Republic vs. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, Jan.
9, 2013 FACTS:
FACTS:
In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void,
finding sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The petitioner, through the OSG, appealed to the
CA. The OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report did not disclose
that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not
constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation
ISSUE:
How should psychologically incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code be
interpreted?
How should the doubt be resolved in voiding of marriage cases?
RULING:
1) In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant
spouse.
2) The Court stresses that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by
the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and
continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during
the marriage.
MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC CRUZ VS. NILO CRUZ
On October 21, 1986 Nilo and Marivi was Married to each other and produced two
sons. On July 7, 2005 Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. She averred
that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate
personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved
oedipal complex," while she herself was found to be suffering from a "personality
disorder of the mixed type, histrionic, narcissistic with immaturity. In his answer,
Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at the start of their
relationship, both he and Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which
they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from
psychological incapacity; and that he was not singularly responsible for the
breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi also contributed to the
deterioration of their union. In October 13, 2008 the RTC denied the petition. The
RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double psychological
incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's
"oedipal complex."
The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself from her father as her
standard of an ideal husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations
and his then being already very focused on his job. Marivi's need for assurance that
she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her standard, was not by itself
sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated.
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC held
that prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective
of his psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his family's benefit.
Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of psychological
incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off by Marivi's unabated
naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies. CA Affirmed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
1
RULING:
No, Article 36 is not applicable in this case.
When is there a psychological incapacity? - We have laid down guidelines in
interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia, we reiterated the
doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, "that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b)
juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)."
The showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. - The mere showing of 'irreconcilable
differences' and 'conflicting personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity." Nor does failure of the parties to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons" amount to psychological incapacity.
We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic that the psychological condition
should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital
obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to
a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
In Marcos v. Marcos, the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have
psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the
totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity. While it
behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology experts as part of
the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its own independent
factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases
they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings."
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did
suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find that
the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly point to the
fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated the
marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that these
personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their marital duties. What
can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility.
For a personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or
permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her
marital duties is another.
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than
that, too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of psychological
incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what
brought about the breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily
attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be imputed to his work
and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.
Garlet v. Garlet, August 2, 2017- See the full case
2

Bakunawa III v. Bakunawa, G.R. No. 217993, August 9, 2017.
FACTS: The parties eldest son was interviewed, together with his father, by the
psychiatrist in this case for declaration of nullity of marriage [on the ground of
psychological incapacity]. The mother took no part in the psychological assessment.
Based on the said interviews, the psychiatrist testified that the mother suffers from
Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, while the father suffers from Intermittent
Explosive Disorder.
RULING: The parties eldest son is NOT a reliable witness to establish the
psychological incapacity of his parents [under Article 36 of the Family Code], since
the eldest son could not have been there at the time his parents were married.
[ The Supreme Court further ruled that while there is NO requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician, much less subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application
only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity.]
G.R. No. 217993
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III,, Petitioner,
vs.
NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, JR, J.:
For resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Manuel R.
Bakunawa III (Manuel) challenging the Decision2 dated March 27, 2014 and
Resolution3 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
98579, which upheld the validity of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).
The Facts
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were
students and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel
got married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.4
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they
lived with Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop
his studies to help his father in the family's construction business. Manuel was
assigned to provincial projects and came home only during weekends. This setup
continued even as Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho).
However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments, he chose
to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora
resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel
depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs.5
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this
period th.at Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody
and mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became
more irritated with Nora and their verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.6
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in
their relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in
drinking sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He
eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They
considered themselves separated.7
3
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of Solicitor General, the
After Manuel spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora became Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of
pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child.8 Quezon City, and the National Statistics Office, as well as the parties and counsel.

SO ORDERED.

On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter alia that the RTC erred in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,9 on the ground that he and Nora are finding that the testimony of the psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the parties'
psychologica11y incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the CA

Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that The CA, in its Decision14 dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal and reversed
Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and the RTC decision. The decretal portion of the decision states:
aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed
Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative
attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings were
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed by [Nora] is GRANTED.
based on her interview with Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because
The Decision dated March 28, 2011 of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in
Nora did not participate in the psychological assessment.10
Civil Case No. Q-08-62822 is REVERSED and SETASIDE.
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife
and has a son with her, whereas, Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City.
Their house and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay a loan SO ORDERED.15
secured by a mortgage on the said property.11

Ruling of the RTC

The CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration16 through a Resolution17
The R TC granted the petition in its Decision12 dated March 28, 2011. The dated April 22, 2015.
dispositive portion thereof reads:
Manuel filed the present petition raising the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE THAN CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO
marriage between MANUEL R. BAKUNAWAIII and NORAREYESBAKUNAWA null and DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. BOTH PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and

The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is hereby ordered to make II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION
entries into the records of the respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE THAN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE
Court. REVERSAL THEREOF.18
4
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising
of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological
evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder
and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code,19 is solely based
on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently,
the CA did not err in not according probative value to her psychological evaluation
report and testimony.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,20 the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity
can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent
proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologist's examination and report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et
al.,22 the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately
related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers
who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the
time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the
incapacity already present at the time of marriage.23
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the
spouses' psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a
reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to
Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his
parents were married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on
Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared
that there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician,24 much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. In this
case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by
means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed
to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.25
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree26 of the National Tribunal of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and
Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but does not consider the
same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.27
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March
27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
YAPTINCHAY vs. TORRES
GR No. L-26462, June 9, 1969
FACTS:
In her petition for appointment as Special Administrator, subsequently as a regular
administrator, of Isidro Yaptinchays estate, Teresita Yaptinchay alleged that she
and deceased Isidro Yaptinchay had lived continuously, openly and publicly as
husband and wife for 19 years (1946-1951). The deceased died without a will and
left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the Philippines,
Hong Kong and other places. Petitioner likewise alleged that certain parties took
away from the residences certain personal properties belonging to the deceased
together with others exlusively owned by her. Upon the foregoing allegations, the
court issued an order appointing Teresita as special administrator of the estate.
5
An opposition was subsequently registered by Josefina Yaptinchay, allegedly the
legitimate wife, and Ernesto Yaptinchay and other children of the deceased upon
the ground that Teresita, not being an heir, had no right to institute the proceeding
for the settlement of Isidros estate, much less to procure appointment as
administrator thereof. They likewise prayed for the appointment of Virginia
Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as special administrator and Josefina as
regular administrator.
The probate court granted the counter-petitioners prayer and named Virginia as
special administrator.
Included among the properties in the preliminary inventory of assets was a
residential house at North Forbes Park, Makati.
Petitioner then filed in another CFI branch an action for replevin and for liquidation
of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with
Isidro and for damages. Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the
writs of replevin and preliminary injunction prayed for, respondent judge Guillermo
E. Torres issued an order temporarily restraining defendants therein (private
respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in
the complaint and from interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and
possession over, amongst others, "the house now standing at North Forbes Park,
Makati, Rizal."
The CFI held that: While the Court is still considering the merits of the application
and counter-application for provisional relief, the Court believes that for the
protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is really
under the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being
appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay,
the Court denies the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of
the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park property and the restraining order
issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist
from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in
the possession of said property.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said order was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the respondent judges
order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession of said property to
respondent Virginia Yaptinchay
HELD: NO.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is
not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or
control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been
clearly established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if
she were lawfully in possession of the house in controversy and if respondent
special administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were
without right thereto. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13, 1965
of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased Isidro
Y. Yaptinchay but also to the conjugal partnership of said deceased and his
legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were brought under the jurisdiction of the
probate court, properly to be placed under administration. 5 One such property is
the lot at North Forbes Park. 6
It is quite true that, in support of the allegation that the house in North Forbes Park
was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she
had contracted during the period when said house was under construction. But
evidence is wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction work. On
the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner
which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the Republic Bank
were for purposes other than the construction of the North Forbes Park home.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes
Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the
prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y.
Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence
of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that
should be under the control of the special administratrix.
Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of
Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said Article 144 says that: "When man and
a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
6
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership."
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship
envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must
first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One
such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during
cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until
such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property
in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence
of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy
to enforce an abstract right.
FUJIKI vs. MARINAY
Doctrine:
Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article 26 of the Family
Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004. Sadly, petitioner
Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost
contact with one another. In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married
without the earlier marriage being dissolved.
Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to
reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship. The couple was able
to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010. Fujiki then filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage). In this case, petitioner prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO).
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing
and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Petitioner in a Motion for
Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule
applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment. Notably,
when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner
stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as
the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed. Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that
there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing
7
De Castro v. De Castro and Nial v. Bayadog which declared that [t]he validity of a
void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
YES. Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
The Supreme Court further held that:
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
xxx
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
xxx
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Article
26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that [w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.
8

GARCIA-QUIAZON v. BELEN
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS
Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen,
who are common-law partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her
mother filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC, claiming that
she is a natural child of Eliseo having conceived at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth Certificate
signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it
was bigamous.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration asserting
that the venue of the petition was improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its
decision in favor of Elise. On appeal, the deicison was affirmed. Hence, the petition
was filed before the SC raising the argument that Elise has not shown any interest in
the petition for letters of administration and that the CA erred in declaring that
Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise has no cause of action on it.
ISSUE
Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage
despite the death of his father, hence cannot be deemed as an interested party.
RULING
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a void marriage, no marriage
has taken place and it cannot be the source of right, such that any interested party
may attach the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Having successional
rights that would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, Elise may
without a doubt impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned by filing an action attaching its
validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse. As a compulsory heir, Elise has a cause of action
for the declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate is
deemed to be an interested part. An interested part is one who would be benefited
in the estate. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband;
she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing
in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
9
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5
Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband, as parties to the case.
The RTC granted Olaybars petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel
all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract. Petitioner,
however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds
that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. The
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this Petition for Review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
HELD:
YES.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
partiesrespondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was
likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted
where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged
marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other
evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the
subject marriage certificate was different from respondents signature appearing in
some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a
categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was
not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed
in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that
no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and
KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City
filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground of Lilias previously existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage claimed that the said
marriage was null and void as she and first husband Eduardo Maxion was forced to
enter the said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by
both parties was the status of the first marriage (whether the said prior marriage is
void or merely voidable). Lilia contested the validity of the pre trial order asking for
respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for Lilia Wiegel to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated by fore.
10
Ruling:
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will
not be void but merely voidable. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear
that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force
because it will not be void but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when
she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on Lilia's
prior marriage for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration
before she can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void
under the law.
TERRE v. TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)
PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE
FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan
Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with grossly immoral conduct, consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting No
judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the
nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant.
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with
this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre succesfully convinced complainant that her marriage
was void ab initio and they are free to contract marriage. In their marriage license,
despite her objection, he wrote single as her status. After getting the complainant
pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another
marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also
void ab initio.
ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent
marriage
HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a
spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainants
evidence as to the basic fact which underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre.
In the second place, the pretended defense is the same argument by which he
inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito A. Bercenilla
being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first
cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known
that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the supreme Court
which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage , a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential.
Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
11
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol for four years.
The lost contacts when the school year ended. When Lucio received a card from
Lucia Barrete from Singapore, constant communication took place between them.
They later became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to
petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 in Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted on January 17,
1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio
Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused
filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need
to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.
TENEBRO VS CA
(G.R. No. 93410 May 7, 1991)
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE
FACTS
1. Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in 1990. The two lived
together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes in 1986.
2. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted
yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a
complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
3. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact
there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he
cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE
WON Tenebro is guilty of bigamy
HELD YES.
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second
or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage of forcible
12
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main purpose of the accused is to
rape the victim.
Capili vs People GR 183805
700 SCRA 443 Civil Law Family Code Void Marriages A Void 2nd Marriage is
not a Defense in Bigamy
Criminal Law Bigamy Elements
In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months
later in December 1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against
Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina
was granted and Capilis marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the
subsisting marriage between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to
dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since the second marriage was already
declared void ab initio that marriage never took place and that therefore, there is
no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of
bigamy was already consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first
marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The outcome of the
civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the determination of Capilis guilt
or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first
marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such
first marriage be judicially declared as void. The parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
People v. Odtuhan
13
 Sally Go-Bangayan vs Benjamin Bangayan, Jr.

Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina in 1980. Then, he remarried Alagon in 1993. He Civil Law Family Code Marriage Bigamy Non-existent marriage
filed apetition for annulment of his marriage to Modina in 1994. 1999, RTC granted
petition anddeclared marriage void for lack of a marriage license. Evelyn Alagon
private complainant learned of Odtuhans previous marriage to Modina and was
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while
charged with bigamy.RTC ruled in favor of Alagon and was indicted in an
Alegre was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship
Information for Bigamy. Upon filing anOmnibus Motion praying for presentation of
with Sally Go. Sallys father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally
evidence to support his motion and his motionto quash be granted, RTC denied the
convinced Benjamin to sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982.
petitions. Respondent went the CA where the petitionwas granted through applying
the Morigo v. People case, and RTC was ordered to give duecourse to receive
evidence on petitioners motion to quash. CA denied motion forreconsideration
before the CA and thus it went to the SC. In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy
case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his
alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage,
Sally presented a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not Odtuhan committed the crime of bigamy, considering thathis
marriage to Modina was void ab inito for lack of a valid marriage license.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between

petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage
is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same
rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion
to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence.43
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616
are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

14
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by ISSUES:
Sally was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both
parties in view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a
jest and never complied with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no marriage license
bigamous marriage to speak of.
Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sallys property relations

Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner

TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)
HELD:
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
YES.
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148. and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sallys father
Article 34 where no license is necessary, shall be void from the beginning. In this
was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the
Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general
nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally
rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts
was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin
which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are inexistent and void from the
also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
beginning. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
non-existent.
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the YES.
seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties
in her answer. The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be

15
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that Benjamins late father himself
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x.
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is
more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No.
61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the
descriptive title married to Sally. The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title married to
Benjamin while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
married to preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the
first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the
contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime
of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence
of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin
and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
Jocson vs. Robles
Facts:
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles ,
on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the amended complaint that
previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had
contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal
action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she
was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature
birth of their first child, who died three days later.
16
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged
plaintiffs' parents with having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to
contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a
married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until
January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs claim of bigamy is valid against the defendant,
whilst the defendant is a married man, who contracted previous marriage.
Held: No. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
Tolentino vs Viilanueva
Civil law Marriage Annulment Investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to
annulment of marriage where defendant has defaulted
.The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact
that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties and for this
reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds.
FACTS:
1) On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment
of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent
was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration,
he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no
sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live
as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen
Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until
January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu.
2) Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio
on September 28, 1959.
3) Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the
complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner
filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the
presentation of his evidence.
4) In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private
respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for
investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing
the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and,
in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to
prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish
the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for
the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
5) On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a
copy of his complaint.
6) Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena
to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies
of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at
10:00 A.M.
7) Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant
City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.\
8) In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel,
prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence on
the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the
17
lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a
copy of the complaint.
9) On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of
petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable
the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
10) In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint
in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation
by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101
of the New Civil Code.
11) Plaintiffs MR was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court is correct in dismissing the plaintiffs petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud because the same was based merely
on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
RULING: YES. Where the husband filed a case for annulment on the ground of fraud
(concealment of pregnancy), and the wife failed to file a responsive pleading, the
court referred the case to the fiscal for investigation. However, the husband refused
to show his evidence nor be interrogated by the fiscal, hence, the court correctly
dismissed the complaint for annulment. The investigation of the fiscal is a
prerequisite to the annulment of marriage where defendant has defaulted.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation
based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case
of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence
for the plaintiff. Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code
of the Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall
not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as
much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions
against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact
that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this
reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds.
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit. WHEREFORE,
THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS
HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
Tolentino vs Viilanueva
Civil law Marriage Annulment Investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to
annulment of marriage where defendant hasdefaulted
.The prohibition against annulling a marriage basedon the stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact
that marriage ismore than a mere contract between the parties and for thisreason,
when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins thecourt to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State inorder to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds.
FACTS:
1) On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment
of his marriage to private respondent Helen Villanueva, alleging that his consent
was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration,
he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no
sexual relations with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live
as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen
Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until
January, 1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu.
18
2) Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio
on September 28, 1959.
3) Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the
complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading, for which reason petitioner
filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the
presentation of his evidence.
4) In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private
respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for
investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing
the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and,
in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to
prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish
the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for
the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
5) On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a
copy of his complaint.
6) Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena
to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as copies
of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at
10:00 A.M.
7) Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant
City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.\
8) In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel,
prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for the reception of his evidence on
the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the
lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a
copy of the complaint.
9) On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of
petitioner unless he submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable
the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
10) In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint
in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing to submit himself for interrogation
by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101
of the New Civil Code.
11) Plaintiffs MR was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court is correct in dismissing the plaintiffs petition for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud because the same was based merely
on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment
RULING: YES. Where the husband filed a case for annulment on the ground of fraud
(concealment of pregnancy), and the wife failed to file a responsive pleading, the
court referred the case to the fiscal for investigation. However, the husband refused
to show his evidence nor be interrogated by the fiscal, hence, the court correctly
dismissed the complaint for annulment. The investigation of the fiscal is a
prerequisite to the annulment of marriage where defendant has defaulted.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation
based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case
of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence
for the plaintiff. Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code
of the Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall
not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact
that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore are as
much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions
against desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The
prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
19
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact
that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this
reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and
sanctity of the marital bonds.
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit. WHEREFORE,
THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS
HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
3. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.
BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got
married on November 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20,
1939 Godofredo filed for annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led
to believe by Luida that she was a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so
Godofredo appealed.

Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941 ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the
marriage?
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
DECISION:
LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-respondent.
There is no fraud because:
HORRILLENO, J.:
The Supreme Court states that: We see no reason to overturn the ruling
FACTS: appealed. It is unlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the
defendant, Luida, was pregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they
1. It was established before the trial court: got married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they were married.)
Since Godofredo must have known that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot
a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938
be annulled.
b. After several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that
The Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To
year
cancel it, reliable evidence is necessary.
c. On November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a
Catholic Cathedral in Baguio
*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.
d. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days

e. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939

Aquino v. Delizo
f. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.
G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960
2. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage
before the CFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the
marriage because the defendant assured him that she was virgin.
FACTS:

20
The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any birth certificate
to show the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between the parties.
Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof of the childs birth but still his
petition was denied. The CA denied Aquinos appeal on the theory that it was not
impossible for the parties to have sex during their engagement so that the child
could be their own and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or suspect that
Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for reconsideration filed by
Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer thus the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Aquinos complaint is correct.
RULING:
No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than
her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she was pregnant
by a man other than his husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at
the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was naturally plump or
fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a womans abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part
of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of
the womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness
of the abdomen more general and apparent.
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It
is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and
decision complained is set aside.
Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-
appellee.
Date: 26 Nov 1970
Ponente: Reyes, JBL
Topic: Voidable Marriages; Grounds for Annulment; Fraud
DOCTRINE:
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not
one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of article 86, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage.
FACTS:
21
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married on 4 Dec 1953.
comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
On 7 Jan 1954, Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, docketed in
CFI of Manila, Civil Case #21589.
this case was dismissed and Anayas counterclaim for damages was
granted.
While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to
Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship
with a close relative of his.
Upon learning of this, Aurora then filed a case for the annulment of their marriage
on the ground of fraud the non-disclosure of such pre-marital relationship.
ISSUE:
W/N the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
NO. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of article 86, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage.
For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment,
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may
be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or
species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred
to in number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting
parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of
a crime involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.
22
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Davao
ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced
from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the Ponente: Reyes, JBL, J.
only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void
Issue;
and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have
stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned therein as Facts:
a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically
dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds 1) Appeal from a decision of CFI Davao declaring the two marriages celebrated one
by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure after another on April
of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that
28, 1949 null and void on the ground of plaintiffs consent was obtained through
Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
force and intimidation
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction:
"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall employed upon her by her father
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."
2) Morning of April 28, 1949civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of MC of
Davao, afternoon

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not remarried in accordance with rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T.
one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for Mih in office in Davao
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an City
action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to 3) Plaintiffs testimony:
the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
- Defendant never wooed her
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society,
and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's - Wedding arranged by father
duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
- Father whipped her often as she opposed marriage

- Resorted to beating her

SISON vs TE LAY LI
- She ran away from home but found by father and promised she will not force her
NO 7037- May 7, 1952 again

Plaintiff and Appellee: Juanita Sison - But renewed subject of marriagehanded her a knife telling her to choose
between her life of his
Defendant and Appellant: Te Lay Li
because of fear that her father might kill her she agreed to the marriage

23
- Testimony corroborated by mother and Epifania del Riorelative of her mother
- She lived with her husband in his parents home but considered him a stranger
since she doesnt love
him
- She was kept a prisoner in the house; she never occupied the same bed with
husband
- Never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949 forced by husband using a
knifeshe mustered
courage to escape from her husbands home
4) DEFENDANTS CLAIMS:
- Marriages were regular and legal
- Entered into marriage freely and voluntarily
- Plaintiff not kept a prisoner
- Plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her and her husband their
own house and business
- She slapped heronly when she ran away with P1200 and when asked where she
came from she retorted it was none of his business
-CFI: finding the plaintiffs marriage consummated only by intimidation and force
and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status of a wife to the
defendant and declared two marriages between them null and void; defendant
ordered to return the P1200 and whatever personal belongings the plaintiff had left
in their house
Witnesses; Judge Delfin Hofilena for defendant but testified in cross examination
that plaintiff came to him and confided that she was being compelled to marry a
man she did not like
Te Seng: plaintiff ran away, her father asked help from him to take daughter home;
confessed that daughter did not want to marry the defendant
DECISION OF SC: The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the sole
modification that the amount ordered return to plaintiff should be P1248 according
to evidence and not P1200.
REASONS:
1) While it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when
it is amply proved that
the marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and w/o the consent and
against the will of one
of the parties, there are no ties to be preserved and the marriage should
consequently be annulled
2) There was no voluntary cohabitation on the wifes part
[No. 5986. March 18, 1941]
JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant,
vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA, defendant and appellee.
ENGZON, J.:
DOCTRINE: The provision of the Marriage Law (Sec. 30, Act No. 3613) referring to
"force" or "violence" as ground of annulment of marriage, does not seem to include
mere intimidation, at least where it does not in legal effect amount to force or
violence.
FACTS:
1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of First Instance denying
plaintiff's demand for the annulment of his marriage with defendant
contracted on November 14, 1938, with all the outward legal formalities.
2. Previous to February, 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza, both single, were
sweethearts.
24
3. Loving perhaps too well, she allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have
his way, with the result that nine months later she became an unmarried
mother.
4. After the baby's birth, i. e., on November 14, 1938, Pelagia's father Jose
Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-law), and three other persons visited
Jose Ruiz at the boarding house where he lived, in Oregon street.
5. They requested, and after some discussion, convinced him to marry Pelagia.
6. With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion, he went with Jose Atienza and companions
to Tanduay street, where Pelagia was living;
7. from there the party, joined by Pelagia and others, went to the Aglipayan
church at Maria Clara street, Manila, then proceeded to secure a marriage
license, and later returned to the same Aglipayan church where the marriage
was celebrated in the evening.
8. Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into wedlock, Jose Ruiz
brought this suit to secure its avoidance.
9. His counsel has 'dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and companions, and the
"plans" drawn to force Jose Ruiz into the marriage, Jose's passive and downcast
attitude, all in an effort to maintain the proposition that Jose Ruiz went with
them that afternoon "convinced" by the following "arguments":
a. the threats of the father supported by his "balisong";
b. the unveiled intimidation by Atty.Villavicencio that if he would not
marry Pelagia Atienza, he would have difficulty when he would take
the bar examinations because, as he said, many have been rejected
admission to the bar on the ground of immorality; and
c. the promise of Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be physically "safe"
if he would go with them.
ISSUE:
W/N Jose Ruiz was intimidated into marrying Pelagia Atienza?
HELD: No!
1. As to the first, it appears that in the course of the conversation during the visit,
Ruiz made the statement that he could not marry Pelagia because he was
already a married man.
2. This so aroused Jose Atienza that he grabbed Ruiz' necktie, exclaiming: "So you
mean to fool my daughter!"
3. Those present intervened quickly, and the dispute stopped.
4. The flare of anger is easily understandable.
5. But it is not sufficiently established that Jose Atienza displayed any
"balisong", or made any threat against the life of Ruiz.
6. In fact, only a one-and-a-half-inch knife was found in his possession by the
policeman whom the companions of Ruiz called upon seeing what they
believed to be the beginning of trouble.
SARAO VS GUEVARRA 40 OG 15 SUPPL 263
FACTS:
Plaintiff and defendant were married and on the same day, plaintiff tried
to have carnal knowledge of defendant. The later showed reluctance and begged
him to wait until evening. Although he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently
large for his organ, she complained of pains in her private part later that night.
Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter offensive to the smell coming
from defendants vagina.
Every attempt to have carnal access to his wife proved to be futile because
she always complained of pains in her genital organs.
Upon the advice of the physician, defendants uterus and ovaries were,
with consent of the plaintiff removed due to the presence of a tumor. The removal
of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation.
Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the operation, he lost all
desire to have access with his wife and thus filed this complaint for annulment of
marriage on the ground of impotency.
ISSUE:
WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical impotency.
HELD:
No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed.
RD:
Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase physically incapable of entering into
the married state as with the capacity to procreate. Impotency is not the ability to
procreate but the ability to copulate. Defect must be one of copulation and not of
reproduction. Bareness will not invalidate the marriage.
The removal of the organs rendered her sterile but it by no means made
her unfit for sexual intercourse. It would appear that it was the memory of this first
unpleasant experience with her that made him gave up the idea of having carnal
knowledge of her.
25

Defendant was not impotent at the time she married the plaintiff for the
existence of tumor did not necessarily render her incapable of copulation.
Plaintiff also contends that his consent of the marriage was procured
through fraud in that the defendant did not reveal to him that she was afflicted
with a disease in her sex organs. According to the Court, this contention in
untenable since fraud is not alleged in the complaint and has not been proved at
the trial.
GR No. L-12790 Aug 31, 1960
Joel Jimenez, plaintiff-appellee vs. Remedios Canizares, defendant and Republic
of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant
Facts: Joel filed a complaint praying for a decree of annulment of his marriage to
Remedios upon the ground that the orifice of her vagina was too small for
penetration. This condition made Joel leave the conjugal home two nights and one
day after they had been married. He alleged that it existed at the time of marriage.
Remedios did not file an answer and so the court directed the Zamboanga City Atty.
to inquire whether or not there was collusion and intervene to see that evidence is not
fabricated. Remedios was also ordered to submit to a physical examination, which
failed as she had refused to be examined.
Procedural history: After hearing, Remedios was not present. The trial court entered
a decree declaring the marriage null and void. The city attorney filed an MR
contending that the impotency had not been satisfactorily established since there was
no physical examination and that instead of annulling the marriage, the court should
have punished her for contempt and compelled her to undergo physical examination.
He further argued that the decree would open the door to collusion simply by
alleging impotency.
Issue: WON the marriage may be annulled on the strength of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed and testified that the wife was and is impotent
Held: NO
Rule: Article 45 (5) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage that either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable;
Application: In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony
tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks.
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of
the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or
be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and
would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this
case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being
compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
Dispositive Portion: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Jones v. Hortiguela (1937)
Petition: Appeal from Order of Cebu CFI
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escao.
Petitioner-appellant-appellee: ANGELITA JONES
Oppositor-appellant-appellee: FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and
heir
Ponente: J. Concepcion
Date: 3 March 1937
Facts:
December 1914 Marciana marries Arthur Jones
26
 o 10 January 1918 Jones secured passport; never heard from
again
October 1919 Proceedings to have Arthur judicially declared as missing
o 25 Oct 1919 Court declared Arthur as an absentee with the
proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take
effect until six months after its publication in the official
newspapers [Art. 186, Old Civil Code]
o 23 April 1921 the court issued another order for the taking
effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having
been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal."
6 May 1927 Marciana and Felix marry
Marciana Escao had died intestate [w/o will]: judicial declaration of only
two heirs (Order issued 9 May 1932):
o Felix Hortiguela (husband) appointed judicial administrator of
estate
Charged P10,000 as administrators fees, approved 10
January 1933
Project of Partition and Final Account approved, 26 June
1933
o Angelita Jones (daughter, by first marriage)
3 March 1934 Angelita filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir
of her mother, Marciana:
o Never valid marriage between Mariana and Felix (null and void)
o Since no valid marriage, Felix not entitled to share in usufruct, 1/3
of inheritance
o Angelita was a minor during intestate proceedings never
assisted by counsel (Felixs lawyers)
o Prayed for:
Reopening of proceedings
Her husband be appointed special administrator w/o
bond
Mariana-Felix marriage be declared null and void
Partition of properties made by Felix be declared null and
void; Angelita be declared only heir
In case Mariana-Felix marriage not null and void, for Felix
to not be entitled to usufruct; new partition of
properties; grant only P4/day administrators fees
14 May 1935 Cebu CFI denies:
o Motion to appoint new Admin.
o Setting aside original declaration of heirs
oHolding unwarranted declaring properties as paraphernal [control
of wife] reserving option for parties to determine which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal
o Setting aside order granting Admin. Fees = P10,000
o Ordering presentation of another project of partition
Both parties appealed
Pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
Art 186 [Old Civil Code] Declaration of Absence [Art. 384 to 386 in the
new Civil Code?]
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee
or since the receipt of the last news, and five years in case the absentee
has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his
absence may be declared.
Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the
same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right
subordinated to the condition of his death. (185)
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six
months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. (186a)
Issues:
1. Was the Marciana-Felix marriage valid?
2. Was Felix entitled to inherit in usufruct in testate or intestate succession.
Ruling:
1. YES.
27
 The requisite minimum 7 years had elapsed since the spouse from
the previous marriage had been absent.
Note that marriage contract not registered in municipality of
Malitbog, but this is not a ground for having the marriage
declared null and void recall that the marriage contract is
neither an essential nor formal requisite. [See Madridejo vs. De
Leon (1931), and U. S. vs. De Vera (1914)]
2. YES
By virtue of his valid marriage to Marciana.
Consequently, Court Order approving Project of Partition and
Final Account also valid.
Ratio Decidendi:
(1) In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana
Escao's former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the
date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and
from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said
marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
Angelita had tried to establish that the absence of Marcianas
previous husband should have begun to be counted on 23 April
1921 thus the gap between absence of the previous marriage
But Angelita, seemed to have also presumed the death of the
previous spouse as well, considering how she treated Felix as her
true stepfather [even living with Marciana and Felix
Sec. 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not
heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
(2) Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao
and was divorced from her at the time of her death there is no doubt that
he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate
succession
Opinions:
No separate opinions.
Decision: reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the
order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June
26, 1933, approving the final account and the project of portion
Principles: Marriage when one spouse is absent.
Lukban vs. Republic
G.R. No. L-8492
February 29, 1956
Bautista-Angelo, J:
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after
a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search,
inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved
futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more
than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a
widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can be declared widow of her husband who
is presumed to be dead.
Held:
No. We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in
the case of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a
petition for judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is presumed to be dead
cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration
cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to the present, much less can the
court determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter must of
necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare
upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead.
(Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made
in a proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we
there said that A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that
reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it
is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court
has to pass .It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.
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Fallo: The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-14058. March 24, 1960.
In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue,
presumptively dead. ANGELINA L. GUE, petitioner and appellant, v. THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.: En Banc
Nature of the case: Appeal from the order of the CFI dismissing the petition of
Angelina Gue for a declaration of the presumptive death of Willian Gue.
Facts: On Oct 11, 1944 Angelina Gue was married to William Gue and they had
two children together. On January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to
Shanghai China but since then had not been heard of, neither had he written to
her nor in any way communicated with her, and she failed to locate him despite
of her efforts and diligence. They had not acquired any property during the
marriage. She then asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death
of William Gue (Art 390 of the CC)
CFI: after publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal. It contends that
no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree
may be predicated and this action is not for settlement of the estate of the
absentee as it is clear he did not leave any.
During appeal, appellant invoked the provisions of Art 390 of the New Civil
Code:
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
SOLICITOR GENERAL: opposed to the petition; cites the decision in the recent
case of Lourdes G. Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines. In this case: Lourdes
G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the
same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has
not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired
about him from his parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his
whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address
being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because
he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be
relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in
the case of Nicolai Szatraw, 46 Off. Gaz. 1st Sup. 243, wherein it was held that a
petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be
dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such
declaration cannot be made in a special proceedings similar to the present,
much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this
matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the
court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely
presumed to be dead.
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Issue: If a person is unheard from in seven years; is a declaration of
presumptive death necessary?

RULING: No. A judicial declaration that a person unheard from in seven years,
being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proofs, cannot reach
the state of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years, would have
to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because
he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be
taken, for such a presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary
proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous
and of not benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time
and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.

People v. Masinsin, CA, 49 OG 39081

If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that her husband was
permanently impotent or sterile, there is no liability. (People v. Masinsin, CA, 49 OG
39081)

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