Hazop Amp Hazid Report CNG Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Rev B

Project Title :
ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION

COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS - TAMBAK LOMBOK
HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT
DOCUMENT STATUS
Approved
:
Approved
: as Noted
Not Approved
B 24 JUL 2013 REISSUED FOR REVIEW YS MTH MEF

A 28 JUN 2013 ISSUED FOR REVIEW YS MTH MEF
REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED COMPANY

PT. Enviromate Technology International
PT Pertadaya Gas HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION 7
1.1 BACKGROUND 7
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 7
1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY 8
1.4 REPORT LAYOUT 8
2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 9
2.1 OVERVIEW 9
2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100) 9
2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B) 9
2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B) 10
2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-109) 10
2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100) 11
2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82) 11
2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger 12
2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200) 12
2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B) 12
2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process 12
2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B) 13
2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300) 13
2.1.13 Fuel Gas 13
2.1.14 Instrument air 13
2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400) 14
2.1.16 Fire water system 14
2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001) 14
2.1.18 Insulation 14
2.1.19 Vent System 14
3 STUDY METHODOLOGY 16
3.1 HAZOP 16
3.1.1 Overview 16
3.1.2 Worksheet Definition 16
3.2 HAZID 16
3.2.1 Overview 16
3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions 17
4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS 18
4.1 INTRODUCTION 18
4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM 18
4.3 GUIDE WORDS 18
4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED 19
4.5 SELECTED NODES 20
HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB JULY 2013
PT. Enviromate Technology International
PT Pertadaya Gas HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK
5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS 21
5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 21
5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO 23
6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP 25
7 REFERENCES 26
APPENDIX A HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDIX B HAZOP REVIEW WORKSHEETS
APPENDIX C HAZID REVIEW WORKSHEETS
APPENDIX D DRAWINGS
PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. PROSIM
PT. Pertadaya Gas
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The PT Perta Daya Gas has awarded to PT. Enviromate Technology International (PT. ETI) to
conduct and construction of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facility. The plant will be located at
Tambak Lorok, Central Java, Indonesia. The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment:
Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system,
CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems.
The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air
Instrument Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package
and Sump system.
The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by
CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase
will be performed on the peak load within 4 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of
CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders.
Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to
reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from
tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger.
Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will
be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders.
The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza
Citivew Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th, and 21st June 2013.
The study identified 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations. The

recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process
or improve the clarity of the process drawings.
HAZOP
Design
It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak
Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to
human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting
for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV)
It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to
metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was
recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case.
It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas
blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and
also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to
personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.
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In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B
to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in
overpressure of the system.
The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is
adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in
Tambak Lorok.
It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type.
Maintenance and Operational
Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas
including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of
redundant equipment such as compressor.
To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at
cooling tower periodically.
HAZID
In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is
recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to
reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack
It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the
personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide
warning sign the area to use ear plug protection.
Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the
philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide
clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire
detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as
control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early
warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including
fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g.
FM-200,etc)
The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review
especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel
available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design
and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to
surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not
provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is
recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant.
During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and
radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack.
Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review
emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay
out and emergency lighting.
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Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make
sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation.
Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among
parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.
MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO
The Major Hazard of this plant is :
• Process Hazard :
1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks
2. Gas Compression System
3. Hot water circulation system
4. Cold Venting
• Non Process Hazard :

1. Control Room located in hazardous area
2. Human Error - Alarm
3. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih
4. Transportation
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
PT. Perta Daya Gas is planning to develop CNG Plant Project. The plant will be located at Tambak
Lorok, Central Java province, Indonesia.
PT. Perta Daya Gas therefore commissioned an independent Chairman and Scribe for a series of
safety studies to review and identify hazards and operability issues related to operation of
Compressed Natural Gas Plant Project.
This report details the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) review
and includes a summary of the recommendations identified during the review, as well as the
HAZOP/HAZID review worksheets.
1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the HAZOP study are to:
• Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the process that could directly
threaten the safety of production personnel or cause operational problems;
• Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;
• Identify engineering and procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will
reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified problem;
• Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and
• Recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary.
The objectives of the HAZID study include:
• Assess changes and consider new requirements that have emerged since the last PHA;
• Identification of new hazard causes or initiating factors associated with the modifications with a
potential to result in major accident events (MAEs), which may give rise to serious and
immediate risk to health and safety of personnel;
• Assessment of the consequences of these new MAEs;
• Determination of risk based on the likelihood and the severity of the consequences for each
identified MAEs;
• Identification of existing safeguards that may include engineering or operational controls and
measures included in the design for prevention and/or mitigation of the MAEs;
• Evaluation of the residual risk taking into account the existing control and mitigation measures;
and
• Recommendation of additional safeguards or procedures, where necessary to demonstrate as
Low as Reasonable Practicable (ALARP).
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY
The HAZOP/HAZID study covers these packages in detail:
1. Main Proces System:
· V-100 : Gas Scrubber
· M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering
· D-100A/B : Gas Dryer
· K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors
· E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager
· V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement
· V-400 : Sump Tank
2. Utilities
· WHRU and Hot Water circulation
· Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation
· Open & Close Drains
· Venting system
· Instrument Air System
· Fuel Gas System
· Fire Water Ring
· Engine Generator
1.4 REPORT LAYOUT
This HAZOP/HAZID report is structured as follows:
• Section 1 gives an introduction, defining the objectives and scope of the study;
• Section 2 describes the process;
• Section 3 describes the HAZOP/HAZID methodology;
• Section 4 describes the HAZOP/HAZID workshops;
• Section 5 lists the references given in the report;
• Appendix A presents the summary HAZOP & HAZID recommendations;
• Appendix B presents the HAZOP review worksheets;
• Appendix C presents the HAZID review worksheets; and
• Appendix D presents the Drawings used, outlining the nodes.
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2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 OVERVIEW
The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying
& H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat
Exchangers and Metering systems.
The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air
Instru-ment Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package
and Sump system.
The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by
CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase
will be performed on the peak load within 4 to 5 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of
CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders.
Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to
reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from
tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger.
Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will
be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders.
2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100)
The gas scrubber (V-100) will be installed on incoming gas to remove any hydrocarbon liquid from
upstream facility. The liquid level on the gas scrubber will be controlled by control valve LV-0101
to avoid liquid carried over to the CNG Plant. High liquid level on the scrubber will initiate the
valve to open, then if liquid level has reached normal condition valve will be closed, so the valve
will be as on/off mode.
The gas scrubber is provided with PSV-0101A/B with set pressure of 34 barg for overpressure
protection, One PSV will be on operation and another one as spare.
Inlet line will be provided with SDV-0101 in order to isolate the plant in emergency condition. The
initiators of SDV-0101 closing refer to Cause & effect diagram.
2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B)
The metering will measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant. Total gas inlet is 19.88 MMSCFD. Gas
inlet would be 19.88 MMSCFD and flows to inlet compressor and 1.1 MMSCFD flows to auxiliary
fuel gas. Metering type is 2x100% custody orifice meter. Metering will be operated in continous
operation. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored by flow computer. Gas inlet to
metering tends to consist of high moisture. Orifice should be designed for wet gas condition.
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2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B)
The outlet gas from gas scrubber (V-100) will be dried through Gas Drying Unit (D-100A/B). Unit
consist of two Gas Dryer + H2S absorber, i.e D-100A/B and D-200A/B. These will be operated on
parallel configuration. Maximum capacity of drying Unit is 10 MMSCFD. The range of inlet
pressure is 20.6-25 barg. One bed will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating
mode. Gas dryer will remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point
to -40oC and maximum 3 ppm H2S. Dew point meter and H2S meter should be installed within
Dryer package unit. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time is 4-8 hours (heating,
cooling and standby).
Gas dryer pre filter (F-100) will be provided at upstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to
ensure that gas goes to molecular sieve is clean and no hydrocarbon liquid carried over. One filter
will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator
will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation.
Gas dryer after filter (F-110) will be provided on the downstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B)
to ensure that are there is no solid particle carried over on the gas before entering the CNG
compressor. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure
differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the
switching operation.
Blower, electric heater, air cooler and liquid knocked out drum will be provided on the regeneration
line. A portion of dried gas will be utilized as regeneration gas. The regeneration gas will be heated
by an electric heater then after removing the water on the desiccants, the regent gas will be cooling
downed via the air cooler then liquid will be removed on the liquid knocked out drum. After
removing liquid on the knocked out drum, regent gas will be re-injected on the main gas line.
The valve sequences on the dryer unit will be controlled by a microprocessor on the dryer unit
package. Running and fault status on the dryer package will be transferred to Plant Control System
(PCS) for monitoring only.
This system is auto mode. No interlock system to main PCS.
2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-110)
The dry gas from dryer with operating pressure of 20.6-25 barg at 26.7-51.7 oCwill be transferred to
the storage cylinder at pressure of 250 barg through CNG compressors (K-
101/102/103/104/105/106/107/108/109/110). There are 10 (ten) compressor trains with 9 (nine)
compressors will be operated in parallel and 1 (one) compressor on standby mode.
Each compressor will be operated with outlet capacity of 2.3 MMSCFD at inlet pressure of 24 barg.
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The compressor is reciprocating type in three stages compression, air coolers will be provided on
each discharge stage to enhance the efficiency of compressor.
The maximum discharge pressure and temperature from CNG compressor are 250 barg and 48OC
respectively. The compressor will be supplied by vendor as a skid including electrical and
instrumentation inside. Control system of CNG compressor is provided with PLC by vendor, the
operating parameter will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring purpose.
Shutdown system of the compressors will be managed by PLC, trigger of shutdown such as lube oil
pressure low, suction pressure low, discharge pressure high, discharge temperature high and High
vibration will be further developed by vendor.
Compressors are driven by Gas Engine drive with fuel gas that supplied from upstream of dryer
skid.
2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100)
Compressed gas from CNG compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC
before entering to CNG cylinders. Cooling water system is closed loop cooling system which
involving CNG cooler (E-100), Cooling water circulation pump (P-200A/B) and Cooling Tower (E-
400). The compressed natural gas need to be cooled down to 35oC for optimizing the requirement of
cylinder storage capacity. The temperature of cooling water inlet to CNG cooler (E-100) is 30oC and
temperature cooling water outlet at 39oC. To avoid prolonged overpressure due to tube rupture,
CNG Compressor would be shut downed by PSHH-0503 then CNG gas would be release to cooling
water return line to Cooling tower (E-400).
DURING DECANTING PERIOD:
Cooling water to CNG Cooler will be discontinued to produce CNG stream with temperature 48oC
and it will be commingled with CNG stream from compartment (Temperature 35 oC).
If pressure decreases and disturbing performance of CNG compressor then CNG stream could be
flowed through E-100 bypass line. Restriction orifice installed in this bypass line to giving sufficient
backpressure for CNG compressor.
2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82)
CNG from E-200 will be stored at CNG storage cylinders. The CNG storage cylinders are consisting
of 95 compartment (base on 20 hours storage time at 18.7 MMSCFD CNG inlet). Each
compartment is consisting of 8 tube cylinders. One cylinder has capacity of 2.38 m3. Three CNG
compartment will be arranged in 1 (one) bank. Each bank will be provided 1 unit manual valve for
incoming and outgoing CNG. Pressure relief device (PSV) protect respectives cylinders. Discharge
PSV will be released to atmosphere and no additional pipe is required for PSV discharge line.
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2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger
Double pipe exchanger would be installed at downstream of PV-0501 to minimize temperature

drop during CNG depressuring by PV-0501 A/B. Heating media is using Hot water in outer pipe
side and CNG stream in inner pipe. Timer valve (KV) would be opened to supply hot water to outer
pipe of double pipe exchanger. Restriction orifice (RO) is provided on hot water inlet to restrict
capacity of hot water to exchanger.
If temperature at downstream PV-0501 close with -25o C, Hot water supply could be discontinued
this condition occur when pressure in compartments was dropped.
2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200)
The CNG Heat exchanger is required during decanting stage, this is to reheat CNG on the
downstream of pressure reducing valve. The temperature decrease due to large pressure drop in
PV0501A/B, this is called Joule Thompson effect. Temperature on the downstream can be lower
than the dew point of CNG such that condensation may occurs.
The CNG heat exchanger (E-200) maximum duty is 4100 kW (basis 4 hours decanting time) then
duty will decrease gradually as the upstream pressure is reduced during decanting process. The
initial stage of decanting, the temperature of CNG will be increased from -38oC to about 30oC. The
heating media for this heat exchanger is hot water system with temperature of 90oC. Hot water
circulation flowrate is 140 m3/hr and the flowrate to E-200 will be controlled by (TV0502).
Temperature control Valve (TV-0502) will manipulate hot water flowrate to E-200 to maintain CNG
export to the pipeline at temperature of 30oC. Temperature control is using cascade with TIC-0502.
2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B)
The pressure of CNG outlet to PLN will be maintained at 28 barg and temperature of 30oC. PIC-
0501A/B are used for controlling CNG outlet pressure. Pressure reducing system will be provided
by two control valves ( PV0501A/B) with one operating and one standby.
This valve is designed base on 4 hours decanting time (96 MMSCFD).
2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process
The storage and decanting process will be performed by opening and closing delivery valve (KV-
0501A/B) downstream of CNG storage cylinders. Storage CNG will be carried out fixed maximum
20 hours per day and decanting will be performed 4 to 5 hours per day. During decanting period the
CNG Cooler (E-100) will be bypassed to reduced joule thomphson effect on the downstream of PV-
0501A/B.
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Duration of decanting can be resetted from the control room, but changing setting time shall refer to
operating pressure on the CNG storage cylinders. Over pressure on the CNG cylinders will initiate
high pressure on the discharge compressor then process shutdown can be triggered.
2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B)
The metering system with 2x100% with crossover will measure natural gas outlet from CNG plant.
Total gas outlet is 113 MMSCFD for 4 hours. Metering is used as custody meter. Flow and
accumulation flow should be monitored in main PLC. For Gas composition analysis, one sampling
connection is installed at the upstream of Outlet Metering (M200A/B).
Gas Flow would be measured for 4 hours per day during decanting time. Totalizer would count total
value base on measured gasflow.
2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300)
The exhaust gas from gas engines ducting will be utilized as source of energy to increase the
temperature of hot water from 63oC to 90oC. Exhaust gas from each turbine will be commingled on
header before entering WHRU, and water will be heating up on the WHRU boiler.
Hot water from WHRU will be stored on the hot water storage Tank at temperature of 90oC.
During storage phase (20 hours), WHRU would heat water in Hot water tank (T-200) for
approximately 10 hours from 30o to 90o C. The water circulating pump (P-500 A/B) with capacity of
45m3/hr is used to circulate water from T-200 through WHRU heater (E-300) and back to T-200.
During decanting phase (4 hours), Hot water pump (P-300 A/B) with capacity of 140 m3/h will
circulate hot water from T-200 to E-200 and back to T-200. Temperature of hot water in the Hot
water tank (T-200) is controlled by manipulating damper position on each exhaust gas Turbine of
CNG compressors.
2.1.13 Fuel Gas
Fuel gas is supplied for two (2) units gas engine generators (1 operation & 1 stand by) thru Fuel gas
strainer and for ten (10) units gas engine compressors (9 operation and 1 unit standby). The fuel gas
strainer is designed based on capacity of less than 1.5 MMSCFD.
Fuel Gas metering (FQI-0901) is provided to measure auxilary fuel gas consumption in CNG
facility.
2.1.14 Instrument air
The instrument air will be provided on CNG plant to enhace the overall reliability of the Plant.
Instrument air requirement is calculated based on the number of control valves and on-off control
valves plus a design margin of 20%. Three (3) Air compressors will be provided with two operating
as lead and lag basis and one compressor as a standby.
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Instrument air system will be provided with a drying unit such that the dew point of instrument air is
less than -40oC.
2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400)
Water as cooling media will be utilized for CNG Cooler (E-100) before storage stage, The CNG
from gas compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC using cooled water.
Cooling water is supplied to the heat exchangers through the Cooling Tower Pump (P-200 A/B) at
flowrate of 35m3/hr. After taking heat of CNG, cooling water leaves heat exchanger at temperature
of 30oC is re-circulated to the Cooling Tower ( E-400) for cooling down and reused. Make-up water
will be provided to compensate water losses on the Cooling Tower (E-400).
2.1.16 Fire water system
Fire water will be taken from existing fire water system in front of CNG plant.
Fire hydrants and monitors will be located based on equipment layout during detail engineering.
2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001)
Auxiliary water for CNG plant will be taken from well in plant. Well water will be treated by
Reverse osmisis (RO) technology prior to be used as make up water. Total consumption for make
up water is 3.2 m3/h. The feedwater to the RO unit will be design accordingly based on input from
vendor.
2.1.18 Insulation
Personnel Protection Insulation (PP) shall be specified on all lines with normal operating
temperatures above 70°C. This will be applied only to sections of pipe that personnel could come
into contact with during normal operation.
Heat Conservation Insulation (HC) shall be specified for heated systems above 65°C (e.g. hot water
from WHRU).
Noise Abatement Insulation (NI) shall be specified on compressor suction and discharge lines,
subject to vendor confirmation.
2.1.19 Vent System
Relief Gas from Pressure safety valves and Blow down system would be collected to vent header
then to vent stack. Automatic drain would be provided to controlling liquid level at bottom vent
stack.
Flame arrester would be installed at upstream of vent stack to avoid flame due to lightning or other
fire source.
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Relief gas from CNG cylinders would be free vent to atmosphere instead of to vent header line as
per client and manufacture requirement.
The vent stack with providing water seal at the bottom of the vent stack to prevent air ingress.
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3 STUDY METHODOLOGY
3.1 HAZOP
3.1.1 Overview
The study was carried out using the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is
broken down into manageable sections and a set of standard Guide Words applied. The
methodology requires exhaustive consideration of each process activity to determine if there are any
potential problems in relation to safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process.
The Causes and Consequences of each deviation are identified. The HAZOP team evaluates the
severity of the problem and adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, recommends
additional safeguards as Actions. The hazard and operability problems highlighted in the course of
the review were captured in the HAZOP Review worksheets (Appendix A).
3.1.2 Worksheet Definition
All concerns raised are documented in the HAZOP Review Worksheets, which include the column
headers as described in Table 3.2a.
Table 3.1a HAZOP Review Worksheet
Column Heading Description

No. Reference Number
Guide word/Deviation A set of standard guide words used to analyse and determine
potential problems that arise
Possible Causes Causes or problems identified
Possible Consequences Description of the consequences of the possible impact of the cause
Type Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment,

Engineering, Operability, Safety, Financial and Regulatory
Safeguard Description of the safeguards in place
Recommendations/Comment Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place
Action Party Relevant party taking responsibility for action(s) identified
The completed HAZOP review worksheets are attached in Appendix A.
3.2 HAZID
3.2.1 Overview
HAZID review is used as a means to identifying potential hazards, determining the associated
consequences and evaluating means of preventing the hazard or controlling the consequences. They
should not be confused with a HAZOP review which looks at specific areas of the process to
identify potential design/operating problems and determine ways of improving the process design to
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prevent such incidents from occurring. A HAZID review is based on a combination of identification,
analysis and brainstorming activities. The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by
reference to an agreed set of guidewords. During the review, each facility was considered in turn
with the facility broken down according to specific areas or enclosed buildings, e.g., Main Deck.
3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions
All findings during the HAZID sessions are recorded by the scribe using HAZID worksheets. These
worksheets contain the column headings given in Table 3.3b.
Table 3.3b HAZID Record Sheet Headings
Column Heading Description

No. Reference number
Category / Guideword Initiating event and guideword used to generate hazard scenario
Event Description Description of scenario and mode of realization
Consequence Description of the consequences of the hazard or possible impact and
escalation of the scenario
Prevention Existing measures to prevent the hazard from occurring
Control Existing measures to control or mitigate the hazard to prevent escalation
Recommendation / Actions generated during the review. Comments on the protective systems
Comments in place, justification of the design are also included in italics.
Action Party Responsibility for addressing each action item will be assigned to the
design team or to the project team
Ranking Qualitative ranking of the frequency and consequence of the hazard
(carried out after the review is completed to save time during the review
itself)
17
PT. Pertadaya Gas
4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in
Plaza Citiview Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th and 21st
June 2013.
4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM
The HAZOP/HAZID team comprises a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the design
and operation of the facilities, led by a safety consultant from PT PROSIM The names and
attendance records of the HAZOP/HAZID team members for each of the systems are tabulated in
Table 4.2a.
Table 4.2a HAZOP/HAZID Team Attendance
June June
Name Co. Role 2013 2013
17 21
Margaretha T PT PROSIM Chairman Ö Ö
Yulia Tirtasiwi PT PROSIM Scribe Ö Ö
Sugiyanto PT ETI Process Engineer Ö Ö
Bernardo PT ETI Ö Ö
Rudolf S PT ETI Ö Ö
Suarno PT ETI Ö Ö
Cut Julia PT IKL Project Manager Ö Ö
Warno Abdullah PT IKL Engineering Manager Ö Ö
Suseno PT IKL Process Engineer Ö Ö
Irvan N PT IKL Ö Ö
Haidar PT IKL Ö Ö
Gigin Ginanjar PT IKL Ö Ö
Isa PT IKL Process Engineer Ö Ö
4.3 GUIDE WORDS
The full set of Guide Words used in the HAZOP/HAZID Review is listed in Table 4.3a & b. It
should be noted that if not found to be applicable or not to produce any problem of concern that had
not already been raised, the Guide Word was not recorded in the Worksheets for that node.
Table 4.3a HAZOP Guide Words
No. Guide Word

1 No Flow
2 Less Flow
3 More Flow
4 Reverse Flow
5 Misdirected Flow
6 Less Level
7 More Level
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
8 Less Pressure
9 More Pressure
10 Less Temperature
11 More Temperature
12 Contaminants
13 Composition
14 Corrosion / Erosion
15 Instrumentation
16 Relief
17 Personnel Safety
18 External Factors
19 Operations
20 Maintenance
21 Drawing
Table 4.3b HAZID Guide Words
Safety System Guide Word No. Comments

Non Process Structural Failures 1 Extreme weather/subsidence/fatigue
Events Impact 2 Collisions
Transportation 3 Helicopter/personnel baskets/vessels
Lifting 4 Dropped Objects
Non Process Fires 5 Fires/escalated fires
Toxic Release 6 Chemical spill
Security 7 Pirates/fishermen
Noise 8 High noise areas/vibration
Health hazards 9 Diseases/working condition/chemicals
Loss of Ignition 1 Fires from individual process systems
containment
Safety Systems Ignition Sources 1 —
Escape/ Refuge 2 Personnel escape to TR
Communication 3 Hotlines/radio, etc
Emergency Lighting 4 Lighting during escape/ evacuation
Environmental Discharge to air 1 Vent/ flare/ relief, etc
Hazards
Discharge to water 2 Produced water, etc
Discharge to soil 3 Gas/ water injection , etc
Waste disposal 4 Hazardous material/ solids/ sanitary waste,
etc.
4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED
A basic Piping and Instrumentation (P&ID) for the process acted as a basis for discussion during the
review, along with the operating procedures. The drawings used are attached in Appendix B.
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
4.5 SELECTED NODES
The process was initially broken down according to the step and then by each action comprising the
step. Each action was considered separately with the full list of Guide Words applied. Thus each
action becomes a “node”, so, for instance, each feed line into a reactor was considered as a separate
node. The nodes used are presented in Table 4.5a & b while the associated worksheets are given in
Appendix A (HAZOP) and Appendix B (HAZID).
Table 4.5a Nodes Reviewed in HAZOP
Node Section Drawing Number Rev

N1 Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V- TS78-P-PID-001 B
100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B TS78-P-PID-002 B
N2 Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, TS78-P-PID-003 B
Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110
including Regenerator Filter B
N2R Regeneration System TS78-P-PID-003 B
N3 Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K109), TS78-P-PID-004 B
including Blowdown Tank VE301A
N4 Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 B
(STORAGE TIME)
N5 Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 B
Metering M-200A/B (DECANTING)
TS78-P-PID-006 B
N6 Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, TS78-P-PID-007 B
Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-100 and TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2
E-200
N7 Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation TS78-P-PID-007 B
pump P-500A/B and WHRU
N8 Water Treatment Plant TS78-P-PID-012 B
N9 Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-400, TS78-P-PID-011 B

Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and
Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B
N10 Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400 TS78-P-PID-010 B
N11 Fuel Gas System TS78-P-PID-009 B

N12 Instrument Air System TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 B
TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2
N13 Fire Water System TS78-P-PID-013 B
N14 Power Generation system TS78-P-PID-014 B
N15 Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure TS78-P-PID-015 B
relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600,
up to Vent Stack VS-100
Table 4.5b Node Reviewed in HAZID
Node Section Drawing Number Rev
N1 CNG Plant – Tambak Lorok TS78-L-LY-001 B1
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS
5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
A total of 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations were generated during the
review. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with
the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings (P&ID’s). A complete list of the
recommendations made by the team during the review itself is tabulated in Appendix A. A unique
number is assigned to each recommendation and the node identification number is included so that it
may easily be traced back to the review worksheets (Appendix B & C). Brief summary of
highlighted recommendations are presented below.
HAZOP
Design
It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak
Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to
human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting
for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV)
It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to
metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was
recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case.
It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas
blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and
also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to
personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.
In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B
to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in
overpressure of the system.
The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is
adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak
Lorok.
It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type.
Maintenance and Operational
Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas
including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of
redundant equipment such as compressor.
To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at
cooling tower periodically.
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PT. Pertadaya Gas
HAZID
In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is
recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to
reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack
It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the
personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide
warning sign the area to use ear plug protection.
Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the
philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide
clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire
detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as
control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early
warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including
fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g.
FM-200,etc)
The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review
especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel
available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design
and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to
surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not
provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is
recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant.
During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and
radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack.
Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review
emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay
out and emergency lighting.
Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make
sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation.
Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among
parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.
22
PT. Pertadaya Gas
5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO
The Major Hazard of this plant is :
• Process Hazard :
1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks
2. Gas Compression System
3. Hot water circulation system
4. Cold Venting
• Non Process Hazard :

5. Control Room located in hazardous area
6. Human Error - Alarm
7. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih
8. Transportation
23
PT. Pertadaya Gas
The hazard management plant can be shown as follow:
24
PT. Pertadaya Gas
6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP
The project, design and operation team should conduct a HAZOP/HAZID follow up session to
response the HAZOP/HAZID recommendations. The response and action plan shall be back up with
the relevant data and justification whether the recommendation is agreed or rejected. At the end, the
team shall formulate action plans, steward all action items and ensure that the relevant changes are
made to the design to address hazard and operability concerns identified as part of this
HAZOP/HAZID.
25
PT. Enviromate Technology International HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK
7 REFERENCES
/1/ Process Plan Description - TS78 - P - BD - 001
/2/ Drawing List :
No Drawing Title Drawing Number Rev
1 PID - Incoming Scrubber System TS78-P-PID-001 B

2 PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B) TS78-P-PID-002 B
3 PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) TS78-P-PID-003 B
4 PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package) TS78-P-PID-004 B
5 PID - Storage and Decanting System TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 B
of 2
6 PID - CNG Heat Exchanger TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 B
of 2
7 PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B) TS78-P-PID-006 B
8 PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit TS78-P-PID-007 B
9 PID - Instrument Air System TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 B
of 2
10 PID - Instrument Air Network TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 B
of 2
11 PID - Fuel Gas System TS78-P-PID-009 B
12 PID - Sump System TS78-P-PID-010 B
13 PID - Cooling System TS78-P-PID-011 B
14 PID - Water Treatment Plant TS78-P-PID-012 B
15 PID - Fire Water System TS78-P-PID-013 B
16 PID - Power Generator System TS78-P-PID-014 B
17 PID - Vent Gas System TS78-P-PID-015 B
18 General Plant Lay Out TS78-L-LY-001 B1
19 PFD – Inlet Metering and Dryer TS78-P-PFD-001 B
20 PFD – Gas Compression System TS78-P-PFD-002 B
21 PFD – CNG Storage and Pressure Reducing System TS78-P-PFD-003 B
22 PFD – Waste Heat Recovery Unit TS78-P-PFD-004 B
23 PFD – Cooling Water System TS78-P-PFD-005 B
24 PFD – Heat Material Balance TS78-P-PFD-006 B
19 UFD – Fuel Gas System TS78-P-UFD-001 B
20 UFD – Instrument air system TS78-P-UFD-002 B
HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BA26 JULY 2013
Appendix A
HAZOP/HAZID Summary Recommendation

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT
SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

NODE Causes / Concerns Consequences Comments / Recommendations Rec Number
1 SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher CNG-HP-1
close due to failure Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih
fire or fatality facility
1 SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 Loss of Production Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from CNG-HP-2
close due to failure Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from
pipeline
1 Any of manual valve at Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Provide operating manual for delivery gas CNG-HP-3
incoming line to V-100 Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to
inadvertently close fire or fatality
1 PV 0105 stuck close or manual Potential overpressurization of V-100 resulting in Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID CNG-HP-4
valve around the PV 0105 hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality TS78-P
inadvertently close
1 Control loop malfunction Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent CNG-HP-5
causing LV-0101 to open fully vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100
explosion
1 Control loop malfunction Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per CNG-HP-6
causing LV-0101 to open fully vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and hazardous area classification
explosion
1 Control loop malfunction Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high CNG-HP-7
causing LV-0101 to open fully vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator
explosion
1 Sour Gas (H2S) and water Internal corrosion of piping and vessel leading to Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream CNG-HP-8
content in the production gas release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire V-100
2 Manual by pass valve at Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line CNG-HP-9
downstream line PG-10-30-053 resulting in equipment damage PG-10-30-053 and update PID
from metering M100A/B to
Compressor unit unit is
inadvertenly open
2 Manual valve upstream BDV- Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream CNG-HP-10
0301 inadvertenly close in the fire/fatality BDV-0301
event of ESD and BDV-0301
required to open
2R Blower E-101 at regeneration No regeneration process causing wet gas going to Ensure interlock system install to prevent CNG-HP-11
unit damage/ not in operation compressor overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101
shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown
(Check with vendor)
2R D-200 A-B shutdown Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system CNG-HP-12
has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow
3 Switch operation between Potential human error to operate manual valve and Provide operating manual for operating redundant CNG-HP-13
compressors safety devices equipments, including compressors
4 One of running compressor fails Less of CNG production Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG CNG-HP-14
to operate compartment to be available at market or provide
spare manual valve in the case of maintenance
required
4 Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or Inefficiency in cooling resulting in high temperature Provide portable temperature detector to check skin CNG-HP-15
loss of cooling water leading to less CNG production temperature of CNG compartment
4 Loss of containment/piping leak Tube leak at E-100 Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower CNG-HP-16
due to corrosion periodically
5 SDV0601 fails close or manual Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200 Show setting point of PV 0501A/B CNG-HP-17
valve in the metering station leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire
inadvertenly closed
5 Gas from suction compressor Double counting of sales gas from Santos meter with Install additional check valve at line PG-2"-3C-027 CNG-HP-18
going to downstream of E-200 to M-100
metering M-200
5 Manual valve upstream BDV- Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream CNG-HP-19
0505 inadvertenly close in the fire/fatality BDV-0505
event of ESD and BDV-0505
required to open
6 Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C- CNG-HP-20
due to failure OR Strainer at transfer and lower gas sales temperature 021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature
upstream P-300A/B blockage in the gas sales
6 Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop High temperature in the circulation water around the Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3C- CNG-HP-21
due to failure OR Strainer at waste heat recovery unit 021 to alert operator
upstream P-300A/B blockage
6 Three way valve TV-0502 to E- Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line CNG-HP-22
200 is inadvertenly close transfer and lower gas sales temperature of E-200
7 Any manual valve at upstream E- Potential overpressure of downstream pump Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P- CNG-HP-23
300 inadvertenly close or check 500A/B
7 One or more gas engine driver Less of flue gas to E-300 resulting in lower Review requirement set point of TIA-0704 CNG-HP-25
shutdown temperature generated for water circulation
7 Start up Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300 CNG-HP-26
WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300
7 Condense water from flue gas at Corrosion at E-300 leading to equipment damage Review requirement TIA-0705 CNG-HP-27
E-300
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 2 SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT
NODE Causes / Concerns Consequences Comments / Recommendations Rec Number

7 Drawing Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting CNG-HP-28
point of all instrumentation alarm and trip
9 Manual valve at outlet T-100 is Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream CNG-HP-29
inadvertenly close or strainer P-100 and P-600
blocked
9 Manual valve or strainer at inlet Potential overflow at T-600 Review design of floating valve T-600 to be radar CNG-HP-30
Basin cooling water is type
inadvertently close
9 Manual valve at upstream P- Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream CNG-HP-31
200A/B inadvertenly close or P-200
strainer blocked
10 Liquid control valve failure at Build up pressure in Sump Tank V-400 leading to Review outlet line at venting V-400 to be sufficient CNG-HP-32
individual equipments (V-300, potential overpressurization for case high pressure gas introduced from
Compressor K-101-109, V-100) upstream equipment to this vessel
11 3" Manual valves at Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at CNG-HP-33
incoming/outgoing line Fuel shutdown upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter
Gas filter is inadvertently closed
12 Manual valve upstream of Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Confirm availability of high pressure trip at CNG-HP-34
Instrument Air Receiver V-300 internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to
inadvertently closed shut down compressor in the case of block of
discharge
12 Manual valve downstream Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream CNG-HP-35
Instrument Air Receiver V-310 PSD Instrument Air Receiver V-310
inadvertently closed
13 Operation Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity CNG-HP-36
to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG
Plant
13 Operation Consider to provide additional flowmeter to CNG-HP-37
measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok
14 Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas CNG-HP-38
GE-100A to cooling system damage Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has
inadvertenly close been included in the generator package.
14 Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream GE- CNG-HP-39
GE-100A to cooling system damage 100A
inadvertenly close
15 Lighting struck during Fire at vent stack Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 CNG-HP-40
PSV/BDV release to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with
fusible plug
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 2 of 2 SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Appendix A SUMMARY HAZOP/HAZID PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT
SUMMARY HAZID RECOMMENDATION

HAZID Hazard Description Consequences Prevention Control Recommendation/ Comment Rec Number Co. Pr Ri Type
No.
4.1.3 Lightning Possible damage to the - Grounding provided Update EQL drawing to show CNG-HD- 1 S (4) 4 S (H16) Design
equipment and potential for each equipment Lightning protection at CNG C(3) C(H12)
fire compartment area (lightning
stack) in process/utility area
4.3.1 Light vehicles impact Potential impact to - vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be equipped CNG-HD- 2 S (4) 2 S (H8) Operation /
e.g. Car piping/equipment from process area with flame arrestor and diesel C(4) C(H8) Maintenance
leading to hydrocarbon engine
release, fire, personnel
injury/fatality and asset
damage
4.7.1 High noise level from Potential personnel ear - Provide SOP to wear ear plug CNG-HD- 3 S (1) 3 S (H3) Design
compressor and gas injury around noise area C(-) C(-)
engine area
4.8.1 Toxic Material during Personnel injury MSDS provided in the Ensure portable eye wash station CNG-HD- 4 S (1) 3 S (H3) Design
handling chemical: for storage facility provided during chemical C(-) C(-)
cooling water, handling (e.g : at control room,
corrosion inhibitor e.g. loading area and water treatment
oxygen scavanger area)
4.8.3 Hazardous waste Personnel injury during PPE - hand gloves, - Alocate waste disposal resulting CNG-HD- 5 S (1) 3 S (H3) Operation /
disposal handling waste disposal face shield from operation/construction C(-) C(-) Maintenance
activity in safe area (third party)
4.9.6 Hot Surfaces at Potential injury due to personal protection PPE Provide warning sign around CNG-HD- 6 S (2) 2 S (M4) Design
exhaust gas, WHRU exposure to heat insulation provided hot surface equipment and C(-) C(-)
and heat exchanger (E- pipings
200)
4.10.1 Leak from Process Release of hydrocarbon Unit SD by low Gas detection system Define philosophy of fire and CNG-HD- 7 S (4) 2 S (H8) Design
Equipment resulting in potential pressure trip at process area gas detection system and C(4) C(H8)
fire/explosion leading to develop fire and gas detection
injury/fatality area at process plant
Loss of Containment Release of hydrocarbon NA Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check temperature CNG-HD- 8 S (4) 2 S (H8) Operation /
resulting in potential with source from in the MCC cabinet and DCS C(4) C(H8) Maintenance
fire/explosion leading to existing IP panel to monitor short circuit
injury/fatality and provide portable fire
extinguisher
4.11.1 Battery Fire/explosion in the Battery room is Heat & Smoke Regularly to check temperature CNG-HD- 9 S (4) 2 S (H8) Operation /
event of hydrocarbon located in non detector, Portable Fire in the MCC cabinet and DCS C(4) C(H8) Maintenance
release. hazardous area Extinguisher provided panel to monitor short circuit
at control room & and provide portable fire
MCC room extinguisher
4.11.2 Vent Fire/explosion in the - Lightning protection Define safe location and CNG-HD- 10 S (4) 2 S (H8) Design
event of hydrocarbon provided at CNG minimum height required for C(4) C(H8)
release in process area if compartment area vent stack and vent location to
stroke by lightning be suitable with wind directions
so that dispersed gas will not be
exposed to process plan
4.12.1 Fire on Plant area Personnel trap/ unable ERP - Provide emergency evacuation CNG-HD- 11 S (4) 3 S (H8) Design
to evacuate leading to risk analysis to determine safe C(4) C(H8)
injury/fatality evacuation route and location of
muster area
- - Form emergency response team CNG-HD- 12 S (4) 4 S (H8) Operation /

(ERT) and conduct emergency C(4) C(H8) Maintenance
drill
4.14.1 Control room Fire or explosion from - Heat and Smoke Review scenario of fire and CNG-HD- 13 S (4) 2 S (H8) Design
process area impact to detector explosion from gas plant to the C(4) C(H8)
control room leading to area of standby personnel such
potential personnel as control room and provide
injury/fatality mitigation plan (design and
location of the building) to
anticipate fire/explosion
- - Define safety requirement on CNG-HD- 14 S (4) 3 S (H8) Design

control room specification to C(4) C(H8)
accommodate fire/explosion
scenario e.g. door, wall and
window specifications
Inability to monitor - - Consider to provide CCTV in the CNG-HD- 15 S (4) 5 S (H8) Design
process area control room for monitoring C(4) C(H8)
purpose
4.15.1 Inability to contact Inability to coordinate Each operator F&G alarm system Define internal and external CNG-HD- 16 S (4) 2 S (H8) Design
control room within response leading to provided with hand communication system (PABX) C(4) C(H8)
emergency potential major accident held radio for connecting operator in the
leading to personnel control room to outside parties
injury/fatality and asset
loss
4.16.1 Inability to initiate Inability to control fire Local ESD push - Define safety layout at CNG CNG-HD- 17 S (4) 2 S (H8) Design
ESD leading to potential button at control plant to show ESD push button, C(4) C(H8)
major accident leading to room fire hydrant, etc
personnel injury/fatality
and asset loss
4.18.3 Blowdown of water Potential contamination Discharge water is Define Sampling point Define Sampling point to CNG-HD- 18
from cooling tower, from process fluid connected to existing to monitor discharge monitor discharge water
discharge RO canal (IP) water
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 1 HAZID Worksheet Summary

Appendix B
HAZOP Review Worksheets

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT
Node 1 Abbreviations SOP Standard Operating Procedures

Review date 17-Jun-13 IM Inspection & Maintenance
Client PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL PM Preventative Maintenance

Project Compressed Natural Gas Plant USD Unit Shutdown
Facility Tambak Lorok PSD Process Shutdown
Section Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V-100 to ESD Emergency Shutdown
Station Inlet Metering M100A/B H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design To remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility and measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant
Intent
Design DP : 34 barG DT: 65 deg C
Conditions:
Opt. OP : 20.6-30.9 barG OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD
Conditions
Drawing PID - Incoming Scrubber System TS78-P-PID-001 B
PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B) TS78-P-PID-002 B
Ri
No. Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Rec. No.
Words L
Parameter: Flow
1.1.1 No No Flow SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at S (4) 1 S (M4) Ensure existing pipeline design CNG-HP-1
due to failure of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust C(4) C(M4) pressure is higher than maximum
Facility ) resulting in discharge pressure discharge pressure from Gundih
hydrocarbon release facility
leading to fire or fatality
Loss of Production Review availability of isolation CNG-HP-2

valve (SDV) from Gundih facility
in the case of overpressure from
pipeline
1.1.2 No No Flow Any of manual valve at incoming Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at S (4) 1 S (M4) Provide operating manual for CNG-HP-3
line to V-100 inadvertently close of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust C(4) C(M4) delivery gas
Facility ) resulting in discharge pressure
hydrocarbon release
leading to fire or fatality
Loss of Production
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 53 HAZOP Node N1

Words L
1.1.3 No No Flow PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve Potential PIH-0103 set at 31 barg as S (4) 1 S (M4) Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 CNG-HP-4
around the PV 0105 inadvertently overpressurization of V-100 high pressure alarm to C(4) C(M4) to show at PID TS78-P
close resulting in hydrocarbon alert operator
release leading to fire or
fatality
PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG
to close SDV-0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 34 Note : maximum upstream pressure
barG is sized for fire case from Gundih is not more than 34 barG
1.1.4 No No Flow Any of manual valves at Station Inlet Potential overpresurization PIH-0103 set at 30 barg as S (4) 1 S (M4)
Metering M100A/B inadvertently of upstream M-100A/B high pressure alarm to C(4) C(M4)
close resulting to fire or fatality alert operator
PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG

to close SDV-0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 34
barG is sized for block
discharge
1.2.1 Less Less Flow Refer to No Flow - manual valves
partially closed
1.3.1 More More Flow Slugging High level at V-100 leading Slug Catcher provided at S (-) 1 S (-)
to liquid carry over to Gundih facility C(2) C(L2)
metering skid M-100 and
downstream equipment
LV-0101 will maintain

level in Gas Scrubber V-
100
LIH-0102 as high level
alarm to alert operator
LIHH-0102 will close SDV-
0102
1.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
1.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of
concerns identified

concerns identified
Parameter: Level

Words L
1.6.1 Less Less Level Control loop malfunction causing LV- Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert S (4) 1 S (M4) Provide SOP to accommodate gas CNG-HP-5
0101 to open fully V-400 leading to potential Operator C(4) C(M4) release from vent of sump tank due
vessel damage (design to gas blow by from V-100
pressure 3.5 barG), fire and
explosion
LILL-0102 to initiate Ensure equipment purchase CNG-HP-6
shutdown of SDV-0102 suitable as per hazardous area
classification
Sump Tank open to Ensure vent stack at sump tank is CNG-HP-7
atmosphere located high enough to prevent
exposure to personnel/operator
1.6.2 Less Less Level Manual valve at bypass line LV-0101 Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert S (4) 1 S (M4)
or manual drain valves V-400 leading to potential Operator C(4) C(M4)
inadvertently open, leak at liquid vessel damage (design
lines pressure 3.5 barG), fire and
explosion
LILL-0102 to initiate
shutdown of SDV-0102
Sump Tank open to
atmosphere
1.7.1 More More Level Control loop malfunction causing LV- High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level S (-) 1 S (-)
0101 to stuck close to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to E (2) E (L2)
metering skid M-100 and open by pass line C(2) C(L2)
LIHH-0102 to initiate
1.7.2 More More Level Any of manual valve High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level S (-) 1 S (-)
upstream/downstream LV-0101 to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to C(2) C(L2)
inadvertently close metering skid M-100 and open by pass line
1.7.3 More More Level SDV-0102 fails closed High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level
to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to
metering skid M-100 and open by pass line
1.7.4 More More Level Slugging High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level S (-) 1 S (-)
to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to C(2) C(L2)
metering skid M-100 and open by pass line

Words L
as
1.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/piping leak Release of hydrocarbon PIL-0102 as low pressure S (4) 1 S (M4)
due to corrosion leading to environmental alarm at incoming V-100 C(4) C(M4)
pollution and potential fire to alert operator
PILL-0102 at incoming V-
100 will initiate closure of
SDV 0101
Fire and Gas Detector at V-
100
1.8.2 Less Less Pressure Refer to Misdirected Flow 1.5.1
1.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3,
1.1.4 ; Less Level 1.6.1, 1.6.2
PV-0105 stuck open Potential overpressure at PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as S (-) 1 S (-)
Metering M100A/B and high pressure alarm to E (2) E (L2)
downstream equipment alert operator C(2) C(L2)
PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG

to close SDV-0101
Manual valve at by pass line PV- Potential overpressure at PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as S (-) 1 S (-)
0105 inadvertently open Metering M100A/B and high pressure alarm to C(2) C(L2)
downstream equipment alert operator
PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG
to close SDV-0101
Parameter: Temperature
1.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
1.11.1 More More temperature No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
Parameter: Contamination
1.12.1 As Well Contamination No additional significant issues of
As concerns identified
Parameter: Composition
1.13.1 Other Composition No additional significant issues of
Than concerns identified
Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion
1.14.1 Other Corrosion / Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping Wall thickness of piping S (4) 1 S (M4) Consider to provide corrosion CNG-HP-8
Than Erosion the production gas and vessel leading to and equipment already C(4) C(M4) coupon at upstream V-100
release of hydrocarbon gas considered sour gas
and potential fire condition
Parameter: Instrumentation

Words L
1.15.1 Other Instrumentation No additional significant issues of
Parameter: Relief
1.16.1 Other Relief No additional significant issues of
Parameter: Safety
1.17.1 Other Occupational No additional significant issues of
Than Safety concerns identified
Parameter: External Factor
1.18.1 Other External Factors Fire at plant Overpresurization of Fire and Gas Detector at V- S (-) 1 S (-)
Than piping leading to 100 C(2) C(L2)
equipment damage
Parameter: Operation & Maintenance
1.19.1 Other Operations No additional significant issues of
1.20.1 Other Maintenance Single isolation valve for Potential exposure of high NA Note: Certification/testing of PSV is
Than Maintenance of PSV-0101A/B pressure to personnel conducted during online operation
during maintenance of PSV- without dismantle of PSV itself.
0101A/B Dismantle of PSV can only be
conducted if there is a risk assessment
for single valve at upstream of the PSV
1.20.2 Other Maintenance No additional significant issues of

Parameter: Drawing
1.21.1 Other Drawing
Than


Section Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas ESD Emergency Shutdown
Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Filter Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby)
Design To remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40 deg C and max 3 ppm H2S
Intent
Conditions:
Conditions
Drawing PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-003 Rev: B
No. Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Initiating Co Pr Ri Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No.
Words L
Parameter: Flow
2.1.1 No No Flow Any of manual valve at Gas Dryer Potential PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 S (4) 1 S (M4)
package is inadvertenly close overpressurization of barG to alert Operator C(4) C(M4)
upstream equipment of D-
100 leading to rupture and
potential fire event
PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to
initiate closure of SDV 0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg
2.2.1 Less Less Flow F-100 Blockage Potential PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 S (4) 1 S (M4)
overpressurization of barG to alert Operator C(4) C(M4)
PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to
initiate closure of SDV 0101
PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg
PDI at F-100 as local

indicator for operator

Words L
Potential wet gas to Gas AIH (dew point alarm) at
Compression system downstream of Dryer unit
resulting in equipment
damage
2.2.2 Less Less Flow D-100A/B Blockage (caking) Potential PSH 0301A set at 32 bar at S (4) 1 S (M4)
overpressurization of Gas Dryer D-100A/B to C(4) C(M4)
upstream equipment of D- close SDV-0101
PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is

sized for block discharge
PDSH for Local indicator at

D-100A/B for operator
damage
2.2.3 Less Less Flow F-110 Blockage Potential PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is S (4) 1 S (M4)
overpressurization of sized for block discharge C(4) C(M4)
PDI at F-110 as local
indicator for operator
damage
2.2.4 Less Less Flow see No Flow 2.1.1 For partial blockage
2.3.1 More More Flow BDV-0301 open due to failure Depressurization of the BDV position indication S (-) 1 S (-)
system, loss of gas to flare and alarm C(3) C(M3)
and loss of production

concerns identified
2.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow Refer to More Flow 2.3.1
2.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve at 1/2-in drain line Gas blowby to Sump Tank SOP/Maintenance of liquid S (4) 1 S (M4)
inadvertently open/leak or liquid leading to gas cloud and trap C(4) C(M4)
trap at F-100 and F-110 stuck open potential fire and explosion
2.5.3 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-100 is Potential condense liquid SOP
inadvertenly open carry over to D-100
damage

Words L
2.5.4 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-110 is Potential condense liquid SOP
inadvertenly open carry over to compressor
unit resulting in
equipment damage
2.5.5 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve to regeneration unit is Ineffective regeneration PSV 0301B set at 34 barG is
inadvertenly open process in Gas Dryer D- sized for block discharge
100A/B
2.5.6 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual by pass valve at Potential wet gas to Gas SOP S (-) 2 S (-) LC by pass manual valve 10" at CNG-HP-9
downstream line PG-10-30-053 from Compression system C(3) C(M6) downstream line PG-10-30-053
metering M100A/B to Compressor resulting in equipment and update PID
unit unit is inadvertenly open damage
Parameter: Level
2.6.1 Less Less Level Refer to Misdirected Flow 2.5.2
2.7.1 More More Level Liquid trap of F-100 stuck close High level at F-100 leading SOP to open by pass
to liquid carry over to Gas manual valve 1/2"
Dryer D-100A/B
Parameter: Pressure
2.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on D-100 Release of hydrocarbon Fire and gas detection S (4) 1 S (M4)
due to corrosion leading to environmental system C(4) C(M4)
damage and potential fire
2.8.2 Less Less Pressure Refer to More Flow 2.3.1

2.9.2 More More Pressure See No Flow 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2.1,
Misdirected Flow 2.5.2
2.9.1 More More Pressure Liquid trap of F-100 stuck open Low level at F-100 leading Sump tank connected to
to gas blow by to Sump atmospheric
Tank
2.9. More More Pressure Manual valve upstream BDV-0301 Overpresurization of NA S (4) 1 S (M4) Provide Lock Open (LO) at CNG-HP-10
inadvertenly close in the event of upstream equipment C(4) C(M4) manual valve upstream BDV-
ESD and BDV-0301 required to open leading to fire/fatality 0301
concerns identified
concerns identified

Words L
2.14.1 Other Corrosion / Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping Wall thickness of piping S (3) 1 S (M3)
Than Erosion the production gas and vessel leading to and equipment already C(4) C(M4)
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety
2.18.1 Other External Factors Fire Overpresurization of drier F & G S (-) 2 S (-)
Than leading to equipment C(2) C(M4)
damage

Parameter: Drawing
2.21.1 Other Drawing No additional significant issues of

Node 2R Abbreviations SOP Standard Operating Procedures


Section Regeneration System ESD Emergency Shutdown
H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 12 hours and the regeneration time 12 hours (heating, cooling and standby)
Design To collect water from the dryer and refresh molecular sieves to be ready to absorb
Intent
Drawing PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-003 Rev: B
Words L
Parameter: Flow
2R.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve to regeneration system No regeneration process F-101 to collect any S (-) 1 S (-)
inadvertenly close causing wet gas going to condense liquid C(3) C(M3)
compressor
AIH (dew point alarm) at
downstream of Dryer unit
Back up dryer available
2R.1.2 No No Flow Blower E-101 at regeneration unit No regeneration process F-102 to collect any S (-) 1 S (-) Ensure interlock system install to prevent CNG-HP-11
damage/ not in operation causing wet gas going to condense liquid C(3) C(M3) overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101
compressor shutdown, Electric Heater should also
shutdown
(Check with vendor)
Potential AIH (dew point alarm) at
overtemperature/overpres downstream of Dryer unit
sure at gas regeneration
system
Back up dryer available
2R.1.3 No No Flow F-102 blockage Pump cavitation Regular Filter mainentance S (-) 1 S (-)
C(3) C(M3)
Overpressurization of PSH-0301B alarm to alert

equipment upstream of F- Operator
102 leading to equipment
damage
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 10 of 53 HAZOP Node N2R

Words L
2R.2.1 Less Less Flow F-102 partially blocked Pump cavitation Regular Filter maintenance S (-) 1 S (-)
C(3) C(M3)
Overpressurization of PSH-0301B alarm to alert

equipment upstream of F- Operator
102 leading to equipment
damage
2R.2. Less Less Flow
2R.3.1 More More Flow No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
2R.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow D-200 A-B shutdown Potential reverse flow S (-) 1 S (-) Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration CNG-HP-12
leading to equipment C(3) C(M3) system has adequate design to accomadate
damage reverse flow
potential more flow at D- AIH (dew point alarm) at
100 A-B resulting potential downstream of Dryer unit
offspec to compressor
leading to compressor
damage
PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low
pressure alarm to alert
operator
PILL 501 at SS-101 to
shutdown SDV-151
2R.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve at drain line of F-102 Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to S (4) 1 S (M4)
or separator after cooler leading to gas cloud and Atmospheric C(4) C(M4)
inadvertently open/leak potential fire and explosion
2R.5. Part of Misdirected Flow Liquid trap at F-102 or at separator Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to S (4) 1 S (M4)
after cooler stuck open leading to gas cloud and Atmospheric C(4) C(M4)
potential fire and explosion
#N/A Part of Liquid trap maintenance

Parameter: Level
2R.6.1 Less Less Level See Misdirected flow 2R.5.2
2R.7. More More Level Liquid trap of F-102 or at drain line High level at F-102 leading Manual by pass valve on S (-) 1 S (-)
of separator stuck close to liquid carry over to Gas around liquid trap C(3) C(M3)
Dryer D-100A/B
Second liquid trap provided

on the pipe to Sump Tank
AIH (dew point alarm)-0301

at downstream of F-101
Parameter: Pressure
2R.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on Release of hydrocarbon F & G system S (4) 1 S (M4)
regeneration system due to corrosion leading to environmental C(4) C(M4)
2R.8.2 Less Less Pressure See Misdirected flow 2R.5.1

Words L
2R.8.3 Less Less Pressure Regeneration pump loss of power gas cannot circulate to AIH (dew point alarm) at S (-) 1 S (-)
due to mechanical problem regeneration system downstream of Dryer unit C(3) C(M3)
resulting in wet gas to
compressor
2R.9.1 More More Pressure See Now Flow 2R.1.3
2R.10.1 Less Less Temperature Electric heater stop due to In efficient heat absorbtion Maintenance S (-) 1 S (-)
mechanical failure to D-100 C(3) C(M3)
AIH (dew point alarm) at

downstream of Dryer unit
2R.11.1 More More temperature Cooler stop due to motor failure liquid cannot be condense AIH (dew point alarm) at S (-) 1 S (-)
and separated to the downstream of Dryer unit C(3) C(M3)
separator
2R.12.1 As Well Contamination No additional significant issues of
2R.13.1 Other Composition No additional significant issues of
2R.14.1 Other Corrosion / Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping Wall thickness of piping S (4) 1 S (M4)
Than Erosion the production gas and vessel leading to and equipment already C(4) C(M4)
2R.15.1 Other Instrumentation No additional significant issues of
Parameter: Relief
2R.16.1 Other Relief No additional significant issues of
Parameter: Safety
2R.17.1 Other Occupational No additional significant issues of
2R.18.1 Other External Factors No additional significant issues of
2R.19.1 Other Operations No additional significant issues of
2R.20.1 Other Maintenance No additional significant issues of

Parameter: Drawing
2R.21.1 Other Drawing No additional significant issues of



Section Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K110), including ESD Emergency Shutdown
Blowdown Tank VE301 H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment Nine (9) compressor online and One (1) stand by; reciprocating type compressor, three-stages
Design To compress natural gas and transfer to the storage cylinder
Intent
Design Shut Off Pressure : Design Capacity: 2.17 MMSCFD each
Conditions: compressor
Opt. Suction Pressure : 26 barG Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD
Conditions Discharge Pressure : 250 barG Power : TBA KW (each compressor)
Drawing PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package) Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-004 Rev: B
No. Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No.
Words
Parameter: Flow
3.1.1 No No Flow SDV W151 fails close Potential PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D-
overpressurization of 100A/B to close SDV-0101
upstream equipment and
piping leading to loss of
integrity and fire event
PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit
Low suction pressure to PT-501 displayed in control

compressor leading to room
compressor damage and
production loss
PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low
operator

Words
PILL 501 at SS-101 to
shutdown SDV-151
3.2.1 Less Less Flow Blockage of filter FF-201 Potential PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D-
overpressurization of 100A/B to close SDV-0101
upstream equipment and
piping leading to loss of
integrity and fire event
PDI - S01 provided around
FF 201
PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit


Section Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME) ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment CNG Storage cylinder consist of 95 compartments. 5 compartments will be arranged in 1 bank (each has 40 tubes).
Operation : 19-20 hours storage time, 4-5 hours decanting time
Design To cooling down compressed gas and storage to CNG compartment
Intent
Design CNG Cooler : DP (shell) : 7 barG; (tube) : 263 barG CNG Cooler DT : 65 deg C Duty CNG Cooler: 201 kW
Conditions: CNG Compartment : DP : 374 barG CNG Compartment DT : 70 deg C
Opt. CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) : OP : 3 barG CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) 2.38 m3 each cylinder
Conditions CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OP : 249 : OT : 30 deg C/ 39 deg C
barG CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side)
: OT : 48 deg C/35 deg C
Drawing PID - Storage and Decanting System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
4.1.1 No No Flow Manual valves at inlet CNG Less of CNG production Local pressure indicator
Compartement inadvertenly close provided each
compartment
4.2.1 Less Less Flow See no flow partially

Words
4.2.2 Less Less Flow One of running compressor fails to Less of CNG production Indicator of online Review sizing of manual valve CNG-HP-14
operate compressor in control incoming CNG compartment to
room be available at market or provide
spare manual valve in the case of
maintenance required
Standby compressor
available
Indication of pressure
and flow of storage
period by graph to
shown loss of production
4.3.1 More More Flow No additional significant issues of

concerns identified
concerns identified
4.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow KV-0503A leak or fails open (storage No adverse consequence PV-0501A/B will hold
condition) the pressure
PIHH 0509 set at 33 barG
will open XV-0506 and
circulate gas to suction
compressor
Parameter: Level
4.6.1 Less Less Level Not relevant
4.7.1 More More Level Not relevant
Parameter: Pressure
4.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to Less Flow
4.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow
4.9.2 More More Pressure Storage time more than 20 hours Potential over pressure at
overall plant
PIH-S01 set 30 barG

alarm to alert Operator
PIHH-S01 set 32 barG to
close SDV-
SV-101/102/103 set@
78/165/294 barg

Words
Maximum discharge
pressure of Compressor
255 barG is less than
MAWP Tube storage
design 373 barG
concerns identified
4.11.1 More More Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of Inefficiency in cooling TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH Provide portable temperature CNG-HP-15
Temperature cooling water resulting in high 0509 alarm will alert detector to check skin
temperature leading to less operator temperature of CNG
CNG production compartment
4.12.1 As Well Contamination Tube leak at E-100 Gas contamination to Gas detector at cooling Provide SOP to control PH at CNG-HP-16
As cooling water system tower fan cooling tower periodically
leading to gas release at
cooling tower
Explosion-proof motor of
cooling tower
Gas trapped at shell side TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH
resulting in eficient heat 0509 alarm will alert
transfer operator
4.14.1 Other Corrosion / See contamination
Than Erosion
4.15.1 Other Instrumentation Instrument air failure Unable to supply gas to Nitrogen back up is
Than customer provided to open KV-
0501 to deliver gas from
CNG compartement to
tambak lorok
Parameter: Relief

Words
Parameter: Safety
4.18.1 Other External Factors No additional significant issues of
Parameter: Drawing



Section Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M- ESD Emergency Shutdown
200A/B (DECANTING) H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment E-200 and M-200A/B will be operated during decanting time only. Decanting Time 4-5 hours.
Design To avoid condensation on the upstream of pressure reducing valve and to measure natural gas outlet from CNG Plant
Intent
Design CNG Heat Exchanger : DP (shell) : 5.5 barG; (tube) : 34 barG CNG Heat Exchanger DT : 120 deg C Duty CNG Heat Exchanger 3860 kW
Conditions: M-200A/B : DP : 34 barG M-200A/B DT : 65 deg C Capacity M-200A/B: 113 MMSCFD
Opt. CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OP : 2 barG / 1.4 CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 Decanting : 113 MMSCFD
Conditions barG deg C / 65 deg C
CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OP : 26.7 barG / 26 CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OT- 38
barG deg C / 30 deg C
Drawing PID - CNG Heat Exchanger TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 Rev: B
PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B) TS78-P-PID-006 B
Words
Parameter: Flow
5.1.1 No No Flow Any of manual valves on the Compressor shut off PIH 0502 set at 250psig to
decanting line to E-200 inadvertenly pressure is 255 barg vs alert operator
close or PV0501A/B stuck close design pressure of
equipment is 263 barg - no
adverse consequence
identified

Words
PIHH 0502 set at 255 psig to
shutdown compressor
Loss of gas to customer FT-0601A/B at M-200A/B

displayed at control room
FILL 0601 A/Bset at 5

MMSCFD for alarm to alert
operator
5.1.2 No No Flow SDV0601 fails close or manual valve Potential PV0501 A/B to regulate the Show setting point of PV 0501A/B CNG-HP-17
in the metering station inadvertenly overpressurization of CNG pressure
closed HE E-200 leading to
hydrocarbon release and
potential fire
PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to
alert operator
PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to
close KV 0501A
5.2.1 Less Less Flow Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed
5.3.1 More More Flow PV0501A/B stuck open Potential PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to
overpressurization of CNG alert operator
HE E-200 and downstream
piping
PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to
close KV 0501A
5.4.2 Reverse Reverse Flow Gas from suction compressor going Double counting of sales Install additional check valve at CNG-HP-18
to downstream of E-200 to metering gas from Gundih meter line PG-2"-3C-027
M-200 with M-100
5.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow BDV-0505 fails open Loss of gas to vent BDV position indicator and
alarm in control room
5.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow XV-0506 fails open Loss of gas back to system Valve position indicator and
instead to customer alarm in control room
Parameter: Level
5.6.1 Less Less Level No additional significant issues of
concerns identified

Words
5.7.1 More More Level No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
Parameter: Pressure
5.8.1 Less Less Pressure Loss of containment/leak on Release of hydrocarbon F&G
Decanting Line leading to environmental
5.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow and more flow

5.9. More More Pressure Manual valve upstream BDV-0505 Overpresurization of NA Provide Lock Open (LO) manual CNG-HP-19
inadvertenly close in the event of upstream equipment valve at upstream BDV-0505
ESD and BDV-0505 required to open leading to fire/fatality
concerns identified
concerns identified
5.12.1 As Well Contamination Tube leak at E-200 Gas contamination to hot Atmospheric venting at Hot
As water system leading to gas Water Tank T-200
release at WHRU
5.14.1 Other Corrosion / No additional significant issues of
Than Erosion concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety

Words
5.20. Other Maintenance No additional significant issues of
Parameter: Drawing



Section Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water ESD Emergency Shutdown
Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-200 H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment Circulation to E-200 will be on decanting time only
Design To heat compressed gas from storage facility to be ready for sales gas
Intent
Design E-500 DP : 2 barG Temperature: 120 deg C T-200 : 290 m3
Conditions: T-200 DP : 0.17 barG P-300 : 140 m3/hr
E-500 : 127 kW
Opt. Source Pressure : atm; Discharge Pump : 3.35 barG CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C Power : 36.8 kW
Conditions
Drawing PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-007 Rev: B
PID - CNG Heat Exchanger TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2 B
No. Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Consequences Safeguards Iniating L S L R Comments / Recommendations Action Party Rec. No.
Words
Parameter: Flow
6.1.1 No No Flow Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop Loss of hot water supply TT-0512 as low temperature S (-) 1 S (-) Provide low temperature switch at line CNG-HP-20
due to failure OR Strainer at leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator C(2) C(L2) PG-12"-3C-021 to close KV-0503 A to
upstream P-300A/B blockage transfer and lower gas prevent low temperature in the gas
sales temperature sales
High temperature in the TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to Provide low temperature alarm at line CNG-HP-21
circulation water around control exhaust gas supply PG-12"-3C-021 to alert operator
the waste heat recovery from compressor
unit
TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C
Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby
hot water circulation pump P-300B
leading to inefficient heat
transfer
6.1.2 No No Flow Manual valve on the downstream Loss of hot water supply TT-0512 as low temperature S (-) 1 S (-)
P300A/B inadvertently closed leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator C(2) C(L2)
transfer and lower gas
sales temperature

Words
High temperature in the TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to
circulation water around control exhaust gas supply
unit
Potential PSHH 0703A set at 4.5 barG
overpressurization of to close P-300A/B
upstream piping
6.2.1 Less Less Flow Three way valve TV-0502 to E-200 is Loss of hot water supply TT-0512 as low temperature S (-) 1 S (-) Provide Temperature Control Valve at CNG-HP-22
inadvertenly close leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator C(2) C(L2) bypass line of E-200
sales temperature
unit
Three way valve TV-0502 to by pass Not adverse consequence
line E-200 is inadvertenly close
6.3.1 More More Flow Hot Water Pump P-300A andB Excess hot water supply to TIC-0502 as high S (-) 1 S (-)
running simultaneously E-200 resulting in potential temperature alarm to alert C(2) C(L2)
overheating operator
Pump running status

indication at control room
concerns identified
6.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve at T-200 to open Loss of hot water supply SOP S (-) 1 S (-)
drain inadvertently open leading to inefficient heat C(2) C(L2)
transfer
Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P-
300 system 500A/B
Parameter: Level
6.6.1 Less Less Level see misdirected flow 6.5.1
6.6.2 Less Less Level More evaporation with less make up Loss of hot water supply Vapor Condenser E-500 S (-) 1 S (-)
water leading to inefficient heat provided C(2) C(L2)
transfer
LSL 0701 to start P-600
pump for make up water
Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P-
300 system 500A/B
6.7.1 More More Level Make up water activated Potential overflow to open LSH 0701 to stop make up S (-) 1 S (-)
drain water and provide warning C(2) C(L2)
to operator
Overflow line to Open
Drain

Words
Parameter: Pressure
6.8.1 Less Less Pressure refer to No Flow 6.1.1
6.10.1 Less Less Temperature Leak at hot water system at Loss of hot water supply TT-0512 as low temperature S (-) 1 S (-)
discharge P-300A/B leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator C(2) C(L2)
sales temperature
unit
6.10.2 Less Less Temperature Fouling/Plugging at E-200 Inefficiency in heating TT-0512 as low temperature S (-) 1 S (-)
resulting in lower gas alarm to alert operator C(2) C(L2)
temperature
6.10.3 Less Less Temperature Refer to No Flow
6.11.1 More More Refer to More Flow

Temperature
6.12.1 As Well Contamination E-200 Tube/tube sheet leak Gas introduce to hot water T-200 is venting to S (-) 1 S (-)
As system leading to potential atmosphere C(2) C(L2)
overpressure of hot water
system
d
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety

Words
Parameter: Drawing



Section Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P- ESD Emergency Shutdown
500A/B and WHRU H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design To recover heat from exhaust gas of compressor and heating water for heating media E-100 and E-200
Intent
Design Pressure: WHRU : 18 Barg Temperature: WHRU : 545 deg C P-500 : 48 m3/hr
Conditions:
Opt. Shell / Coil : 0.03 barG / 3 barG Shell / Coil OT : 490 deg C / 63 to 90 deg C Power : 1283 kW
Conditions
Drawing PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-007 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
7.1.1 No No Flow Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B Loss of water circulation TIC-0703 to close S (-) 1 S (-)
stop due to failure OR Strainer at leading to overheating of dampener from C(2) C(L2)
upstream P-500A/B blockage hot water circulation to T- compressor flue gas
200
TIC-0703 as high
temperature alarm to alert
operator
PSV-0701 as thermal relief
routed to open drain
Pump running status

indication at control room
Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby

water circulation leading to pump P-500B
inefficient heat transfer

Words
7.1.2 No No Flow Any manual valve at upstream E-300 Loss of water circulation TIC-0703 to close S (-) 1 S (-)
inadvertenly close or check valve leading to overheating of dampener from C(2) C(L2)
blockage hot water circulation to T- compressor flue gas
200
TIC-0703 as high
operator
Potential overpressure of Vendor to provide minimum flow CNG-HP-23

downstream pump recycle line at P-500A/B
7.2.1 Less Less Flow Any manual valve on the water Loss of water circulation TIC-0703 to close S (-) 1 S (-)
circulation line at WHRU system leading to overheating of dampener from C(2) C(L2)
partially closed hot water circulation to T- compressor flue gas
200
TIC-0703 as high
operator
7.3.1 More More Flow Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B Excess water circulation to Pump running status
running simultaneously E-300/T-200 - no safety indication at control room
consequence
concerns identified
7.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual valve to open drain Loss of water circulation TIC-0703 to close S (-) 1 S (-)
inadvertenly open leading to overheating of dampener from C(2) C(L2)
hot water circulation to T- compressor flue gas
200
TIC-0703 as high
operator
7.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve to venting open Loss of water circulation TIC-0703 to close S (-) 1 S (-)
leading to overheating of dampener from C(2) C(L2)
hot water circulation to T- compressor flue gas
200
TIC-0703 as high
operator
Parameter: Level
concerns identified
concerns identified

Words
Parameter: Pressure
7.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to No Flow 6.1.1
7.10.1 Less Less Temperature Refer to No Flow
One or more gas engine driver Less of flue gas to E-300 TIA 0704 to alert operator S (-) 1 S (-) Review requirement set point of CNG-HP-25
shutdown resulting in lower C(2) C(L2) TIA-0704
temperature generated for
water circulation
Start up Low gas temperature from Provide drain line at lowest point CNG-HP-26
exhaust gas compressor to gas ducting E-300
WHRU resulting
condensation at gas
ducting E-300
7.11.1 More More Refer to No Flow, Less Flow,
Temperature Misdirected Flow
7.12.1 As Well As Contamination No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
7.14.1 Other Corrosion / Condense water from flue gas at E- Corrosion at E-300 leading Check with vendor the S (-) 2 S (-) Review requirement TIA-0705 CNG-HP-27
Than Erosion 300 to equipment damage requirement of TIA-0705 C(2) C(M6)
as low temperature alarm
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety
Parameter: Drawing

Words
Than
Than
7.21.3 Other Drawing Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to CNG-HP-28
Than show setting point of all
instrumentation alarm and trip



Section Water Treatment Plant ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design to treat sea water and provide potable water for cooling media
Intent
Design Pressure : 7 barG Temperature: 65 deg C Flow : 3.2 m3/hr
Conditions:
Opt. Pressure : 4 barG Temperature : ambient

Conditions
Drawing PID - Water Treatment Plant Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-012 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
8.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve at inlet Feed Pump No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water S (-) 2 S (-)
P701 inadvertenly close for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) C(1) C(L2)
to low performance of heat
transfer
Low suction pressure of PSL1209 to stop P702

P702 resulting in pump
damage
8.1.2 No No Flow Pump P701 stop due to failure No make up water supply Pump maintenance S (-) 2 S (-)
for cooler/heater leading C(1) C(L2)
transfer

damage
8.1.3 No No Flow MOV-1201 (valve on duty) No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water S (-) 2 S (-)
inadvertenly close for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) C(1) C(L2)
transfer

damage

Words
8.1.4 No No Flow High Pressure Pump P702 failure No make up water supply Pump maintenance S (-) 2 S (-)
transfer
8.1.5 No No Flow Manual valve downstream P702 No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water
inadvertenly close for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP)
transfer
Potential overpressure of PSH 1211 to stop P702 and

upstream equipment P701
8.1.6 No No Flow Manual valve downstream Buffer Potential overfilling TK02 LS-1201 to stop Feed Pump S (-) 1 S (-)
Tank TK-02 inadvertenly close P701 C(1) C(L1)
LS-1201 to stop Hi press

Pump PU-201
8.1.7 No No Flow High Pressure Pump PU-201 failure No make up water supply Pump maintenance S (-) 2 S (-)
transfer
Manual valve downstream PU-201 No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water S (-) 2 S (-)
inadvertenly close for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) C(1) C(L2)
transfer
Potential overpressure of PSH 1216 to stop PU-201

upstream equipment
8.2.1 Less Less Flow Filter F-1A//B blockage Potential overpressure of PI 1201, PI 1202 and PI S (-) 2 S (-)
upstream equipment 1203 to monitor differential C(1) C(L2)
pressure
8.2.2 Less Less Flow Filter FX-01/02 blockage Potential overpressure of PDI 1201 to monitor S (-) 2 S (-)
upstream equipment differential pressure C(1) C(L2)
8.2.3 Less Less Flow RO-A blockage Potential overpressure of PSH 1211 to stop P702 and S (-) 2 S (-)
upstream equipment P701 C(1) C(L2)
8.3.1 More More Flow Control valve upstream FM 1205 Potential overflow to TK01 LS01 to stop FEED pump S (-) 1 S (-)
stuck open P701 C(1) C(L1)

concerns identified
8.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual valve for sample Loss of make up water to SOP
inadvertenly open environment
8.5.2 Part of Misdirected Flow Manual drain valve from RO-A to Loss of make up water to SOP
open ditch inadvertenly open environment
Parameter: Level
concerns identified
8.7.1 More More Level see more flow
Parameter: Pressure
8.8.1 Less Less Pressure see no flow

Words
8.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow and less flow
concerns identified
8.11.1 More More No additional significant issues of

Temperature concerns identified
8.13.1 Other Composition Manual valve from chemical source Low make up water SOP
Than inadvertenly close quality leading to scale

Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety


Parameter: Drawing
Than



Section Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-100, Make Up ESD Emergency Shutdown
Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
P-200 A/B Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design To provide cooling media for E-100

Intent
Design Pressure: Cooling Tower : 3.5 Barg Temperature: 65 deg C Capacity T-100 : 54 m3
Conditions:
Opt. Pressure : ATM Temperature : 30 - 45 deg C Power P-100 : 0.85 kW; P-200A/B :
Conditions 5.88 kW
Drawing PID - Cooling System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-011 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
9.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve at inlet T-100 is Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown S (-) 2 S (-)
inadvertenly close to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600 C(2) C(M4)
potential pump damage
Loss of make up water for Temperature alarm at

cooling media and make up WHRU, E-100 and E-200
T-200 leading to ineffective
heat transfer
9.1.2 No No Flow Manual valve at outlet T-100 is Loss of pump suction and S (-) 2 S (-) Provide lock open (LO) for manual CNG-HP-29
inadvertenly close or strainer potential pump damage C(2) C(M4) valve upstream P-100 and P-600
blocked
Loss of make up water for Temperature alarm at
cooling media and make up WHRU, E-100 and E-200
T-200 leading to ineffective
heat transfer
9.1.3 No No Flow Make up water pump P-100 broken Loss of make up water for Pump running status S (-) 1 S (-)
or stop cooling media leading to indication at control room C(2) C(L2)
ineffective heat transfer

Words
Pump maintenance
9.1.4 No No Flow Manual valve or strainer at inlet Loss of make up water for Temperature alarm at E-100 S (-) 1 S (-)
Basin cooling water is inadvertently cooling media leading to C(2) C(L2)
close ineffective heat transfer
Potential overflow at T-600 Floating valve at T-600 to Review design of floating valve T- CNG-HP-30
start/stop pump P-100 600 to be radar type
9.1.5 No No Flow Cooling water pump P-200A/B Loss of make up water for Pump running status S (-) 1 S (-)
broken or not in operation cooling media leading to indication at control room C(2) C(L2)
9.1.6 No No Flow Manual valve at upstream P-200A/B Loss of pump suction and Strainer Maintenance S (-) 2 S (-) Provide lock open (LO) for manual CNG-HP-31
inadvertenly close or strainer potential pump damage periodically C(2) C(M4) valve upstream P-200
blocked
Loss of make up water for
cooling media leading to
9.1.7 No No Flow Manual valve at downstream P- Potential PSH 1108A to stop P- S (-) 1 S (-)
200A/B inadvertently close overpressurization of 200A/B C(2) C(L2)
piping at pump discharge
9.2.1 Less Less Flow Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed
9.3.1 More More Flow Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A and B More of water cooling Pump running status
running simultenaously media - no adverse indication at control room
consequence
concerns identified
9.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 3" manual valve at T-100/E-400 to Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown
open drain inadvertenly open to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600
9.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2" manual valve at E-400 to open Low level at E-400 leading Floating valve will flow
drain inadvertenly open to loss of pump suction and water from T-600
Parameter: Level
9.6.1 Less Less Level see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3,9.5.1 Loss of water for cooling
media resulting insufficent
heat absorbed during heat
transfer leading to CN gas
offspec
9.6.2 Less Less Level Make up water pump P-100 fails to Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown S (-) 2 S (-)
stop to loss of pump suction and Pump P-100 C(2) C(M4)

Words
High level at Cooling Float valve will stop
Tower basin T-600 incoming flow to cooling
tower
9.7.1 More More Level Float valve at Cooling Tower basin E- Potential overflow to open SOP S (-) 1 S (-)
400 failure drain C(2) C(L2)
Parameter: Pressure
9.8.1 Less Less Pressure Leak in water supply line to E-100 Loss of water for cooling S (-) 2 S (-)
media resulting insufficent C(2) C(M4)
heat absorbed during heat
transfer leading to CN gas
offspec
9.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3
concerns identified
9.11.1 More More Motor at E-400 fails to run high temperature of water TT-0503 at E-100 as high S (-) 1 S (-)
Temperature supply to E-100 leading to temperature alarm to alert C(2) C(L2)
less production operator
concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety

Words
Parameter: Drawing
Than



Section Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400 ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design To collect liquid drain from vessel (closed drain system)

Intent
Design Pressure : 3.5 barG Temperature: 45 deg C P-400 Capacity : 1.2 m3/hr
Conditions:
Opt. Tank Ops Pressure : ATM; P Temperature : AMB Power P-400 : 0.3 kW
Conditions Pump Suc Pressure : Atm, Disch Pressure : 2 barG
Drawing PID - Sump System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-010 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
10.1.1 No No Flow 4" manual valve at inlet V-400 High level at source vessel Safeguards at source vessel S (-) 1 S (-)
inadvertenly closed C(1) C(L1)
10.2.1 Less Less Flow No additional significant issues of

concerns identified
10.3.1 More More Flow Liquid control valve failure at Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere S (-) 1 S (-) Review outlet line at venting V- CNG-HP-32
individual equipments (V-300, Tank V-400 leading to C(1) C(L1) 400 to be sufficient for case high
Compressor K-101-109, V-100) potential pressure gas introduced from
overpressurization upstream equipment to this
vessel
10.3.2 More More Flow Manual drain valves at individual Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere S (-) 1 S (-)
equipments inadvertently open Tank V-400 leading to C(1) C(L1)
during online operation potential
overpressurization
Loss of level at the source LT at individual equipment
vessel as low level alarm to alert
operator; and as low level
trip to initiate USD

Words
Double-valve provided at
drain line of the individual
equipments
concerns identified
concerns identified
Parameter: Level
10.6.1 Less Less Level Sump Pump P-400 fails to stop due Loss of liquid level leading Pump will be stopped S (-) 1 S (-)
to LT-1001 failure to function to Sump Pump P-400 during no signal (FC) C(1) C(L1)
damage due to cavitation
10.7.1 More More Level Pump stopped due to no power Overfilling of Sump Tank LAH 1001 as high level S (-) 1 S (-)
supply or pump damage V-400 and liquid release alarm to alert operator C(1) C(L1)
from vent to environment
SOP - draining activity is

attended by operator
Standby portable pump will
be provided and connected
to available spare nozzle
Parameter: Pressure
10.8.1 Less Less Pressure No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
10.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to More flow
10.9.2 More More Pressure Blockage of flame arrestor at vent Potential Bug screen provided
line overpressurization of V-
400
concerns identified
concerns identified

Words
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety
Parameter: Drawing
Than



Section Fuel Gas System ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design To provide fuel to compressor

Intent
Design Pressure : 13.5 barG Temperature: 45 deg C Capacity : 1.5 m3
Conditions:
Opt. Pressure : 10 barG Temperature : 21 deg C

Conditions
Drawing PID - Fuel Gas System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-009 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
11.1.1 No No Flow 3" Manual valves at Loss of fuel gas supply PT-0902 as low pressure S (-) 1 S (-) Provide lock open (LO) for 3" CNG-HP-33
incoming/outgoing line Fuel Gas leading to compressor alarm to alert operator C(4) C(M4) manual valves at upstream and
filter is inadvertently closed shutdown downstream Fuel Gas Filter
11.1.2 No No Flow PCV-0901A/B stuck closed Loss of fuel gas supply PT-0902 as low pressure S (-) 1 S (-)
leading to compressor alarm to alert operator C(4) C(M4)
shutdown
Standby PCV available
11.2.1 Less Less Flow Pump N4 stop due to failure Less of fuel gas supply PDI 0901A/B to monitor S (-) 1 S (-)
leading to compressor differential pressure C(2) C(L2)
shutdown
Back up fuel gas filter
available
PT-0902 as low pressure
11.3.1 More More Flow PCV-0901A/B stuck open Potential PT-0902 as high pressure S (-) 1 S (-)
overpressurization of alarm to alert operator C(1) C(L1)
concerns identified

Words
11.5.1 Less Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
Parameter: Level
concerns identified
concerns identified
Parameter: Pressure
11.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to No Flow and Less Flow
11.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to More Flow
concerns identified
concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety
Parameter: Drawing
Than



Section Instrument Air System ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment
Design To provide instrument air for instrumented system

Intent
Design Pressure : 12 barG Temperature: 45 deg C Capacity 183.63 SCFM (each)
Conditions:
Opt. Pressure : 6 - 10 barG Temperature : AMB - 40 deg C Power: 30 kW (each)

Conditions
Drawing PID - Instrument Air System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 Rev: B
PID - Instrument Air Network TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 B
Words
Parameter: Flow
12.1.1 No No Flow Manual valve upstream of Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from S (-) 1 S (-)
Instrument Air Receiver V-300 supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver V- C(2) C(L2)
inadvertently closed to PSD 300 is provided for 5
minutes in operation
PT-0803 set at 7 barg as low

Operator
Potential NA Confirm availability of high CNG-HP-34
overpressurization of pressure trip at internal of Air
upstream piping Compressor C300A/B/C package to
shut down compressor in the case of
block of discharge
12.1.2 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream of Air Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from S (-) 1 S (-)
Dryer Prefilter F300A/B supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver V- C(2) C(L2)

Words
Potential PSV 0801 set at 12 barG
overpressurization of release air to atmosphere
upstream piping
12.1.3 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream of Air Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from
Dryer D300A/B inadvertently supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver V-
closed to PSD 300 is provided for 5
Potential PSV 0801 set at 12 barG

overpressurization of release air to atmosphere
upstream piping
12.1.4 No No Flow Any manual valve upstream Air Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from S (-) 1 S (-)
Dryer after filter F301A/B supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver V- C(2) C(L2)
Potential PSV 0802 release air to

overpressurization of atmosphere
upstream piping
12.1.5 No No Flow Any manual valve downstream Air Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from
Dryer after filter F301A/B supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver V-
Potential PSV 0802 release air to

overpressurization of atmosphere
upstream piping
12.1.6 No No Flow Air Compressors package Loss of instrument air Auto start of standby S (-) 1 S (-)
trip/broken supply potentially leading compressor by PSLL-0803 C(2) C(L2)
to PSD
Nitrogen back up at
downstream F-310A/B
12.1.7 No Flow Manual valve downstream Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from S (-) 1 S (-) Lock Open (LO) for manual valve CNG-HP-35
Instrument Air Receiver V-310 supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver V- C(2) C(L2) downstream Instrument Air Receiver
inadvertently closed to PSD 310 is provided for 5 V-310
Potential
overpressurization of
upstream piping
12.2.1 Less Less Flow Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B Less of instrument air PDI 0801 to monitor S (-) 1 S (-)
blockage supply potentially leading differential pressure C(2) C(L2)
to PSD
Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801
resulting in
instrumentation damage
leading to potential
shutdown
Spare Air Dryer Prefilter
available

Words
12.2.2 Less Less Flow Air Dryer D-200A/B blockage Less of instrument air PDI 0802A/B to monitor S (-) 1 S (-)
supply potentially leading differential pressure C(2) C(L2)
to PSD
Wet instrument air Dew Point Meter DE 0801
resulting in
shutdown
Spare Air Dryer available
12.2.3 Less Less Flow Air Dryer After Filter F301A/B Less of instrument air PDI 0802 to monitor S (-) 1 S (-)
blockage supply potentially leading differential pressure C(2) C(L2)
to PSD
Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801
resulting in
shutdown
Spare Air Dryer After filter
available
12.3.1 More More Flow All Air Compressor running
simultaneously - no adverse
consequence
concerns identified
12.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual drain valve at V-300 High pressure air blowby Sump Tank V-400 is open to S (-) 1 S (-)
inadvertently close to sump tank V-400 atmosphere C(2) C(L2)
Less of instrument air

supply potentially leading
to PSD
Parameter: Level
concerns identified
12.7.1 More More Level Water condensation in V-300 and Low quality of instrument SOP to monitor LG 0801 S (-) 1 S (-)
lube oil entrainment from air leading to potential C(2) C(L2)
compressors instrument damage and
shutdown
Parameter: Pressure
12.8.1 Less Less Pressure see no flow, less flow, misdirected flow
12.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow
concerns identified

Words
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety
Parameter: Drawing



Section Fire Water System ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment Fire water is supplied from existing facility
Design to provide cooling system and extinguish fire from the process plant and building
Intent
Design Pressure : ATM Temperature: 45 deg C
Conditions:
Opt. Pressure : ATM Temperature : ambient

Conditions
Drawing PID - Fire Water System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-013 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
13.1.1 No No Flow Any of manual valve at fire water Lack of fire water supply SOP S (3) 1 S (M3)
ring inadvertently close/stuck close resulting in inadequate C(3) C(M3)
water to extinguishing fire
13.1.2 No No Flow Existing fire water pump inoperation Fail to supply fire water in S (3) 1 S (M3)
case of fire leading to fire C(3) C(M3)
escalation
13.2.1 Less Less Flow Any of manual valve at fire water Lack of fire water supply SOP S (3) 1 S (M3)
ring partially close resulting in inadequate C(3) C(M3)
water to extinguishing fire

concerns identified
concerns identified
concerns identified
Parameter: Level
concerns identified

Words
concerns identified
Parameter: Pressure
13.8.1 Less Less Pressure see less flow
13.9.1 More More Pressure No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
concerns identified
concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety
13.19.1 Other Operations Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire CNG-HP-36
Than water capacity to be adequate for fire
water handling in CNG Plant
13.19.2 Other Operations Consider to provide additional flowmeter CNG-HP-37
Than to measure fire water consumption for
Tambak Lorok
Parameter: Drawing
Than



Section Power Generation system ESD Emergency Shutdown
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment GE-100 A is main generator and GE-100B is back up generator (emergency???)
Design to provide power for CNG plant

Intent
Design Pressure : Temperature: Capacity : 600 kW
Conditions:
Opt. Pressure : Temperature :
Conditions
Drawing PID - Power Generator System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-014 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
14.1.1 No No Flow Power Generator unable to operate No power generated Standby Generator S (-) 1 S (-)
due to damage leading to plant shutdown provided C(3) C(M3)
Back up power supply from

PLN available
XV 1401 or XV 1402 or XV - 1403
inadvertenly close
PV 1401 or PV-1402 stuck close
Manual valve up stream GE-100A
inadvertenly close
concerns identified
concerns identified
concerns identified
14.5.1 Part of Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve to drain system Hydrocarbon gas release to
open environment
v
concerns identified

Words
concerns identified
Parameter: Pressure
14.8.1 Less Less Pressure see less flow
14.9.1 More More Pressure see more flow
concerns identified
14.11.1 More More Any manual valve down stream GE- Overheating at GE-100A S (-) 1 S (-) Confirm availability of TSHH to CNG-HP-38
Temperature 100A to cooling system inadvertenly leading to equipment C(3) C(M3) trip Gas Generator GE-100A in
close damage, plant shutdown case of high temperature has been
included
Lock Open in (LO)
the generator package.
for manual valve CNG-HP-39
downstream GE-100A
concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
Parameter: Safety

Parameter: Drawing



Section Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device ESD Emergency Shutdown
and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100 H,M,L High, Medium, Risk
Co Consequence
Pr Probability
Ri Risk
S Safety Risk
C Commercial Risk
Comment Normally Flare system has no hydrocarbon gas flowing
Drain and liquid outlet of Vent Stack is normally close
Design To gather release gas from process relief valves and BDV and routing gas to safe area
Intent
Design Pressure : 5.5 barG Temperature: 85 deg C Capacity Vent Stack : 12.5
Conditions: MMSCFD
Opt. Pressure : ATM - 2 barG Temperature : 10-60 deg C

Conditions
Drawing PID - Vent Gas System Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-015 Rev: B
Words
Parameter: Flow
15.1.1 No No Flow No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
concerns identified
15.3.1 More More Flow PSV or BDV passing Loss of gas to atmosphere Flame arrestor installed S (4) 1 S (M4)
resulting gas cloud around C(4) C(M4)
process area and potential
fire if ignited
15.4.1 Reverse Reverse Flow Air ingress to venting system Potential fire/explosion Water seal at bottom of vent S (4) 1 S (M4)
inside piping stack to prevent air ingress C(4) C(M4)
to venting system

concerns identified

Words
Parameter: Level
concerns identified
15.7.1 More More Level Liquid carry over from PSV/BDV release of hydrocarbon Vent stack is equipped by S (-) 1 S (-)
liquid to environment dead leg to collect liquid C(2) C(L2)
and drain to Sump Tank V-
400
Parameter: Pressure
15.8.1 Less Less Pressure No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
15.9.1 More More Pressure No additional significant issues of
concerns identified
concerns identified
concerns identified
Parameter: Relief
Than
Parameter: Safety concerns identified
15.18.1 Other External Factors Lighting struck during PSV/BDV Fire at vent stack S (4) 1 S (M4) Consider to install CO2 snuffing CNG-HP-40
Than release C(3) C(M3) system at VS-100 to extinguish
fire at vent stack completed with
fusible plug
Parameter: Drawing

Words
Than
Than

Appendix C
HAZID Review Worksheets

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT
Node 1 Abbreviations SAA

Review 17-Jun-13 Co Consequency
date
Client PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL P Probabitliy
Project COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS PLANT Ri Risk
Area TAMBAK LOROK Rec Recommendation
Comment The plan is located beside Indonesia Power Company. The S Safety Risk
North side is sea side. The South side is Turbine Generator C Commercial Risk
belong by IP. H,M,L High, Medium, Low
Drawing General Lay Out CNG Plant Drawing No. TS78-L-LY-001 Rev. B1
No. Category/ Hazard Description Consequences Prevention Control Recommendation/ Rec Number Action Party Co. Pr Ri
Guideword Comment
4.1.1 Natural Events Earthquake Potential of loss of - Plant, equipment,
plant integrity building and
leading to damage foundation design
and hydrocarbon anticipated to
release accommodate
earthquake factor
(0.15G), referring to
UBC-1997 and soil
investigation result
4.1.2 Natural Events Rob in process area Potential damage to Plant is designed NA
process equipment above Rob
posistion (80 cm
above average
ground level vs
70 cm average
rob) and in high
position
4.1.3 Natural Events Lightning Possible damage to - Grounding provided Update EQL drawing to CNG-HD- 1 S (4) 4 S (H16)
the equipment and for each equipment show Lightning C(3) C(H12)
potential fire protection at CNG
compartment area
(lightning stack) in
process/utility area
Lightning protection at
CNG compartment
area (lightning stack)
in process/utility area
CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK Page 1 of 7 HAZID Worksheet Node 1

Guideword Comment
4.1.4 Natural Events Settlement Possible damage to - Pile foundation (block
the equipment and design) provided to
potential fire withstand settlement
4.1.5 Natural Events Land slide No major concern -
4.2.1 External Events External corrosion Damage to the Painting & Periodic maintenance S (-) 2 S (-)
equipment, loss of coating for piping and inspection for all C(3) C(H9)
production and equipment surface vessels and
pipings
-
4.3.1 Transportation Light vehicles impact Potential impact to - vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be CNG-HD- 2 S (4) 2 S (H8)
e.g. Car piping/equipment from process area equipped with flame C(4) C(H8)
leading to arrestor and diesel engine
hydrocarbon
release, fire,
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset damage
4.3.2 Transportation Heavy equipment to Potential impact to Concrete road Pipe bridge provided S (4) 2 S (H8)
gas plant e.g. mobile piping/equipment to connect each C(4) C(H8)
crane leading to equipment across road
hydrocarbon
release, fire,
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset damage
4.4.1 Lifting Lifting equipment Potential damage to SOP for lifting - S (-) 2 S (-)
(mobile crane, forklift) pipeline and activity including C(2) C(M4)
failure equipment certified
personnel to
conduct the
lifting
4.5.1 Non Process Fires Bush fire No additional - S (4) 2 S (H8)

significant issues of C(4) C(H8)
concerns identified
4.6.1 Security Theft/sabotage Loss of production. Fence line around Security's Officer stand S (4) 2 S (H8)
Potential major the plant area by 24 hrs at plant area C(4) C(H8)
accident leading to
personnel
injury/fatality

Guideword Comment
SOP for control - S (4) 2 S (H8)
personnel C(4) C(H8)
incoming to the
plant
4.6.2 Security Vandalism No additional - -
significant issues of
concerns identified
4.6.3 Security Wild animals (tiger, No additional - -
crocodile and snake) significant issues of
concerns identified
4.7.1 Noise High noise level from Potential personnel - Provide SOP to wear ear CNG-HD- 3 S (1) 3 S (H3)
compressor and gas ear injury plug around noise area C(-) C(-)
engine area
4.8.1 Health Hazards Toxic Material during Personnel injury MSDS provided Ensure portable eye wash CNG-HD- 4 S (1) 3 S (H3)
handling chemical: for in the storage station provided during C(-) C(-)
cooling water, facility chemical handling (e.g : at
corrosion inhibitor e.g. control room, loading area
oxygen scavanger and water treatment area)
PPE - hand - S (1) 3 S (H3)

gloves, face C(-) C(-)
shield
SOP for chemical
handling
4.8.2 Health Hazards Handling molecular Personnel exposure PPE - hand JSA S (1) 3 S (H3)
sieve at dryer system to H2S resulting in gloves, face C(-) C(-)
personnel injury shield
SOP for handling

molecular sieve at
dryer system
4.8.3 Health Hazards Personnel hygiene and Health impact to Toilet and pantry Medical emergency S (1) 4 S (M4)
living activity operator are provided in provided (clinic) for C(-) C(-)
control room operation personnel
building

Guideword Comment
4.8.3 Health Hazards Hazardous waste Personnel injury PPE - hand - Alocate waste disposal CNG-HD- 5 S (1) 3 S (H3)
disposal during handling gloves, face resulting from C(-) C(-)
waste disposal shield operation/construction
activity in safe area (third
party)
4.9.1 Maintenance/ Working at high Fall and slip Maintenance Permit to works system S (4) 2 S (H8)
construction location such as resulting in access provided C(-) C(-)
lightning pole, WHRU injury/fatality at WHRU
SOP for working

at height during
maintenance and
construction,
including
competent
personnel
4.9.2 Maintenance/ Hot/cold Work Fire and potential SOP for hot/cold permit to works system S (4) 2 S (H8)
construction fatality work activity C(4) C(H8)
during
construction,
including
competent
personnel
4.9.3 Maintenance/ Confined Space Entry Potential fatality SOP for confined permit to works system S (4) 2 S (H8)
construction due to asphyxiation space entry C(-) C(-)
during
maintenance and
construction,
including
4.9.5 Maintenance/ Electrical Hazards Potential Proper insulation ELCB (Earth Leakage S (4) 2 S (H8)
construction electrocution for Circuit Breaker) C(-) C(-)
resulting in cabling/wiring provided for electrical
injury/fatality equipment/devices e.g.
welding machine
4.9.6 Maintenance/ Hot Surfaces at Potential injury due personal PPE Provide warning sign CNG-HD- 6 S (2) 2 S (M4)
construction exhaust gas, WHRU to exposure to heat protection around hot surface C(-) C(-)
and heat exchanger (E- insulation equipment and pipings
200) provided

Guideword Comment
4.10.1 Loss of Leak from Process Release of Unit SD by low Gas detection system Define philosophy of fire CNG-HD- 7 S (4) 2 S (H8)
Containment Equipment hydrocarbon pressure trip at process area and gas detection system C(4) C(H8)
resulting in and develop fire and gas
potential detection area at process
fire/explosion plant
leading to
injury/fatality
- Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check CNG-HD- 8
with source from temperature in the MCC
existing IP cabinet and DCS panel to
monitor short circuit and
provide portable fire
extinguisher
4.10.2 Loss of Diesel Leak No additional

Containment significant issues of
concerns identified
4.11.1 Ignition Sources Battery Fire/explosion in Battery room is Heat & Smoke detector, Regularly to check CNG-HD- 9 S (4) 2 S (H8)
the event of located in non Portable Fire temperature in the MCC C(4) C(H8)
hydrocarbon hazardous area Extinguisher provided cabinet and DCS panel to
release. at control room & MCC monitor short circuit and
room provide portable fire
extinguisher
4.11.2 Ignition Sources Vent Fire/explosion in - Lightning protection Define safe location and CNG-HD- 10 S (4) 2 S (H8)
the event of provided at CNG minimum height required C(4) C(H8)
hydrocarbon compartment area for vent stack and vent
release in process location to be suitable
area if stroke by with wind directions so
lightning that dispersed gas will not
be exposed to process
plan
S (4) 2 S (H8)
C(4) C(H8)
4.11.3 Ignition Sources Static electricity from Fire/explosion in - vehicle park area away S (4) 2 S (H8)
external vehicle the event of from process area C(4) C(H8)
hydrocarbon
release.

Guideword Comment
4.12.1 Escape/ Refuge Fire on Plant area Personnel trap/ ERP - Provide emergency CNG-HD- 11 S (4) 3 S (H8)
unable to evacuate evacuation risk analysis to C(4) C(H8)
leading to determine safe evacuation
injury/fatality route and location of
muster area
- - Form emergency response CNG-HD- 12 S (4) 4 S (H8)

team (ERT) and conduct C(4) C(H8)
emergency drill
- - S (4) 5 S (H8)
C(4) C(H8)
4.13.1 Emergency Personnel trap in Personnel Emergency - S (4) 6 S (H8)
Lighting wrong way injury/fatality lighting for C(4) C(H8)
evacuation is
provided in
control room and
evacuation route
4.14.1 Manned Building Control room Fire or explosion - Heat and Smoke Review scenario of fire CNG-HD- 13 S (4) 2 S (H8)
from process area detector and explosion from gas C(4) C(H8)
impact to control plant to the area of
room leading to standby personnel such as
potential personnel control room and provide
injury/fatality mitigation plan (design
and location of the
building) to anticipate
fire/explosion
- - Define safety requirement CNG-HD- 14 S (4) 3 S (H8)

on control room C(4) C(H8)
specification to
accommodate
fire/explosion scenario
e.g. door, wall and
window specifications
- - S (4) 4 S (H8)
C(4) C(H8)
Inability to monitor - - Consider to provide CNG-HD- 15 S (4) 5 S (H8)
process area CCTV in the control room C(4) C(H8)
for monitoring purpose

Guideword Comment
4.15.1 Communication Inability to contact Inability to Each operator F&G alarm system Define internal and CNG-HD- 16 S (4) 2 S (H8)
control room within coordinate response provided with external communication C(4) C(H8)
emergency leading to potential hand held radio system (PABX) for
major accident connecting operator in the
leading to control room to outside
personnel parties
injury/fatality and
asset loss
4.16.1 Shutdown Inability to initiate Inability to control Local ESD push - Define safety layout at CNG-HD- 17 S (4) 2 S (H8)
ESD fire leading to button at control CNG plant to show ESD C(4) C(H8)
potential major room push button, fire hydrant,
accident leading to etc
personnel
injury/fatality and
asset loss
4.16.2 Shutdown Loss of power Plant shutdown ESD is fail safe UPS is provided S (-) 2 S (-)
resulting loss of action C(4) C(H8)
production
Uncontrolled - Alternative power S (-) 3 S (-)
process upset source from PLN for C(4) C(H8)
emergency equipment
4.17.1 Other Plant layout - - S (-) - S (-)
C(-) C(-)
4.18.1 Discharge to air Note: venting only for - -

emergency situation
4.18.3 Discharge to Blowdown of water Potential - Discharge water is Define Sampling point to CNG-HD- 18
water from cooling tower, contamination from connected to existing monitor discharge water
discharge RO process fluid canal (IP)
4.18.4 Discharge to soil No additional significant

issue of concern
identified
4.18.5 Waste disposal Disposal of operation/ Potential - - Alocate waste disposal CNG-HD- 5 S (-) 4 S (-)
construction waste e.g. environmental resulting from C(-) C(-)
plant, log disturbance operation/construction
activity in safe area (third
party)

Appendix D
Drawings Reviewed
NODE 1
NODE 2
NODE 2
NODE 2R
NODE 3
NODE 4
NODE 6
NODE 5
NODE 5
NODE 7
NODE 6
NODE 12
NODE 12
NODE 11
NODE 10
NODE 9
NODE 8
NODE 13
NODE 14
NODE 15

Hazop Amp Hazid Report CNG Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Rev B

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Project Title :

ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION

HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT

B 24 JUL 2013 REISSUED FOR REVIEW YS MTH MEF

REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED COMPANY

4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS 18

APPENDIX A HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The study identified 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations. The

Maintenance and Operational

MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO

The Major Hazard of this plant is :

• Non Process Hazard :

1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the HAZOP study are to:

The objectives of the HAZID study include:

1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY

The HAZOP/HAZID study covers these packages in detail:

1. Main Proces System:

· V-100 : Gas Scrubber

· M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering

· D-100A/B : Gas Dryer

· K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors

· E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager

· V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement

· V-400 : Sump Tank

· WHRU and Hot Water circulation

· Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation

· Open & Close Drains

· Instrument Air System

· Fuel Gas System

· Fire Water Ring

1.4 REPORT LAYOUT

This HAZOP/HAZID report is structured as follows:

2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100)

2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B)

2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B)

This system is auto mode. No interlock system to main PCS.

2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-110)

2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100)

DURING DECANTING PERIOD:

2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82)

2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger

Double pipe exchanger would be installed at downstream of PV-0501 to minimize temperature

2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200)

2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B)

This valve is designed base on 4 hours decanting time (96 MMSCFD).

2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process

2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B)

2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300)

2.1.13 Fuel Gas

2.1.14 Instrument air

2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400)

2.1.16 Fire water system

2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001)

2.1.19 Vent System

3.1.2 Worksheet Definition

Table 3.1a HAZOP Review Worksheet

Column Heading Description

Possible Causes Causes or problems identified

Type Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment,

Safeguard Description of the safeguards in place

Recommendations/Comment Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place