1
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA
D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D.
SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-
LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10,
1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate
on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and
entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the
Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio,
Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of the RTC, and
praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem
of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy
Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2)
the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in
favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3)
Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the
administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified
public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event
the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will
of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by
petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the
probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No.
98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and
enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic
will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa
465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na
pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng
lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga
kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa
ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin
pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na
si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot
sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders
ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang
asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na
pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng
anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na
si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi
siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng
Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–
90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of
the probate proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of
the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only
shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his
eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for

probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court
is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the
extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows
that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are
Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854
of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the
widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not
apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do
otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme
Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155
SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for …
respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be
intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in futility. It
would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or
could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special
Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC
in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING
THAT:
I will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING
WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF
COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE
2
TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF
PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A
DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES
PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT
IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S
WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL
IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE
CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the
court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to
the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of
an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-
Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory
heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners
and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo,
to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since
there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the
holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid,
respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of
the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case
disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented
by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own
handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private

respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity
of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of excluding his
eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that
he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein
the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in
his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a
whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by
his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause
for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919
of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery
or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or
ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or
descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document
executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil
Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the
3
testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will
of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of
the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it
cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who
is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case,
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In
this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given
effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that
the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to
the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention
of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document
did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between
Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy,
the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of
the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the
right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have
allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10,
1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is
directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended
until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 857 February 10, 1903
EULALIO HERNAEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ROSENDO
HERNAEZ, Defendant-Appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject of this action is the will executed by Doña Juana
Espinosa, widow of Don Pedro Hernaez, on December 5, 1894,
in Bacolod, Island of Negros, before a notary public, and three
witnesses, and with the aid of an interpreter, the testatrix not
understanding Spanish. In this will the principal dispositions are
those relative to the legacy of the third part of the hereditary
estate of free disposal, which the testatrix leaves to her eldest
son, Rosendo, to the betterment of the other third made in favor
of this same son, and the distribution of the remaining third in six
equal parts among her five children, Rosendo Domingo,
Magdalena, Mateo, and Eulalio Hernaez y Espinosa, and her
two granddaughters, Peregrina and Victorina Parapa y Hernaez,
in representation of their deceased mother, Clara Hernaez y
Espinosa.
The plaintiff is one of the sons of the testatrix and the complaint
has not been acquiesced in by Magdalena Hernaez y Espinosa
nor Peregrina and Victorina Parapa y Hernaez, whose consent
plaintiff sought to obtain.
The action brought is for the annulment of the will upon the
ground: (1) of the incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the incapacity of
the notary, attesting witnesses, and the interpreter; and (3) a
substantial formal defect in the will.
The incapacity of the testatrix according to the complaint is
alleged to consist in this: That on the 5th of December, 1894,
she was over 80 years of age and was so ill that three days
before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction,
and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she
walked in a stooping attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as
a result of her senile debility. The incapacity of the notary in that
he did not understand the Visayan dialect, the language of the
testatrix. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is supposed
to consist in their not having a perfect knowledge of Spanish,
and the incapacity of the interpreter in that he was an
amaneunsis of the notary and was the person who wrote out the
will. The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to
consist in the fact that two physicians were not present to certify
to the sanity of the testatrix at the time of its execution, and the
absence of two interpreters to translate the will, because
executed in a foreign language.
These are briefly, the grounds upon which the action for the
annulment of the will rests, and these were the issues raised at
the trial. The evidence introduced bears upon the issues above
stated to which alone the decision of the court must be limited.
For the purpose of proving the mental incapacity of the testatrix
the plaintiff introduced oral testimony and expert evidence; the
oral testimony was for the purpose of proving the following facts:
That the testatrix on the 5th day of December, 1894, was so ill
that she could not speak; that by reason of her age she walked
in a stooping position and gave contradictory orders. The priest
who was with her during the last hours of her life was called to
testify that on the 3rd day of the same month and year he had
administered the sacraments to her, and that the patient was at
4
that time so seriously ill that he scarcely understood her when
she spoke. The expert witnesses were called to testify upon the
question propounded: "Could an octogenarian in the
pathological condition peculiar to that age possess sufficient
mental faculties to permit her to dispose of her property causa
mortis?" The result of the oral evidence is that the testimony of
the four witnesses called has proven one fact, which is, that the
testatrix toward the end of her life walked in a stooping position.
The first witness, Isidora de la Torre, affirmed that three days
before her death she was very ill but answered questions which
were addressed her, and only one witness, Ambrosia Sotsing,
testified that four days before the death of the testatrix she had
been to see the latter and that she could not speak then because
she was suffering from fainting fits, this witness being the only
one who testified that the testatrix had given contrary order.
These four witnesses are, respectively, 78, 75, 60, and 57 years
of age. The priest, D. Nicolas Alba, stated that he had
administered the sacraments to the testatrix before the
execution of the will but was unable to remember the day; that
he understood her then when she spoke and that the testatrix
frequently confessed even when not feeling seriously ill, and that
when sick she was accustomed to confess in her house (this
point is confirmed by the witness Sotsing who testified that she
had been to see the testatrix three times and that on all three of
these occasions the communion had been administered to her);
that when he confessed her some days before the execution of
the will he had also administered the extreme unction on
account of her advanced age; that at that time she was in the
enjoyment of her mental faculties but the witness could not state
whether she preserved them up to the moment of her death, he
not being present when this occurred. The expert evidence
introduced by the testimony of Dr. Lope de la Rama gave the
following result: That if the organs are intact the physiological
functions are perfectly performed, and that consequently some
men before reaching the age of decrepitude lose their mental
faculties by the weakening of the brain, either as the result of
illness or of abuses, while others preserve their understanding
to a very advanced age. It is unnecessary to pass upon the oral
evidence introduced by the defendant; the documentary
evidence (record, p. 38) shows that the testatrix did not die two
days after the execution of her will. The will was executed on the
5th and her death occurred on the 12th of December,
1894.chanrobles virtual law library
It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the
interrogatories nor the documents presented with the complaint
can the conclusion be reached that the testatrix was deprived of
her mental faculties. The fact that on old woman gives
contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping position, that
she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some
days before making her will, are circumstances which even if
fully demonstrated by proof could no lead the court to establish
a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who
is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental
faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in
compliance with the requirements of article 695 of the Civil Code
certifies that in his judgment the testatrix had the necessary legal
capacity and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the
purposes of the execution of the will. "The Code might have
adopted either one of two systems [with respect to the mental
capacity of the testator] - that of establishing as a general rule
the presumption of soundness of the mental faculties until the

contrary be proven, or that of presuming mental weakness in the
absence of proof that the act was performed while the mental
faculties were in their normal condition. Under the first
presumption a will made should be declared valid in all cases, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. Under the second it
would have to be considered as void upon the presumption that
it was executed by a person demented, unless the contrary is
shown. The Code has adopted the first system as being the most
rational, by accepting the principle that mental soundness is
always to be presumed with respect to a person who has not
been previously incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated
and proven by the proper person and the correctness of this
choice is beyond doubt; in the meantime the intervention of the
notary and the witnesses constitutes a true guaranty of the
capacity of the testator, by reason of their knowledge of the
matter. (Manresa, Commentaries, vol. 5, p. 344.)
It has at no time been regarded as a ground for the annulment
of a public instrument executed before a notary public by a
native of these Islands, ignorant of Spanish, that the notary was
not acquainted with the dialect of the party executing the same.
If this officer, upon whom the law imposes the obligation of
drawing the instrument in the official language, that is, Castilian,
does not know the dialect he can avail himself of an interpreter
in accordance with the provisions of the law itself; hence the fact
that the notary who legalized the will in question did not know
the Visayan dialect spoken by the testatrix is by no means an
argument in favor of the nullity of this public instrument, nor has
it been for the nullity of any one of the long series of instruments
executed before Spanish notaries, and even Filipino notaries,
unacquainted with the dialect or dialects of the locality in which
they performed their duties or the special dialect of the party.
With respect to the attesting witnesses it has been fully proven
by the manner in which they testified at the trial, "without the
necessity of an interpreter," as to those called as witnesses and
by conclusive evidence as to the deceased attesting witness
whose signature and competency have been completely
established, that they knew the dialect of the testatrix in
accordance with section 5, article 681, of the Civil Code, and
also understood Spanish. As alleged, but not proven, their
knowledge of the latter language may not have been perfect, but
this does not make them incompetent, nor is it a ground for
annulment. Finally, the prohibition of article 681, section 8, is not
applicable to the interpreter, of whose services the notary
availed himself for the execution, drafting and legalization of the
will, for the simple reason that it does not refer to the interpreter
but the witnesses, and there is nothing to authorize the
extensive interpretation attempted to be made of its precepts.
The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered
by article 665, was not necessary. "This precept refers clearly
and expressly to the conditions which must be complied with in
order that a demented person may make a will by availing
himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct from the cases
governed by article 685 when the testator has not been declared
demented." (Judgment of June 10, 1897.)
Had anyone observed any incapacity in the testatrix some time
before it would have been easy to have taken the proper steps
to obtain a declaration of the status of incapacity in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code, and then, after a legal
declaration of this condition, she could not have executed a will
unless two physicians had certified that at the time of her
5
examination she was in the enjoyment of a lucid interval; but
there was no necessity of waiting for a lucid interval when the
constant condition was that of lucidity.
Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required
by article 648 of the Civil Code. This is a requisite for the
execution of a will in a foreign language, and neither by the letter
nor by the purpose of this article could it be required with regard
to the will in question. Not by the letter, because neither the
testatrix nor the notary expressed themselves in a foreign
language. Neither the Castilian spoken by the notary nor the
Visayan spoken by the testatrix are foreign languages. Nor is the
case within the purpose of the law. "The prior laws had not
provided for the execution of a will by a foreigner in his own
language. Such a case could not arise under the old law
because the right to make a will being one inherent in citizenship
they systematically denied to the foreigner the exercise of that
right. The execution of a will being at the present time based
upon natural right, the foreigner is entitled equally with the
citizen to make a will. Although it is true that foreigners, under
international law, can make a will before the consuls of their
nation, it is none the less true that they do not always make their
wills in a town in which an accredited consul resides. For all
these reasons it was necessary to provide by law for a special
form for the will of the foreigner who might be ignorant of the
Spanish language and yet have occasion to make a will. The
form which the law has adopted satisfies the most exigent spirit,
for the presence of two interpreters, the fact that the will is
recorded in a public instrument in both languages, and that it is
signed by all who take part in the act are the most efficacious
guarantees against fraud and bad faith." (Falcon, 3 Civil Code,
p. 94.) Text writers discuss the application of article 684 to a will
executed in one of the local idioms of Spain, considering them
to be on the same footing as a foreign language in a place in
which Castilian is the tongue spoken or understood; but we have
no occasion to enter into this discussion, the legal sense and
constant practice observed in these Islands being sufficient.
Upon these grounds we hold that judgment must be for the
defendant, declaring the will executed by Doña Juana Espinosa
on the 5th of December, 1894, to be valid and efficacious,
without special imposition of costs. So ordered.
 6

G.R. No. 847 February 12, 1903 It not having proven that the property which it is sought to require
one of the forced heirs, the defendant herein, to bring into
EULALIO HERNAEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. collation was acquired gratuitously from the intestate, the action
ROSENDO HERNAEZ, defendant-appellee. can not be maintained.
ARELLANO, C.J.: We therefore dismiss the complaint, with the costs of both
instances to the plaintiff. So ordered.
This action was brought in connection with the proceedings on
the administration of the intestate estate of Pedro Hernaez,
father of the plaintiff and of the defendant. The purpose of the
action is to obtain the inclusion in the estate by collation of the
values of the Naga and Panaogao properties, owned by the
defendant, that the same may be included in the inventory of the
mass of the intestate succession. The facts set up in the
complaint are the following: (1) That as Rosendo Hernaez was
a poor man after his return from his student life in Manila, he was
supported by his father. (2) That shortly afterwards he
purchased the Naga estate, he at that time not being engaged
in any profitable trade or industry. (3) That he was the
administrator of the property of his parents. (4) That the money
with which he purchased the Naga estate belonged to his father.
(5) That the Panaogao estate was purchased by Rosendo after
the death of his father.

The legal principle upon which the plaintiff relies is that

established by article 1035 of the Civil Code, in accordance with
which a forced heir in certain cases is required to bring into the
mass of the succession properties or moneys which he may
have received gratuitously from the decedent during the lifetime
of the latter. Therefore it is evident that of the facts set up in the
complaint the only one relevant to the issue is the fourth,
concerning the acquisition of the Naga estate. With respect to
the fifth, as to the Panaogao estate, apart from the fact of its
irrelevancy, it is not apparent what connection the simple
statement that a forced heir acquired the said estate after the
death of the causante can possibly have with the question of
collation.

But, whatever might be said about the facts alleged, none of

them have been proven. In the replication an allegation was
added to the effect that Rosendo Hernaez was never in
partnership with Julian Hernaez, his brother, this fact having
been set up in the answer of the defendant.

Two witnesses, Miguel Solis and Severino Duran, testifies that

they had never seen any articles of co-partnership recorded in a
public or private instrument. Rosendo, however in answering
interrogatories, testified that he had been an industrial partner
and that no written articles had been executed. Of the nine
witnesses presented by the defendant, Domingo and
Magdalena Hernaez and Peregrina Jarapa, the latter a nephew
and the former brothers of both the contending parties, denied
that Rosendo purchased the Naga estate with money belonging
to his father, but testified that it was purchased with money
acquired by his own labors.

The Naga and Panaogao estates were acquired by the

defendant, the first from his brother Julian on the 25th of
November, 1881, and the second from Pedro Garganera on the
2nd of November, 1898. There is not the slightest indication that
the money with which these estates were purchased was or
could be other than that of the purchaser himself. (Public
instruments on pp. 350 and 401 of the record.)
 7

G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-
SANSON, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F.
HERNANDEZ, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 promulgated August 29,1986 affirming in toto
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXII 2 dated March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the
holographic will marked in evidence as Exhibit "H" as one wholly
written, dated, and signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola
in accordance with law while in possession of full testamentary
capacity, and allowing and admitting the same to probate.
Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to
the executor, Eduardo F. Hernandez, as well as the certificate
of probate prescribed under Section 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court.
SO ORDERED. 3
This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty.
Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the
probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola
executed on January 28, 1980. 4 The testatrix, who died single,
parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70
years, devised in this will several of her real properties to
specified persons.
On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor
in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of special
administrator. 5 With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs
of the testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5,
1981 6 appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of
the testate estate of deceased.
On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the
only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in
the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of
Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same
was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full
possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary
dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person
and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win;
and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder
of the estate.
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the
evidence presented in support of the petition to be conclusive
and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of
the disputed will.
Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision. 8
Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son,
alleging that witnesses have been located whose testimonies
could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as well as
undue influence exerted on the latter.
The appellate court in its resolution of October 13,
1986, 10 denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on the
following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the
motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate unnamed
witnesses only after the court's decision was handed down, and
(2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the fact
of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence
exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative
since these facts were brought to light during the trial.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27,
1986 11 was likewise denied by the appellate court in its
resolution of November 20, 1986 12 on the ground that the
affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion
constitutes cumulative evidence and the motion being in reality
a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.
In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following
errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE
GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE
PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE.
II
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION
DENYING THE AFORESAID MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
III
AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY
WRITTEN, DATED AND SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA
MONTINOLA.
IV
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED WILL WAS FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO
CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE OF EXECUTION AND TO
SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS TO THE
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE
ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE TIME OF ITS ACTUAL
EXECUTION.
V
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE
HERMINIA MONTINOLA WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE
PRESSURE AND IMPROPERIMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART
OF THOSE STANDING TO BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED
WILL.

On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent

court a motion for new trial. 9 Attached to her motion was the

VI
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION TO PROBATE.
In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3,
1986, was substituted by her heirs.
In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that
the appellate court erred in denying the motion for new trial
insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented is not
merely corroborative or cumulative.
On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that
the motion for new trial was a pro-forma motion because it was
not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We
find merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 53 provides —
Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of
appeals becomes executory, a motion for new trial may be filed
on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not
have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the
exercise of the diligence and which is of such a character as
would probably change the result. The motion shall be
accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the
grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.
The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson
alleged the following:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted
efforts to locate witnesses whose whereabouts were not known
to us during the trial in the lower court, but I have finally
succeeded in tracking them down;
4. That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case,I am
convinced that they would testify under proper subpoena for
purposes of shedding light on the fact that the testatrix was
gravely ill at or but the time that the questioned will was allegedly
executed;
5. That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances
under which the purported will was executed; and that they know
for a fact that there was 'undue influence' exerted by petitioner
and other relatives to procure improper favors from the testatrix;
xxx xxx xxx 13
Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the
requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a witness who was
already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify
the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were
unnamed without any certainty as, to their appearance before
the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they
would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court.
Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue
influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not
statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts and
not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not
valid. 14 The affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's
8
time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial
or of any evidentiary weight.
Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be
presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It
is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate
the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the
appellate court was handed down. The trial lasted for about four
years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged
witnesses who were admittedly known to her. The evidence
which the petitioner now propose to present could have been
discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and
there is no sufficient reason for concluding that had the petitioner
exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to
discover said evidence. 15
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the
alleged illness of the testatrix as well as the charges of undue
influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the
trial, and new evidence on this point is merely corroborative and
cumulative which is generally not a ground for new
trial. 16 Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not
carry much probative weight which can alter the judgment. 17
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by
petitioner only for the purpose of delaying the proceedings. In
fact, petitioners son in his manifestation admitted that he had to
request a new law firm to do everything legally possible to meet
the deadline for the filing of a motion for reconsideration and/or
for new trial. 18 This would explain the haphazard preparation of
the motion, thus failing to comply with the requirements of rule
53, which was filed on the last day of the reglementary period of
appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon is
questionable. The appellate court correctly denied the motion for
new trial.
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the
running of the period for appeal. 19 Since petitioner's motion was
filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of the period
to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on
the following day, September 25. And when the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October 30,1986, it
was obviously filed out of time.
Since the questioned decision has already become final and
executory, it is no longer within the province of this Court to
review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to
the due execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of
testatrix are now conclusive. 20
At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on
its merits, the petition will also have to fail.
During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three
(3) close relatives of the testatrix presented but also two (2)
expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and
signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These
testimonies more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the
Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised
Rules of Court, 22 or the probate of holographic wills.
As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to
present competent proof that the will was actually executed
sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously

ill and dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the
supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion
Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which
upon careful examination did not prove such claim of antedating.
The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of
Appeals that the will in question was executed according to the
formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court
when supported by evidence. 23 We have examined the records
of this case and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by the
respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in
accordance with law.
Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged
holographic will was without rhyme or reason, being the only
surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate
relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary
capacity of testatrix.
In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, 24 it was held —
The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country
are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from
one's estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of
relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we
understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the
inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by
will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the
Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889...
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no
compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part
of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister
who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Nevertheless, per
testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two
boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore,
petitioner's son Francis was instituted as an heir in the contested
will.
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the
testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of
the unsoundness of her mind.
We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil
Code provides —
A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an
institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the
entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should
not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to
succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in
accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder
of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of
only eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the
will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind.
The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs
of the deceased in intestate succession.
9
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives,
other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood
ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to
disregard non-compulsory heirs. 25 The fact that some heirs are
more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue
influence. 26 Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate. 27
The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by
undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the
beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture
or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to
exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been
exercised. 28 The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was
actually exercised. 29
Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the
respondent court —
There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the
subject Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that
decreased had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a report
of one of the two expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals
the existence of significant handwriting characteristics such as:
1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing
xxx xxx xxx
3. good line quality.
4. presence of natural variation... (Exhibit X).
The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality
could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was
indeed of unsound mind and/or under undue influence or
improper pressure when she the Will.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs against petitioner.
The decision of respondent court dated August 29, 1986 in toto
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March
21, 1985 is hereby declared to be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN,
Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as
her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in
case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be
payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen.
The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was
born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she
was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor
has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her
at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine
Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any
interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character,
and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
10
payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of
her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order
of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen
Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half
of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate
of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of
California alone, but the entire law thereof because several
foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines
and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of
the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for
all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a
citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right
of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952,
and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through
counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION
OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS
THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER
OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING
AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY
OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE
IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts
of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was
born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his
first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher,
was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the
Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of
the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines
the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney"
and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers'
offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's
Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is
the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born
in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine
years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
11
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to
relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned
or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
make home in the State of California.
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that
he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not
a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when
he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of
that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile,
as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And
he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man
with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months,
he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the
place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not
be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of
meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions
is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court
below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his
property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952.
But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand,
relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a
witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen
was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi,
the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is
the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would
have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the
renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois,
thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems
no compelling logical reason why the original reference should
be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is
true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference
and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents
12
of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption
of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that
the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem
is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis
of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of
the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case
stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had
been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result
would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties
in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be
valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-
14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England,
and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession
to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's
last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France,
the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to
turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a
French court were called upon to determine how this property
should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts
statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action:
(a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or
(b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that
this is what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question

may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in
such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases
result in returning the main controversy to be decided according
to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court
of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules
as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only
the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its
rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the
law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards
the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to
bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law
of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided
it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which
agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and
if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
13
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law
— he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict
of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its
internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own
intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article
946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of
the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions
about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that,
since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal
estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should
determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion
of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the
domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws
rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as
in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience
of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid
at the domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the
universal application. It had its origin in that international comity
which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age,
when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must
enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as
so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce
the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in
Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in
the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above
 14

the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the

law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law
of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of
the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football,
tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of
his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent,
if the question has to be decided, especially as the application
of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced
heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156;

Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867;
Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs
vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in
the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there
exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar
to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased

Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity
of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law,
the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California,
not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed

and the case returned to the lower court with instructions that
the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.