People vs.

Tandoy
192 SCRA 98 (1990)
Best Evidence Rule

FACTS:

On May 27, 1986, detectives of the Makati Police conducted a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati. The
target area was a store along the said street, and detective Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting
for any pusher to approach. Soon, three men approached him. One of them was Mario Tandoy who said: “Pare, gusto mo bang
umiskor?” Singayan answered yes. The exchange was made then and there—two rolls of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00
bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit). The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. The marked money and eight foils of
marijuana were found on Tandoy’s body. An information was filed against Tandoy. The RTC of Makati found him guilty of violating
RA 6425. Tandoy appealed. In his appeal, Tandoy invoked the best evidence rule and questioned the admission by the trial court of
the Xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Xerox copy of the marked P10.00 bill is excludible under the best evidence rule.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the Solicitor General’s Comment which refuted the contention of Tandoy. The
best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a Xerox copy
thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Air France vs. Carrascoso

18 SCRA 155 (1966)

Best Evidence Rule

FACTS:

Carrascoso, bought a first class ticket to go to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in first class but on their
stop-over in Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced the plaintiff to vacate his seat in order to make room for a “white
man”, who, the Manager aleeged, had a better right to the seat. After a brief commotion wherein Carrascoso said he would leave
his seat on over his “dead body,” he gave it up.

The CFI decided in favor of Carrascoso , while the CA affirmed the decision but reduced the award further.

During the trial, one piece of evidence that was admitted was the alleged entry by the purser employed by the defendant
and testified to by the plaintiff. The alleged notebook entry, read “First class passengers was forced to go to tourist class against his
will and that the captain refused to intervene”. Defendant charges that such testimony by Carrascoso is incompetent for being
hearsay.

It is claimed by Air France that such piece of evidence comes within the proscription of the Best Evidence rule they are
claiming such entry could not have been proven by mere testimony but by presenting the notebook itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entry in the notebook is incompetent as evidence?

RULING: Yes.

The subject of inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the Best
Evidence rule. It is admissible.

Besides, from a reading of the transcript above mentioned, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startiling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment,
are ADMISSIBLE AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE. For they grow out of “the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of
the declarant.”

The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res
gestae.

It is not within the Best Evidence Rule as the entry was made outside the Philippines by the employee of Air France. It
would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso’s testimony. If it were true that no entry was made
the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
De Vera vs. Aguilar
218 SCRA 602 (1983)
Best Evidence Rule

FACTS:

Petitioners (all surnamed De Vera) and respondent Leona (married to Mariano Aguilar) are the children and heirs of the late
Marcosa Bernabe. Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land. Such property was mortgaged by petitioners to Bordador.
When the mortgage had matured, the respondents Spouses Aguilar redeemed the property, and in turn Bernabe sold the same to
them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Then, an OCT was issued in their name. Three years later, the petitioners wrote to
the respondents claiming that as children of Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof. The
petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Bernabe. Petitioners De Vera filed a suit for reconveyance
of the lot. The TC rendered its decision ordering the reconveyance of the lot. In ruling for the petitioners de Vera, the TC admitted,
over the objection of the respondents Aguilar, a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of sale executed by respondents in favor of Bernabe.

On appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed. The CA found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has
not been duly proven by petitioners, so secondary evidence (Xerox copy of deed of sale) is inadmissible. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

RULING:

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the
court. The sufficiency of proof for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the TC.

In the case at bar, the TC merely ruled in the existence and dye execution of the alleged deed of sale. The existence of the
alleged deed was proved by the Xerox copy. In establishing the execution of a document, the same may be accomplished by the
person(s) who executed it; by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or by any person who was present and saw
it executed or who, after its execution saw it and recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties had confessed the
execution thereof. The petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged deed through the testimony of the
notary public.

The loss or destruction of the deed may be proved by any person who knew the fact of its loss or by anyone who had made,
in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place(s) where papers of similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all duplicates must be accounted for before using copies.
For since all the duplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be
regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable. In the case at bar, the notary public testified that the
alleged deed of sale has about 4 or 5 original copies. Hence, all these must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. These petitioners failed to do. Decision affirmed.
Villa Rey Transit vs. Ferrer
25 SCRA 845 (1968)

Best Evidence Rule

FACTS:

Jose Villarama was an operator of a bus company (Villa Rey Transit) pursuant to CPCs granted him by the PSC. In 1959, he
sold 2 CPCs to Pangasinan Transpo. Co. (Pantranco) with the condition that Villarama shall not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU
service competing with buyer. 3 months later, Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed wherein the wife and relatives of Jose
Villarama were the stockholders and the incorporators. The Corporation. then bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando. The Sheriff
levied 2 out of the 5 CPCs pursuant to a writ of execution in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, Fernando’s judgment creditor. The 2 CPCs were
sold at auction with Ferrer as highest bidder. Ferrer then sold these 2 CPCs to Pantranco . Thus, VRTI filed a complaint for
annulment of the sheriff’s sale of the CPCs in favor of Ferrer and its subsequent sale to Pantranco. The CFI declared these sales as
null and void. Hence, this appeal. It is the contention of Pantranco that Jose Villarama and the Corporation were one and the same.
Therefore, the non competition clause embodied in the deed of sale entered into by Jose Villarama is also binding to the
Corporation. The evidence presented by Pantanco to prove its contention is Photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers. Jose
Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that no evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them
since “they were merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the originals themselves”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers (Exh. 6 to 19 and 22) showing that Villarama had co-
mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of VRTI are admissible in evidence?

RULING:

Yes. Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exhibit 22 which are photostatic copies of the ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama
had co- mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of the Corporation are very illuminating evidence.
The requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party are: a.) opponent’s
possession of the original; b.) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; c.) satisfactory proof of its existence; d.) failure
or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court.

Said requisites have been complied with. Villarama has practically admitted the 2nd and 4th. As to the 3rd, he admitted their
previous existence in the files of VRTI and had even seen some of them. As to the 1 st, he said that the originals were missing and
that VRTI was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence
to show that the original is in the actual possession of the adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that
the writing is in his possession or under his control.

Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, on being notified to produce it, admit having
it in his possession. Secondary evidence is admissible where he denied having it in his possession. The party calling for such
evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is “when the
original has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court.” The original of the vouchers must be deemed to have been lost as
even VRTI admit such loss. Thus, said evidence, though secondary, are admissible.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
192 SCRA 209 (1990)
Parole Evidence Rule

FACTS:

Salonga filed a complaint for collection against Cruz. Salonga claims that Cruz borrowed from him
an amount of P35,000, and that only P20,000 had been paid. Salonga also alleges that he and Cruz
entered into a “pakyawan” agreement, whereby the latter would grant him an exclusive right to purchase
the harvest of certain fishponds. Salonga claims that Cruz failed to comply with his part of the agreement
by refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount of indebtedness. Cruz admitted
having received P35,000 but denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. He contends that these
amounts were received by him not as loans, but as consideration for their “pakyaw” agreement. He added
that it was Salonga who owed him money since Salonga actually occupied the fishpond, and has not paid
rentals for the 10-month period. It was also established that after a preliminary harvest, they entered
again on a verbal agreement whereby Salonga and Cruz had agreed that Cruz, who was then leasing from
Yabut, will sublease the fishpond of the latter to Salonga. Sometime later, the owner of the fishpond,
Yabut, took back the fishpond from Cruz. Salonga now claims that aside from the P35,000 he delivered,
he also paid P28,000 to Cruz, which constituted the consideration for their pakyaw agreement. This was
evidenced by a receipt. Cruz testified, along with his 2 witnesses, that the receipt explained the
transaction behind the pakyawan agreement. However, it is argued that the receipt is very clear in its
language and its tenor must not be clouded by any parol evidence introduced by Cruz. Furthermore, it is
contended that the receipt is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction referring to the pakyawan
agreement.
The CA disregarded the parole evidence offered by Cruz, and now appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the parole evidence may be admissible to explain the relationship between the receipt and
the “pakyawan” agreement.

RULING:

The parole evidence is not applicable in the case at bar. The rule is predicated on the existence of a
document embodying the terms of an agreement, but the receipt only attested to the fact that Cruz
received P35,000 from Salonga. It is not and could not have been intended by the parties to be the sole
memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, the receipt does not even mention the transaction that
gave rise to its issuance. At most, the receipt can only be considered a casual memorandum of a
transaction between the parties and an acknowledgement of the receipt of money executed by Cruz for
Salonga’s satisfaction. A writing of this nature, is not covered by the Parol Evidence Rule.

A receipt is a written acknowledgement, of the manual custody of money or property. It is not

intended to be an exclusive memorial and the facts may be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt.
This is because usually a receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction independently existing, and
not conclusive.

Although the word, “pakyaw” was mentioned in the receipt, Cruz and his witnesses testified to
show when and under what circumstances the amount was received. Their testimonies do not in any way
vary or contradict the terms of the receipt.
 A deed is not conclusive of every fact stated therein. A distinction should be made between a
statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be
varied by parol evidence, but the latter may not. The Parol Evidence Rule clearly refers to the terms of the
agreement, or contractual act.

The statement in the receipt is just a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct
act of payment made by Salonga. Its reference to the amount as consideration of the pakyaw contract
does not make it part of the terms of the agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to
explain the receipt, particularly with respect to the date when said amount was received.

Even assuming that the receipts were covered by the Parol Evidence Rule, no objection was made
by Salonga when Cruz introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and
issuance of said instrument. The rule is that objections to evidence to must be made as soon as the
grounds therefore become reasonably apparent. For Salonga’s failure to object to evidence introduced by
Cruz, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.

Parol evidence admissible.

Lechugas vs. Court of Appeals

143 SCRA 335 (1986)

Parole Evidence Rule

FACTS:
Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the Lozas, alleging that the
latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding
to the middle and northern portion of the property owned by the Lechugas. She alleged that they
appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and refused to surrender the possession of the same
despite demands. The complaint was dismissed but Lechugas appealed to the RTC. Victoria Lechugas
testified that she bought the land now subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a
public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which plaintiff had caused to be registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds. Loza et. al. on the other hand, maintain that the land which Lechugas bought from Leoncia
Lasangue in 1950 is different from the land now subject of this action. Their evidence in chief is that their
predecessor, Hugo Loza, purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor, and the adjoining parcel of
land from one Emeterio Lasangue. These two parcels of land were consolidated during the cadastral
survey while the remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, was designated separately. The
Lozas claim that the lot bought by Lechugas from Lasangue is situated south of the land now subject of
this action.

Leoncia Lasangue, Lechugas’ vendor, testified for the Lozas, stating that she sold six hectares of
her inherited property to Lechugas under a public instrument. The land sold to her is the one south of the
land in litigation. Lasangue herself, although illiterate, was able to specifically point out the land which she
sold to the Lechugas.
 The CA admitted and gave credence to the testimony of the Lasangue regarding the sale of the
disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed between Lasangue
and Lechugas. Lechugas now contends that the CA erred when it subjected the true intent and agreement
to parol evidence over her objection. She alleges that parol evidence should not be admissible in order to
vary the subject matter of the deed of sale, because the land described therein is delimited by metes and
bounds. Furthermore, Lechugas argues that to impugn a written agreement, the evidence must be
conclusive.

ISSUE:

Whether the testimony of the vendor, which is contrary to the terms of the agreement, is
admissible as an exception to the parol evidence rule.

RULING:

Lechugas’ reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was
executed by Lasangue in favor of Lechugas. However, the dispute over what was actually sold is between
Lechugas and the Lozas. Hence, Lasangue is a stranger to the dispute, and is not bound by the parol
evidence rule.

The testimony of Lasangue is admissible. The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not
properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim
on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

The parol evidence rule applies only as between parties to the written agreement or their privies.
However, strangers to a contract are not bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the
construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases. The parole evidence rule does not apply where either
one of the parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement, and does not
claim under or through one who is party to it.
People vs. Mendoza
264 SCRA 18 (1996)
Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

Facts:

Gina Mendoza was put to fire in her home. She suffered fourth degree burns and died of
hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns. Rolando Mendoza, husband of the said deceased,
was charged with parricide for the death of Gina.

The prosecution presented Paul Michael, a five-year old son of Gina and Rolando, as a witness. He
testified that on the evening of the death of Gina, his father Rolando boxed his mother on her mouth and
tied her up. He declared that he saw kerosene and matches in their house. On rebuttal, Paul Michael
stated that his father burned his mother because they quarreled when his mother wanted him to go with
his father to the street corner, to which Rolando objected. He asserted that his father, who was drunk,
tied the victim’s hands behind her back, poured kerosene on the front of her body and set her aflame.

The accused denied the allegations of the prosecution and impugned the capacity as a witness of
the eyewitness Paul Michael.

The trial court gave credence to Paul Michael’s testimony and convicted Rolando.

Issue: Whether or not Paul Michael is a competent witness

Ruling:

Paul Michael is a competent witness. According to section 20 Rule 130, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses. A boy, four or
five years of age, thus, can satisfy the above-mentioned requirement because he can already speak and
understand things happening around him. Moreover, the fact that Paul Michael was found in a state of
shock after his mother burned clearly shows that he understood what happened.

Furthermore, according to section 21 (b) of Rule 130, provides that children whose mental maturity
is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of
relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. Thus, a child of any age can be a
competent witness as long as he can perceive and clearly convey his perceptions upon examination. The
requirements of a child’s competency as a witness consist of the capacity of observation, recollection, and
communication. Hence, it is not age which conclusively determines the capacity of a child as a witness.
People vs. Salomon
229 SCRA 402 (1993)
Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

Facts:

Sylvia Soria is a twenty-year old mental retardate. She was walking along the Maharlika Highway
where Salomon and Conge were waiting for her. The two accosted Sylvia, forcibly took her to the ricefield
ten meters away from the highway and raped her. On her way home, Soria met her brother and told the
latter what happened. Sylvia’s family reported the incident to the police on the same night. Sylvia’s
father signed a complaint for rape for his daughter and subjected Sylvia to medical examination, which
revealed that the latter had vaginal lacerations.

After four months, Salomon and Conge was arrested. Trial commenced and the principal witness
for the prosecution was Sylvia.

The accused however, denied the charge of rape. Conge testified that he only shoved his five
fingers into Sylvia’s vagina in anger because the latter hit him in the neck with a piece of wood. Salomon
corroborated Conge’s testimony. The two denied that they went to Masbate to escape, alleging that they
headed there to purchase two horses.

The trial court found the two accused guilty of rape as conspirators. On appeal, the accused
impugned the competence of Sylvia as a witness in their brief.

Issue: Whether or not Sylvia Soria is a competent witness

Ruling:

Sylvia is a competent witness. A mental retardate is not disqualified as a witness form such reason
alone. The competence of testimony depends on the quality of perceptions and the manner of conveying
the same upon examination. Although Sylvia’s speech was slurred and there was necessity to ask her
leading questions, her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent, and credible. Her mental condition
did not impair her credibility. The Supreme Court thus, gave credence to her testimony and affirmed the
conviction of the two accused.
Goni vs. Court of Appeals
144 SCRA 222
Dead Man’s Statute

Facts:
The three haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the
Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the TABACALERA. In 1949, Praxedes T.
Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said
haciendas. As he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of
TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin
Villegas.
Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas as TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction
between Villanueva and Villegas without a guaranty. Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter
fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement
was reduced to writing and signed by petitioner Genaro Goñi as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva.

Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus went
to Vicente for the purpose of rescinding the contract. However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had already
been debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of five years.

TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva.
Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of
Villanueva.

Intestate proceedings were instituted after Villanueva died. Among the properties included in the
inventory submitted to the court were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.

On the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the deceased
delivered to his heirs, Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property (field no. 3 of the Hacienda
Dulce) against petitioner Goñi as administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva and the
latter’s heirs based on the contract/promise to sell executed by the Villanueva in his favor.

The Plaintiff presented two witnesses. One of them is Gaspar Vicente, himself, who over the
objection of ther defendants testified on facts occurring before the death. Defendants presented Genaro
Goñi, who testified on the alleged verbal lease agreement

Trial court rendered a decision in favor of Vicente. Both parties appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:

May Gaspar Vicente testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of Prazedes Villanuava
which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 130,Sec.20?

Ruling:

Yes. Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from
testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship
Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties
to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close
the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove
from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased.

The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been
distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs
are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's
right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that
they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the
deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to
establish, if living.

Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private
respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the
estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during
deceased's lifetime." It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private
respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the
action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields
nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but
by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.

Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person
in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party
must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent. The
contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact of
Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore
could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said
contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the
parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death
has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case a bar, for the reason that
petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell.
Lim v. Court of Appeals
214 SCRA 273 (1992)

Physician-Patient Privilege

Facts:

Juan Sim and Nelly Lim are husband and wife respectively. Sim filed a suit for annulment with the RTC of
Pangasinan on the ground that Lim has been suffering from Schizophrenia before, during and after the marriage. During
the trial of the case, Sim announced that he would present Dr. Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital, as his expert witness. Lim’s counsel opposed the motion on the ground that testimony sought to be
elicited is privileged as Dr. Acampado had examined and diagnosed Lim. The subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued and
Lim’s counsel filed a motion to quash. Upon the hearing of the said motion, Lim’s counsel contended that Dr. Acampado
is barred under the rule on confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship. Sim’s counsel countered that Dr.
Acampado would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired during Lim’s
examination. RTC Judge ruled in favor of Sim and allowed Dr. Acampado to testify. When Dr. Acampado took the witness
stand, he was qualified by Sim’s connsel as an expert witness, and asked hypothethical questions, but she neither
revealed what illness she examined and treated Lim for nor disclosed the results of Lim’s examination and the medicines
prescribed.

Lim filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA. CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that “petitioner failed in establishing the confidential nature of the testimony given by or obtained
from Dr. Acampado. The case was elevated to the SC. SC affirms CA.

Issue:

Is Dr. Acampado barred to testify under the Physician-Patient Privilege?

Ruling:

No. The rule on the physician–patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness
stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled safely and efficaciously
treat his patient. In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed the following requisites must
concur:

1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and if disclosed would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The predominating view is that the privilege though duly claimed is not violated by permitting a physician
to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the
physical mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is base
strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient.

Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

Krohn v. Court of Appeals

233 SCRA 146 (1994)

Physician-Patient Privilege

Facts:

Edgar Krohn and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in St. Vincent de Paul in Manila in and had 3
kids. Paz underwent psychological testing to ease her mental strain. The spouses separated in 1973.
Edgar was able to obtain a copy of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report signe by Dr. Banaeg and Dr. Reyes.
Using the report, he was able to obtain a decree nullifying his church marriage. Meanwhile the Pasig RTC
granted the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership. Then in 1990, Edgar filed a case for
annulment with the Makati RTC. During trial Edgar testified on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report. This was objected on the ground of Physician-Patient privilege. The court overruled the
objection and admitted the Report in evidence. Paz elevated the issue with the CA but the latter affirmed
the RTC. Paz filed a case for Certiorari with the SC.

Issue:

Is the husband barred from testifying by the Physician–Patient privilege?

Ruling:

No. In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient’s husband who wishes to testify on a
document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed
prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his
testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient
and executed the report.

Failure to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, amounts to a waiver of the
right to make such objection and consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
BANCO FILIPINO vs. MONETARY BOARD
142 SCRA 523 (1986)
State Secrets

FACTS: This is a Petition to review the Order of the RTC of Makati, Branch 136.

Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents dated 17 February 1986" is the
order of Branch 136, Regional Trial Court, Makati, granting the motion of Banco Filipino, based on Section
1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records
which are claimed as needed by Banco Filipino for the preparation of its comments, objections, and
exceptions to the Conservator's report dated January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated March 19,
1985.

The documents asked to be produced, inspected, and copied included copies of tapes and
transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its meeting on July 27,
1984, and March 22, 1985.

Respondent Monetary Board, in its Petition, assails the order and contends that:

(1) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to Sections 13
and 15 of the Central Bank Act.

"Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest .- Whenever any member
attending a meeting of the Monetary Board has a material personal interest, directly or
indirectly, in the discussion or resolution of any given matter, said member shall not
participate in the discussion or resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting
during the deliberation thereon. The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a
member had a personal interest in it, shall be made available to the public. The minutes of
the meeting shall note the withdrawal of the member concerned. (As amended by PD No.
1827).

"Sec. 15. Responsibility. -Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the
Central Bank who willfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a
result of such violation or negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of
any information of a confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary
Board except as required in Section 13 of this Act or about the operations of the Bank, and
to the use of such information for personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the
Bank or third parties. (As amended by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Italics supplied).

(2) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held subsequent to the submission of the Central
Bank reports. They did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality to any
question of fact that may be raised in relation to their contents.

Petitioner, in it Comment, assails the Monetary Board’s petition stating that:

(1) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the RTC Makati intended full evidence taking of
the proceeding for judicial review of administrative action filed with the Supreme Court, the trial court
being better equipped for evidence taking.
(2) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central Bank records because it is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine
established in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that "when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the
generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of
law."

(3) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank are material and relevant because Banco
Filipino is entitled to prove from the Central Bank records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed Banco
Filipino without a Monetary Board resolution and without examiner's reports on the financial position of
Banco Filipino; (b) that a Monetary Board resolution was later made to legalize the Banco Filipino closure
but it had no supporting examiner's report; (c) that the earlier reports did not satisfy respondent Governor
Fernandez and he ordered the examiners and the conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to "improve" them; and
(d) that the reports were then fabricated.

Respondents, in their Reply to petitioner Banco Filipino’s Comment, argued that:

(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner Banco Filipino are inapplicable
because:

a) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the generalized interest of
confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is merely presumptive. On the other hand, the so-called
Monetary Board deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court because statements and opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members of the Monetary
Board are specifically vested with confidentiality under Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The
"public interest" requirement for nondisclosure is evident from the fact that the statute punishes any
disclosure of such deliberations.

b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance or need to produce the alleged Monetary Board
deliberations. What petitioner intends to prove are not "issues" raised in the pleadings of the main
petition.

(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence, but in practicing oppression by the forced
publication of the MB members' confidential statements at board meetings.

(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board are in truth merely the individual statements and
expressions of opinion of its members. They are not statements or opinions that can be imputed to the
board itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of stenographic notes on the deliberations of the
Monetary Board are not official records of the Central Bank; they are taken merely to assist the Secretary
of the Monetary Board in the preparation of the minutes of the meetings. And as advertedly also, the tape
recordings are not available as these are used over and over again.

ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are material
and relevant.

HELD: Yes. The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are material and relevant.

The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by Banco Filipino pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the
production of books, documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his
cause of action or defense" (General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 45 C. 2d
879, cited in Martin, Rules of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the trial judge
in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness
and practicability" (Line Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On the ground of public
policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the
production or inspection of privileged matter, that is, books, papers which because of their confidential
and privileged character could not be received in evidence" (27 CJS 224). "In passing on a motion for
discovery of documents, the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not documents are
relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944,
9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102).
Likewise, "any statute declaring in general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally
construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on
Evidence, Vol. VIII, p. 801, citing the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137,143).

In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Regional Trial Court in granting Banco Filipino’s motion for the production of the
documents enumerated herein. We accept the view taken by the court below that the documents are not
privileged and that these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the
Court.

ISUUE No. 2: Whether or not the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are privileged
communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because statements and opinions
expressed in the deliberation of the members of the Monetary Board are specifically vested with
confidentiality under Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.

HELD: No. The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are not privileged
communication.

Respondents contend that "it is obvious from the requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank
Act) that the subject matter (of the deliberations), when resolved . . . shall be made available to the
public but the deliberations themselves are not open to disclosure but are to be kept in confidence."
This Court, however, sees it in a different light. The deliberations may be confidential but not
necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in
Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said
deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. The
disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no indication that such
disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third parties. Significantly, it
is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful
and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by the
court below.
On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states:

"Section 21. Privileged Communications.-The following persons cannot testify as to

matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxxxxxxxxxx

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by disclosure. "

But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for
the protection of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 2,11). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked
rule will not be applicable.
 "The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official
confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure question. x x x". (Agnew vs. Agnew, 52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the
Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 199).

In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the
disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already
closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at
this time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise
state secrets. Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of production are tenuous and
specious. If the respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of their
duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke fear of disclosure.

On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only
the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as
to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure. It will be well
to consider that:

"Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public, the
community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected"
(State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).