Francisco v. House or Rep.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,

sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment complaint never made it to
the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that
the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not
been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body,
has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the
word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a
first complaint that never got through the Committee, no impeachment
complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S

1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second

impeachment complaint valid?

HELD
1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean,
as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means “to perform or facilitate the first action,” The Court pried
the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers
of the Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing
of the verified complaint to the Committee on Justice of the Lower House.
This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an
impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint.
2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article
XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Lacson v. Perez
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion
(Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering
the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests
of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter
effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas
corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc.
No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the
information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until
this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly
faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that
hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the
warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May

6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and
academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the
police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts
for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests
of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the
circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc.
No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this
time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in
law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial
authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for
the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to
claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither
assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they
expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare
the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding
their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no
complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ
of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful
restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their

undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives,
and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting
Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in
relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: In the wee hours of 27 July 203 some 300 junior officers and enlisted
men of AFP, heavily armed stormed the Oakwood Premiere in Makati
demanding for the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defence and
Chief of the PNP. By virtue of Proclamation 427 dated 27 July 2003, state of
rebellion was declared and General Order No 4 of the same date, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to
suppress and quell the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the
Constitution. The soldiers returned to barracks on the same night and the
declaration of state of rebellion was lifted on 1 August 2003 by virtue of
Proclamation No 435. In the interim, several petitions were filed before the
Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4. Sanlakas contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no
sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General argues that the petitions
have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.
Issue: Whether or not declaring state of rebellion is needed to declare
General order No 4?
Decision: Petitions dismissed. The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and
has rendered the case moot.
Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. The case at bar is one such case. The mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration
of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. The
presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion
with due regard to constitutional rights

Kilos Bayan Vs. Morato

Facts :
• In a previous decision, the Court invalidated a contract of lease bet PCSO
and the Phil Gaming Mgt Copr on the ground that it was made in violation of
the PCSO’s charter
• Hence, the PCSO and PGMC entered into a new equipment lease
agreement (ELA).
• Petitioners in the 1st case again came to Court seeking to nullify the ELA in
the ground that it is substantially the same as the nullified contract.
• PCSO/PGMC questioned the standing of the petitioners and argued that
they lack cause of action.

Issue :
1. WON petitioners have standing and cause of action
2.WON the contract of sale should be nullified.
Held :
1. No Standing.

Ratio :
• The grant of standing in the 1st case (Kilosbayan vs. Guingona) does not
bar the SC from looking into the issue again. That is not the law of the case
as the petitioners claim because though the cases

involved the same parties, the cases are not the same. (The contracts are
subtantially different according to the Court). Moreover, the 7-6 ruling
granting the standing in the 1st case is a « tenous one that is not likely to be
maintained in subsequent litigation ».
• In this case, strictly speaking, the issue is not standing but WON the
petitioners are real-party-in-interest as required by Rule 3 sec. 2 of the
Rules on Civil Procedure.
• Stading is a constitutional law concept which requires a « partial
consideration of the merits as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas ». It is a question on whether
parties « alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to
assure the concrete adverseness, which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largly depends for illumination of difficult
constitutitonal questions »
- A party must show (citing Valmonte vs PCSO) that :
a. not only the law is invalid but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direcy injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not only in an indefinite way.
- now, in this case, the petitioners suing as taxpayers failed to allege that
taxes have been misspent. The Senators did not show « that their
prerogatives as legal have been curtailed ».
• Neither are they real parties in interest. A real-party in interest is the party
who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment or the « party entitled
to the avails of the suit ».
- the parties only cited provisions under Art II of the Constitution such as :
sec. 5 (general welfare clause) ; sec. 12 (that the right of the parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the govt, « sec. 13. State recognition
for the vital role of the youth in nation-building and promotion of their
physical, moral, spritual, intellectual and social well-being.
- These are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action. They do not embody judially enforceable
constitutional rights but for guidance for legislations.
- This is actually a case for annulment of a contract such as the real parties
in interest can only be :
a. parties to the contract
b. parties which are principally or subsidiarily to one of the parties or whose
rights with respect to that party are prejudicial
c. have a right to be part of the public bidding but have been illegally
excluded from it.

2. No cause.
Ratio :
• The features of the 1st contract that made it actually a joint enture
agreement are not present herein. There is only a lease contract in the form
of the ELA which is not against the PCOS’s charter.
• Actively, the PCSO is not absolutely prohibited from entering into joint
ventures so long as it itself holds or conducts the lottery. It is however
prohibited from investing in companies offering the same games.
• E.O. 301 requires public bidding only for the purchase of supply and not
lease agreements.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona

Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to
prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed
by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in
connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto.

Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on

the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said
contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P.
Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate
the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and
propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of
judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the
instant suit.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant
petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

RULING: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the
procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The
Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary
taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-
profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the
validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various
government agencies or instrumentalities.

As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether
the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be
gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of

Lease is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.
Petitioner corporation composed of citizens suing in their capacities as
senators, taxpayers, and concerned citizens, opposed the Contract of Lease
between PCSo and PGMC which sets up an on-line lottery system on the
basis or serious moral and ethical considerations. The SC ruled that a party’s
standing is a procedural technicality which the courts may, in the exercise of
its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised in this
petition. The court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they
be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside the technicalities of
procedure. Insofar as taxpayers’ suit are concerned, the Court has declared
that it is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be
entertained or that it enjoys an open discretion to entertain the suit or not.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Estrada was charged of the violation of the Anti-Plunder Law (RA
7080, amended by RA 7659.) on April 4 2001. Petitioner filed Omnibus
Motion initially alleging the lack of a preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offense, and opportunity to prove lack of
probable cause, all of which were quashed. On June 14, petitioner moved to
quash the Informations filed against him. Sandiganbayan denied motion,
hence appeal to SC.
Petitioner: 1. Anti-plunder Act is unconstitutional under the “void for
vagueness” doctrine which states that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute.
2. Anti-Plunder act in unconstitutional for being overbroad, which states that
a government purpose may not be achieved with means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of constitutionally
protected freedoms
3. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with due process since
the terms in S1, par. D and S2 (“combination”, “series”, “pattern”) are
precisely vague & overbroad, which denies the petitioner of the right to be
informed of the nature & cause of the accusation against him.
4. Anti-Plunder act is unconstitutional for it dispenses with due process since
the S4 thereof sets a lower standard for the modicum of evidence required
to convict person than that which is required for criminal cases, which is
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague and overbroad
2. Whether or not the Anti-Plunder Law lowers the threshold for evidence in
violation of due process
3. Whether or not Plunder as defined is malum prohibitum, which means
that criminal intent need not be proved in order to convict person.
Held: 1. NO. There are several levels of reasoning which the SC used.
a. presumption of constitutionality of a statute- basic principle that a
legislative enactment is presumed to be in harmony with the Consti. Every
intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of
its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort.
b. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of
the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. 1. words
of a statute will be interpreted in the natural, plain & ordinary acceptation,
except in cases where it is evident that the legislature intended a technical &
special legal meaning
2. a statute is not rendered uncertain & void merely because general terms
are used, or because it employed terms that were not defined. There is no
statutory or constitutional command that the Congress needs to define every
word it uses. Inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
3. challenge of a statute for being “vague” can only be applied for those laws
which in the face are utterly vague and cannot be clarified by a saving clause
or by construction.

c. the overbroad and vagueness doctrines, according to the SC, have a

special application for free-speech cases & are inapt for testing the validity
of penal statutes.
Therefore, the Anti-Plunder law does not violate due process since it defines
the act which it purports to punish, giving the accused fair warning of the
charges against him, and can effectively interpose a defense on his behalf.
2. NO. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the
accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The petitioner’s contention that the
language of the law which states that not every act of amassing wealth
needs to be proven, but only a pattern or series of acts, dispenses with the
requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is unfounded. The prosecution
still has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the acts constituting plunder
(though not all) occurred, and these predicate acts form a pattern. Hence it
does not lower the level of evidence from “beyond reasonable doubt” to
“mere preponderance”. Further, S4 on “for the purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder”, a procedural & does not define a substantive right in favor
of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy.
3. NO. Plunder is mala in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Mens
rea must be proven. Again, this only means that the Anti-Plunder Law does
not establish a lower level of evidence.

Aquino v. Comelec
Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new
2nd district of Makati stating that he has been residing there for ten months.
When his candidacy was opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy
stating that he has been residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of
a contract of lease. COMELEC dismissed petition for Aquino’s disqualification
and garnered majority vote on 1995 election. Mateo Bedon filed for
suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in favour of Bedon hence
the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency
requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for
Aquino to qualify he must prove that he has established not just residence
but domicile of choice. Clearly, the place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home” where he eventually intends to
return and remain – his domicile – is what the Constitution speaks of
residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is not an indicia
of the right to vote or to be voted upon

Marcos vs. Comelec,

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy
Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,
education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She
went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was
elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of

the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate
for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought
to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to

be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The

court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s

domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of

domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary

residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

Philconsa vs. Mathay

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of
the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment
of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker

and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved
just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation
is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The
reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who
took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December
30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in
the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only
the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators
who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the

increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the
Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without
distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the
full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure,
using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident
the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components
of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the
House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10),
the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of
the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the
increase in compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided
by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of
all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
Ligot vs. Mathay,
Facts: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of
P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court’s unanimous
decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement
claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the
unapproved amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s
request for reconsideration was denied, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement using php 32k?

Decision: Petition denied. To grant retirement gratuity to members of
Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the
basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)
would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the
salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency

Coseteng v. Mitra,
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of
Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her
as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal –
a request backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth
member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the
House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the
replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and
injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan,
Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that
their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats
and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further
alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other
congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political

question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with
the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and
that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of
the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional

representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a
political question but because revision in House representation in CA was
based on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP
members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This
granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to
LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the
Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an
opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the
House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House
seats in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because

they are not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements
for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have

been nominated and elected by their parties because of members were
nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson
in that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.
Guingona vs. Gonzales
Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties
represented in the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as
follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The
LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a
whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able
to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation
in the CA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Held: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and

election of the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18
of Art. VI of the Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it
is not in compliance with the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected
on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the
political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a
breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP
an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of the
minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The
provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character
and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation.

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be
elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and
that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding
directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a proportional
representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that
the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an
indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution.
The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate
of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional
membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed
by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted,
so long as it has the required quorum.
Tanada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern

as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal
of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring
the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law
or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published
in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
Armault vs. Nazareno
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime
in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special
committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who
delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to
the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions
in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer
its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out
their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee
may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but
the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due
process of law.
Armault vs. Balagtas
FACTS:Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the
negotiations for the purchaseof the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by
the Government of the Philippines. The price paidfor both estates was
P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the Philippines adopted
Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine
"whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the
price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor,
any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the
investigation conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution,
petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or
P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this
question, whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines
Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when
he shall reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the
person who received theP440,000 and to answer questions pertinent
thereto.In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid,
petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit, Exhibit A, wherein he gives in
detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed
circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The
Committee did not believe this. The Committee adopted Resolution No. 114
on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:RESOLUTION
APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS
CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID
PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALLHAVE
PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.ISSUE:1.)Whether or not
a court may review a finding by the Senate Special Committee in not
believing the affidavit produced by the petitioner in giving the name of Jess
D. Santos asthe one who received the P440, 000.2.)Whether or not the
continued confinement and detention of the petitioner-appellee, as ordered
in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952 valid.HELD:
1.)No. The courts should avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its
exercise of departmental discretion in the means used to accomplish
legitimate legislative ends. Theonly instances when judicial intervention may
lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional
inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative
discretion. In the absence of a clear violation of a constitutional inhibition,
the courts should assume that legislative discretion has been properly
exercised. All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken
against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the
constitutional guaranteeof due process has been accorded him before his
incarceration by legislative order, and this because of the mandate of the
Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or
property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully
been extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be
heard personally and by counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval
of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.2.)YES. In the previous
case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201, it was
admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a
witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry,
to compel him to give the information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power,
not its punitive power. The argument is that the power may be used by the
legislative body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to
the performance of its duties. No act is so punishable unless it is of a nature
to obstruct the performance of the duties of the legislature.The principle that
Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses
is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
orincidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate
said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and
information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge andinformation, if it is impotent to
punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each
branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently
of the other's authority andpower. And how could the authority and power
become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act
of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the
legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority
must be distinguished fromthe judicial process by which offenders are
brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment which the
criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the
legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because the
former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process,
whilethe latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the
criminal law.We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the
exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the course of the
legislative process, the legislature's
authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be
supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion
and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of
constitutional limitations, the exercise of the authority is not subject to
judicial interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon,supra)