Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of
Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors
were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that
afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen.
Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which
he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as
a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was
sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant
appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come
down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On
the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early
in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was
then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes
was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it
seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and
left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then
he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies
seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for
assaulting them.

Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged,
were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a
motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply
they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be
found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an
extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake
of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the
defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant
tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides
attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the
evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.

We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct
result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the
evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he
wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence
shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room
as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was
defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that
the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that
he be confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director
thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging
Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill
one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of
his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace
of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at
the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of
the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel
forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and
was at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring
the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly,
Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On
March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the
objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital
who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental
condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court
on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the
court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the
accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then
issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist
of the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report
as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the
Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case
was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating
that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended
indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be
discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case."
Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered
from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial
was had.

After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-
quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.

The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:

A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has
had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the
commission of the defense.

B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during
and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of
abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that
he was mentally deranged.

C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the
defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of
the offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.

D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting
him thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen.
Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will
kill you." Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife,
from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he
would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by
policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of
the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days
later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los
Angeles.

As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to
indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense
set up being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.

On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the
legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities
are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different
theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et
seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a
defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the
commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a
reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the
criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity
(Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative
verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity
is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence"
(10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs.
Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third
view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States,
160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413;
46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No.
15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition
that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every
essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients,
and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of
the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44
Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a
criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests
upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We
affirm and reiterate this doctrine.

In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed
the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without
indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented
sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind
that the accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a
person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition
of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required
(Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs.
Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler,
Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to
established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the
thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear
and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).

The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the
commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only
occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are
appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or
spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be
careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during
the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the
commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and
circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following considerations have weighed
heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from that
reached by the court below:.

(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it
appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26,
1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the
San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His
confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the offense
on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of
the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or
scientific foundation.

(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental
disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental
Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and
Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief
alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain
peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and,
in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected
by this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the
period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed
under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in
relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will
have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions
and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of
normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and
Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).

(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an
interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934
— the date when the crime was committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of
insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3,
defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).

(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station
on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by
detectives to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles
Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital
the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities
themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in
the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report
was made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of
psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL

January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,

Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:

(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his
bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however,
but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then
he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and
other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take
even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the
hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He
would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with
his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the
door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or
smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.

(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak,
and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is
seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would
not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with a
cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews
recited passages in the literature as for example the following.

"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"

At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.

(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious
and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.

(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented
as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.

(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he
could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example,
told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he was
benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the
hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he

could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his
 throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La
Loma Cemetery.

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his
memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in
the hospital he has no recollection at all.

(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general

information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.

( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have
been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on
January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during
his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement
in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.

2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a
form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.

(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.

Assistant Alienist

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another
assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:

I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic
Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has
decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at
large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly
serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice
with his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make
his action over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly
religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the
average conception of an earthly man.

He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that
upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and
the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that
appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had
been watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also
called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not
necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from
what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his
work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime
is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are
common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is
being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the
time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is
exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and
the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with
paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the
San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of
the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of Manila
shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information
charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of
treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the
chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.

All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation
and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was
committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior
strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)

On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the
hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the
place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga.
After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs.
Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's
office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46,
April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).

The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the
victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February,
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the
victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused
the procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it
my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he
spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of
his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to
her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6)
months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder.
Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent
medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his
monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple,
instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16,
1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was
not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid;
chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the
fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach
ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain
therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no
longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned
home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard
from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed").
She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the
barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is
the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would
not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even
in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma
Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay
official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay
official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN,
pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that
the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17,
1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo
was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that
his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able
to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali
Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs.
Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was
already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)

Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the
accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr.
Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left
side weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified
that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988;
TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).

On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime
of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:

1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;

2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act.
The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He
was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order
to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane
when he committed the crime.

It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-
appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime changed.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful
act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person
from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v.
Puno, 105 SCRA 151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity
and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion
is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible
under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion
test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would
believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he
has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency
being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)

So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or
conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by
disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such
as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.

Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in
issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the
act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:
thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine
whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)

In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused
was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and
impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The
accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.

Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and
did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote

Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals
unfortunately are not present, sir.

(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be
treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is
permanent, the manifestation of insanity is curable.

Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987,
thus:
 Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has
been mentally ill?

A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to
scan my record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7)
months before his contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987,
the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep
thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of
appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of
1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of
medical and psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However,
We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission
of the offense.

The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane,
has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of
the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the
latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly
against the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:

Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino
Dungo?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.

Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the
accused at your residence?

A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that
he wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was
requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR.
Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land
Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late
Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did
you tell him?

A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question
of me?"
 Q What was his answer?

A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to
make a request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his
name.

Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the
accused?

A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the
transfer of the landholding in the name of my father and my name."

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person
who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from
impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts.
This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid
intervals.

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:

Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when
asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in
Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not
appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to
another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?

A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

A Yes, sir.

COURT

Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?

A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory

examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for
example praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to
consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the
accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can
reason out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or
unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we
deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the
members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for example he
shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was aware of what he
did, he knows the criminal case.
 COURT

Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim
in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware
when he did the act?

A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2,
1983; emphasis supplied)

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of
the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of
what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act
charged. As stated by the trial court:

The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane.
The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an
envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused
consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the
killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of
the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in
Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the
Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in
stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)

There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
(People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth
or not.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused.1âwphi1 However, in
the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The
burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:

In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S.
v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and
that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil.
288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an
accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of
overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.

Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea
of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby

AFFIRMED without costs. SO ORDERED.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the
costs.

The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:

The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya
who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the
accused, Ines Rafanan alias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.

The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at
Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two
children.

On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of
the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6)
meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the
evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as
the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store
and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like,"
and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet
including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her with
said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her
pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant and
succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the
sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her
mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
 Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the
house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that
evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in
the house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.

Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what
happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued
among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother
confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant could not
answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the
complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what
happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to
the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San
Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant.
He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused.
The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the
accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted,
convicted the appellant.

The instant appeal is anchored on the following:

Assignment of Errors

1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the complainant and her mother.

2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C".

3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition of the accused-appellant at the
time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.

4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from insanity. 2

Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant
that the testimony of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on
cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that she left the house of
appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March
1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to
minor and inconsequential details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair
the credibility of the complainant.3

The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in this respect is clear and convincing:

Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store after you
helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?

A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.

Q And what did you say?

A "I do not like," I said.

Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?

A I struggled and cried.

Q What did the accused do after that?

A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do. He was able to do what he wanted
to do.

Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?

A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now,
will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse
you?

A He had sexual intercourse with me.

Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?

A I was wearing pants, sir.

Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?

A Yes, sir, I have a panty.

Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your pants and your panty?

A He removed them, sir.

Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?

A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he succeeded.

Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?

A He went on top of me, sir.

Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?

A He was wearing pants.

Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still wearing his pants?

A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.

Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?

A I saw his penis.

Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw, he went on top of you. When he
was already on top of you what did you do, if any?

A I struggled.

Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when he was on top of you?

A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?

Fiscal Guillermo:

Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a leading question which is a follow-up
question?

Witness:

A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.

 Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?

A I felt something that came out from his inside.

Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?

A Around five minutes maybe, sir.

Q After that what happened then?

A He removed it.

Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?

A No more, sir, he sat down.

Q What, if any, did he tell you?

A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my

mother and to anybody in their house.

Q What else did he tell you?

A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.

Q After that where did you go?

A I went home already, sir. 4

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent
intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital
in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December
1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.

During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio
N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.

In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental condition were set forth:

On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever questioned but refused to answer.

On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window,
or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even
 when persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor, seemingly in
deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange
voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.

The report then concluded:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder
called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling
inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual
aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment. 5

The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental condition:

At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He
is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of being irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim
he does not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having
committed any wrong act

and the following conclusions:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane,
manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness
of his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.

He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6

In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and
"adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant
had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During
this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept
well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language
he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to
stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7

In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said
to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a
mental condition to stand court trial." 8

Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his
admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9
The
defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified
that she had examined and treated the appellant.

Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —

The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People
vs. Formigones10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting
extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a complete
absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916;
96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that
the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties
does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86
Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with]
imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that
a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2)
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the
will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating
to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court
has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the
will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be
expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is presented as
desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the
accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at
most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal
Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis
an usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. 13
A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the
symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner:

Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a

disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also
stressed the dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and
consequent autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and
initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A's:
association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.

xxx xxx xxx

Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he

considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a
diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken
aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations,
the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to
others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or influenced from
the outside.

Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of
second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank
symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders
of affect, and emotional blunting.

Perceptual Disorders

Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .

Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli

are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the
hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient,
discussing him in the third person. Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on
what he is doing and what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very
disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own
thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by
hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.

Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic

patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses
experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but
 schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the night,
sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in three
dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory
modalities.

xxx xxx xxx

Cognitive Disorders

Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning,
and that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They
are among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.

Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type
of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that
exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs
in most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily
experience. The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with the scientific
times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over
his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14

In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15

it has mostly been rejected by the Court.
In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the
mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or
the consciousness of his acts.

The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:

(Fiscal Guillermo:)

Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor
that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with
the incident in this case?

A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.

Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the
time of the commission of the alleged rape?

A Yes, he was conscious.

Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?

A Yes.

Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?

A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will
place his penis?

A Yeah.

Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?

A Yes.

Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which
you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is
committed?

A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act
is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and
a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness
within the standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he
could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the
bound of insanity or psychosis.

Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here
is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?

A Yes, they are also capable.

Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?

A Yes.

Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all
the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?

A Yes, it could be done.

Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?

A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but
yet there is no inhibition on the individual.

Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to
commit is wrong?

A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition.
The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is
[not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current
state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death
should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral
quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia
sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony,
by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be
shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17
Here,
appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of
the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and
Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical
period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately before
the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral
patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually
observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the
defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.

Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting
because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be
considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an
illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of
the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating
circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63
of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty
(reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral
damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 136845 October 8, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias "IMONG," appellant.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias Imong was found guilty of parricide with the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty and sentenced to death. He was ordered to indemnify the heirs of his wife,
Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages and to pay
the costs of suit. His conviction is the subject of this automatic review.1

The records show that on 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon appellant and his wife
Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an animated conversation. Living with them in the same
house in Barangay Bulbulala, La Paz, Abra, was appellant’s father Agustin Florendo. After Erlinda
was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any provocation
hacked Erlinda with a bolo in the head and other parts of her body. The victim could only exclaim,
"Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill me)!"2

Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident. Instead of stopping appellant, Agustin
left the house for fear that his son would also attack him. Agustin sought help from his immediate
neighbor, Ernesto Anical, and told him, "Kasano Erning, patayen yen met ni Imong ni baketnan (How
is this Erning, Imong is killing his wife)!"3Ernesto too became frightened and did not go out of his
house; instead, he told Agustin to go to the barangay captain for assistance.

Agustin went to the house of Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya to report the incident but the latter
was not there. Thus, the wife of the barangay captain, upon being apprised of what happened,
hurriedly went out to look for any available barangay tanod for assistance and was able to contact
Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora. Agustin, on the other hand, restrained by fear and shock, stayed at
the barangay captain’s house and when he finally returned at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon
Erlinda was already dead.

In the meantime, appellant ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife. When
Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora arrived at the house of the barangay captain, he found appellant there
holding a bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. Felipe advised appellant to yield his
bolo but the latter did not respond. This prompted Felipe to grab his hand and take away his bolo.
When Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya arrived, he asked appellant why his hand and feet were
covered with blood but the latter did not answer. Appellant was later taken to the La Paz District
Hospital for treatment of his wound and the police authorities of La Paz thereafter took him into
custody pending investigation of the incident.

Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso, Municipal Health Officer of La Paz, autopsied the cadaver of the victim and
found that she sustained sixteen (16) wounds on various parts of her body, four (4) of which were
considered fatal and resulted in her instantaneous death due to hypovalemic shock caused by
massive hemorrhage.4 1a\^/phi1.net

On 2 September 1996 appellant was committed at the Abra Provincial Jail. During his confinement,
he was observed to be having difficulty in sleeping. He could not eat during meal times. Most of the
time he would stand in his cell without talking to anyone. Thus on 9 September 1996 he was treated
as an outpatient at the Abra Provincial Hospital (APH). The Provincial Warden then requested a
psychiatric examination of appellant to determine whether he was fit to be arraigned.5

On 17 October 1996 appellant was supposed to be arraigned but he appeared without counsel and
remained unresponsive to the questions propounded to him. On the same date, the trial court
referred appellant to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) for psychiatric
evaluation since there was no psychiatrist at the APH. On 20 November 1996 he went to the
BGHMC for consultation and was admitted and managed as a case of schizophrenic psychosis,
paranoid type (schizophreniform disorder).6 He was detained at the hospital and given medication for
his illness. On 7 June 1997, after confinement for six (6) months and eighteen (18) days, he was
discharged and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was found fit to face the charges against
him.7 When finally arraigned on 12 August 1997 appellant pleaded not guilty.

At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to
claim exemption from criminal liability. At the initial hearing, the prosecution presented Agustin
Florendo, Godofredo Apuya, Ernesto Anical, Felipe Adora and Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso as
witnesses.

Agustin Florendo attested that his son was not in his proper senses on the day of the incident and
repeated on cross-examination that appellant was crazy and had been behaving strangely for one
(1) year before the incident.8

Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya, on the other hand, stated that he already knew that appellant
was mentally ill because in two (2) instances, three. (3) months prior to the incident, he saw him
singing, dancing and clapping his hands in their yard.9 Witness Ernesto Anical stated further that on
the day of the incident appellant was not in his right senses as he saw him sharpening his bolo with
his eyes red and looking very sharp. Yet, he likewise testified that appellant would join the people in
their barangay in their drinking sprees and when already drunk he would beat his wife.10

Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora also testified that appellant had been behaving oddly and was
somewhat crazy as he saw him ten (10) days before the incident singing and talking to
himself.11 Both Godofredo Apuya and Felipe Adora stated that appellant suspected that his wife was
having an affair with Godofredo for he once went to the house of Godofredo looking for her. But
before the trial could prosper, the presiding judge received a letter from the provincial warden asking
for the recommitment of appellant to the BGHMC because of his unstable mental condition. On 8
June 1998 the trial court directed the examination and treatment of appellant but not his admission in
the hospital. Nonetheless, appellant was readmitted at the BGHMC on 11 June 1998 and discharged
on 7 August 1998.

On 10 August 1998, upon the assurance of Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy that appellant was fit to stand trial,
appellant was called to testify. He stated that he did not remember anything that happened on 28
August 1996 but recalled seeing his children days before the incident; that he was brought to the
provincial jail by the police authorities; that he thumbmarked a form given him in jail; that he came to
know about the death of his wife only when his father told him about it while he was in jail; and, that
he did not know Barangay Captain Apuya when asked about his alleged affair with his wife.12

In the assailed Decision dated 19 August 1998 the trial court held that the crime committed was
parricide. While no marriage certificate was presented to prove the relationship between appellant
and the victim, such fact was evident from the testimonies of the witnesses and appellant himself
who averred that the victim was his legitimate wife; that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was
present because the victim suffered sixteen (16) wounds; that while it was true that there was
evidence that appellant was observed to be doing things out of the ordinary, like singing in English,
dancing, laughing or talking alone, there was also evidence that he was socializing freely with the
other young men in the barangay; that all these were indicative only of mental abnormality that did
not excuse him from imputability for the offense; that no expert witness was presented to testify on
the insanity of appellant; and, the motive of appellant in killing his wife was jealousy.

Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of
insanity; for appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime, and for upholding the legitimacy of his common-law relationship with the victim in order to
bring the killing within the ambit of Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code.

The Court rejects the plea of insanity.1a\^/phi1.net Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised
Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e.,
appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence
of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests
upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and
convincing evidence.13

The alleged insanity of Florendo was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. He was not
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally hacked his wife.
The following circumstances14clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence
on his part when he committed the felony: (a) He was apparently well until about three (3) to four (4)
months prior to his admission in the hospital when he was noted to have blank stares, claiming that
he was in deep thought because he suspected his wife of having an extramarital affair, and at times
would confront his wife about the matter but the latter would deny it; (b) That he became irritable at
home and was easily angered by his children’s slightest mistakes; (c) That due to his jealousy he
claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with his bolo in order to confront her but hacked her
instead many times to death; (d) He denied having hallucinations at that time or being possessed by
an evil spirit; (e) Immediately after the incident he went to the barangay captain, never thought of
running away, and apparently felt guilty about what happened; (f) In jail, he said he started having
auditory hallucinations where he would hear voices commanding him to do something but refused to
elaborate on this; and, (g) He claimed that he frequently thought of his three (3) children whom he
missed so much. These were hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind.

A perusal of appellant’s testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions, bearing and
temperament. Except for his testimony in open court that he had no recollection of what happened
on 28 August 1996, he attested that he saw his children a few days before the incident; that he was
brought to the provincial jail by the police authorities; and, that he thumbmarked a form given him in
jail. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, he must have
been in full control of his mental faculties. His recall of the events that transpired before, during and
after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an
aberrant mind. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his act.

The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the
usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the
insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately
acquainted with appellant, or who has rational basis to conclude that appellant was insane based on
the witness’ own perception of appellant, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.15

The first four (4) witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that appellant was crazy and had
lost his mind as they noticed him to be behaving oddly, i.e., singing, dancing and talking to himself.
The prosecution witnesses may have testified that appellant appeared to them to be insane prior to,
during and subsequent to the commission of the crime, but there is a vast difference between an
insane person and one who has worked himself into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use
reason or good judgment in his action. The fact that a person behaves crazily is not conclusive that
he is insane. The prevalent meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." The popular conception of the
word "crazy" is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man
may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally
so.16

The evidence adduced consisting of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant was
insane immediately before or on the day the crime was committed consisted merely of assumptions,
and is too speculative, presumptive and conjectural to be convincing. Their observation that
appellant manifested unusual behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity because
not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity hence exempting.

In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the BGHMC a few months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe
schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by a person’s inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality, and is often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior
apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated
emotionality. During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind
barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem
preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "far away."17

Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.18 The medical findings of the
BGHMC, which diagnosed appellant’s mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type,
refer to appellant’s treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was
completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his
wife. It is inconclusive as to whether he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very
moment of the killing.

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of 15 August 2000, an evaluation of the psychological and
psychiatric condition of appellant was conducted by the Supreme Court Clinic Services at the
National Penitentiary on 22 August 2000. The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report disclosed that
appellant was suffering from psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia, paranoid
type. It divulged further that "prior to the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms, appellant
manifested unusual behavior prior to the commission of the crime of parricide described as
fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness and jealousy or preoccupation with the fidelity of his wife. In
retrospect, this group of symptoms could have possibly been the prodromal phase heralding the
onset of the psychotic illness."19 The report revealed that symptoms of appellant’s mental illness
were conceivably manifested prior to the date of the crime and that substantial evidence was lacking
to conclude that his abnormal behavior was due to the use of drugs or any prohibited substance.20

As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages of a
disease prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had
some form of mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms of schizophrenia, it did not totally
deprive him of intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise
sound judgment and satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed
infidelity of his wife, sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly
crime. While appellant on many occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would
indicate that he was not of sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal
mental state and not necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere
abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.21 The odd or bizarre behavior of
appellant prior to the commission of the crime as described by the prosecution witnesses, if anything
else, did not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. If the defense of insanity
is sustained, the floodgates to abuse will be opened by the cunning and ingenious public. Testimony
that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime does
not prove insanity. The grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care
and circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape
punishment through a general plea of insanity.1awphi1.nét

We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing simply because
according to the autopsy report the victim’s body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all, four (4) of which
were severe, deep and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for determining cruelty; it is
whether appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim’s suffering. Thus, there must be
proof that the victim was made to agonize before appellant rendered the blow which snuffed out her
life.22 Although Erlinda received sixteen (16) wounds in all there is no showing that appellant
deliberately and inhumanly increased her suffering. At any rate, even if cruelty is proved, it cannot be
appreciated against appellant to raise the penalty to death as this was not alleged in the Information.
Under Sec. 9, Rule 110, of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1
December 2000, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information or complaint,
otherwise, they cannot be properly appreciated. Being favorable to appellant, this procedural rule
must be given retroactive application.

As to the marriage of the victim and appellant, the trial court properly upheld its legitimacy. In
parricide, the best proof of relationship between appellant and the deceased is the marriage
certificate, and in the absence thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered. The
testimony of appellant that he was married to the deceased is an admission against his penal
interest. It is a confirmation of the sem per praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that "a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage."23 Even if the marriage certificate was not presented, that the victim was the legitimate wife
of appellant is evident from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In open court, appellant
himself volunteered the information in his offer of evidence through counsel and on direct
examination that the victim was his legitimate wife.

Appellant was properly convicted of the crime of parricide.24 Parricide not being a capital crime per
se, as it is not punishable by the mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death which are two (2) indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater
penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance appreciated for appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed.25 Nonetheless, clinical findings at the time of evaluation of the psychological
and psychiatric condition of appellant show that despite maintenance of anti-psychotic medication he
remains to be symptomatic. It is imperative that there should be continuous maintenance of his anti-
psychotic medications and regular psychiatric follow-up to achieve and sustain remission of
psychotic symptoms.

As the trial court failed to award indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim, the amount of
P50,000.00 should be adjudged as civil indemnity ex delicto, which award is mandatory and requires
no proof other than the victim’s death.26
WHEREFORE, the conviction of accused-appellant GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG of
parricide under Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5, of RA 7659, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead
of death. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of his wife, the deceased Erlinda Ragudo Florendo,
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.

G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case for
parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any
aggravating circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.

The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños2 y Domingo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and
sentencing him to death. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; and P22,800.00 s actual
damages."3

In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and the
fetus inside her. It reads thus:

"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Melecio Robinos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who
was, then six (6) months pregnant causing the instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos,
and the fetus inside her womb."5

When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,6 pleaded not
guilty.7 After due trial, the RTC convicted him.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution's version of how appellant
assaulted his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:

"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo
Robiños was in his parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo
was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza
Robiños, who were at the sala, quarrelling.
"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just
leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw
appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from
where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant's attack on
his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's house where
he reported the incident.1âwphi1.nêt

"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of
the victim Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay
San Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his
mother's house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24,
1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However
while Benjamin was at his mother's house, he received the more distressing news that his
own sister Lorenza had been killed by appellant.

"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he
was afraid of what appellant might do. From his mother's house, which was about 150
meters away from his sister's home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's good
you would see how your sister died.'

"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police
station at Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the
other members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay
San Isidro. The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and
barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from the
house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come out of the house. When
appellant failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the
bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal of the wall
exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.

"6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and
holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He
was uttering the words, 'I will kill myself, I will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was lying on her back
and facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.

"7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant
away from Lorenza's body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin.
Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the
help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However,
before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant
admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed
his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

"8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale
and not breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenza's
body for autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However,
he had to be taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.

"9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling,
Tarlac, prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
 'The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab
wounds on the different parts of her body.

'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came
home and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double
knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows.

'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.

'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches
long including handle.'

"10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who
conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robiños' body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as
evidence."8

Version of the Defense

Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but
seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:

"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented

the testimonies of the following:

"FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents had
occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person
went [sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his
father told the same thing to his mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and
exchanged heated words.

"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know
Melecio Robiños only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused
isolated himself, 'laging nakatingin sa malayo', rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured
alone.

"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he
and the accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in the morning up to
5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond
in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were required to
fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.

"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified
that as the accused's inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused
sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion,
laughing and sometimes crying.

"MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in
their house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know
that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not
remember when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe
that he killed his wife."9
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this Court
for review.10

The Issues

Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:

"I

The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering
from psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.

"II

The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity."11

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Main Issue

Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance

At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the allegation
that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and
the commission of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Appellant, however,
interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability.

Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who
relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the
very moment when the crime was committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity
be considered.14

The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
every person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane
when the crime was committed.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no
substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.

As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation
preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at
all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a
deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by
their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo's testimony in part as follows:

"Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if they talked
to one and the other?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: Did you hear what they talked about?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you hear?

A: 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?', Sir.

COURT:

In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.

ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your father do?

A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir."17

Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging
to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:

"ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already there in
the house of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead?

A: No, Sir.
 ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q: Why?

A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.

COURT:

Q: Why do you know that he was amok?

A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.

Q: How?

A: It's good you would see how your sister died, Sir."18

Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife
may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who
had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately
thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done.
Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when the latter
confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even showed to them the knife used to stab
the victim. Valdez's testimony proceeded as follows:

"Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robiños?

A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited for the
police officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going
around the house and when we saw blood, some of our companions removed the walling of
the house and at that time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robiños lying down as if at that
moment, the wife of Melecio Robiños was already dead, Sir.

Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?

A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?

A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he
killed his wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.

Q: What is that weapon?

A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.

COURT:

What is that, knife?

 A: It's a double bladed knife, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

He admitted to you that he killed his wife?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or
what?

A: What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket ko' meaning 'I killed my wife,' Sir."19

Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity
of his act.

Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of
insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the
commission of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robiños,20 all the other
defense witnesses testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been
detained in prison.

To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused
must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally
responsible.21 Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the
precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v.
Villa,22 this Court incisively ratiocinated on the matter as follows:

"It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center.
But, in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending
trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by
his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak future
for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental
equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-
appellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing
the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or
during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this
Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental condition of the person alleged to be
insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the exempting circumstance
of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x x."23 (Italics supplied)

Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If
the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.24

The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination of
the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind at the
time of the killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six
months after the commission of the crime.25 Moreover, she was not able to make a background
study on the history of his mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain
social worker to gather data on the matter.26

Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering from
psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion
was not definite and was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court, her
declarations were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity.
According to the RTC:

"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio
Robiños was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from
insanity and it is possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before
examination; and in her opinion accused was suffering from delusion and hallucination. And
her opinion that at the time accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is
merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx Aside from being her opinion, she conducted the mental,
physical and neurological examinations on the accused seven (7) months after the
commission of the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given accused an opportunity
to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to observed (sic)
and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused immediately before, during and immediately
after the commission of the offense. Her finding is conjectural, inconclusive. She did not
conduct background examination of the mental condition of the accused before the incident
by interviewing persons who had the opportunity to associate with him."29

Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely
deprived of reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not
indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his
wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear
and convincing proof is required to establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the defense failed to meet
the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity.1âwphi1.nêt

Second Issue:

Proper Penalty

Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the
death penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the
absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty was not
only baseless, but contrary to the rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Revised
Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor General concedes this error in the imposition of the
death penalty.32

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in
accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "When a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, x x x."

The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is
mandated to impose one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two
indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of
which is quoted as follows:

"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxx xxx xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied)

Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable
penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.35

Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable with
death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible
penalties, the application of either one of which depends on the presence or the absence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.36

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal
Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which
were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.

ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 175880 July 6, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 153217]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RICARDO COMANDA y CAMOTE, Appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Appellant Ricardo Comanda assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 12 October 2006,
affirming in toto the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 17,3 Davao City, dated 20
December 2001, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On 12 January 1998, appellant was charged with rape in an Information4 filed by Prosecutor Rico T.
Garcia, the text of which reads:

Criminal Case No. 40, 254-98

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of RAPE, under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree5 (sic) No. 7659, upon the instance of
BBB6 – mother of the complainant, whose affidavit is hereto attached and form part of this
Information, committed as follows:

That on or about January 11, 1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) the complainant –
AAA,7 nine (9) years old, against her will.

Contrary to law.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Before trial could proceed however, the RTC issued
an Order8 on 30 July 1998, granting appellant’s request that he undergo psychiatric examination to
determine his mental condition to withstand trial.

On 28 June 1999, Dr. Rowena Lacida, a medical officer at the Davao Medical Center, testified to
confirm her report that based on her psychiatric evaluation of appellant and the psychological test
conducted by psychologist Evangeline Castro, appellant was psychotic and was suffering from
mental disorder. Thus, she concluded that he could not understand the accusation of a serious
offense against him.9 Further proceedings were therefore held in abeyance by the RTC in an
order10 dated 22 July 1999, until such time that appellant’s mental condition made him fit to stand
trial. In the meantime, appellant was ordered to submit himself for further treatment.

Thereafter, the continuing examination of appellant was referred to Dr. Rosemina Laud-Quirapas,
likewise a medical officer at the Davao Medical Center.11 On 12 March 2001, she submitted her
mental status report finding appellant competent to stand trial. On 13 March 2001, she affirmed, in
open court, her conclusion that appellant’s mental status examination and neurological test results
show that he is already fit to stand trial.12
Hence, trial on the merits ensued. The evidence for the prosecution establishes the following facts:

While the Talandang Elementary School in Talandang, Davao City, where AAA was a Grade IV
student, was in the midst of its "Bayanihan" project, at around 1 p.m. of 11 January 1998, AAA went
with her father to the school where he was to do some carpentry work for the project. Appellant,
AAA’s paternal granduncle whom she called Uncle Dodo, likewise went with them. At some point,
AAA was instructed by her teacher to request appellant to fetch another uncle of hers to help with
the project. AAA relayed the request to appellant, who readily agreed. He brought her along.
Appellant took a shortcut to their supposed destination, justifying the move to AAA with the ruse that
her uncle, who lived with AAA’s grandmother, was on the hill fetching his carabao. On their way,
appellant suddenly laid down on a grassy area, unzipped his pants, lowered AAA’s underwear and
told her not to make any noise or to tell anybody. He forced AAA to lie on top of him, kissed her lips
and embraced her tightly, unzipping the back of her dress in the process. AAA then felt appellant’s
penis penetrate her vagina.13

After about thirty (30) minutes, AAA heard her mother, BBB, shouting. AAA grabbed her underwear,
hurriedly put it on and ran to her mother, crying. In her mother’s embrace, AAA fell unconscious. She
was brought to the house of her aunt, accompanied by her mother, grandmother, aunt and appellant.
When they arrived thereat and upon regaining her senses, AAA told them that her Uncle Dodo was
"yawa" and "bastos" (devil and uncouth).14 She was later taken to the hospital for examination. The
following day, accompanied by her parents, AAA went to the Mintal Police Station to report the
incident.15

In her testimony, BBB presented AAA’s birth certificate to establish that the latter was born on 22
April 1988 and was therefore only nine (9) years old at the time of the rape. She testified that on 11
January 1998, at around one o’clock in the afternoon, her husband, AAA and appellant went to
Talandang Elementary School to help in the "Bayanihan" project. Her husband thrice returned to
their house to get slabs of lumber for use in the school. When asked about AAA’s whereabouts, he
said that the latter went with appellant to her (BBB) mother-in-law’s house.

Worried, BBB immediately proceeded to the said house but failed to find AAA and appellant thereat.
She continued to search for them, all the while shouting and calling their names. Suddenly, AAA
appeared from behind a thick shrub, running towards her and crying. Her dress was unzipped at the
back and her underwear lowered. AAA collapsed as she embraced BBB. Appellant soon after
approached them from behind while buttoning his shirt. When asked what he did to AAA, appellant
answered that she fell from the hill.

According to BBB, when the victim’s shock receded, she heard her shout at appellant, uttering "yawa
ka," "bastos ka," "isumbong tika ni papa" (you’re a devil, uncouth, I will tell my father).16 BBB took
her daughter home and the latter complained of difficulty in urinating. AAA then told her that
appellant made her lie on top him and inserted his penis inside her vagina. BBB immediately brought
AAA to the hospital. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Mintal Police Station.17

BBB claims that following appellant’s arrest, the latter repeatedly asked for forgiveness and, after the
case was already filed, even wrote them a letter begging for forgiveness.18

Prosecution witness SPO1 Kervin Magno, a police officer of Mintal police precinct, Tugbok, Davao
City, identified appellant in open court, as well as the police blotter of AAA’s complaint dated 11
January 1998.19 The prosecution was unable to locate and present Dr. Daruesa, the physician who
personally conducted the physical examination of the victim. Nonetheless, it submitted the doctor’s
examination report of AAA.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. In his testimony, appellant asserted that he
could not remember having been with the victim on 11 January 1998 or any incident proximate to the
date of his arrest.20However, appellant admitted that AAA was known to him since her birth and that
she was a sickly child who suffered from periodic convulsions.21

The trial court found appellant guilty of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the victim for damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages.22

Conformably with this Court’s decision in People v. Mateo,23 appellant’s appeal by way of automatic
review was transferred to the Court of Appeals. Finding no sufficient basis to disturb the finding and
conclusions of the trial court, the appellate court, on 12 October 2006, rendered its decision affirming
in toto appellant’s conviction.24

Now, the case is with the Court again.

In his brief,25 appellant makes a lone assignment of error, maintaining that the court a quo gravely
erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

According to appellant, AAA simply stated that she lay on top of him while he was embracing her
and trying to insert his penis into her vagina, without any showing from her narration that her legs
were

ever spread apart. Thus, he concludes that it is inconceivable that he successfully inserted his penis
into her vagina in such a position.26 Moreover, appellant avers that AAA’s assertion that his penis
penetrated her vagina for thirty (30) minutes is preposterous. If this were true, he argues, then AAA
should have bled profusely considering that this was presumably her first sexual experience.27 Thus,
the defense maintains that assuming appellant was the one who molested AAA, he should only be
convicted for acts of lasciviousness.28

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Preliminarily, we note that the Information makes an erroneous designation of the statute violated
and appears to have been drafted with the old rape law in mind even though Republic Act No. 8353
was then already in effect.29Nonetheless, the oversight has no detrimental effect on the sufficiency of
the Information. There is no significant difference in the treatment of statutory rape of females under
the old and new rape laws.30 The allegations of force and intimidation in the Information are mere
superfluities, since they are not constitutive of or elemental to statutory rape. The real nature of the
criminal charge cannot be determined from the caption or preamble of the Information or from the
mere reference to a particular provision of law alleged to have been violated because they are
conclusions of law. On the contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.31 Thus, an incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake.32

On the matter of the prosecution proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt, we find it pertinent to
reiterate the settled rule that the determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests
primarily with the trial court,33 because it has the unique position of observing the witness’
deportment on the stand while testifying. Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the
assessments and conclusions of the trial court, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
former’s findings.34
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused, more often than not, depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is
generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself.35 Her testimony is most vital
and must be received with the utmost caution.36 However, when a rape victim’s testimony is
straightforward, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, then it deserves full faith and
credit and cannot be discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a
conviction.37

In scrutinizing such credibility, jurisprudence has established the following doctrinal guidelines: (1)
the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
could affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality as it had the opportunity to examine their
demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testified in a clear,
positive and convincing manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness.38

Applying the principles to the instant case, we find AAA’s narration of her harrowing experience
trustworthy and convincing:

xxxx

Atty. Olaguer:

Q Where were you on January 11, 1998?

A I was in school.

Q Where? What school?

A At Talandang Elementary School.

Q Who were you with in school at that time?

A I was with my father.

Q Did you not have any classes at that time?

A None.

Q Why were you in school together with your father?

A I went with him.

Q Were there any other persons in your school at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did you arrived (sic) in school at that time?

A 1:00 p.m.

Q What were you and your father doing in school together with the other people in school?

A They were doing carpentry job.

Q Why were they doing carpentry job?

A It was a school project.

Q What happened when you were there?

A I was send (sic) for an errand by my teacher.

Q Who was your teacher?

A Mrs. Ferolino.

Q Where did she send you?

A To a store.

Q Did you go to the store?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who was your companion?

A I was alone.

Q After that, you went back to the school?

A Yes, sir.

Q After that, what happened next?

A Mrs. Ferolino asked me to tell my uncle Dodo to tell my uncle Nilo to join in the bayanihan.

Q Who were the other persons present when your teacher tell (sic) you to call your uncle Dodo?

A There were.

Q Who is that uncle Dodo you are referring to?

A He is my uncle.

Q Is he present right now, in court?

A Yes, sir.
Q If he is present in court right now, can you please point him out?

A (witness pointing to a person in the courtroom, wearing white t-shirt, who identified himself as
Ricardo Comanda, the accused).

Q Why do you call him uncle Dodo? How were (sic) you related to him, if you know?

A He is the uncle of my father.

Q Do you know, why he became the uncle of your father?

A Because he is the cousin of my grandmother.

Q Are you referring to the grandmother of your paternal side or maternal side?

A Paternal side.

Q Do you know the degree of relationship when you say that he is the cousin of the mother of your
father? Are they first or second cousin (sic), if you know?

A I do not know.

Q You said that your teacher asked you to call your uncle Dodo to go to your uncle Nilo, to join the
bayanihan. Who is uncle Nilo?

A The brother of my father.

Q Where was he at that time if you know?

A Yes, at his residence.

Q You said that your uncle Nilo was at his residence. Do you know if (sic) how far was (sic) the
house of your uncle Nilo from your school?

A Yes, sir.

Q How far was it?

A I know it is far.

Q When your teacher tell (sic) you to call your uncle Dodo to fetch your uncle Nilo, were there other
persons around?

A None.

Q So, it was only you and the teacher, am I correct?

A Yes, sir.
Q After she told you to tell your uncle Dodo, you immediately told your uncle Dodo on (sic) what your
teacher told you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where was he at that time?

A He was in school also.

Q Doing the same job, helping the bayanihan?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you tell your uncle Dodo when you saw him?

A I told him that my teacher, Mrs. Ferolino, is asking him to fetch uncle Nilo, for him to help in the
bayanihan.

Q What did your uncle Dodo answered (sic)?

A He acceeded (sic).

Q Did you go with him when he fetch (sic) your uncle Nilo?

A He made me went (sic) with him. He brought me along with him.

Q Were there any other persons around, when he told you that he is going to bring you to the house
of your uncle Nilo?

A None.

Q Where was your father at that time, if you know?

A They were working on the school project.

Q When he said that he is going to bring you with him, did you in fact go with him to the house of
your uncle Nilo?

A Yes, sir.

Q And would you please tell us, if there are houses along the way from your school to the house of
your uncle Nilo?

A None, because the road he took, was on the short cut (sic).

Q Were you able to reach the house of your uncle Nilo?

A No.

Q What happened while you were on the way, to the house of your uncle Nilo?
A He used the short cut (sic) road.

Q What else transpired?

A He told me that my uncle Nilo was on the hilly portion of the place, fetching the carabao.

Q Did you believed (sic) him?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened after that?

A He lie (sic) down on the grassy portion.

Q Who lie (sic) down?

A Uncle Dodo.

Q Did you not asked (sic) him, why he lie (sic) down on the ground?

A No.

Q What happened after that?

A He unzipped his pants.

Q What happened after that? After unzipping his pants?

A He lowered my underwear.

Q What did you do when he lowered your underwear?

A I was shocked because he told me not to tell anybody and not to create any noise.

Q Did you not shout?

A No.

Q But were you afraid?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why? Why were you afraid of your uncle Dodo?

A I was scared that he might kill me.

Q What other words that (sic) he uttered to you at that time?

A None.
Q So, when he unzipped his pants and took off your panty, what happened next?

A He asked me to lay (sic) on top of him.

xxx

Q What transpired after that time?

xxx

A He kissed my lips.

Q What did you feel when he kissed your lips?

A I was very scared.

Q What else did he do after he kissed your lips?

A His penis and my vagina touched.

Q How did his penis and your vagina touched (sic)? How did he do it?

A He attempted his penis to penetrate my vagina.

Q What was your position at that time when he tried to insert his penis to (sic) your vagina?

A I was lying on top of him.

Q Was he embracing you when he tried to insert his penis to (sic) your vagina?

A Yes, he was embracing me.

Q Was his penis able to penetrate your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you already undressed at that time?

A He unzipped the back of my dress.

Q Was his penis able to touch your vagina?

A Yes, his penis touched my vagina.

Q How long was he doing that?

A I think, more or less 30 minutes only, because I heard somebody shouted (sic).

xxx
Atty. Gonzales:

Q When your uncle Dodo’s penis, by the way, were you able to hold your uncle Dodo’s
penis?

A I cannot remember.

Q When your uncle Dodo made you lie down on top of him, did you not resisted (sic) it?

A I was angry and I even wiggled.

Q When you were on top of your uncle Dodo, did your uncle Dodo held (sic) you?

A Yes, he held me in (sic) both arms.

Q And did your body touched (sic) his body at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q For what your uncle have (sic) done to you, did your vagina bleed?

A No.

Q Actually, you did not see the penis of your uncle Dodo?

A I see (sic).

Q That was when (sic) the time, when he undressed himself?

A Yes, sir. At that time, he unzipped his pants.

Q When you were already on top of the body of your uncle Dodo, you did not anymore see
his penis?

A No.

Q So, you did not also see your uncle Dodo’s penis touch your vagina?

A I was not able to see it but I felt it.

Q When you speak of your vagina, you are only talking on (sic) its outer part of your private
part?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you say outer part, you only refer to a portion of your vagina, which is bulging?

xxx

A On the opening, not outside.

x x x39

To be sure, a young girl’s revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission
to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault to her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere
concoction.40 AAA, it might be noted, has not been shown to entertain any ill-motive to impute such a
grave offense against her own granduncle.41 Considering that AAA was a child of tender years and
not exposed to the ways of the world, it is improbable that she would impute a crime as serious as
rape to appellant, her paternal granduncle.42

Appellant presents a two-fold defense to free himself of liability. One, he claims to suffer from
amnesia, insanity or some form of mental abnormality. Two, he argues that the victim’s assertions
are riddled with dubious inconsistencies.

In stark contrast to AAA’s convincing recital of facts is appellant’s unsupported and pitiful defense of
insanity before the trial court, which the latter properly rejected. We agree with the astute
observations of the court a quo:

It is incredible for accused to remember all the small details involving the complainant from the time
she was born up to the years she was studying, including her alleged sickness and confinement in
the hospital, as well as other matters relating to accused[‘s] closeness with complainant and
collateral relatives of complainant, from her maternal and paternal side: all these things, including
the important fact, accused clearly remembered he was arrested by a policeman and put inside the
jail, on account of the complaint of complainant and her mother of the offense charged yet claimed,
he cannot remember what happened to complainant on the very incident of rape testified to by
complainant.43

Verily, appellant’s seeming selective amnesia makes his denial suspect.lawphi1.net During the
proceedings, he could remember distant and specific details about AAA’s history and family yet
when the matter referred to the crux of his incarceration, he could not recall a thing. All told, the
series of elastic representations cast serious pitfalls on appellant’s credibility, as an experience of
this nature will, for certain, linger in one’s mind unlike the unusual amnesia displayed by appellant
before the trial court. The point is, appellant has not done much to turn the tide, so to speak, to his
side.44

The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,45 for there is a presumption that acts
penalized by law are voluntary.46 Appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity.
The defense did not present any expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report, or any
psychological findings or evidence regarding his mental condition at the time of the commission of
the offense. Appellant’s charade of amnesia is evidently a desperate maneuver for exculpation. Yet,
amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown by competent proof
that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action and that it was wrong. Failure to
remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime was
performed.47

There is likewise no showing that appellant had a history of any mental aberration. The report
submitted by Dr. Lacida in 1999 merely stated that it was "the opinion of the medical staff that the
patient is psychotic but the duration and onset of mental illness could not be determined due to the
absence of a reliable informant."48 No conclusive evidence supports appellant’s assertions of
insanity, more remarkably because its cause and duration could not be determined with certainty.
Moreover, by 2001, he was already found to be competent to stand trial.49
Appellant alleges improbabilities in AAA’s accusations on two (2) points: first, that the victim failed to
state that her legs were spread apart in order for appellant to have penetrated her; and second, that
appellant could not have penetrated her for thirty (30) minutes.

Appellant’s arguments warrant scant consideration. The lapses that he highlights are but mere trivial
details which do not overthrow the weight of evidence against him. The position of the parties during
sexual intercourse is not material in the crime of rape.50 For rape to be consummated, the hymen of
the victim need not be penetrated or ruptured. It is enough that the penis reaches the pudendum, or,
at the very least, the labia. The briefest of contacts under circumstances of force, intimidation or
unconsciousness, even without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our
jurisprudence.51 The mere introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ, thereby
touching the labia of the pudendum, already consummates the crime of rape.52

Likewise, we have ruled that ambulatory difficulty and pain in a woman’s genitalia are not standard
consequences after a first ever sexual intercourse.53 Moreover, whether sexual contact between
appellant and AAA lasted for thirty (30) minutes or thirty (30) seconds matters not. The essence of
the offense as charged is the deplorable sexual congress appellant had with a child under twelve
(12) years of age. Notably, a child of such tender years cannot be expected to have an accurate
concept of time, especially under the circumstances she then suffered.

All told, we rule that the finding of guilt as pronounced by the RTC and the Court of Appeals should
be sustained. AAA’s minority was alleged in the Information and proven with certainty. There is thus
no impediment in affirming the sentence of reclusion perpetua. Anent the civil liability of appellant,
we modify the award of damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the court finds
appellant liable to AAA in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.54

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00189-MIN is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant RICARDO COMANDA y CAMOTE is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the
Information in this case) the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA, J.:

The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from one who is totally
deprived thereof and is unable to exercise sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that
the actions made by the latter be measured under a lesser stringent standard than that imposed on
those who have complete dominion over their mind, body and spirit.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10, 2014 Decision[1] and
the December 15, 2014 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which
affirmed the May 30, 2013 Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13283, finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

In an Information,[4] dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder for
killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused SOLOMON VERDADERO armed with a
Rambo knife, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon him
stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.[5]

On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the pre-trial, he invoked
the defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.[6]

Evidence of the Prosecution

The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:

On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father
Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there
to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.[7]

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a
tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo
proceeded towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug
store, Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.[8]

Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife.
He again struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father
but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool, which he
used to hit Verdadero in the chest.[9]
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers
arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring
him to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the
CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.[10]

Evidence of the Defense

The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved around Verdadero's
alleged insanity, to wit:

Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as he claimed to
hear strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam),
Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC after he became
violent and started throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined for
two (2) months and was diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.

On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his
mental illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic
disease. Then, in 2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.

On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing incident. There,
she saw Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself
inside the comfort room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and was transferred to an
isolation room after Miriam informed the nurses of the incident.[11]

On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr. Leonor Andres-
Juliana (Dr. Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-
Juliana opined that Verdadero suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his violent behaviour.

Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu)
conducted a mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was
already brought to CVMC and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr.
Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the
stabbing incident.[12]

The RTC Ruling

On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide.
The dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON VERDADERO y
Galera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him:

1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor [as
maximum] as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum; and,

2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:

 a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and

c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[13]

The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish
the presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court,
however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial
court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at
the time he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with
the commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court
agreed that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks,
but was unable to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The
decretal portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment, dated May 30, 2013,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated
December 15, 2014.

Hence, this present petition, raising the following

ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S

CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims that Maynard
even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at the police station before
the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after the
stabbing incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded
that he had a relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.

In its Comment,[15] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the present petition
presented a question of fact, which could not be addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence
presented failed to completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.

In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),[16] Verdadero indicated that he would no longer file a reply as
his petition for review already contained an exhaustive discussion of the issues.

The Court's Ruling

The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity. Before delving
into the merits of the case, a discussion of the procedural issue is in order.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; Exceptions

The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review as it principally
revolves around the issue of his insanity — a question of fact which should no longer be addressed
in a petition for review. The Court disagrees.

Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court as it is limited to reviewing only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions
wherein the Court expands the coverage of a petition for review to include a resolution of questions
of fact. In Laborte v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,[17] the Court reiterated the
following exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the stabbing incident.
Obviously, it is a question of fact, which, ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for
review. As will be discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in the case
at bench warrant the application of the exception rather than the rule.

Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed

To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had
suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane
person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The
defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts
penalized by law are voluntary.[18]

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the
Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3)
he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward
sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first
confinement in 1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse
on March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be
ascertained is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his
mental state.

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy

and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.[19] A showing that an accused
is suffering from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the
consequences of his act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.[20]

In People v. Florendo,[21] the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an exempting
circumstance, to wit:

Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without
the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an
exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

[Emphasis Supplied]

In People v. Isla,[22] the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding
or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise,
he must be adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted
from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was
completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such complete
deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the
offense.

In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because such
defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance.[23] As such, he is duty bound to establish with
certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly
admitting to have stabbed Romeo to death.

Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the accused. In
People v. Opuran[24] the Court explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit:

Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only
be measured and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by
outward acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language and conduct. xxx

Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the
accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,[25] the Court elucidated that evidence of the mental
condition of the accused during a reasonable period before and after the commission of the offense
is material, to wit:

In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not
required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A
person's mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and
emotions may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of
sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.

Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that
Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a
view different from that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly
proven.

It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the exact moment the
crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may
still be shown by circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Further, the expert
opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be taken into account.

Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the time of the stabbing
incident. During her testimony, she stated as follows:

On direct examination

Atty. Tagaruma

Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which involved your diagnosis
as a life long chronic disease?

Witness

A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.

Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?

A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx

Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of schizophrenia could
distinguish his act?

A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the commission of the
crime that the impulse control and judgment of an individual was affected sir.

Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia could not
distinguish any act from right or wrong?

A: There is a possibility, sir.

Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon admission on March
19, 2009?

A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must be a remission
if the symptom is abated, your Honor.

xxx

Atty. Tagaruma

Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged violent behavior of Solomon
Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the date of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it
possible that the violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr.
Juliana in diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on March 12, 2009?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet Taguinod and the
conclusion made by you, is it also your conclusion that Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March
12, 2009 due to violent behavior?

A: Yes, sir.

On cross examination

Prosecutor Aquino

Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be continued even
when medications is administered to him?

A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the patient may have
relapse (sic) even with medication, sir.

Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case could that have a
long effect on his mental condition?

A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely eradicate the
symptom.

Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the medication
undertaken as of January 19, 2009?

A: It's haphazard, sir.

xxx

Court

Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?

A: Undifferentiated, your honor.[26]

[Emphases Supplied]

Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a relapse of his
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that
Verdadero might have been in a lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of
unsound mind at the time he stabbed Romeo.

Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made by Maynard, a
witness for the prosecution. In his testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and
appearance when they met at the police station, to wit:

On cross examination

Atty. Tagurama

Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that you are familiar
with Solomon Verdadero even before March 12, 2009?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?

A: We are neighbors, sir.

Q: You are immediate neighbors?

A: Yes, sir

Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic) time?

A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.

Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior did you observe
from him?

A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.

Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or what you called not
in his proper mind occurred often?

A: It occurred once in a while, sir.

Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon Verdadero appears not in his
proper mind?

A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.

Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Court

Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the passed (sic) years
before this incident was he also violent like what happened on March 12, 2009?

Witness

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt do I get you right
that Solomon Verdadero was with you at the police station?

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?

A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.

xxx

Q: Can you describe his appearance?

A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.

xxx

Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how he was reacting?

A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).

Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?

A: Yes, your honor.[27]

[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had observed
that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes
become violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again
of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was
immediately transferred to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control
him from harming himself and others.[28]

These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and
violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis
for his previous diagnosis.[29] The evidence on record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited
symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu
reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that
fateful day.

Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of schizophrenia.
Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be
appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or simultaneous to
the crime.[30]

Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and
circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment
through a general plea of insanity.[31] The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not
indicate that the defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.

The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the defense of insanity
and remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped
on his mental incapacity. Unlike in previous cases[32] where the Court denied the defense of
insanity as it was raised only when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged
insanity was not a mere afterthought.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the
responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen
an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental condition may be
addressed so that he may again function as a member of society. He shall remain confined therein
until his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation for his release.

Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He
is, nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed
from the criminal liability.[33]

The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform to recent
jurisprudence.[34] The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the
RTC must each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the rate of six per cent (6%)
per annum should be imposed on all damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision
until the same have been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant Solomon Verdadero y
Galera of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental
Health for treatment and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on a
recommendation from his attending physicians from the institution.

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this decision until the
same shall have been fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.

Luis Contreras for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the
appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in
Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five
children. From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the
barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay.
After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at
the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the
blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long
thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her
husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of
the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came
in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed
and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein
he admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement
he used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his
brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed
that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the
defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two
guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was
rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his
clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain
silent and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes
until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow
prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was
opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain
his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt
from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same
theory and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the
defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering
only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old
Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and
applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the
commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will,
because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to
imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.
Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that
a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned
to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United
States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:

Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the
accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other
testimony to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted
absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of
the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According
to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted
himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and
dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in
school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made
copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of
killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were
justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.

But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence
to the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement
Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother,
Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant.
However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said
house but also used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the
suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.

The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings,
simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking
up the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the
floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one
though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the
authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In
his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to
deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of
catching him, and insuring his conviction.

Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was
not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint
either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him
the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in
his favor of the mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which
thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness
"as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in
paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset
them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article
64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible
penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance
with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty
applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of
the same Code refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible
penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that
article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by
some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of
the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised
Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:

And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law,
because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not
contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the
Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)

Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and
which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power
conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper
petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be
deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may
reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.

Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court
in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for
parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The
Court further observed:

We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such
moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5
of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the
case with a view to executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of
confinement.

In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower
court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.

Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited,
and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the
attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower
to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.

Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory --
the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven
facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression
-- no immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This
psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating
factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she
was eight months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn
childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on
parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention
during the pendency of this case.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the
accused with the penalty of DEATH.

The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]

The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of
a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:

Cadaveric spasm.

Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its
sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in]
laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of
the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.

Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.

which caused his death.[4]

With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on
March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of the facts in this
wise:

Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter,
they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens younger brother,
Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They
each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens house before reaching
his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to
look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the
evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home
passing the side of the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which
Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also
noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about
fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy
check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan
who unfortunately had no money to buy it.

That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc
when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag,
locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.

On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from
his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench
but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban
destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen
door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the
unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben
lying on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back
of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his
sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as
that of [her] son.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station
at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas rented house. Together
with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house
and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with
a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in
one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning
against a wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one
and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The
bedroom was not in disarray.

About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at
the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the
presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases,
Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing.
The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].

Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she
got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday.
With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel,
Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel
went home despite appellants request for her to sleep in their house.

Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping
knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant,
Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her
around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant
packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home,
Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding
her by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant testified
that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he
got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe,
causing him to drop the blade and his wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe
as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.

Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly
distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:

1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husbands death, as a Secretary to the
Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie
Bianca.

2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang;
they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their
relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens brother, Alex,
in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.

4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic
married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk,
Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a
kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the
house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident
in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw
blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after
Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.

Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in
1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the marriage went along, Marivic
became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivics two sons,
there were three (3) misunderstandings. The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife
through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear
and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already
transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens hand was plastered as the bone cracked.

Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
 5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we collected our
salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which
they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with
Ben, after which he went across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game
because during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers
and runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the
Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one Fredo who is used by
Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard
by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am
innocent. Basobas thought they were joking.

He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas
admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he
once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her
and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so many times.

Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only
one (1) year.

6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual
drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed,
and sometimes beat her.

These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would
follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after
she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben
would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.

7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and
violence she received at the hands of Ben.

7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November
15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through
the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling with each other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold.
He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as
that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])

7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he
heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the
window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw the spouses grappling with each
other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He
said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that,
he went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning.
(Again, please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).

7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte.
His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be
living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him
that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house
and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He
testified that while Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our
house and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which means
lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as
according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.

7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon
of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched
in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied
Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house because she might be
battered by her husband. When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano
said that her husband was already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of
his staggering walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the house and she heard them
quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas)
Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as
Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did
sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her
room and they locked the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the
knife through the window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one
came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivics house on November 15, 1995, the
couple were still quarreling.

7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel,
Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr.
Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS
Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.

xxxxxxxxx

Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23)
separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic
which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit 3.

On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries
were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine
the psychological make-up of the patient, whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.

7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about
two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his
help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled
with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.

xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who
began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.

Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was
violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu
x x x Rubillos.

On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom;
that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony;
that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila,
rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she
did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby;
and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know
what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist
with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her
towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.

9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the
foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses
and some defense witnesses during the trial.

10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time
of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases,
such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the
police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw some police officer and
neighbor around. She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his
back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.

xxxxxxxxx

Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the
head which she described as a fracture. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or
3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.

Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.

12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September
1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito
L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24
January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had
prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.

The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.

15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the
Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief
Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.

This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.

16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on
19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening
of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified
forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from
the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.

17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivics
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea, within ninety (90)
days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with
the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.

18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L.
Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but
that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.

Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private
clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the
Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology
at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling psychologist of
the National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a
Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was
the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American
Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from
about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently
lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence
and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology.
She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this
is the first case of that nature.

Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over
a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital
conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.

Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological abuse,
verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.

xxxxxxxxx

Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself.
She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of
themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and
even sexually abusive to them. Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a
dysfunctional family or from broken homes.

Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low opinion of himself.
But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile,
very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times
they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The batterer
also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled
to do anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of modeling
of aggression in the family.

Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband:
poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope
her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake
of the children.

xxxxxxxxx

Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock
themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical violence on both of
them. She said that in a normal marital relationship, abuses also happen, but these are not consistent,
not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out. In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse
occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even
death on the victim.

xxxxxxxxx

Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her feeling of self-confidence
which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation which she
sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the imprint of all
the abuses that she had experienced in the past.

xxxxxxxxx

Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity
or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of
herself as a victim.

xxxxxxxxx

19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared
and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry
for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans
Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was
called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center
for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also
a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the
Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.

He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from
the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored The
Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000, which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-
Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the
use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.

Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology
deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a
bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.

Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered
a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases.
In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under
Atty. Nenita Deproza.

As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is
physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder depends on the vulnerability of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy,
perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the
post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.

xxxxxxxxx

Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks of nothing but the suffering.

xxxxxxxxx

A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and
she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher
sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.

Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness, such as the
deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes
what is around him within the environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very competitive;
he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in
himself and prone to act without thinking.

xxxxxxxxx

Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who
administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual
cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.

xxxxxxxxx

Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and
primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate
surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to
weapons when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left
on her but to act decisively.

xxxxxxxxx

Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2)
hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as
a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.

xxxxxxxxx

On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her
husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the trauma. He said that we are
trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will
just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing
of the trauma flashed in her mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was
not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.

xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial
a quo were elevated.[9]

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the
back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review.

Supervening Circumstances

On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1)
the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination
of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants Motion,
remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion
on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two
clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11]supposedly experts on
domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to
and admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records
of the case.[12]

The Issues

Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts consideration:

1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense.

2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married
and that she was therefore liable for parricide.

3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
 4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and
further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.

5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.

6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.

7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.

8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic
Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death.[13]

In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-
defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Collateral Factual Issues

The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the
resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion
or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case.
In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses
and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings
and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory
of the accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions, we
cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence
presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion
of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch
should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been
legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this
Court held:

The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide
of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to.

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellants deceased
spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection
to these testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
admission of her marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
the party making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a
palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking the non-
presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by
appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens death -- whether
by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its
September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her
husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head,
the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts
actually caused the victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not
dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised the
novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such evidence may have been relevant. Her theory
of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal
requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the
surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellants children.
As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction
and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the
prosecution prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now
fault the lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila
and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the
life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial courts appreciation of these circumstances
has little bearing on the final resolution of the case.

First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus

Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or
defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to
prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule
that in criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]

The Battered Woman Syndrome

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While
new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of
self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or
defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably
fearful state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time.[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs
about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male;
the tendency to accept responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship
will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of
violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident;
and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a
show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to
prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be
double-edged, because her placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right
to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of
control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence
spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and,
sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable.
During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can
be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered
woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate
her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she
may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past
painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out
of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During
this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show
a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other
hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that
her partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real person
whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the
batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though,
is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially
if she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way
of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly
tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans psyche. In this
phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness,
each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]

History of Abuse
in the Present Case

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses.
She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me
and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you
and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me
down on the bed and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to
him and he said sorry.
 Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by
your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.

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Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.

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[Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your
occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?
A Three times a week.
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D.
Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of
your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and
redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion
(R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr.
Caing;
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
and
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending
physician: Dr. Canora.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending
physician, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What
do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough
substance if force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So,
[pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

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Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.
Q What did she tell you?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she
told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.

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ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the
month of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
A Yes, sir.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient
pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her
pregnancy or for some other findings?
A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, sir.
Q For how many days?
A One day.
Q Where?
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

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Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?
A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I
think I have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a
consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
Q For what?
A Tension headache.
Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
 A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or
less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family
history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the
moment you ask to the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which
is unfortunately does not response to the medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood
pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte,
testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic
would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at
the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten oclock at night, because the couple
were very noisy and I heard something was broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into Ecels
room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben --
but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk.
Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of
drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses
saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful
night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards
her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I
boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately
asked my son, where was his father, then my second child said, he was not home yet.
I was worried because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So
 while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my
children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time
because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again
beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had
fears that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of
Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if
any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried
he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble
for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore
him of his provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, why did you switch
off the light when the children were there. At that time I was also attending to my
children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not answering
his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to
stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he
was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front
neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at
me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained
a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the
drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
 very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to
vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

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ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist
it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latters ordeal to the
court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in laymans
term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to
verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she
was the one who was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was
involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being
involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical
 abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason
that the husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child
she was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time
very depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or even
hell when it was happening day in and day out. [39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or
unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her
about three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the
facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial.

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Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were
fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond
of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their
wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc
where her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think
that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a
self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she
became a disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the
battering that happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost shes
not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering,
 emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her
husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is
this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of
that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who
can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust.
That the data that Im gathering from her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his
Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The
Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the
atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also
enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining
his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly
to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive
every time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that
her husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically
more than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of
her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife
syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn from that of
an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence,
has had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and
prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman
immobilizes the latters ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse
often escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman usually has a
very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen
the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave
an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latters belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified
in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably ten to twenty thousand violent
family disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office
in Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in
which the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely
abused, battered persons may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an active response to try to
escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found
that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely
to respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individuals thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as learned helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible,
because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will
alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
 Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent
behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no
escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she
typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be
found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence
that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering
incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started,
Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in
adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove
the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How
did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She
simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would
seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would
return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she
believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his
emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless
and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts
that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed,
they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the
factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they
concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be
proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish
all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the
Genosas.

BWS as Self-Defense
 In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal
right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS
defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -- she must have
actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order
to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must
face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:[62]

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes actual,

sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In
the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been
able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based
on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted
graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where
the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To
require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would
amount to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based on the conduct
of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.[66] Considering
such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.[67] In
the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part
of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances
that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances
that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her
Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:

This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced
with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her
abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on
her part. [70]

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of repetitious
pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as the severity and the
prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding thereon, he
said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission
of the battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and
another one is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is
interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....

xxxxxxxxx

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of
the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress
disorder is injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very
severe stimulus that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual,
suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the
victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very
susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the
fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will
manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness,
and fear and probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the
individual will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it
is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After
this six (6) months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after
six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the
 individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis
from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x
his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,
psychological paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an
illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
this circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that
this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason.[77] To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his
being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a
cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced
passion and obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate
room, her emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and
used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period
of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos
testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality
[or] trauma -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the
trauma that she suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is beyond the
control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the
brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion
and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
 On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of
time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted
on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their
child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child.
Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.

Second Legal Issue:

Treachery

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the
resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death
upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of
Ben had been found lying in bed with an open, depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his
head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to
establish indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his
death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag
you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front
neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at
me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could
not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained
a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I
smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the
drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the
wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that
very moment was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to
vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxxxxxxxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade
about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I
ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I
was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure
was raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
 (Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the
same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I took pity on
myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby,
so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of
the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the
rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful
act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There is no showing,
though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]

Proper Penalty

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been
found to have attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree,
pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to
have attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the
maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum;
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
detention on parole.[91]
 Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor
simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized
on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in
which decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven
facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies
conducted here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct
personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely,
the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning
process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits
of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the
Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and
an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing,
the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts
of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED.
However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending
her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her,
the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review. The Court
may pass upon all relevant issues, including those factual in nature and those that may not have been
brought before the trial court. This is true especially in cases involving the imposition of the death
penalty, in which the accused must be allowed to avail themselves of all possible avenues for their
defense. Even novel theories such as the "battered woman syndrome," which is alleged to be
equivalent to self-defense, should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the merits,
not rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

The Case

For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic Genosa y
Isidro in connection with the automatic review of the September 25, 1998 "Judgment"[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City[2] in Criminal Case No. 5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of parricide
aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to death.
In an Information[3] dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta charged
appellant-movant with parricide allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the
purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:

'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets
and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration
of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain,
laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."

After arraignment and trial, the court a quo promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic
Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding
treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby
sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."

The Antecedents

Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion,[4] to bring
"to the attention of the x x x Court certain facts and circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant
the setting aside of [her] conviction and the imposition of the death penalty."
Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the
means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had consistently claimed that she
had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of his death was
"cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of
the occipital bone," which resulted from her admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such
conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy
report on the body of the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings
she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to appreciate her self-defense
theory. She claims that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was
equivalent to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her
husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."
She thus prays for the following reliefs:[5]
"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and
a re-examination of the cause of death.
2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists of the Court to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing of
her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.
3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists to
form part of the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the case before a lower court in Metro Manila
to admit the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists."
On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,[6] which
substantially objected to the Motion on the ground that appellant had not been "deprived of her right
to due process, substantial or procedural."
 The Issues

In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed
and reexamined in order to ascertain the cause of his death, and (2) whether the appellant should be
examined by qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the time
of the killing.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for the reception
of evidence from qualified psychologists or psychiatrists whom the parties may present to establish her
state of mind at the time of the killing.

First Issue: No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death

Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine his exact
cause of death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of
his head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.
Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting
his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused the
victim's death. There is no need to exhume the body at this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for
the purpose.
Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial
court. Time and again, we have said that this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the
firsthand reception of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to the party
during the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer sought by appellant for the
exhumation of the victim's body cannot be granted.

Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's State of Mind at the Time of the Killing

In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into

evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered
woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina
Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense
and to consider the "battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense.
Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence
was her fault; (2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she
fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is
omnipresent and omniscient.[7] Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future
beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the violent
nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will
seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that
she would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other
than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression
and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less fatal
means of eliminating her sufferings.
Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the
United States and in Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder,
rather than a form of mental illness.[8] It has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's
perception of the danger posed by the abuser.[9]
In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to
prove that her relationship with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an
expert can explain how her experiences as a battered woman had affected her perception of danger
and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had resorted to force against her batterer.
The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between appellant
and her deceased husband. A defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him
at least six (6) times due to injuries related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for severe
hypertension due to emotional stress.[10] Even the victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses'
quarrels every now and then. The court a quo, however, simplistically ruled that since violence had
not immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.
Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered woman
syndrome" as a possible modifying circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the
accused. The discourse of appellant on the subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court
that the syndrome deserves serious consideration, especially in the light of its possible effect on her
very life. It could be that very thin line between death and life or even acquittal. The Court cannot, for
mere technical or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense, for any
criminal conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing
the possibility of the death penalty must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that
could save them from capital punishment.
In People v. Parazo,[11] after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent
Omnibus Motion and allowed him to undergo mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and
evaluation to determine whether he was a deaf-mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and
mute, yet unaided during the trial by an expert witness who could professionally understand and
interpret his actions and mutterings, the Court granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It justified its
action on the principle that "only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused] be
consigned to the lethal injection chamber."
More recently in People v. Estrada,[12] we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and remanded
the case "to the court a quo for a conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings." In that case, the defense
counsel had moved to suspend the arraignment of the accused, who could not properly and
intelligently enter a plea because of his mental defect, and to confine him instead in a psychiatric
ward. But the trial court denied the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and
determining for itself that he could understand and answer them "intelligently." After trial, he was
convicted of murder aggravated by cruelty and thus sentenced to death.
In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:[13]

"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge
is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of
determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accused-appellant's competency
to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-
appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness."
 It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court
practically denied him a fair trial prior to conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.
Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused
had not performed the act voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court, through
Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:

"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by
him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal
liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose
between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is
presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore,
should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired."[14]

In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted
freely, intelligently and voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly
evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and
emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible psychological cause and effect of her fatal
act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot simply refer her for proper psychological or psychiatric examination
and thereafter admit the findings and evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes of
automatic review. The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity
to cross-examine the defense witnesses and to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with
the principle of due process, a partial reopening of the case is apropos, so as to allow the defense the
opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with our foregoing disquisition, as well as the
prosecution the opportunity to cross examine and refute the same.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY
GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered woman syndrome" plea, within ninety (90) days from notice,
and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the
TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.

Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio
Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law
which We are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We
impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17
September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).

The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:

Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine,
Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-
shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle
borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death.

After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age
and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed
to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which
narrated in part:

. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and
acting with discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions
to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent manner, an air
rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a
result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at
the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)

On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:

I
 THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.

II

THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD

CONSTITUTE A LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.

III

THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE

CHARGED AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)

This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds
relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have
been presented during trial.

On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:

WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND

II

WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE

NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY
LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)

Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with
respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article
12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the
petitioner that "discernment" connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People
vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill
. . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor
between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:

If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information
that the accused acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously,
operate or cause to be fired in a reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22
caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the information to allege a
cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception. (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)

If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of
a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.

On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts.
We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.

The word "intent" has been defined as

 (a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
including such knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or
determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom
and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as
used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this
wise:

The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability
of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by
law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . .
(Emphasis supplied) p. 583

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of
one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence
a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent
act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen
acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend,
thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.

In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note
the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the
RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. 1In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:

The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to

determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime
can exist, and because ... the infant 3(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him)
from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)

lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing
a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not
absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as
used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It
could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two
different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means
of committing an offense.

In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies.
However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above
nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act
which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below
fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said
Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction
or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.

In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the
law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying
sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:

That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information
that she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the Peñaranda River and as a
consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then and there.' This
allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew what would be the consequence of
her unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that she knew it to be
wrong. (Emphasis supplied)

From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment."
What We meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a
knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence,
petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it
in effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses
the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.

Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against
him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged
mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty
imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for
the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same
principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P

200.00; ... (emphasis supplied)

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:

The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty
provided for by law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed
in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal
liability. 5

The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing
Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should
be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.

The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before.
As intimated in the case of Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs.
Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

JOEMAR ORTEGA, Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in
toto the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999,
convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega[4] (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations
both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8) years of age. The
accusatory portions thereof respectively state:

Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with
the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province
of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic)
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual
intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.[9] Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.[10] Among her siblings CCC, BBB,
DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family
members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors.
However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then
informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.[11] There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped
her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.

The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old
and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega[12] (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner,
for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was
sick.[13] During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept
together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There
petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's
residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and raped
her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of
these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.[14] AAA
did not tell her parents about her ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the
house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time,
Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching,
petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room
which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and
brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of
AAA.[15] AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens.
She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.[16]

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in
their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked
from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a
pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter,
BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.[17]

MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted
his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner
molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her
ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the
matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go
to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish
and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night.
The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their
house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she
demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination.[18]
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas[19] (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was
molested.[20] Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann
Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an
unofficial written report[21] showing that there were abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora
and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette. She also found that the minor injuries she saw on
AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear
after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings
required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement[22] was reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.[23] As such, petitioner stayed with a
certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in
order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated
and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's
office only filed the two (2) instant cases.

Version of the Defense

Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and

Luzviminda Ortega.[24] He is the second child of three siblings ― an elder
brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified that:
his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care
of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together
with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts
to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort
room, but he merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet
bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996,
petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house;[25] they were dancing and playing together
with all the other children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in
a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was
with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;[26] petitioner
explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was
accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger
sister;[27] BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel
with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the
evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by
MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as
AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to
a doctor for examination.[28]
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time
of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in herfirst marriage, while AAA and the rest
of her

siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted
AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest
daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching
television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the
kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and
AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time;
while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked
for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing
in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that
time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at
them; and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up,
saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the
one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but
instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who
found no indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting
the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance
only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied
to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who
recommended that they should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed
on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with
a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would
come home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes forlaundry. Every time petitioner came
home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation
erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant
cases.[29]

The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to
impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus,
the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of
RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6)
years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the offended
party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[30]

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending
appeal.[31]

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense
of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also
held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus,
hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the
factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution[33] dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS
OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE
RESULT OF THE CASE.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE
KATALBAS.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE

COURT, THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS
CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED
RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS
WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS

SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES
ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.[34]

Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court,
we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that
from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA
felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his
fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or
lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size
of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr.
Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found
that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the
CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation
of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA,
petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience.
As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act
in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or
subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the instant case,
as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical
report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr.
Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11)
days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost
a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not
inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart from the
initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that AAA
and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.[35]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since
despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips
of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped
her in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering
AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is
established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people
nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded
the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to
determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner
acted with discernment when he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.[36]
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was
enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law establishes a
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and children at risk[40] with
child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention,
intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their
development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section 8[41] thereof, has
created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and
functions[42] such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to
enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of
the CICL. The law also

provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of
R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.[43]

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title VIII
Transitory Provisions

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and
Below. Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below
at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the
child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer.
Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention
programs, as provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and
undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released,
unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the child is detained pending trial,
the Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary
and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary
and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of
the child to a youth detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the
Law. The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC,
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in
conflict with the law under their custody.
 SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion
and Court Proceedings. If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending
diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation
with the local social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in
consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the
appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict
with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or
other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions
of the Probation Law.

SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall
be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences
shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so
qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.

Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with
the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises,
namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that
at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution
for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the
heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded
respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister.
While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard
such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their
daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic
experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.[45] We find
petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order
to extort money from petitioners parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases
of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was
only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal
opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen
is not required.[46] Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having
full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.[47]

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of
the act, no criminal liability arises.[48] Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,[49] we held:

[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on
the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,

necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit
from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has)
no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable
of performing a criminal act.

In its Comment[50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by
the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in
2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as
defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG
claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A.No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68
thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38[51] of
R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG
argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its
application.

We are not persuaded.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age
or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below,
at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's
age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of
the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old.[52]

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application
to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal
law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused
are given retroactive effect.[53] This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
 publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
instances involving special laws.[54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.

In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on
the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:

Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions

Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may

I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following
provision:

ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW
PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND
RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED
TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION
PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15
YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.

The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult
offenders?

Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have
the capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the
facilities are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of
children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those
who currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.

Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or
through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.

Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting
before that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which
will conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the
physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now
have to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is
included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these
individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.

The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes
effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the
present Penal Code, for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration
under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.

The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . .
. provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies,
censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to
remain in detention.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some
sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have
to address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the
capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the Santiago amendment is accepted.[55]

xxxx

PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS

xxxx

Senator Pimentel.

xxxx

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application,
I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a
transitory provision that would make this law apply also to those who might
already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their
penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
 Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the
Transitory Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator,
specifically, Section 67. For example, Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of
children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the
crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. So that would be
giving retroactive effect.

Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying
to cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting
execution.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional

amendment, subject to style.

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we
have to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate
provision.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able
to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law,
he should be given the benefit of the law.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.[56]

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a
statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the
law, viz.:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to
the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the
law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent.
The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and
purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and
follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best
 with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects
of the legislature.[57]

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[58] In this case, the plain meaning
of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to
herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape
committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption
from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that
petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the
nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading
or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.[59]

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect
our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of
CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped
us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the
Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has
compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times
over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most
particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim
that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of
their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old
or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs,
simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. [60]

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of
rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when
she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the laws greater protection. However, this
consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not
subject to review by this Court.[61] Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or
unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.[62]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless,
the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC). SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 180380 August 4, 2009

RAYMUND MADALI AND RODEL MADALI, Petitioners,

- versus -
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
Raymund Madali (Raymund) and Rodel Madali (Rodel) seek the reversal of the 29 August 2007
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27757; and its 23 October 2007
Resolution,[2] affirming with modifications the 28 July 2003 Decision[3] of the Romblon, Romblon,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81, in Criminal Case No. 2179, finding petitioners guilty of
homicide.
For the death of AAA,[4] Raymund, Rodel and a certain Bernardino Jojo Maestro (Bernardino)
were charged before the RTC with the crime of Murder. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:

That on or about the 13th day of April 1999, at around 11:00 oclock in the
evening, in the Barangay XXX, Municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and
there by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, strike with a coconut frond and llave inglesa and strangle
with a dog chain, one AAA, inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts of
his body which caused his untimely death.[5]

During the arraignment on 31 May 2000, the three accused, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty.[6]

On trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Jovencio Musa (Jovencio), 16
years old, the victims cousin and the alleged lone eyewitness to the killing; (2) Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 3 Rogelio Madali, the designated Deputy Chief of Police of the Romblon Police Station; (3)
Police Officer (PO) 3 Nicolas Molo, the police investigator assigned to the case; (4) BBB, the mother
of the deceased victim; (5) Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado, Chief of the Romblon District Hospital, the
physician who issued the death certificate of AAA; (6) Emerson de Asis, the alleged companion of
witness Jovencio on the night in question, who later became a hostile witness; (7) Michael Manasan,
also a companion of witness Jovencio before the killing of the victim occurred; (8) Dr. Floresto Arizala,
Jr., a forensic expert from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, who conducted the
examination of the corpse of the victim after the same was exhumed.

As documentary and object evidence, the prosecution offered the following: (1) Exhibit A
Affidavit of Jovencio executed on 22 April 1999, detailing the circumstances prior to, during and after
the killing of the victim perpetrated by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (2) Exhibit B Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Jovencio dated 8 May 1999, a recantation of the 22 April 1999 Affidavit; (3) Exhibit C
Amended Affidavit of Jovencio dated 28 May 1999, which was substantially the same on material
points as the 22 April 1999 Affidavit; (4) Exhibit D Undated Reply Affidavit of Jovencio insisting that
the death of the victim was authored by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (5) Exhibit E Joint Affidavit
of prosecution witnesses SPO3 Rogelio Madali and a certain SPO2 Teresito M. Sumadsad; (6) Exhibit
F the coconut frond recovered by the police officers from the scene of the incident; (7) Exhibit G a dog
chain used as part of a strap that was tied to the victims neck while he was hanging from a tree; (8)
Exhibit H the handkerchief that was tied around the victims neck; (9) Exhibit I empty bottles of gin; (10)
Exhibit J cellophanes with rugby; (10) Exhibit K pictures taken from the crime scene including the
picture of the body of the victim tied to a tree; (11) Exhibit L Letter of Request for the NBI to conduct
an examination of the body of the victim; (12) Exhibits M to O NBI routing slips; (14) Exhibit P Death
Certificate issued by Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado; (15) Exhibit Q Exhumation Report issued by Dr.
Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (16) Exhibit R the Autopsy Report submitted by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.;
(17) Exhibit S Sketch of the head of the victim showing the injuries thereon; and (18) Exhibit T
handwritten draft of the exhumation report.
Taken together, the evidence offered by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 in the
afternoon of 13 April 1999, BBB, who made a living by selling goods aboard ships docked at the
Romblon Pier, and who was constantly assisted by her 15-year-old son AAA, was on a ship plying her
wares. AAA, together with Jovencio and Raymund, was there helping his mother.[7] Sometime later,
Raymund and AAA left the ship. Jovencio stayed a little longer.[8]

At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Jovencio and another friend named Michael Manasan sat
beside the Rizal monument in the Poblacion of Romblon, located between the Roman Catholic Church
and Lovers Inn. Michael had just left Jovencio when Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino and the victim AAA
arrived. After meandering around, the group proceeded to climb the stairs, atop of which was the
reservoir just beside the Romblon National High School. The victim, AAA, ascended first; behind him
were Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and witness Jovencio. As soon as they reached the reservoir,
Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted out, Join
the rugby boys. AAA replied, Thats enough. Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard
coconut frond. AAA lost his balance and was made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel and
Bernardino. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same coconut
frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to his head and body from Rodel,
who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness.

Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to
a dog chain. With the contraption, the three malefactors pulled the body up a tree.
 Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could only muster a faint voice
saying Enough every single-time AAA received the painful blows. Bernardino, who seemed to
suggest finishing off the victim, remarked, Since were all here, lets get on with it. Before leaving the
scene, the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the incident to anyone, or he would be next.

Tormented and torn between the desire to come clean and the fear for his life, Jovencio hardly
slept that night. He did not divulge the incident to anyone for the next few days. BBB, the victims
mother, was worried when her son did not come home. She started asking relatives whether they had
seen her son, but their reply was always in the negative.

It was three days later that a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported to the police authorities
about a dead man found in Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon NationalHigh School. When the
policemen went there, they found the cadaver emitting a foul odor, with maggots crawling all over,
hanging from a tree with a handkerchief tied around the neck and a dog chain fastened to the
handkerchief. Also found in the area were paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, as well as empty bottles
of gin and a coconut frond.
The provincial hospital refused to conduct an autopsy, since AAAs corpse was already
decomposing and stank so badly. It was through the intercession of the NBI that the body was
eventually exhumed and examined by medico-legal experts. Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., who
conducted the examination, opined that the victim died due to head injuries and not to asphyxiation by
hanging. He declared that the victim was already dead when he was tied to the tree, and that the
variety of injuries sustained by the victim could be attributed to more than one assailant.

Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and pointed to Raymund, Rodel and
Bernardino as the perpetrators of the crime. Thereafter, Jovencio executed his first affidavit, which
was dated 22 April 1999. Because of the threat made on him by a certain Wilson, an uncle of Raymund
and Rodel, Jovencio executed a second affidavit dated 8 May 1999, repudiating his first
affidavit. On 28 May 1999, Jovencio made his third sworn statement substantially reverting to his first
affidavit.

The accused, on the other hand, advanced the defense of denial and alibi. They claimed they
had nothing to do with the death of AAA, and that they were nowhere near the locus criminis when the
killing occurred.

According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father Rodolfo Madali in the house of a friend
named Noel Mindoro, located more or less 14 kilometers from the place where the victim was slain
where they spent the whole evening until the following morning. Rodels testimony was corroborated
by his father and Noel Mindoro.

On their part, Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino declared that they were in their
respective houses on the night in question. Raymunds place was allegedly five kilometers away from
the scene of the crime, while Bernardinos was one kilometer away. Bernardinos testimony was
supported by his father Bernardino Maestro, Sr. and by his neighbor Diana Mendez. Raymunds friend,
Pastor Mario Fajiculay backed up the formers alibi.

Convinced by the version of the prosecution, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the
three accused. On account of the prosecutions failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation, they were only convicted of homicide. The RTC observed that
the incident was a sort of initiation, in which the victim voluntarily went along with the perpetrators, not
totally unaware that he would be beaten. The RTC also appreciated the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority in favor of the three accused. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused BERNARDO (sic) Jojo MAESTRO, JR.,

RODEL MADALI AND RAYMUND MADALI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years and to indemnify the
heirs of AAA jointly and severally the amount of PhP 50,000.00.[9]

On 6 August 2003, Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund and Rodel elevated
their convictions to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC
that Rodel and Raymund killed the victim. However, pursuant to Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which exempts from criminal liability
a minor fifteen (15) years or below at the time of the commission of the offense, Raymunds case was
dismissed. Rodels conviction was sustained, and he was sentenced to six months and one day
of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, but the imposition of said penalty
was suspended pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344. The judgment provides:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 28, 2003, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon (Branch 81) is Criminal Case No. 2179, is affirmed
with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Appellant Raymund Madali is declared EXEMPT from criminal

liability and the case, insofar as he is concerned is hereby DISMISSED
pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.

2) Appellant Rodel Madali is found guilty of homicide, the proper

penalty for which is fixed at six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Imposition of this penalty should, however, be SUSPENDED, also
pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.

3) In addition to the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court in the

amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), moral damages in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is hereby awarded in
favor of the heirs of the victim, AAA.
 4) xxxx

5) Finally, this case is referred to the Department of Social Welfare

and Development (DWSD) for further proceedings in accordance with
R.A. No. 9344.[10]

Hence, the instant case.

Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the Court of Appeals findings, which
gave weight and credence to the account of the incident given by prosecution witness Jovencio, whose
testimony according to them was replete with patent and substantial inconsistencies. First, petitioners
set their sights on the conflicting affidavits executed by Jovencio. The first affidavit implicated the three
accused in the death of AAA, which was controverted by the second affidavit where Jovencio denied
having seen the three accused butcher the victim, while the third affidavit restated the material points
in the first affidavit. Petitioners also pointed out the discrepancy between the first and the third
affidavits, as the former stated that Jovencio was not seen by the three accused when they executed
the victim; whereas in the latter affidavit, Jovencio stated he was with the three when the killing took
place. Second, petitioners assert that the testimony of Jovencio relating to the alleged fact that his
companions, Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis, saw the three accused and the deceased during
the night in question was debunked by the very testimonies of Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis
wherein they declared otherwise.

Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in disbelieving
the defense of alibi they interposed, considering that the prosecution failed to muster the required
quantum of proof, and that said defense was corroborated by testimonies of the other defense
witnesses.

The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the parties and their witnesses.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness
stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates,
can weigh such testimonies in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate
between truth and falsehood.[11] This is especially true when the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this
Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily
the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.[12]

The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any significant facts in the case.

This Court itself, in its effort to ferret out the truth based on the evidence on records has
diligently pored over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and, like the RTC, finds the
testimony of Jovencio credible. Subjected to the grueling examinations on the witness stand, Jovencio
steadfastly pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the persons who slaughtered the victim. He
testified as follows:

Q: Mr. Witness, will you tell us where were you on April 13, 1999?

xxxx

A: I was at the Rizal standing by.

xxxx

PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:

Q: While you were at Rizal on April 13, 1999 in the evening, [who was your
companion]?

A: Only Michael.

Q: And what were you doing with Michael?

A: Only standing by there.

Q: Did anything happen while you were standing by with Michael?

A: None, sir.

Q: Did anyone arrive while you were there?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: Jojo [Bernardino] followed by Raymund then AAA, then Rodel.

Q: And what happened when they arrived?

A: They were also standing by there.

Q: How long did they stand by in that place?

A: I do not know how many hours?

Q: Then, what happened next?

A: Around 10:30 oclock we went there.

Q: When you said we, to whom you are referring as your companions?

A: Jojo [Bernardino], Rodel, Raymund and AAA.

Q: What happened to Michael?

A: He went home.

Q: When you said you went there, to which place are you referring?

A: Near the high school at hagdan-hagdan.

Q: There are three (3) main streets in the Poblacion of Romblon, which street did you
take in going to hagdan-hagdan near the high school?

A: In the middle.

Q: Did you climb the stairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was ahead?

A: AAA.

Q: And who came next?

A: Rodel.

Q: Then, after Rodel, who?

A: Raymund.

Q: Then?

A: [Bernardino].

Q: [Bernardino] who?

A: Maestro.

Q: What is the relation of this Jojo Maestro to Bernardino Maestro you pointed a while
ago?

A: That Jojo is his alias.

Q: Did you reach the top of the stairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Upon reaching the top of the stairs, what did you do, if any?

A: [Bernardino] blindfolded AAA.

Q: With what?

A: Handkerchief.

Q: Where did he get that handkerchief?

A: From Raymund.

Q: After AAA, what is the family name of this AAA?

A: AAA.

Q: After AAA was blindfolded, what happened next?

A: Then [Bernardino] told him Join the rugby boys!

Q: Did AAA make any reply?

A: AAA said Thats enough.

Q: What happened after Jojo Maestro said you join the rugby boys?

A: AAA was struck by a coconut frond three (3) times.

Q: Who struck him with the coconut frond?

A: [Bernardino].

Q: What happened to AAA when he was struck three (3) times with the coconut fronds?

A: He was made to stand.

Q: After standing, what happened next?

A: AAA was again struck with the coconut frond byRaymund.

Q: Was AAA hit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Here (witness is pointing to the posterior aspect of his right thigh).

Q: What happened to AAA when he was hit by the coconut frond?

A: As if he became weak.

Q: How about Rodel, what did Rodel do, if any?

A: He boxed the body and the head.

Q: Of whom?

A: Of Rodel.

Q: Who was boxed by Rodel?

A: AAA.

Q: In Exhibit C you mentioned about llave inglesa, what is this llave inglesa?

A: Lead llave inglesa.

Q: And how does it look like?

A: I forgot already but it was a brass knuckle.

Q: Did Exh. C mention that Rodel punched him in different parts of his body with a llave
inglesa causing him to fall to the ground, how did Rodel use this llave inglesa?

A: Worn in his hand (witness raising his right hand and motioning the left as if wearing
something in his right hand), then punched him.

Q: When he was punched on different parts of his body by Rodel using llave inglesa,
what happened to AAA?

A: He lost consciousness.

Q: When AAA lost consciousness, what did Bernardino Maestro, Raymund Madali and
Rodel Madali do, if any?

A: Raymund used his handkerchief in tying the neck of my cousin.

Q: Who is this cousin of yours?

A: AAA.

Q: What is the family name?

A: AAA.

COURT:

How about Bernardino as part of the question?

PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:

Q: Bernardino, what did he do, if any?

A: The chain for the dog was tied to the handkerchief.

COURT:

How about Rodel?

A: They helped in lifting him and making him stand and hooked the tie to the tree.

Q: What is this tie which was hooked to the tree made of?

A: The chain.
 Q: Referring to the dog chain?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: While all these things were happening, what was Jovencio Musa doing who is a
cousin of AAA?

A: I got shock upon seeing it.

Q: Did Jovencio Musa utter anything or do something?

A: Everytime AAA was being struck I said Enough!

(Tama na!).

Q: How many times did you say that is enough?

A: Twice.

Q: How did the three (3) react to your saying Tama na, tama na!?

A: It is already here so we will proceed.

COURT:

Translate that.

A: Yari na ini, idiretso na.

xxxx

Q: After tying the dog chain to the tree, what happened next?

A: I was told by the three (3) that if I would reveal I would be the next to be killed.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: No more, we went home already.[13]

Jovencio saw at close range the incident as it was unfolding before his very eyes as he was
there when it happened. He was in the company of the perpetrators and the victim. Thus, the incident
could not have escaped his attention. The prosecution adequately established in graphic detail,
through the eyewitness, the circumstances that transpired before, during and after the killing of
AAA. At around 11:30 p.m. of 13 April 1999, Jovencio, together with the victim, as well as with Rodel,
Raymund and Bernardino, went to a place near the Romblon National High School. Jovencios earlier
companion, Michael Manasan, did not go with the group, as he had already left a little earlier. As they
reached their destination, the group ascended the stairs leading to a reservoir near the said school.
AAA was ahead, followed by Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and Jovencio. Upon reaching the top,
Bernardino blindfolded the victim with a handkerchief and told the latter, Join the rugby boys! The
victim responded, Thats enough! Bernardino then hit the victim thrice, using a green and hard coconut
frond. Unable to withstand the beatings, the victim hit the ground and was lifted to his feet by
Bernardino, Raymund and Rodel. With the same coconut frond, Raymund hit the victim on his right
thigh. Rodel followed by punching the body and the head of the victim with a brass knuckle (llave
inglesa) wrapped around the formers right fist. Feeling for his cousin, Jovencio shouted Tama na!
Tama na! Bernardino responded, Yari na ini, ideretso na, (We have come this far, we have to finish
it.) The victims strength was no match to the injuries he received. He passed out. Raymund then tied
a handkerchief around the victims neck, fastened a dog chain to the ends of the said handkerchief
and, with the aid of Raymund and Rodel, hoisted the victims body to and hanged it from a nearby
tree. Shocked at what was happening, Jovencio just watched the whole incident, failing to muster
enough courage to help his dying cousin.

The perpetrators warned Jovencio not to divulge to anyone what he saw, or he would be the
next victim. Then they all left the place, leaving the victims body hanging from a tree.

The testimony of Jovencio was substantiated by the medical findings indicating that the victim
was hit in the head by hard blows, causing his death. Other pieces of evidence such as the coconut
frond, the dog chain and the handkerchief found in the scene also supported Jovencios account.

Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, petitioners Raymund and Rodel
could only muster mere denial. Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too flaccid to stay firm
against the weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence that deserves no weight in law. It cannot be given
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative
matters.[14] Between the self-serving testimonies of petitioners and the positive identification by the
eyewitness, the latter deserves greater credence.[15]

Petitioners alibi, which was supported by the testimonies of close relatives and friends, cannot
overcome the convincing evidence adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative testimonies of
relatives and friends are viewed with suspicion and skepticism by the Court.[16]

Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, two elements must concur: (a) the accused was in another
place at the time the crime was committed; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. In the case under consideration, Raymund was within
a 5-kilometer distance from the scene, while Rodel was within a 14-kilometer distance. Even
assuming arguendo that Raymund and Rodels defense were true, still, it was not physically impossible
for them to be at the crime scene and to be participants in the gruesome crime. It was not difficult for
them to travel from where they allegedly were and arrive at the scene during the killing episode.

Petitioners made an issue of the affidavit of recantation repudiating the earlier one laying the
blame on them. The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot prevail over
the testimony made during the trial.[17] Jovencio effectively repudiated the contents of the affidavit of
recantation. The recantation would hardly suffice to overturn the trial courts finding of guilt, which was
based on a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial. As held by this Court, an
affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony
given in open court.[18] A recantation is exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it is easily secured from
a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.[19] Considering
the age, the social standing and the economic status of witness Jovencio, it is not far-fetched that the
combination of these factors impelled him to affix his signature to the recanting affidavit. Besides,
Jovencio explained why he executed the second affidavit or the affidavit of recantation, which
supposedly exonerated petitioners. He had been threatened by a certain Wilson, who was a relative
of petitioners. Jovencio testified:

Q: Alright, in Exh. C specifically C-1, you mentioned that, you said that somebody
fetched me in the evening of May 7, 1999 who told me that Rey Andrade
wanted to talk to me regarding the incident, who was that somebody who
fetched you in the house?

A: I do not know but he is known as Andrade.

xxxx

Q: What was the subject of your conversation with Andrade?

A: About the Nephew of Wilson.

xxxx

Q: How about this Wilson you were referring to?

A: Wilson all of a sudden arrived there.

Q: Did Wilson say anything?

A: Wilson said, if we will lose, all our expenses will be paid and if he wins I will be the
next.[20]

Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged contradiction between Jovencios narrative
-- which claimed that Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan saw the victim in the company of the
malefactors immediately prior to the killing -- and the testimonies of these two witnesses denying such
allegation.

Unfortunately, this is just a minor inconsistency. The common narration of Emerson de Asis
and Michael Manasan that they did not see the perpetrators with the victim prior to the killing are too
insignificant, since their narration did not directly relate to the act of killing itself. Said inconsistency
does not dilute the declarations of Jovencio. Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its
incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in
the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on
the very act of accused-appellants.[21] As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one
another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their
credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution
witness.[22] The minor inconsistencies and contradictions only serve to attest to the truthfulness of the
witnesses and the fact that they had not been coached or rehearsed.[23]

The declaration of Michael Manasan -- that he did not see the petitioners together with
Jovencio and the victim immediately prior the incident -- does not help a bit the cause of petitioners. As
the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Michael could not have seen the malefactors in the
company of the victim because according to Jovencio, Michael had gone home earlier that evening.

In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings.

As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from
criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections
6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.

xxxx

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. If it has been determined
that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which
will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child
to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's
nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and
development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with
the child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or
nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be
released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization; a barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the
Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer; or, when
and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by
the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not comply with the
prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by
the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare
Code."
 Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not
shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.

As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is
necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. x x x.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.[24] Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted with
discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to
anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable
act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under
18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper
period.

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 68, the maximum penalty should be within prision mayor, which is a
degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
maximum penalty should be in the medium period of prision mayor or 8 years and 1 day to 10
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere within the penalty
next lower in degree, that is, prision correccional. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals, which is 6 months and one day of prision correccional to 8 years and one day of prision
mayor, is in order. However, the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant
to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which states:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty
of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which
may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances

of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided
in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The Court of Appeals awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of the heirs of the victim. In addition, Rodel and Raymund are ordered to
pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the actual damages for funeral expenses, which the
prosecution claimed to have incurred but failed to support by receipts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 August 2007 in
CA-G.R. No. 27757, exempting Raymund Madali from criminal liability is hereby AFFIRMED. With
respect to Rodel Madali, being a child in conflict with the law, this Court suspends the pronouncement
of his sentence and REMANDS his case to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. However, with respect to the civil liabilities, Rodel Madali and
Raymund Madali are solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.

O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the
information, as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of
killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest,
with premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed
the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the
deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused
had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one
could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should remain
unpunished.

The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac
and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories,
indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.

There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important
facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with
Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on
a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers
an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration which
he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of the
stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met
the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so
during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could
find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the
shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20 years of age, was working at something
under a manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the accused directed his question to
the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way
a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction between
the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the
deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens
and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not invite
the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained
under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun.
What took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as
follows:

And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens
were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild
chickens we would have something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw
a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up
the chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had
wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working,
running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from
where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the
occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he
was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went
together to see the dead body.

Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers
were found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident
occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to
the malecon where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused
called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time.
Tagampa says that they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused says that
they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon
grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in
the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were
working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the
witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of
the accused, who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a
gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body
finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or
eighteen hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well,
covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it.
Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid of him,
although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The
defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of
the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told
the story substantially as above.

So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the
deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the
accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to
show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The
Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have
for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the
hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same
time, there having been only one shot fired.

Article 1 of the Penal Code says:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.

 Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the
contrary shall appear.

Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:

He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident
without liability or intention of causing it.

Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:

A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is

proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be
entitled to an acquittal.

The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune
or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of
doing harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia.,
154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292;
U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A.,
N. S., 1152.)

In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is
there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident
occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his
concealment and denial.

In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove
such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional
killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a
consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury
should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing
but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and
it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be
erroneous.

In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide,

which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal
intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to
warrant a conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.

We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from
custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 172695 June 29, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

- versus -
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, Appellant.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Information[1] dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was charged with
the crime of parricide, committed as follows:

That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province

of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y
Completo, while conveniently armed with illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow,
with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side
of her neck causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial thereafter
ensued.

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently
in the evening of November 5, 1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage
due to laceration of the jugular vein of her neck. According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina,
Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who conducted the autopsy on the
victims body, the fatal weapon could have been a pointed instrument like a nail. There
is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife
hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The letters written by the
accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-in-law, to his father-in-law,
and lastly, the victims sister, speak so eloquently of someone who accepts the fault for
the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness from the close relatives of the victim
is a clear admission of authorship of the fatal act.

In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the
fatal harm to his wife. This is the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or
not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental.

xxxx

Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening
of November 5, 1993, between 9:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock, the accused came home
drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked the door and table, and then
threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But the
accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling and arrow
from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred
to the adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there, Guillermo
heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo
concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the house of
Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused carrying the
bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia
to the hospital but to no avail.

From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon
Consorcia was preceded by a quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated
the accuseds version that he was practicing the use of the weapon when Consorcia
was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecutions contention that the
shooting was intentional.

x x x To sustain the accuseds assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon
at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut
Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow
inside his house.

It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the hospital
and while on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified
that while the victim was being attended to by the medical personnel of said hospital,
the accused stayed outside the hospital premises, then he disappeared. He was later
on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside the comfort room of a
 premises in an adjoining barangay. The accuseds omission to surrender himself to the
authorities is a clear indication of guilt.[3]

After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision,[4] the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y

COMPLETO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and
hereby sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a Decision[6] dated February 28,
2005, the Court of Appeals denied appellants appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998 of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 of Bian, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[7]

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 16,
2005.

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his conviction was based
did not sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the prosecution failed to prove his
motive in killing his wife; or that they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident.
 Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who shot his wife
with a deadly arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all
engaged in target shooting using the sling and arrow. Hence, he surmised that any one of them could
have shot the victim. At any rate, even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same
was accidental and not intentional.

Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining barangay, while his wife was
being treated in the hospital, likewise does not prove his complicity since the prosecution did not prove
that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.

Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law where he asked
for forgiveness should not be considered as admission of guilt.

The petition lacks merit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
guilty person.[8] Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the
possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind is required.[9]

In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a
conviction, are present. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following pieces of
circumstantial evidence indubitably established that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent behavior of her
(Consortia) husband, herein accused-appellant. And even if Consortia would
 not tell Leticia about the beatings, the latter would see her face with black eyes
as evident proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk and
displaying violent behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and
unconscious, to be brought to the hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound in the
neck which fatally lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the wound was a
pointed object.
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister of
Consortia asking for forgiveness.

Also notable is accused-appellants behavior immediately after the incident. He

disappeared and did not enter the clinic where Consortia was rushed for
treatment. And when Consortias sister later sought police assistance in searching for
accused-appellant, the latter was found by the police hiding inside a toilet at a nearby
barangay.[10]

There is no merit in appellants contention that the prosecution failed to prove motive in killing
his wife. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which his conviction
rests.[11] Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means
used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the
circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies
as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.[12]

In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established appellants intent to
kill his wife:

First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and his
wife. Leticia, the victims sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent behavior of the
appellant who would often lay hand on the victim during their marital squabbles.

Guillermo, appellants father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident, appellant arrived
in their conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door and table and threw away the
electric fan. Guillermo tried to prevail upon appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling
and arrow which he kept near the ceiling.

Guillermo left appellants house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law, Yolanda, located
about four meters away; but he could still hear the victim and appellant arguing and shouting at each
other. After a while, Guillermo requested Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda
met the appellant carrying Consorcia soaked in blood.

Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature.[13] In
the instant case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed to the hospital. This is
indeed contrary to human nature. A husband is expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to her
last breath. In this case, however, appellant took flight. It is well-established that the flight of an
accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a
circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[14]

Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining barangay
is not an indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately hid in order to
evade being arrested.[15]

The contention lacks merit.

As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying wife, more
so if his absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation for his flight. In appellants
brief, he claimed that in all probability, it might have happened that he (appellant) was merely
answering the call of nature at the precise time when he was arrested.[16] However, we find it is highly
illogical for appellant to go as far as the adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially
since he could do so inside the premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was fearful
of reprisal coming from the victims relatives[17] is contrary to his claim of innocence.

Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellants intent to kill the
victim. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the neck, a vital
organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical
injury inflicted on the deceased manifests appellants intention to extinguish life.[18]
 Fourth: As regards appellants act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and bringing her to
the hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an indication of an act of repentance
or contrition on the part of appellant.[19]

In fine, all these circumstances prove appellants intent to harm his wife.

There is likewise no merit in appellants contention that he was not the one who shot the deadly
arrow because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all playing and practicing
target shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.

Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was alone with
his wife inside their house when the incident happened. This completely discounts the possibility that
other than appellant, there could be another person or persons who could have perpetrated the
crime. There is no paucity of evidence because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the
victim up to the time Yolanda saw him carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the
testimony of defense witness Galang supports the prosecutions contention that appellant was alone
with his wife at the time of the incident. As noted by the Court of Appeals:

Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies
and headed home at about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00
p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being rushed to the hospital. Instead of
weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galangs testimony even supports the
prosecutions version that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night,
accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably going home from that
drinking session with his friends. x x x[20]

There is likewise no merit in appellants contention that assuming he was the one who killed
his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not
applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are
exempt from criminal liability:

xxxx
 4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.

Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and
convincing evidence.[21] The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential
requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it.[22]

By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered
as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense of accident must be struck
down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial
court:

Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the

law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon
was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let
it be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the standards as an instrument for
archery competitions. To sustain the accuseds assertion that he was practicing the
use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even
failed to rebut Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused was keeping said sling
and arrow inside his house.[23]

Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of proof of
establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to prove
justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing.[24] Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence
to prove the same.

Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellants contention that the letters he wrote to his
parents-in-law and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not be considered as an
implied admission of guilt. He claimed that he wrote the letters in order to explain that what happened
was an accident and that he was to be blamed for it because he allowed his drinking buddies to play
with the sling and arrow.

Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed
by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness
unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to
an attempt to compromise.[25] Under the present circumstances, appellants plea for forgiveness should
be received as an implied admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellants assertion, the killing of
Consorcia was deliberate, and not by accident.

Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the lower
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial courts factual findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our
function to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all over again except when there is serious ground
to believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal via certiorari is
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
Court of Appeals.[26]

Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Likewise, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 were properly awarded by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
28, 2005 which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna,
Branch 24, finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124058. December 10, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS G. RETUBADO alias JESSIE, appellant.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Branch 29, in
Criminal Case No. TCS-2153 convicting the appellant Jesus G. Retubado of murder, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Emmanuel Caon the sum
of P50,000.00.
The appellant was indicted for murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on the 5th day of November, 1993 at 9:30 oclock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay I
Poblacion, Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Emmanuel Caon with the use of unlicensed
revolver of unknown caliber, thereby hitting the latter on his forehead, resulting to the instantaneous
death of the said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellants
younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and
gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was having
dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Caon, Jr.,
The Caons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay
captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was not the culprit. The
barangay captain considered the matter closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting
Emmanuel Caon, Jr.
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Caon, Sr., a pedicab driver
called it a day and decided to go home after a days work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the
junction of Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing
with Marcial Lucio saw him. Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother? Emmanuel ignored
the appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook Emmanuel, grabbed
and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and
pedaled on until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta Caon was in the balcony of their house,
above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred,
the appellant continued following Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The
appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the appellant
that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her
husbands shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the
forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted
for help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to
the Tuburan District Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar G. Arellano, the Municipal
Health Officer, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Emmanuel and prepared a report thereon with
the following findings:

Examination in Detail:

On detailed examination, a gunshot wound was found at the left side of the forehead, measuring 1
cm. in diameter. At the skin surrounding this wound was found powder burns which measured 3
cms. in diameter as the skin had been blackened and burned by powder of the bullet. The underlying
frontal bone was fractured and depressed. The underlying meninges of the brain as well as the
frontal area of the brain was traumatized and injured. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid were leaking
from this wound. The edges of this bullet wound was inverted thus this was the gunshot entry
wound. The wound was found to be circular in shape. The exit wound was found at the left parietal
bone measuring 1.2 cm. in size or diameter for this wound communicated with the entry wound of
the left side of the forehead. The connection from the wound of entry to the exit wound measured 8
cms. The parietal bone was fractured and was depressed and the parietal part of the brain and
meninges was traumatized. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid as well as brain tissues leaked out from
this wound.

Possible cause of death:

1. Gunshot wound at the head (left side) with injury to brain and meninges
2. Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe loss of blood)

(Sgd.) Ivar G. Arellano

MUN. Health Officer[3]

Dr. Charity Patalinghug and the victims daughter Loreta C. Claro signed Emmanuels Certificate
of Death.[4] The appellant surrendered to the police authorities but failed to surrender the firearm he
used to kill the victim. Forensic Officer Myrna P. Areola of the PNP Regional Office subjected the
appellant to paraffin tests. The Chemical Analysis of the paraffin casts gave the following results:

FINDINGS:

...

1. POSITIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his left hand cast.

2. NEGATIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his right hand cast.[5]

Norberta also testified on the expenses incurred by her family due to her husbands death. No
documentary evidence was, however, offered to support the same. She declared that she felt sad and
lonely as a result of her husband's death.

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful
act with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when
he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom
holding a handgun with his right hand.Emmanuels trigger finger was outside the trigger guard, and he
held the firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant took
hold of Emmanuels right hand with his left, and pulled the gun towards Emmanuels stomach. The
appellant grabbed Emmanuels free hand with his right hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees
to the ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuels
forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. The bullet hit Emmanuels forehead. Norberta fled from the
house. For his part, the appellant rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the
dining table before entering his bedroom. When he went back to the dining room to get the gun, his
younger sister, Enrica told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun. He found Edwin outside
their house near the church, and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun into the sea. When
the appellant asked his brother to show him where he threw the gun, Edwin refused to do so.
Marcial Lucio corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that he was talking with the
appellant at around 9:00 p.m. at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets when the victim Emmanuel
passed by in his pedicab. When the appellant called the victim, the latter ignored the call, prompting
the appellant to chase the victim, and eventually push the pedicab into a canal.
The appellants father, Iigo Retubado, testified that on the evening of November 5, 1993, he was
in their house with Edwin, his son who was mentally-ill. It was already late when the appellant
arrived. The appellant was disheveled, and laid down the gun he was carrying on the table. The
appellant told his father that he would surrender to the police because he had shot somebody.[6] The
appellant thereafter went to his room to change clothes while Iigo went to the comfort room to answer
the call of nature. When he was done, he saw the appellant frantically looking for the gun. As Edwin
was also nowhere to be found, Iigo concluded that Edwin might have taken the gun with him. He also
testified on Edwins mental imbalance and on the latters confinement at the Psychiatric Department of
the Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City sometime in 1991.[7]
On November 6, 1993, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Although he was
required by the municipal trial court to file his counter-affidavit, the appellant refused to do so.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. TCS-2153,
convicting the appellant of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder under Art. 248 R.P.C. and sentences the accused to the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00.

However, accused is given full credit of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.[8]

On appeal, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I

First Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED AS CAUSED
BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF CAUSING IT WHILE THE ACCUSED
WAS PERFORMING A LAWFUL ACT WITH DUE CARE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IT ERRED IN
NOT CONVICTING HIM JUST MERELY OF HOMICIDE INSTEAD OF MURDER.

II
 Second Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VERY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL
CONTENTS OF EXHIBIT B OF THE PROSECUTION --- CHEMISTRY REPORT, PARAFFIN TEST
-- WHICH ARE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED.

III

Third Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE
WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION IS SATISFACTORY AND SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED OF MURDER.

IV

Fourth Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ACCUSED HAS
EXPLAINED WHY HE FAILED TO SURRENDER THE GUN WHICH HE GOT FROM THE
DECEASED.[9]

The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending himself when he
grabbed the victims hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the bullet hit the victims
forehead. The accident was not the appellants fault. The appellant asserts that when he wrestled with
the victim for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He contends that he had
no intention of killing the victim, as he merely wanted to talk to his son. If he had wanted to kill the
victim, he could have easily done so when he met the latter for the first time that fateful night
of November 5, 1993. Moreover, the appellant submits, he did not commit any felony; hence, under
paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he is not criminally liable for the death of the
victim.[10] In the alternative, the appellant asserts that he should be convicted only of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery
is wanting. He and the victim had a heated exchange of words before they grappled for the possession
of the gun. Such heated discussion had already forewarned the victim and placed him on guard; thus,
treachery cannot be legally considered.
The contention of the appellant has no merit. Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.

...

4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another
provided that the following requisites are present:

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
 The provision was taken from Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:

ARTICULO 8.

7. El que para evitar un mal ejecuta un hecho que produzca da en la propiedad ajena, siempre que
concurran las circumstancias siguientes:

Primera. Realidad del mal que se trata de evitar.

Segunda. Quesea mayor que el causado para evitarlo.
Tercera. Que no haya otro medio practicable y menos
perjudicial para impedirlo.

Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not an accurate translation of the Spanish
Penal Code. The phrase an injury does not appear in the first paragraph in the Spanish Penal
Code. Neither does the word injury appear in the second subparagraph of the Spanish Penal Code.
The justification is what is referred to in the Spanish Penal Code as el estado de necessidad:

Es una situacion de peligro, actual o immediato para bienes, juridicamente protegides que solo
puede ser evitada mediante, la lesion de bienes, tambien juridicamento protegidos, pertenecientes a
otra personas.[11]

The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave
peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical
rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la vida, la
integridad corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another.[12]
It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional
provocation of the party invoking the same.[13]
A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of
necessity is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not commit a crime in legal
contemplation; hence, is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil liability is borne by the person/persons
benefited by the act of the accused. Crimes cannot exist unless the will concurs with the act, and
when, says Blackstone, a man intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful, the deed and
the will act separately and there is no conjunction between them which is necessary to constitute a
crime.[14] Others are of the view that such act is a cause for exclusion from being meted a penalty; still
others view such act as a case of excluding the accused from culpability.
According to Groizard, rights may be prejudiced by three general classes of acts, namely, (a)
malicious and intentional acts; (b) negligent or reckless acts; (c) acts which are neither malicious,
imprudent nor negligent but nevertheless cause damages.

Nuestra propiedad puede ser perjudicada, puede sufrir detrimentos por tres clases de hechos. Por
actos maliciosos, intencionales, encaminados directamente a causarnos dao; por actos que, sin
llevar ese malicioso fin y por falta de prudencia, por culpa o temeridad del que los ejecuta, den ese
mismo resultado, y por actos que, sin concurrir en su ejecucion un proposito doloso, ni culpa, ni
negligencia sin embargo produzcan menocabo en nuestros bienes.[15]

The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution
because if such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the
prosecution can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a
question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The legal aphorism is
that the findings of facts by the trial court, its calibration of the testimony of the witnesses of the parties
and of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions based on its own findings are accorded
by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued
or misapplied cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will change the
outcome of the case. We have meticulously reviewed the records and find no basis to deviate from
the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the
author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.
First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch
of their house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the
latters shoulders. She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot
the victim on the forehead, thus:
Q Now, you said that when your husband was about to go out again in order to see
his trisicad and as he opened the door he saw Jesus Retubado near the door. What
happened after that?
A He asked Jesus Retubado why Jesus Retubado chased him when he was driving
his trisicad.
Q Now, as your husband was asking this question to the accused Jesus Retubado what was
the distance to your husband at the time?
A Just very near to him.
Q And you to the accused at that very moment what was more or less your distance?
A About an armslength.
Q When your husband asked Jesus Retubado why the latter chased him while your husband
was driving his trisicad what was the answer of Jesus Retubado, if any?
A My husband asked the accused Jesus Retubado what is his grudge to him and Jesus
Retubado answered that it is not you who has a grudge to me but it is your son.
Q When Jesus Retubado uttered that statement what transpired after that?
A He immediately pointed his firearm that he was bringing (sic) to my husband Emmanuel
Caon.
Q By the way considering that you were just near to both your husband and the accused
where did that firearm that you said was pointed by the accused to your husband
come (sic) from?
A While the accused was standing in front of our door his hands were placed inside his T-
shirt covered by his T-shirt.
Atty. Pepito:
We move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive, Your Honor. The question was, where
did it come from?
COURT:
Let the answer stay in the record but let the witness answer again.
A From the hands of accused Jessie.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, just a while ago you were making a motion using your hand placed inside your T-
shirt. Now, when you saw the firearm for the first time where did you saw (sic) the firearm
for the first time where did the firearm come from as you saw it from the hands of the
accused?
Atty. Pepito:
Already answered. It came from the hands of the accused.
Fiscal Pansoy:
I will reform.
Q Before you saw the firearm in the hands of the accused where did the firearm come from?
Atty. Pepito:
She is incompetent. We object.
COURT:
Reform the question.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, before this question was asked to you as to where the firearm came
from you were making a motion by placing your hands inside your shirt when you were
only asked as to where the firearm came from?
A That was what the position of the accused when he was standing in front of our door and
I do not know what was inside his T-shirt. I only know that he was carrying a firearm
when it fired.
Q Now, when the accused pointed the firearm to your husband and fired the same more or
less what was the distance between the accused and your husband at the very precise
time when the firing was made?
A It was just very near because his hand did not bend. (Witness demonstrating by pointing
to her forehead).
Q Now, more or less, describe to the Court the approximate distance between the firearm
that was pointed to your husband and the forehead of your husband at the time when
the firing was done?
A It touched the forehead of my husband.
Q That was the very time that you heard the gunburst?
A Yes.
Q When the accused fired the firearm that was carried by him, what happened to your
husband?
A My husband fell down backward to the ground inside the house.
Q By the way, what was the flooring of your house where your husband fell backward to the
ground?
A Cemented.
 Q By the way considering that you were just very near to where the incident occurred can
you describe the length of the firearm that was used by the accused in firing your
husband?
A It was a short firearm about 6 inches.
Q Now, as your husband fell down to the floor where did the accused proceed and what did
the accused do?
A He was just casually walking away as if nothing had happened.
Q Now, what did you do to your husband, if any, after he fell down to the floor?
A I have done nothing because I was somewhat shocked. I could not move because I was
shocked.[16]
Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the
police authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the
victim. The appellants claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to
change his clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities
that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the
sea. The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the victim
in a state of necessity.
Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim. The victim ignored the appellant
as the latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the poblacion of Tuburan. The
appellant was incensed at the effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The appellant followed
the victim to his house where the appellant again confronted him. The appellant insisted on talking
with the victims son but the victim refused to wake up the latter. The appellant, exasperated at the
victims intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt and shot the victim on the forehead. It was
impossible for the victim to survive. With the appellants admission that he shot the victim, the matter
on whether he used his right or left hand to shoot the latter is inconsequential.
We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present
case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present,
namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.[17] The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the
abovementioned conditions. Thus, the appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Although the Information alleges that the appellant used an unlicensed firearm
to shoot the victim, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant had no license to possess the
same. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm to commit homicide
should not be appreciated against the appellant.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned himself
in to the police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his arrest.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity[18] to the heirs of the deceased. In addition,
the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00[19]and the temperate damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of actual damages was offered.[20]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Jesus
G. Retubado alias Jessie is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim,
Emmanuel Caon, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages. SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted
and the innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the
Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof.In the present case, a careful reexamination convinces
this Court that an accident caused the victims death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible
witnesses create a reasonable doubt on appellants guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 28, 2001 Decision[2] and the October 30, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAGR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment [4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno
Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner]
ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.[6]

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:

That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any
justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting upon the latter
gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim
thereafter.[7]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondents version of the facts as follows:

Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Concepcion, Iloilo.
On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at
the Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in
the municipality in December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by
the Concepcion Elementary School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with other
School Administrators. When his wife asked him, Why will you be arrested? [H]e answered [Even I]
do not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for
my arrest.

Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary
Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar
Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.

Later that day, about a little past 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went
near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly
for tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa: Lets go to the investigation
room. The investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is located. The
jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation
room.

At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the
side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding
from the holster.

When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation room, two (2)
gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a
.45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa
be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not provided) happened to be at the crime scene as
he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr.
Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.

Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an
autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:

Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.

Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by sutures, surrounded
by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From
left heel, directed medially backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals
space into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating left ventricular
wall causing punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x
0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0
cms. From right heel (2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm.
on its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From anterior
midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal
cavity, perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit,
ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of
9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.
REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.

Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboas body were gunshot
wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and
exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to
right. As to the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was
probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and the gun must have been a little bit
higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of the ribs,
left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was
inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the guns nozzle to the right side front of the victim. The
distance between the entrance points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters.[8]

Version of the Defense

The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them
from the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone
eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:

Erna Basa:

x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon; at about
past 2 oclock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of
words which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify
and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she was inside
the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three
meters away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly
pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun. x x
x.

Eden Legaspi:

x x x [A]s early as 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the investigation
room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 oclock that same afternoon while there
inside, she heard a commotion outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the commotion
started they were seated on the bench and after the commotion that woman soldier (referring to
Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of
a gun and immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place where she was
seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.

Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:

He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then attached
to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2 oclock or
past that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation;
as he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it,
all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun;
Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by the police of Concepcion
and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard
to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa walking with him,
he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was
holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away from
him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his
gun with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he
held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his
efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry
the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds,
he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds
the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun; more grappling followed and five
seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the
attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster until
it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber and
cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he used his left
hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach
the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than
Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of them was stronger;
after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying stop that and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime
after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and said that the case
be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when his gun was put in its holster only its
handle protrudes or comes out from it.

Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that happened during
the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of San Dionisio
and that case involves other persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also
the chance to invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he
took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took
Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the
investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty meters, more or less, from
the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the commanding officer, officer
of the operations division and that of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim
tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the
victim; the hand of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his
gun; that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell
whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from the tip of
its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his gun was fully loaded and
cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed them and probably reported the incident to their
commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense;
when his commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took away his gun he did not
tell him anything.

Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.

He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas
Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he made an
autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with
trajectory medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory
somewhat going upward; at the same time of his examination he saw this victim to be wearing a
light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any
powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to be
powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the pocket of the jacket of the
victim.[9]
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful
in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots
were fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before
it went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots;
and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of
petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of
Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,[10] the CA maintained that a revolver is not
prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because
of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the
trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had
to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have
been intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire.[11]
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:

[Petitioners] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been shot only
once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby establishing
[petitioners] determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming
without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been followed by another
shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was
hit on two different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles,
means that there was an intent to cause the victims death, contrary to [petitioners] pretensions of the
alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that the location, number and gravity of the
wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the
incident. x x x.[12]

Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had
miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this
justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion
of the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the
commission of the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate
court in this manner:

x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must
use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of
public position. (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is no showing that
the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former fetched the latter from the
stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the
commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial courts finding that the said aggravating circumstance
that [petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the crime cannot be
sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum
of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for
the crime of homicide. x x x.[13]

Hence, this Petition.[14]

 Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioners
conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to convict the petitioner,
in contrast to petitioners overwhelming evidence to support his theory/defense of
accident.
II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of
the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner
was in full control of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa
were both holding the gun in forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor generals observation that the
fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioners determined effort to kill the
victim.
IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented when
it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of
petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling ensued.
V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioners reaction to the incident
when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly
argues against his claim of accidental shooting.
VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in
determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at
the victim when the same was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-
defense are inconsistent.
VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages.[15]
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas
Balboa was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Accidental Shooting

Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive.[16] Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact
finding. But where some facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may
overturn the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in
dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination
is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

xxxxxxxxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intent of causing it.

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due
to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled.[17] Thus, in determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in
control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired

The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the
incident firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events
of that fateful afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That
commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion
which you heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be
understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you
were inside the investigation room as part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking
somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this
case? Am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw
both of them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It
was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and
Sgt. Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the
possession of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboas hand was also
there. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as
they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would
touch each other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was
released from its holster and then there was an explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to
because the gun was turning.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was
the one holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was
then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the
handle of the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you
testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front
of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoys right and Balboas left
sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards
each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun
and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held
by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the
trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the
gun with his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the
same hand holding the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore
whose hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the
gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, Daw duha na sila nagakapot, what you really
mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have
previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoys right hand was
still on the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand
of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing his right hand with her left
hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of the left hand is
somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
 Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its
holster and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up
to the time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand of
Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab
the handle of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away
from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using
his left hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of
Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir.[18]
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the
scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried
to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon
was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of
petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while
his left was warding off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances,
petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately
aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: [Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the
left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely
lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun.[19]
Release of the Guns Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
 Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless
released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence
showed that the weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this
fact could only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This
conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This
frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was
fierce and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be
dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and
the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the
claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the
mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in
question, explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:

x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when
fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying
again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location
of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim
of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing
Balboas upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioners hand over the gun;
the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboas body as he was
falling down and releasing his hold on petitioners hand x x x.[20]

Thus, the appellate courts reliance on People v. Reyes[21] was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it over
to the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun
accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present case
involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the
gun used in Reyes.[22]Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner,
is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds

On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all
frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioners claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It
held that if there was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x
each other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead
to an inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta.[23]
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise
moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the
existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes
inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession
of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory
of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness
account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties positions were unsteady, and that
the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the
eyewitness testimony as follows:
 Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to
because the gun was turning.[24]
xxxxxxxxx
Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they
were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.[25]
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:

x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First, because the
position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons holding the
gun when it fired. This is especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession
of the gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.

[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the victim during the
grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit
Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45
pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun
down as he was going down. When the gun went off the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of
the bullet in Balboas body was going upward because his upper body was pushed downward
twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination, petitioner
testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we separated from each other. This
sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were grappling over the gun and
were moving very fast. x x x. [26]

Presence of All the

Elements of Accident

The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act
with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused,
there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury.[27] From the facts, it is clear that all these elements
were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend
his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody.Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate
escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
 Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent
his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had
kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially
within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the
deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention
of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm
the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in
the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law.The removal of the gun
from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which
led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create
serious doubt on the latters culpability.
Petitioners Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt

To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident
was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was dumbfounded,
according to the CA; was mum, pale and trembling, according to the trial court. These behavioral
reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After all,
a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating
room; and, in the next breath, he was looking at his companions bloodied body. His reaction was to
be expected of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense

Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot

Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no
intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in
order to defend oneself from imminent danger.[28] Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not
occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose
of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental
result of both parties attempts to possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner
-- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion
of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner
is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 1352, Mar 29, 1905 ]

US v. APOLONIO CABALLEROS ET AL. +

DECISION
4 Phil. 350

MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven
years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder
perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France,
John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principal or
as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the
crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm
this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is
a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but that he was in a
banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began
to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter
called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts
which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any
way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the
contrary, since Baculi, as well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate,
expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor
was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his
supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary,
Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal
proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who
made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for
the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through
the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them.
Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force,
intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of
the Philippine Commission.)
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems
to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his
judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants
criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we
acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered,
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.