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Vessela Valiavitcharska - Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias Encomiun of Helen
Vessela Valiavitcharska - Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias Encomiun of Helen
1
Charles P. Segal, “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos,” Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology 66 (1962): 99–155.
2
Segal, “Psychology of the Logos,” 102.
3
Segal, “Psychology of the Logos,” 112.
4
Segal, “Psychology of the Logos,” 127.
5
See W. J. Verdenius, “Gorgias’ Doctrine of Deception” in G. B. Kerferd, ed., The
Sophists and Their Legacy: Proceedings of the Fourth International Colloquium on Ancient
Philosophy (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 117–128. On a similar note, W. K. C.
Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) 50, describes
Gorgias’ rhetoric as “sophistic in every sense,” where “sophistic” carries the same
meaning of murky and shifty as it does in Plato’s dialogues. Also on Gorgias’ theory
of logos in relation to deception and tragedy, see Robert Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric:
Gorgias, Plato, and Their Successors (London: Routledge, 1996), 25–51.
6
Jacqueline de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, trans. J. Lloyd
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). So too George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 149
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 61–68, and Classical Rhetoric and Its
Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1999), 34–36, who concentrates on Gorgias’ stylistic innovations
in an effort to demonstrate their effectiveness.
7
Richard Leo Enos, “The Epistemology of Gorgias’ Rhetoric: A Re-Examination,”
The Southern Speech Communication Journal 42 (1976): 35–51 (p. 50).
8
Bruce E. Gronbeck, “Gorgias on Rhetoric and Poetic: A Rehabilitation,” The
Southern Speech Communication Journal 38 (1972): 27–38.
9
See John Poulakos, “Gorgias’ Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric,”
Rhetorica 1 (1983): 1–16; “Gorgias’ and Isocrates’ Use of the Encomium,” Southern
Speech Communication Journal 51 (1986): 300–307. Also on the Encomium of Helen as
an implied defense of rhetoric, even though rhetoric can take a license with truth,
see Wardy, cited in n. 5 above, 35–39. Scott Consigny, Gorgias, Sophist and Artist
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), lays out an approach he
names “anti-foundationalist” and argues that Gorgias’ account of logos is “parodic”
in that it draws attention to the “rhetoricity” of every text (p. 30) neither confirming,
nor denying truth but incorporating deception as something inevitable.
10
All subsequent references to, quotations from, and translations of the Encomium
of Helen are from D. M. MacDowell, Gorgias: Encomium of Helen (Bristol: Bristol Clas-
sical Press, 1982). All references to Gorgias’ other works are from Hermann Diels and
Walter Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 2 (Zurich: Weidmann, 1982), section
82.
11
Edward Schiappa, The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, has argued for a “pre-disciplinary” reading of the
Encomium, i.e., a reading preceding Aristotle’s division of rhetorical genres.
150 RHETORICA
is not guilty in the latter two cases either. The Encomium ends with
a brief conclusion, in which Gorgias tells us that he has achieved
the purpose he had set for himself at the beginning of the speech.
Thus it happens that a large part of the speech is devoted to the
proof of why Helen is not guilty if she was persuaded by logos,
and this part constitutes the reflection on the nature and function of
logos.
In the beginning of the Encomium Gorgias introduces the subject
of logos by pronouncing that “the grace (κìσµο̋) of a city is excellence
of its men, of a body beauty, of a soul wisdom, of an action virtue and
of a speech truth; and the opposites are a disgrace (κοσµÐα).” The
meaning of the word κìσµο̋ in relation to logos and truth has sparked
debate: should it be taken as “adornment,” “ornament” or “good
order,” “decency”? The differences between the meanings of κìσµο̋
would yield different conceptions of what Gorgias understands the
relation of logos and truth to be: in the first case, truth would be a mere
embellishment to speech, in the second, truth would be desirable or
even necessary for speech. However, in this context κìσµο̋ is directly
opposed to κοσµÐα, i.e., the opposite of excellence, beauty, wisdom,
and truth. In the next sentence, Gorgias says that it is an error to
“blame the praiseworthy and praise the blameworthy.” Thus it seems
more likely that here κìσµο̋ is closer in meaning to “good order,”
“decency,” “fittingness” or—as MacDowell translates it—“grace”
(which makes κοσµÐα a “disgrace”). However, the precise meaning
of κìσµο̋ is less important than the fact that a logos, according to
Gorgias, can and should contain the truth, although truth may be
only an external feature of logos. In Gorgias’ view, one who speaks
“correctly” (æρθÀ̋) should reveal the truth and refute those who
blame Helen—which is what he himself sets out to do in this speech,
i.e., “to show the truth and put an end to ignorance.” What kind of
logos is a truthful logos, according to Gorgias?
To answer that question, I turn to Gorgias’ analysis of logos in
Encomium 8–14. To demonstrate the power of logos, Gorgias con-
siders different kinds of speeches: poetry, inspired incantations, the
speeches of the astrologers, false speeches, and speeches at com-
pulsory or philosophical contests. He begins with an appeal to the
power held by poetry in popular opinion: everyone knows how it
can inflict “tearful pity” or bring joy to those who hear it; thus the
mind suffers, through speeches, a “suffering of its own” at others’
fortunes and misfortunes. Gorgias defines poetry as “discourse with
meter” (λìγον êχοντα µèτρον) and declares its power irresistible, but
it is unclear whether poetry works through persuasion or in some
other way, and whether it is truthful and reliable or not (Encomium 9).
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 151
12
G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1981), argues that the result of Gorgias’ treatment of logos is that its power on the
soul is comparable to the power of drugs on the body.
152 RHETORICA
asks the Greeks how he would have been able to rule them after
becoming a traitor: “By persuasion? By force?” (Palamedes 14); and
second, when he tells his jurors that he cannot hope to persuade them
with the help of friends or entreaties or pity (Palamedes 33).13
To sum up so far: in Helen 8–14 Gorgias distinguishes two kinds
of logos: logos with meter (poetry), which is irresistible, but whether
or not it is persuasive, we do not know; and logos infused with δìξα,
which is intrinsically persuasive, and thus slippery, unreliable, even
evil. There is yet a third kind of logos which makes an appearance
in Gorgias’ speech, and that is his own. At the end of the Encomium
he says, “I have removed by my speech a woman’s infamy and have
kept to the purpose which I set myself at the start of my speech: I
attempted to dispel injustice of blame and ignorance of belief.” This
statement refers back to the beginning of the speech, where Gorgias
tells us that he wishes, “by adding some reasoning (λογισµì̋) to
[his] speech, to free the slandered woman from the accusation and
to demonstrate that those who blame her are lying, to show the
truth, and put a stop to ignorance.” Does he mean then that logos
combined with λογισµì̋ is truthful logos? Not necessarily. Λογισµì̋
appears to be another feature external to logos, and does not always
lead to the truth. Gorgias’ statement at the beginning of the speech
could be taken as a simple description of his method. Besides, the
list of deceptive speeches includes the philosophers’ speeches, which
presumably also contain a certain measure of λογισµì̋.
Gorgias’ method of argumentation in the Encomium has been de-
scribed as “apagogic” and “rationalistic”14 and it has been compared
to the way he reasons in On Not Being and Palamedes, in which the
use of λογισµì̋—if not professed openly—is implied. Although in
Palamedes the aim of rationalistic reasoning is to reveal the truth of
Palamedes’ motives and actions, in On Not Being the same kind of
reasoning is used to achieve an absurd result—that nothing is, and
even if it is, it is inapprehensible, and even if it is apprehensible, it
could not be communicated. Guthrie contends that although the pur-
pose of On Not Being is serious, the conclusions of the composition
cannot be taken seriously to reveal any truth, but are intended as a
sort of reductio ad absurdum of Eleatic, and particularly, Parmenidean
13
Michael Gagarin, “Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?” Rhetorica 19 (2001): 275–
91 (pp. 288–89). Kerferd, cited in n. 12 above, 80 contends that Gorgias distinguishes
two kinds of persuasion, one good and one bad, but I do not see this kind of argument
anywhere in Gorgias’ extant speeches or fragments.
14
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 121; Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, cited in n. 6
above, 167–68.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 153
15
Guthrie, cited in n. 3 above, 193–94. For discussion of the problems connected
with the interpretation and translation of On Not Being, see Schiappa, cited in n. 11
above, 133–52.
16
Kerferd, cited in n. 12 above, 81.
17
Richard Bett, “The Sophists and Relativism,” Phronesis 34 (1989): 139–69 (pp.
150–53).
18
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 122–23.
19
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 123.
154 RHETORICA
20
Translation from Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, eds. and trans., Early
Greek Political Thought: From Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 203.
21
Trans. Gagarin/Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, 203.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 155
22
Plato may be deliberately misrepresenting Gorgias’ views of logos in the Gorgias,
when he has him say that the rhetorical art is “to be able to persuade with speeches
judges in the law courts, or statesmen in the Council, or the people in the Assembly
or at any other meeting” and afterwards agree with Socrates’ definition that the “art
of rhetoric is the artisan of persuasion” (πειθοÜ̋ δηµιουργì̋ âστιν ûητορικ , Gorgias
452e-453a). It seems to me unlikely that the same person who, in a public situation
(such as the oral performance of the Encomium of Helen), labels persuasion as “evil”
(Encomium 14), would, in an equally public situation (and presumably more than
once—for Plato to cite it in his dialogue), define his art as the art of persuasion.
It is quite possible that Plato invented the definition of rhetoric himself, just as he
probably invented the word “rhetoric.” The word rhetorike does not appear in any
of the fragments of the sophists; see Edward Schiappa, “Did Plato Coin Rhetorike?”
American Journal of Philology 111 (1990): 457–70, also Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos:
A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2nd ed. (Columbus: University of South
Carolina Press, 2003), 39–63. Cf. Atheneaus’ comment that, after reading the dialogue
that bears his name, Gorgias is said to have exclaimed, “How well Plato knows how
to satirize!” (Deipnosophistae 11.113.2 (Kaibel) = DK 82.A15a, trans. Sprague).
156 RHETORICA
23
Cf. Philostratus, Epistulae et dialexeis 73 = DK 82.A35, Diodorus Siculus 12.53.3
= DK 82.A4.
24
Rhetoric 1.1404a = DK 82.A29.
25
Segal, cited in n. 1 above, p. 127.
26
As Schiappa has demonstrated, certain individual phrases are clearly rhythmic,
yet the speech fails to repeat an overall pattern that could be recognized as metered
poetry (Schiappa, Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory, cited in n. 11 above, p. 111). He
argues that both Gorgias and Thrasymachus draw upon poetic meters but do not
depend on them; “meter is a natural consequence rather than being an end in itself”
(p. 113).
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 157
27
See Suidas, Lexicon G. 388 = DK 82.A2, Diodorus Siculus 12.53.4 = DK 82.A4.
28
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 85–105, argues that Gorgias’ style, although not
“poetic” in the strict sense of the word, “resembles” poetry in that it is not everyday
language and strikes the listener as strange (p. 94).
29
Kennedy, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 64–66.
30
Jeffrey Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 25.
31
Claudius Aelianus, Varia historia 12.32.4 = DK 82.A9.
32
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 101, describes Gorgias as a “prose rhapsode.”
33
MacDowell, cited in n. 10 above, 16. John Poulakos, cited in n. 9 above, p. 3,
argues that the word παÐγνιον in the last sentence indicates that the composition could
not have been intended as a model speech for students because it would undermine
its own purpose.
158 RHETORICA
34
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 131.
35
Michael Gagarin, “Correct Argument in Sophistic Rhetoric” (delivered at the
fifteenth biennial meeting of the ISHR in Los Angeles in July 2005), and Antiphon
the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2002), 26–27.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 159
and killed him was to blame or whether it was those who organized
the contest, according to the most correct logos (κατ τäν æρθìτατον
λìγον) (Pericles 36).36 Schiappa interprets the meaning of æρθì̋ here
as applying not only to speech but to “competing ways of life [ . . .
], choices of war or peace, judgments of just or unjust, etc.,” that
is, to both speech and reality. Protagoras’ concern, therefore, was
with a “correct understanding of actions (πργµατα) as reflected in
discourse.”37
The same issue surfaces in Antiphon’s Second Tetralogy, in which
two pairs of court speeches treat the hypothetical situation of a youth
who threw a javelin and killed a boy who happened to be running
across the practice field. The plaintiff (the dead boy’s father) insists
that the youth committed an unintentional murder and therefore
should be punished as a murderer, while the defendant (the youth’s
father) insists that the boy made a mistake in running through the
field at an inopportune moment and was punished for that mistake
with his own death. The issue here is the representation of reality
and the resulting attribution of blame. The plaintiff maintains that
the actions alone (πργµατα) are self-evident and should suffice in
issuing a verdict; the defendant, however, claims that according to
the truth (λ θεια) of what was done, his son should be absolved
since he made no mistake in action—his javelin did not stray from
its course, nor would it have missed the target, had the boy not
prevented it from reaching it. The word æρθì̋ is used by the de-
fendant only once: “For my part, if I have lied about anything, I
agree that whatever I have said correctly (æρθÀ̋) can also be discred-
ited as unfair (δικο̋); but if I have spoken the truth (λ θεια) but
with subtlety (λεπτ) and precision (κριβεÐα), then it is only fair that
any hostility that results should be directed not at me the speaker,
but at him [the boy] who acted.”38 But the word is connected with
a representation of the truth through valid reasoning. One aspect
of Gorgias’ own use of æρθì̋ seems very close to this one: if one
is to speak correctly (λèξαι τε τä δèον æρθÀ̋), one should free He-
len from blame; he himself wishes to do that and show the truth
(δεÐξα̋ τληθè̋) by adding some reasoning (λογιµì̋) to his speech.
The implication is that reasoning could help in providing a “cor-
rect account” and demonstrating the truth of whether or not she
is guilty.
36
Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 27.
37
Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, cited in n. 22 above, pp. 163–64.
38
Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 125.
160 RHETORICA
39
Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 38–63, argues that Antiphon referred to as
“the orator,” Antiphon known as “the sophist” (who wrote Truth and Concord), and
Antiphon the author of the Tetralogies are one and the same person.
40
Trans. Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 67.
41
Schiappa, cited in n. 22 above, 164; Gagarin, “Correct Argument in Sophistic
Rhetoric,” cited in n. 35 above, p. 10.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 161
42
Cf. DK 82.B7–8a, Isocrates, Panegyricus 1–3.
43
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the fourteenth biennial
meeting of the ISHR in Madrid in July 2003. I am grateful to the audience, as well as
to Rhetorica’s referees, Rhetorica’s editor, Harvey Yunis, and especially, to my advisors
Professors Michael Gagarin and Jeffrey Walker, for their suggestions and invaluable
help.