Natres LTD Digests

BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC.
, Petitioner
vs.
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, THE PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION
AUTHORITY, AND THE DENR-EMB (REGION VI), Respondents
June 26, 2012 G.R. No. 196870
FACTS: Boracay Island (Boracay), a tropical paradise located in the Western Visayas region of the
Philippines and one of the country ’s most popular tourist destinations. The island comprises the barangays ofbarangays of
Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and Yapak, all within the municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan. Respondent
Province operates both ports to provide structural facilities suited for locals, tourists and guests and to provide safety
and security measures. In 2005, Boracay 2010 Summit was held and participated in by representatives from national
government agencies, local government units (LGUs), and the private sector. The summit yielded a report which
showed that there was a need to expand the port facilities at Caticlan due to congestion in the holding area of the
existing port, caused by inadequate facilities, thus tourists suffered long queues while waiting for the boat ride going
to the island.
On May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent Province issued Resolution No.
2009110, which authorized Governor Marquez to file an application to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area
in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan with respondent PRA. Within the same month of October 2009, respondent Province
deliberated on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40)
hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources and as a response to the findings of the Preliminary
Geohazard Assessment study which showed that the recession and retreat of the shoreline caused by coastal erosion
and scouring should be the first major concern in the project site and nearby coastal area.
Respondent PRA approved the reclamation project on April 20, 2010 in its Resolution No. 4094 and
authorized its General Manager/Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to enter into a MOA with respondent Province for the
implementation of the reclamation project. On April 27, 2010, DENR-EMB RVI issued to respondent Province ECC-
R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be
done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty port. On June 1, 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. On June 7, 2011, this Court issued
a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments
to the petition. After receiving a copy of the TEPO on June 9, 2011, respondent Province immediately issued an order
to the Provincial Engineering Office and the concerned contractor to cease and desist from conducting any
construction activities until further orders from this Court.
Petitioner also questions the classification made by respondent Province that the reclamation project is
merely an expansion of the e xisting jetty port, when the project descriptions embodied in the different documents
filed by respondent Province describe commercial establishments to be built, among others, to raise revenues for
the LGU; thus, it should have been classified as a new project. Petitioner likewise cries foul to the manner by which
respondent Province allegedly circumvented the documentary requirements of the DENR-EMB RVI by the act of
connecting the reclamation project with its previous project in 1999 and claiming that the new project is a mere
expansion of the previous one.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Province failed to perform a full EIA as required by laws and
regulations based on the scope and classification of the project
RULING: Respondent Province filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that the ECC issued by respondent DENR-
EMB RVI covered an area of 2,691 square meters in Caticlan, and its application for reclamation of 40 hectares with
respondent PRA was conditioned on its submission of specific documents within 120 days. Respondent Province
claims that its failure to comply with said condition indicated its waiver to pursue the succeeding phases of the
reclamation project and that the subject matter of this case had thus been limited to 2.64 hectares. Respondent
PRA, for its part, declared through its General Manager that the Aklan Beach Zone Restoration and Protection Marine
Development Project will now be confined to the reclamation and development of the 2.64 hectares, more or less.
Case Digests in NatRes & LTD under ASG Marissa Dela Cruz – Galandines
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The Court notes such manifestation of respondent Province. Assuming, however, that the area involved in the
subject reclamation project has been limited to 2.64 hectares, this case has not become moot and academic, as
alleged by respondents, because the Court still ha s to check whether respondents had complied with all applicable
environmental laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the actual reclamation project.
We recognize at this point that the DENR is the government agency vested with delegated powers to review and
evaluate all EIA reports, and to grant or deny ECCs to project proponents. It is the DENR that has the duty to
implement the EIS system. It appears, however, that respondent DENR-EMB RVIs evaluation of this reclamation
project was problematic, based on the valid questions raised by petitioner.
Respondent DENR-EMB RVI should conduct a thorough and detailed evaluation of the project to address the
question of whether this could be deemed as a group of single projects (transport terminal facility, building, etc.)
etc.) in
a contiguous area managed by respondent Province, or as a single project.
The very definition of an EIA points to what was most likely neglected by respondent Province as project proponent,
and what was in turn overlooked by respondent DENR-EMB RVI, for it is defined as follows:
An [EIA] is a process that involves predicting and evaluating the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative
impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes
designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to
protect the environment and the community’s welfare.
As may be gleaned from the breakdown of the 2.64 hectares as described by respondent Province above, a significant
portion of the reclaimed area would be devoted to the construction of a commercial building, and the area to be
utilized for the expansion of the jetty port consists of a mere 3,000 square meters (sq. m). To be true to its definition,
the EIA report submitted by respondent Province should at the very least predict the impact that the construction
of the new buildings on the reclaimed land would have on the surrounding environment. These new constructions
and their environmental effects were not covered by the old studies that respondent Province previously submitted
for the construction of the original jetty port in 1999, and which it re-submitted in its application for ECC in this
alleged expansion, instead of conducting updated a nd more comprehensive studies.
Any impact on the Boracay side cannot be totally ignored, as Caticlan and Boracay are separated only by a narrow
strait. This becomes more imperative because of the significant contributions of Boracay ’s white-sand beach to the
country’s tourism trade, which requires respondent Province to proceed with utmost caution in implementing
country’
projects within its vicinity.
The Court chooses to remand these matters to respondent DENR-EMB RVI for it to make a proper study, and if it
should find necessary, to require respondent Province to address these environmental issues raised by petitioner
and submit the correct EIA report as required by the projects specifications. The Court requires respondent DENR-
EMB RVI to complete its study and submit a report within a non-extendible period of three months. Respondent
DENR-EMB RVI should establish to the Court in said report why the ECC it issued for the subject project should not
be canceled.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF TANON STRAIT v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES

GR NO. 180771, APRIL 21, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon
Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal
guardians and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
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protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner is former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon
Strait, among others.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, non-
profit, non-governmental organization, established for the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo
D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR; Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENRRegional Director for
Region VII and Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration
Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine branch office; and
Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C. Arranguez (Arranguez)
and Antonio Labios (Labios), in their c apacities as then Director of the EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of
the DOE, Region VII, respectively
FACTS:
This case consists of two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, concerning Service
Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development, and exploitation of petroleum resources
within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Injunction, which
seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it nullified for willful and gross violation of the
1987 Constitution and certain international and municipal laws . 3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for C ertiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus,
which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with SC-
46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents to provide petitioners
access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil Exploration Project.
Petitioners' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners Resident
Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was
reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would
be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They
attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao," also known as the "fish aggregating device" or
"artificial reef." Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish
kill" observed by some of the local fisherfolk to th e seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by
private respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a
pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards' allegations
of reduced fish catch and la ck of public consultations or discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior
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to the issuance of the ECC. Moreover, it alleges that during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from
entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than
the 1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE. It also agrees in the allegation that public respondents
DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent
JAPEX without ensuring the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the
Environmental Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations. It
further claims that despite several requests for copies of all the documents pertaining to the project in Tañon Strait,
only copies of the P AMB-Tañon Strait Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various
laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public
respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46;
and that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They further contend that the
issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually
terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is legal (NO)
*The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD:
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place,
is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in
La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. The
grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or uniform terms,
conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion
of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented
to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms
to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and void for noncompliance
with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources
in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum
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production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may
serve as the general law upon which a service contract for p etroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed
by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration
and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected
seascape.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service Contract No. 46 is hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., et.al.

vs.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et.al.
(G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 and 209430) 8 December 2015
FACTS: In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines which governs the regulation of the
importation or introduction, movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological materials in the
Philippines. The same was followed by the Guidelines on Planned Release of Genetically Manipulated Organisms
(GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the
Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI) executed a
Memorandum of Undertaking, in pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on eggplants that
are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer.
Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of
continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging
that the Bt talong field trials (The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis
thuringiensis (Bt) were
incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc which
CrylAc which is toxic to target insect pests.) violate
their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that the required Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was not secured prior to the project implementation and that there is no
independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for human consumption and the environment. While
the respondents contend that all environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the
affected communities and that the Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement Law
ISSUES: Whether the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects involving the
introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
RULING:
Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and
FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system should apply to the release of GMOs into the environment
and issue joint guidelines on the matter.
All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to undertake
activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment are required to prepare a detailed Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.
An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to h ave significant adverse
impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse” and which “include activities that have significant
environmental consequences.”
In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential hazards of
GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field testing would
definitely fall under the category of ECP.
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Oposa V. Factoran
[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]
Facts:
The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The respondent in
this case was then the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. In their Complaint filed
before the RTC, the petitioners alleged that they “are all citi zens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." The petitioners prayed for, in
the said complaint, that the trial court order the cancellation of all Timber License Agreements (TLA) in the country
and that the respondent cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving n ew timber
license agreements.
In the said complaint, petitioners said that, as of that time, a total of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes were under the TLA issued to private corporations by the respondent DENR and at that rate the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after several years.
The case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground the complaint lack ed of cause of action. Petitioners contend that
the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations c oncerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 19 87 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable
right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to
the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a
valid cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners in this case have a cause of action a gainst respondent DENR.
Held:
The Court, in granting the petition, said that:
“We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petitioners failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law in Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the Section
15 of the same article.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil a nd political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions.
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As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be
too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.”
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. No. 171947-48, December 18, 2008
FACTS: In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to compel the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean up the Manila Bay.
CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their health and the inaction
of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights to life, health, and a balanced ecology
guaranteed
guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also averred under the Environmental Code, it is MMDA’s duty to clean up
the Manila Bay.
The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the decision
on the ground that MM DA’s duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary duty hence it cannot be
compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was for a general clean -up of the Manila Bay
yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to specific incidents of pollution and not to
undertake a massive clean-up such as that ordered by the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.
HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the process of
implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not mean that
their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s function to alleviate the
problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In short, MMDA does not have the
discretion to whether or not alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay
area.
area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision -making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be
compelled by mandamus.
Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental Code involves a general clean up, the
Supreme Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the Environmental Code is to perform cleaning in general and
not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with the other government agencies,
must act to clean up the Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Doctine:
There exists no conclusive presumption that public agricultural lands in the Philippines after a lapse of thirty or any
other number of years, the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto.
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Facts:
The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a petition in the Court of Land
Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of land in the municipality of Ba guio, in the province
of Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court of Land
Registration and opposed the petition. The Government of the United States that the land was part of the military
reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land Registration in favor of t he petitioner, from which
judgment the respondents appealed in accordance with the law then in force to the Court of First Instance of the
province of Benguet. The case was therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The
petitioner has brought the case here by bill of exceptions. The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of
title, except a possessory information obtained in 1901. By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this
possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only those effects which the laws give to mere
possession.
Issue: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.
Held:
No. Prescription does not run against the Government as to its public lands. The government is still the absolute
owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateo’s possession of the land has not been of such a character as
to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived up on it for many years. It was never used for any thing but
pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently
not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient
length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and
obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
Cruz v. Secretary of DENR

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
DOCTRINE:
 Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains.
 Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute
part of the land of the public domain.
 The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the sa me.
FACTS:
 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous
Indige nous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
 The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of t he public domain as well as minerals and other
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natural resources therein, in violation of the Regalian Doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
 The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in pa rt.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Regalian Doctrine?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
 Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are
found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.
 Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.
Magallona v. Ermita (2011)

J. Carpio, En Banc
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as
an archipelagic State. 3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea,"
the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.
Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying
with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or .
. .legislators," as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA
9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's sovereign power, in
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and
(2) RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts,
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant co nstitutional provisions.
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522's treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument
of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included — its failure to
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reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III's framework of regime of islands to determine
the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Issue: Whether the constitutional provision on the protection of the subsistence of fishermen is violated by RA 9522.
(NO.)
Held:
Petitioners' invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative
guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights . . . ." Article
II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting
executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and balanced
ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the
claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth
(Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving
solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime
delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community w ill of course reject it and will refuse to
be bound by it. UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
maritime space — the exclusive economic zone — in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new
rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS
III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the
territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC. VS THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL
190 SCRA 673; GR NO. 79538
18 OCTOBER 1990
FACTS:
Soon after the change of government, in 1986, petitioner sent letters to the Office of the President and to the
Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) seeking (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement (TLA No. 87),
which was cancelled along with nine other concessions, during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA
NO. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks D evelopment and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation
of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all
logs found in the concession area. It all eged that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given the opportunity
to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires without a formal award or license, as
these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Marcos.
The Ministry denied the request and ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of
the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands,
and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose
licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact that there was currently a total log ban being imposed on
the subject areas.
After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but the petition was denied on
the ground that the appeal
appeal was prematurely filed, the
the matter not having been
been terminated in the M
MNR.
NR. Hence,
petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.
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ISSUE:
Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past regime
HELD:
The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that
the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders
orders are as conclusive upon the
rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of
res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction
Petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law for attacking the validity of th ese administrative actions until
after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting
requesting for
reconsideration, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned.
The fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed
by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. Although there is no specific time fram e fixed
for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC, the same must nevertheless be
done within a “reasonable time”. Failure to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders
the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of the laches.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitle thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. The laws
aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.
In the case at bar, petitioner waited at least 3 years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions. Its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect
tantamount to laches. The writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie.
More importantly, the assailed orders of the MNR disclose public policy consideration, which effectively forestall
judicial interference.
interference. Public respondents,
respondents, upon whose
whose shoulders
shoulders rests the
the task of implementing
implementing the policy to develop
and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license
agreements entered into,
into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and
training.
Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter
a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
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The Court expresses its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a
number of logging concessionaires. Should the appropriate
appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave
grave abuse of
discretion on the part of concerned officials with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court will
not hesitate to step in. However, in this case, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any
of the affirmative reliefs sought.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP f rom signing the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII
(DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS).
HELD:
No. This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time
of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of of the MOA-AD,
MOA- AD, includes not only “Moros” as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA- AD proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both
parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-
AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
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SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS, et. al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. No. 156052 07 March 2007
CORONA, J.
FACTS: Pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, the Sa ngguniang Panlunsod ng
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 sometime on November 20, 2001. It was approved by herein
respondent, as City Mayor, Hon. Jose Ateinza, Jr., on November 28, 2001 and became effective a
month after, following its publication. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed and
mentioned therein to cease and desist f rom operating their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, both the oil companies, as well as the city
government of Manila and the DOE committed to create programs which are beneficial to all.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified
Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.In the same resolution,
the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July
25, 2002.Thereafter, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of
the oil companies. Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under
Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them
to stay. Respondent’s defense, on the other hand, is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded
by the MOU and the resolutions. However, he also confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU
are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists
that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way
prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered
as a mere guideline for its full implementation.
ISSUE: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
RULING: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the
chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,
Jr. , it was ruled that:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might
seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the
the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances
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imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila fro m
the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
Facts:
The Philippine government (through the Commissioner of Public Highways) signed a contract with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay and
for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road.
President Marcos issued PD1084 creating Public Estates Authority and transferred to it the 'lands' reclaimed in
Manila Bay for the Manila-Cavite Road and Reclamation Project. Thereafter, President Aquino issued Special Patent
No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP". A TCT was also
issued in the name of PEA covering 3 reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion
of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City, which were part of these lands acquired by PEA.
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI C oastal bay and development corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. However, the JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Maceda delivered a privilege speech denouncing the JVA as the
"grandmother of all scams". Thus, the Senate Committees investigated on the matter and c oncluded the following:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates
of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus vo id; and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
Petitioner Frank Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Pray er for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
On March 30, 19 99 PEA and AMARI signed an a mended Joint Agreement which was approved by President Estrada.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of r eclaimed land which will be
titled in its name.
Issue: Whether the stipulations in the Amended JVA or the transfer to AMARI of certain lands reclaimed and still to
be reclaimed are unconstitutional
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Held:
Yes. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may
not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3
Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Sec. 2 article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged
areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain
to AMARI will be void in view of sec 3 Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.]

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DELCASTILLO, ROLANDO
BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
"NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and
pray that respondent be directed:
(a) To furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) To furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing the irrespective loans; and/or
(c) To allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte, a lawyer and a member of the media, wrote to respondent
Belmonte, General Manager of the GSIS, requesting that he “be furnished with the list of names of the opposition
members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of
Mrs. Imelda Marcos”. Also
Marcos”. Also in the said letter, he justified his request by invoking the right to information under the
Freedom Constitution. The deputy general counsel of the GSIS, on behalf of respondent Belmonte, wrote back to
the petitioner and replied that they are not granting the request of the petitioner and said that “[m]y opinion
“[m]y opinion in this
regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they
may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for
the GSIS to breach this conf identiality unless ordered by the courts.”
Before receiving the reply of the respondent, petitioner Valmonte, along with the other petitioners, filed the instant
case.In his comment, respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which
is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
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To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled
to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case f alls
under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the right to such information
Held:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Court said that:
“The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
“The cornerstone
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of the government, the citizenry ca n become prey to the whims
and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec.1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under
limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is
an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by
the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with
the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government. Like all the
constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to
"matters of public concern", and is further" subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the
State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest", and is "subject when the information requested from the government
intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies
like the GSIS. A corporation has no right to privacy since the entire basis of the right to privacy is injury to the feelings
and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through
its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in
nature.
The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same
function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary
function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
The consideration in guaranting access to information on matters of public concern does not however, accord to
citizen the right to compel custodian of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their
desire to acquire such information.
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

GR No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
Cortes, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Valentin Legaspi is invoking his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern whe n he
was denied disclosure by respondent CSC of information regarding civil service eligibilities Sibonghanoy and Agas as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. He sought relief by way of mandamus to compel respondent to
furnish him the requested information.
information. The OSG contended, among others, that respondent
respondent does not have thethe
ministerial duty to furnish petitioner with such records, hence, cannot be mandated to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be compelled to disclose requested

requested information by petitioner.
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HELD: Yes. The constitutional
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern
concern in the Bill of Rights are self-
executing. The right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become
become operative and enforceable by virtue of the
adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding
proceeding such as this
one.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern.
This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public
records on the manner in which
which the right to information
information may be exercised by the public. It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information
sought is of public interest or public concern.
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligible.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any
provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there
is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this ca se, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service
eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the
law upon access to the register of ci vil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Tano vs. Socrates

G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997
FACTS:
This case involves that of the constitutionality Ordinance No. 15-92 of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Puerto
Princesa City banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City effective for 5 years. To
implement the ordinance, the City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City issued Office Order No. 23 ordering inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from air and sea. Likewise an ordinance (Ordinance No. 2,
series of 1993) and resolution (Resolution No. 3) were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Provincial
Government of Palawan prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years.
Petitioners challenged the office order and ordinance on the ground that it deprived them of due process of law,
their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. They averred that there were violations
of Sec. 2 Art. XII and Sec. 2 and 7 of Art. XIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said ordinances and o ffice order are in violation of the rights of the petitioners
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition stating that the challenged ordinances do not suffer any infirmity, both under
the Constitution and applicable laws, including the Local Government Code. There is also no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
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There can be no doubt as to the validity of the ordinances for the reason that the Local Government Code vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges
therefor. The Sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances that protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of d estructive fishing.
The said ordinances also find support under R.A. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for
Palawan Act which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with
protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
BELLOSILLO, J.
Facts:
Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
1) petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation , a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
2) Renong Berhad , a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price
ofP44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a
managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the
bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x which respondent GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October
1995 petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
Petitioner’s contentions and respondent’s aversions are the following:

1) In Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.
Respondents said that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
2) Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business
of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the
hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC i s clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Respondents contend that granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51 % of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly,
51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the
disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have
questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
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Issues:
WON the selling of 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation is
unconstitutional?
Held: Yes.
First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred . And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances
an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself
by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Second, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. The term qualified
Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
Respondents are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL C ORPORATION to purchase
the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
petitioner vs. PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC ., respondent
G.R. No. 159308. September 16, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
DOCTRINE
Environmental Law; All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology, which right carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment, particularly our diminishing forest resources —
private rights must yield when they come in conflict
conflict with this public policy and common interest
FACTS
On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. executed
Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-040 whereby petitioner, represented by then Regional
Executive Director (RED) for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent, represented by its President
Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located
in Barangays Langapod,
Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Da tagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of
timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.
Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) which the
DENR approved on August 17, 1995.
On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding
respondents alleged failure to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the
constant threats and harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio Mendoza, D ENR Region IX,
issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a regional team to evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.
ISSUE
WON IFMA No. R9-040 is a contract and not a mere privilege granted by the State to respondent. (NO, IFMA No. R9-
040 is a privilege granted by the State.)
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RULING
IFMA No. R-9-040 is a license agreement under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 (Revised Forestry Code), the law
which is the very basis for its existence. Under Section 3, paragraph (dd) thereof, a license agreement is defined as
a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right of
possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding
obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in
said agreement.
An IFMA has for its precursor the Timber License Agreement (TLA), one of the tenurial instruments issued by the
State to its grantees for the efficient management of the country’s dwindling forest resources. Jurisprudence has
been consistent in holding that license agreements are not contracts within the purview of the due process and the
non-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in the Constitution. Our pronouncement in Alvarez v. PICOP
Resources, Inc .is enlightening
In unequivocal terms, we have consistently held that such licenses concerning the harvesting of
timber in the country’s forests cannot be considered contracts that would bind the Government
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare . (citing Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr.,
Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 811) Such unswerving verdict is
synthesized in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., (id.,
Jr., (id., at pp. 811, 812) where we held:
In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because
he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that a s correctly
pointed out by petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of
the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the

President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein x x x.
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive

action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the constitution . In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, [125 SCRA 302,
325 (1983)] this Court held:
x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State

regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not
a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise

would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
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property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights. ( People vs. Ong Tin, 54
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary [190 SCRA 673, 684 (1990):
x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the

principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-
24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be

passed.
cannot be invoked.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from
it are not absolute.
All Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under Section 16, Article II
of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment,
particularly our diminishing forest resources. To uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the State. The
DENR is the instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country’s environment and
natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing
of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.
Thus, private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common interest. They must
give way to the police or regulatory power of the State, in th is case through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and
conditions of existing laws, rules and regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with.
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
DOCTRINE/LAW APPLICABLE: Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
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FACTS:
PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have its Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). In the middle
refuse d to attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead,
of the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused
on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus
against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to
compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP.
PICOP is, thus, insisting that the government is obligated by contract to issue an IFMA in its favor because of the
1969 Document.(Presidentail Warranty). A contract, being the law between the parties, can indeed, with respect to
the State when it is a party to such contract, qualify as a law specifically enjoining the performance of an act. PICOP’s
claim that the warranty is not limited to fifty years, but that extends to other fifty years.
RTC rendered decision in favor of PICOP. DENR Secretary filed Motion for consideration, but RTC denied. DENR
Secretary then filed a Notice of Appeal and CA affirmed decision of the RTC, with modification that the payment of
P10M as damages to PICOP be deleted. PICOP filed motion for reconsideration which was denied by CA. From the
petition for review submitted by PICOP, Court reversed and set aside the decision of CA with regard the granting of
Petition for Mandamus filed by PICOP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec of DENR is enjoined by law to issue and IFMA in favor of PICOP
RULING:
No. PICOP’s interpretation of the 1969 Document cannot be sustained. PICOP’s claim that the term of the warranty
is not limited to fifty years, but that it extends to other fifty years, perpetually, violates Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution which provides:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
What one cannot do directly, he cannot do indirectly. Forest lands cannot be alienated in favor of private entities.
Granting to private entities, via a contract, a permanent, irrevocable, and exclusive possession of and right over
forest lands is tantamount to granting ownership thereof. PICOP, it should be noted, claims nothing less than having
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession of its concession areas, where all other entrants are illegal, a nd
where so-called "illegal settlers and squatters" are apprehended.
IFMAs are production-sharing agreements concerning the development and utilization of natural resources. As such,
these agreements "may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by la w." Any superior "contract" requiring the State
to issue TLAs and IFMAs whenever they expire clearly circumvents Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which
provides for the only permissible schemes wherein the full control and supervision of the State are not derogated:
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements within the time limit of twenty-five y ears, renewable
for another twenty-five years.
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All projects relating to the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources are projects of the State.
While the State may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by these citizens, such as PICOP,
the projects nevertheless remain as State projects and can never be purely private endeavors. PICOP is indeed
neither a national agency nor a government-owned or controlled corporation. The DENR, however, is a national
agency and is the national agency prohibited by Section 27 from issuing an IFMA without the prior approval of the
Sanggunian concerned. As previously discussed, PICOP’s Petition for Mandamus can only be granted if the DENR
Secretary is required by law to issue an IFMA. We, however, see here the exact opposite: the DENR Secretary was
actually prohibited by law from issuing an IFMA, as there had been no prior approval by all the other Sanggunians
concerned.
Thomas Cheesman vs. IAC and Estelita Padilla

G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
Facts:
Thomas Cheesman married his wife(Criselda) who is a Filipino Citizen on December 4, 1970. His wife
acquired a land through a “Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights” executed by certain Armando Altares
dated June 4, 1974. The land was exclusively managed by his wife with his knowledge and without any protest from
him. Tax declarations for the property were issued in the name of his wife only. On February 15, 1981, he and Criselda
separated. On July of the same year also, Criselda sold the said land to Estelita Padilla without the knowledge of
Thomas Cheesman. Thomas brought suit to annul the sale. He contends that the property was acquired during the
existence of their marriage, and that said property belongs to the conjugal partnership. The Trial Court rul ed in favor
of Criselda, and that Article 160 of the Civil Code could not be applied since he is an American citizen and such
contention is not in harmony with the fundamental law of the land as regards to the prohibition to aliens from
acquiring or holding residential land except by hereditary succession. It wa s also affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
Whether or not Thomas Cheesman’s citizenship is a bar to his action to recover the lot and house for
conjugal partnership?
Held:
Yes, his citizenship is a bar to the said action. The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential
land. Section 14, Article XIV of th e1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the
Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any
event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife
on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property.
To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
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Sanchez vs. CA
G.R. L-40177 February 12, 1976
Facts:
Respondent rural bank executed certain affidavits of adverse claim to certain registered sugar lands belonging to
petitioner as co-owner or redemptioner. Said lands were the subject of mortgage loans, obtained from respondent
bank, which had been fully paid and discharged either by payment or redemption after extra-judicial foreclosure.
Claiming that it still had certain unsecured money claims against the registered owners, the bank refused to
surrender the certificates of title without an adverse claim first annotated on the certificates. When the register of
deeds refused to register the bank's adverse claim, the latter asked the CFI as a registration court to direct the
register of deeds to annotate the adverse claim. The court granted the petition and the order to annotate the
adverse claim was immediately annotated even before it became final and executory. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the same holding that appeal, not certiorari, was the "only remedy,"
and that the error committed by the trial court, if at all, is not a ground for certiorari, because not every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact is abuse of discretion.
Issues:
Whether a mere money claim may be properly registered as an adverse claim on a Torrens Certificate of Title within
the purview of the Land Registration Act?
Held:
A mere money claim may not be registered as an adverse claim on a Torrens certificate of title and a judge who
orders the annotation on the certificate of title of such money claim as an adverse claim acts without any authority
in law and commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction that calls for the issuance of the
corrective writ of certiorari. Section 110 of the Land Registration (Act 496) provides that a person or entity who
wishes to register an adverse claim in registered land must claim a "part or interest in the registered land adverse to
the registered owner." Thus, purely money claims arising from unsecured personal loans granted by the creditor on
promissory notes executed in his favor by the borrowers and co-signed by the registered owner as co-maker are not
registrable as adverse claims against the co-maker's registered lands. The claim asserted must affect the title or be
adverse to the title of the registered owner in order to be duly annotated as an adverse claim to the land against the
registered owner. Respondent court's decision was set aside and in lieu thereof judgment is rendered declaring null
and void the lower court's Order for annotation of respondent bank's affidavits of adverse claims on the c ertificates
of title in question.
CORPUS VS GROSPE
GR NO 135297 June 8, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land. The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino
Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.
To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the
contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of G eronimo Grospe, for a period
of four years to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa
Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan,"which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during the duration
of the mortgage.
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Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner
instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of possession due to the fact that the latter had entered
the disputed land by force and intimidation on and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land.
As per the respondents, petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and cultivation of the property
until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed a "Waiver of Rights" over the
landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394. Petitioner denied this.
ISSUE:
1. WON the waiver of land reform rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid. NO
2. WON there was voluntary surrender on the part of the petitioner. YES
RULING:
1. NO. The Court has already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession.
This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts
of land, thus
thus negating the government’s program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.
2. YES. The nullity of the Wa iver does not save the case for him because there is a clear showing that he voluntarily
surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the
government, of his rights under the agrarian laws. As per PD 27, title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform
program shall not be transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with
the provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section 8 of RA 3844 also provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold
relation xxx shall be extinguished by: xxx (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, xxx."
In this case, petitioner’s intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence
to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions surrender
surrendering
ing his possession of the landholding. I t was the government, through
the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries
under the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require
court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence.
Petitioners voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government
because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-
farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry
of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-
farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer.
Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and economic organization to ensure that the
tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.
PEOPLE V MACEREN
GR No. L-32166
October 18, 1977
FACTS
March 7, 1969 - Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were
charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 196 9
resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cru z. The lower court held that electro fishing
cannot be penalize because electric current is not a n obnoxious or poisonous substance a s contemplated in section
II of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by
substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
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ISSUE
Whether or not the administrative order penalizing electro fishing i s valid
HELD
No, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority
in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the
Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any
legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already
enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency
can have only the a dministrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.
REPUBLIC VS. MARASIGAN

GR No. 85515, June 6, 1991
Facts:
Private respondent, claiming to be one of the heirs of Epifania Alcano, registered owner of a parcel of land located
in Canubing, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, containing an area of 33,294 square meters, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, filed a petition for the
reconstitution of "the original and duplicate copy ( sic)"
sic)" of the said Transfer Certificate of Title on the basis of the
owner's duplicate copy. She alleged therein that she is in possession "of the title subject matter of" the petition but
she, however, did not allege the reason why she asked for the reconstitution.
The trial court set the petition for hearing and required its publication in the Official Gazette, which was done.
Required notices, except to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land, were given.
Thereafter, the trial court granted the instant petition. The Register of Deeds of this province is hereby directed to
reconstitute the original and the owner's duplicate copies of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-66062 in the name of
the registered owners ( sic).
sic). Petitioner herein, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed from said Order
to the Court of Appeals which was later on denied.
Issue:
Whether or not notices to adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land are mandatory and
jurisdictional in judicial reconstitution
reconstitution of certificates of title.
Held:
Yes. Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 has not been alt ered, modified or amended. Since the requirement therein
therein of service
of notice of the initial hearing to the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not complied with
in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66062. Accordingly, the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the
Order of the trial court granting the petition and in holding that said Section 13 has been "at least impliedly
amended" by Section 23 in relation to Section 110 of P.D. No. 1529 which took effect on 11 June 1978.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al .,

al ., The Court ruled that the requirements of Section 12 and Section 13
of R.A. No. 26 a re mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings utterly
null and void.
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TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA,
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, NICOLAS A. PASCUAL, CRISANTO F. PASCUAL, ANSELMO F. PASCUAL, MAMERTO F.
PASCUAL, PASCUALA A. MEJIA, DAMIANA A. M EJIA, CIRILO S. PASCUAL, and CATALINA S. PASCUAL )
G.R. No. L-55771 November 15, 1982
FACTS: The case involves a Petition for Reconstitution of title, original and owner’s duplicate copy’ over lots 2 and
4 indicated in Plan II-4374 docketed as 504-P filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal by the Pascuals, claiming
as the intestate heirs of the deceased Manuela Aquial, The petition alleged that the copies of the said title were
salvaged after the World War. The petition was given due course and it was set for hearing. Accordingly, publication
of the petition in the Official Gazette was made and notices of hearing were sent to the adjoining owners except
Tahanan who is not only an adjoining owner but also an owner and an actual occupant as the 9 hectares portion of
Tahanan’s land overlapped the land of the Pascuals registered in the name of their predecessor Manuela Aquia l. A
decision was rendered granting the said petition. Tahanan filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied, hence,
it filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court properly acquired and was invested with
with jurisdiction to hear and decide
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P in the light of the strict and mandatory provisions of Republic Act No. 26
RULINGS: Republic Act No. 26 specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be
followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant
the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution
must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and
posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide
specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be follo wed.
Upon a cursory reading of both the petition for reconstitution and the notice of hearing, it is at once apparent that
Tahanan has not been named, cited or indicated therein as the owner, occupant or possessor of property adjacent
to Lot 2, title to which is sought to be reconstituted. Neither do the petition and the notice state or mention that
Tahanan is the occupant or possessor of a portion of said Lo t 2. The result of this omission or failure is that Tahanan
was never notified of the petition for reconstitution and the hearings or proceedings therein.
It is all too evident that the Pascuals in refiling their Petition for Reconstitution in October, 1977 docketed as Case
No. 504-P, had no intention to notify nor give cause for notification and knowledge to all adjacent or boundary
owners, particularly Tahanan. Hence, the Court did not actually acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Heirs of Malabanan v Republic

GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
Doctrine: Applicants under 14(1) of PD 1529 in relation to sec 48(b) of CA 141 acquire ownership of, and registrable
title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. It is sufficient that the land be declared
alienable and disposable at the time of the filing for the application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title and
the land need not be alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession.
FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration of a 71,324sqm parcel of la nd in Silang, Cavite. He claimed
that he had purchased said property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty years.
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Malabanan submitted a certification from DENR CENRO stating that the land is alienable and disposable in 1982. RTC
granted Malabanan’s request for registration.
However, the Republic appealed to CA ar guing that Malabanan did not adhere to the requirement of time required
by the law and the he failed to prove that the land is an alienable and disposable land.
CA ruled in favor of the Republic on the ground that the possession of land before it was declared alienable and
disposable cannot be included in the computation of possession of the land, thus Malabanan did not adhere to the
period requirement of the law.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners can register the land
HELD:
NO. The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession –
possession – possession
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier –
– the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Decree . Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless
Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Republic v CA and Naguit

GR No. 144057 January 17, 2005
Facts:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of
Ibajay Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the aforesaid land. On February 20, 1995,
the court held initial hearing on the application. The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ra mon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No.
3888 until 1991. On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming
(Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to
Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney -
in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut
and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which
have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors in interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until
she filed her application for registration. MCTC rendered a decision in favor of Naguit.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an
order dated February 18, 1998. The RTC dismissed the petition filed by the Republic. The Republic then again filed
an appeal which was consequently dismissed by the Court of Appeals. The OSG assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding th at there is no need for the government’s prior
release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the
meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the
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required period. The OSG invokes SC’s holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Cour t
Cour t in arguing that
the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since
prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Issue: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land
be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
could even start.
Held:
No. Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving
the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property. SC finds no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-
in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects
the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the
existence of 50 to 60 year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed
by Urbano in 1945.
REPUBLIC V BIBONIA
G.R. No. 157466 June 21, 2007
Doctrine:
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at
the time the application for registration of title is filed.
Facts:
Respondents Cheryl B. Bibonia and Ricardo L. Fernandez, substituted by Joselito G. Manahan filed an application for
registration of parcel land in RTC Da et, Camarines Norte.
Cheryl B. Bibonia - covers Lot 1 and alleged that she bought the land from Marita King as shown by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 29, 1992. Marita King received the land by virtue of donation inter vivos from her
father Mariano Morales. Mariano Morales, on the other hand, purchased the lot from Sisenando Barco who, in turn,
bought it from Restituto Paraon on September 10, 1955.
Ricardo L. Fernandez - substituted by Joselito

Joselito G. Manahan; covers Lot 2 and alleged that
that he bought the land from
Remedios Cribe on September 29, 1992. It was donated to the latter by her father, Mariano Morales, on December
18, 1987, who purchased the lot from Basilia Barco and the heirs of Liberato Salome on July 31, 1968.
In the course of th e proceedings, the trial court ordered the substitution of Fernandez by respondent Manahan, the
former having transferred his rights and interest over Lot 2 in favor of the latter by virtue of a Deed of Assignment.
The registration was granted to both respondents. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari by the Republic contending that that the Court of Appeals erred when it departed from settled
jurisprudence by ruling that respondents have occupied the lots for thirty (30) years; and that they could not have
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maintained a bona fide claim of ownership because at the time of the filing of their application on September 1,
1994, the lots had been alienable for only eight (8) years, per Certification from the Community and Environment
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents were able to prove that the lots subject of their application were then disposable
and alienable land of the public domain;
2. Whether they were able to show that they have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession of the lots in the concept of owners.
RULINGS:
1. YES. Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
provides for who may apply for a registration of land. Applicants for registration of land must prove: (a) that it
forms part of the alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
In the instant case, the lot was declared alienable and disposable by a positive government act. The evidence
on record shows that a Certification was issued by the CENRO, DENR to the effect that the lots are within
Camarines Norte Project No. 4-E, alienable and disposable area, certified as such on January 17, 1986. In the
case of Republic V CA it was held that Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at
the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is stil l reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good
faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property. Hence, in this case respondents filed their application in 1994, the lots were already declared
alienable and disposable by the DENR 49 years ago, or in 1945.
2. NO. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondents were able to prove, through
testimonial and documentary evidence, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession of the lots for the period required by law.
However, the trial court overlooked the fact that the required thirty-year period of occupation by an applicant
for registration has already been amended by P.D. No. 1073 that took effect on January 25, 1977. Thus, instead
of the thirty-year requirement, applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, must prove
that they have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
Unfortunately, evidence on record shows that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the disputed property only since 1955. Although respondents possession and that of
their predecessors-in-interest was more than 39 years when they filed their application for registration in 19 94,
that period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of title. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
fide claim
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Republic vs. Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 164408; March 24, 2014
Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for original registration of land. Director
of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of land since June 12, 1945.RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.
On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time when the land became
alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether Zurbaran acquired the land by prescription.
ISSUE:
What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of land?
RULING:
The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed. The f ollowing are the bases for application:
1. On the basis of p ossession, wherein you need to show the following:
a) The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain;

b) The applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
c) The applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is sufficient that
property is alienable and disposable at the time of application
2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:

a) Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property;
b) Continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title OR 30 years regardless of good
faith or bad faith.
c) Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of 10-year or 30-year period
of possession. Only patrimonial property of the State may be a cquired by prescription. Property of public dominion,
if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial property of State.
Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation commenced (no allegation
that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the application is based on prescription.
Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by law either to
be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth.
REPUBLIC v TSAI
GR No. 168184 June 22, 2009
Facts:
Respondent filed an application for the confirmation and registration of the subject property under Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Respondent alleged that she is the o wner of the subject property and the improvements thereon.
Respondent declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
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The Republic opposed respondents application on the following grounds: (1) that respondent and her predecessors-
in-interest failed to present sufficient evidence to show that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073); (2) that the
tax declarations and tax receipt payments attached to the application do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide
fide acquisition of the land applied for or of respondents open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or
earlier; and (3) that the subject property forms part of the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
Trial court granted respondents application for registration. The Republic appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed
the trial courts decision. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied Republics
motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court can grant the application for registration despite the lack of proof of
respondents open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
Ruling: NO.
Section 48(b) of the CA 141 ha s been amended several times. The Court of Appeals failed to consider the amendment
introduced by PD 1073. In Republic v. Doldol , the Court provided a summary of these amendments:
The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claimfide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufficient.
Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 19 77, it must now be shown that possession and occupation
of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or
earlier.This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
In this case, respondent failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation of the subject property, as
required by both PD 1529 and CA 141. We agree with the Republic that respondent’s evidence was not enough to
prove that her possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because respondents earliest
evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the year
1948. In view of the lack of sufficient showing that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the
subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, respondents’ application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141 should be denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical School), petitioner,
vs. NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.
GR No. 132963 September 10, 1998
Facts
In 1959, Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan, Opol, Misamis Oriental. He subsequently filed
an application for saltwork purposes in 1963, however, such application was denied in 1968 by the Bureau of Forest
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Development. The Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932 Cad- 237 as a
school site; the area, unfortunately, included Doldol’s land.
In 1970, Opol High School transferred to the site. President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180, reserving
Scho ol in 1987. The school then made demands for Doldol to vacate
the area including Doldol’s portion for Opol High School
the land. The RTC ruled that Doldol must vacate the land, but the CA reversed the decision, contending that Doldol
is in possession of the land for 32 years.
Issue
Whether Opol High School or Nicanor Doldol has the better right to the land in dispute?
Held
Opol High School (now Opol National Secondary Technical School) has the better right to the land in dispute.
The CA anchored its ruling on Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which provides:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
However, said provision was amended by RA 1942, which now states:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
As in Republic v. CA, it was held that in order to resolve the abovementioned issue, two requirements must be met,
so that the possessor of the land may acquire a right to a government grant without the need of a certificate of title:
1. that the land is alienable public land; and,
2. that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act
Doldol met the first requirement, but because he only started occupying the land in 1959, he did not acquire a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
title, thus he cannot segregate the land in dispute from the public domain.
DENR et al VS. YAP et al

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of
the Philippine Tourism Authority
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated
September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
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Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing a n application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for declaratory relief
relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June
12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay
beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible
susceptible of private
ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have
have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island
was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,”
forest,” which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. The OSG
maintained that respondents- claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3 -82 was was misplaced.
misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents- claimants, declaring that, “PD 1810 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In 2004,
the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original
petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their
respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705 .
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified

unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.
forest.
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as “a mass of land s of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classificatio n for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose
and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all all unclassified lands, including those Is land, are ipso facto
those in Boracay Island,
considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its
its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such classification
modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
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22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required .

required . In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government
that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. The
burden of proof in overcoming suchpresumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court.
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land.
If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have
identified the specific limits of each, as President
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION

R EGISTRATION OF TITLE
FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORP v REPUBLIC
GR No. 147359 March 28, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October 23, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366,
and the March 7, 2001 Resolution denying its reconsideration.
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for confirmation of
title to parcels of land, described as Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030 ,3 with an aggregate area of 8,463 square
meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application was docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835.
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it openly, exclusively and
notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim
fide claim of ownership, tacking its
possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner failed to prove its open, continuous, adverse and notorious possession of the subject
properties in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) year
Held:
In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous
and adverse possession of the subject lots since June 12, 19 45. At best, FATCO can only prove possession of Lots No.
1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But as the law now stands, a mere showing of
possession for thirty (30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown too that possession and occupation had
started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
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ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GR No. 148338 June 6, 2002
Facts:
The case is a petition for review on the reversal of the decision of the RTC by the CA denying the application of the
petitioner for the registration of a parcel of land (forest land) located in Maragondon,Cavite. In October 13, 1997,
petitioner filed an application for registration of a parcel of land, stating therein that he is resident of Poblacion,
Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim
of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his
family. He also indicated the owners/occupants of the adjoining properties and submitted the f ollowing documents:
(a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601, (b)
Technical Description of Lot No. 1891; (c) Certification in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for
registration purposes, attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; (d) Certification, dated August 14, 1997, that
the subject land is alienable and disposable;(e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the property is not covered
by any public land application or patent; (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the parcel of land;
and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty taxes
on the said lot up to 1997.
Petitioner also submitted to the branch clerk of court the original copy of tracing cloth plan of the land and the latter
transmitted to the Land Registrat ion Authority all the documents supporting the petitioner’s application. No
oppositor appeared during the hearing except for the provincial prosecutor in behalf of the Bureau of Lands. All
parties except to the Bureau of Lands were declared in default by the court and the trial ensued. Petitioner presented
witnesses in the person of Raymuldo Telia who testified he knows the petitioner to be the owner of the said land
since he was young. Petitioner further claims that he and his family planted mango and bamboo trees and raised
animals on it and they solely gather the fruits and forest products of said land. The lower court granted the
application of the petitioner thus the respondent appealed to the CA contending that the petitioner failed to submit
the original tracing cloth plan of the lot and to establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest has been in open,
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute within the period required by law. The CA
reversed the lower court decision holding that the petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the tracing cloth
plan of the land applied for registration.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to submit the original copy of the tracing cloth plan is required in the land registration
proceeding.
Held:
The court held that the submission of the original copy of the tracing cloth plan is a mandatory requirement in the
application of original registration of land. Failure to submit the same is fatal. The purpose of which is to establish
the true identity of the land and ensure that it does not overlap adjoining lands that are already registered.
1. The contention of the petitioner that he submitted it to the branch clerk of court who transmitted the same to
the Land Registration Authority has no merit since the court held that he is duty bound to retrieve it and submit
it before the court. It is not the function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no authority to
approve original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there, the
applicant may easily retrieve the same there f rom and submit the same in evidence.
2. The court cannot admit his prayer to reopen the proceeding for him to submit the original tracing cloth plan or
sepia paper as newly discovered evidence for it does not meet the following requisites for re-opening a case to
present a new evidence: 1) the evidence was discovered after the trial; 2) such evidence could not have been
discovered or produced on trial within a reasonable time; 3) it is material and not merely corroborative in
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weight that when admitted will change the judgment. The original tracing plan cannot be considered as newly
discovered evidence since it was already available at the time of application for registration.
3. Petitioner failed
failed to establish
establish to have met the legal requirements on the manner and length of possession as to
vest him title of ownership of the land. He claims to have planted bamboo trees and mango trees but such is held
by the court as “mere casual cultivation” of the land that does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.
Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the 30-year open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the
concept of an owner, as required by C.A. No. 141, 48 (b), as amended, petitioners application for original registration
of Lot No. 1891 cannot be granted
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE, BRANCH I COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA and
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-35273 July 25, 1983
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
Development Bank of the Philippines filed an action against the Iglesia ni Kristo. The complaint states among other
things that Development Bank of the Philippines acquired a certain parcel of land located at Sagana, Laur, Nueva
Ecija, with an area of 19 hectares, more or less; that it acquired the same thru a sheriff's sale held on April 2, 1952
on account of a foreclosure of mortgage securing an agricultural loan of P4,500.00 granted to one Emilio Libunao;
that on July 18, 1953 after the expiration of one year from and after the date of the registration of the certificate of
sale, and after the mortgagor, Emilio Libunao failed to exercise his right to redemption, the plaintiff caused the
consolidation in its favor the exclusive and absolute ownership thereof, and was issued T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in its
name; that said parcel of land was originally owned by Mr. Emilio Libunao, who obtained a Homestead Patent on
June 19, 1937, which was registered as O.C.T. No. 5482 on January 19, 1938; that on August 2, 1966 plaintiff sold to
its former owner Emilio Libunao the said property for the sum of P10,953.23 under a Deed of Conditional Sale; that
plaintiff learned that the defendant Iglesia ni Kristo thru its followers and with its full knowledge and consent is
occupying the said parcel of land since October 3, 1966, and claiming the same to be a portion of that certain parcel
of land known as Lot B-2, Psd- 47351, covered by T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the na me of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo was
originally registered on June 1, 1964 as O.C.T. No. 0918 under Decree No. N-11506, Rec. No. 55081, Case No. 3244
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, issued on May 25, 1954; that despite repeated demands by plaintiff,
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo and all persons claiming it falled and refused and still fail and refuse to vacate the said
parcel of land to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.
The respondent Court declared the title of the defendant Iglesia ni Kristo, T.C.T. No. NT-53573 to be null and void,
and orders the Register of Deeds to cancel the aforementioned title. The respondent Court likewise orders the
defendant Iglesia ni Kristo to deliver the possession of the said property to the plaintiff or to its duly authorized
representative, and to pay the costs.
Issue:
WHICH OF THE TWO TITLES IS SUPERIOR, AN EARLIER TITLE SECURED ADMINISTRATIVELY OR A LATTER TITLE
SECURED THRU JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?
Held:
The rule in Vital is not applicable to this case. A torrens title issued upon a free
free patent may not be cancelled after
the lapse of ten years from the date of its registration because the statute of limitations bars such cancellation. But
if the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred or
conveyed, knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another who
together with his predecessors-in-interest has been in possession thereof,
thereof, and if the patentee and his successor-in-
interest were never in possession thereof, then the statute barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a
free patent does not apply, and the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land
judicially settled, and if the allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true
true owner of the parcel of land granted
granted as free
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patent and described in the Torrens title and that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in
possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his predecessor-in- interest have been in possession
thereof be established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of
the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of
land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof. (Philippine Reports,
Reports, Vol. 90, pp- 858-859)
In the instant case, the situation is reversed. Emilio Libunao was given a homestead patent in 1937 and the Torrens
Title in 1938. Victoria Mara villa registered her supposed title to the property only in 1954 or seventeen years later.
It is therefore, the title of Maravilla, the petitioner's predecessor-in- interest, which should be declared a nullity. She
filed an application for land registration over property which had already been awarded by the State to Emilio
Libunao 17 years earlier and a title to which had already been registered, 16 years before the registration of her title.
Maravilla could not legally claim that she owned the lot as her private property prior to its registration in her name
in 1954 and even prior to 1938 when title was registered in the name of Libunao pursuant to a homestead patent.
The contention in the comments of the Iglesia ni Cristo (its lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private
lands, following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was
considered private land in the Susi case was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time immemorial,
as in Cariño vs. Insular Government.
Considering the circumstances of this case, we follow the general rule that where two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier date must prevail as between
the original parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land,
the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second
certificate.
We apply the ruling in Pajomayo, et al v. Manipon et al. (39 SCRA 676) that where the same parcel of land is
covered by two titles, necessarily when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other, the latter should
be declared null and void and should be cancelled. Petitioner claims that it is an innocent purchaser for value and
as such is entitled to the protections provided by law particularly the guarantee of indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of a Torrens Title after the expiration of one year within which to file a petition for review. The
respondent Bank is the innocent purchaser for value in this case and is more entitled to the protection claimed by
the petitioner. The rule on successive registration controls. The Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to
decree anew the registration of a land already decreed and titled. It had no power to bestow validity upon the
second decree.
Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying

G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005
J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
1. The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City.
Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land. After her
death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta
Maloloy-ons eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bern abe, Roberta and Fausta, all
surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.
2. Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 3, 19 64, conveying the subject pa rcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty
Company. Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No.
3344 (the law governing registration for unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had been religiously paying
real property taxes on said property.
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3. In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title as the original title over the subject
property had been lost during the war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing the
Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the name of the abovementioned Aying siblings.
Thus, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2856 was issued.
4. In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed
to persons occupying the property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-Lapu City.
5. On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. The case eventually reached this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 128102, entitled Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals, Luis Aying,
Demetrio Sida, Felomino Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo Augusto. On March 7, 2000, a Decision was
promulgated in favor of herein petitioner, declaring it as the rightful possessor of the parcel of land in question.
6. Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of the eight Aying siblings,
all in all numbering around 220 persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial Partition with
Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint was
dismissed twice without prejudice. Said complaint was re-filed on August 19, 1993, docketed as Civil Case No. 2 930-
L.
Issue: Whether or not respondents’ cause of action is imprescriptible
Held:
The facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs
have executed the subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law applicable to this case
is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states: ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud,
fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he
repudiates the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. However, in constructive implied trusts,
prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said
trust is not a condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly,
it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the issuance of th e Torrens title over the property.
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of R eal Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No.
3344 and not under Act No. 496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year prescriptive
period cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of registration of the subject document under Act No.
3344. The prescriptive period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.
With regard to petitioner’s argument that the provision of Article 1104 of the Civil Code, stating that a partiti on
made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to say that
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had
been upheld but only as to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As discussed above, what was
conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document.
document. Thus, the
law, particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon petitioner to act as a trustee for the
benefit of respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having brought their action within the prescriptive
period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their share in the la nd in dispute.
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ALABANG DEVT CORP VS VALENZUELA
G.R. No. L-54094
August 30, l982
FACTS
This case originated from a petition for reconstitution of title by the respondents, Pascual. The respondents allege
that they are the owners of the land which is now “Alabang Hills Village Subdivision.”
Alabang Development Corporation (ADC) filed in the court below a belated intervention and motion for new trial
which were denied by respondent judge. The trial court granted the petition of the respondents ordering the
issuance of TCTs in favor of them. This led to the filing of this petition for certiorari and prohibition by ADC. The lands
were also the subject of a previous case heard by the Court, Director of Lands v Bernal .
ISSUE
Whether the court has jurisdiction
HELD
No. Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data required
in section 12 and section 13 of Republic Act 26 have been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such
buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property,
of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the property. Neither do
these data appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a
copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. On these glaringly conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its
pronouncement in the Bernal case, to wit, "In
" In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with
the above cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or
jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the
statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void ."
At this point the case was already dismissed, but then the court continues the discussion. After passing upon the
jurisdiction issue, the Court cannot just let go unmentioned its observation that the lots involved in this
reconstitution case are part of the survey plan (Plan II-4373 ) allegedly covering also Lots 1 and 3 which are involved
in the Bernal case. This remarkable coincidence warrants a reproduction here of the Court's findings as to the non-
veracity and falsity of the survey plan II-4374 submitted in support of reconstitution in the Bernal case. The court
pointed out that the land involved in that case is the exact same land. The evidence presented, the subdivision plans
were the same, and the respondents. As the Court accepted and approved in the Bernal case the above final report
on the relocation-verification survey of the regional officer of the Bureau of Lands and admitted it as evidence of the
falsity of the survey plan in question, there is no reason for this Court not to use it likewise as basis for reaching. The
conclusion is that Lots 2 and 4 supposedly covered by the same Survey Plan II- 4374 are purely imaginary and do not
actually exist on the ground .
ground .
The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order of the lower court
denying their motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence allowing the said order/decision to become final.
There is no laches nor finality of any decision to speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced
null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction . Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in
their comment, the judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of lands covered thereby who
were not joined as parties in the proceeding. As the Co urt ruled in the Bernal case on the matter of intervention "a
valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties" such as petitioners who hold
subsisting Torrens Titles to the properties in question and "this aspect of the case commands the joinder of
indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any
question of late intervention." Petitioners have precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy of the
present special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside for want of jurisdiction the decision
and all proceedings of respondent judge. If there is any laches at all to speak about, it is the respondents who should
be held culpable thereof. For they appear to have slept on their supposed rights to the property claimed by them. It
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is of record that the petition for reconstitution was prepared and filed in September 1977, more than thirty years
after the alleged loss or destruction of the alleged certificate of title in the last World War II.
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the land Registration Act)
cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without
first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case
of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals , 13 "in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to
be reconveyed is his.") The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution
of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names
of their duly registered owners. ït¢@lFº
owners. ït¢@lFº The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the
Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to
two different holders thereof. A fortiori , such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly
registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges
who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable therefor.
Spouses Pedro and Nena Tan v. Republic

GR No. 177797 December 4, 2008
Per J. Chico-Nazario
Facts:
The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925. Prior to the spouses Tan, the
subject property was in the possession of Lucio and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses. Lucio and Juanito Neri
had declared the subject property for taxation purposes in their names under Tax Declarations No. 8035 (1 952), No.
1524 and No. 1523 (1955).
The spouses Tan acquired the subject property from Lucio and Juanito Neri and their spouses by virtue of a duly
notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate Property dated 26 June 1970. However, a certain Patermateo
Casiño (Casiño) claimed a portion of the subject property, prompting the spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting
of Title against. On 29 August 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 88-204 favoring the spouses Tan
and declaring their title to the subject property thus "quieted".
Refusing to give up, Casiño filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property before the Bureau of Lands.
On 8 December 1999, Casiño's application was ordered cancelled by Officer Ruth G. Sabijon of DENR-CENRO,
Cagayan de Oro City, upon the request of herein petitioner Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the subject property.
In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title 25 to the subject property. The application
of the spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 496 26 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. In compliance with the request 28 of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August 2000, the
spouses Tan filed on 5 October 2000 an Amended Application for Registration of Title to the subject property.
On 28 February 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic, and reversing
and setting aside the 9 May 2001 Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to comply with
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public La nd Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945.
Issue: Whether the Spouses Tan had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land. ( NO)
Holding:
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown,
too, that possession and occupation had started on 12 June 1945 or earlier.
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It is worth mentioning that in this case, even the spouses Tan do not dispute that the true reckoning period for
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title is on or before 12 June 1945. They also admit that based on
on
the previous evidence on record, their possession and occupation of the subject property fall short of the period
prescribed by law. The earliest evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can be traced back to
a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in 1952. However, the spouses Tan are
now asking the kind indulgence of this Court to take into account Tax Declaration No. 4627 issued in 1948, which
they had attached to their Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals but which the appellate court
refused to consider. Just as they had argued before the Court of Appeals, the spouses Tan point out that Tax
Declaration No. 4627 was not newly issued but cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2948; and should the Court take judicial
notice of the fact that tax assessments are revised every four years, then Tax Declaration No. 2948 covering the
subject property was issued as early as 1944.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. On the basis thereof, it is
clear that evidence should have been presented during trial before the RTC; evidence not formally offered should
not be considered. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax Declaration No. 4627 was only submitted by the Spouses
Tan together with their Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
reason given by the Spouses Tan why they belatedly procured such evidence was because at the time of trial the
only evidence available at hand was the 1952 tax declaration. More so, they also believed in good faith that they
had met the 30-year period required by law. They failed to realize that under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient because what the law
requires is possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945. This Court, however, finds the reason given by the
spouses Tan unsatisfactory. The spouses Tan filed their application for registration of title to the subject property
under the provisions of Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. It is incumbent upon them as
applicants to carefully know the requirements of the said law.
RECTO vs. REPUBLIC

GR No. 160421 October 4, 2004
FACTS: Spouses Recto filed with the RTC an application for the registration of title under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529, or in
the alternative a petition for registration under Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, over a lot designated as Lot 806, Cad-424 in
Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The spouses alleged that they purchased
purchased the lot from the Medrana sisters, who inherited the
same from their parents, who possessed it prior to 1945. The Medrana family, during their possession of the lot,
continuously planted rice and corn therein.
The evidence presented by the spouses, among others, was a Blue Print Copy of the Plan and Technical Description
of Lot 806, both certified by Land Management Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands), of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The RTC granted the petition, hence, ordered

ordered the lot’s registration.
registration. However, the OSG, on appeal to the CA, CA,
contended that the RTC erred in granting the petition, arguing that the spouses failed to: (1) offer in evidence the
original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the period required by law; and (3)
overthrow the presumption that subject pro perty forms part of the public domain. The CA, thus, reversed the RTC’s
decision on the ground of the spouses’ failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806.
ISSUE: WON failure to p resent the original tracing cloth plan would d efeat the spouses’ application for registration.
HELD: No. The submission of the tracing cloth is is a mandatory requirement for registration.
registration. However, it was held
that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan
from the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies
copies and other evidence could alsoalso provide sufficient identification. In
Republic v. Court of Appeals , the Court ruled that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lots technical
description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands (Now the Land Management Bureau of the
DENR) are sufficient to identify the land applied for registration.
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EAGLE REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, HEIRS OF
CASIANO DE LEON AND MARIA SOCORRO DE LEON AND PLARITA M. REYES, Respondents.
GR NO. 151424 July 4, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Facts
1. The Spouses Casiano de Leon and Maria Socorro de Leon filed with the CFI of Rizal an application for registration
of two lots.
2. Several parties opposed the application, including the Heirs of Dionisio Tomas and the Carabeo family.
3. On December 11, 1979, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of Casiano de Leon and his children. Copies of this
decision were sent through registered mail to the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Solicitor General, and legal
counsels of parties in opposition.
4. The Heirs of Dionisio Tomas appealed the De Leon Decision. However, it appears that another decision, similar to
the De Leon Decision exists in the records of the LR C. This decision awards the property to Martina G. Medina. T hus,
pursuant to this document, OCT No. 129 was issued in the name of Martina G. Medina.
5. Medina later exchanged the property for a 3,000-hectare parcel of land in Norzagaray, Bulacan owned by Plarita
Reyes through a Deed of Ex change. A TCT registered in the name of Reyes was consequently issued.
6. Through a Deed of Sale, Reyes sold the property to Eagle Realty Corporation, and a TCT was issued in Eagle Realty’s
name.
7. When Cesario de Leon discovered that OCT No. 129 was issued to Medina, the De Leons sent a letter-complaint
to the LRC asking for an investigation on the matter. The investigation concluded that the Medina Decision was fake
and recommended that appropriate action be filed for the nullification of OCT No. 12 9 and derivative titles issued in
the names of Plarita Reyes and Eagle Realty Corporation.
Issues
1. W/N the one-year prescriptive period is applicable to this case?
2. W/N Eagle Realty Corporation is an innocent purchaser for value?
Held
1. No, the one-year prescriptive period is not applicable to this case. The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title
does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
As such, a title issued based on void documents may be annulled. Moreover, elementary is the rule that prescription
does not run against the State and its subdivisions.
2. No, Eagle Realty C orporation is not an innocent purchaser for value. He who alleges that he is a purchaser in good
faith and for value of registered land bears the onus of proving such statement. This burden is not discharged by
involving the ordinary presumption of good faith. In this case, petitioner failed to discharge this burden. In its answer,
petitioner merely alleged that it is an innocent purchased for value since it acquired land from Reyes for P1.2M
without notice of any defect in her title and after verifying the genuineness of the title in the ROD of Pasay City and
the LRC. However, petitioner did not present any proof that would substantiate this allegation nor did it present any
evidence to show that it took other steps to verify the authenticity of its predecessors’ title.
Toribio Laxamana vs. Laureana Carlos, et. al.,

G.R. No. 35797, December 13, 1932
FACTS:
The case refers to seven appeals taken by opponents from the judgment of the CFI rendered in a civil case denying
and dismissing their respective oppositions and adjudicating and decreeing the registration of the lots without the
oppositions described in the application, in favor of the applicant Toribio Laxamana and his wife Leoncia Conui, with
the exception of the portion of Lot Nos. 36 and 60. The applicant- appellee questions the court’s jurisdiction to review
the evidence upon the appeal taken by the opponents and appellants last mentioned thru Attorney V. Franco, in
view of the fact that they announced their intention to appeal and then filed a bill of exceptions without waiting for
the trial court to pass upon the motion for a new trial filed by them on Apr. 17, 1931, upon the ground that the
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evidence does not justify the judgment, which is contrary to law, the CFI of Pampanga having approved the said bill
of exceptions on April 30, 1931.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules and procedure involving Civil ca ses apply to registration cases as well
HELD:
Yes, it will still apply. While the nature of the action is different, the facts in the case of Conspecto vs Fruto, are
identical to those in the present case. Although the cases cited are ordinary civil actions and the case at bar is one
of registration, the rule with reference to the order of filing the motion for a new hearing, exception, appeal, and
bill of exceptions is the same. According to the ruling cited, the Court has no jurisdiction to review questions of fact
raised by the appellants in their brief; it must accep t the trail court’s findings upon the various lots affected by the
opposition, and determine merely if the conclusions of law derived from the findings of fact are in keeping with the
statute.
Egao v CA
G.R. No. 79787 29 June 1989
Facts:
The respondents filed a motion for quieting the title and recovery of possession and ownership against the
petitioners. Apparently, they claim they are the owners of the parcel of land by virtue of the deed of sale they
entered into with Roberto Marfori to whom the petitioners allegedly sold their land to. The Egaos acquired their
land title by virtue of a free patent and transferred their ownership in favor of Marfori by virtue of a deed of sale.
However, the Certificate of Title was not transferred in Marfori’s favor. Up on purchase of the land from Marfori, the
respondents introduced improvements thereon and paid taxes for the property. However, the petitioners illegally
occupied portions of the land. Petitioner answers that they are the true owner of the land by virtue of the Certificate
of Title issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to their Free Patent. The lower court ruled in favor of Egao. Upon
appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court on grounds that the main issue should be whether Egao can
validly sell the land to Marfori who subsequently transferred the ownership to the respondents. The CA holds both
Egao and Marfori to be in pari delicto for violating the 5-year restriction provided by Commonwealth 141 against
encumbrance and alienation of public lands acquired thru free patent or homestead patent. They cannot therefore
obtain affirmative relief. It also declares the respondents as innocent purchasers for value who the obtained the
duplicate of the OCT still in the n ame of the Egaos from Marfori and ownership was transferred to them by physical
possession of the property. I t thus promulgated judgment holding the respondents the absolute owners of the land
in dispute, to cancel the OCT of the petitioner and its transfer thereof to the respondents and to surrender peaceful
possession of the land to the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners validly transferred their ownership to Marfori to resolve the rights of the respondents
over the land in dispute?
Ruling:
The SC holds that based on the adduced evidence, the Egaos sold the lot to Marfori within the 5-year restriction
period provided by law on Free Patent based on the Deed of Sale entered into by the parties. Although the
petitioners denied the validity of the Deed of Sale the court held that it was notarized and a notarial document has
in its favor the presumption of regularity. When the land was sold to the respondents, they know that the OCT is still
registered under the name of the petitioners. Thus, they are not considered to be innocent purchaser as contrary to
the ruling of the CA. Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which
should put a reasonable man on his guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and
relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases the property without making any
further investigation, he cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith for value. A private individual cannot bring
an action for reversion or any action which would have an ef fect of canceling a free patent and the certificate of title
issued on the basis thereof since the land covered will form part again of the public domain. Sec. 124 of the Public
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Land Act provides that deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) y ear period are null
and void thus the Egaos have no title to pass to Mar fori and nobody can dispose that which does not belong to him.
The respondents are not innocent purchasers for value with no standing to question the rights of the petitioners
over the land and to file an action to quiet the title. The petitioners remained to be the registered owners and
entitled to remain in physical possession of the disputed property. Respondents are ordered to deliver the OCT to
the petitioners without prejudice to an action for reversion of the land to be instituted by the Solicitor General for
the State.
ARMED FORCES AND POLICE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, INC. vs INES BOLOS SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 147559 June 27, 2008
NACHURA, J.
Facts:
On September 14, 1994, the Notice of Levy was presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. The
Notice was entered in the Primary Entry Book under Entry No. PT-1305. However, it was not annotated on TCT No.
PT-79252.
On September 20, 1994 or six (6) days after the presentation of the Notice of Levy, a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 24, [1994], executed by EBR Realty Corporation in favor of Ines B. Santiago involving the same parcel of
land covered by TCT No. PT-97252 was presented for registration and entered under Entry No. PT-1653. The Register
of Deeds issued TCT No. PT-94912 in the name of vendee Ines B. Santiago on the basis of the deed of sale, unaware
of the previous presentation of the Notice of Levy.
When the Register of Deeds discovered the error he immediately sent a letter dated October 24, 1994 to Ms. Ines
B. Santiago requesting her to surrender the documents, particularly the deed of sale and owners duplicate of TCT
No. PT-94912 so that he can take appropriate rectification or correction. Ms. Santiago refused to surrender the
documents and owners duplicate of said title.
This prompted the Register of Deeds to file a Manifestation dated November 11, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q -92-11198
informing the court of the foregoing circumstances and praying that the Register of Deeds be authorized to annotate
on TCT No. PT-94912 the Notice of Levy on Attachment of Real Property.
On May 28, 1997, acting on the consulta by the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City on the propriety of annotating the
notice of levy on attachment on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT -94912, the LRA issued a Resolution that the
subject Notice of Levy cannot be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912, except by order of the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 12, 1998, the LRA issued an Order denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. On petition to the Court of Appeals, it denied the inscription of the levy on
attachment upon the title of respondent Santiago without court order and that such controversy is substantially a
judicial issue over which the Registry of Deed nor the Land Registration Authority has no jurisdiction. Verily, on a
mere Consulta, the Land Registration Authority could not rule on such issue on whether or not a registered owner
is a buyer in good faith or not. Only our ordinary courts have that exclusive jurisdictional prerogative to try and
decide such controversy.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; however, the same was denied in a Resolution dated March 15, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
I. Whether the notice of levy on attachment may be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912;
II. Whether a declaration from the court that respondent is a purchaser in bad faith is necessary before the notice
of levy on attachment may be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912; and
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III. Whether a court order is necessary in order that the notice of levy on a ttachment may be annotated on TCT No.
PT-94912.
Held:
I. Yes. In voluntary registration,
registration , such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's duplicate certificate be
not surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees be made within fifteen (15) days, entry in the
day book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration,
registration , such
as an attachment, levy upon
upon execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice
to all persons of such adverse claim.
The entry of the notice of levy on attachment in the primary entry book or day book of the Registry of Deeds on
September 14, 1994is sufficient notice to all persons, including the respondent, that the land is already subject to
an attachment.
Under Sections 51 and 52 of PD 1529, the act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar
as third persons are concerned. Constructive notice is also created upon registration of ev ery conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land.
In this case, the preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished by the subsequent registration of
the prior sale to respondent. The attachment that was registered before the sale takes precedence over the latter.
Superiority and preference in rights are given to the registration of the levy on attachment; although the notice of
attachment has not been noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of the Register of Deeds
produces all the effects which the law gives to its registration or inscription.
II. No. A declaration from the court that respondent was in bad faith is not necessary in order that the notice of levy
on attachment may be annotated on TCT No. PT-94912 because of the irrebuttable presumption under the rule of
notice that
notice that it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title and that
he is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact shown by the record
and to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed.
The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated on the original title on file in the Registry of Deeds,
which resulted in its non-annotation on TCT No. PT-94912, should not prejudice petitioner. As long as the requisites
required by law in order to effect attachment are complied with and the appropriate fees duly paid, attachment is
duly perfected. The attachment already binds the land.
III. Yes. Under Section 71 of PD 1529, “If the owner neglects or refuses to comply within a reasonable time, the
Register of Deeds shall report the matter to the court, and it shall, after notice, enter an order to the owner, to
produce his certificate a t a time and place named therein, and may enforce the order by suitable process.”
In this case, since respondent refuses to surrender the owners duplicate certificate so that the attachment lien may
be annotated, a court order is necessary in order to compel the respondent to surrender her title. As a rule, the
functions of the Register of Deeds are generally regarded as ministerial and said officer has no power to pass upon
the legality of an order issued by a court of justice.
TERESITA ROSAL ARRAZOLA vs. PEDRO A. BERNAS and SOLEDAD VERNAS ALIVIO
G.R. No. L-29740 November 10, 1978
AQUINO, J.:
FACTS
Teresita was allegedly an adopted daughter of Elviro Bernas who on May 5, 1967, when he was 79 years old,
executed in Iloilo City a notarized will wherein he disinherited Teresita and instituted his brother Pedro A. Bernas
and his sister Soledad Bernas Alivio as heirs to all his properties, including Lots Nos. 371 and 373 which he had
allegedly "involuntarily transferred" to Teresita.
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A month later, or on June 5, 1967, Elviro Bernas died in Roxas City. His brother Pedro filed with the Court of First
Instance of Capiz a petition dated September 6, 1967 for the probate of his will (Special Proceeding No. V-2965 ). On
December 12, 1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim. He
alleged in that adverse claim that Lots Nos. 371 and 3 73 were conveyed by his brother Elviro to Teresita Rosal Bernas
"involuntarily, fictitiously and without consideration" and that in Elviro's will the two lots were devised to him
(Pedro) and his sister Soledad.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on TCT Nos. T-6881 and T-6882, Teresita R. Bernas
Arrazola filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion dated August 13, 1968 for the cancellation of the
annotation of adverse claim. The motion was predicated on the grounds that she was not served with prior notice"
of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification" thereof filed with the court. Pedro
A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion.
The lower court in its order of August 20, 1 968 granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the annotation.
The oppositors appealed.
ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in ordering the ca ncellation of the adverse claim
RULING
YES. The lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim. It is true that the will of Elviro Bernas
has not yet been probated but the fact is that there is a pending proceeding for its probate. And in that will the
testator transmitted to his surviving brother and sister, the herein oppositors-appellants or adverse claimants, the
right to secure a declaration as to the invalidity of his conveyance of lots Nos. 371 and 373 to Ter esita Rosal Arrazola.
Because of that will, Teresita's title to the two lots have become controversial. To alert third persons, or for that
matter the whole world, to the fact that Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio have an adverse claim on the
two lots, section 110 of Act No. 496 gives them the remedy of causing to be annotated their adverse claim on the
titles of the two lots. If that remedy is not given to them, then the registered owner can transfer the lots to an
innocent purchaser for value and, in that event, the unregistered adverse claim will be nullified or frustrated.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third persons that there
is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during
the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is
subject to the outcome of the dispute.
Appellants' adverse claim, which was made in good faith, has some basis and semblance of plausibility and is not
palpably frivolous or vexatious. Hence, it is premature to order the cancellation of the annotation thereof before it
is finally determined by the courts that the titles of Teresita Rosal Arrazola to the disputed lots are indefeasible and
that appellants' claim is devoid of merit.
It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity which should be
litigated in a proper proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse claim is not as harmful as the non-
registration of a valid one (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 118 Phil. 980).
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs MARTINO TOMBIS TRINO

GR No. 26849; September 21, 1927
FACTS:
On June 13, 1921, the Government of the Philippine initiated the "Sagay cadastre, B. L. No. 127" to lot No. 1429 a
public land. During the pendency of the case, Martino T. Triño was notified to appear before the CFI of Negros
Occidental. The trial set for February 13, 1922, could not be had for the lack of a presiding judge, but nevertheless
the case was called on that date by the clerk of the court, and as no one appeared except the deputy provincial fiscal,
a decree of general default against the whole world was entered. On June 5, 1923, Triño appeared and filed an
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answer. He declared ownership over the land as indicated on the cadastral plan of the municipality of Sagay, then
case was heard. On December 3, 1925, a decision was given in favor of Martino Triño. But before the decree was
issued, one Martino Tumbis had conveyed the lot to Cristeta Ibañez. Cristeta Ibañez, through Esteban Vazquez her
attorney- in-fact, sold the lot to Leopoldo Escalante for P30, 000. Transfer certificates of title in the names of Cristeta
Ibañez and Leopoldo Escalante are of record. A notice of lis pendens was filed by the provincial fiscal with the office
of the register of deeds of Negros Occidental on June 29, 1926, but has not been noted by the register of deeds on
the certificates of title. The government took steps to correct the anomaly, the deputy provincial fiscal filed by a
motion for reconsideration stating that Martino Triño had not yet a cquired nor perfected any title upon the said lot
and the land in dispute is a public land and obtained it through fraud. The counsel for Martino Triño opposed the
motion. A hearing was conducted and the motion filed by the fi scal was denied by the lower court. The government
appealed the decision. In amplification of the assigned errors, extensive briefs have been submitted, while three sets
of lawyers have been permitted to appear as amici curiae.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in dismissing the motion filed by the fiscal and that Martino Triño owns the lot in dispute.
Ruling:
In a cadastral proceeding, a court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to one who has put in no claim to it. The written
declaration claiming certain described property is the v ery basis of jurisdiction to render a judgment. In a cadastral
proceeding, under an opposition claiming an undefined portion of a certain lot, a court has no jurisdiction to make
an award of the whole lot. Such an opposition is void for vagueness and uncertainty and cannot serve as a basis of
award. Also in a cadastral proceeding, a court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot as not contested when it is contested,
and to proceed to adjudication without giving the opposing parties an opportunity to be heard. That would be
violated of the most rudimentary legal principles. It is held on the facts and the law that the judgment entered in
this cadastral case with reference to lot No. 1429 is null and void ab initio because of lack of jurisdiction of the court
to render it.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and The DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,
Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO
LUISITO MARTINEZ, respondents. GR No.
No. L-35778 January 27, 1983
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LAND, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAH AM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,
Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA, respondents. G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, 1983
FACTS:
G.R. No. L-35778:

Respondent Luisito Martinez filed an application for registration of title of one (1) parcel of land, with an area of
323,093 square meters, more or less. However, the Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the application
stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to
private appropriation. That said land was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that land was assigned as Lot No.
626, Mariveles Cadastre. Respondent contends that he inherited the land from his parents and in his possession
since 1938.
G.R. No. L-35779:

Respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration of two (2) parcels of land, containing an area of
443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less which described and Identified as
portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431. Respondent
Thelma alleged that, said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed the land since 1935. The Court
of First Instance confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito
Martinez and Thelma Tanalega.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not said parcels of land which are portions of Lot No. 626, Mariveles Cadastre are alienable and
disposable land of public domains?
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2. Whether or not the alleged possession of the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to
sustain their claim for prescription?
RULING:
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral
proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over
the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have
declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res
judicata.
judicata . A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded
from re-litigating the same issues already d etermined by final judgment.
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the lands subject
matter of the instant cases, the same must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the
respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area applied for are cultivated. A mere casual
cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The
possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless
the occupant can prove possession and oc cupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number
of years to constitute a grant from the State. Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual,
peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required
by law.
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the Director of Lands but
by the Land Registration Commission. The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject
of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-owner-beneficiaries. The
submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., (WIDORA) vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
G.R. No. 91797 August 28, 1991
Facts:
Plaintiff WIDORA filed before the respondent court an application for registration of a parcel of land alleging that
said is covered covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 and issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban and acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro situated in at Malitlit-Uoogong,
Quezon City, with an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in Plan No. LRC (SWO) -15352. Respondent of the
previous case, Molina, filed an opposition to the CA, claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8. Petitioner
Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that said court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being
applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas. The court issued
an order directing the applicant to prove its contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 a re not proper derivatives of
the original certificates of titles. petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging among others that
Land Registration Commission itself has advised the court that the 156 hectare property sought to be registered is
covered by valid and subsisting titles in the name of Ortigas, but was later denied by the same court. The CA, dated
dated November 27, 1989, declared respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) as the registered
owner of the disputed parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration which was again denied. Later, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss
the land registration case whichgranted by the court. The petition on hand, WIDORA argues that respondent court
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erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of
registration and instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent trial court erred in sustaining the validity of the TCT NOs. 77652 and 77653
despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration.
Held: Yes. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the
basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the
title to and binds the land. Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land
applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the
land and is null and void. As for the error of the court, Sec. 108, PD 1529 states that – “no correction of certif icate
icate of
title shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the original case in
which the decree of registration was entered” and jurisprudence held that – “While the law fixes no prescriptive
period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title if it would mean the
reopening of the decree of registration beyond the period allowed by law” As jurisprudence stated –
stated – “One who relies
on a document evidencing his title to the property must prove not only the genuineness thereof but also the identity
of the land therein referred to” In the case at bar, private respondent's TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 trace their origins
from OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 as it is now claimed by respondent Ortigas. As for the
decision of the trial court in the previous case, ..." Nowhere in said decision, however, is a pronouncement that TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued from TCT No. 227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves show that they were derived from OCT No. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from
OCT 351 or TCT 22 7758. If indeed, the real origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what respondent Ortigas should have done
was to file a petition for the correction of the TCTs in question as stated earlier.
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Asso., vs. Victor O. Ramos

GR No. 127882 December 1, 2004
Facts: On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing the
DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors
for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent. On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942
to "govern the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines
the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern fina ncial or technical assistance
agreements. On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two
newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity o f R.A. No. 7942, however,
or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O.
Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December
20, 1996. Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. They pray that the
Court issue an order:(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional
and null and void;(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in
DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and
void; and(d) Cancelling the Finan cial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to W estern Mining Philippines, Inc.
as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 7942 is constitutional.
Held: Yes. The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the
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provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto. Moreover, the same provisions, whether by design
or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60%-40% capitalization requirement for
corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural
resources. These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources
that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to
the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vi ces that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it a ims to
suppress.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al. vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD et a l.
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex
– complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and
liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have
– have caused
detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that
with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major
sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to
the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among
jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary func tion than their
rural counterparts.
counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due the emissions
emissions of PUVs.
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order
the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16 ,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution,
in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and Section 4 14 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act
of 1999.”
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power to
regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and knowledge that
the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under
respondents’ f unctions
unctions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB,
are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the function of the DOTC
is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as
setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He
recommended that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel
the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
ISSUES
Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative of requiring public utility
vehicles to use compressed natural gas (CNG)- NO.
Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas through
a writ of mandamus- NO.
RULING
Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no
law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the
LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”
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In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the
task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line
agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a
grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The legislature should provide
first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any
judicial recourse by mandamus is is taken.
In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 29 0, which implemented a program
on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed.
DIDIPIO v GOZUN
GR No. 157882 March 30, 2006
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules
and Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Order No. 96-40, s. 1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into
on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation estab lished
under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that now goes under the new
name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are Australian
nationals.
on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares covering
the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area
area is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the full right of
ingress and egress and the right
right to occupy the same. It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented
prevented from entry
into private lands by surface owners or occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals
therein.
Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized
under Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other
residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
I. WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST
AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT P AYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION
9, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.
NO.
The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned contractor,
disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be
acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf
of the contractor, through a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the
FTAA. Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still
still various avenues by which surface rights
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can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of
the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide
for just compensation in expropriating
expropriating private properties.
properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section
Section 107 of DAO
96-40 provide for the pay ment of just compensation.
II.WHETHER
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE MINING ACT AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR SANCTIONING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OF DETERMINING
JUST COMPENSATION.
NO.
There is nothing in the provisions of the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations that exclude the
courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in expropriation proceedings involving mining
operations.
Although Section 105 confers upon the Panel of Arbitrators the authority to decide cases where surface owners,
occupants, concessionaires refuse permit holders entry, thus, necessitating involuntary taking, this does not mean
that the determination of the just compensation by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Min es Adjudication Board is final
and conclusive. The determination is only preliminary unless
unless accepted by all parties concerned. There is nothing
wrong with the grant of primary jurisdiction by the Pa nel of Arbitrators or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine
in a preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants. The original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts to decide determination of just compensation remains intact despite the
preliminary determination made by the administrative agency.
III.WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE, THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA, ABDICATED ITS PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
RA 7942 provides for the state's control and supervision over mining operations.
operations. The following provisions thereof
establish the mechanism of inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute reportorial
requirements.
The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96- 40 hardly relegates the State to the role of a “passive regulator” dependent
on submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government agencies concerned are empowered
empowered to approve
or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change -- the various work programs and the corresponding minimum
expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development and utilization phases of the mining
enterprise.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS'

RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE ROLE OF WHOLLY FOREIGN AND
AND FOREIGN-
OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN MINING ENTERPRISES, VIOLATES PARAGRAPH 4, SECTION 2,
ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
the use of the word “involving” signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities
having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance.
Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and deliberate decision to avoid the use of
restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the expression “agreements x x x involving either technical or
financial assistance” in an exclusionary and limi ting manner.
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V.WHETHER OR NOT THE 1987 CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS S ERVICE CONTRACTS
NO. The mere fact that the term service contracts found in the 1973 Constitution was not carried over to the present
constitution, sans any categorical statement banning service contracts in mining activities, does not mean that
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution was eradicated in the 1987 C onstitution.
The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who
would invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the
State; this time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent abuses of the pa st regime.
the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service
contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations acting
acting as contractors
on the one hand; and on the other, th e government as principal or “owner” of the works. In the new service
contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in
the creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its agencies
(DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the entire operation.
OBITER DICTA: justiciable controversy: definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. To exercise the
power of judicial review, the following must be extant :
(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; - involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.
In the instant case, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been
enacted, DAO 96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been entered into. The FTAA holders have already been
operating in various provinces of the country.
(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and - A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. (3) the person challenging must
have the “standing" - personal or substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy
controversy even without any other overtovert act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to a waken judicial duty.
“Taking” under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private p roperty for more than a momentary
period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.
The requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
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Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. On the other
hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent
trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the for mer, there are still traditional
distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no
compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of private
private individuals are
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. Thus,
an ordinance prohibiting theaters from selling tickets in excess of their seating capacity (which would result in the
diminution of profits of the theater-owners) was upheld valid as this would promote the comfort, convenience and
safety of the customers.
where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public
welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there
is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
there is compensable taking.
On different roles and responsibilities:

DENR Secretary: accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts of agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. (Executive Order No. 279, 198 7)
In re: easements and taking

In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, it was held that the imposition of burden over a private property through
easement was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required.
required. The Court declared:
And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is no t merely
a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the
same, by expropriating it for public use which, be it what it may, cannot be accomplished unless the owner of the
property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of
the remedy employed in such cases, as it is only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to,
against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power
with which the same is invested.
In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must be inconsistent. The former must be so
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act.
ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING v. IAC

(G.R. No. 63528, September 1996)
Mere recording of a mining claim, without performing annual work obligation, does not convert the land into mine ral
land. The recording only operates as reservation to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities.
Thus, if no minerals are extracted therefrom, the land is not mineral land and registration is not precluded by such
recorded claim.
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PD 1214 – issued
issued on October 14, 1977; it required all locators under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to secure mining lease
contracts under the provisions of PD 463
Facts:
Subject Land -41,296 square meters situated in the barrio of Lucnab, Itogon, Benguet.
Parties:
A. ATOK BIG-WEDGE MINING COMPANY (clai ming that the said parcel of land is a mineral land.)
B. TUKTUKAN SAINGAN (claiming that the said parcel of land is agricultural.)
Contentions:
Atok- contended that the said parcel of land was being registered in the office of Mining Recorder in 1921 and 1931
pursuant to Philippine Bill of 1902. It is about sixteen years before TUKTUKAN declared the land in question for
taxation purposes and thirty four (34) years before private respondent filed the land registration proceedings in
1965. They also showed the payment of annual assessment fees for the said land since 1931.
Tuktukan- who was 70 years old at the time testified shows that he acquired the land from his father-in-law, Dongail,
when he married his daughter; that he was then 18 years old; that at the time of his acqui sition, it was planted with
camotes, casava, langka, gabi, coffee and avocados; that he lived on the land since his marriage up to the present;
that he has been paying the taxes during the Japanese occupation and even before it; that he was never disturbed
in his possession. Supporting his oral testimony, applicant [Tuktukan] submitted tax declarations x x x both dated
March 20, 1948, the former for a rural land and the latter for urban land and improvement therein.
Issue: Who is preferred, the m ining claimant who merely recorded or located a mining claim without performing the
annual work obligation required by the Philippine Bill of 1902 or the applicant for registration who has possessed
the land under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years?
Held: The applicant who has possessed the right has a better right. The recording of mining claims could not have
been intended to be the operative act of classifying lands into mineral lands. The recording only operates to reserve
to the registrant exclusive rights to undertake mining activities upon the subject land. The power to classify lands
into mineral lands could not have been intended under the Philippine Bill of 1902 to be vested in just anyone who
records a mining claim. This strengthens our holding that the rights of a mining claimant are confined to possessing
the land for purposes of extraction of minerals. Thus, if no minerals are extracted, notwithstanding the recording of
the claim, the land is not mineral land and registration thereof is not precluded by such recorded claim. Thus, in case
at bench, the mining claimant, who had failed to comply with the annual minimum work requirement, could not, all
the more, be expected to have extracted minerals f rom the mining location.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., vs. CA

G.R. No. 94759, January 21, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Technology Developers Inc. is a corporation who manufactures charcoal briquette. They
received a letter from Pablo Cruz, the acting mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan ordering them to cease operations and to
bring to his office a Building Permit, an Anti- Pollution Permit and other documents. Lacking a Mayor’s Permit, when
inspected, the acting mayor had the plant padlocked, stopping their operations. They for mandamus and
preliminary injunction against the respondent mayor which was granted by the lower court. In a motion for
reconsideration by the respondent mayor, evidence was presented showing that the by-products from
manufacturing process done in the plant are hazardous to people’s health. The lower court then set aside its prior
order and dissolved the writ of injunction. The petitioner was denied by the CA upon appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the acting mayor can close down the petitioner’s pla nt
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the mayor of a town has a responsibility to protect his town’s inhabitants from
pollution, even though the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR is the agency that determines whether
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the pollution requires
requires control or prohibition of a business operation.
operation. A mayor may deny the application of
a permit to operate a business by virtue of
of his police power unless
unless the business
business takes measures
measures to control pollution
resulting from his business operations. In this case, the acting mayor called on the petitioner to produce permits
after receiving complaints from his town’s residents about the emissions from the plant and closed the plant after
he found out that the plant had no proper air pollution device installed.
MMDA vs. Jancom Environmental Corporation

G.R. No. 147165; January 30, 2002
Facts:
After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo
waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between
Jancom and the Philippine Government, represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management
through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta. The
contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it
to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the passage of RA 87 49, or the Clean Air Act of
1999 and the clamour of San Mateo residents for the closure of the dumpsite. When the MMDA published another
call for proposals for solid waste management projects for Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC
asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management
Committee disregarding the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.
Petitioner argued that the incineration technology provided in the contract is prohibited by law, citing the Clean Air
Act in support thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract could be unilaterally cancelled by the Government since incineration is prohibited by
the Clean Air Act?
Held:
The court held that as pointed out by the appellate court, Section 20, which provides:
“SECTION 20.Ban
20.Ban on Incineration.-
Incineration .- Incinertion, hereby defined as the burning of municipal, bio-
chemical and hazardous wastes, which process emits poisonous and toxic fumes, is hereby
prohibited: xxx."
does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal; rather, only those burning processes which
emit poisonous and toxic fumes are banned.
The rule that a statute should be given effect as a whole requires that the statute be so construed as to make no
part or provision thereof a surplusage. Each and every part of the statute should be given its due effect and meaning
in relation to the rest. It is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed as to be
a useless surplusage and, accordingly, meaningless in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no effect
whatsoever therein.To consider Section 20 of the Clean Air Act as prohibiting all forms of incineration would render
the phrase "which process emits poisonous and toxic fumes" a useless surplusage, which could not have been the
intention of legislature, seeing that our learned legislators even took pains to define, in Section 5, Article II of the
Clean Air Act what poisonous and toxic fumes are, viz: viz:
Section 5. Definitions.- As used in this Act:

t) "Poisonous and toxic fumes" means any emissions and fumes which are beyond
internationally-accepted standards, including but not limited to World Health Organization
guideline values;
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It may not, thus, be argued that the Clean Air Act prohibits all forms of incineration as to make the contract in
question violative of the Clean Air Act. This is not to say, of course, that the contract involved does not in fact run
afoul with the Clean Air Act. That issue may still be raised by the proper party in a proper action.
Calanza v. Paper Industry Corp.

Gr no. 146622
April 24, 2009; CHICO-NAZARIO, J:
Facts:
On Aug 23 1991, petitioners Leonora Calanza and other petitioners filed with DENR DAVAO CITY, applications for
small scale mining permits for the purpose of erxtrcting gold. In their applications, petitioners stated that the area
where they will conduct mining operations was in the Municipality of Boston, Davao Oriental.
On Dec 1992, the governor of Davao Oriental, Rosalind Lopez approved the applications and issued six small scale-
mining permits in favor of the petitioners. Since the mining areas applied for by petitioners were within the
respondent logging concession area under Timber License Agreement that covered large tracts of forest lands of the
Province of Davao Oriental.
petitioners’ entry into the mining area on the grounds

Respondent, through its officer Roberto Dormendo, refused petitioners’ entry
that it has the exclusive right of occupation, possesion, and control over the area being a logging concessionaire
mining permits are defective since they were issued by the governor of Davao Oriental.
thereof. That petitioners’ mining
Respondent also claimed that the issuance of petitioners’ permits were void ab initio since the sam Sec. 5 of RA no.
People’s Small Scale Mining Act, which prohibits the issuance of mining permits over areas covered by forest
7076, People’s
rights such as TLAs of f orest reservations unless their status as such is withdrawn by competent authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the small scale mining permits of the petitioners are valid
Ruling:
No, the governor has no authority to issue mining permits pursuant to the prevailing statute of RA no. 7076. The
approval of application for mining permits and for mining contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining
Regulatory Board. It is composed of DENR Representative, a representative for small scale mining sector, a
representative from the big scale mining industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is
tasked to approve small scale mining permits and contracts. Considering that the governor is without legal authority
to issue said mining permits, the same permits are null and void.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp. vs. Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, et al.
GR No. 135190 – 09 April 2002
FACTS:
This case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest River or known as Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area.
Area . Diwalwal has been embroiled in controversy with hundreds of people perishing in mine accidents,
man-made or otherwise, brought about by unregulated mining activities. On March 10, 1988, Marcopper was
granted an Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land which included the Diwalwal area.
This acquisition of mining rights by Marcopper was challenged by Apex. However, the Court found out that Apex did
not comply with the procedural requisites of acquiring mining rights within forest reserves.
Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act where DENR issued an Order
declaring 729 hectares of Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. Later on, a petition for
cancellation of EP No. 133 was filed before DENR and while the ca se is pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133
to petitioner herein Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.
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On March 3, 1995, RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was enacted which later on a llow, through Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board of Davao, issuance of ore transport pertmits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in Diwalwal
mines. With this, petitioner file a complaint contending that the illegal issuance of OTPs allowed extravtion and
hauling of P60,000.00 worth of gold. On 24 June 1997, Memorandum 97-03 was issued by the DEBR secretary
providing for a direct state utilization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Memorandum issued by the Secretary of DENR divested petitioner’s right to the gold rush
area under EP No. 133
HELD: No. The challenged Memorandum 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as policy in resolving
Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the Memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a
study of this option and nothing else. It did not grant any management/operating profit-sharing agreement to small-
scale miners or to any party but it simply instructed DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to determine its
feasibility.
SR METALS INC V ANGELO REYES

G.R. No. 179669 June 04, 2014
Del Castillo, J.
Facts: On March 9, 2006, each of the petitioners was awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining Permit (SSMP) by the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte; they were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni -Co) in a
20-hectare mining site in Sitio Bugnang, Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The EMB sent the mining
corporations a Notice of Violation informing them that they had exceeded the allowed annual volume of 150,000
MTs combined production as their stockpile inventory of Nickeliferous ore had already total 177,297 dry metric tons
(DMT). This was based on the August 10, 2006 Inspection Report of the MGB Monitoring Team which conducted an
inspection after the DENR received complaints of violations of small-scale mining laws and policies by the mining
corporations. A technical conference was thereafter held to hear
hear the side of the mining corporations anent their
their
alleged over-extraction.
On November 26, 2004, DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) against the mining
corporations suspending their operations for their operations. A few days later or on November 30, 2006, DOJ
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez replied to Governor Amante citing DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006. By comparing PD
1899 to Republic Act (RA) No. 707 6, a subsequent law that likewise defines small-scale mining, the DOJ opined that
Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed to have been impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the
latter law mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for small-scale mi ning.
Issue: Whether or not Section 1(1) of PD 1899 that sets the annual production limit of 50,000-MT on small-scale is
already repealed by RA 7076?
Held: No. Under Section 3(b) of RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to 'mining activities which rely heavily on manual
labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment.’ Significantly,
this definition does not provide for annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899. We do not, however, subscribe to the
aver ment that the 50,000-MTs production limit does not apply to small -scale miners under RA
mining corporations’ averment
7076. Recognizing the DENR’s mandate to regulate the country’s natural resources under EO 192, both PD 1899 and
RA 7076 delegated to the DENR, thru its Secretary, the power to promulgate the necessary IRRs to give effect to the
said laws. Significantly, the DENR in the exercise of such power had just recently resolved the question on the
production limit in small-scale mining. On July 5, 2007, it issued DMC 2007- 07 or “Clarificatory
“ Clarificatory Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Small- Scale Mining Laws”. By imposing the annual production limit of 50,000 DMT to both
SSMPs issued under PD 1899 and Small-Scale Mining Contracts (SSMCs) under RA 7076.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 120365. December 17, 1996
FACTS: Two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal
Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut
lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on
patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City. On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz,
together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the
morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. There were three
persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The
driver identified accused-appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo. SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and
found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn
lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs. SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting
documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice,
(4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs.
Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents. All he could show was a certification from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the
coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San
Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel
examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber.
The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber. When the CENRO personnel
inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted 258 pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume
of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.
On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section
68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he
acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber
permits (PLTP) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica C ayosa and Elpidio
Sabal. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and
that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. It also ordered the
confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant.
ISSUE: Can Que be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to
penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the
particular documents necessary to make the possession legal (neither did other forest laws and regulations existing
at the time of its enactment)?
HELD: Yes. Accused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an
offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. — Any
person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess
timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered
the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
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of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found.
The Court rejects appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the
possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products
is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws
and regulations.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing
timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however,
it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere
possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber
comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest
products without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum.
Que likewise interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" (under Sec. 68, PD 705) to refer to those
laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the
law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession
possession of timber or
other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the
transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order. DENR Administrative Order No.
59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3
of the Administrative Order provides:
Section 3. Documents Required. Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber,
plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities
products/commodities
shall be covered with appropriate Certificates of Origin, i ssued by authorized DENR officials, as specified
in the succeeding sections.
xxx xxx xxx
3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a
CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which
has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to
deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or
delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.
xxx xxx xxx
When apprehended on March 8, 1994, ac cused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces
of tanguile lumber.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (DENR), vs. MARCOPPER
MINING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 137174
July 10, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal system. In the meantime, the
National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was abolished by EO No. 192 dated June 10, 1987, and its
powers and functions were integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB).
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On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to
"cease and desist from discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This was appealed by the MMC with the Office
of the President (OP).In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was
created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00 a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund
(ETF) thereof. However, on June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased
from making further deposits to the ETF. The PAB sought for the enforcement of the order issued by the OP,
petition and ordered the PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid
however, the CA acted on Marcopper’s petition and
Order. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that RA 7942 repealed the provisions of RA 3931, as amended by PD 984, with respect
to the power and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to issue, renew or deny permits for the
discharge of the mine tailings.
HELD:
NO. The Court ruled that it appears that there is no genuine conflict between RA 7942 and RA 3931 as amended by
PD 984 that precludes their coexistence. The legislature intended to maximize the exploration, development and
utilization of the country’s mineral resources to contribute to the achievement of national economic and social
development with due regard to the social and environmental cost implications relative thereto. The law intends to
increase the productivity of the country’s mineral resources while at the same time assuring its sustainability through
judicious use and systematic rehabilitation. Henceforth, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as
the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the States mineral resources, through its Secretary, has the authority to enter into mineral agreements on behalf of
the Government upon the recommendation of the Director, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of RA 7942.
The PAB and the Mines Regional Director, with their complementary functions and through their combined efforts,
serve to accomplish the mandate of RA 3931 (National Pollu tion Control Decree of 1976) as amended by PD 984 and
EO 192 and that of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO

TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., and MCARTHUR
MINING, INC., Petitioners, vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES
M INES CORP., Respondent.
G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014
FACTS: Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the
province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of E nvironment and Natural Resources (DENR), it learned
that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
Petitioner McArthur Narra and Tesoro, filed an application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP) which was
subsequently issued. On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR three (3)
separate petitions for the denial of petitioners’ applications for MPSA.
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned and controlled by
MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable
stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the MPSA s over the areas covered by
applications since it knows that it can only participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed
Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’ capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they we re
likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
Petitioners averred that they were qualified persons under Section 3(aq) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995. They stated that their nationality as applicants is immaterial because they also applied
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for Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) denominated as AFTA- IVB-09 for McArthur, AFTA-IVB-08
for Tesoro and AFTA-IVB-07 fo r Narra, which are granted to foreign- owned corporations. Nevertheless, they claimed
that the issue on nationality should not be raised since McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are in fact Philippine Nationals
as 60% of their ca pital is owned by citizens of the Philippines.
On December 14, 2007, the POA issued a Resolution disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs. The POA
considered petitioners as foreign corporations being "effectively controlled" by MBMI, a 100% Canadian company
and declared their MPSAs null and void.
Pending the resolution of the appeal filed by petitioners with the MAB, Redmont filed a Complaint with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), seeking the revocation of the certificates for registration of petitioners on the
ground that they are foreign-owned or controlled corporations engaged in mining in violation of Philippine laws.
CA found that there was doubt as to the nationality of petitioners when it realized that petitioners had a common
major investor, MBMI, a corporation composed of 100% Canadians. Pursuant to the first sentence of paragraph 7 of
Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which implemented the
requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the exploitation of natural resources, the CA used the
"grandfather rule" to determine the nationality of petitioners.
In determining the nationality of petitioners, the CA looked into their corporate structures and their corresponding
common shareholders. Using the grandfather rule, the CA discovered that MBMI in effect owned majority of the
common stocks of the petitioners as well as at least 60% equity interest of other majority shareholders of petitioners
petitioners
through joint venture agreements. The CA found that through a "web of corporate layering, it is clear that one
common controlling investor in all mining corporations involved x x x is MBMI." Thus, it concluded that petitioners
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are also in partnership with, or privies-in-interest of, MBMI.
ISSUE:
Whether
Whether or not the Court of A ppeals’ ruling that Narra, Tesoro and McArthur are foreign corporations based on the
"Grandfather Rule" is contrary to law, particularly the express mandate of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, as
amended, and the FIA Rules.
HELD:
No. There are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and the
grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules which
implemented the requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the controlling interests in
enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino citizens, provides:
Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is o wned by Filipino
citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality (CONTROL TEST), but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding
to such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality (GRANDFATHER RULE). Thus, if 100,000
shares are registered in the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or
capital, respectively, of which belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by
Filipinos. But if less than 60%, or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or partnership,
respectively, belongs to Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as owned by Filipinos and
the other 50,000 shall be recorded as belonging to aliens.
In mining disputes, the POA has jurisdiction to pass upon the nationality of applications for MPSAs. Petitioners also
scoffed at this Court’s decision to uphold the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arb itrators (POA) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) since the POA’s determination of p etitioners’ nationalities is supposedly
beyond its limited jurisdiction. Indeed, as the POA has jurisdiction to entertain "disputes involving rights to mining
areas," it necessarily follows that the POA likewise wields the authority to pass upon the nationality issue involving
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petitioners, since the resolution of this issue is essential and indispensable in the resolution of the main issue, i.e.,
the determination of the petitioners' right to the mining areas through MPSAs.
The grandfather rule, petitioners reasoned, has no leg to stand on in the instant case since the definition of a
"Philippine National" under Sec. 3 of the FIA does not provide for it. They further claim that the grandfather rule
"has been abandoned and is no longer the applicable rule." They also opined that the last portion of Sec. 3 of the
FIA admits the application of a "corporate layering" scheme of corporations. Petitioners claim that the clear and
unambiguous wordings of the statute preclude the court from construing it and prevent the court’s use of discretion
in applying the law. They said that the plain, literal meaning of the statute meant the application of the control test
is obligatory.
SC disagreed. "Corporate layering" is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution
and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather rule has
already been abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis.
Petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or
more of their equity interests. Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering pe titioners’ corporate owners,
namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC. The "control test" is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a
corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to undertake
the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. When in the mind of the
Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity
ownership in the corporation, then it may a pply the "grandfather rule."
Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 129540, December 13, 2005
Petitioners: Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo, Pintong Bocaue Multipurpose Cooperative, Concerned
Citizens Of Rizal, Inc., Rolando E. Villacorte, Bernardo Hidalgo, Ananias Ebuenga, Vilma T. Montajes, Federico Munar,
Jr., Rolando Beas, Sr., Et Al., And Kilosbayan, Inc.
Respondents: Executive Secretary, Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources, Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Secretary of Public Works & Highways, Secretary of Budget & Management, Metro Manila Development
Authority And The Honorable Court of Appeals
DOCTRINE:
Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. The most important product of a watershed is water, which is one of
the most important human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future
generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for
review on certiorari of
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for lack of cause of
action, the petition for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus with
mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ
of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
Proclamation No. 635: Due to garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal
applications. In fact, this site, extending to more or less 18 hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February
1990 for the solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28 August 1995, for
use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. This site, extending to more or less 18 hectares, had
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already been in operation since 19 February 1990 for the solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan,
Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.
On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented
by former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a letter to President Fidel Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation
No. 635. Receiving no reply, they sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating their previous request.
On 22 JuIy 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction.
On 19 July 199 9, President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the gravity of the problems in the affected areas
and the likelihood that violence would erupt among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure
of the dumpsite on 31 December 2000. Accordingly, on20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship
Programs and Projects and the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo,
wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite until its permanent closure on 31 December
2000.
On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and Local Govemment (DILG) Secretary
Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite "in view of the emergency situation of
uncollected garbage in Metro
Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent
imminent health and sanitation epidemic."
epidemic." Claiming
the above events constituted a "clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas," the petitioners
filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on l9 January 2001.
On 24 January 2001, the Supreme Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for, "effective immediately
and until further orders." Meanwhile , on 26 January 2001, President Estrada signed Republic Act No. 9003,
otherwise known as "The Ecological Solid Waste Mana gement Act of 2000," into law.
Lower Court's Ruling: The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Executive Secretary, et al. The CA denied, for lack of
cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
ISSUES:
Whether the permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act. No. 9003 (YES)
Aa Proclamation No. 635 is constitutional (NO)
HELD:
YES. We hold that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.
The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the dumpsites permanent closure. A brief review
of the records of this case indicates two self-evident facts. First , the San Mateo site has adversely affected its
environs, and second , sources of water should always be protected. The adverse effects of the site were reported as
early as 19 June 1989, when the Investigation Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
of DENR-IV-1 stated that the sources of domestic water supply of over one thousand families would be adversely
affected by the dumping operations. The succeeding report included the observation that the use of the areas as
dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental factors of the community. Respondent LLDA
in fact informed the MMA that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location
of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its program of upgrading the water
quality of the Laguna Lake. The DENR suspended the sites ECC after investigations revealed ground slumping and
erosion had resulted from improper development of the site. Investigation Reports submitted by the Regional
Technical Director to the DENR reported respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school located
approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over
the schools playground. It further reiterated reports that the leachate treatment plant had been eroded twice
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already, contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the residents. The contaminated
water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Bosoboso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.
This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of
Appeals, we
Appeals, we had occasion to reaffirm our previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals,
Appeals, on the primordial importance of watershed areas, thus: The most important product of a watershed is
water, which is one of the most important human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause
loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is a n intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.
Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the
National Water Crisis Act to adopt urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which
adversely affects the health and wellbeing of the population, food production, and industrialization process. One of
the issues the law sought to address was the protection and conservation of watersheds. In other words, while
respondents were blandly declaring that the reason for the creation of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, i.e., i.e., to
protect Marikina River as the source of water supply of the City of Manila, no longer exists, the rest of the country
was gripped by a shortage of potable water so serious, it necessitated its own legislation. Respondents actions in the
face of such grave environmental consequences defy all lo gic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of providing
solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened the problem.
The Reorganization Act of the DENR Defines and Limits Its Powers over the Country's Nafural Resources
Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192 entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping
of the Marikina Wa tershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the DENR, an agency of
the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is
defined by
defined by the declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular
reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority. It is the height of irony that the public
respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the San Mateo site, but have deftly
ignored their corresponding responsibility
responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.
The Local Government Code Gives to Local Government Units All the Necessary Powers to Promote the General
Welfare of Their Inhabitants
NO. The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates Rep. Act No. 7160, or the Local
Government Code. Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28
August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on
10 October 1991.
Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by
government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.
When all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the protest rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province, they acted within
the scope of their powers, and were in fact fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 a llows every local
government unit to exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare, which involve, among other things, promot(ing) health and safety, enhance(ing)
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants .
In Lina , Jr. v. Pao , the Court held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government
units, should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the
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particular community implementing the project. In Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas , the Court held that there was
no statutory requirement for the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring
facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical.
Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected
local communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
sanggunian . Absent either of these
mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
Waste Disposal Is Regulated by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000
Republic Act No. 9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000), approved on 26 January 2001, was enacted
pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste
management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize
environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource
conservation and recovery. It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with
regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of solid
wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education a nd public information, and the funding of solid waste
management projects. The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework,
which should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure
within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located
within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. This writes finis to any remaining aspirations
respondents may have of reopening the San Mateo Site. Having declared Proclamation No. 635 illegal, we see no
compelling need to tackle the remaining issues raised in the petition and the parties respective memoranda.
More Detailed Timeline:

17 November 1988: respondent Secretaries of the DPWH and DENR and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which provides a mong others that the DPWH
shall commence the construction/development of said dumpsite.
8 and 10 February 1989: the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo to various concerned gov’t officers pointing out that
it had recently passed a Resolution banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its
jurisdiction, asking that their side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance all
and any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these
letters.
It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and owned by the DENR was part of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, the Memorandum states that:
3.5 Said Dumping Site is observed to be confined within the said Watershed Reservation, bearing in the
northeastern part of Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. Such illegal Dumping Site operation inside (the)
Watershed Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. . .
Recommendations:
5.1 The MMC Dumping Site Inside Marikina Watershed Reservation, particularly at Brgy. Pintong Bocaue, San
Mateo, Rizal and at Bo. Pinugay, Baras/Antipolo, Rizal which are the present garbage zones must totally be
stopped and discouraged without any political intervention and delay in order to save our healthy ecosystems
found therein, to avoid much destruction, useless efforts and lost (sic) of millions of public funds over the
land in question;
question ;
19 February 1990: the DENR Environmental Management Bureau, through Undersecretary for Environment and
Research Celso R. Roque, granted the Metro Manila Authority (MMA [formerly MMC]) an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) for the operation of a two-and-a-half-hectare garbage dumpsite.
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09 March 1990: respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), through its Acting General Manager, sent
a letter to the MMA, which provides LLDA’s objection to the dumpsite located in the watershed as it is in compatible
with their upgrading the quality of the water in the lake.
31 July 1990: less than 6 months after the issuance of the ECC, Undersecretary Roque suspended the ECC in a letter
addressed to the respondent Secretary of DPWH stating that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from
improper development of the dumpsite.
16 November 1993: DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala sent MMA Chairman Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. a letter stating that
after a series of investigations by field officials of the DENR, the agency realized that the MOA entered into on 17
November 1988 is a very costly error because the area agreed to be a garbage dumpsite is inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation. He then strongly recommended that all facilities and infrastructure in the ga rbage dumpsite
in Pintong Bocaue be dismantled, and the garbage disposal operations be transferred to another area outside the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect the health and general welfare of the residents of San Mateo in
particular and the residents of Metro Manila in general.
06 June 1995: petitioner Villacorte, Chairman of the PBMC, wrote President Ramos, through the Executive Secretary,
informing the President of the issues involved, that the dumpsite is located near three public elementary schools,
the closest of which is only fifty meters away, and that its location violates the municipal zoning ordinance of San
Mateo and, in truth, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board had denied the then MMA chairmans application
for a locational clearance on this ground.
21 August 1995: the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo issued a Resolution expressing a strong objection to the
planned expansion of the landfill operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the
draft Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6 Hectares from Marikina Watershed Reservation for the landfill site
in Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal.
Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies aforementioned, the Office
of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August
1995, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for Use as
Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority.
06 September 1995: Director Wilfrido S. Pollisco of the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau wrote the DENR
Secretary to express the bureaus stand against the dumpsite at Pintong Bocaue, and that it is our view . . . that the
mere presence of a garbage dumpsite inside a watershed reservation is definitely not compatible with the very
purpose and objectives for which the reservation was established.
24 November 1995: the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented by
former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a letter to President Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation No. 635.
Receiving no reply, they sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating their previous request.
22 July 1996: the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus
with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing on the prayer for
preliminary injunction was held on 14 August 1996.
13 June 1997: the CA denied the petition for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction for lack of cause of action.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the above decision.
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05 January 1998: while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
pointing out that the effects of the El Nio phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation.
28 January 1999: the petitioners filed a Motion for Ea rly Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of
the dumpsite by the MMDA. This resulted to MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay, agreeing to
abandon the dumpsite after 6 months or on 20 July 1999.
13 July 1999: the petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Early Resolution in anticipation of violence between
the conflicting parties as the date of the scheduled closure of the dumpsite neared.
19 July 1999: then President Joseph E. Estrada issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite on 31
December 2000.
20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA
with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, a nd the City of Antipolo, wherein the latter
agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite until its p ermanent closure on 31 December 2000.
11 January 2001: President Estrada directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the
San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical
and imminent health and sanitation epidemic.
Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected areas, the
petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001.
26 January 2001: Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,
was signed into law by President Estrada.
CHAM v PIZARRO
AC No 5499 August 16, 2005
FACTS: A disbarment case was filed by the petitioner against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for
commission of falsehood and misrepresentations in violation of a lawyer’s oath. According to the complainant,
Cañete, Alipio and now deceased Navarro offered for sale to him a parcel of land with an area of approximately
forty (40) hectares. He having expressed interest in the offer, Cañete and Navarro arranged a meeting between him
and respondent where he categorically represented to him that the property being offered for sale was alienable
and disposable. Respondent in fact presented to him 1) Real Pro perty Tax Order of Payment; 2) a Deed of Absolute
Sale purportedly executed by the alleged previous actual occupant of the property, 3) Special Power of Attorney by
his alleged co- owners authorizing him to sell the property. Respondent then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over
the property in his favor stating that the property is presently in the possession of the sellers. The sellers agree with
the buyer that they are the absolute owners of the rights over the said property; that they have the perfect right to
convey the same; that they acquired their rights over the said property by absolute deed of sale.
After payment, he subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its
front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property could not be
fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park. Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an
alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership. He thus secured a Certification from CENR stating that
the said lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park and under the Public Land Law, lands within this category are not
subject for disposition. Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification stating that those named by respondent as
prior owners of rights over the property from which respondent and his alleged co-owners acquired their alleged
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rights were not among those inventoried as occupants. Pertinent portions of the Report and Recommendation of
the The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) read:
. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of ( sic)

sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of NIPAS ACT prohibited the
illegal selling of rights or possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan Natural Park; a fact supposed to be
known by the respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and was in the practice of his profession also in said
area.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent shall be held liable
RULING: In the case at bar, complainant presented certifications from the DENR that the property is part of the public
domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 24 issued
on December 1, 1945, all properties of the public domain therein designated as part of the Bataan National Park
were withdrawn from sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private rights.On the other hand, respondent
has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights and interests over the property
which he could have conveyed to complainant. E.g., he could have presented any document issued by the
government conferring upon him and his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with
any such right or interest, but he presented none. He merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
executed by prior owners, a month shy of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as neither tax receipts nor
realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over realty unless supported by other
effective proof. Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase,
for P3,372,533.00, non-existent "irrevocable rights, interest and participation" over an inalienable property.
PICOP V. BASE METALS

G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006
FACTS:
In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines
Operating Agreement with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine
Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCI's 18 mining claims
located in Agusan del Sur. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining
Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a
Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims.
Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan
del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a MOA whereby petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw
Mining an access to its mining claims.
In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements
(MPSA for brevity). While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign
its rights and interests over 37 mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources
Corporation. The transfer included those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being
informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw
Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new
operator of its claims. On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending
MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in
support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan
Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the
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Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau(MGB), an Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application because it violated
the non-impairment clause and will be prejudicial to herein petitioner.
The Panel Arbitrator initially ruled for petitioner, but upon appeal to the Mines Adjudication Board, judgment was
in favor of respondent, CA affirmed stating that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's
peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the
Board of Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty
did not convert PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the
government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.
Issue: W/N the concession area of petitioner is closed to mining activities and that the conversion of the agreement
into MPSA will run counter to the non-impairment clause of the Constitution
Held: NO, a Timber license agreement is not a contract, but a mere privilege. We should state at this juncture that
the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end that the country's natural resources maybe
rationally explored, developed, utilized and conserved. In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance
between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor the right to enter a timber concession and cut timber
therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly compensated for any damage done to
the property as a consequence of mining operations. Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA
is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved lands for specific purposes other than mineral
reservations, such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area. Sec.15(b) of DAO96-40 provides that
government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written clearance by the government
agency having jurisdiction over such reservation. Sec.6 of RA7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved
lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. Secondly,
RA7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves. DENR Memorandum Order No.03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of
area status and clearance or consent for mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest
lands, military and other government reservations, forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed
forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among
others, are open to mining applications subject to area status and clearance. Lastly, PICOP failed to present any
evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as an initial component of
the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, Presidential proclamation or executive order as required.
Special People Foundation Inc. v. Canda

G.R. No. 160932, January 14, 2013
Facts: The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-
an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River,
and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities. The petitioner
applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586. The petitioner
appealed Canda’s findings claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from the
Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) that had recently been
issued a CNC. However, upon submission of the requirements, it resolved that the petitioner is not exempt from the
coverage of the Environmental Compliance. Subsequently, a petition for mandamus was filed but denied by the RTC
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is proper?
Held: Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner. SC dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it was legally entitled to
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demand the performance of the act by the respondents. It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the
intervention of a court of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded
by administrative processes. The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies. A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy
lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment. The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for
mandamus rendered its petition in the RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy
towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate
further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of
the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay Region”.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive
jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
“Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery pr ivileges in the municipal waters and impose rental
fees or charges therefore…”
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the
LLDA. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate
grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating
the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lak e.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures
unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared
illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be
effected.
ISSUES:
1. Which agency of the government –
government – the
the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region – should
– should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
2. Whether or not the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency.
HELD:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide
that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or
activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive
authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the la ke region.
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Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be tak en as an exception to the general
law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as
much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general la w by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of
the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively
regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of
the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers
including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority
to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA
has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion
of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its cha rter vested on it.
EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, et al, petitioners v. NATIONAL POWER

POWER CORPORATION, respondent
G.R. No. 145328 March 23, 2006
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
DOCTRINE:
Although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure
projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts
in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this
dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising
their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. In such cases, let the hammer fall and let it fall hard.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a
party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for
protection of a party’s substantive
an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided
for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of
53.4 meters to support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak
Power Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio Osmeña, Sr. Highway (South
Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmariñas Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where
petitioners’ homes are.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible adverse effects
that such a structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles and studies
linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses range from cancer
to leukemia. They aired this growing concern to the NAPOCOR, which conducted a series of meetings with them.
Negotiations between petitioners and the NAPOCOR reached an impassé, with petitioners vying for the relocation
of the transmission lines to Fort Bonifacio on one hand, and the NAPOCOR insisting on a 12-meter easement
widening, on the other. Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on
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the hazardous effects of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves and their
families, petitioners, through the instant case, sought what they had failed to achieve through amicable means with
NAPOCOR and prayed, inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort
Bonifacio.
On 13 March 2000, Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an order in Civil Case No. 00-352, which temporarily restrained
the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project. By order of
15 March 2000, the trial court extended the restraining order for 18 more days.
NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with
the Court of Appeals assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree No. 1818
(1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Or ders or P reliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving
Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the Government, "
particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction.
Presidential Decree No. 1818 provides:
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an
infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among other public utilities for
transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity
entity or government official from proceeding with or continuing the execution or implementation
of any such project, or the ope ration of such public utility or pursuing any lawful activity ne cessary for such
execution, implementation or operation.
In the interregnum, by order dated 3 April 2000, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against NAPOCOR. The trial court articulated that an injunction was necessary to stay respondent
NAPOCOR’s activation of its power lines due to the possible health risks posed to the petitioners. Asserting its
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court was of the view that Presidential Decree No. 1818 and jurisprudence
proscribing injunctions against infrastructure projects
projects do not find application in the case at bar because of the health
risks involved. The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing and installing high voltage cables
to the steel pylons erected near petitioners’ homes and from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric
current through said cables while the case is pending final adjudication, upon posting of the bond amounting
to P5,000,000.00 executed to the effect that petitioners will pay all the damages the NAPOCOR may sustain by
reason of the injunction if the C ourt should finally decide that the petitioners are not entitled thereto.
With health risks linked to exposure to electromagnetic radiation as their battle cry, petitioners, all residents of
Dasmariñas Village, are clamoring for the reversal of the decision dated 3 May 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 57849 as well as the resolution dated 27 September 2000, denying their motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision of the C ourt of Appeals reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction against respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to stay the latter from
energizing and transmitting high voltage electric current through its cables erected from Sucat, Parañaque to
Araneta Ave., Quezon City.
Petitioners clutch on their stand that Presidential Decree No. 1818 could not be construed to apply to cases of
extreme urgency as in the present case when no less than the rights of the petitioners to health and safety hangs on
the balance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin
the construction and operation of the 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree No. 1818.
HELD: Yes, the petition should be granted.
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Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against government infrastructure projects.
In Garcia v. Burgos,
Burgos , Presidential Decree No. 1818 was held t o prohibit courts from issuing an injunction against any
infrastructure project in order not to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects or frustrate the
economic development effort of the nation.
While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases involving the implementation of projects and contracts
on infrastructure, natural resource development and public utilities, this rul e, however, is not absolute a s there are
actually instances when Presidential Decree No. 1818 should not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court
declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly
outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
In the case at bar, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR
Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution (right to
health).
To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondent’s failure to conduct prior consultation with them, as the
community affected by the project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code which provides:
"no project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned are
complied with, and prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned
Sanggunian concerned is observed."
From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’ constitutionally protected right to health and
whether respondent NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with
the affected communities are veritable questions of law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO
and subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law divest the case from the protective
mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.
Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils
the health and safety of the petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of preliminary
injunction. -- Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses such as cancer and
leukemia to exposure to electromagnetic fields. The records bear out, to boot, a copy of a brochure of NAPOCOR
regarding its Quezon Power Project from which will be supplying NAPOCOR with the power which will pass through
the towers subject of the controversy. The NAPOCOR brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant
with high voltage power, Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be located within safe distances from
residences. And the Quezon Power Project mandates an easement of 20 meters to the right and 20 meters to the
left which falls short of the 12-meter easement that NAPOCOR was proposing to After all, for a writ of preliminary
injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be probably in violation of the rights of
applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which
is different from injunction as a main action where one needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and
permanent injunction.
Buendia v. City of Iligan

GR No. 132209 April 29, 2005
Per J. Chico-Nazario
Facts:
On 05 October 1992, petitioner Buendia filed with the NWRB an application for the appropriation of water from a
spring located within his property in Ditucalan, Iligan City. In the absence of protests to the applications being timely
filed, the NWRB, after evaluating petitioner's applications, issued on 25 June 1993, Water Permits.
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On 17 November 1993, almost five (5) months after petitioner's Water Permits were issued, respondent City of Iligan
filed with the NWRB an "Opposition and/or Appeal" contesting the issuance of said water permits to petitioner. The
Opposition and/or Appeal sought to serve as both a protest against petitioner's water permit applications, as well
as an appeal to the NWRB's grant of the water permits to petitioner.
On 10 March 1 994, the NWRB issued an Order dismissing respondent's Opposition

Opposition and/or Appeal. The "Opposition"
part was dismissed for being filed out of time, while the "Appeal" part was dismissed as a consequence of the denial
of the opposition to the application, i.e., in the absence of a verified protest having been seasonably filed, no water
rights controversy arose; hence, there was no decision from which respondent may appeal from.
Issue: Whether Buendia has the right to appropriate the water. (YES)
Holding:
Articles 16 and 17 of the Water Code of the Philippines provide:
Art. 16. Any person who desires to obtain a water permit shall file an application with
the Council [now Board] who shall make known said application to the public for any
protests.
In determining whether to grant or deny an application, the Council [now Board] shall
consider the following: protests filed, if any; prior permits granted; the availability of
water; the water supply needed for beneficial use; possible adverse effects; land-use
economics; and other relevant factors.
Upon approval of an application, a water permit shall be issued and recorded.
Art. 17. The right to the use of water is deemed acquired as of the date of filing of the application for a water permit
in case of approved permits, or as of the date of actual use in a case where no permit is required.
From a reading of the above provisions, it is evident that after an application to obtain a water permit has been
made known to the public, any interested party must file his protest thereto, in order that the application may be
properly evaluated. Otherwise, after the application for a water permit has been approved, the grantee of the permit
now acquires an exclusive right to use the water source, reckoned from the date of the filing of the applications.
Thus, after petitioner's right to the water permit has been properly adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly
question said grant. By virtue of respondent's failure to lodge a timely protest, petitioner has already acquired the
right to appropriate the water from the spring inside the latter's property.
In conclusion, the failure of respondent City of Iligan to timely oppose the water permit applications, and later on to
file the Petition for Certiorari within a reasonable time has the effect of r endering the grant of the water permits to
petitioner Buendia final and executory.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 125018, April 6, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner REMMAN Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) and private respondent Crispin Lat are owners of adjoining lots.
Lat’s land is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit tress, while REMMAN devotes its land to its piggery
business. REMMAN’s land is 1½ meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat. Sometime in July 1984, Lat
noticed that REMMAN’s waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating his pl antation. He made
several representations with
with REMMAN but the latter fell on deaf
deaf ears. On March 14, 1985, after almost one hectare
of Lat’s plantation was already inundated with ankle -deep water containing pig manure, as a result of which trees
growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction against REMMAN. REMMAN denied the allegations
allegations and argued that additional measures
measures such
2C AY 2016-2017
as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery
to prevent any damage toto the adjoining estates.
estates. The trial court held
held REMMAN liable for damages. In this petition,
REMMAN contends that its negligence and liability for damages were not sufficiently established. It also raises the
defense of fortuitous event (heavy rains) which caused the inundation of Lat’s plantation, and the supposed natural
easement imposed upon Lat’s property.
Issue: Whether or not REMMAN negligent and should be held liable for damages?
Held:
YES. REMMAN’s negligence was clearly established. Lat’s property was practically made a catch basin of polluted
water and other noxious substances emptying from REMMAN’s piggery which could have been prevented had it not
been for the negligence of appellant arising from its: (a) failure to monitor the increases in the level of water in the
lagoons before, during and after the heavy downpours; (b) failure to augment the existing lagoons prior to the
incident, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the flooding, the piggery had grown to a capacity of 11,000
heads, and considering that it was reasonably foreseeable that the existing waste disposal facilities were no longer
adequate to accommodate the increasing volume of waste matters; and (c) the repeated failure to comply with its
promise to private respondent. REMMAN’s assertion that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous event is not
well taken. Even if the heavy rains constituted
constituted an act of God, REMMAN was still guilty
guilty of negligence. The event was
not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor – negligence
– negligence or imprudence – had
– had
intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted
from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed
removed from
the rules applicable to acts of God. As regards the contended natural easement imposed upon Lat’s property, Article
637 provides that lower estates are imposed the obligation to receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from higher estates. However, where the waters which flow from a higher state are
those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of
the lower or servient estate to compensation.
LOVINA VS MORENO
GR No. L-17821 November 29, 1963
Doctrine: The Secretary of Public Works and Communications unrestrained final and unappealable authority upon
issues whether a stream is public and navigable, whether the dam encroaches upon such waters and as constitutive
as a public nuisance and whether the law applies to the state of facts.
FACTS:
Numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga complained that appellees blocked the “Sapang Bulati”, a navigable
river in the same municipality and asked that the obstructions be ordered removed, under the provisions of RA 2056.
After notice and hearing of the parties, Sec of Public Works and communications found the constructions to be a
public nuisance in navigable waters and ordered the land owners to remove 5 closures of Salapang Bulati.
Appelles contend that RA 2056 is unconstitutional as it invests

invests in said secretary
secretary with unrestrained final and
unappealable authority upon issues whether a stream
stream is public and navigable, whether the dam encroaches
encroaches upon
such waters and as constitutive as a public nuisance and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power to said secretary.
ISSUE:
WON there is an unlawful delegation of judicial power. NONE
SC RULING:
RA 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public
streams, constructions that no private person was anyway entitled to make because the bed if navigable streams is
public property and ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession.
2C AY 2016-2017
It is true that the exercise of the secretary’s power under the act ne cessarily involves the determination of some
questions of fact but these functions whether judicial or quasi-judicial are merely incidental to the exercise of the
power granted by law provided that the party affected is given opportunity to be heard.
The mere fact that an office is required by the law to inquire the existence of certain facts and apply the law thereto
in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statue may give to non-judicial o fficers the power to declare
the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions and similarly may grant to commissioners and other
subordinate officer power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts a s a basis for procedure in the enforcement
of particular laws.
It is noteworthy that RA 2056 authorizes removal of unauthorized dikes either as public nuisances or as prohibited
constructions on public navigable navigable streams
streams and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class. In fine, it
is held that RA 2P56 foes not constitute unlawful delegation of judicial power and such power should be respected
in the absence of legality, error of law, fraud or imposition so long as the said findings are supported with substantial
evidence submitted to him.
TANJAY WATER DISTRICT VS GABATON

GR NO. L-63742 17 April
April 1989
FACTS
Tanjay Water District filed in the RTC of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, an action for injuction with preliminary
mandatory injunction and damagers, against the Municipality of Pamplona and its officials to prevent them from
interfering in the management of the Tanjay Waterworks System. The judge of said court dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter (water) and over the parties (both being government
instrumentalities) by virtue of Art. 88 of PD 1067 and PD 242. He declared that the petitioner's recourse to the court
was premature because the controversy should have been ventilated first before the National Water Resources
Council pursuant to Arts. 88 and 89 of PD No. 1067. He further ruled that as the parties are government
instrumentalities, the dispute should be administratively settled in accordance with PD No. 242.
In the second case, Josefino Datuin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Tarlac Water District in the DOLE
which decided in its favor. However, upon respondent’s MR which was treated as an appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint for “lack of jurisdiction”, holding
that as the respondent Tarlac Water District is a corporation created by a special law (PD No. 198), its officers and
employees belong to the civil service and their separation from off ice should be governed by Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.
ISSUE
Whether or not water districts created under PD No. 198, as amended, are private corporations or government-
owned or controlled corporations
HELD
The Court ruled in the case of Hagonoy Water District vs. NLRC ,
NLRC , G.R. No. 81490, August 31, 1988, that water districts
are quasi public corporations whose employees belong to the civil service, hence, the dismissal of those employees
shall be governed by the civil service law, rules and regulations. The hiring and firing of employees of government-
owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil Service La w and Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Article XIB Section 2(l) of the 1 987 Constitution provides that "(t)he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters."
charters ." Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water
District, and respondent Tarlac Water District and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage
of the civil service law, rules and regulations.
2C AY 2016-2017
Greenpeace vs EMB DENR
CA- GR SP No. 00013 May 17, 2013
Facts:
This is a Petition for writ of continuing mandamus and writ of kalikasan with prayer for issuance of a temporary
environmental Protection order (TEPO).
In support of the petition for mandamus, petitioners averred that, pursuant to PD No. 1586, in relation to PD 1151,
the PH Environmental Impact Statement System (PEISS) was established which required the submission of an EIS
before any proposal or project by a government agency or a private entity that significantly affects the environment
may be implemented. In line with the PEISS, DENR issued DAO No. 2003 -30 which requires any project that poses a
potential environmental risk to secure from it an ECC which would certify that the proposed project would not cause
a significant negative impact on the environment, citing DAO No. 08-2002 of the DENR which presumes GMO as
harmful to and significantly affects the environment. Consequently, petitioners maintained that bt talong field trials
did not comply with the PEISS Law in that the proponents of the said field trials did not secure an ECC from the DENR
and prayed that public respondents be restrained from conducting field tests of bt talong, on various locations of
the PH on the grounds that the said field trials violate or threaten to violate the right of Filipino citizens to a balanced
and healthful ecology.
Issue: Whether or not the conduct of the bt talong filed trials has violated the constitutional right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
Held:
The CA held that the issuance of a writ of kalikasan is in order.
The writ of kalikasan is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person or entity authorized by law, people ’s
organization, non-governmental organization or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated,
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or
entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces.
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, specifically Rule 20 of this Rule, has set forth the so-called
“precautionary principle”
principle ” which states as follows:
Section 1. Applicability. -
Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the
benefit of the doubt.
Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the following
factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity
to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal
consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.
The precautionary principle especially finds relevance in the case at bench in that the present controversy deals with
the a genetically modified organism that would be introduced into our ecosystem and eventually to the Philippine
market for human consumption. In this light, the CA finds that the issuance of the writ of kalikasan is warranted
under the circumstances, bearing in mind that the fundamental law of this land, no less than the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, explicitly declares as a state policy to “protect and advance the right of the people to a balance and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhy thm and harmony of nature ”.
2C AY 2016-2017
FELICIANO vs. GISON
G.R. No. 165641 August 25, 2010
FACTS: The present petition arose from the tax case initiated by LMWD after it filed with the
the Department of Finance
Finance
(DOF) a petition requesting that certain water supply equipment and a motor vehicle, particularly a Toyota Hi-Lux
pick-up truck, be exempted from tax. These properties were given to LMWD through a grant by the Japanese
Government for the rehabilitation of its typhoon -damaged water supply system.
In an indorsement dated July 5, 1995, the DOF granted the tax exemption on the water supply equipment but
assessed the corresponding tax and duty on the Toyota Hi-Lux pick-up truck. On June 9, 2000, LMWD moved to
reconsider the disallowance of the tax exemption on the subject vehicle. The DOF, through then Undersecretary
Cornelio C. Gison, denied LMWDs r equest for reconsideration because the tax exemption privileges of government
agencies and government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) had already been withdrawn by Executive
Order No. 93. This prompted LMWD, through its General Manager Engr. Ranulfo C. Feliciano, to appeal to the CTA.
After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the CTA found LMWD to be a GOCC with an original charter.
For this reason, the CTA resolved to dismiss LMWDs appeal for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
The CTAs resolution was without prejudice to the right of LMWD to refile the case, if it so desires, in the appropriate
forum. Likewise, the CTA denied LMWDs motion to reconsider the dismissal of its appeal.
LMWD filed a petition for review with the CA raising the issues of whether the CTA decided the case in accord with
the evidence presented and the applicable law, and whether the LMWD is a GOCC with original charter. The CA
found the petition to be unmeritorious and affirmed the CTAs ruling that the LMWD is a GOCC with original charter,
and not a private corporation or entity as LMWD argued. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari filed
by LMWD with this Court.
LWMD argued that it is a private

private corporation or entity and
and not a GOCC. Feliciano argues that PD No. 198 which
created LWMD is a general law similar to the Corporation Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not LMWD is a GOCC with original charter?
RULING: The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations created
under a general law. The second refers to go vernment-owned or controlled corporations created by special
charters.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a general law applicable to
all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations created by special charters,
which historically gave certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-owned or controlled corporations through special
charters. Since private corporations cannot have special c harters, it follows that Congress can create corporations
with special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled. Obviously, LWDs [referring to
local water districts] are not private corporations because they a re not created under the Corporation Code.
LWDs are not registered with the Securities and Exchange C ommission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states
that "[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities and Exchange Commission articles of
incorporation x x x." LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or members.
There are no stockholders or members
members to elect the board directors
directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the
directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office.
2C AY 2016-2017
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
GR NO 191427 MAY 30, 2011
FACTS
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution Control Division Monitoring and
Enforcement Section, after conducting on March 14, 2000 a la boratory analysis of URC’s corn
URC’s corn oil refinery plants
wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government standards provided under Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. Hearings on petitioner’s
pollution case were thereafter commenced on March 1, 2001.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioner’s wastewater
petitioner’s wastewater failed
to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties on August 24, 2007, attaching copies of its Daily Operation
Reports and Certification to show that accrued daily penalties should only cover a period of 560 days. After
conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay for a total of 1,247 days, worth PHP 1,247,000.00. Petitioner
moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only accumulated daily penalties in the sum of Five Hundred
Sixty Thousand (P560,000) Pesos on grounds that the LLDA erred in first , adopting a straight computation of the
periods of violation based on the flawed assumption that petitioner was operating on a daily basis − without
excluding, among others, the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation work from
December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days); and second , in disregarding the Daily Operation Reports and
Certifications which petitioner submitted to attest to the actual number of its operating days, i.e., 560 day s.
ISSUE
Whether or not LLDA erred in not crediting petitioner for undertaking remedial measures to rehabilitate its
wastewater treatment facility
HELD
No, the petition must fail. Without belaboring petitioner ’s assertions, it must be underscored that the protection of
the environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent or vital than the pressing concerns of private
enterprises, big or small. Everyone must do their share to conserve the national patrimony’s meager
patrimony’s meager resources for
the benefit of not only this generation, but of those to follow. The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade
its WTF (from 2003 to 2007), a move arrived at only under threat of continuing sanctions, militates against any
genuine concern for the well-being of the country ’s waterways.
LLDA V CA
GR No. 110120 March 16, 1994
Romero, J
Facts:
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-
complaint with the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the
residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
After an onsite investigation, monitoring and test sampling conducted by the LLDA it was found out that it was
harmful and no permit was first obtained from ECC, EMB of DENR as required under PD 1586 and clearance from
LLDA as required under RA 4850 as amended by PD 813 a nd EO 927 series of 1993 for such dumping operation.
LLDA issued Cease and Desist Order to stop the dumping operation. City Government of Caloocan stops the
operation but later on resumed after the failure to settle the problem. LLDA again issued an order and issued an
Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at
2C AY 2016-2017
the Camarin area. LLDA with PNP enforced the Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage
dump trucks into Tala Estate, Camarin.
Pending resolution, City Government of Caloocan filed in RTC Caloocan City for an action for the declaration of nullity
of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of writ of inju nction. TRO was granted enjoining the LLDA
for enforcing the cease and desist order. Case was raffled to RTC Branch 126 which at that time was presided by the
RTC Branch 127 J udge, the pairing Judge recently retired.
LLDA on its part filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the
subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals
and not by the Regional Trial Court. The Motion was denied and injunction order was issued against LLDA. Thus,
LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to CA and for the meantime TRO was issued and continuing until lifted by
the court. The City Government of Caloocan filed a MR and/or to quash recall the TRO alleging that it would be
calamitous if the government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily.
After the hearing, CA promulgated the decision:

“The Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for annulment
of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ”; and
“The Laguna Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease a nd desist order
under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.”
1983.”
Hence, LLDA filed a petition for review on certiorari with pray er of TRO before the Supreme Court. The court granted
the TRO.
Issue:
Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Ruling:
YES.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its
garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850,
as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of
injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to " make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution. Section 4, par. (d) Explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
It would be a mistake to draw there from the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in
question when the power "to make,
make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly
and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. While it is a fundamental rule that
an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule
that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express
2C AY 2016-2017
powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist
order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In the case of Pollution Adjudication Board v .

v . Court of Appeals, et al .,
al ., the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease
ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly
enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 ( d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against
any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within
the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of al l projects
initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation
of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders
issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe
objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power
of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of
the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.
2C AY 2016-2017

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BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF TANON STRAIT v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES

Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations

Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is legal (NO)

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., et.al.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Cruz v. Secretary of DENR

ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Regalian Doctrine?

HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.

Magallona v. Ermita (2011)

G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008

CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.]

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has the right to such information

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may be compelled to disclose requested

Tano vs. Socrates

Petitioner’s contentions and respondent’s aversions are the following:

x x x Provided, that when the national interest so requires, the

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive

x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise

x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the

SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be

HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.

DOCTRINE/LAW APPLICABLE: Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Thomas Cheesman vs. IAC and Estelita Padilla

REPUBLIC VS. MARASIGAN

In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al .,

(TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.

Heirs of Malabanan v Republic

ISSUE: WON the petitioners can register the land

Republic v CA and Naguit

Ricardo L. Fernandez - substituted by Joselito

a) The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain;

2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:

However, said provision was amended by RA 1942, which now states:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

DENR et al VS. YAP et al

HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required .

IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION

Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying

Issue: Whether or not respondents’ cause of action is imprescriptible

Spouses Pedro and Nena Tan v. Republic

RECTO vs. REPUBLIC

The RTC granted the petition, hence, ordered

Toribio Laxamana vs. Laureana Carlos, et. al.,

GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs MARTINO TOMBIS TRINO

G.R. No. L-35778:

G.R. No. L-35779:

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Asso., vs. Victor O. Ramos

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 7942 is constitutional.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS'

The requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

On different roles and responsibilities: