PASTOR B.

TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)

FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948,
without knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the
local civil registrar. However, they were already estranged as of June 1948. Vicenta left for the United
Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State
of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final
and absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in
California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended
on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections,
and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment
of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
The RTC did not decree a legal separation, but freed the Tenchavez from supporting his wife and
to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Tenchavez, to the extent of
P45,000.00, and Tenchavez directly appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

RULING:
No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law
to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was
still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband
without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce,
and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husband’s
feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a
decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO, et. Al., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996
Ponente: REGALADO, J.

FACTS:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio
and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasa’s house passes through the
properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.

Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around their property.
This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios and the Santoses
to compel them to grant his right of way with damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of
the blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the
Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa to
pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding damages in favor of Mabasa
(Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is proper.

HELD:
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.

In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his tenants left because of
the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was well within his right. He
built the fence inside his property. There was no existing easement agreement, either by contract or by
operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only after the
judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which was even conditioned on the payment
of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against Mabasa when he built
the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the
damage has to be borne by Mabasa.
Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier, et. Al., Respondents
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
Ponente: PERALTA, J.

Facts:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then decision of the RTC regarding its judgment
sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The decision being contested
sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested
by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to
Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente
which was never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the water bill.
Regional Trial Court judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally
plaintiffs, the following sums:

(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;

(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and

(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.

The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed.
Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision, with the modification that the awarded damages is
reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to
₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants.

Issue:
Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off the
water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed ownership of property to
Pastorfide.

Ruling:
No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn
or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article
19 of the civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
Ponente: AZCUNA, J.

FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of
court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.

The Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into
between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null
and void ab initio, ordering Noel to pay Isabel Lucia moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of
P100,000.00, and authorizing the Isabel Lucia to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Noel Buenaventura appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
promulgated a decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts
decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari to the supreme court.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Court of Appeals correctly awarded Isabel Lucia moral damages and exemplary
damages.

RULING:
The Supreme Court modified the decision of the Court of Appeals in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The rest of said decision and
resolution are affirmed.

The trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties
particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis
of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying
him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and
that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact
his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-
appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage
work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant-appellee and their
son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later,
refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were
together but also after and throughout their separation.

Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach
in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct
that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or
non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may
be made.

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which
read as follows:

ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted
that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the
act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were
done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.

On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article
36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the
Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:

. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . .

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for
the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages
was without basis in law and in fact.

Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. at Baltao Building
mild steel plates which the latter ordered and as part of the payment, a bouncing check was issued by one
“Eugenio Baltao”.

Petitioner, in a sincere attempt to collect the sum of money due them, filed a criminal complaint
against private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao after the latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing
check despite demand. However, there was a mistake of identity as there were two “Eugenio Baltaos”
conducting business in the same building – Eugenio S. Baltao and his son, Eugenio Baltao III.

It was found that the signature of the check was not of Eugenio S. Baltao and because of the alleged
unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao filed a complaint for damages anchored on
Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code against petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights (Article 19) has been violated, resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law.

RULING:
No, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of rights. What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private respondent was their
failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to
them by private respondent. Petitioners had conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check. Private
respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first hand. Instead, private
respondent waited in ambush and thereafter pounced on the hapless petitioners at a time he thought was
propitious by filing an action for damages.

The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of
the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Thus,
anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to
another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

There is no proof or showing that petitioners acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case
against private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith committed by
petitioners, they cannot be held liable for damages.