to the Avablan philosopher Averroes and to some of his followers. In brief, it is that the essences of such substances ave identical with thelr forms to the exclusion of matter. The whole essence of the species is the form; for example, the whole essence of man consists in his soul. There is only a logical distinction, therefore, between the form “humanity” and the form “soul.” They are really identlcal. ‘The soul is called the “form of the part” (forme partis) tnasmuch as it perfects matter and brings it into actuality, Humanity is called the “form of the whole” (forma totus) inasmuch as through it the whole com~ posite is determined and fixed in the species, Matter and the material parts of the composite are not included in the essence nor are they included in the definition. signifying the apecies, but only the formal principles of the species" If we turn to Averroes’ Commentary on the Metaphysics we see that this is indeed the serise of his doctrine, although some of the terms used by St, ‘Thomas to express:{t are not to be found there, In particular, 1t does not seem that Averroes used the expressions forma partis and forma totus, ‘The Arabian philosopher follows Aristotle very closely in distinguishing three meanings of the term “substance.” It signifies first of all, he says, the matter of the composite of matter and form. Secondly it means the form, ‘Thirdly it designates the composite itself of form and matter. However, even though all these three can be called substance, only the form can be called the essence or quiddity, Form is the substance of the thing in the senso that it indicates its essence. Matter is a part of the composite ‘but it does not belong to the | ts » revised by R. in actu: forma autem totlus, secundum sleet tome: tishy, Sa HMI’ ” ™ Gua totum, compontum per ean in specie *., solendiim est'quod elren defnitimes collocatur, Et ex hoo volunt quad nuliae Fetbip, ot enum essonting, duplex est opinio. partes materiag ponantus in Wefinitone jn Quldaja nim dlont ‘quod, fota, emantia clean spesiem, ged solum principle special es sigue quod totaal Sirentia . Et ter Averrois et quorumdam sequentlum cum. dlount quod eadem aocundum rem ent forma Loo. cit, n, 1407, CL, De Ente et Herentia. fotlus, quse signifeatur nomine humanitatis, ed. Baur CMfonasterii, 1999), p, 19; In et fouma partis, quse slgnifeatur nomine Sent, d. 44 q..), a, 1 nol. 2, ad 2; 0: Shines, sed. diderunt golum secundum Omnia Ti (Parla, 1874}, p, 288; Contra atlonefa: ‘nam forma paris dictus gecun anifafe, On. the dum quod porflelt materiam, et facit eam ra, Dp. 168. [1657MEDIAEVAL STUDIES essence, It is simply the subject underlying and receiving the form, Hence it includes form in its definition, but the definition of the form as the very essence of the thing does not include matter, From his examples it is clear that matter in this context is not simply individual matter but matter in general, for ex- arople, ‘in the case of man, flesh and bones. Borrowing an example from Aristotle, Averroes says that the form “eon- cavity” does not include matter in its definition. “Snubness" however does, because it is concavity in the nose or in the flesh of the nose. ‘The nose, then, is part of the substance signified by snubness, but it is not part of the definition of the form of concavity, It is almply the subject of this form. ‘The case of man js similar to this, Man is a substance in the sense of a com- posite of form and’ matter. Soul is his form and body his matter. The very essence of man, however, lies in his form, namely his soul, and not in his-matter, ‘Matter is simply the subject receiving the form which is his quiddity. Conse- quently we cannot say without qualification that the quiddity of man is identical with man, In one sense it is and in another it is not. The quiddity of man is the form of man and his very belng (este). Tt i not the man composed of matter and form: ++. quidditas hominis est homo uno modo, et non est homo alio modo; et est forma hominis, et non est homo qui est congregatus ex materia ct forma. According to Si, Thomas, however, this is contrary to Aristotle's intention: Sed videtur esse contra intentlonem Aristotelis® It should be noticed that he does not here assert that it is contrary to his very words, but contrary to his intention, In interpreting Aristotle St, Thomas will say that a conclusion is according to his intention {f he thinks it can be deduced from hia prineiples, even though it is not to be found in so many words in his writings. For example, he Imew perfectly well that Aristotle never explicitly taught the doctrine of creation.’ Yet he asserts that Averroes was wrong in thinking that Aristotle proved creation to be impossible. It is not according to Aristotle's intention that something must always come from something and not from nothing, for creation follows necessarily from: his own principles” So too in the question of the essence of material substances, St, Thomas thinks that Averroes’ interpretation is not in accord with Aristotle's intention, for there is a principle in his Metaphysics leading to the opposite view. The Stagirite says in Book VI that natural, things differ from mathematicals precisely in that the former have sensible matter in their definition while the latter do not.’ Now, St. ‘Thomas argues, if sensible matter is included in their definition, it must be Si igitur hoo namen substentia dicitur substantia; materia vero non, pracdicatur slmplictier de materia mubstantias eompoaitae do habenis formam vera. prnadieatione, ne ex materia et forma et de forma ejus et de dum ut praedicetur per se; idolum enim non eomposito,. tune forma substantiae dicciur dicitur esse cuprum, nec homo caro, mec ‘esse substantia rel, cum {psa declaret emsen- slmua nasus, Averroos, In VII Meta. tc, 34; tier ua; materia vero dleltur secundum Onera Omnia VIIL ‘Wentce, 1574), fol. 184- considerationem ad substantlam compositom D-c. ex materia ot forma esse pars aubstantine, + Avervocs, op. cit, t. c 2s fol, 171; of. gocundum considerationem vero ad substan, 0, 38; fol. 801-K, tam declarantem essentlam rel non.dieltur “*St ‘Thomas, In Vit Meta, 9, n, 1408, gme pars substantiae, sed ease deferens *Cf, St, Thomas, Summa Theol 1, 44, 2 gam definitionam, verbl gratis, ur ¢ study, of St. Thoma thought on this almites, cujus definitio est concavitas In question, of. A. Pogis, ‘A Note on Bt. yaso) aut in came nagl; namus enim est pars ‘Thomas,’ Summa ‘Theologica, 1, A 1-2, substantine ejus quod significat hoc nomen Mediaeval Studies VIII (1948); 159-108, a quod est, congregatio’ ‘nasi et TCH St, "Thomas, Te VI Phys, 2m. 45 itatls, et non est pars definitionis con- ed. Leonine (Rome, 1884), p,_ 367. cavitatls| sed est subjectim el.» forme “FArisioue, Moen V1, 102528 ft of, Bt praed| per se de habente formam, Thomas, Jn VI Meta, 1, nn, i155- lum ‘quod declarat quiditatem ejus (166)ARMAND MAURER included in their essence, for the definition signifies the essence, Sensible matter cannot enter into the definition of a material substance by way of addition, as something outside its essence, for only accidents, not substances, are defined in this way. So it follows that sensible matter is a part of the essence of natural substances, not only as io individuals but also as to their species” Of course Averroes knew as well as St, Thomas the Aristotelian distinction between the manner in which the natural philosopher and the mathematician define their objects. He realized that the mathematician does not include sensible matter in his definitions while the natural philosopher does Still, he did not draw the conclusion of St. Thomas, namely that sensible matter must be contained in the quiddity of a material thing, He always asserted that although such matter is a part of the composite substance and is necessarily included in the natural philosopher's definition of it, it is not contained in the quiddity of that substance, The quiddity is the form alone without matter, It is not difficult to see why Averroes never drew the conclusion of St, Thomas, His alm in commenting on Aristotle was simply to state the authentic doctrine of the Stagirite, which for him was identical with philosophical truth; and Aristotle himself never seems to have drawn the conclusion, On this point ‘Averroes appeara 10 have simply stated in his own terms the thought of ‘Aristotle, According to Avlatotle, mutter, form and the composite of matter and form ae each in thelr own way obcld.! Odcla then, in his terminology corresponds to substantia In the Latin version of Averroes’ Commentary. The Aristotelian term 73 rl fy eva: covresponds to Avevroes’ quidditus, It designates, Aristotle says, obsle without mutter.” It is primay substance (npdiry olela) and is identical with form (e os). A recent historian has described the Aristotelian phrase 7d vi fy elvasin this way: . + the phrase presents the notlon of a cause opposed to the unintelligible matter (which is the prinelple of contingency and change), and so expresses the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing, It implies that the form is the fundamental Being of the thing, and that whatever else may be in the thing derives its Being from the form, The form is designated by the peculiarly Asistotelian expression as the element in the thing which is that thing’s necessary and unchangeable Being, in contrast in the physical order to the matter and the composite (both of which are changeable), and in the logical order to the generic characteristics (which are not necessarily xe- stricted to the species in question). A thing is its generic nature, its matter and the composite. They are what it is, But what it necessarily and un- changeably and definitely is, 1s its form, ‘The genera, the matter, or the composite may be the what-ie of the thing, But only its form can be its what-IS-Being (rb rl dy elvas)® Aleit enim gupesiug in exo, quod res aCt, Averroes, In VI Matty to 2 tol, naturales hebent bx ul definitiont materiam — 48A-F senaibilem, et in hoc differant a mathe- "St, ‘Thomas on, the other hand had a matiel,” Non autem potest diel quod sub: twotold preoccupation in hls eommentares: stantiae aaturelee defclantur Per td quod to xed Aristotle correctly and to reach be- non sit de cssontla earum. jubstantiae ond him to philosophic truth, ch M, D. enim non habent definitionem ox additione, Chenu, Introduction a Vétude de. ecint sed sola accldentia, ut est habltum, Thomas @Aquin (Montreal, Paris, 1050), p. Unde rolingultar quod sonsibilis sit A pars essentiag substantiarum ‘naturciium, — i* Arlatetle, Meta, Vil, 10, 109501. ‘non solum quantum ad individua, sed etiam 4 Aristotle, op. eit, 7, 1032zb14, ‘uantum ad species {pias Definitiones enim Aristotle, loc, cit, 10szb1-2, on dantur de Individuls, red dq gpecigbus, 4 J. Owent, The Doeiring. of, Being, tn, Se rm VIII Meta, 0m. 1488, Cf. 11, Arlatotalian Metaphysics (Toronto, 1951), p. initio vero signifloat quid est i. W, D, , Aristotle's Metaphysics . J, (Oxford, 1924), pp. evi, 127, [167]MEDIAEVAL STUDIES If this is true, it seems that Averroes’ identification of form with quiddity or essence is authentically Aristotelian. In making it, moreover, he was simply following in the steps of the classical Greek commentators on Aristotle, who recognized that for the Stagirite 7d ri gy eva: or essence is form as distinct from matter." Indeed even in the Middle Ages there were some who agreed with Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle on this point. Perhaps they are the followers of Averroes mentioned above by St. Thomas.” Among thelr number St. Albert is the most important—at least the young St. Albert writing his Commentary on the Sentences." Adam of Buckfield’s unedited Commentary on the Metaphysics also shows the influence of Averroes on this as on other points of doctrine.” Even more striking, however, is the evidence of Averroes’ inter- pretation in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York, which cites the Arabian philos~ opher at great length on the identity of form and quiddity.* If this interpretation of Aristotle is correct, certain statements in the Meta~ physics, which at first sight are difficult to understand, become quite clear, For example, he says in one place that the definition of man does not include ‘bones, sinew-and flesh; only the parts of the form are parts of the definition.” Again, the definition of man is the definition of the soul.” ‘When he writes in this way, Aristotle is by no means denying what he said dn Book VI of the ‘Metaphysics about sensible matter appearing in the natural philosopher's definition of a natural substance, He is simply pointing out that such a definition is of a composite substance (aivodos odeta.) and not a definition of a substance in terms of its 7d rl fy elvar” In the latter sort of definition matter will not be present, for it is not part of the essence, The natural philosopher, however, is concerned with matter as well as with form. In his definitions, then, matter will be added to form, His objects of study are things constituted by addition (rd & spocBicews).“ The objects of mathematics are different from those of the natural philosopher, for they are constituted by abstraction; that is to say sensible matter is deliberately left out of consideration.” For Aristotle, then, there is a sense in which a composite substance has a definition including matter and form, and it is precisely this sort of definition that the natural philosopher formulates. What is significant from our point of ‘view, however, is that such a definition is not one of the very essence of the thing. The essence is the form elone. The natural philosopher, unlike the C8. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In illius, Materia autem est para integritatts, Arivtotelis Metaphysien Commentaria; ed, non essentiae relj forma vero 8, Gierlin, 189, p. 400, 1. 27-29; ‘Undo et materia dicitur uno modo pors rel Aicleplug, In Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z et allo modo non, secundum Ipsum Aver- G ; ed, M. Hayduck (Berlin, oem, Secundum vero considerationem ad p36, 1 Step. $80, 1 ius, substantiam , compositam ex materia et ‘Ariitotells De Anima Paraphrasis; forma, est materia pars substantine, Secun~ ‘Gierlin,, 1800), p, 22, 11. 4-6, dum vero considerationem ad substantlan ot Brabant ges declaraniem esontigm rel. non ales sane it, Cf. hi s substantiae, sed comparens et definieng formam et suam definitionem. Thomas ork, Sovtoniale U4) Mt, Blorence, cod, S Aristotle, Meta, ‘VEL, 10, 09%et7-23 ® Aristotle, Be city Ani *Esewnere a ee eee ina peat jazi. On this point, ch, >. a Aaistotle, De Casto Tt, 1, 2608i8-27. “CE, "M.D. Philippe, ‘Abstraction, addl- fon, séparation dans 1a philosa tote’, Revue Thomiste 1948), Owens, op. elt, pp. 289-240, For the defini- tion of eompoaita substances, of, O, Hamel Le syetime dAristote (Paris, 1920), pp. iis cap, Ida (1)S5al-9), secand nem ecole, mentions felrouok torwe alent ‘Gubstantla ‘rel, cum ipsa declarat essontiam 1168]ARMAND MAURER mathematician, defines his objects in terms of matter because the forms he studies are not independent of matter; they imply a relation to it, Nevertheless, the essence of what he defines is form alone. Tt thus appears that an act of addition is required for the natural philosopher to grasp his object, as an act of abstraction is needed for the mathematician to gresp his." Such a distinction, however, has no place in St. Thomas’ philosophy, in which, as we shall see, the essence of a material thing includes both form and matter, It is significant that when St, Thomas comments on Aristotle he mentions the role of addition in natural philosophy,” but it plays no part in his own philosophy, where there seems to be no place for it. If, AVICENNA AND ST. THOMAS, ‘A second opinion concerning the essence of material substances is attributed by St. Thomas to Avicenna. According to this view the essence of such sub- stances is composed of matter and form; it does not consist in form alone, Sensible matter enters into the essence of the species, so that form is but. a part of the quiddity, not the whole, Of course it is not a question of the essence being composed of this particular form and this particular matter, for the individual, such as Socrates and Callias, is composed of these; but rather of form end maiter in general, as soul and body make up the essence of the species man. According to this opinion, St, Thomas says, the “form of the whole” (forma totius), which Is the quiddity itself of the species, differs from the “form of the part” (forma partis) as whole from part,” On several other occasions St, Thomas attributes the same doctrine to Avicenna.” However, the expressions forma partis and forma totius do not seem to appear in the Latin translation of Avicenna’s works,” In his Metaphysics the form is said to be always a part of the quiddity (forma enim semper est pars quidditatia in compositis), while the quiddity 1s said to be the composition itself of form and matter" Avicenna does not here call the quiddity a form; the form, however, is sald to be a part of the quiddity, which is related to it. as a whole, ‘St, Thomas adopied this Avicennian doctrine in his early work, the De ente et essentia,® and maintained it to the end of his career.” In one place in his “CEM. D, Philippe, art. cit, 460-9; J. . Fr, Roland-Gosselin writes: Je ne Val pas Owens, op. cit, pp, 289-240, r@heontéo dans, Ja traduction des oeuvres "St Thomas, Ie II De Caelo et Mundo, d’Avicenne, Le ‘De Ente et Essenita’ de 8. 3, nn. 4-5; ed, Loonine (Rome, 1886), p, 286. Thomas d'Aquin (Le Saulcholr, Kain, 1926), Th his commentary on the Metaphysics St. p22, note T have found neither’ it nor Thomas aays that definition by addition is the expression forma marti, not definition of a composite but of a form — "'Definitio enim compositorum non est ex with “ils proper matter: Et proptes Roc, soln forma, “Definition enim rol. signiGeat stouti ace! ontin dafiniintur gx addins omne 1d ex quo, conaitutur jus etventin Subjectorum, ita of forma ex additione pro- Unde contingit ut contineat materiam aliguo ‘jue materiac, Cum igitur In, dednitione fo, Bt pet, noe, cogonsitur, differentia formae ponitiy materia, est definitio ex Inter quidditatem et formam; forma enim additione; ‘non eutem eum cponitur in defle semper est pars. quidditatis in compoattin itione compostti, In VHT Mets, 9, n. 1477, omnis vero simpliols forma est ipsum sim “Undo est alia opinio, quam sequitur plex, quoniam non est ibi complexio, Com- Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma fotius, positorum vero forma non est ipsa compos tine eat toon ‘quidditas speciel, differt « neo est corum quidditas. Ipsa com) forma partis, sicut totum a parte; nam non est forma, ideo quia constat, quo: ‘quidditas “speciei ost composita ex materia est coum; quidditas vero est id quod est, ot forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex hac quicquid est forma existente conjuncta materia individua, Ex his enim componitur materine, quod quidem amplius est quam iduum, ut Socrates ef Calllas, In VI Intentlo formae, . ... Ergo forma est unum 8. eorum quae conveniunt in hac compositions; URL Seni 0. 8g, 8008; ed Mandgnnet quidditas vero, eat pss, compose, com” I (Pars, 1928), p, 225; In TY Sent, d. 44, 4. Blecteng forma et, aterm, Avieemio, Ta. ty sol, & ad 29; ed, Vives 1 (Pacis, Mets, & 5 (Venice, 1508) fol. Sort F. 1874), p. 208. "De Ente ot Easentia 2, pp, 19-20, ‘With regard to the term forma tottus, "CE, Compendium Theologiae 151, Opu- 1169)MEDIARVAL STUDIES Commentary on the Sentences he contrasts it with Averroes' and calls it the “truer” doctrine Perhaps this qualification is a xeflection of the non-committal attitude of his teacher St. Albert towards the two views in the same place in his Commentary on the Sentences, There St. Albert simply mentions the teachings of Avicenna and Averroes without showing any preference; or if any is shown, it is to Averroes’, which he mentions last and which, significantly, he tales at the authentle interpretation of Aristotle: Si autem cum Averroe et Aristotele sentiamus quod forma totius est forma materise, ratione tamen differens, sicut videtur velle in septimo Primae Philosophiae . . .* In his own Commentary on the Metapliysics, however, St, Albert's interpre- fation seems to have undergone a change, There he distinguishes between the two meanings of form as quiddity, and as distinct from matter and part of the composite. Certain persons, he says, call the second form the quiddity, for instance the soul of nian his quiddity, but this Is an improper way of speaking In his later writings St. Thomas does not qualify his acceptance of Avicenna’s position, In his Summa contra gentiles, In the parallel place to the Commentary on the Sentences mentioned above, he drops the “truer” and simply makes the Avicennian doctrine his own." He does the same in his Commentary on the ‘Metaphysice, where he also presents it as the teaching of Aristotle in Chapter 10 of Book VII of the Metaphysics: Et hace est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo.” If we examine St, Thomas’ commentary on this Book, we see how consistently he maintains this interpretation, However, it sometimes entails forcing the meaning of Aristotle's text, For example, in Chapter 10 the Stagirite determines what parts are to be included In a definition. He distinguishes between parts of the form (eos) and parts of the composite of form and matter (cbvohoy ), He concludes that parts of. the form alone are parts of the definition, and he explicitly adds that by the form he means the quiddity (76 rl qu elva:)* Here the identification of quiddity and form as distinct from matter is expressly stated, ‘The Moerbeke translation of this passage used by St. Thomas is as follows: Pars igitur quidem est et speclei (speclem autem dico quod quid erat esse) et simul totius ejus quod ex specie et materia ipsa.” Moerbeke used species to translate the Greek «tos, which is anid to be Identical with quod quid erat esse, the literal rendering of 7d rl jy elvat, This together with matter is said to constitute the whole or composite, Commenting on this text, St, Thomas says that species includes matter, at Jeast universal matter, and it is distinguished from form alone. When Aristotle asserts that the composite whole is composed of form (¢dSos, species) and matter, St. Thomas interprets, this matter to be individual matter. ‘To say that the com- posite is constituted ex specie et materia means for him that the nature of the specles is in this determinate matter, Sic igitur patet quod materia est pars speciel, Speciem autem hic intel~ lgimus non formam tantum, sed quod quid erat ease, Et patet etiam quod acula, omnia 2; ed. Mandonnet (Paris, 192, “St, Albert, In VIT Meta, 1, ly ed. Borgnet p,, 108, Parks, 1890),'pp, 401-2, Ch In it Phys, 2,2 MCE In IV Sent, d. 44, 1, a, 1 sol, 2 Baris, 1890), 'p. 128, ad 2m; ed. Vives Il (Baris, levy, p, 208. Contra Genities IV, 81 De humanitate, Tale tov is speorporated info the ‘Supple; in Vil Meta, 9, n. 108, ment to the Summa Theologiae q. 7, a, 2, "Aristotle, Meta, Vil, 10, 1085b2, za, @Cathale-Splazzi” edition ‘of St, ‘Thomas! Bt, Albert In IV Sent, d. 44, a, U1; ed. Commentary, p. $61, 1, Borgnet (Paris, 1804), p. D6, (170)ARMAND MAURER materia est pars ejus totius, quod “est ex specie et materia,” idest singularis, quod significat naturam speciel in hac materia determinata." - St, Thomas’ distinction, however, between species and forma is not found in Aristotle’s text. There species is form (‘cléos), because it must. be added to matter to form the composite whole; it does not itself include matter. Clearly St. Thomes must force Aristotle’s text to have it say that matier is included in the species, I the same Chapter Aristotle explicitly identifies the soul of animals with their form (ZSos) and quiddity (rd rl qy elves). Moerbeke's translation of this passage of the Metaphysics runs as follows: Quoniam vero animalium anima est forma ipsorum (haec enim substantia est animati), quae secundum ratlonem substantia est et species et quod quid erat case tali corpori . . We find here the same identification of form and quiddity. Aristotle expressly tells us-that the soul, which is the form of the animal, is {ts quiddity, St. ‘Thomas does not deny it in his commentary on the text, but interprets it to mean that the soul is the quiddity of on animal because the organfo body can only be defined through the soul: Corpus enim organicum non potest definiri nist per animam, Et secundum hoc anima dicitur quod quid erat esse tal! corpori. Once more the Angelic Doctor is obliged to interpret Auistotle’s text in a forced way in order to bring it into line with his own thought. Again, Aristotle says, “When I speak of substance (oicla) without matter, I mean the quiddity (rd rt 4 elvar).” Although the statement seems to apply generally to all quiddity, St. Thomas interprets it to mean the quiddity of an artificial thing in the mind of the producer: Et ista species sive substantia sine ‘materia eat quam dixlt supra quod quid erat esse rei artificiatae.” One more example may be cited. In Chapter 11 of Book VII Aristotle says that in a sense there is a definition of a composite substance (cbvohov.) and in another sense there is. not. There is no definition of it with its matter for that is Indefinite; but there is a definition of it with reference to its primary sub- stance (mpdrn odcla), for instance, in the case of man the definition of the soul, For, he adds, the substance (otcla) is the indwelling form (‘eféos) which with the matter constitute the composite substance (abvohos obala).” Moerbeke’s translation of this is as follows: ‘Hujus (soil. totus) autem est aliqualiter ratio et non est. Nam cum materia, non est. Indeterminatum enim est, Secundum autem primam substantiam est, ut hominis quae animae ratio, Substantia namque est species, quae inest, ex qua et materia, tota dicitur substantia.” ‘What is the “matter” which does not enter into the definition of a composite substance because it is indeterminate? It would seem to be that which unites ‘with form (for instance the soul) to constitute the composite whole, Now this is ip, VIE Matas 1m, 3481, Aristotle, loc. clt,, 1035b14-18, cauthactieat ‘edition of St ‘Thomas’ ommantary, TRE henas, Toe, off, m, 1484. # Axistotle, op. olt., 7, job, 2. “St. OP. Sit, 8 n. LUT, However, Avetoar Tinsel istetptets ths satoment‘MEDIAEVAL STUDIES prime matter, which, since it has no determinate characteristics, cannot enter into the definition.” Such an interpretation, however, is impossible for St. Thomas, for it implies that the epecies or form to which the definition corresponds does not itself in- clude matter, It implies that this form is the quiddity, which Aristotle con- stantly identifies with the form (os) or primary substance of a thing, But then the quiddity does not contain matter, According to St. Thomas’ interpretation the quiddity or species of a material thing does include universal matter, but not individual matter. So he understands Aristotle to mean that the matter which is indeterminate and hence not included in a definition is individual matter: Cujus quidem. compositi aliquo modo est definitio, aliquo modo non est. Quia si accipiatur “cum materia’, scilicet individuall, non est ejus definitio, quia singularie non definiuntur, ut supra est habitum, Cujus ratio est, quia talis materia individualis est quid infinitum et indeterminatum, Materia enim non finitur nisi per formam, Sed compositum acceptum “secundum primam substantiam,” idest secundum formam, habet definitionem. Definitur enim compositum acceptum in specie, non secundum individuum.* ‘These ave illustrations of the difficulty one has in trying to interpret the Aristotelian text as St ‘Thomas does. The text is indeed obsoure, especially in its Latin translation, but it does not lend itself easily to the view that matter, even in the sense of universal matter, is included in the very quiddity of a material thing, A reasonably coherent view of being emerges from the Azistote- lian Metaphysics, and in it the notion of rd ri fv elva: plays a central vole" Tt is the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing; the element which fs its necessary and unchangeable being, As such, it is the thing's form. In the physical order it is contrasted with the matter and with the composite of matter and form, In the logical order it is the specific difference, contrasted with the generic determination, The Aristotelian concept of what the thing is (rd rf torw) is not identical with the concept of 73 cl jp elvat, for the latter is what the thing is necessarily and immutably and as intelligible to the intellect, The thing is its ahatter ag well as its form, They are included in what it is (7d rl terw),# but because matter is unintelligible in itself and the root of change, it does not enter into the thing's very ‘quiddity or 78 rt fv elvat, From the very beginning of his career St. Thomas adopted a somewhat dif- ferent attitude. ‘The notion of quiddity which we find in his De ente et essentia differs significantly from that of Aristotle, even though he presents them to us as identical.” . - The name quiddity, he tells us in thet work, is derived froma what the defi- nition signifies; Quiditatia vero nomen sumitur ex hoc quod per definitionem significatur.* Wssence sometimes has the same meaning.” Hence whatever is included in the definition of a thing is included in its quiddity or essence. Starting with this notion of quiddity it is not difficult for the Angelic Doctor to prove that matter must be contained in the essence of material substances, Tor the definition of these substances not only contains form but also matter; otherwise there would be no difference between definitions in natural philosophy “Ct. W, D, Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics nomen quiditalls mutatur, Et hoo est quod ME Oxford, 10%), p, Philorophys frequenter nominat quod, aula St, Thomas, Tn VEE Meta., 11, n, 1530, erat ease”, id est hoe per quod aliquid NGE, J, Owens, ‘The Doctrine of Being in ubet ense quid. St. Thomas, De Ente et the Apistotelian Motaphysies Cforonto, 1051). Essent yp. 16 Me OMe See Hi Robin,“ SLoe. ales pit, stole (Paris, 1040), , 88. "Op, cit, 2p. Le . omen cuentiie a philosophis in 172]ARMAND MAURER and in mathematics.” Is it possible that matter is included in the definition of material substances and still is not contained in their essence? That is the crucial point, Can matter be present in the definition as added to the essence or as a being outside the thing's essence? As we have seen, the Aristotelian view seems to be that in the natural philosopher's definition of a material substance matter is added to the quiddlty, which is the form alone. St. Thomas rejects this, however, for according to him it entails a confusion of the way in which accidents and substances are defined. The mode of definition by addition implies that matter is contained in the definition simply as the subject of the essence, and that the essence, being incapable of separate definition, s imperfect, But this 1s the way accidents, not substances, are defined. Hence St, Thomas concludes thet the essence of natural substances cannot be form alone but the composite of form and matter." He looks for confirmation of this in Boethius. According to a dictum often quoted in the Thirteenth Century, Bocthius maintained that otola signifies the composite of matter and form," and oteta, he tells us on the authority of Cicero, is the same in Greek as essentia in Latin.” But as Father Roland-Gosselin. remarks, the famous dictum of Boothius cannot be found in the work to which it is attributed, his Commentary on the Categories.” Instead we read there thet matter, species and the composite of the two are all called substance." As we have already observed, this 1s good Aristotelian doctrine, if substance 4s under- stood as olla, Olle is a broad term designating not only the composite but algo matter and form, St, Thomas’ notion of essence, therefore, it not equivalent to the Aristotelian concept of otola. Still nother consideration leads St, Thomas in the De ente et easentia to the conclusion that the essence of a. natural substance embraces both form and matter. Although essence has the meaning of quiddity, or that which the defi~ nition signifies, {t is also, and more particularly, defined in reference to existence, It 4s that through which and in which a being has ease: easentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse.” Again, essence is that according to which a thing is sald to be: Eesentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur." Now the esse of a composite substance does not belong only to the form or to the matter, but to the composite: *Neque ctlam forma tantum substantine Bacon's Questions on the Metaphysics, ‘composltae oaaentia dick potest, quamvis hoe Bacon denles -sgalnst Avicenna at the fam aaserere conentur, Ex hia enim quae essence js the compoalte of matter and form, dita sunt patet quod easentin est id quod but rather results from thelr composition. iefinitionem ‘rel slgnificatur, Definitio $t R. Bacon, Quaestiones supra Ubros itinrum naturalium non tantum Philosophiae Aristotelia; ed, Steele ed etlam materlam; allter (Oxford, 1990), 1-9. Some texts of enim definitiones naturales et mathematicae Bacon are pote in Roland-Gosselin, Le non differrent, Ibid, “De Ente et Easentia" de S. Thomas d’Aquin "Tbid. St. Thomas ifes here that the (Le Saulcholr, Kain, 1926), p. 6 note 1. Lessing is not the valat Hon betwean form -~ De Ente ot Eusentia, 3, Shes ona Pe Sle ‘of tertium quid votalting from, thelr union, PL IMC. On the. deri ewe Searchin i Yacadebt' Sicha! eae se = an Po Vesta is psn Vit sls 12-5; Roland-Gosselin, rallzguit ic . oth, pr b note, 2, Fede ay Minette ect sented, Sea, OMB, Raland-Goselin, op, oft, m. 8 Fra. 2p. 229, ‘But tla is to be note 1. ‘ Mig expltaation, in fhe Be Cum autem tres mubetantian aint, materi, ot Essentia, Cf, a IV, specic et quae ex utrisque confit De humenitate vero, non est intelligendum elgg composite et gompacte substantia, quod ait quaedam’ forma consuxgens ex Boethlus, In Cut, J, de Substantia; PL confunctione formee ad muteriam, qunsl re- 134A, aliter mit we. Possibly in his © @De Ente ot Eesentia 1, p, 17. Op, oft, 2 p. 2 ia eb utroa De Ente et Kesentia he is claxi it ua Sonate rather aintlaous fo oger [173]‘MEDIAEVAL STUDIES . esse substantine compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi. Hence the composite of form and matter and not the form alone is the complete principle through which the thing exists. Moreover, if the essence is that according to which a thing is sald to be and to be a being, it cannot be form or matter alone, for whatever is composed of several principles is given its name: not from one of them but from the composite." It follows from this that the composite alone is the essence. St. Thomas adds that form alone is in its own way the cause of the esse of the composite, but this does not entitle it to the name of essence." He seems to have in mind here a doctrine similer to that of Thomas of York, who says that form alone must be the essence because it gives ease to the substance. Thomas writes in his Sapientiale: Forma enim est pars quae cum fuerlt, est ves; id est, ad oujus esse sequitur esse rel, Ex quibus mantfestum ost quod forma dat esse rei. Constat autem qued illud quod esse dat alicul essentia ejus et quidditas est. Quare essentia et quidditas substantise singularis est forma.” According to St. Thomas, however, even though the form alone causes the esse of the substance, it Is still only a part or principle of the composite, and ao it is not the complete principle through which and in which the being has esse. Only the composite fits this description. It alone then is the essence. ‘The concept of essence at which we bave now arrived with St. Thomas is quite different from that of Avlstotle and Averroes. Essence or quiddity is viewed in relation to the act of existing (esse), of which it is simply the formal de- termination and specification, Essence is nothing in itself without esse, except in the mind concelving it Esse is the act of the form and of the composite sub- stance.” Hence form or quiddity is no longer, as it is for Aristotle, the supreme “Ibid. Esse autem non convenit formae tantum nec. materiae tantum, sed com~ posito: materia enim non ost nisi in Dotentiay forma vero est qua aliquid ost, est enim actus, Unde reatat quod com~- positum proprie alt, Contra Gentiles I, 43, ‘The essence concelved as quo est must be distinguished from the essence conceived ag quod est or the subject of existence; 2.9. humonity from man, Humonity ig" con selved by precision as the formal principle of men, and it is related to t as part to whole. In both senses, ‘however, essence includes both form ond matter. For th: distinction between them, ct, De Ente Eon §, pr 30-02, IT Sant, d 24, 1 5 LP 855-6; In VIL Meta, 8, nn, 1878-05 Gusdlibee 2, 4; Sum. Theol, 3,3. In the Intier two ‘texts St Thomas’ distinguishes humantty from man as essence from sup- all. Te is beyond the scope ot this papar Wo" discus the thomy” problem of” this gtinetion, “Unde ‘oportet quod essentia, qua ros denominatur ens, non tantum ‘sit forma Reque .tantum ‘materla, sed utrumque, quamvis hulurmodL ease, suo, modo sola sit causa, Sle enim alila videmus, quae ex pluribus prineiplis constituuntur, quod res nom denominantar | ex alters orum prineipiorum tantum, sed sb eo, quod jutrumae complectitur, mrentio 2 p. 21, In still another sense, St. ‘Thomas says: ens dieltiy ab actu, ossendi, De Veritate 1, 1; of. In IV Meta, 2, n, 558, [174] Tn this, senso, “. .. boing is that, which: ts ‘be-ing’, in virtue’ of the very ‘to be! which it exercises.” E, Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 68), b, 17, “Cz supra, note 65. Both form and sgsence are th thelr, own, ways principles aac. ey are principles quo est the form, however, is the cause of the esse, for it gives eae to matter formal cause, Potest’ enim diel “ano est” ipsa partis, qaae dat esse materi on etiam’ diel “quo est” ipsa natura ‘quae re~ Unguitur ex confunetione a materia, ut humanttas, In I Sent, d. a2, p. 228, *Sapienticle TH, 4 Me, Florence, cod. Conv. ‘sopp, A. 6431, fol. 98", It, does not sgom that St. ‘Thomas knew the Saplentiale when he wrote the De Ente et Easentia, for both were belng written about the mame Your, 1255, ‘Thomas, of York died about 1260, Cf, E. Longpré, ‘Fr, Thomas d’York', Argh, Bran. Hist, XOX (026), 681, Lod, Régls, forma Lodveate de ie’ Mdlephyerrue Conran i age de la hysique fontreal, OM ¥ Aa ipsem etiam: formam comparatur fpsum ease ut actus, Per hoc enim in com- posltis ex materia ‘et forma dicltur forma soso, principium | essendl, quia ost comple mentum. substentiae, culty sctue ext ipmim ease, Contra Gentiter CE. B, Glison, Thomleme (Paris, 10, p, 49; Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 1049), p. 173.ARMAND MAURER act and the ultimate principle of being and intelligibility.” Being and intelligi- bility no longer ultimately derive from form to matter and to the composite, but rather from esse, For ease is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections.” It is also the root of all intelligibility, for anything is knowable in the measure in which it has esse." Indeed, how could it be otherwise in a philosophy like St. Thomas’, in which God, who is at the peak of actuality and intelligibility, is Ipsum Esse Subsistens? Once this viewpoint is adopted, not only are the notions of being and essence radically transformed, but the situation of matter relative to the essence under- goes a change. As long as essence is regarded from the standpoint of intelligi- bility, as what a thing is necessarily and immutably, it will tend to be focused in the form to the exclusion of matter, for matter is in itself unknowable and the root of change. On the other hand, as soon as it is regarded “existentially”, in relation to existence, matter will be seen as not foreign to essence, for what the thing is, is not form, but a composlie of form and matter. ‘What is more, it now becomes possible to see that matter enters into the essence even regarded from the viewpoint of intelligibility. The existence of each * being is a gift of God, created out of nothing according to an intelligible pattern which is'a divine idea. In the case of a material being, matter forms a part of that intelligible pattern, so that even though strictly speaking there is no divine. idea of prime matter, for in itself it neither exists nor is knowable, still there Is a divine idea of the composite, which includes prime matter.” Although unintelli- gible in itself, prime matter is thus essential to the full intelligtbility of the composite and enters in full right into the essence of a material being. It appears that Aristotle. was prevented from seeing this, at least in clear fashion, just because he was not aware that the material world is brought into existence from nothing, and that the existence thus conferred on it Js its supreme actuality of being and the source of its intelligibility, Like his master Plato he considered matter eternal, and form the ultimate perfection of belng and know- ability," However much he may have differed from Plato in his conception of matter and form, he shaved with him these fundamental views, which dominate his notion of quiddity as form. ‘However, even though Aristotle Identified quiddity with form, we find ten- dencies and suggestions in his philosophy which point to the integration of matter in quiddity. It is these which St, Thomas seizes upon and develops, leading the Stagirite into avenues unknown to himself. Aristotle tells us that definition manifests what-is and substance (rl tor: xal odcla)." Commenting on this, St. Thomas says: + + « definitio est manifestativa elus quod quid est et substantiae, idest essentiae cuiuslibet rei.” For him, the what 4@ and substance manifested by the definition can only be the essence. And since what 1s manifested by the definition of a material substance is a composite of matter and form, both must be embraced in that essence, Thus the connection of matter with form in the definition leads St. ‘Thomas to the conclusion of their integration in the essence, ‘The reference to matter in the definition was seen by Aristotle, W. D. Ross "Ot 3, 0 it, pp. 94, 219-228, Posterior Analytice Th, 3, 9b4, Stal. By 28¢' Thomas, De Potente, 7 aaa translating Aristotle's whai-is in’ thlg ‘con abet esse text " ford ™ Unumquoddue, by. “essential nature” the | Ox dgntun Tabet ae) Sognosebil feanauatlon gives "a, “echoluste” tem eniiles I, stotle’s_ statements, mt 5; Sum. * Post, Anab, 2 n. 10; ed, Leonine u ear ee ene, Mea pe 380 Gt tn Vil Meta, Im a, 1887, w¥or' Aristoile's doctrine of form, of. J. Owens, op. elt, expecially ‘pp. 23-28, (175)MEDIAEVAL STUDIES notes tbat he originally describes esvence as substance without matter and constantly identifies it with form as opposed to matter. Still, he goes on to point out, the Stagirite was aware of the need of defining the essence of a “materiate universal” in reference to the kind of matter in which alone that essence can be embodied, for example man in reference to his dominant parts, such as heart or brain.” This “unsuspected implication of matter in essence”," which Aristotle never seems to have clearly seen, is precisely what St. Thomas brings into the light, His achievement in this regard rests upon an Aristotelian principle, but its full accomplishment remains his own. We can say of it, as Prof, Gilson says of his doctrine of creation: On ne saurait dépasser plus olairement Jes conclusions d’Aristote au nom d'un principe aristotélicien.” gee 3b oe ° i Secs, UE” Game Tee es ona cor 4 0S, evil, ‘otle, > luon, ie ie gi bb mnddidwaie'T (Paria, 1080, 218, wate [176]