Thick Aesthetic Concepts

Author(s): Roman Bonzon

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Spring, 2009), pp. 191-
199
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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 ROMAN BONZON

Thick Aesthetic Concepts

I. THICK CONCEPTS concerned, not with uses of thick ethical te

(which he called "secondarily evaluative terms
The term 'thick concept' was introduced but withinto uses of more general, or thin, eth
terms like
philosophical discourse by Bernard Williams in 'good,' 'right,' 'wrong,' and 'ough
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, in was the in con-
connection with these that he first arg
text of a discussion of the fact-value distinction.1
that their use in a given context has both a desc
He was interested in the extent to which tivethis anddis-an evaluative meaning, which never
less drive
tinction is found in the linguistic data that can ina principle always be distinguished. I
essay
certain kind of moral theorist, rather than on "Descriptivism" he considers the u
simply
the term 'good' in the locution 'good wine.' So
being imposed upon the data by his interpretation.
one who as
What Williams had in mind were such concepts says that Colombey-les-deux-eglises v
courage, brutality, and gratitude, whichtage "seem 1972 tois a good wine is doing so because it
express a union of fact and value. The away certainthese taste, bouquet, body, and so forth. H
notions are applied is determined by ever, whatthe the fact that there is not a name for the
cise complex
world is like (for instance, by how someone has of descriptive qualities that mak
behaved), and yet, at the same time, theira good wine is no reason to suppose that the
appli-
scriptive
cation usually involves a certain valuation of the meaning of the term 'good wine' can
bea isolated.
situation, of persons or actions."2 To call woman We can invent a word and teach
brave or courageous is to characterizebody her-toher recognize the taste denoted by the w
Hare believes
character, actions, dispositions, or demeanor- inthat we could do this "whether or
not he wasor
a certain way and to regard her as admirable himself disposed to think that these
liquids
praiseworthy on that basis. To say that she is tasted
kind good, or that, if they were wines,
is also to hold her up as worthy of praisethey or weread-good wines. He could, that is to say,
miration, but for quite different reasons,learn thewhilemeaning of [the invented name] quite
calling her foolhardy may be disparaging independently
her be- of his own estimation of the merit
havior on grounds not wholly dissimilar of wines
to thosehaving that taste."5 This strategy, Hare
that would excite admiration as bravery.claims,
The termsworks also "when, as in most moral and
that express these concepts, according to aesthetic
Williams, cases, there is no one word which has
"certainly do not lay bare the fact-value justdistinc-
the descriptive meaning that we want, but a
tion. Rather, the theorist who wants multitude
to defend of possible ways of describing, in greater
or lesser detail,
the distinction has to interpret the workings of the sort of thing we have in mind."
these terms, and he does so by treating "It them
is," he continues,
as "very hard to say what it is
about a particular
a conjunction of a factual and an evaluative ele- picture which makes us call it a
ment, which can in principle be separated good one; frombut nevertheless what makes us call it a
one another."3 good one is a series of describable characteristics
Williams refers in a general way to combined
the work in just this way."6
of R. M. Hare as paradigmatic of this kind In laterof writings, Hare explicitly considers the
treatment. However, in his earlier writings
strategy(be- in relation to the more specific, substan-
fore Moral Thinking of 1981) Hare was tive,chiefly
or thick ethical concepts like cruel and rude.

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67:2 Spring 2009

© 2009 The American Society for Aesthetics

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192 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

The presumption
In the case of 'rude,' he says that that such
"it value
is concepts
possi- de-
ble to accept that an act
marcatesatisfied
a complex of descriptive
the descrip-
features that
tive conditions for being calledgrasped,
can be registered, 'rude' without
and subsequently de-
being committed to evaluate it adversely,
ployed independently even
of an evaluative perspec-
though 'rude' is normally
tive onan adjective
the world of adverse
just is the fact-value distinction,
evaluation."7 which Hare, so far from finding in our employ-
mentthis
Now Williams thinks that of valuestrategy
terms, actually imposes upon it.
of isolat-
ing the descriptive content of a thick concept by
finding or inventing a term that captures only it
and not also the evaluative aspect
II. AESTHETIC CONCEPTS depends upon a
fundamental misunderstanding of how thick con-
cepts work. How we apply It would
thick seem that there is a perfectly
concepts, accord- natur
tension of Williams's
ing to Williams, is a function of our and McDowell's analys
inhabiting
the realm
an evaluative perspective that of is
aesthetics. Indeed, I would
not available togo s
someone not endowed with the interests and sen- as to argue that the idea of a thick concept is
sitivities that shape and are in their turn shapednaturally at home here than in ethics. Afte
by that "form of life." It is not at all a matter aesthetics is centrally concerned with fitting
of standing outside that perspective and neutrallygether accounts of perceptual sensitivity, disc
registering the occurrence of a complex of fea-ination, judgment, taste, criticism, and evalu
tures, which then becomes the basis for commen-concerning the diverse productions of a cul
dation or condemnation, for competent use of theparticipation in which is logically presuppose
relevant terms. Rather, it is the evaluative stance these capabilities, whereas ethics usually has
that enables sensitivity to the features. Hare seemsuniversal ambitions. But the idea that there are
to think that anyone can perceive or be trained tothick aesthetic concepts has been denied, either
perceive the features in virtue of which the termforthrightly or qualifiedly, by some recent promi-
'courage' is applied. Williams's view is that onlynent aestheticians- Frank Sibley, Nick Zangwill,
those whose interests and feelings can be engagedJerrold Levinson, and Malcolm Budd. In this es-
by courageous acts can have a common basis forsay, I defend the idea against these attacks by first
applying the term. giving an account of the nature of aesthetic con-
In a note, Williams adds that "[t]he idea that cepts and then making clear where I believe the
it might be impossible to pick up an evaluative attackers have gone wrong.
concept unless one shared its evaluative interest The comments we tend to make about works
is basically a Wittgensteinian idea," which he firstof art and other objects of aesthetic interest seem
heard "expressed by Philippa Foot and Iris Mur-broadly to be of two kinds, corresponding to two
doch in a seminar in the 1950s."8 But the more im-kinds of broad concern. We may describe them,
mediate influence he cites is John McDowell. In or we may appraise them- that is, assign them
"Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Impera- some aesthetic value.10 But this distinction is not
tives?" "Virtue and Reason," and most directly in so stark as it may initially appear, for certain of our
"Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following," McDow- descriptions (or appraisals) appear already to in-
ell argues that volve appraisal (or description). To say of a piece
of music that it is "graceful," for example, seems
it seems reasonable to be sceptical about whether the at once to characterize it and to praise it; to call
disentangling manoeuvre here envisaged can always abe painting "garish" is to condemn it, perhaps on
effected; specifically, about whether, corresponding to account of its glaringly bright colors. As Hume
any value concept, one can always isolate a genuine fea- observes near the beginning of his essay "Of the
ture of the world- by the appropriate standard of gen- Standard of Taste," "[t]here are certain terms in
every language which import blame, and others
uineness: that is, a feature that is there anyway, indepen-
dently of anyone's value experience being as it is- to praise,
be and all men who use the same tongue must
that to which competent users of the concept are to agreebe in their application of them. Every voice is
regarded as responding when they use it: that which unitedis in applauding elegance, propriety, simplic-
ity, spirit in writing, and in blaming fustian, affec-
left in the world when one peels off the reflection of the
appropriate attitude.9 tation, coldness, and a false brilliancy."11 While

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 Bonzon Thick Aesthetic Concepts 193

ties are picked

importing praise or blame, out by descriptive
these terms termsclearly
and can d
figure in positive,
termine certain descriptions of negative,
their or neutral aesthetic
object. Wh
makes for propriety inappraisals.
writing is different fr
what accounts for spiritedness.
Finally, we may say thatWe have
the mosaic is brilliant.therefo
to consider three types of
A judgment terms
like this, or
which Zangwill calls aconcepts
"sub-
employ in talking or thinking about
stantive aesthetic judgment," objects of a
plainly incorporates
thetic interest. an evaluation of its object.15 It is not merely a
There are, first, such general
description evaluative
of it. Unlike 'beautiful,' however, the term
as 'beautiful,' lovely/term 'ugly,' andthe'hideous,'
'brilliant' does indicate presence of spe- who
function in aesthetic judgments cific descriptive properties inis simply
virtue of which the to in
cate the value of the objects term is applied- in to this case,
which the bright and rich
they are a
plied. Following Sibley, welines
colors, strong may call
and contrasts, these sole
and dynamic
evaluative aesthetic terms, composition. Sibley expressing
refers to such a term as an thin ae
thetic concepts.12 Although evaluation-added term.they Further apply
examples include to thing
on the basis of other properties 'elegant,' 'garish,' 'gaudy,' and
the 'graceful,' as well as
things posse
no indication is given thoseof what
mentioned by Hume in these other pro
the passage I quoted
erties might be. 'This above.
mosaic is beautiful' clai
aesthetic value for the Now object
the question isdenoted, say t
this: Does an evaluation-
Alexander mosaic found in the House of the Faun added aesthetic term represent merely a conve-
at Pompeii, without giving the basis for the claim.nient linguistic device for pairing an aesthetic eval-
Nick Zangwill, tracking the distinction at the leveluation with its detachable descriptive basis, or
of judgments, calls such claims uverdictive aes-does it instead denote a thick aesthetic concept? In
thetic judgments."13 the next section, I will begin to present consider-
The mosaic also possesses properties that do ations in favor of thinking that evaluation-added
not imply any degree of aesthetic merit at all.aesthetic terms denote thick aesthetic concepts. I
Calling attention to them does not commit one towill then turn to various denials of this thought
a favorable or unfavorable attitude toward their and, in the process of dealing with them, hope to
bearer. Sibley labels the terms we use in talk- complete my case.
ing about such properties descriptive merit terms.
There are of course all sorts of things we say
about beautiful things that have little to do di-III. THICK AESTHETIC CONCEPTS
rectly with their aesthetic value. The mosaic, for
instance, is around nineteen feet by ten feet, isConsider two mosaics- the Alexander mosaic and
made of well over a million tesserae, dates froma reproduction that closely resembles it in ways
the second half of the second century B.C., de- specifiable in purely descriptive terms. (There is
picts a battle between Alexander and Darius III, in fact such a copy of the mosaic, situated where
and was discovered during excavations at Pompeii the original- now preserved in the Museo Archeo-
in 1831. Perhaps a better name for these types of logico Nazionale in Naples- was found. My use of
properties would be simply 'descriptive.' But there this example does not, however, depend upon this
are other descriptive properties that can be- andfact.) Let us imagine that in fabricating the repro-
indeed typically are- used to support aesthetic duction the artisans successfully labored to ensure
evaluations without themselves being evaluative,that the appearance of the original was captured to
and for these the name 'descriptive merit' is apt.the fullest extent the physical materials allowed.
Among descriptive merit terms we might intro-We can go even further and say that the origi-
duce a further division. There are those that des- nal and copy share a great many descriptive merit
ignate emotive or expressive qualities like somber, qualities. Both are lively, vibrant, dynamic, rich,
solemn, sentimental, gay, melancholy, sad, joyous', and unified. Nevertheless, for reasons made famil-
behavioral qualities like nervous, lively, vehement, iar by Frank Sibley's seminal essay on "Aesthetic
placid', reactive or affective concepts like mov- Concepts," we can easily imagine that the two
ing, tragic, comic, shocking, glaring', and gestalt, differ in their evaluation-added properties, that
formal, or "regional" qualities like asymmetric, the original is brilliant while the copy is garish.16
unified, balanced, coherent, loose.1* These quali- And in consequence we can come to accede to

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 194 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

opposing claims concerning their

tions for being solely
called rude evalua-
without being commit-
ted to evaluatemosaic
tive properties- the Alexander it adversely. (What
is ais thing
not possible,of
beauty, while its copy isas not.
I would argue
What in line explains
with the argument of the
this?
First, it should be clear that
preceding evaluation-added
paragraph, is for one to accept that an
act satisfied
properties determine solely all the conditions for
evaluative being called rude
properties,
so that any two works to being
without which committed the same
to evaluate sub-
it adversely.)
stantive aesthetic judgments
And the reason apply will
is that a wholly notchar-
descriptive dif-
fer with respect to any acterization
verdictive of an act or an object cannotjudg-
aesthetic entail
ment. Put another way, thatany difference
it has any between
value, ethical or aesthetic, at all.
two works at the verdictive level must be traceable Therefore merely descriptive characteriza-
to some difference at the substantive level. And tions of an object cannot entail that it has
this should be clear because the concepts desig- any evaluation-added properties, since these do
nated by evaluation-added terms are criteria for entail that it has some solely evaluative property.
the application of concepts designated by solely And this is where my disagreement with Zang-
evaluative terms; they are what ground general will begins. For he makes room for a conception
of substantive aesthetic judgments- couched, re-
evaluative claims. This is a point Zangwill insists
upon. "Something which is beautiful cannot be member, in the language of 'elegant,' 'graceful,'
barely beautiful. It must be beautiful because 'brilliant,'
it 'garish,' and the like- that represents
them as wholly descriptive and therefore deriv-
has various substantive properties [i.e., properties
described by substantive aesthetic judgments]."17 able from other merely descriptive characteriza-
In a later paper Zangwill expands on this: tions. It turns out that he wants to allow for the
possibility of analyzing the concepts referred to by
these terms both as thick aesthetic concepts and as
Substantive judgments do not describe neutral features
mere
of things but ways of being beautiful or ugly. We can put conjunctions of description and evaluation.
He writes: "The role of substantive aesthetic de-
the point in terms of the function of the judgments. The
function of verdictive judgments is simply to pick out scriptions, whether or not they have an evaluative
content, is to pick out properties that determine
aesthetic value and disvalue; and the function of substan-
aesthetic merit or beauty. If they have evaluative
tive judgments is to pick out the substantive properties
that determine aesthetic value and disvalue. Substantive content, then it is analytic that they determine
them. If they do not have evaluative content, then
judgments are there to serve verdictive judgments.18
it is not."19 And he wants to leave open the pos-
It should also be noted, however, that purelysibility that substantive aesthetic judgments have
descriptive or even descriptive merit propertiesno evaluative content because he is frankly skep-
cannot by themselves directly ground verdictive tical of the existence of thick aesthetic concepts:
aesthetic judgments; they must first be conceptu- "[W]hen we use substantive descriptions ... we
conversationally imply an evaluation. So evalua-
alized at the substantive level. This was something
Hare failed to recognize in his discussion of the tion is not part of the content or sense of the judg-
ment. Instead, we infer that the person making
thin term 'good' in the locutions 'good wine' and
'good painting.' The function of this term is simplythe judgment also makes the evaluative judgment
evaluative; it does not, and indeed cannot, allowfrom the use of the language in a context."20
anyone to isolate the descriptive basis upon which To support his contention that evaluations can
be merely conversationally implied by substan-
the term is applied, for the simple reason that there
is no such thing. Rather there are diverse conglom- tive aesthetic judgments, Zangwill relies on H. P.
Grice's account of conversational implicatures as
erations of descriptive properties that are relevant
"cancellable." On this view we can, to return to
to the application of different evaluation-added
terms. A good painting is good (that is, beautiful orour example, claim that the Alexander mosaic
aesthetically meritorious) because it is graceful oris brilliant, expecting our audience to understand
because it is brilliant. It is these evaluation-added
that it is characterized by certain purely descrip-
concepts that implicate descriptive properties. But tive or descriptive-merit properties, but at the
there was something right about Hare's later dis-same time somehow convey to them that we mean
cussion of evaluation-added terms. It is possible toto withhold an attribution of aesthetic merit- by,
accept that an act satisfied the descriptive condi-for example, explicitly cancelling the favorable

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 Bonzon Thick Aesthetic Concepts 195

appraisal that is merely

Then, heconversationally
denies that there are thick conceptsimpli
in
by the term. There areaesthetics,
two forthings
two reasons. to be said abo
this in response. First, Levinson supposes with respect to what
we have been calling the evaluation-added term
'gaudy' that "it seems possible to approve a work
IV. DEFENDING THICK AESTHETIC CONCEPTS CONTRA
LEVINSON AND BUDD for its gaudiness, say, or despite its gaudiness. This
suggests that the essence of gaudiness is not a
judgement of disapprobation on the speaker's part
First, it seems to be just wrong. Reflect upon the
but instead a kind of appearance: a perceptually
kind of thing Zangwill is asking us to make sense
of: manifest effect one can register independently of
any evaluative assessment of or attitudinal reac-
tion to that effect."25 Now I agree that it is possi-
A: "That's a striking mosaic. What do you think of it?"
ble to have a favorable aesthetic evaluation of a
B: "I think it's absolutely brilliant- but I don't think it work despite its gaudiness, because it might have
has any aesthetic merit." other evaluation-added properties that outweigh
this defect; but this admission has no tendency to
What is A supposed to make of B's remark, or of show that gaudy is not a thick aesthetic concept.
any similar remark phrased in terms of a synonym The possibility of aesthetically approving some-
for 'brilliant'? Only that B does not really under- thing despite its gaudiness is perfectly consistent
stand the meaning of his terms. Indeed, Zangwill with the conception of gaudiness as a thick aes-
later retreats from his position when he considers thetic property. Indeed, if part of the essence of
the case of elegance. "Can the elegance of some- gaudiness when attributed to a thing is disappro-
thing ever be a demerit? It is difficult to see that bation, then that would easily explain why it is
it could. If something is elegant, it seems that that possible to speak sensibly of its being outweighed
necessarily counts toward its being beautiful or in an overall judgment. However, I cannot see how
aesthetically meritorious, even if other features it is possible to approve a work for its gaudiness
can outweigh that merit in an overall judgment unless either it is baldly assumed that 'gaudy' is a
of value."21 Upon further consideration, he allows purely descriptive term or else aesthetic approval
that "there may well be a residual class of substan- is fully assimilated to personal preference. One
tive aesthetic descriptions which are intrinsically can, after all, simply like bad things.
evaluative."22 If so, then my only difference with Second, Levinson, following Zangwill, sup-
him would be- possibly- over how extensive the poses that "the evaluative implications, loosely
set of thick aesthetic concepts is, and not over its speaking, of terms like 'gaudy'- which perhaps
existence. derive, in part, from past histories of use in connec-
This is the place, before I give my second re- tion with particular canons of criticism or taste-
sponse to ZangwilFs account of substantive aes- can be explicitly cancelled or disavowed with-
thetic judgments, to address what Jerrold Levin- out semantic anomaly."26 He goes further than
son and Malcolm Budd have to say on this matter. Zangwill, however, in supposing that the evalua-
Unlike Zangwill, Levinson is uncompromising in tive implications of every evaluation-added term-
his denial of the existence of thick concepts. He even of a term like 'graceful'- can be suspended:
denies, first, that there are thick concepts in ethics: "Grace would seem to be aesthetically contra-
"Whether someone is courageous, honest, or mer- indicated in an expressionist painting or sculp-
ciful would seem to be open to straightforward ture of the mass executions at Babi Yar. If so,
observation, although observation of a complex then even gracefulness may not be, tout court, a
sort, and by an observer versed in the human form pro tanto merit in works of art, and the positive
of life."23 The argument seems to be that because evaluative overtones of its attribution to a work
these properties are available to bare observation, may be only a matter of conversational implica-
they are not inherently evaluative.24 But this is just tion."27 By 'aesthetically contra-indicated,' Levin-
Hare's view of things, and Williams's and McDow- son, I take it, means that a painting or sculpture of
ell's strictures are therefore immediately applica- such a subject in such a style would be aesthetically
ble. I will take this up in more detail when I present bad if it were graceful. But granting this need not
my second response to Zangwill (in Section V). force one to accept that the positive evaluative

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 196 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

implications of 'graceful' can

taken to be abe suspended,
merely and
descriptive property and not
an irreducibly
thereby concede that there are no evaluative
thick one, anaesthetic
assumption that
Budd himself
concepts. What Zangwill says aboutis not prepared to countenance.
a parallel case
seems right. Delicacy is out of place, that is, contra-
indicated, in an aesthetically successful
V. DEFENDING triumphal
THICK AESTHETIC CONCEPTS CONTRA
arch; however, "delicacy does
ZANGWILLnot merely outweigh
AND SIBLEY

some important positive feature of the rest of the

design, instead it destroysI now
it. Butturn to thenthe second of my responses
the positive
value of the delicate part or aspect
Zangwill's original remains."28
position. In my first respo
Why cannot grace destroy therejected
I simply rough-hewnthe claim that, bold-
in every case
evaluative force of
ness of the sculpture or painting, evaluation-added
doing terms can be
so precisely
because its favorable aspect coherently cannot
denied. I will be denied?
now argue that even if
A thick concept account itof werethepossibleevaluation-added
to cancel the evaluative impli-
term would in fact explain- cationsrather
of some particular
than usebe
of anunder-
evaluation-
mined by- the phenomenon added term,
of this would not show that
aesthetic these terms
contra-
indication. did not designate thick aesthetic concepts. For the
In a recent article on "The Intersubjective Va- issue is not that of simply cancelling the evalu-
lidity of Aesthetic Judgments," Malcolm Budd ation when one already knows how to apply the
goes over much the same ground as my Section II. thick concept, as Zangwill seems to think. The real
"But," he says, question is how one learns to use the concept in
the first place.
although aesthetic judgements are susceptible of this
In any given case, one might cancel the favor-
threefold division, there is no need to deal separately
able aesthetic evaluation inherent in using some
with evaluation-added judgements. For the evaluative
thick aesthetic concept either (a) because one does
element of an evaluation-added judgement has as its
not currently /ee/ the approbation that is the nor-
specific object the property attributed to an item, as, for
mal condition of its use or (b) because one no
example, the brightness of the colouring is the specific
longer shares the value linked to that approba-
object of the evaluative element of the judgement that
tion. In case (a), one recognizes that the substan-
a painting is garish. Hence an evaluation-added judge-
tive aesthetic judgment is appropriate (and even
ment can be assimilated, in one respect, to a purely eval-
correct) but for various psychological reasons is
uative judgement, and, in another respect, to a purely
unable to experience the associated feelings, and
descriptive judgement. It is in fact a combination of therefore unable to affirm aesthetic value.30 One
two judgements, one purely descriptive, the other purely
can see what the fuss is all about, but one is too de-
evaluative: its purely descriptive element consists in at-
pressed or distracted to feel and therefore endorse
tributing the signified property to an object and its purely
it. After a recital of Chopin's waltzes, I can agree
evaluative element consists in the signified aesthetic
with my companion that the pieces are elegant, but
value (of the property attributed).29
be too distracted to affirm their beauty. In case (b),
But is this right? Surely when we call a paint- one has so revised one's aesthetic framework that
ing garish, we do so on account of its obtru- the concepts that used to be central to it no longer
sively bright colors. We are saying that the painting matter. One can still grasp that the thick aesthetic
is garish, not its bright colors. The bright colors concept properly applies, but can no longer see
themselves are neither aesthetically bad nor aes- what the fuss is all about. The waltzes can seem to
thetically good; they are- simply- bright. And in belong to a bygone and unlamented age.
another painting their brightness may not be ob- But neither of these possibilities can be used
trusive, and in fact may be responsible for its bril- to prove that evaluation-added aesthetic terms
liance. For suppose we were to say that the bright are mere conjunctions of descriptions and eval-
colors were themselves garish, and that it is this uations-that, as Levinson puts it, "the evalua-
garishness that transfers to the painting and makes tive implications, loosely speaking, of terms like
the painting garish. Then the bright colors would 'gaudy'- which perhaps derive, in part, from past
have to have some other property in virtue of histories of use in connection with particular
which they are garish; the bright colors cannot be canons of criticism or taste- can be explicitly can-
barely garish- unless, of course, garishness is being celled or disavowed without semantic anomaly."

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 Bonzon Thick Aesthetic Concepts 197

Indeed, they rather prove that

content together in thetheyconcept justareis the not
atti- a
that they cannot. For tudeunless one
or feeling it calls forth.first hador a f
And the attitude
grasp of the thick aesthetic concepts
feeling cannot unchangeably fasten that
itself uponwe a
now able to recognize as what
different these
set of qualities, terms
since it cannot be charac- ref
to, one has no purchase on
terized the terms
independently at all.
of the descriptive content
This is a point McDowell
to which it originally
is united. What enablesmade us to groupcon
cerning thick ethicalobjects
concepts. Hare
of aesthetic interest and
together Levin
as elegant
son suggest that it isis possible
not their commonto isolate
possession featur
of some perhaps
in the world that one can specified
complexly simply observe
set of nonaesthetic or d
qualities,
tect, and then invent but
a purely descriptive
the appropriateness term
of our use of the concept
more complex description
of elegance-to capture
along them,
with its inextricable element ofwit
out first having learned
favorable to seewith
evaluation- these
respect tofeatures
them. Cor-
forming the descriptive content
rect applications of thick
of such concepts require partic-ethi
concepts- as fused together
ipation in theby the
aesthetic sensibilities,
interests, cognitive reper-
terests, emotions, feelings, and attitudes
toire, and evaluative that
practices of their users, a like-for
their evaluative content: mindedness and like-heartedness with them; the
concepts are simply not discernible from the out-
Consider, for instance, a specific conception of some side. Subjects without our emotional economy or
moral virtue: the conception current in a reasonably co- lacking our aesthetic tastes or our cognitive capac-
hesive moral community. If the disentangling manoeu- ities could not possibly grasp or deploy them.
vre is always possible, that implies that the extension of Sibley, whose classification of the kinds of terms
the associated term, as it would be used by someone who we use in aesthetic judgments framed the discus-
belonged to the community, could be mastered indepen- sion of aesthetic concepts in Section II, is actu-
dently of the special concerns that, in the community, ally skeptical that his three-part classification of
would show themselves in admiration or emulation of terms corresponds to a three-part division of prop-
erties. He thinks there are no properties that are
actions seen as falling under the concept. That is: one
could know which actions the term would be applied both
to, evaluative and descriptive. With regard to the
application of evaluation-added terms, he speaks
so that one would be able to predict applications and
of the possibility, "if we were fastidious language
withholdings of it in new cases- not merely without one-
self sharing the community's admiration (there needusers,
be of inventing a merely descriptive term" to
be the counterpart of any given evaluation-added
no difficulty about that), but without even embarking on
an attempt to make sense of their special admiration term. But, he says,
But is it at all plausible that this [manoeuvre] can always
be brought off?31 I think no such heroic course is called for, first, because
even if these terms do have an evaluation-added use, it
The descriptive features of actions
seems to form
me to beno natu-
secondary and that the terms 'hon-
ral kind, such as would give them shape in
est,' 'courageous,' the ab-
'intelligent,' etc. are available as plain
sence of a communal evaluative perspective.
descriptive Be- because if their main
terms, and secondly,
havior that superficially resembles
use werebravery could
evaluation-added, it would presumably always
be foolhardy; actions that appear generous
be possible could
to make clear by the context and appro-
be naive. It is perception colored
priateby ethical
disclaimers con-
that only the descriptive element is
intended.32
cern, and not perception alone, that enables one
properly to classify cases.
In aesthetics, the use of evaluation-added terms
Given the account of thick aesthetic concepts I
must be such as to denote thick aesthetic con- have presented, my response to Sibley is straight-
forward. The "heroic course" he mentions just is
cepts, since there is no way of teaching someone
what the terms mean unless he or she could be the disentangling maneuver McDowell is skepti-
brought to share the affective attitudes, see the cal of. No "merely descriptive" term can possi-
same saliencies, and make the same discrimina-bly capture what is captured by an evaluation-
tions, as mature users of the terms. One cannot added term, because what an evaluation-added
term captures is more than a mere description.
pry the descriptive content apart from the attitude
or feeling aspect, since what holds the descriptive
Second, it seems to be a misunderstanding of the

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 198 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

meanings of such terms concepts

as 'honest'
is right, then thereand 'coura-
are no ethical merit-
geous,' and their aesthetic conferring properties with nonevaluative
counterparts such namesas
either.
'elegant' and 'brilliant,' to Moral works,that
claim too, are to they
be identifiedare
with
generally available as plainthe totality of features that are terms-
descriptive relevant to their as
opposed to particular uses ethical appraisal. cancellation of
where
Like Strawson, Sibleyexplained.
evaluative force can be satisfactorily thinks that there is an
important difference between moral and aesthetic
judgments. But his hostility to a thick concept in-
VI. CONCLUSION
terpretation of evaluation-added aesthetic terms
leads him to question Strawson's explanation in
Suppose we grant that evaluation-addedtermsterms al- of identity for works of art. In-
of criteria
stead, and
ways refer to thick concepts, in both ethics he proposes
aes- that in moral judgments an
thetics. I indicated at the beginning of evaluation-added
Section II term is applied to an object
on was
that I thought the idea of a thick concept the basis of some determinable characteristics,
more
at home in aesthetics than in ethics. I will not at- such that other objects sharing such characteristics
tempt to argue for this thought here, but I willwould merit the same evaluation-added term. In
end this essay with a gesture in the direction of anaesthetic judgments, by contrast, the evaluation-
argument. added term is applied only on the basis of some
Sibley's "Particularity, Art, and Evaluation," determinate characteristics that are unshareable
where he voices his reservations about evaluation- between two objects.37
added terms, was designed to be a response to an In his very influential earlier paper on "Aes-
essay by P. F. Strawson originally written in 1953,thetic Concepts," Sibley had argued that detec-
"Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art."33 Straw-tion of these determinate characteristics was an
son had suggested that an important difference be-exercise of aesthetic taste.38 What is interesting is
tween moral judgments and aesthetic judgmentsthat the kinds of consideration he advanced for
can be located in the fact that the former are based this claim are not unrelated to the kinds of con-
on general rules and principles, while the latter aresideration that favor a thick concept analysis of
not. He credited an earlier essay by Stuart Hamp- evaluation-added terms. It might therefore be the
shire, "Logic and Appreciation," with the insightcase that any difference between moral and aes-
that thetic judgments would depend upon the possi-
bility of appealing to a more or less robust coun-
it is quite meaningless and empty to praise a man's char-
terpart to the exercise of something like aesthetic
acter or express moral approval of one of his acts without
taste in the moral domain.39
having reasons of a certain sort- of such a sort that giv-
ing the reasons would involve mentioning, in terms not
ROMAN BONZON
themselves evaluative, generally applicable criteria of
excellence in men or lightness in acts; whereas judgment Department of Philosophy
in aesthetic matters is not thus wedded to non-evaluative Augustana College
Rock Island, Illinois 61201
descriptions of general features of the thing judged."34
internet: romanbonzon@augustana.edu
Strawson's explanation of this difference relied
on his account of the criterion of identity for a
work of art as "the totality of features which are 1 . Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosoph
relevant to its aesthetic appraisal."35 While moral (Harvard University Press, 1985). The anthropologist Clif
judgments involve attributions of evaluative prop- ford Geertz used the term 'thick description' in the ope
ing essay of his Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Ba
erties on the basis of nonevaluative properties,
Books, 1973). He says he borrowed it from two essays
"there are no aesthetic merit-conferring proper- Gilbert Ryle, "Thinking and Reflecting" and "The Think
ties, with non-evaluative names."36 But Strawson, of Thoughts," in Gilbert Ryle, Collected Papers, Volume
in his interpretation of evaluation-added ethical (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971).
2. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 129
terms, makes the same mistake as Hare, Levinson,
3. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 13
and Sibley. Attributions of evaluative properties 4. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Claren
are not made solely on the basis of nonevaluative don Press, 1952), p. 121; R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reas
properties: if what I have said about thick ethical (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 24-25, 27, 187-191.

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 Bonzon Thick Aesthetic Concepts 199

22. Zangwill, "The in

5. R. M. Hare, "Descriptivism," Beautiful,
his the Essays
Dainty, and theon th
Moral Concepts (University of California Press, 197
Dumpy," p. 18.
pp. 57-58. 23. Jerrold Levinson, "Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative
6. Hare, "Descriptivism," p. 59. Force, and Differences of Sensibility," in Aesthetic Concepts:
7. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Essays after Sibley, ed. Emily Brady and Jerrold Levinson
Press, 1981), pp. 74-75. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 63.
8. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 219, 24. It is not clear what Levinson means by the phrase
n.7. 'versed in the human form of life.' Obviously, this must be
9. John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Harvard
read as evaluation-neutral, on pain of committing him, after
University Press, 1998), p. 201. all, to the existence of thick ethical concepts.
10. We can also assign them some nonaesthetic value: 25. Levinson, "Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force,
pedagogical, historical, financial, sentimental, and so andon.Differences
I of Sensibility," p. 63. Emphases in the
will ignore these in my discussion. original.
11. David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 2nd para- 26. Ibid.
graph. 27. Levinson, "Aesthetic Properties, Evaluative Force,
12. Frank Sibley, "Particularity, Art, and Evaluation," in and Differences of Sensibility," p. 64, n. 13.
his Approach to Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 28. Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the
p. 91. Dumpy," p. 18.
13. Nick Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the 29. Malcolm Budd, "The Intersubjective Validity of Aes-
Dumpy," in his Metaphysics of Beauty (Cornell University thetic Judgements," British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007):
Press, 2001), p. 9. Emphasis in the original. 333-371, quotation from p. 335.
14. I have adapted this classification from Goran Her- 30. Dom Lopes forced me to acknowledge this qualifi-
meren, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities (Lund University cation in an earlier paper of mine, "Fiction and Value," in
Press, 1988), p. 106. Imagination, Philosophy, and the Arts, ed. Matthew Kieran
15. Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the and Dominic Mclver Lopes (London: Routledge, 2003),
Dumpv " p. 9. p. 168.
16. Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts," in his Approach 31. McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, pp. 201-202.
to Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp. 3-4: 32. Sibley, "Particularity, Art, and Evaluation," p. 93.
"[AJesthetic qualities always ultimately depend upon the Emphasis in the original.
presence of features which, like curving or angular lines, 33. P. F. Strawson, "Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of
colour contrasts, placing of masses, or speed of movement, Art," in his Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen,
are visible, audible, or otherwise discernible without any ex- 1974).
ercise of taste or sensibility. Whatever kind of dependence 34. Stuart Hampshire, "Logic and Appreciation," in Aes-
this is, and there are various relationships between aesthetic thetics and Language, ed. William Elton (Oxford: Basil
qualities and non-aesthetic features, what I want to make Blackwell, 1954). It originally appeared in World Review
clear in this paper is that there are no non-aesthetic fea- 1952. Strawson, "Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art,"
tures which serve in any circumstances as logically sufficient p. 182.
conditions for applying aesthetic terms." 35. Strawson, "Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art,"
17. Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the p. 185.
Dumpy," p. 19. Emphasis in the original. 36. Strawson, "Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art,"
18. Nick Zangwill, "The Concept of the Aesthetic," in p. 186.
The Metaphysics of Beauty, p. 34. Emphases in the original. 37. Sibley, "Particularity, Art, and Evaluation," pp. 95-
19. Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the 101.
Dumpv," D. 19. Emphases in the original. 38. Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts."
20. Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the 39. Work on this essay was supported by an Augus-
DumDV." d. 16. Emphases in the original. tana College Presidential Research Fellowship. I thank
21. Zangwill, "The Beautiful, the Dainty, and the Tim Bloser for helpful comments on a draft of this
Dumpy," p. 17. essay.

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